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AIES '23

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Welcome!

We are delighted to welcome you to the 2023 *AAAI / ACM Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Ethics, and Society – AIES 2023* in Montreal, Canada.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly pervasive, powerful, and contested. While AI has the potential to empower individuals and improve society, the ethical ramifications of AI systems and their impact on human societies requires deep and urgent reflection. International organizations, governments, universities, corporations, and philanthropists have recognized this need to embark on an interdisciplinary investigation to help chart a course through the new territory enabled by AI. As has been noted by past program chairs, earlier iterations of this conference and others have seen the first fruits of these calls to action, as programs for research have been set out in many fields relevant to AI, Ethics, and Society.

The AIES conference is convened each year by the AIES Steering Committee and its technical program is designed by program co-chairs from Computer Science, Law and Policy, the Social Sciences, Ethics and Philosophy. Our goal is to encourage talented scholars in these and related fields to present and discuss the best work related to morality, law, policy, psychology, the other social sciences, and AI. In addition to the community of scholars who have participated in these discussions from the outset, we explicitly welcome disciplinary experts who are newer to this topic, and see ways to break new ground in their own fields by thinking about AI.

AIES 2023 received 237 submissions to the main track. Papers were reviewed by members of the program committee, and final decisions were made by the program co-chairs in consultation with the program committee members who reviewed each paper. We made a serious effort to ensure that each paper was reviewed by a team with sufficient expertise to give that paper a thorough evaluation. We decided to accept 68 papers, one of which was later withdrawn, so these Proceedings contain the remaining 67. In addition, students accepted to the student program had the option of publishing an abstract of their work, and we are excited to be able to feature 31 of these in the Proceedings.

We have three keynote speakers scheduled. Annette Zimmermann of the University of Wisconsin will speak on “The Generative AI Deployment Rush: How to Democratize the Politics of Pace.” Jamie Morgenstern of the University of Washington and Amazon will speak on “Changing Distributions and Preferences in Learning Systems.” Paola Ricaurte Quijano of Tecnologico de Monterrey and the Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University will speak on “AI for/by the Majority World: From Technologies of Dispossession to Technologies of Radical Care.”. In addition, we will have a keynote panel, moderated by Program Co-Chair Alex John London of Carnegie Mellon University, on “Large Language Models: Hype, Hope, and Harm.” The panel will feature Roxana Daneshjou of Stanford University, Atoosa Kasirzadeh of the University of Edinburgh, Kate Larson of the University of Waterloo, and Gary Marchant of Arizona State University.

Organizing AIES would not have been possible without the contributions of many people. Francesca Rossi has been a model leader as Conference Chair. Theodore Lechterman, Su Lin Blodgett, Wenbin Zhang, and Brent Venable have put tremendous energy into organizing the student program. Gaurab Pokharel and Tasfia Mashiat were of great help in the innumerable tasks involved in organizing the paper reviewing and selection process. Francisco Cruz provided invaluable support for our web presence. Marc-Antoine Dilhac has graciously helped us with local organization and involving Mila, Vince Conitzer was always available for advice, and none of this would have been possible without the incredible organizational abilities of Meredith Ellison and Chesley Grove at AAAI.

AIES is co-sponsored by ACM SIGAI and AAAI. We are grateful for financial support from several corporate and nonprofit sponsors, the US National Science Foundation, and ACM SIGAI. This support allows us to keep costs low for attendees, as well as allowing many students to attend who would otherwise not have been able to.

Finally, the biggest thanks must go to the authors who submitted papers, the program committee members who spent countless hours thoughtfully reviewing them, as well as the broader AIES community, who keep working on and thinking about the important questions. We are grateful for this opportunity to support the community in its goals, and look forward to sharing an experience in Montreal that is both intellectually rich and of genuine importance in the world today.

Conference Program Co-Chairs:
Sanmay Das (George Mason University)
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The Generative AI Deployment Rush: How to Democratize the Politics of Pace

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CCS CONCEPTS

• Social and professional topics; **• Professional topics**; **• Computing and business**; **• Socio-technical systems**; **• Computing industry**; **• Computing profession**; **• Testing, certification and licensing**; **• Codes of ethics**; **• Computing / technology policy**; **• Government technology policy**; **• Applied computing**; **• Law, social and behavioral sciences**;

KEYWORDS

AI deployment, generative AI, political philosophy of AI

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The most recent wave of generative AI deployment has rapidly accelerated its pace over the past months. This has prompted a cluster of competing and controversial responses from tech industry practitioners and the wider public: on the one hand, those that call for temporary deployment moratoria, and on the other hand, those that resist blunt restrictions on deployment itself, but instead propose different mechanisms for subjecting AI deployment to regulation, such as through oversight and safety review via newly created institutions, or through licencing requirements that would-be deployers must meet.

Each one of these positions—as different as they may be—is *unusual*, because each one seems to signal a significant and philosophically interesting departure from a formerly widely shared attitude amongst technology industry practitioners: the view that prioritizing deployment speed, that 'moving fast and breaking things', is a non-negotiable requirement for enabling innovation. Thus, the reasoning used to be, rapidly paced AI deployment must not be unduly constrained, neither by heavy-handed bans, nor by more restrictive regulation. In contrast to that view, these recent responses ostensibly all suggest a more cautious approach towards rapid, large-scale AI deployment.

This apparent shift in industry attitudes about the appropriate pace of deployment may well align with existing attitudes of parts of the wider public. However, this shift alone does not negate the fact that the brute *ability* to deploy quickly and at scale still lies primarily with a relatively small number of corporate actors benefitting from a significant concentration of wealth and power. Importantly, this creates a deployment dynamic in which technology companies get to dictate the pace of AI deployment first, putting citizens and governments in a position of merely being able to *react ex post* to industry decisions to deploy. This deployment dynamic sustains a *politics of pace* that continues to insulate corporate actors from meaningful democratic control.

This talk extends conceptual and normative work in political philosophy to develop and defend the view that the question of which AI tools get deployed at scale, and—crucially—how quickly, is a fundamentally political problem. In order to identify suitable solutions to this problem that align with core democratic values, democratic constituencies must regain control over decisions affecting deployment pace. This talk critically evaluates competing possible strategies for achieving that goal.

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Changing distributions and preferences in learning systems

Jamie Morgenstern
University of Washington and Amazon

ABSTRACT

In this talk, I'll describe some recent work outlining how distribution shifts are fundamental to working with human-centric data. Some of these shifts come from attempting to "join" datasets gathered in different contexts, others may be the result of people's preferences affecting which data they provide to which systems, and even more can arise when peoples' preferences themselves are shaped by ML systems' recommendations. Each of these types of shift require different modeling and analysis to more accurately predict the behavior of ML pipelines deployed in a way where they interact repeatedly with people who care about their predictions.

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1 BIO

Jamie is an assistant professor in the Paul G. Allen School of Computer Science & Engineering at the University of Washington. She was previously an assistant professor in the School of Computer Science at Georgia Tech. Prior to starting as faculty, she was hosted by Michael Kearns, Aaron Roth, and Rakesh Vohra as a Warren Center fellow at the University of Pennsylvania. She completed her PhD working with Avrim Blum at Carnegie Mellon University. Her work studies the social impact of machine learning and the impact of social behavior on ML's guarantees. How should machine learning be made robust to behavior of the people generating training or test data for it? How should ensure that the models we design do not exacerbate inequalities already present in society?

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AI for/by the majority world: From technologies of dispossession to technologies of radical care

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ABSTRACT

The dominant and celebratory discourse surrounding AI often fails to acknowledge the intricate dynamics and implications associated with the human, material, and environmental costs of technological development, particularly in the midst of a civilizational crisis [5]. Furthermore, hegemonic AI, primarily developed by large technology corporations, capitalizes on the resources, data, and labor of the majority world only to be deployed as a glamorous product that furthers the accumulation of privilege, wealth, and power by global elites. As a result, these hegemonic intelligent technologies originate from a predatory and violent world model that has been imposed as a universal paradigm of existence. These dominant technologies are intentionally designed to perpetuate power asymmetries. The so-called artificial intelligence, marketed as a revolutionary innovation, has proven to be the offspring of interconnected systems of oppression: a capitalist mode of production; a colonial system of epistemic, economic, social, racial, and cultural dominance; and a patriarchal order of violence that fulfills its own prophecy [10]. Artificial intelligence, driven by influential global actors with market-driven and war-driven interests, materializes as a socio-technical assemblage that optimizes capital accumulation through dispossession [3] and the exertion of violence over the territories and populations of the majority world [8]. Hegemonic AI technologies are fundamentally technologies of dispossession, appropriating the commons for their development. Their creation is governed by macro-structural forces guided by the market and powerful actors seeking control, as control is a prerequisite for wealth accumulation. Control encompasses natural resources (territory), knowledge (processing information and data), labor (productive force), bodies (labor and the capacity to produce knowledge), subjectivity (sensibility and identity), and intersubjective relations (ways of relating, living, and coexisting) [7]. Dispossession arises from the interconnections of violent systems operating at both micro and macro scales. Dispossession manifests throughout the entire lifecycle of AI, spanning from design and development to deployment, use, and disposal [6]. The human, material, and environmental costs associated with technological development are obscured by narratives emphasizing efficiency, optimization, and the automation of the world. Big capital, including finance, pharmaceuticals, agribusiness, mining, and technology, forms alliances to control global value chains and knowledge production systems, ensuring that the ultimate benefits remain concentrated in the hands of a few. Concentration of power, wealth, and knowledge widens the gaps between individuals, communities, countries, and regions, erasing them physically, socially, and epistemically. As the gap continues to widen due to the accelerating momentum of production and capitalist accumulation, the depletion of the planet's resources and life-supporting systems draws nearer. To dismantle socio-technically mediated systems of violence, it is imperative to address power imbalances and rediscover the fundamental relational nature of existence. Alternative models of the world and dignified futures necessitate alternative models of technological development that are grounded in values associated with a radical ethics of care [1], communality [2], conviviality [4], and shared responsibility for the consequences of human impact on the planet [9].

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Social and professional topics** → **Codes of ethics**; *Professional topics*;

KEYWORDS

technoscience, machine learning, coloniality, feminism, racial capitalism, data, algorithms

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Protecting Children from Online Exploitation: Can a Trained Model Detect Harmful Communication Strategies?

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ABSTRACT

The growing popularity of social media raises concerns about children's online safety. Of particular concern are interactions between minors and adults with predatory intentions. Unfortunately, previous research on online sexual grooming has relied on time-intensive manual annotation by domain experts, limiting both the scale and scope of possible interventions. This work explores the possibility of detecting predatory behaviours with accuracy comparable to expert annotators using machine learning (ML). Using a dataset of 6771 chat messages sent by child sex offenders, labelled by two of the authors who are forensic psychology experts, we study how well can deep learning algorithms identify eleven known predatory behaviours. We find that the best-performing ML models are consistent but not on par with expert annotation. We therefore consider a system where an expert annotator validates the ML algorithms outputs. The combination of human decision-making and computer efficiency yields precision—but not recall—comparable to manual annotation, while taking only a fraction of the time needed by a human annotator. Our findings underscore the promise of ML as a tool for assisting researchers in this area, but also highlight the current limitations in reliably detecting online sexual exploitation using ML.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Applied computing** → **Psychology**; • **Information systems** → **Top-k retrieval in databases**.

KEYWORDS

Child sexual exploitation, online grooming, chat logs, machine learning, natural language processing

*Authors contributed equally to this research.
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1 INTRODUCTION

Online sexual grooming is an increasing problem in the digital age [25]. In 2021 alone, UK police forces recorded over 5,000 offences relating to sexual communication with a child, representing an increase of over 70% on the three years prior [42]. In the US, 5.4% of adolescents experience online grooming between the ages of 13–17 [23]. The victims of online predators often endure significant harm, with many abusers seeking physical contact offline [48]. Early identification of these predators is therefore crucial.

In prior work on identifying such predators [6, 43, 51, 52], researchers have largely relied on manual annotation of online conversations between predators and their victims. This work is time-consuming and prone to error. While machine learning (ML) has the potential to automate some of this effort, its use for preventing child endangerment online remains underexplored.

We investigate the extent to which ML algorithms can help with detection of online predatory behaviours. One of the involved challenges is that acquiring real-world data featuring minors is inherently difficult due to moral concerns regarding the protection of victims, logistical issues in data collection, and ethical constraints ensuring that data is handled sensitively. Consequently, we utilise a corpus of chat logs from Perverted Justice [21], an online watchdog featuring adult decoys impersonating underage victims.

We focus on identifying 11 communication strategies characteristic of predatory interactions, based on a framework developed, established, and validated by forensic psychologists [18]. While these strategies do not cover all predatory behaviours, they represent many of the actions that law enforcement deems problematic. The 11 behaviours are also subtle and difficult to discern even for experts, leading to frequent disagreement. Therefore, in addition to conventional metrics like precision and recall, we also examined the level of inter-rater agreement, and how it relates to the deviations of machine-generated annotations from the experts.

Section 2 outlines the background and challenges of automatic detection of online predatory behaviours. We then describe our methodology in Section 3.1 and investigate the performance of fully

automated annotation in Section 3.2. The results are unsatisfactory for several behaviours, especially those which appear more rarely in the manually annotated corpus. We address this in Section 4, where we aim to enhance performance via human-computer collaboration. We let the computer extract conversation segments representative of one of the communication strategies before one of the authors, a forensic psychology expert, verifies the resulting predictions. This approach significantly improves the overall precision while maintaining an order of magnitude higher efficiency relative to manual annotation. In Section 5, we address the ethical implications of automated detection of predatory behaviour. Finally, we discuss limitations and summarise our findings in Section 6.

2 BACKGROUND

2.1 Online Child Sexual Exploitation

Existing social science literature on online grooming is extensive, focusing primarily on classifying predatory behaviours in order to aid law enforcement. Researchers have identified two types of sexual predators based on whether they seek to establish physical contact, or wish to engage in fantasy-like discourse [15]. Unsurprisingly, due to the added risk of offline offending, most research has focused on identifying offenders who seek physical contact with their victim [6, 43, 51, 52]. However, the notion that predatory behaviour can be parsed into wholly online or offline offending is oversimplified. For instance, a systematic review of 22 empirical studies found minimal evidence of offenders who solely engage in contact or fantasy-seeking behaviours [8]. Recognising the spectrum of tactics used by offenders is crucial for improving detection methods and tailored interventions.

Current models of online grooming do not account for how the role of the victim impacts the predator's response [14, 15, 33–35, 37]. This lack of understanding in bilateral communication between offender and victim has meant that law enforcement often relies on rudimentary methods such as detecting hyper-sexualised keywords to identify predatory activity. Where the literature has taken a bilateral approach, results have highlighted the importance of understanding the linguistic exchange between offenders and victims. For example, Seymour-Smith and Kloess [47] found that predators would request sexually explicit images in part to trap and control their victims. Once in possession of the images, predators utilised overt persuasion and extortion to overcome victim non-compliance. Such insight demonstrates the utility that can be gleaned from considering the victim's role and the predator's tactics, something that would not be possible by merely scanning for hyper-sexualised keywords, and underscores the necessity for more sophisticated approaches to detecting online predatory behaviour.

Elliot's Self-Regulation model [22] is the first to incorporate victims' behaviour into a model of online predatory grooming. Self-Regulation is a feedback system comprising two phases: a) potentiality, and b) disclosure. *Potentiality* includes mechanisms for rapport-building, incentivising the relationship, disinhibiting the victim, and managing security risks. *Disclosure* primarily concerns whether the predator's behaviour has sufficiently desensitised the victim. Outcomes of this stage can include seeking agreement on a common goal (e.g., arranging offline contact).

As the landscape of online communication continues to evolve, so does the complexity of predatory tactics. While invaluable in providing a foundational understanding, traditional methods have shown limitations in scalability and adaptability to the changing modus operandi of online groomers. This limitation necessitates the exploration of more automated approaches like machine learning.

2.2 Automated Approaches

Offenders use a variety of subtle behaviours to manipulate the conversation flow, such as flattery to build trust [2], or threats and bribes as a coercion tactic [30]. This subtlety can be challenging for automated approaches to detecting predatory behaviours [9]. Prior attempts like [3] relied on dictionary-based approaches, which often result in a large number of both false positives and negatives [7, 31].

Another strain of literature has focused on identifying predators from a mixed corpus of illicit and everyday conversations [20, 26, 27, 29, 41, 45]. While valuable in its own right, this line of research does not offer significant value to law enforcement, as it lacks psychological insight that could justify a preventative intervention. Furthermore, an ML algorithm trained to distinguish between mundane and predatory conversations may overly rely on sexual words [19], while missing more subtle intimacy-seeking, social, and opportunistic behaviours. For example, some predators withhold sexually explicit talk to establish rapport and control [22], or fulfil their fantasy of a a conventional relationship with the victim [24].

Finally, most similar to our work is research on using ML to detect behaviours domain experts regard as problematic. For instance, Gupta et al. [27] used psycholinguistic features to identify six phases of a predatory interaction: friendship forming, relationship forming, exclusivity, risk assessment, sexual activity and conclusion. Similarly, Gunawan et al. [26] used supervised ML to align these phases with specific behaviours such as asking for a picture, talking about friends, discussing hobbies, and building mutual trust. Cano et al. [12] undertook a similar task using a social signal processing approach. Other studies have used a combination of ML and dictionaries to detect qualitative differences in linguistic behaviour between the messages produced by predators and those generated by victims [19], or quantify the level of predatory behaviour from crowd-sourced metrics [45].

While there has been progress in understanding online child sexual exploitation and developing suitable detection methods, a gap remains in addressing the complexity of predatory tactics. Moreover, existing approaches often struggle to detect subtle predatory behaviours and instead rely on detecting sexually-explicit keywords. This study aims to address these gaps by employing advanced machine learning techniques to develop a more nuanced detection model to identify the subtle behaviours predators use throughout the online grooming process.

3 AUTOMATED LABELLING OF COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES

3.1 Method

3.1.1 Dataset. This work uses chat log data between online sexual offenders and adult decoys posing as children and teens. We

Table 1: Behaviour labels used for manual annotation of predator messages, including characteristics of each communication strategy.

Strategy	Code	Characteristics
Communication	COMM	Sustaining the interaction
		Asking questions
		Using linguistic fillers
Rapport	RAPP	Sweet talk
		Show interest
		State shared experiences
Control	CONT	Make demands
		Illusion of victim control
		Ask permission
Challenge	CHAL	Direct confrontation
		Mock insult
		Challenge abilities
Negotiation	NEGO	Arrange to meet
		Offer incentives
Use of Emotion	EMOT	Guilt tripping
		Vilifying third parties
		Playing the victim
Testing Boundaries	TEST	Checks engagement
		Setting boundaries
Sexual Topics	SEX	Stating sexual preferences
		Fantasy talk
		Suggest media production
Mitigation	MITI	Normalising sex
		Downplay age differences
Encouragement	ENCO	Flirting
		Acting as mentor
Risk Management	RISK	Emphasise secrecy
		Acknowledge wrongdoing
		Discuss consequences

compiled twenty-four chat logs from Perverted Justice[1] using an automated web scraping tool built on top of the `beautifulsoup` [46] library in Python. Perverted Justice is a publicly available online repository of two-way instant messaging interactions from sites such as MySpace and Yahoo Instant Messenger. The chats took place between 2003 and 2016. We randomly chose our chat logs from the over 600 available on the Perverted Justice website. On average, chat logs contained 539 messages sent between the two speakers. The interaction would often take place over several days, comprising multiple conversations. The offender always initiated the interaction. The chat logs comprised 12,942 messages in total. Offender messages to the victim accounted for 6,771 (52%) of these.

3.1.2 Data Processing. We extracted chat logs from the Perverted Justice website as plain text files, then inspected and cleaned the data to standardise formatting and remove additional commentary. We also anonymised the text, identifying the speakers only based on their role in the conversation (predator or decoy).

[1]Perverted Justice ceased operations in 2016 but continued to make their data publicly available until March 2023. We originally accessed the data in 2020.

Two of the authors of this work, both possessing a forensic psychology background, used a grounded theoretical approach to label the offender messages. Grounded theory is a flexible methodology designed to extract descriptive (i.e., qualitative) patterns in data [13]. Codes are developed inductively (i.e., data-driven) through an iterative approach to the point of data saturation. The annotators then reviewed and amended prospective codes until they reliably described the interaction. A final coding framework was agreed upon, resulting in eleven communication strategies predators use when responding to their victims. We also included an additional control variable corresponding to a null annotation, i.e., where none of the strategies were found in the respective message. The communication strategies are briefly described in Table 1, and in detail in **??**.

Coding the corpus took four months and over 600 hours to complete. In addition, codes were not mutually exclusive, meaning a predator could display multiple strategies within the same message. This approach and the time-consuming nature of manual coding significantly contributed to the required effort and highlighted the infeasibility of a manual approach for coding large datasets. Based on the time required for this corpus, manually coding the entire corpus held by Perverted Justice would likely require several years of effort.

Due to the time and effort required, it was not feasible to perform repeat coding of our entire corpus. However, inter-rater agreement was sample tested, in addition to collaborative coding exercise during the initial development of the framework. We split the coded predator message corpus into training, testing, and validation regions. 70% was used for training, 20% for testing, and 10% for validation. Data splits were stratified to ensure coverage in each region mirrored that observed in the full corpus. Table 2 reports the distribution of messages per region.

Table 2: Split of predator-to-victim messages in our dataset into training, testing, and validation regions using a 70-20-10 ratio. Splits were stratified to ensure distribution of labels in each region matched the full corpus.

Region	Messages	Data Split
Train	4712	70%
Test	1355	20%
Validation	704	10%

3.1.3 Models. We used a natural language inference (NLI) approach to predict how messages relate to communication strategies. NLI is an NLP technique that focuses on comparing two statements of the text. Specifically, determining whether a given statement (the hypothesis) is inferred or contradicted by another statement (the premise) [5]. If the hypothesis can be inferred from the premise, the relationship is one of entailment. On the other hand, contradiction or neutral outcomes occur when we cannot infer a relationship between the two statements.

In this work, we use each predator message as a hypothesis and form one premise from each communication strategy. For example, "This message is an example of control" would be used for the control strategy [32]. We used each message/label sentence pair during training as input to a deep learning model. We used a version of

`RoBERTa-large` [39] hosted on Huggingface, with an implementation built in `Pytorch` [44]. In addition to pretraining, this model has been fine-tuned for NLI tasks using the Multi-Genre Natural Language Inference corpus [50]. We performed further fine-tuning using our training and validation sets. Model parameters are identical to [49]. We trained our models for 10 epochs with batch size 32 and a learning rate of 10^{-5}.

Model predictions for each message in the test set were binarized by finding an optimal threshold, i.e., one that maximizes correlation with the actual labels, as in [32]. This means we set a different threshold per label, allowing us to achieve better results compared to a pre-determined value (such as a universal 50% cut-off).

3.1.4 Comparing zero-shot and few-shot learning. As the time required to manually label our corpus is a bottleneck that hinders the mobility of our approach to larger datasets, we were interested in how prediction performance suffered when we used a reduced training sample. In addition to training on the entire training set, we experimented with few-shot and zero-shot conditions. In the zero-shot condition, we made predictions on the test set with no additional training. In few-shot settings, we experimented with different amounts of positive training examples between 5 and 150. As before, we used a stratified approach when sampling the positive classes to ensure that the class distribution in the few-shot settings matched the actual distribution of the whole training set.

3.1.5 Expanding the contextual window. We also tested whether the surrounding messages increased the contextual understanding of the model. To examine this, we expanded the message window to include multiple prior messages sent by both speakers, and concatenated them into a single input. In addition to the single message input, we experimented with five-message windows. The five-message window combines each predator message with the two preceding victim and predator messages.

3.2 Experiments and results

3.2.1 Coverage Statistics. We report coverage statistics for each communication strategy in Table 3. We calculate coverage as the proportion of messages with a positive class label. Each of the eleven behaviour codes is highly imbalanced. Except for 'communication' (coverage = 73%), positive labels form the minority class. Inspection of messages that were labelled with the 'communication' label revealed that predators were engaging in considerable amounts of both information-sharing and information-gathering. This was particularly prominent at the beginning of conversations, and characterised by a series of targeted, and directive questioning: "asl?"[2], "are you there alone?", "do you want to give me your number?". There were also a considerable number of attempts to use humour-related acronyms (i.e., "lol", "LMAO", "hehe") that explained the high coverage of 'communication' throughout the corpus.

By contrast, mitigation was the rarest label and appeared in only 3% of predator messages. Aside from communication, the average coverage of the remaining labels was 14.3%, suggesting behaviours appeared rarely. Equally, however, the majority of predator messages (92%) were labelled with at least one behaviour. Threshold values were similarly broad—thresholds for communication, control, challenge and encouragement were all within 0.005, while, rapport, use of sex, and risk management all generated a threshold ≥ .85.

[2]The phrase 'asl' is text-speak for "age, sex, location?"

Table 3: Coverage statistics of each communication strategy over all offender messages. Coverage represents the percentage of messages in the dataset that use the corresponding strategy. Train and Test columns indicate the number of manually labelled positive class instances in the train and test regions, respectively. The threshold column shows the optimized threshold based on the largest cross-validated Matthews correlation coefficient (MCC) between predicted and actual labels.

Strategy	Coverage (%)	Train	Test	Threshold
Communication	73	3445	991	.002
Rapport	15	718	206	.98
Control	21	979	282	.004
Challenge	5	211	60	.005
Negotiation	21	986	283	.75
Use of emotion	16	773	222	.71
Testing boundaries	31	1470	423	.78
Use of sex	18	861	248	.98
Mitigation	3	144	41	.7
Encouragement	8	378	109	.004
Risk management	5	217	62	.88



Figure 1: Performance metrics for NLI models trained on all available data for each communication strategy. The subplot shows accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 scores for offender messages within the test set.

3.2.2 Classification of predatory behaviour when trained on all available data. Figure 1 reports the performance of each label when trained with all available training data. Seven of the eleven behaviours also obtain an $F1$ score above 50%, with the best-performing behaviour being 'communication' ($F1$ = .87), followed by 'testing



Figure 2: Comparison of precision, recall, and F1 scores for NLI models trained on single and expanded message inputs for each communication strategy. Each subplot displays the evaluation metrics for a specific communication strategy. The x-axis represents the performance metric, while the y-axis represents the score for the metric. The green bars represent the scores achieved by the model trained on a single message input, while the turquoise bars represent the scores achieved by the model trained on an expanded window of 5 messages.

boundaries' ($F1 = .62$), 'rapport' ($F1 = .61$), and 'use of sexual topics' ($F1 = .61$). Performance was poorest for 'challenge' ($F1 = .28$), followed by 'encouragement' ($F1 = .32$), and 'mitigation' ($F1 = .4$). Precision was an issue for the majority of labels, indicating a number of false positives and suggesting that the model had learned some rules that were contributing to a high false-positive rate. To better understand performance, a brief qualitative exploration was performed on a random sample of ≈ 10% of the test set.

The rapport model correctly recognised complements and sweet talk as positive examples, but missed more everyday examples of rapport building such as social greetings, (e.g., "hi, how are you? asl?"). It also routinely failed to identify general conversational patter as evidence of rapport (e.g., "how was your spring break?").

Some aspects of control appeared to take place over longer ranges than single messages. For example, persistently asking the same question was often misclassified, as each message was considered an independent event.

In trying to predict encouragement, which was amongst the worst performing labels, the model appeared to overfit on short verbal nods (i.e., "kool" and "sure"). This appeared regularly in predator speech, but was not always labelled as encouragement by our annotators. Over-reliance on these phrases seems to substantially increase the false positive rate. Risk management appeared to perform better than other rare behaviours. Examination of the positive classifications indicated that this was largely a consequence of recognising attempts to establish the presence of a parent, (e.g.,"is ur dad gona be home tomoro?" and "when are they getting home?").

3.2.3 Comparing classification accuracy with an expanded message window. Figure 2 reports a per behaviour comparison of precision, recall, and F1 between single and multi-message input. Due to the high performance and coverage of the communication strategy, we dropped this label from the remainder of our analysis. The general performance increase was marginal for model precision. However, rapport, control, risk management, and testing boundaries all increased when we included the additional context. However, 'use of sexual topics' decreased precision by 5% (from 70% to 65%) when we used a multi-message window.

An expanded message window markedly increased the recall of several behaviours, including rapport (increased from 52% to 81%), negotiation (from 50% to 67%), testing boundaries (from 31% to 76%), and risk management (from 37% to 48%). This suggests that the added context from the previous messages decreased the false negatives for these behaviours.

3.2.4 Comparing classification accuracy in few-shot and zero-shot conditions. Figure 3 reports the change in the $F1$ as the number of positive training examples increases. At zero-shot, all categories had an F1 score below 50% and half were below 15%. The subjectivity of the behaviours is a possible cause of lacking performance. As noted by [28], concepts such as "rapport" are tough to define, even for humans. It is therefore not surprising that a machine fails at this task without any positive examples for training.

As demonstrated in Figure 3, however, most behaviours notably improved with a small amount of positive training examples. On



Figure 3: Change in F1 score as the size of the training set increases for each communication strategy. The x-axis represents the number of manually labelled positive instances in the training set, ranging from 0 (zero-shot) to 150. The y-axis represents the F1 score. Each subplot shows the change in F1 score as a line per communication strategy.

average, results indicate that the model attained considerable improvement by training on 50–100 positive examples.

3.2.5 Comparing pairwise agreement between machine and expert annotation. We performed a validation study to explore differences in annotations generated by our forensic psychology experts with those generated automatically by our models. In total, the first author of this work validated the classifications of 645 messages. This step generated a third set of annotations and was deemed a more efficient alternative to re-labelling the corpus from scratch. Cohen's K [16], a standard metric, was used for measuring pairwise agreement between annotators, where larger values of K indicate more agreement between raters. An acceptable level of agreement is subjectively defined. However, social scientists often use the interpretation provided by [38]. In our case, we take the agreement between the two human annotators as the level of 'acceptable' agreement.

Figure 4 reports pairwise agreement scores for each behaviour. Across all behaviours, and for each combination of raters, including the automated one, values of K ranged between .46 and .95, indicating a minimum of 'moderate' agreement on any pairwise combination. Comparing H1 (initial annotations) with H2 (validations performed by the first author), several of the behaviours received a K value above .8, indicating near-perfect levels of agreement. Comparing these agreement scores with those generated by human-machine comparisons (H1 & AI or H2 & AI), values of K are significantly and consistently lower. This finding suggests that our best-performing model was unable to achieve an agreement comparable to an additional human rater. For example, the average agreement between H1 and H2 for 'risk management', 'mitigation', 'negotiation', and 'challenge' was .91 – comfortably within the 'near perfect' range. Conversely, the average agreement between AI and H1 or H2 on the same behaviours was .58. We note that despite being trained on data only from H1, the model did not systemically agree with H1 more than with H2.

4 HUMAN-MACHINE COLLABORATION FOR DETECTION OF PREDATORY COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES

The results presented in Section 3 indicate that whilst a ML solution offer a significant improvement in performance when sufficient training data is available, model precision remains an issue for most behaviours. Over-prediction can result in lost time in high-stakes settings where precision is essential. While in the case of online grooming, it is arguably more tolerable to misidentify non-predatory behaviour as predatory (i.e., lower precision) than to identify predatory behaviour as non-predatory (i.e., lower recall), law enforcement will sacrifice considerable resource unnecessarily if detection of predatory behaviour is consistently poor. It is, therefore, vital that automated systems address this.

This section examines the potential of resolving this issue via a human-in-the-loop approach. While human experts can identify contextual nuances and subtle behaviours that machines may miss, the manual effort required for such annotation is time-consuming, and thus not scalable to large chat datasets. On the other hand, machines need a fraction of the time for processing but, as we have seen, do not achieve the required accuracy. Following [10], we therefore use a weak supervision approach, where the machine is tasked with identifying relevant segments of the chat log, which are then verified by a human expert.



Figure 4: Pairwise agreement between the original human annotations (H1), human verified annotations (H2), and machine-generated annotations (AI) for each communication strategy. The x-axis shows each pairwise combination of raters, and the y-axis displays the Cohen's kappa score, a measure of inter-rater agreement. Shaded areas indicate the level of agreement, ranging from almost perfect (dark grey) to slight agreement (white), according to the interpretation in [38]. Each subplot corresponds to a single communication strategy. The results demonstrate the extent of agreement between different raters and provide insight into the quality of machine-generated annotations compared to human-verified annotations

4.1 Method

4.1.1 Dataset. We used the same twenty-four chat logs used in Section 3, and trained our models with the same data split. In addition, we labelled a further fifteen chat logs from Perverted Justice to increase the size of the test set. In total, we annotated 12,426 messages sent by an offender.

Instead of predicting behaviours at the message level, we grouped messages occurring within a set period into conversations, defined as a continuous sequence of messages where the gap between two messages did not exceed one hour. This step generated sixty-seven conversations, with an average of 185.46 (SD = 188.77) offender messages per conversation. For each conversation and each behaviour label, we extract the conversation segment that best represents each label. This means that the resulting labels indicate which communication strategies were present in each conversation at least once. Note that we omitted the communication category from this analysis as it is likely to be present in all conversations.

4.1.2 Task. We performed our analysis on each conversation within the expanded test set. For each conversation, we used an ensemble of labelling functions–automated methods to annotate data—to extract the segment of text that best represented each behaviour label. Extracted segments were then ranked according to their confidence level, with the top-k segments passed to a human verifier (the first author) to either accept or reject.

4.1.3 Schema. We constructed five labelling functions to extract the text segments. These were: (i) NLI sequence classifier fine-tuned on our training set, (ii) Zero-Shot Q&A classifier, (iii) Zero-Shot Q&A classifier with cosine similarity, (iv) Sentence embeddings with cosine similarity, (v) keyword detection. We provide a complete overview of each of these labelling functions in Appendix **??**.

4.2 Experiments and results

Figure 5 reports performance in precision and recall when $k = 1$ compared to $k = 3$, i.e., when the human validator saw only the model's best guess ($k = 1$) or the top three ($k = 3$). Precision performance was generally very high for both $k = 1$ and $k = 3$, with two labels (Control and Negotiation) obtaining perfect precision when compared to manual annotation. The average precision score across all behaviours was similar, with both conditions performing ≈ 0.94. Given the subjective nature of the labels, imperfect precision mostly corresponds to disagreement between annotators. The lowest performing behaviour was 'Challenge', which dropped by 13% (from 0.8 to 0.73) between the two conditions. This drop in performance is likely due to the $k = 3$ model incorrectly providing more information to the user to verify, thus increasing the likelihood of a false positive. Overall, our findings suggest that a human-in-the-loop approach can consistently extract relevant text segments for the user to review.

However, for most categories, the collaborative set up did not improve recall compared to fully automated methods. In the present context, low recall (an excess of false negatives) can be explained either as a consequence of inter-annotator disagreement (i.e., the model provided excerpts that the verifier rejected, in disagreement with the original annotation), or an inability of the model to identify salient information for a given category (i.e., the model fails to



Figure 5: Comparison of precision and recall scores for each communication strategy using top k extraction. The AI-generated evidence was manually verified by humans. High precision scores indicate that the AI-selected evidence aligned with human interpretation of each communication strategy. Lower recall scores suggest that the AI may not have identified all relevant evidence for human review. The green and turquoise bars represent top k extraction with k=1 and k=3, respectively

return anything for the user to verify). Supporting the latter explanation, providing more information for the user to review by increasing the value of k did improve recall for all categories. The average improvement in recall was 11%, from 0.52 ($k = 1$) to 0.63 ($k = 3$).

With respect to the inter-rater disagreement artificially lowering recall, removing such effects would typically require manually re-annotating the entire corpus. However, the high time intensity of manual annotation meant this was not possible in the present context. As an efficient alternative, the first author manually inspected points of disagreement between the original annotations and the output from Section 4.1.2. The first author then re-coded original annotations, and performance metrics were recalculated. Figure 6 reports F1 scores with these amended annotations.

5 ETHICAL AND SOCIETAL CONSIDERATIONS

Developing frameworks to support the automatic detection of online grooming raises critical ethical considerations. For example, data acquisition regulations may hinder accessing the large volumes of data required to train a machine learning algorithm suitably [4]. Other cyber-security issues, such as proper data storage and the potential for hacking, also mean that law enforcement is often reluctant to release actual investigative material, such as chatlogs, for academic purposes [36]. Other privacy issues behind using actual investigative data include difficulties obtaining informed consent for bulk data collection [40].

This work utilises a large corpus of online predatory chat logs archived by a child-safety watchdog organisation. Both the creation and use of this data are controversial. For example, the Perverted Justice model has been criticised for encouraging cyber-vigilantism [54]. Moreover, the fact that offline meetings were routinely televised as part of NBC's To Catch a Predator series has resulted in claims of unnecessary humiliation towards individuals who, at that point, had been neither charged nor convicted of a crime [1]. Additionally, debate exists around whether the persistence of some volunteers constituted legal or moral entrapment [11, 21].

While using the Perverted Justice corpus raises ethical questions, it is important to consider the context in which this data was collected. All predators featured in the chat logs were later convicted of a crime (according to the administrators of the Perverted Justice website, the undercover volunteers' activities resulted in the criminal conviction of over 600 predators between 2003 and 2016). Decoys did not initiate contact with the offender or introduce sexual content, and the conversations did not feature children but an adult playing the role of an underage victim. Notwithstanding these ethical challenges, the difficulties associated with accessing chat logs with real victims have meant that the Perverted Justice archives have become a viable and effective alternative.

Another ethical consideration is the risk of perpetuating harm towards children who have experienced sexual abuse, if researchers mishandle the data used to train an algorithm. There is a need to consider the potential impact of using sensitive information, and to ensure that the rights and dignity of children are respected. Additionally, use of automated detection systems may have unintended consequences, such as false positives or misidentification, which can lead to unjust accusations and damage to innocent individuals' reputations [53]. However, in a deployed system, false negatives are more severe, as they may prevent law enforcement from saving a child from harm.

Due to the high-risk nature of this application, and the level of performance our system achieves, it is clear the technology is not ready to reliably assist in detecting online grooming behaviour in the real world. However, it shows promise in helping researchers working on this crucial domain streamline and speed up their annotation process. Annotating large volumes of text data containing potentially disturbing content can be emotionally challenging. While research that explicitly explores annotator well-being is scarce,



Figure 6: Comparison of adjusted recall scores for each communication strategy after resolving disagreement between original annotations and human verified annotations. Original annotations and human verified annotations were re-annotated by the first author to account for potential discrepancies between the two sources. Bars represent the recall score, where an increase indicates improved recall after adjusting annotations. The analysis aims to investigate whether low recall scores are due to differences in annotators or an inability of the AI to generate relevant evidence. Top 3 extraction, where k = 1 (green) and k = 3 (turquoise) respectively, was used to automatically extract segments of messages as evidence of each communication strategy for human verification.

a related area that has received attention is the role of content moderators on social media. Research has shown that prolonged exposure to harmful material can cause psychological distress, such as post-traumatic stress disorder [17]. The development of automated systems could be helpful in proactively protecting the mental well being of those on the front-lines of data annotation.

6 CONCLUSIONS

Manually labelling the 24 chat logs used in this work took over 600 hours. Given that the full Perverted-Justice corpus contains 850 chat logs, it would be infeasible to label the entire corpus without the help of automated methods. We find that an ML based approach shows potential when applied to the detection of online predatory behaviour. However, even with training, the agreement between the model and a human annotator is not comparable to the agreement between two human annotators.

Adding a human validation step to the annotation process improves precision significantly for the cost of a small-time investment compared to human annotation. However, recall remains an issue even in the collaborative setting. Issues in predicting the correct behaviours seem to stem from the rarity of certain behaviours, but also due to their nuanced nature. These conclusions may be transferable to other contexts and annotation schemes involving highly-subjective class labels. Performing post-validation on the automatic classifications allowed us to gain qualitative insight into the model's performance, which may be used to design better prompts and improve performance further. Overall, our results are an encouraging step towards building tools that may assist researchers within this domain, even if the current capabilities are insufficient to build a sufficiently reliable automated model for detection of online sexual exploitation in the real world.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Given the nature of our topic, ethical approval was sought for the initial data collection and manual labelling of the Perverted Justice corpus. Ethical approval was granted by the University of Liverpool's Institute of Population Health Research Ethics Committee (REF: 9972). This project was supported by the Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence project RC-2015-067.

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Analysis of Climate Campaigns on Social Media using Bayesian Model Averaging

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ABSTRACT

Climate change is the defining issue of our time, and we are at a defining moment. Various interest groups, social movement organizations, and individuals engage in collective action on this issue on social media. In addition, issue advocacy campaigns on social media often arise in response to ongoing societal concerns, especially those faced by energy industries. Our goal in this paper is to analyze how those industries, their advocacy group, and climate advocacy group use social media to influence the narrative on climate change. In this work, we propose a minimally supervised model soup [57] approach combined with messaging themes to identify the stances of climate ads on Facebook. Finally, we release our stance dataset, model, and set of themes related to climate campaigns for future work on opinion mining and the automatic detection of climate change stances.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies** → *Natural language processing*; • **Information systems** → **Sponsored search advertising**.

KEYWORDS

social media, climate campaigns, facebook ads, bayesian model averaging, minimal supervision

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1 INTRODUCTION

We are approaching a decisive moment for international efforts to tackle the climate crisis, and International Energy Agency (IEA) report sets out a pathway for achieving this goal by reducing global carbon dioxide (CO_2) emissions to *net zero by 2050*. IEA emphasizes policy interventions by governments worldwide to drive the energy transition and lower greenhouse gas emissions. Towards a net-zero future, the United Nations (UN) campaign for individual action on climate change and sustainability called ActNow[1] so that by making choices that have less harmful effects on the environment, we can be part of the solution and influence change. Despite the urgency to avoid catastrophic climate change [42], scientific explanation [15], the policy plans of the world's governments [1], digital activism [25], we are still lagging from climate goals. The reason behind this lag is the negative influence of fossil fuel companies working to undermine and weaken much-needed climate action [44].

Over the last decade, online advertising has significantly increased to disseminate agendas and sponsored content has been used to reach more people on social media [7, 8, 22, 29, 33]. Advertising plays a pivotal role in climate change because some advertising defends the destructive oil and gas industry, greenwashes brands and drives consumption. At a congressional hearing in April 2021, Facebook chief Mark Zuckerberg admitted that climate misinformation was a "big issue"[2]. A Bloomberg analysis pointed out that millions of climate change-denial ads continue to be approved on the platform despite increasing pressure from climate groups to more effectively regulate content[3]. Oil and gas industries have been using paid-for social media advertising on Facebook to capture the narrative on climate change. However, climate scientists have reached a consensus that climate change is real and is caused by human activity on the planet, which has and will have adverse effects on humanity and the biosphere around the planet [13]. Stakeholders supporting climate change also use the Facebook advertising platform to influence the targeted audience, focusing on transitioning to renewable energy. Though the transition to a renewable energy economy may be exciting to renewable energy advocates and scholars, many industries and community has different perspectives on it [43, 50]. For example, Fig. 1 presents two sponsored ads



Figure 1: Example of sponsored ads in Facebook where the advertisers have different stances on climate change focusing on different themes.

on Facebook having two different stances on climate change. The

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[1] https://www.un.org/en/actnow
[2] www.theguardian.com
[3] www.campaignasia.com

stance of the top ad (inside the brown box in Fig. 1) is (`pro-energy`) as the sponsor is against 'unnecessary regulations on oil and gas industry' and the ad *theme* is (`economy_pro`) mentioning 'oil and gas industry supports local jobs'. The *stance* of the bottom ad (inside the green box in Fig. 1) is (`clean-energy`) as the sponsor supports 'transition away from fossil fuels' and the reason for this is the 'threatening effect of fossil fuels on our health'. So the ad *theme* is (`HumanHealth`).

In this work, we aim to understand how climate advocates and fossil fuel corporations are using advertising to control the narrative on climate change and climate policy. Our goal is twofold: first, to characterize the themes of the ads, and second to build on this characterization to identify the stances of the ads, i.e., **pro-energy**, **clean-energy**, **neutral**.

Our theme assignment process is motivated by a thematic analysis approach [5]. We begin by defining a seed set of relevant arguments based on recent studies [10, 41], where each pro-energy theme is defined by multiple sentences. Since the initial set of themes contains only pro-energy arguments, we add clean-energy themes and phrases. We fine-tune a pre-trained textual inference model using a contrastive learning approach to identify paraphrases in a large collection of climate related ads.

In recent years, research has shown that models pre-trained on large and diverse datasets learn representations that transfer well to a variety of tasks [11, 19, 26, 30]. The fine-tuning process has two steps: (1) fine-tune models with a variety of hyperparameter configurations, and (2) select the model which achieves the highest accuracy on the held-out validation set and discard remaining models. Wortsman et al. [57] recently showed that selecting a single model and discarding the rest has several downsides, and they proposed *model soup*, which averages the weights of fine-tuned models independently. While Wortsman et al. [57] showed model soup performance on four text classification datasets from the GLUE benchmark [54], we develop a minimally supervised model soup approach leveraging messaging theme to detect stance for analyzing climate campaigns on Facebook. We focus on the following research questions (RQ) to analyze climate campaigns on social media:

- **RQ1.** Can a model trained with minimal supervision using theme information be leveraged to predict the presence of stances in Facebook ads related to climate change?
- **RQ2.** What are the intersecting themes of the messaging?
- **RQ3.** What demographics and geographic are targeted by the advertisers?
- **RQ4.** Do the messages differ based on entity type?

Our contributions are summarized as follows:

(1) We formulate a novel problem of exploiting minimal supervision and Bayesian model averaging to analyze the landscape of climate advertising on social media.
(2) We identify the themes of the climate campaigns using an unsupervised approach.
(3) We propose a minimally supervised model soup approach to identify stance combining themes of the content of climate campaigns. We show that our model outperforms the baselines.
(4) We conduct quantitative and qualitative analysis on real-world dataset to demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed model.

The remaining sections of the paper are structured as follows: we commence with a discussion on related work, followed by the presentation of dataset details. Subsequently, we introduce the problem formulation, after which we outline the methodology employed. Later, we provide comprehensive information on the experimental settings, including the results, baselines, and ablation study. Finally, we address the research questions **RQ2**, **RQ3**, and **RQ4** through a detailed analysis. Our data, code, and model are publicly available at https://github.com/tunazislam/BMA-FB-ad-Climate

2 RELATED WORK

Recent studies have shown climate change activism in social media and news media [4, 52, 53]. Sponsored content on social media – especially Facebook, is the main channel to reach the targeted audience on a specific event such as US Presidential election [29], or specific issues, i.e., COVID [28, 39, 51], immigration[9, 49].

Several studies have analyzed the discourse around climate change. Luo et al. [36] proposed an opinion framing task on the global warming debate on media. Koenecke and Feliu-Faba [32] studied whether climate change related sentiment in tweets changed in response to five natural disasters occurring in the US in 2018. Dey et al. [17] explored stance with respect to certain topics, including climate change in a tweet-based setting. To understand the narratives of climate change skepticism, Bhatia et al. [3] studied the automatic classification of neutralization techniques. Diggelmann et al. [18] introduced a veracity prediction task in a fact-checking setting on climate claims. Our work differs from these in that we use a **probabilistic approach** to detect stance incorporating **theme information** of climate related ads on social media.

Our work falls in the broad scope of minimal supervision [2, 27, 28, 40, 45, 47], contrastive learning [20, 21, 55, 58] and Bayesian model averaging [37, 38] where averaging the weights of multiple models fine-tuned with different hyperparameter configurations improves accuracy and robustness [57].

climate change, climate, fossil fuel, fracking, energy, oil, coal, mining, gas, carbon, power, footprint, solar, drilling, tri-city, petroleum, renewable, global warming, emission, ecosystem, environment, greenhouse, ozone, radiation, bioenergy, biomass, green energy, methane, pollution, forest, planet, earth, ocean, nuclear, ultraviolet, hydropower, hydrogen, hydroelectricity, geothermal, sustainable, clean energy.

Table 1: List of the keywords for data collection.

3 DATA

We collect 88, 022 climate related English ads focusing on the United States from January 2021 - January 2022 using Facebook Ad Library API[4] with the keywords 'climate change', 'energy', 'fracking', 'coal'. To create the list of keywords for collecting ads about climate and

[4] https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/api

oil & gas industries, we read multiple articles about climate policy, environmental justice, climate change mentioning green/clean energy, transition from fossil fuel to renewable energy, coal dependent US states, protection of fossil-fuel workers and communities, and other climate debates, and made a list of repeating statements. Then, we consult two researchers in Computational Social Science and construct a list of relevant keywords. The full list of keywords is in Table 1. Our collected ads are written in English. For each ad, the API provides the ad ID, title, ad description, ad body, funding entity, spend, impressions, distribution over impressions broken down by gender (male, female, unknown), age (7 groups), and location down to states in the USA. So far, we have 408 unique funding entities whose stances are known based on their affiliation from their websites and Facebook pages. These funding entities are the source of supervision in our model. As we don't know the stance of the ads, we assign the same stance for all ads sponsored by the same funding entity. This way, we have 25, 232 ads whose stances are known.



Figure 2: Siamese-BERT network for contrastive learning to generate sentence embeddings.

4 PROBLEM FORMULATION

We formulate our stance prediction problem as a minimally supervised model soup approach. We know the stance of the funding entity, but we don't know the stance of the ads. We assign the same stance for all ads sponsored by the same funding entity. We want to predict the stance of the ad using the model soup approach in the following way:

$$\text{Point estimation: } P(y_s|X_a, \theta, y_t) \tag{1}$$

$$\text{Bayesian posterior: } P(\theta|y_s, X_a, y_t) \propto P(\theta)P(y_s|X_a, \theta, y_t) \tag{2}$$

where, X_a is the ad, y_s is the predicted stance, y_t is the assigned themes, θ is the model parameter. For the point estimation in Equation 1, we fine-tuned the pre-trained BERT model [16] by concatenating theme information. For Bayesian model averaging (Equation 2), we implement both the uniform and greedy soup approaches provided by Wortsman et al. [57] including messaging theme, which can be regarded as cheap Bayesian posterior approximations. We get the theme y_t, using the contrastive learning approach following Reimers and Gurevych [48].

PRO-ENERGY	Economy_pro, Identity, Climate solution, Pragmatism, Patriotism, Against climate policy, Give away.
CLEAN-ENERGY	Economy_clean, Future generation, Environmental, Human health, Animals, Support climate policy, Alternative energy, Political affiliation.

Table 2: Resulting themes.

5 METHODOLOGY

In this section, we describe how to obtain sentence embedding using contrastive learning, generate themes and phrases, assign themes for the ad content, and implement model soup in our problem.

5.1 Sentence Embeddings with Contrastive Learning

We use $88k$ unlabeled ads for finetuning Sentence BERT (SBERT) [48]. Our training approach uses a siamese-BERT architecture during fine-tuning (Fig. 2). During each step, we process a sentence S (anchor) into BERT, followed by sentence T (positive example). In our case, the anchor is the ad text, and a positive example is the ad description or ad summary. Some ads do not have ad descriptions. In that case, we generate an ad summary using BART summarizer [34]. BERT generates token embeddings. Finally, those token embeddings are converted into averaged sentence embeddings using mean-pooling. Using the siamese approach, we produce two of these per step — one for the anchor A and another for the positive called P. We use multiple negatives ranking loss which is a great loss function if we only have positive pairs, for example, only pairs of similar texts like pairs of paraphrases. In our case, positive pairs are ad text and description/summary.

5.2 Themes and Phrases Generation

To analyze climate campaigns, we model the climate related stance expressed in each ad (i.e., pro-energy, clean-energy) and the underlying reason behind such stance. For example, the top ad (brown box) of Fig. 1 expresses a pro-energy stance and mentions their support for local jobs as the reason to take this stance.

Three main challenges are involved in this analysis: 1) constructing the space of possible themes, 2) mapping ads to the relevant themes, and 3) predicting the stance leveraging the themes. We combine computational and qualitative techniques to uncover the most frequent themes cited for pro-energy and clean-energy stances. We build on previous studies that characterized the arguments supporting the oil and gas industries [41]. In this work, researchers develop four broad categories of pro-energy themes by looking at audience responses to ads from fossil fuel companies. As energy is an economic, social, security, and environmental concern, we go through relevant research conducted by United Nations, influencemap.org and pewresearch.org to construct a list of potential themes and phrases for each theme. We add new relevant pro-energy themes and corresponding phrases that were not covered by previous work, such as *"Green New Deal would take America back to the dark ages"*

Themes	Phrases
Economy_pro	"Oil and gas will create more jobs", "Without oil and gas, there is no job", "Fracking supports thousands of jobs", "Without fracking, we will be jobless", "Oil and gas help local business", "Without oil and gas, our economy would be at risk", "Oil and gas industries pay high wages", "Jobs would be lower paid without oil and gas", "Local business would suffer without the oil and gas industry", "Don't take jobs away from the coal miners", "Coal is powering economic progress", "Protect our jobs", "Banning fossil fuels will lead to job losses", "Fracking jobs will bring new opportunities to rural areas", "Local communities would suffer due to the loss of tax revenue", "Natural gas ban would kill local jobs", "Oil and gas industries help the community through philanthropic efforts", "Energy industry gives back to communities", "Without the oil and gas industry, there would be less philanthropy".
Identity	"Shifting away from fossil fuels is the loss of our culture", "Destruction of fossil fuel industry feels like the destruction of our identity", "Fossil fuel workers struggle with a loss of identity due to factory shut down", "We should protect our community identity", "Our identities are at stake", "Support the miners", "Coal is not just a Job, it's a way of Life", "Remember the pride that coal mining gave us", "We are fighting for our identity", "Support our families and communities through supporting oil and gas industries".
ClimateSolution	"We support reducing greenhouse gas emissions", "We develop technologies to reduce carbon emission", "We are committing to net-zero emissions", "We are transitioning energy mix away from fossil fuels", "We are moving towards renewables", "Natural gas is the future of clean energy", "Fossil gas is a low carbon energy source", "Natural gas is the perfect partner to renewables", "Natural gas is part of the solution to climate change", "Thanks to natural gas, emissions have reduced", "The oil and gas industry has to be a partner, not a problem", "Renewable natural gas will help us get to net zero carbon emissions as fast as we can".
Pragmatism	"Oil and gas are affordable energy sources", "Without oil and gas, energy would be expensive", "Oil and gas are reliable energy sources", "Oil and gas will keep the lights on no matter what", "Banning fossil fuel would make energy unreliable", "Without oil and gas, energy would be unreliable", "Oil and gas are safe", "Oil and gas power our lives", "Oil and gas are efficient", "Oil and gas meet our essential energy needs", "Oil and gas are resilient", "Oil and gas are abundant", "Oil and gas are secure".
Patriotism	"Shutting down local oil and gas production would force us to increase reliance on unstable foreign oil", "We achieved record-high oil and gas production", "US is leading in oil and gas production", "US is an energy leader", "Without US oil and gas, the world would be forced to use dirtier emissions intensive oil and gas", "Stand up for American energy", "Keep Alaska competitive", "It's not patriotic to shut off American energy", "We don't have to necessarily be reliant on the Middle East", "We are loaded with coal. It's here and it's ours".
AgainstClimatePolicy	"The Build Back Better Act will ruin our economy", "Green New Deal would take America back to the dark ages", "Biden and Democrats own this energy crisis", "Biden's pipeline closure increases gas price", "Government's climate agenda is harmful to our economy", "Democrats' impractical energy policies won't stop climate change", "Government's climate policy is outrageous", "D.C. Socialists are attacking the oil and gas industry", "Biden's climate policy would make energy unaffordable".
GiveAway	"We are giving away free gas", "Collect free coupon for gas".
Economy_clean	"Compared with fossil fuel technologies, which are typically mechanized and capital intensive, the renewable energy industry is more labor intensive", "Fast-growing renewable energy jobs offer higher wages", "Fossil fuels are expensive", "Renewable energy opens up job opportunities", "Clean energy will create jobs boom", "Clean energy can rebuild our economy", "Nuclear energy can bring new clean energy jobs", "Losing nuclear power plants meaning losing jobs", "Make polluters pay to clean up their messes", "Energy companies put profit over people", "Big oil and gas companies are forcing American families to pay more".
HumanHealth	"Climate change is the single biggest health threat facing humanity", "Changing weather patterns are expanding diseases, and extreme weather events increase deaths and make it difficult for health care systems to keep up", "Our communities are facing increased risk of illness, disease, and even death from our changing climate", "Climate impacts are already harming health through air pollution, disease, extreme weather events, forced displacement, pressures on mental health, and increased hunger and poor nutrition in places where people cannot grow or find sufficient food", "Climate crisis is impacting our communities", "Fossil fuels threaten our health", "We need breathable air", "Toxic pollution kills people".
FutureGeneration	"Protect our children, family and future generations", "Climate change is a grave threat to children's survival", "Clean air for healthier kids", "Children's immune systems are still developing, leaving their rapidly growing bodies more sensitive to disease and pollution", "Save the children", "Hotter temperatures, air pollution, and violent storms are leading to immediate, life-threatening dangers for children, including difficulty breathing, malnutrition and higher risk of infectious diseases".
Environmental	"Carbon dioxide and additional greenhouse gas emissions are leading contributors to climate change and global warming", "By slowing the effects of climate change and eventually reversing them, we can expect to see a reduction in extreme weather like droughts, floods, and storms caused by global warming", "Protect our planet", "Changes in the climate and increases in extreme weather events are among the reasons behind a global rise in hunger and poor nutrition", "Changes in snow and ice cover in many Arctic regions have disrupted food supplies from herding, hunting, and fishing", "Destructive storms have become more intense and more frequent in many regions due to climate change", "Climate change is changing water availability, making it scarcer in more regions", "Global warming exacerbates water shortages in already water-stressed regions and is leading to an increased risk of agricultural droughts affecting crops, and ecological droughts increasing the vulnerability of ecosystems", "The rate at which the ocean is warming strongly increased over the past two decades, across all depths of the ocean", "Melting ice sheets cause sea levels to rise, threatening coastal and island communities", "More carbon dioxide makes the ocean more acidic, which endangers marine life and coral reefs", "As greenhouse gas concentrations rise, so does the global surface temperature", "Wildfires start more easily and spread more rapidly when conditions are hotter", "Protect our air", "Protect our ocean", "Climate crisis affects the environment", "The top cause contributing to carbon dioxide emissions is electricity generation from fossil fuel power plants".
Animals	"Climate change poses risks to the survival of species on land and in the ocean", "One million species are at risk of becoming extinct within the next few decades", "Toxic pollution kills animals", "Wildlife is severely affected by the reduction of rainfall and a lack of water", "In the U.S. and Canada, moose are struggling due to an increase in ticks and parasites that are surviving the shorter, milder winters".
AltEnergy	"Transitioning to renewable energy is not only necessary to fight the climate crisis, but also the only way we can quickly and effectively meet rising energy demands", "Alternative energy sources have a much lower carbon footprint than natural gas, coal, and other fossil fuels", "We can diversify our energy supply by implementing the widespread use of large-scale renewable energy technologies and minimizing our imported fuel dependency", "Renewable energy is cheap", "Sustainable energy is the future".
SupportClimatePolicy	"The Build Back Better Act would put $555 billion toward building a clean energy economy in the United States, the largest single investment in combating climate change in American history", "Support clean energy", "Green New Deal is a crucial framework for meeting the climate challenges we face", "Support the Energy Jobs & Justice Act", "Stop corporate polluters", "Big oil and gas industries should be held accountable for climate change", "Join Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative today", "Support climate policy", "Biden should honor his climate and justice commitments", "We need climate leader", "We need to hold our leaders accountable for climate crisis".
PoliticalAffliation	"Owners of oil and gas companies are the top donors to a political action committee", "Big oil and gas industries spend millions to fight climate bills".

Table 3: Pro-energy (red) and clean-energy (green) themes and phrases to show how the sponsors use social media to influence the narrative on climate change.

Data split	Number of Funding entities	Number of Ads
Training	261	17780
Validation	65	2074
Testing	82	5378

Table 4: Data details.

Model	Method	Accuracy	Macro-avg F1
LR_tf-idf	Best individual model	0.810	0.506
RoBERTa-base	Best individual model	0.943	0.879
T5-small	Best individual model	0.874	0.8743
BERT-base	Best individual model	0.921	0.854
	Uniform Model soup	0.944	**0.888**
	Greedy Model soup	**0.945**	0.884

Table 5: Performance comparison on test data. Comparing model soup with simple Logistic Regression with tf-idf feature (LR_tf-idf) as well as standalone BERT, RoBERTa, and T5 baselines.

Model	Accuracy	Macro-avg F1	Learning rate	Weight decay
FBERT_Hyper1 (text)	0.897	0.833	2.00E-05	0.01
FBERT_Hyper2 (text)	0.909	0.866	1.00E-05	0.01
FBERT_Hyper3 (text)	0.899	0.687	1.00E-04	0.001
FBERT_Hyper4 (text)	0.895	0.774	1.00E-04	0.01
FBERT_Hyper5 (text)	0.905	0.856	1.00E-05	0.001
FBERT_Hyper6 (text)	0.898	0.813	3.00E-05	0.001
FBERT_Hyper7 (text)	0.896	0.825	3.00E-05	0.01
FBERT_Hyper8 (text)	0.892	0.833	2.00E-05	0.1
FBERT_Hyper9 (text)	0.885	0.813	1.00E-04	0.0001
FBERT_Hyper10 (text)	0.906	0.861	1.00E-05	0.1
Uniform Model soup (text)	*0.943*	*0.880*	-	-
Greedy Model soup (text)	*0.933*	*0.872*	-	-
Point_est_Hyper1 (text + thm)	0.921	0.854	2.00E-05	0.01
Point_est_Hyper2 (text + thm)	0.883	0.835	1.00E-05	0.01
Point_est_Hyper3 (text + thm)	0.916	0.695	1.00E-04	0.001
Point_est_Hyper4 (text + thm)	0.874	0.845	1.00E-04	0.01
Point_est_Hyper5 (text + thm)	0.897	0.826	1.00E-05	0.001
Point_est_Hyper6 (text + thm)	0.902	0.825	3.00E-05	0.001
Point_est_Hyper7 (text + thm)	0.894	0.830	3.00E-05	0.01
Point_est_Hyper8 (text + thm)	0.894	0.829	2.00E-05	0.1
Point_est_Hyper9 (text + thm)	0.888	0.781	1.00E-04	0.0001
Point_est_Hyper10 (text + thm)	0.879	0.822	1.00E-05	0.1
Uniform Model soup (text + thm)	0.944	**0.888**	-	-
Greedy Model soup (text + thm)	**0.945**	0.884	-	-

Table 6: Ablation study. FBERT: Fine-tuned pre-trained BERT model, Point_est: Point estimation, thm: Theme, Hyper: Hyperparameter.

which falls under a new theme called '**Against Climate Policy**'. As the initial set of themes contains mostly pro-energy arguments, we add reasons for supporting climate actions which are clean-energy themes, e.g., "*Climate change is a grave threat to children's survival*" ⇒ **Future Generation**. Then, we consult with two researchers in Computational Social Science and finalize the relevant themes with corresponding phrases. The final set of themes can be observed in Table 2. The full list of phrases for each theme can be observed in Table 3.

5.3 Assign Themes

Our main goal is to ground these themes in a set of approximately $25k$ labeled (stance) ads. To map ads to themes, we use the cosine similarity between their fine-tuned sentence BERT embeddings (details of fine-tuning provided in subsection 5.1) of the ad text and the phrases of each theme. To check the quality of the theme label, we annotated around 300 ads with corresponding themes and noticed an accuracy of 38.4% and macro-avg F1 score of 40.2%, which is better than the random (6.6%).

5.4 Bayesian Model Averaging

In this work, we develop a minimally supervised model soup approach by incorporating messaging themes to identify the stances of climate ads on Facebook. We used two approaches for model soup. The first one is uniform soup [57]. We consider a neural network $f(x, \theta)$ with input data x and parameters θ. For uniform soup, we take the average of the fine-tuned model parameters $(f(x, \frac{1}{k}\sum_{i=1}^{k}\theta_i))$ where θ_i can be considered as samples from the Bayesian posterior and the average can be viewed as a cheap approximation to Bayesian model average. The second one is the greedy soup approach [57]. For the greedy soup, we first sort the models in decreasing order of validation set accuracy. The soup is constructed by sequentially adding each model as a potential ingredient in the soup and only keeping the model in the soup if performance on the validation set improves.

6 EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS

This section presents the experimental details of the stance prediction task on climate change-related ads. We randomly split our data based on the funding entity so that the same ads do not appear in the other splits. At first, we randomly split 20% of the funding entities and keep them as a testing set. Then we randomly split the rest of the data and keep 20% of that as a validation set and the rest as the training set. Details number of funding entities and ads for each split are shown in Table 4. We fine-tune the pre-trained BERT-base-uncased model [16] and run for 10 epochs for each hyperparameter setting, i.e., learning rate and weight decay. We set the maximum text sequence length to 110, batch size 32, and use Adam optimizer [31]. We concatenate the assigned theme with ad text so that our model can leverage the theme information.

We use pre-trained weights from the Huggingface Transformers library [56]. Evaluation is conducted once at the end of the training, without early stopping. We use a single GPU GeForce GTX 1080 Ti GPU, with 6 Intel Core i5-8400 CPU @ 2.80 GHz processors to run each model, and it takes around 15 minutes to run each model. But averaging several of these models to form a model soup requires no additional training and adds no cost at inference time.

6.1 Results

We provide experimental results in Table 5. For the evaluation metrics, we use accuracy and macro-average F1 score. At first, we compare our approach with simple Logistic Regression (LR) [14] trained on term frequency–inverse document frequency (tf-idf) features baseline (Table 5). Then, to make sure that the model soup being a better hypothesis holds irrespective of the underlying language model (LM) architecture, we test our work on larger pre-trained LM, i.e., RoBERTa [35], T5 [46] besides BERT. Finally, we compare the performance accuracy and macro-average F1 score with the standalone models (best individual model) with respect to the model soup (Table 5). From Table 5, we notice that the uniform model soup



(a) Pro-energy ads



(b) Clean-energy ads

Figure 3: Distribution of ad themes by Number of Ads, Impressions, and Spend.



(a) Economy_pro (b) Environmental (c) SupportClimatePolicy

Figure 4: Wordcloud for three messaging themes based on the popularity of ad impressions, expenditure, and the number of sponsored ads for both pro-energy and clean-energy ads.

using ad text + theme (88.8% macro-avg F1 score) outperforms the greedy model soup for text + theme and the best individual model baselines (Answer to **RQ1**).

6.2 Ablation Study

For the ablation study, we run the experiments using only ad text (we **do not** provide any theme information). We notice that the uniform model soup (text + theme) still gives better performance than the uniform model soup (text), greedy model soup (text), and the best single text only models (Table 6).

7 ANALYSES

In this section, we present analyses that address our three research questions (**RQ2**, **RQ3**, and **RQ4**).

In subsection 7.1, we find that various advertisers prioritize distinct themes to promote their narratives that endorse particular stances. In subsection 7.2, we find that advertisers aim their messages at particular demographics and geographic locations to spread their viewpoints. Subsection 7.3 shows that how messaging differs based on the entity type.

7.1 Narrative Analysis

We consider only ads with correct stance prediction and corresponding themes for narrative analysis. To answer **RQ2**, we analyze the messaging strategies used by the advertisers (Fig. 3). By impressions and expenditures, the most popular ***pro-energy*** messaging theme is '**Economy_pro**', accounting for approximately 27% of total impressions and 28.7% of total expenditure (Fig. 3a). Under this theme, narratives promote how *'natural gas and oil industry will drive economic recovery', 'GDP would decline by a cumulative* 700 *billion through 2030 and* 1 *million industry jobs would be lost by 2022 under natural gas and oil leasing and development ban'* (Fig. 4a).

Based on impression, the most popular ***clean-energy*** messaging category is '**SupportClimatePolicy**' (Fig. 3b) (approximately 35%), which features narratives supporting Build Back Better Act[5] to *fight climate change, create clean energy jobs, equitable clean energy future, take bold climate action* (Fig. 4c). Based on spend, the most popular (42%) ***clean-energy*** messaging theme is '**Environmental**' (Fig. 3b). This theme focuses on narratives about *'how dirty fossil fuel industries would harm the indigenous peoples and wildlife', 'why climate scientists agree that climate change causes more extreme droughts, bigger fires and deadlier heat', 'effects of carbon pollution on climate crisis'* etc (Fig. 4b).

7.2 Demographic and Geographics Distribution by Impressions

As Facebook enables its customers to target ads using demographics and geographic information, we further analyze the distribution of the messaging categories to answer **RQ3**. At first, we perform a chi-square test [12] of contingency to calculate the statistical significance of an association between demographic group and their stances. The null hypothesis H_0 assumes that there is no association between the variables, while the alternative hypothesis H_a claims that some association does exist. The chi-square test statistic is computed as follows:

$$\chi^2 = \sum \frac{(observed - expected)^2}{expected}$$

The distribution of the statistic χ^2 is denoted as $\chi^2_{(df)}$, where df is the number of degrees of freedom. $df = (r-1)(c-1)$, where r represents the number of rows and c represents the number of columns in the contingency table. The p-value for the chi-square test is the probability of observing a value at least as extreme as the test statistic for a chi-square distribution with $(r-1)(c-1)$ degrees of freedom. To perform a chi-square test, we take gender distribution over stance and age distribution over stance separately to build contingency tables correspondingly.

The null hypothesis, H_0: whether the demographic group and their stances are independent, i.e., *no relationship.*

The alternative hypothesis H_a: whether the demographic group and their stances are dependent, i.e., $\exists$ *a relationship.*

We choose the value of significance level, $\alpha = 0.05$. The p-value for both cases is < 0.05, which is statistically significant. We reject the null hypothesis H_0, indicating some association between the audience's demographics and their stances on climate change. Fig. 5a shows that *more males than females* view the ***pro-energy*** ads, and *more females than males* watch ***clean-energy*** ads. However, ***pro-energy*** ads are mostly viewed by the *older population (65+)* (Fig. 5b). On the other hand, *young people* from the age range of $25-34$ watch ***clean-energy*** ads (Fig. 5b).

In Fig. 6, we show the distribution of impressions over US states for both stances. To plot the distribution, we use the Choropleth map[6] in Python. ***Pro-energy*** ads receive the most views from Texas which is the energy capital of the world[7] (Fig. 6a). Fig. 6b shows that ***clean-energy*** ads are mostly viewed from California because recently, CA has become one of the loudest voices in the fight against climate change[8].

Type	Entity
Corporation	EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION
Corporation	Shell
Corporation	BP CORPORATION NORTH AMERICA INC.
Corporation	Twin Metals Minnesota
Corporation	Wink to Webster Pipeline LLC
Industry Association	AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE
Industry Association	New York Propane Gas Association
Industry Association	Texas Oil & Gas Association
Industry Association	New Mexico Oil and Gas Association
Industry Association	National Propane Gas Association
Advocacy Group	Coloradans for Responsible Energy Development
Advocacy Group	Grow Louisiana Coalition
Advocacy Group	Voices for Cooperative Power
Advocacy Group	Consumer Energy Alliance
Advocacy Group	Maine Affordable Energy

Table 7: List of entities from pro-energy ads.

[5] https://www.whitehouse.gov/build-back-better/

[6] https://plotly.com/python/choropleth-maps/

[7] www.eia.gov/

[8] www.pewtrusts.org



(a) Gender **(b) Age group**

Figure 5: Distribution of impressions over demographic distribution both for pro-energy and clean-energy ads. (a) More males than females watch the pro-energy ads. On the other hand, more females than males view clean-energy ads. (b) The older population (65+) watches the pro-energy ads. In contrast, the younger population (25 − 34) watches clean-energy ads.



(a) pro-energy **(b) clean-energy**

Figure 6: Distribution of impressions over geographic. Pro-energy ads are mostly viewed from Texas (a), whereas clean-energy ads are mostly viewed from California (b).

7.3 Distribution of Messaging by Entity Type

Fig. 7 shows the top 5 funding entities based on expenditure in pro-energy and clean-energy ads. We notice that **Exxon Mobil Corporation**, which is one of the world's largest publicly traded international oil and gas companies[9], spends the most on sponsoring pro-energy ads on Facebook. Clean-energy ads are mostly sponsored by **The Climate Pledge**, which is powered by 378 companies in 34 countries around the globe[10].

To understand how fossil fuel industries and their support groups influence public opinion, we categorize pro-energy funding entities into three types, i.e., Corporations, Industry Associations, and Advocacy Groups. Finally, we select the top 5 pro-energy funding entities based on their expenditure for each category. Table 7 shows the list of pro-energy entities included in our analysis.

The highest spending on '**Economy_pro**' narratives comes from all three entity types (Fig. 8). Corporation entities spend on '**Patriotism**' narratives as their second target. Furthermore, advocacy groups focus on '**Pragmatism**' narratives as their second target. Moreover, industry associations spend almost equally on '**ClimateSolution**' and '**AgainstClimatePolicy**' narratives. Analyzing the messaging themes for different funding entities indicates different groups are fulfilling different messaging roles (Answer to **RQ4**).

[9]https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/
[10]https://www.theclimatepledge.com/

8 CONCLUSION

We propose a minimally supervised model soup approach leveraging messaging themes to identify stances of climate related ads on social media. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first work that uses a probabilistic machine learning approach to analyze climate campaigns. We hope our approach of stance detection and theme analysis will help policymakers to navigate the complex world of energy.



Figure 7: Top 5 funding entities based on expenditure. Orange plot represents pro-energy. Green plot represents clean-energy.



Figure 8: Pro-energy ad themes by funding entity type.

9 LIMITATIONS

In this work, we predict the stances of ads using the theme information. We can further explore other potential tasks, such as moral foundation analysis [23, 24], which will help model the dependencies between the different levels of analysis.

Note that our fine-tuned SBERT based theme assignment model is an unsupervised learning approach and an alternative approach could be zero-shot and/or few-shot classification models [6]. We leave this exploration for future work.

Moreover, our analysis might have an unknown bias as it is based on English written ads on Facebook focusing on the United States only. Another limitation is transparency – some particular aspects of the advertising campaigns are not available to the public through the Facebook Ads Library API, thus limiting our findings.

10 ETHICS STATEMENT

The data collected in this work was made publicly available by Facebook Ads API. The data does not contain any personally identifying information and reports engagement patterns at an aggregate level. The authors' personal views are not represented in any qualitative result we report, as it is solely an outcome derived from a machine learning model.

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AI Art and Misinformation: Approaches and Strategies for Media Literacy and Fact Checking

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ABSTRACT

Misinformation in its many forms is a substantial and growing problem for society today. Whether financially or ideologically motivated, purveyors of misinformation do not abide by legal, technical or moral rules. Therefore new, ludic, narrative, gamified and artistic approaches are needed. In this paper we analyse the approaches taken in countering misinformation by 18 AI and machine learning works of art, developed in the MediaFutures project. We examine how these align with existing AI approaches to countering misinformation, and how they address some of the key challenges. We show that AI artists engage with existing debunking and inoculating strategies, including highly technical aspects such as deepfakes, while also utilizing focused strategies of data literacy and collective intelligence. We also find that they are able to integrate hard-to-refute strategies such as narrative and emotion. These findings suggest that data as an art material and AI techniques as art tools are worth of further investigation as to their effectiveness for countering misinformation within society.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Information systems** → *Social recommendation*; • **Computing methodologies** → **Machine learning**; • **Applied computing** → **Media arts**.

KEYWORDS

Misinformation, fake news, disinformation, AI art, media literacy, fact checking

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1 INTRODUCTION

Misinformation of various types has been around for centuries, but has grown as the technologies that enable its spread have grown. This matters as misinformation negatively affects the wellbeing of individuals, groups and society in a number of ways. It can undermine democracy [43], reduce climate change consensus [54], exacerbate crises [50] and even lead to death [13]. Further, the proliferation of ways in which misinformation can be encountered also matters, as repeated exposure to a piece of misinformation boosts its likelihood of being believed [35]. Misinformation is also more compelling when it is delivered in emotional language, or designed to be attention-grabbing [35].

Social media is a key forum for misinformation as it enables even those without formal knowledge of the workings of mass media to become content creators, challenging the domain of traditional media [25]. In the run up to the 2016 elections over one quarter of Americans visited a fake news site, visiting an average of 5.5 articles each [37]. Algorithms are a key component of social media, recommending content to users that will keep them engaged with the platform and so provide exposure for adverts [33]. This process is opaque to users and so has been called 'invisible attention engineering' [55]. Misinformation is frequently designed to work with the algorithms to find its way into users' feeds [55].

Art, in the form of cave paintings, predates modern humanity. These paintings and stories shared orally were a way to share knowledge before the existence of written language. The narrative patterns enabled them to be more readily absorbed and remembered by their recipients, who needed the information contained within them to survive. The arts, therefore, are a key way of enabling people to develop the knowledge they need in order to engage effectively with the world around them.

Artists have been working with AI since the 1970s [25]. Algorithms and art are a current topic of much interest, both in popular culture and academia, fueled by the accessibility of algorithmically generated art using large language models such as Dall-E. However, there is also an emerging field of Critical AI art that seeks to engage and comment on society, and with it, attention given to the ethical use of AI tools in this critical art [18].

In this paper we look at art that exposes, refutes or counters various forms of misinformation, by using data science and AI approaches. We describe our use of the term misinformation and some of its key impacts and motivations. The key strategies used

to counter it, media literacy and fact checking, plus algorithmic methods for these, are explored. We show that AI art is used to highlight social tensions in AI itself and as a critique of technology, making it a potential strategy for dealing with misinformation. We identify the strategies used to challenge misinformation online by AI artists through interviews. We find that as well as using current technologies from the computing and journalism sectors, artists incorporate emotion, narrative and explicit ethical appeal in order to counter misinformation.

Our research questions therefore are: 1. What strategic approaches does AI art take to countering misinformation? 2. Which data, tools and techniques are utilized? 3. How does the artistic approach add value to algorithmic approaches to countering misinformation?

This paper makes two key contributions. Firstly, it contributes to the corpus on countering misinformation by analysing a specific and emerging AI approach, and examining how this may support more established approaches. Secondly, it contributes to the growing corpus on AI and the arts by describing the use of AI for artistic creation in a specific context.

2 BACKGROUND LITERATURE

2.1 The challenge of online misinformation

There is no agreed typology of the kinds of incorrect information that is disseminated online both knowingly and unknowingly, although there are some taxonomies created within specific terms [32], [40]. The term 'misinformation is generally understood to mean incorrect information in the sense that it differs from the best available expert information or established fact [57]. 'Disinformation' is seen as more pernicious, and constitutes knowingly incorrect information created for 'public harm or for profit' [28]. Since 2016 these terms have been joined, and possibly superceded in popular imagination by the term 'fake news' [39] which itself includes a number of formulations, including propaganda, trolling, conspiracy theories and satire [53]. Throughout this paper we use employ the term 'misinformation' to represent all forms of incorrect news messaging.

Misinformation in the political sphere has led to "cognitive fallout" where people can continue to believe misinformation even after having been told it is untrue [35]. This "continued influence effect" of misinformation has been demonstrated repeatedly [30], [11]. One of the "fingerprints" of misinformation is its emotional appeal, with high emotionality ensuring virality and hindering analytical explanation [14]. As a consequence, misinformation spreads to up to 1,000 times more people than factual information [56], although some research has shown this is a function of the larger size of some fake news cascades [31].

The growth of large language models has increased the democratic access to content creation online [48], but this very facility presents a threat from machine generated fake news. Another form of machine generated fake news is 'deepfake' videos. These use generative adversarial networks to create believable yet false media [38]. The Korean news channel MBN created a deepfake of its anchor Kim Joo-ha for a bulletin [16], however, the majority of deepfakes are created for the purposes of misinformation. Well-known deepfakes exist of world leaders. such as US film director Jordan Peele's deepfake of Barack Obama discussing deepfakes [44], or more malignly, Vlodymyr Zylynsky suggesting Ukrainian soldiers lay down their weapons [17].

The key motivations for the production and dissemination of misinformation are financial and ideological [7]. Making money via advertising revenue generated by clicks and views on websites is attractive to the fake new media as well as the real news media. An example of this is the far-right conspiracy theory and fake news website InfoWars, which at one point in 2018 made USD800,000 a day. Financially motivated fake news sites often use narrative techniques (clickbait) to appeal to the unwary, such as 'You won't believe what Obama says in this video." [44], [7].

Ideological motivations are more complicated. Propaganda ensures when official bodies spread fake news for ideological reasons. Satire is fake news spread by legitimate bodies for the purpose of entertaining their audience. Trolling is fake news (usually) spread by individuals for' their own entertainment or personal purposes. Largely, these are all driven by requirements for power and influence, albeit in different ways [7].

2.2 Data-driven approaches to countering misinformation

The two key approaches that have been taken to stemming the spread of misinformation online are fact-checking and the development of media literacy within populations (especially youthful ones).

2.2.1 Fact checking. Fact checking is "the systematic publishing assessments of the validity of claims made by public officials and institutions with an explicit attempt to identify whether a claim is factual" [59]. As such it is conducted after the dissemination of misinformation and is colloquially known as 'debunking' [35]. It is performed by both journalistic and non-journalistic bodies such as the Associated Press and FactCheck.org. Both of these organisations use human-led, investigative reporter techniques for fact checking. However, effectiveness of fact-checking as a tool for counteracting misinformation is somewhat undermined by people's unwillingness to accept corrective fact-checking [10]. While "falsehoods" can be corrected, feelings are more challenging [36].

Computationally-oriented approaches are primarily based on knowledge graphs [19]. There are automated approaches that focus on fake news detection, such as Hoaxy [46], which visualise the spread of information on Twitter, and websites that identify how much content around a news story appears to be linked to bots such as Botometer [1]. ClaimBuster flags up claims that appear to be worthy of checking, based on a combination of natural language processing and machine learning [24]. However, this is a very emergent area, and "the potential for automated responses to online misinformation that work at scale and don't require human supervision remains sharply limited today" [24]. With this aim, several automated fake news detection techniques have been developed, based on algorithmic techniques such as random forests (multiple decision trees), content features for classification and neural networks, although they have not necessarily been very successful [26]. One challenge is the variety of types of fake news which has no agreed taxonomy [32].

Further, collecting reliable datasets of fake and trustworthy news on which to train these techniques is not a trivial task and no benchmark dataset exists [36]. Datasets of importance include FEVER, consisting of 185,445 claims generated by altering sentences extracted from Wikipedia and LIAR, based on statements from Politifact.

Approaches to counter machine generated misinformation have been based on identifying the difference between machine and human generated writing. However, they have been less successful in distinguishing legitimate from false machine generated writing, as, unlike humans, machines do not alter their styles between true and false information [45]. Techniques for countering deepfakes include many versions of artifact detection, strict blockchain data provenance for multimedia, and counter attacks [8].

2.2.2 Media Literacy. Media literacy is the development by an individual of a set of skills around critical thinking, evaluation strategies, search skills and knowledge of the news and media industries [12],[20]. Limited research on games and gamification shows that these might also help media literacy. This suggests active engagement with different literacy skills, rather than passive instruction, is important [20]. Media literacy is seen as a 'pre-emptive' approach [35] and has in the past been characterised as an 'psychological inoculation' approach in that it seeks to arm the individual with the skills necessary to critically appraise and identify misinformation when coming into contact with it [36],[12].

A number of studies confirm that media literacy is correlated with the ability to identify misinformation, or engage critically with information online [20]. In one such study a practical test was administered to 63 adults aged 19-24, which showed that critical evaluation behaviours were positively correlated to the correct identification of fake news stories [34]. Unlike debunking, inoculation works equally despite prior attitudes [36].

Computational approaches to media literacy are based on identifying the algorithmic knowledge a media literate public would need to possess, and delivering that through computing education. A key component of this is raising awareness of aspects such as invisible attention engineering, bots/agents, content filtering and tracking [55]. This involves not only creating awareness of the technical capabilities, but their implications. In a post-digital world, in which the digital world and the 'real world' are no longer meaningfully separate, the technical and the political can no longer be separate [29].

The existence of 'big' datasets for training purposes is a key reason AI research is currently flourishing. Hence, the need for a data literacy within media literacy in order to understand the potential impacts of AI, given that the datasets themselves are frequently problematic [29]. Even more specifically, there have been calls for an algorithmic literacy [47].

In addition to these purely educational approaches, a computational approach has arisen that involves automatically notifying readers of the pragmatics of the content, in order to augment their media literacy in context. These could then identify ways that the reader is being manipulated without their awareness, such as by certain tropes being used as narrative frames [9].

Contemporary media literacy tends to organize around five themes: youth participation, teacher training and curricular resources, parental support, policy initiatives, and evidence base construction [12]. However, older adults are particularly susceptible to fake news and consume substantially more than younger people. This may be in part due to not being 'digital natives' and having less facility with the technology on which they encounter fake news [42].

2.3 Critical AI art

According to the World Economic Forum, "Giving people access to data most often leaves them feeling overwhelmed and disconnected, not empowered and poised for action. This is where art can make a difference. Art does not show people what to do, yet engaging with a good work of art can connect you to your senses, body, and mind." [21]. The participation of artists in technological or scientific projects has proven to question technologies, increase citizens' awareness, explore hypothetical paths for progress, enhance and humanize technologies [21].

The first decade of this century saw AI artists exploring natural language processing, computer vision and pattern recognition. In the 2010s deep learning technologies enabled greater expansion [25]. Non-fungible tokens, facilitating a market for digital art, have further brought AI art into the mainstream [25]. High-profile projects such as The Next Rembrandt, which used deep learning to generate a 'typical' Rembrandt painting, tapped into corporate sponsorship as well as industry, public sector and academic partnerships [2].

A specific form of AI artwork is critical AI art – used to address social tensions arising from technology and to enable a sense of critical distance from the technology [51]. A number of artworks, such as Capture (2020) and DataMasks (2014), engage with what has been called "algorithmic anxiety" around the growing ubiquity of facial recognition technologies [58]. DataMasks created masks that, "are shadows of human beings as seen by the minds-eye of the machine-organism" [15]. Projects such as MIT's Crowd-Sourced Intelligence Agency (2015) expose dataveillance practices by allowing visitors to assume the role of security analysts and monitor and analyse their friends' tweets [23]. The well-known ImageNet Roulette (2019) uses classification techniques to illustrate what happens when technical systems are trained on problematic data [3].

As well as being fake news, deepfakes are used as art work to address the dangers of deepfakes themselves. The deepfake In Event of Moon Disaster (2020) purports to show a recording of President Nixon delivering a contingency speech in the event of the Apollo 11 moon mission ending disastrously. It was created by MIT to educate people about the existence of deepfakes and the challenges of identifying them [41]. Artist Bill Posters created a deepfake of Mark Zuckerberg, entitled 'I wish I could…' (2019), which was commissioned for exhibition to raise awareness of how people can be manipulated by social media. This video, showing Zuckerberg boasting that Facebook owns its users, was subsequently posted to Instagram (and was still there at the time of writing). Such works explicitly engage with and critically examine the ethics of AI.

In particular, critical AI art facilitates such aspects as linking "underlying technical systems to structural issues of power", enables experiential learning, and crucially, allows interpretation rather than straightforward explanation [27]. There are a number of projects that aim to use art based on data technologies to interrogate existing structures or create new insights. The British Antarctic Survey Data as Art programme developed a series of artworks using Antarctic data, with the aim of engaging a broad audience with the question

of, 'why is this data important for society?' [4]. RAND Art + Data engaged artists to create visual stories with the aim of challenging the audience to think differently about policy analysis, including topics such as barriers to Covid vaccination and Russian propaganda [5]. The EU S+T+ARTS programme (science plus technology plus the arts) aims to support interdisciplinary teams of artists and technologist to creatively innovate in a host of fields [52]. The project DataStories aimed to investigate data in a "post-truth environment" using a variety of narrative approaches across a number of media including film [6]. There is sufficient volume of artists working in critical AI to provoke the need for a taxonomy of data as a material [22].

Figure 1: Data-Masks Installation in Karlsruhe, 2015 [Public domain], via the artist's website.

3 METHODOLOGY

To investigate the use of fact-checking and media literacy strategies by critical AI artists, we conducted interviews with participants in the Horizon Europe project MediaFutures.

3.1 MediaFutures

MediaFutures is part of the European S+T+Arts programme. It offers grant funding and support for startups and artists, via open calls held in 2020, 2021 and 2022. In MediaFutures, artists are asked to use data as an art material to create works that question the impact of misinformation on individuals and society. The 1st cohort graduated in September 2021, the 2nd cohort graduated in April 2022 and a 3rd cohort started in November 2022 and will graduate in June 2023.

Currently, 10 art pilots have concluded, with a further 5 currently in the third cohort of the programme. A further 8 projects where artists collaborated with startups have also concluded, giving a participant pool of 18 projects. (There are currently 4 more such projects in the programme.) Of the concluded art projects, some are in their final version and have exhibited their work, while others are still pre-exhibition. Of these projects, some use AI to explore and challenge AI, while others use AI/machine learning to explore non-AI contexts. This includes both 'pure' art works and art works with a commercialisation element, developed by artists and startups together. A description of all the art projects in the first two cohorts of the programme can be found in the Appendix.

3.2 Interviews and analysis

We interviewed the artists and startups behind 18 art projects in the MediaFutures programme. These interviews took place after the end of the first and second rounds of the MediaFutures residency and acceleration programme in 2021 and 2022. The interviews were structured, took place remotely and were accompanied by three questions on the data, tools, and techniques used which were sent and answered via email (see Appendix B). The interviews were then transcribed and thematic analysis was conducted. The projects are referred to by ID numbers in the results. Our interview pool was constituted by all the art and artist/start up projects that were selected for the second phase of the MediaFutures project (developing the project to the exhibition/pre-exhibition stage). The interview guide can be found in Appendix 2. We then applied inductive analysis to the interview transcripts, developing codes as we read.

4 RESULTS

4.1 Approaches to media literacy and fact checking

The projects in MediaFutures engaged in both debunking and inoculation strategies. The projects that focused on debunking ([774452], [580713], [504746] amongst others) were aware of the necessity for datasets in combatting fake news, and created new datasets by bringing together multiple different sources. "Specialists cannot combat misinformation if they don't have data to analyse it…we wanted to do is to create a dataset of fake news, which are specific to [a] region, because [it] is highly underrepresented in terms of misinformation…So we talked with all these organisations, and we say, Let's unite all these databases in order to create a big data set for the academic community" [580713]. Artistic engagement was seen as a unique way not only to spread information but also to gather hard to access data. "If you don't understand street stories, you don't understand what's really going on, and you don't get street stories in response to surveys or in response to experts going into interviews or running focus group" [776326]. Those datasets are used in many works for building AI models that allow classifying claims based on their feasibility, auto fact-checking, or fine-tuning pre-existing AI models for a specific context or topic. For instance, Computer-Assisted Recognition of Denial and Skepticism (CARDS) is employed in classifying different types of misinformation on climate change.

Many artists were familiar with and engaged with media literacy theory. "It's very important to understand how to debunk them, how to find a way to raise the resilience and the capacity of people dealing with all this information… and also the creation or the critical thinking of people" [774452]. Artists frequently specified exactly how they believed media literacy creates protection against misinformation. "The main aspects, which we wish to deliver, as an impact to society is strong, critical thinking, super important, as we believe that educated persons can't be influenced by propaganda so easily" [423794.] Others extended the link from critical thinking to behaviour change. "So [engaging with the artwork] as

Figure 2: Epic Sock Puppet Theater uses datasets of right and left wing 'sock puppet' social media accounts, the words of which are then spoken by animatronic sock puppets [Public domain], via MediaFutures.

the foundational of media literacy, of behavioural changes, I guess" [504746].

In terms of data, Twitter was a commonly used source of data in artworks that took a media literacy approach. [984662, 193374]. The GDELT Global Difference Graph (GDG) databases were used to analyze more than 250,000 headlines of Russian-language media publications for fake news identification [774452]. However, artists often created their own datasets for various reasons. One artist ran up against the problem of there simply being no appropriate existing dataset for Eastern Europe [580713]. The LIAR and LIAR+ datasets were used in this project not for their data, but to inform the structuring of the new dataset to address fake news. Another required a very small, specific dataset [859977]. Others sought to collect data that did not otherwise exist, for instance, micro-narratives [776326]. One artwork consisted of a browser plug in that used 11 data sources, including Wikidata and review site TrustPilot, to make visible the underlying ethics of certain websites [504746].

The artists were, overall, very clear on how data-driven art builds media literacy. For instance, "every time disinformation is picked up in the sense of sound or data, there's always this critical approach in revealing mechanisms, but also in the systematic refutation of the disinformation. You see the digital analysis mechanisms and you hear refutations so there's a strong critical thinking here" [831967]. One team believed that debunking approaches were ineffective, and disrupting people's patterns of thinking would be more effective. "I think that there seems to be a dominant view, … that you handle myths by making people more aware of facts, and that's a really bad sign …we think art can provide a line of flight by which people can escape from those dominant patterns" [776326]. One project moved away from either approach to consider less how misinformation is countered, towards, "how do we improve access to accurate information" [859977].

Another focus around data was increasing data literacy, enhancing the ability of the audience to understand aspects of the data, either what it contained or how it was created. This might be simply provoking interest in data, by creating an "immersive experience [that] can become a kind of stepping stone for these people to get curious about" [369215] Some goals were very ambitious, aiming for "people [to] understand better large amounts of data in the making. What is data, how it's done, how you make sense of a database" [758112]. One artist found that collecting data from others, and analysing it, subverted the dominant trope, "as users, companies and governments are analysing us, and in this case we are analysing" [774452].

Educational aspects appear, therefore, to be very present in how the artists are thinking about their artworks and what they want participants, viewers or audiences to take away with them. "Instead of exit through the gift shop, we're thinking it's kind of like exit through the educational aspect of why this exists and kind of details about the process of how these were made, implications for how synthetic media is being used in the world today" [060672]. However, various strategies were employed here. Some were more ludic approaches, "the whole mission of our project is to educate people about what this information is methods of manipulation of their brains, but make it in a gamified way" [423794]. Others explicitly used the base of education to build more concrete behaviour change upon. "I call it an educational art tool. But we have ideas for how it's not just be this kind of individual tool that you use to educate yourself. It's how do we turn you from this individual into collective of individuals. The long objective for this is to use [the artwork] as a form of protest" [504746]. Adding these layers of complexity to simple educational tools also appeared in other ways. One of the artist/startup teams particularly noted that it was important to "educate from within" in terms of the infrastructures worked with, but also that their educational tool needed to "allow for these ambiguities and uncertainties" [758112] surrounding the particular data they worked with.

4.2 Tools and techniques

The artworks created varied widely in form. Some were installations which the audience could experience physically (e.g. 730 Hours of Violence, How many heartbeats to send an email), Critical Climate Change Machine) some were on the web (e.g. Invisible Voices, Social Sandwich) and some in the metaverse (e.g. Time Lapse Migration). Like ImageNet Roulette, many of the works took a hybrid form and can be exhibited in person and on the web. MediaFutures offered technical support to the artists, but the artists involved are often technically highly skilled. "Because I have an interest as an artist, I think that as an artist, we have to be involved in developing our digital tools… You know, that's my art." [758112] "the artists knew more on NFT than us [the startup partner] because they are really into digital art" [748452].

The use of AI and computational methods varied widely across the art works. Some projects were highly complex and used as many as 20 tools or libraries, among them AI models for classifying, predicting or generating content [101362]. A number of the more technically simple projects, such as generating sound or images processing data from social networks, like Twitter, utilized only 4 [984662]. There were also a number of artworks that used data as a source for building the narrative, rather than incorporating it directly in AI, or other computational, models (734815, 859977).

One artist working in the media literacy space described the process as "classical data science pipeline… classical data science

tools" [423794]. Many artists followed this traditional pipeline of data collection, preparation, exploration, visualisation, experimentation and classification. Some of them used visualisation as the end product [774452], and there was the use of supervised classification and regression models (e.g., K-nearest neighbours, DBSCAN or Neural Networks).

One network-based artwork, which had an accompanying commercial product, used knowledge graphs for extracting insights of data. Another work, in the same vein, used network science analysis techniques to achieve perform clustering of networks and in graphs and, ultimately, visualize them.



Figure 3: Illustration from Bibliograph, showing how objects in a library are related. [Public domain], via MediaFutures.

One of the most advanced uses of AI in the artwork was for generating synthetic content. Open-source tools like Tools such as the faceswapping framework SimSwap were used by artists addressing deepfakes who also used generative adversarial networks [353266]. Visitors to Oracle Network were introduced to deepfakes by animation of their own images, with First order motion models, which were also used for The Evil Magic Mirror and Soft Evidence. Not all artists developed their work from scratch. One work was based on an existing classifier that had been developed in research. Amongst artists generating,creating and exploring the impacts of deepfakes, existing datasets such as WIDER FACE were used. However, ethical concerns, primarily regarding whether consent for images of real people to be utilized for deepfakes could properly be described as informed, led some of the artists employing deep fake technologies to the creation of their own datasets using generative adversarial networks [353266, 060672].

Most of the artworks developed their work based on open-source tools following the recommendations of mentors in the residency and acceleration programme, however others created their tools from scratch. Consequently, MediaFutures encouraged the publication of datasets and code created by the artists and the algorithms created for an artwork on propaganda are available for others to use in working with propaganda narratives [774452] Again, concern about misuse meant that artists working with deepfake technology were reluctant to do this. [569260].

4.3 Emotion, narrative and ethics in misinformation countering strategies

"Art has a special way, in the way we make sense of things, and we make sense of data. And that art has that kind of level of abstraction that can bridge things" [776326]. The power of art was seen to be facilitative, with art going beyond existing data visualisation techniques and enabling exploration of "much more than representations of the data" [996510]. Others felt the relationship between data and art worked "efficiently" and," the data approach can be enriched with the artistic methods" [774452]. It was believed that, "this interdisciplinary connection between data and art is becoming more and more important and more valid" [758112].

Narrative, or story-telling, was seen as a key aspect of many of the artworks. Simply consumed narratives easily go viral. "So one of the ways that people can find stories, and one of the ways they can discover meaning, is through art, through cartoons. Cartoons are very effective. They go viral" [776326] Another artist described their product as a "storytelling platform" [774452]. Narrative was seen by one team as effective in creating behaviour change. "That's one of the things we do with narrative…So one of the ways you get people to change is ask them a question that they can't answer without thinking or acting differently" [776326].

Emotion is often seen as a tool of misinformation, but the artists frequently engaged with this in their work. One artist used AI emotion analytics to gather information on people interacting with their artwork, and personalised the experience based on that. "There are three emotions, focused, energetic and rage. And for each of those, I create a specific soundtrack. So depending on the emotion when the user is using his mouse, it will say okay, it seems like you're a bit energetic, so it's going to play the energetic track and that way for everybody, the game is going to sound different" [423794]. Emotion was seen as a way to grasp the attention of users. "We need a very strong emotional reaction and engagement in order for people to start understanding how important it is to seek truth, you know, what is truth?" [266713].

Other artists focused on the importance of removing emotion to create neutral ground on which to discuss otherwise emotionally-heightened subjects. Two works explicitly facilitate this platform for dialogue, while others seek to find a way to integrate multiple sides of the story into their artwork. "I need to learn how to look at [a person who is very conditioned to believing misinformation] side of story as well" [266713]. Artists were seen as people who were particularly capable of communicating multiple points of view, "because artists in their worlds express a lot of narrative stories and different points of view" [734815]. Other pieces take what are normally highly-politicised subjects and make them, "purposefully neutral and apolitical. This allows people to engage on neutral ground for conversation about image manipulation and the risk of misinformation posed by such technologies" [060672].

Sound, visuals and touch were viewed as a way of bringing emotions into the misinformation area in a positive way, and combatting potential for attention drift. These emotions might be positive, "because it's something engaging and funny…it would catch their mind as being a different way of explaining and visualising something that before was boring," [201483]. An augmented reality project implemented 'explosions' into their game after discovering

users found it, "satisfying" [580713]. Related to this is art's ability to be multi-sensory and transpose the abstract to the physical. "These abstract concepts, about fake news, . . . this is an enormous amount of data and I think it's very hard to imagine how it looks like, how it sounds like, so we're trying to appeal to the different senses of the audience" [996510]. "Even though I'm using data and binaries, I wanted to make sure that people understand that [misinformation] has a huge material effect on everybody. I'm using a heartbeat, which, when you put your hand on it, you can literally feel the heartbeat" [266713]. This appeal was deemed necessary as an approach by some artists as a deliberate response to the perceived low refutation abilities of current strategies. "We want to create artistic interpretation of fake news, so that people are engaged that find them catchy, visually appealing, we strongly believe that having very strict and boring way of saying, this is fake news...is not engaging people" [774452]. A further art work built on this by segmenting their audience by psychological learning types and developing elements for visual, sound and kinaesthetic individuals [423794].

While all the artists considered the ethical aspects of their artwork as part of the MediaFutures process, some also surfaced ethical questions to their audience. One artist noted that engaging in a project that sought to educate people about harms required a high level of ethicality, especially around transparency, so people engage with the work can trust them. "Ethics has always been at the heart of it..it's about trust. And if we're not doing it right, then then who are we commenting on other people's [ethics]?" [504746]. As noted above, dataset compilation raised many ethical concerns, in particular with regard to deepfakes. "Oftentimes, when you see a deepfake, this many images are scraped from Google without anyone's consent. But we created every single one, so also raising awareness about consent and use of data." [060672].

Figure 4: Still from deepfake video Soft Evidence [Public domain], via MediaFutures.

5 DISCUSSION

Most of the art works in MediaFutures discussed above engage with the key existing strategies for countering misinformation online. They largely adhere to media literacy routes but also develop new, clean verifiable data sets, valuable for fact checking, and many worked with deepfakes to raise awareness of the technology's capabilities and impact. Only one artist rejected the idea that fact-checking would work as an approach. However, an emergent strategy appeared to be focused around collaborative intelligence, essentially a distributed network where each agent contributes autonomously to problem solving. This approach has been used in, for instance, participatory democracy. One of the challenges for traditional counteraction strategies is that they largely attempt to apply considered and direct approaches to mitigating the effects of often highly emotional misinformation. Many of the art works in MediaFutures deal with the challenge of emotion head on, whether by responding emotionally, or neutralizing the emotion in the misinformation. Simply by being art, and sitting outside of the traditional online arenas of media and social media, art is able to create more neutral ground for the discussion of politicised subjects that are vulnerable to post-truth argumentation. This neutral ground is sometimes highly structured, as in Social Sandwich, which reflects other attempts to create less polarised social media online. Similarly, one project used 'standard' classifier, clustering and neural network approaches to the detection of fake news, but added the additional element of using emotion to identify to alert people that they had encountered untrustworthy news.

Deliberately trying to engage an audience or making an intervention 'less boring' has not necessarily been a key goal of media literacy attempts, many of which work with captive audiences. Artists, however, are experienced in the aim of capturing the attention of potential audiences in a world competing for attention, and this has been the driver behind collaborations such as the British Antarctic Survey exhibition. Through the ability to be multi-sensory (even online, through the use of sound) art has an extra dimension through which to communicate with the audience, and be, in the words of one artist, "much more than representations of data". This is key, as it is this appeal which enables virality. Many of the interviewees discussed narrative as a compelling technique for engaging with their audience, or for ensuring their audience engaged with each other. This narrative could then be distributed and consumed via any of the multisensory methods described above, from a brief cartoon to a virtual exhibition of refugee art, but with the ability to appeal to the natural human instinct for storytelling. This reflects the findings that artistic approaches enable interpretation by the audience, requiring engagement, rather than a one-way explanation [4].

Although the types of projects selected into MediaFutures meant that our dataset would not include any artists who were using wholly non-AI approaches to critique misinformation, there was still a vast spectrum across the use of data and technology. While there was standard use of such datasets such as LIAR and techniques such as generative adversarial networks, there was also the utilisation of more unusual software such as translation software and the dataset of the Observatory of Cultural and Linguistic Diversity on the Internet [859977]. Through such approaches, AI art may offer a way to engage more tools in the fight against misinformation. As noted, the major task of debunking fake news is establishing reliable training datasets [10]. For some parts of the world these are simply not available, and the creation of these datasets as part of these artworks is a useful contribution. Artists also promote inclusivity via awareness and addressing of the inherent biases in general datasets) that are focused on claims in majority languages (e.g. English) and the lack of representativity of certain countries.

Projects such as the British Antarctic Survey and those studied in [54] focused on educating audiences. Many of the artists we interviewed engaged specifically with educating their audiences around data, to the point that data literacy, rather than a broader media literacy, was their aim. The artists were sensitive to and responsive to the idea that some groups were excluded from the majority of media literacy approaches, and there was focus on making artworks inclusive and accessible in terms of the amount of digital awareness that was necessary to engage with them, despite their underlying use of AI tools and techniques. This is particularly clear in works such as 730 Hours of Violence, Soft Evidence or How Many Heartbeats to Send a Love Email, where the audience can experience the art works in comparatively familiar ways.

The artworks frequently demonstrated economy of use with multiple aims, but with the audience able to engage with the art at whatever level they felt comfortable. For instance, a number of art works offer tools that allow individuals to simply engage with the art work, but then provide an opportunity to engage further, either with other individuals or by taking knowledge from the artwork into other parts of life. In this way the artwork operates on a number of levels, as a visual, tactile or sonified experience, an educational tool, and then a tool of active choice, or protest against misinformation. This demonstrates the linking of the technical to the power as described in [4]. While the majority of the artists interviewed dealt with ethics mainly in terms of ensuring their own art was ethical, rather than explicitly engaging with the ethics of AI two art projects made highlighting unethical practices the focus of their engagement with misinformation.

This therefore offers a range of considerations to take into account when designing future technologies or interventions against misinformation. The first is that, as data is an established art material, many artists are well-positioned to bring technical as well as artistic skills to their work, creating highly integrated art works. We also find that narrative is a powerful tool that can be exploited through the data/art relationship and resists easy binaries. Integrating emotion into the response to emotionally-heightened misinformation allows for engagement on a more equal footing, which may help reduce the inequity of virality. We also find the idea of engaging with misinformation not prior to or post exposure, but synchronously, via collaborative and participatory opportunities for engagement, to be compelling and worthy of more investigation.

6 CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK

6.1 Conclusion

Efforts to counter misinformation online have been hampered by both an age old truism and a very contemporary concept. On the one hand, humans are emotional beings, who respond to storytelling, whether that story is objectively true or not. On the other hand, there is now, in certain circles, a reluctance to accept anything as objective fact, and a mistrust of experts. This creates fertile ground for the most appealing information to be the most widely shared, regardless of veracity, and for there to be little leverage for counter argument.

Countering misinformation with art, however, addresses both of these aspects. Firstly, we have an emotional response to art we find compelling. Secondly, although art can certainly be argued about, it cannot be argued with. After all, "you cannot refute a work of art" [49]. AI-driven artistic interventions allow their creators to use some of the same core techniques of media literacy and fact-checking, based on the same AI approaches, but also utilise multisensory and emotional tools that have the possibility of reaching a wide range of demographics.

6.2 Limitations

The strategies outlined above are from one project. They represent only a subsection of the possible approaches. A number of these artworks are yet to be implemented or exhibited, so the aims are still largely theoretical, rather than user tested for efficacy.

6.3 Future work

As it stands, the variety of strategies available to art and artists, the difficulty in countering a work of art and the fact that art can be understood on many levels mean that this intuitively appears to be a useful addition to other forms of media literacy. In particular, more work needs to be done on understanding the role of data literacy and collective intelligence. However, the effectiveness of current interventions is unclear [38]. Taken together, these suggest that more work is necessary to measure the impacts, both immediate and long term, of artistic approaches. Assessment of this is underway with a number of MediaFutures projects.

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APPENDIX A: AI ART PROJECTS IN MEDIAFUTURES 1ST (2021) AND 2ND (2022) COHORTS

Artwork	Brief Description
Soft Evidence	A series of synthetic scenes intended to be as believable as possible. In the exhibition, they mixed synthetic scenes with real scenes to invite the audience to guess which scenes are fake. This interactive guessing encouraged the audience to question the images they see, who created them and for what purpose.
Evil Magic	In this experiment the artists create a deep fake in real time with the face of the user. They demonstrated how, in a few seconds. software can capture the audience's face and body gestures, and turn their images into a deep fake saying words that they would never have said.
Social Sandwich	Offers encounters with anonymous strangers with opposing views or values. The users are invited to collaborate with one another to determine the trustworthiness of the news that appears online. During a 15 minute message-based conversation, they see the world from another perspective, and discover how to keep exchanging when they do not agree with someone's views.
Chanate Machine	Quantifies and reveals the mechanisms of misinformation on global warming. It is composed of two data sets. Fake news stories are categorised and the number of the category is displayed on the artwork. In the exhibition, correspondence is established between values and categories of detected false arguments. Confronted with a landscape of numbers, the visitors are invited to evaluate the quantities of each type of false argument.
730 Hours of Violence	An exhibition using data to explore the new paradigms of violence in the 21st century. Each piece is based on specific data sets, with the aim of engaging the audience with data and encouraging them to understand it rather than ignore it.
Two Truths and a Lie	A multimedia installation exploring the relationship between foreign languages, mother tongues and trustworthiness. In the age of disinformation, distributing credible information is an increasingly complex challenge, but what exactly makes individuals 'deem' an information source trustworthy? Combining experimental documentary, video art, spatial audio, and assemblage, the 100-channel and 100-language installation uses the children's game of 'two truths and a lie' to blend truth and fiction beyond the point of discernibility.
Invisible Voice	A browser plugin that empowers individuals to make informed decisions about the websites and companies that they use. It opens a pop-up, that displays data to enable the user to make informed decisions based on the company's practices, derived from 17 databases.
Edit Wars	The project addresses the use of aggressive narratives in the government-controlled media that isolate public perception from the real state of affairs. Data from large datasets are analysed quantitatively and qualitatively to draw meaningful conclusions for the presentation, and the findings displayed in a multimedia interactive medium.
Synthetic Identity Speculations	A participatory artistic research project that monitors individual synergy effects of social network algorithms and their impact on body images. Transgressing platforms through hyperrealistic ideals and potentially momentous misclassifications, accountability for algorithmic agency is effectively shifted to users.
How Many Heartbeats to	Offers a new narrative about energy consumption and digital data through an interactive experience engaging our own body energy. This artwork intends to create awareness on digital pollution caused by

Send A Love Email	infobesity and fake news, and to question our intimate relationship with online data.
Bibliograph	Bibliograph combines two micro tools for collective linked data aggregation, text annotation and voice recording. The resulting semantic layer allows greater engagement with texts. We are proposing the use of this tools in a non-technical digita environment suited for independent research, autonomy and digital literacy.
HyperViz	This immersive prototype turns hyperspectral data satellite data from a wide variety of sectors including environmental management, agriculture and pandemics into a digital experience for the general public in a way that raw data cannot be experienced.
Fragile Perspectives	A multi-sensory experience of news landscapes, information distortion and the fragility of perspectives formed by unbalanced news consumption. The audience can go further with the tool Ject-ai which was used to analyse news
Ponte	An online tool which allows discussions starting with an illustration. The artwork-based discussion launches the participants into a creative narrative mode. The metaphors and abstractions at the center of arts allow people to contrast perspectives without devaluing an opinion or attributing blame for being wrong. The inputs from those discussions with people around the world are then presented back in illustrations to the participants in an exciting way.
MUMIDIS	The Museum of mis- and disinformation» educates people about methods of brainwashing with disinformation. Using realistic visuals and audio, the audience is engaged in a gamified way to guess false and trusted news. Emotion AI technology, detects emotions & behavior of online visitors and compares the emotions of readers, while they consume news.
The Oracle Network	The Oracle Network is composed of two main parts: urban augmented reality art spread around the city that leads, like a treasure hunt, to the Central Hub of interactive artificial intelligence art installations. The Central Hub is a private space where visitors interact with artificial intelligence art installations. The installations are on three levels of virtualization to gradually introduce the viewer into the abstract tech space of fake media.
Time-lapse Migration	A digital storytelling and exhibitions platform on the web and on the metaverse to disseminate first hand forced migration narratives and to give visibility and new market opportunities to refugee artist's artwork. This counters misinformation and disinformation on refugee phenomenon in Europe, by giving a wider context and different lights on the migration fluxes, their motivations, problems but also past episodes of forced migration in Europe and their contributions to European culture.
Doppelganger	Doppelgänger aims to educate the audience on understanding of the laws and practices surrounding CCTV and draw into question the neutrality and trustworthiness of images recorded by a machine in an age where deep fake technology is widespread.

APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW GUIDE

The first line in each question is the main question, with the following questions used as prompts or followups as necessary.

1. Can you give us a brief overview of what you set out to do in the MediaFutures support programme (MediaFutures for short), and what you ended up doing?

How is your project connected to misinformation?

2.What were your expectations going into MediaFutures?

What did you hope to learn?

What did you think are going to be the biggest challenges?

3.What was your actual experience of participating in MediaFutures?

What challenges did you face during your work in MediaFutures? Did you use any of the MediaFutures resources, like datasets, infrastructure, tools, or the toolkit?

4.What types of support did you seek outside of MediaFutures? Were there types of support that you could not find either within or outside of MediaFutures?

5. What role did citizens/users engagement play in your project? Did you engage citizens/users in the design or testing of your product/artwork?

Did you support interaction among citizens/users? How would you describe that interaction and their effect on participants?

Did you change or improve your citizen engagement practices as a result of MediaFutures, for example in terms of ethics?

6. What do you think is the impact of your project on your users?

Do you think it improved or is able to improve their knowledge on a specific subject?

Did or could it have an impact on their media literacy, how they understand, access, use media?

Did you notice or do you think it could improve users' soft skills such as interpersonal communication, collaboration, problem solving and critical thinking?

7. Do you think that MediaFutures had an impact on your visibility and recognition in your sector? How?

Did you observe an increase in your followers and/or interactions on social media?

8. How has participating in MediaFutures changed your use of data? Did you use new or different data sources? Which?

Did you change your data management practices? How?

What were your biggest challenges around use of data?

9. How relevant was interdisciplinarity and/or an intersectoral approach for your project? How did that surface?

10. (Start up/Artist only)

What do you think is the value of start-up/artist collaborations?

11. What was it like to work with artists/start-ups on this project?

12. Will you continue working with this artist/start-up after MediaFutures?

13. How did the physical distance impact the co-creation process? AI Art and Misinformation

14. What would you recommend to others attempting such collaborations?

(Artists only)

10. Have you consulted or collaborated with scientists or technologists (internal or external) to carry out the project?

11. What were the fields of expertise that you needed to carry out the project?

12. How did you establish that collaboration? Has MediaFutures helped you to do that? Why not?

14. Which are the main challenges and opportunities of scientist/technologist and artist collaboration?

15. Which are the crucial elements of a successful artist / scientist /technologist partnership

16. What have you learned during MediaFutures? Have you changed the way you work? What is your most important takeaway? What do you wish you had known before starting in MediaFutures? What did you learn about misinformation during your project?

17. What was your biggest success within MediaFutures and what did this mean for your project and for you as an artist/entrepreneur?

18. What are your plans after the end of MediaFutures?

(Follow-up questions via email)

1. What data set did you use? Please provide links to open, or a brief description for closed datasets. If the datasets are associated with a project or paper, references would be great.

2.What data tools did you use? Please provide a list of any tools you used during the project, and a brief description of what you used them for (where appropriate). This could include high-level tools for data processing (cleaning, modelling, visualization, etc.), but also data science frameworks, libraries, and models. We are especially interested in models that deal with disinformation or other core applications of projects (metaverse, community detection, cascade effects, XAI or algorithmic fairness techniques, etc.).

3. What data, code, or other outputs of your project did you or would like to publish? Please provide a link to any published resources, and some details about any you would like to publish, including whether you would like our support in doing so.

From Preference Elicitation to Participatory ML: A Critical Survey & Guidelines for Future Research

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ABSTRACT

The AI Ethics community faces an imperative to empower stakeholders and impacted community members so that they can scrutinize and influence the design, development, and use of AI systems in high-stakes domains. While a growing chorus of recent papers has kindled interest in so-called "participatory ML" methods, precisely what form participation ought to take and how to operationalize these ambitions are seldom addressed. Our survey of the relevant literature shows that in many papers, participation is reduced to highly structured, computational mechanisms designed to elicit mathematically tractable approximations of narrowly-defined moral values. Of papers that actually engage with real people, these engagements typically consist of one-time interactions with individuals that are often unrepresentative of the relevant stakeholders. Motivated by these clear limitations, we introduce a consolidated set of axes to evaluate and improve participatory approaches. We use these axes to analyze contemporary work in this space and outline future AI research directions that could meaningfully contribute to operationalizing the ideal of participation.

KEYWORDS

Participation, elicitation, value-alignment

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1 INTRODUCTION

With the proliferation of data-driven algorithms automating or assisting high-stakes decisions in diverse societal domains [3, 60], the project of ensuring that these algorithms align with stakeholder values has taken on new urgency. As scholarly work on Fairness, Accountability, Transparency, and Ethics (FATE) has matured, a growing chorus of voices within the research community has called for centering issues of power, agency, equity, and participation [8, 9, 50, 71, 79]. For example, in addressing the goal of achieving *fairness*, scholars have highlighted the importance of determining precisely whose judgments about what constitutes fairness should be prioritized and how those values should be operationalized [67]. Offering appropriate responses to these critical questions requires the research community to design effective processes and mechanisms to involve stakeholders in the ideation, design, development, and use of ML systems in order to make sure these systems reflect their values and make deliberate, morally acceptable trade-offs when those values conflict with one another. Beyond a mechanism for value alignment, *participation* has been hailed as an end on its own and an essential ingredient of broader justice-related ideals, such as procedural fairness and democratic governance [77].

To heed these calls and include non-expert stakeholders in the process of designing, evaluating, and deploying ML-based decision-making systems, a recent line of work in AI/ML has supplied computationally feasible mechanisms to elicit stakeholders' moral preferences and values. For example, one early and influential study of this kind was the Moral Machine study, which went viral and attracted millions of internet users [6]. As described in Section 4, participants were posed pairwise comparison questions in the form of "trolley problems" [73]. In each scenario, they were asked to choose whose lives to prioritize, e.g., passengers' or pedestrians', in the face of an unavoidable accident. In follow-up work, Noothigattu et al. [59] used the data from the study to propose an algorithm to model and aggregate participants' *moral preferences* by estimating and averaging linear utility models in the hopes of reflecting all participants' preferences. Structured, computationally efficient mechanisms of this type are frequently designed to elicit mathematically tractable approximations of narrowly-defined values, and they have sometimes been referred to as *"Participatory ML"*. The rationale behind these methods is to provide the precision, formality, and scalability needed to model and capture moral values in ways that enable ML experts to translate them directly into measures and objective functions for developing and evaluating ML systems.

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While the intention behind the above line of work is noble and prior work in the area has provided several intriguing observations [44, 64, 71], we contend that there are fundamental limitations to these so-called "participatory ML" approaches. In particular, we critically examine the leap from structured preference elicitation to participatory design for value alignment. Through an extensive literature review and comparative analysis of several existing methods, we outline ten axes along which participation (by non-technical stakeholders) should be evaluated:

(1) Is the target stakeholder group **represented** appropriately?
(2) At what **stage** of the ML lifecycle is their participation sought?
(3) Is the appropriate **setting** for effective participation provided?
(4) Are adequate **resources** available to facilitate participation?
(5) Are there **communication** channels between participants and researchers to discuss the participatory task and the significance of its outcomes?
(6) Are the affordances and limitations of the **elicitation** mechanism adequately scrutinized, understood, and addressed?
(7) What are the mechanisms for **conflict resolution**?
(8) Do participants get to review and provide **feedback** about the process and outcomes of their participation?
(9) Does the participation benefit and **empower** the target stakeholder group?
(10) And finally, have the researchers properly **evaluated** their proposed approach?

To illustrate the utility of our proposed guidelines, we selected five influential participatory ML articles published in recent years and critically evaluated their contributions through the lens of our ten criteria. While the majority of these contributions required little in the way of resources, they all lacked adequate representation of stakeholder groups. Additionally, four of the five had mixed or unsatisfactory results along half of our axes, notably empowerment and communication channels. These findings suggest that while preference elicitation may pose an interesting computational problem, the corresponding methods are insufficient for addressing stakeholders' needs around participation.

In conclusion, as issues of empowerment, control, and agency take center stage in the AI ethics discourse, the research community must strive to provide real avenues of participation to marginalized stakeholders and impacted community members. We hope that the critique put forward here motivates future research toward closing major gaps and shortcomings of existing approaches and identifies new directions for impactful contributions, including considering participatory methods beyond traditional preference elicitation, increasing the representation of members of target communities in ML research and development teams, and acknowledging the fundamental limitations of ML as a tool to address complex sociotechnical challenges on its own.

2 RELATED WORK

In this section, we provide a brief overview of participatory design, its general critiques, and similar approaches in the context of AI/ML. We also highlight notable recent surveys of participatory design for AI and data practices that, while different in scope and scale from the current contribution, are recommended to the interested reader. We end this section with a brief overview of preference elicitation mechanisms proposed recently in CS venues.

2.1 An Overview of Participatory Design

Participatory design (PD) can be described as an approach to design that centers users in the design process [18, 45, 70]. While it originated in Scandinavian workplaces as a way to empower workers in light of technological changes [70], it has also been deployed in areas of governance and sustainable development as a way to empower citizens, particularly in the Global South [39, 45]. More recently, some have proposed that machine learning and automation can help increase participation in governmental processes, for example, by using natural language processing (NLP) to help citizens audit their government [65] or aid stakeholders in negotiating proposals and peace talks [4, 5].

However, others have argued that due to the large impacts that algorithms can have on people's lives (e.g., [3, 60]), participation in design of *the algorithms themselves* should be prioritized [2]. In line with this argument, researchers have employed qualitative participatory approaches to build algorithmic systems across a range of domains, including but not limited to Wikipedia content moderation [30, 69, 81, 83], teacher assistance tools [37], feminicide news and data collection [23, 72], and legal document review [19]. While our survey centers works that utilize quantitative/computational approaches to preference elicitation to build value-aligned models, it is important to highlight the qualitative work around PD as they share similar goals and are, at least for some design choices, more appropriate for achieving the goals of participation.

2.2 Critiques of Participatory Design

In spite of the general excitement around PD, it is not without its share of critics. In particular, Cooke and Kothari [17] and Mohan [55] criticize participatory approaches to government and development as they have been applied in the Global South. They argue that local practices may not always stem from culture but rather from necessity (i.e., due to scarcity of resources). They also critique homogenizing participants as a single group (resulting in participation benefiting certain subgroups more than others), and assuming norms and communication are similar (enough) to Western counterparts. In response, Kesby [46] concedes that *"[these] are important criticisms"* but nevertheless counters [17]. Using the author's prior work studying gender relations and HIV in Zimbabwe, Kesby highlights that blind resistance to participation on account of it involving power dynamics and domination is dangerous, and argues that well-utilized participation can actually lead to beneficial societal changes.

Focusing on participatory approaches to AI/ML design, Bratteteig and Verne [12] argue that various aspects of AI, including lack of transparency, possibility of biased data, and the need to adapt to new situations through constant training, can make it difficult for AI and PD to work together. Additionally, Delgado et al. [20] note that even though various practitioners are in favor of greater stakeholder participation in algorithm design, what constitutes *participation* in this sense is actually not clearly defined. Robertson and Salehi [63] and Sloane et al. [68] take their criticism a step further,

positing that participation can actually prevent progress or promote exploitation—depending on the choices available to participants.

There are various answers to the above critiques. For instance, recent work has proposed participatory frameworks for handling difficulties posed by PD and AI alike. Martin Jr et al. [53] put forward *Community-Based System Dynamics* (CBSD), which involves engaging stakeholders via causal loop diagrams and simulations to learn and include their viewpoints. Hossain and Ahmed [38] directly respond to Bratteteig and Verne [12] with a different approach they denote as *agile PD*. Drawing parallels with both agile software development and political activism, agile PD centers marginalized voices by leveraging stakeholders' spokespeople, alliances between practitioners and stakeholders, and stakeholder involvement in engineering processes. Hossain and Ahmed note that it is not a panacea to all of the issues raised in Bratteteig and Verne [12]. Nevertheless, they believe that *"agile PD is a first major step towards having a design method used with marginalized people that may be transferable to the design of AI technologies, but also revamped so that it does not encounter and contain the issues that exist with present-day PD."* Bondi et al. [10] respond to Sloane et al. [68]'s concerns of *participation-washing* with another framework called *Participatory Approach to enable Capabilities in communiTies* (PACT). PACT centers stakeholder participation in building AI for social good by inviting stakeholders to evaluate how resulting AI systems distribute and expand human capabilities. We draw from these critiques and responses in formulating our guidelines for participatory ML.

Addressing qualitative participatory approaches to AI algorithms, Birhane et al. [8] perform three case studies. The first involves participatory building of NLP-based translation tools for low-resourced languages in Africa. The second discusses an indigenous community's participatory shaping of data usage agreements. The third details a framework for participatory approaches to dataset documentation. Each of these case studies employs analysis in terms of benefits and shortcomings via priorities and related work similar to ones used here (e.g., [45]). What distinguishes our work is our focus on *quantitative* approaches proposed by AI/ML researchers and our critique structured around a set of axes along which such participatory approaches can be assessed.

2.3 A Survey of Preference Elicitation for ML

To gather papers for our literature review, we employed several approaches. We primarily consulted the proceedings of top conferences and journals that were likely to publish contributions that fit our definition of participatory ML. These venues included but were not limited to AAAI, FAccT, CHI, CSCW, AIES, and EAMMO. We also followed citation trails to and from widely cited papers in our repository, and used searches across Google Scholar and Arxiv to find additional related work.

The results of this review are summarized below. We grouped the articles retrieved by this search into one of two categories based on the goals the participation aimed to achieve: **use cases of moral preference elicitation** or **performance metric elicitation**.

Use cases of moral preference elicitation. Numerous participatory ML approaches have sought to create value-aligned algorithms for certain use cases through *moral preference* elicitation. Awad et al. [6] introduce the Moral Machine experiment, a study in which participants from various countries were posed questions that probed their beliefs about autonomous vehicles. Based on the results of that study, Noothigattu et al. [59] propose a method to construct a utility model to reflect the collective preferences of the participants, which in turn could quickly navigate ethical quandaries in a deployed system. Lee et al. [52] use similar techniques as [59] in conjunction with interview and workshop sessions. They do so to build a donor-recipient matching prioritization algorithm for a food delivery nonprofit based on participatory input from relevant volunteers and stakeholders. Kahng et al. [43] generalize the framework proposed in [52] to motivate algorithms that model participants' beliefs in order to facilitate democratic voting processes via automation. Kahng et al. [43] indirectly builds on earlier work by Lee et al. [51] to motivate participatory democracy via voting rules such as Borda count and Condorcet winner voting. Outside of the algorithmic governance space, Freedman et al. [27] demonstrate how to use participatory input to build kidney exchange algorithms that reflect stakeholders' beliefs. Johnston et al. [41] utilize preference elicitation in the medical resource allocation space, but their application domain is COVID-19 resource triage.

Performance metric elicitation. Another branch of participatory ML work involves building metrics to assess algorithms based on what is most important to participants. Ilvento [40], Jung et al. [42], Mukherjee et al. [58], and Bechavod et al. [7] propose methods to estimate individual-level definitions of fairness (as described in [24]) based on participant queries. Yaghini et al. [78] use Equality of Opportunity, as opposed to individual definitions of fairness, for metric elicitation. Hiranandani et al. [33, 34, 35, 36] apply metric elicitation to derive metrics that pertain to performance or group-level fairness. While these works have sought to build new metrics based on stakeholder input, others have explored which existing notions of fairness and feature selection most align with stakeholders' values. Saha et al. [64], Saxena et al. [66], Srivastava et al. [71], and Harrison et al. [31] assess participants' understanding of different fairness metrics and observe conditions under which they prefer some metrics over others. They do so based on crowdsourced responses to online surveys. In comparison, Cheng et al. [14] propose an interview protocol and user interface to help stakeholders weigh tradeoffs between metrics and gauge responses. Instead of gathering participants' thoughts on metrics, Grgic-Hlaca et al. [29] and Van Berkel et al. [75] explore what feature usage participants consider "fair" to use. Kasinidou et al. [44] further researches subtleties regarding *what participants consider agreeable* versus *what they consider fair* in decisions made by automated systems.

In Section 4, we offer further details and critical evaluations for a small selection of the above quantitative elicitation methods [27, 40, 52, 59, 71]. As we will argue shortly, our focus on these contributions is motivated by the attention they have garnered and is meant to illustrate evaluation via our axes (proposed in Section 3) through several concrete case studies.

3 TEN AXES FOR EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION

Drawing on our extensive literature review and our sustained direct experience working with impacted community members, we provide a necessary set of axes for a quantitative approach to contribute

to the meaningful involvement of non-technical stakeholders in the design and use of ML systems. Table 1 summarizes our guidelines, and the rest of this section elaborates on each in more detail.

Representation. Our first axis concerns the representation of stakeholders in the participatory activity. We argue that *stakeholder groups should be represented commensurate to their need for/claim to empowerment* and that participants should be *generally representative of their respective stakeholder population.* These considerations serve to center marginalized voices in the activity. As noted by Cooke and Kothari [17] and Mohan [56], failing to do so may result in benefits of participation being enjoyed solely by those with prior privilege(s) and/or good social standing. Ideally, a representative individual or committee should also be placed in the research and development team.

Stage. The next axis pertains to how participants are involved in the ML lifecycle; namely, it concerns which part(s) of the ML pipeline (e.g., ideation, design, development, deployment, or maintenance) participants can affect. Our guidelines stipulate that participation generally requires *engagement as early as possible and at multiple stages of the ML lifecycle* as opposed to a one-time engagement after the system is already built and deployed. For instance, issues could arise if participants were involved in how the model performance was assessed but excluded from the data selection phase. Additionally, given that cultural norms and values evolve and that knowledge of a system's shortcomings accumulates over time, a one-time interaction may not suffice to decide how (or whether) the ML system should be maintained or discontinued.

Setting. The setting in which participation takes place is the next crucial component of our guidelines. Specifically, we contend that participation should be *conducted in an environment that is comfortable, familiar, and beneficial to participants.* If participation takes place in an unfamiliar or uncomfortable setting (e.g., research lab or company headquarters as opposed to one's own neighborhood), processes may not elicit true, underlying views of the participant (e.g., due to pressure or coercion, etc.). Moreover, a beneficial setting guarantees *fair compensation for participants (relative to that earned by the system's researchers and developers)* regardless of outcomes of the participation itself. Sloane et al. [68] argue for *"recogniz[ing] participation as work,"* and one way of doing so is to provide proportionate compensation, especially in cases where downstream deployed systems can yield nontrivial financial benefits for its designers and practitioners.

Resources. We argue that the participatory activity should be designed to be compatible with realistic resource constraints. This axis promotes forms of participation that *require minimal participant resources for effective engagement.* For example, the meaningful participation should not assume background knowledge that the stakeholder group does not possess.

Communication. As argued by Kelty [45], *"The experience of participation must include the sense not only of having spoken, but of* having been heard.*"*[1] To take this into consideration, we recommend that *there should be open-ended communication channels between practitioners and participants to discuss the activity.* In addition, we suggest that practitioners should *provide adequate background information to participants* and should *communicate outcomes of the activity to participants in a way they can understand and probe.* If participants are not provided requisite information on the problem the ML system is trying to solve (e.g., use cases and auditing metrics are obfuscated by technical jargon) and there are no ways to clarify misunderstandings, their participation may not reflect their true beliefs. Additionally, if results are not disclosed or understood, participants may rightfully feel exploited.

Elicitation. The specific mechanism and interface used for eliciting participants' judgements and values can have a significant impact on the the outcomes and perceptions of the activity. We suggest that elicitation should be done in a *multifaceted manner* that requires *reasonable effort* from participants while accounting for *realistic human conditions* (e.g., psychological tendencies and biases). This is in contrast to approaches that may utilize one form of elicitation (such as structured elicitation through pairwise comparisons), saddle participants with cognitive burdens, or assume rational agent models. As Vaughan [76] and Koppol et al. [48] indicate, humans are not oracles and can get tired, make mistakes, or even lie under certain circumstances. Therefore, participatory approaches that assume away these possibilities may fail in practice.

Conflict resolution. Aside from channels of communication between researchers/practitioners and participants, participants *should be empowered to communicate with one another, especially to deliberate and resolve disagreements.* Handling differences solely by crude enforcing mechanisms (such as majority rule) may quash a key aspect of participation and lead to unacceptable outcomes [49, 61, 63].

Feedback. Participatory approaches should allow participants to provide continual feedback to researchers and practitioners about every aspect of the activity, not just the specific question(s) of interest to researchers. For example, participants should be able to voice their concerns about the project generally or about the nature of their participation in particular. Our guidelines support participation that offers *multiple channels for continual feedback.* Failure to provide these channels may result in participants feeling undervalued, unheard, and exploited.

Empowerment. One of the most important axes considered by our guidelines is how participation actually affects the target population and their relevant outcomes. We emphasize that the target stakeholder group *should benefit from participation* beyond adequate compensation for their effort. Participants *should gain better control over the design process and outcomes as well as the benefits the activity produces.* The former is in line with existing human participant research practices (e.g., the Belmont Report, as summarized in [54]). For example, if the participants' involvement leads to significant research insights or accuracy gains, they should be acknowledged as co-authors and co-creators of the resulting artifact.

Evaluation. Lastly, our guidelines encourage researchers and developers of participatory mechanisms to critically evaluate their proposal. We emphasize the need to *verify the efficacy and validate* with people (as opposed to relying on simulations or mathematical proofs). Testing with actual human participants could uncover

[1] Emphasis added by Kelty.

Axis	Sample Prompts	Satisfactory Examples	Unsatisfactory Examples
Representation	*Are all stakeholder groups represented commensurate to their need for/claim to empowerment? Are participants representative of their respective stakeholder population?*	Stakeholder groups are adequately represented; marginalized voices are centered; a representative stakeholder has a long-standing voice in the broader research/development project.	Inadequate representation of key stakeholder groups; marginalized voices remain marginalized and disempowered.
Stage	*At what stage(s) of the ML lifecycle are participants engaged? What is/are the specific choice(s) for which participants can provide input?*	Engagement at multiple stages; providing input on impactful choices in each stage	One-time engagement; focus on unimpactful choices
Setting	*What are the conditions under which participation takes place? Is the setting familiar, comfortable, and beneficial to participants?*	Face-to-face human interactions; familiar location; adequate time and compensation	Virtual interactions; unfamiliar location; insufficient time and compensation
Resources	*What participant resources (e.g., time, money, background knowledge and expertise) are required for meaningful participation?*	Minimal resources needed for practical usage	Nontrivial resources and time investment required
Communication	*Can participants and practitioners communicate about the task? What background information is provided to participants about the ML system and the participation activity? How is the outcome of the activity communicated with them?*	Open-ended communication channels exist; participants are provided enough information accounting for their prior knowledge; results disclosed to participants in an understandable manner	No communication channels exist; participants lack the context required to understand the task; results not disclosed; disclosure is too high-level or technical.
Elicitation	*How are values elicited? What kinds of assumptions are made to capture those values?*	Multiple methods and user interfaces to elicit the same value; accounting for psychological effects	(Only) structured elicitation mechanism; Unrealistic agent models
Conflict resolution	*How are the conflicts of opinion among participants brought forward and handled?*	Channels to handle disagreement and deliberation among participants	(Only) crude voting mechanisms used to handle disagreements
Feedback	*Do participants have effective channels to provide continual feedback and voice concerns both about the participation outcome and the process?*	Feedback channels outside of elicitation	No feedback channels exist
Empowerment	*Does the participation empower/benefit the target population? How much control does it afford to participants? Can participants prevent technologies from being built or suggest entirely new routes?*	Participation provides great control over development and future benefits	Participants have little control over the process/product and little or no access to benefits
Evaluation	*How are participatory mechanisms/frameworks evaluated/validated? Have the findings been reproduced under various conditions?*	Co-design and testing with real human participants	(Only) verification with simulations and mathematical proofs

Table 1: Ten axes to evaluate participatory ML proposals.

practical challenges and limitations that proofs or simulations can never identify.

4 CASE STUDIES

While interest in this area has exploded in recent years, some works in particular have been highly influential. Specifically, they have been widely cited (e.g., on the order of 100 to 1000 times) and have inspired numerous follow-ups. As such, many of the other works in this field utilize similar ideas and fare similarly with respect to our axes. The review and critique in this section consist of in-depth case analyses of a handful of influential works in participatory ML, as a concrete illustration of the utility of our axes. Our assessments of these works are summarized in Table 2.

4.1 Moral Machine Voting

Description. Awad et al. [6] study the Moral Machine experiment in which people from around the world were queried about their personal ethics regarding autonomous vehicles. Specifically, users were posed questions similar to the Trolley Problem [73] in that in the face of an unavoidable accident between a self-driving car and pedestrians, they were asked to answer *whose lives should be prioritized: those of the pedestrians or those of the vehicle's passengers?* under varying conditions (e.g., young passengers, elderly pedestrians, etc.). Noothigattu et al. [59] subsequently use data collected from this experiment as an example and proposes a method to learn linear utility models based on Thurston-Mosteller (TM) processes [57, 74] that approximate individuals' beliefs, after which these models can be averaged together to obtain an overall model that

	Cases				
Axis	Noothigattu et al. [59]	Ilvento [40]	Srivastava et al. [71]	Lee et al. [52]	Freedman et al. [27]
Representation	Unclear target population, possible selection bias, mismatch of norms	Unexplored, no human involvement, left to implementers	Slight deviations from US Census	Selection bias through self-selection and volunteer-based sampling	Utilization of crowdworkers with awareness of divergence from target population
Stage	One-time engagement; at data collection stage	One-time engagement during model evaluation	One-time engagement during model evaluation stage	Interactions at multiple points in process, including model-building, aggregation, and result interpretation	Model training stage
Setting	Clear problem context, minimal language requirements, comfortable environment	Unexplored, left to implementers	Clear problem context, basic language requirements, and comfortable environment	Clear problem context and comfortable environment through in-person meetings	Clear problem context, basic language requirements, and comfortable environment
Resources	Access to internet; social media access	Unspecified, assumes knowledge of problem and access to querying system	Internet access; access to MTurk	Nontrivial time and effort required from participants	Internet access; access to MTurk
Communication	Information communicated through structured UI; No unstructured communication with researchers	Unspecified, left to implementers	Information communicated through structured UI	Frequent, free-form communication through interviews and workshops	Information communicated through structured UI; No unstructured communication with researchers
Elicitation	Structured elicitation via pairwise comparisons	Structured elicitation via pairwise comparisons	Structured elicitation via pairwise comparisons	Structured and unstructured elicitation via pairwise comparisons and interviews	Structured elicitation via pairwise comparisons
Conflict resolution	Aggregation of preferences via voting	None; assumes individual agent or body capable of coming to consensus	None; assumes individual agent or body capable of coming to consensus	Channels for deliberation during discussions and workshops	Aggregation of preferences via BT models
Feedback	None	None	Comment submission form which seemed to have no results on downstream experiments	Channels for feedback during discussions and workshops	None
Empowerment	Unclear	Unclear	Unclear	Control over parts of development, and understanding of results	Unclear
Evaluation	Evaluation via simulation on both synthetic and real-world pair-wise comparison data	Theoretical vetting via proofs of convergence	Human evaluation via MTurk workers	Human evaluation by participants and researchers	Human evaluation via MTurk workers of approach, not outcomes

Table 2: Details of case study assessments across each axis of participation. Green indicates relative satisfaction, orange indicates relative unsatisfaction, and yellow indicates mixed results.

ideally reflects the preferences of all participants. The authors conclude that the resulting model could be deployed at runtime and quickly decide the best alternative (in terms of utility maximization) that should be in line with the population's norms.

Evaluation. Based on Awad et al. [6]'s setup, given the scope and scale of the experiment, the target population is unclear. However, selection bias through requiring interest and internet access to participate may affect stakeholder representation. In particular, a *"[w]orld map highlighting locations of Moral Machine visitors"* in [6] illustrates noticeable sparsity in areas of the Global South, including but not limited to large swaths of Africa, South America, and east and central Asia. Given that existing literature also suggests that Western norms may not cleanly map to non-Western societies [9, 32], the experiment may not have truly elicited global values. Additionally, as described, Noothigattu et al. [59]'s model only allows for a one-time engagement of stakeholders. Pairwise comparison queries were posed via image comparisons to eliminate language barriers (see [6]) and participants could participate in their environment of choice, so the setting is reasonable. Provided participants have access to Internet and social media, resource requirements would also be minimal, as these are the only resources required by this framework. However, the protocol in [59] does not involve communication between participants and practitioners, and there is also only one structured elicitation mechanism through voting that

does not allow for conflict resolution between participants. Moreover, the protocol does not provide feedback channels or empower participants in the process, and simulations and [6]'s dataset were used to evaluate the approach. Beyond our guidelines, Chan et al. [13] highlights that stakeholder identity in terms of gender and perspective (i.e., passenger versus pedestrian) may affect elicited preferences, and El-Mhamdi et al. [25] and Feffer et al. [26] prove that the averaging approach employed here is not robust in the case that participants vote strategically.

4.2 Metric Learning for Fairness

Description. In light of existing work highlighting how various definitions of fairness may be mutually unsatisfiable under certain conditions (e.g., Chouldechova [15], Kleinberg et al. [47]), Ilvento [40] describes mathematically how to elicit metrics of fairness from people. The author does so by introducing an algorithm to obtain a metric grounded in an individual-based definition of fairness (such as the one described at length in [24]) from an agent by posing questions about the distance metric to use for the definition. Specifically, there are two types of queries posed to the agent:

(1) *real-valued distance queries*: questions inquiring about the distance between two individuals (e.g., $\mathcal{D}(u, v)$ for individuals u, v), and
(2) *triplet queries*: questions inquiring about whether one individual in a set of three is closer to one versus the remaining individual in the set (e.g., $\mathcal{D}(a, b) < \mathcal{D}(a, c)$ versus $\mathcal{D}(a, c) \leq \mathcal{D}(a, b)$ for individuals (a, b, c)).

Given these types of queries, the rest of the paper describes how to learn an individual-level fairness metric from these queries based on a finite set of N individuals and proves that their methods of doing so, specifically by choosing a set R of representative individuals and comparing them to other members of the set while using properties of a distance metric to order everyone, converge with total numbers of queries polynomial in $O(|R|N)$.[2] The work assumes that the agent is a single person or body of people "free from explicit biases or arbitrary preferences" but does not perform any analyses with actual human participants.

Evaluation. Participant representation is unconstrained and therefore determined by the researcher(s) or practitioner(s). Given that this method elicits preferences regarding performance metrics, any participants are only involved at a single point of the ML pipeline (the evaluation phase) and only have power over determining the output metric. Setting, communication, and participant resources are also unconstrained beyond assumptions of ample problem context and access to the querying system. The approach uses structured elicitation and utilizes a rational agent model. It also assumes that if the agent is actually a body of people, they should be able to come to consensus and resolve any disagreements amongst themselves. Therefore, there are no methods to handle disagreements between participants.[3] As described, there are also no feedback channels. Evaluations were performed via proofs of convergence and not with live participants.

4.3 Eliciting Perceptions of Fairness

Description. An alternative approach to eliciting value-aligned models or metrics is to determine which type(s) of performance people generally prefer or may want to prioritize for a given situation. To that end, Srivastava et al. [71] conduct three experiments with Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers to explore conditions under which stakeholders may want to prioritize a certain definition of fairness as opposed to predictive accuracy or vice-versa. The first two experiments posed pairwise comparison queries to participants that asked which one of two algorithms was more discriminatory based on output of the algorithms in terms of predictions, ground-truth values, and demographics of people affected (namely their race and gender). One experiment involved algorithms to predict criminal recidivism while the second discussed algorithms to predict skin cancer likelihood. The researchers used the Equivalence Class Edge-Cutting (EC^2) algorithm [28] to simultaneously limit the number of queries to ask participants and estimate the mathematical definition of fairness that aligned with participants' responses. They found that demographic parity agreed with participants' answers the most often in both of these experiments, contrary to their hypotheses that equality of false positive or negative rates would be prioritized in the criminal recidivism setting while equality of accuracy would be prioritized in the skin cancer setting. In their last experiment, participants were asked to decide which of three algorithms with different fairness-accuracy tradeoffs should be used in a given setting. For instance, one of these algorithms had high accuracy for both men and women but at different rates while another algorithm with overall lower accuracy had equal accuracy across demographic subgroups. There were four settings in question that varied both the domain and stakes of the decisions being made:

(1) Skin cancer prediction (medical domain, high-stakes),
(2) Flu virus prediction (medical domain, low-stakes),
(3) Jail time prediction (criminal justice domain, high-stakes),
(4) Bail amount prediction (criminal justice domain, low-stakes).

In the end, they found that participants preferred accurate algorithms when the setting involved high-stakes decisions and fair algorithms when the setting involved low-stakes decisions, regardless of the setting's domain. The authors conclude by specifying limitations of their work (such as that they only considered algorithms with similar levels of accuracy, but larger differences in accuracy may have yielded other results) and suggesting future directions, arguing in particular that *"Algorithmic decisions will ultimately impact human subjects' lives, and it is, therefore, critical to involve them in the process of choosing the right notion of fairness,"* and that their work is *"an initial step"* in this direction.

Evaluation. In terms of representation, the sample of participants contained slight deviations from the US Census. While this work involves more than one interaction with participants, all experiments

[2] The bounds reported by Ilvento [40] take the form $O(|R|N)$ multiplied by a logarithmic factor and range from $O(|R|N \log N)$ to $O\left(|R|N \log \frac{1}{\alpha_L}\right)$ depending on the assumptions and querying algorithm provided, where α_L is "the minimum precision with which the arbiter can distinguish elements or distances."

[3] Ilvento [40] explicitly states "When human fairness arbiters strongly disagree, we consider this to be a situation where discussion between the human fairness arbiters, and perhaps additional external parties, is needed."

are limited to determining the fairness notion that most cleanly maps to their intuition. This in turn only relates to one part of the ML pipeline . Even though ample context about each problem was provided to the participants in their place of choice and resource requirements only involved access to MTurk, this work uses structured elicitation via MTurk as opposed to face-to-face interactions. The approach also lacked communication protocols, strategies for resolving conflicts between participants, and participant empowerment. While there were feedback channels for providing additional comments on the experiments, this input seemed to have no effect on determining the flow of the overall study. This being the case, evaluation of the approach still involved humans, in addition to quantitative and qualitative result analysis.

4.4 WeBuildAI

Description. In [52], Lee et al. summarize their work with a local nonprofit food delivery organization. Their goal was to improve the matching algorithm used to connect establishments with leftover food to recipient groups that could use it. As modifications to this algorithm involve a number of stakeholders with different preferences, the researchers believed a participatory approach would work well. The resulting format consisted of three phases. The first involved individual belief elicitation by creating models through pairwise questions (based on TM processes, similar to Noothigattu et al. [59]) or optionally via manual specification of scoring rules. The next used Borda count voting aggregate recommendations from these individual models and involved asking stakeholders *who, if any of you, should be prioritized in this voting process?* (in this case, they almost unanimously chose to prioritize the food delivery organization over donors and recipients). Lastly, the research team built and presented an interface to stakeholders in order to communicate effects of their participation on future decisions, namely in terms of explanations, preference rankings, and vote counts of various outputs. Each part of this process was conducted via in-person workshop and study sessions, and participants were compensated for their time and effort. However, participants were mostly a homogeneous group based on demographics (primarily white female), which the authors attribute to volunteer-based sampling.

Evaluation. While selection bias yielded a participant group that was not very diverse, the resulting participants were involved at multiple points in the algorithmic development process during face-to-face meetings. Sessions were conducted at participants' convenience and for which they were paid, and each provided participants with appropriate context. This being said, this method of participation was resource-intensive for the participants due to the time and effort needed to interact with the researchers. Results of these sessions were communicated to stakeholders during follow-up sessions and the built interface, and even though structured elicitation approaches were used at various points, participants had the ability to modify inputs to these approaches (such as by making individual models through explicit rules or altering Borda count voting power). Stakeholders had channels for feedback and deliberation and were also empowered by having control over several parts of the development process. Researchers' methods were evaluated based on these in-person workshop sessions.

4.5 Value-aligned Kidney Exchange Algorithm

Description. Freedman et al. [27] build on a long line of research on kidney exchanges (e.g., Abraham et al. [1], Dickerson et al. [21, 22]). The authors do so by reasoning about how to incorporate moral preferences into their clearing algorithm (e.g., the belief nonsmoking individuals should be prioritized to receive kidneys over smoking individuals). The work illustrates a proof-of-concept approach in this regard via two experiments in which MTurk workers were used as participants. The first experiment ascertained MTurk workers' thoughts on which patient attributes should be relevant to decisions about prioritization. The next involved asking another set of MTurk participants a number of pairwise comparison questions to learn how they prioritized donating kidneys. Specifically, each comparison involved answering a hypothetical question, namely *based on their patient profiles, which of these two individuals requiring a transplant should receive a kidney?*. Attributes included in these patient profiles were age, general health, and drinking behavior (e.g., young, healthy, rare drinking patient versus old, cancerous, frequently drinking patient) which were in-turn determined based on the results of the first experiment. With the resulting pairwise comparison data, the researchers built Bradley-Terry (BT) models [11] to approximate how the average participant made decisions. They subsequently used the corresponding BT scores for each patient profile to configure tie-breaking behavior of their clearing algorithm such that patients matching profiles with higher scores received kidneys over patients with lower scores if both were otherwise equally prioritized recipients. Finally, they compared this modified algorithm to their original algorithms without participant input through a number of simulation experiments and showed that the new algorithm behaved as expected (i.e., patients with profiles corresponding to higher BT scores received kidneys more often). Overall, they demonstrated that there were no technical barriers to implementing this algorithm.

Evaluation. While this work relies on crowdsourcing via MTurk, the authors clearly state that actually building a model for use in practice would involve working with a number of stakeholders closely related to the problem. There were two engagements with the participants, but both were related to one stage of the model development process through MTurk tasks with no other forms of engagement. However, using MTurk allowed researchers to provide problem context and allow participation in a setting where the participants were comfortable. While their method imposes few resource requirements on participants (primarily access to MTurk), the utilization of (only) structured elicitation means it lacks communication with participants, conflict resolution strategies between participants, channels for feedback, and participant empowerment. Lastly, it allowed them to evaluate their approach through human participation to prove that their method was technically sound, but they were not able to evaluate results in a practical setting.

5 DISCUSSION OF FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Drawing on the limitations of prior work, we conclude this work by outlining several important avenues through which AI/ML researchers and practitioners can effectively contribute to participatory frameworks.

Choosing and justifying the target population. Beginning any participatory project by strongly considering the appropriate target population can facilitate downstream parts of the process. This determination is not necessarily trivial, as questions like *why this group?* and *why this sampling approach?* may not be easy to answer. However, choosing a target population makes it possible to assess whether the sample of stakeholders is conducive to the end goals of the project or not (perhaps due to bias). For instance, Srivastava et al. [71] note that their sample of MTurk workers deviates slightly from the US population. But is this the appropriate target group of stakeholders to include in the process of determining the definition of fairness?

Identifying which choices in the ML lifecycle impact stakeholders' outcomes the most. By being aware of which parts of an ML project have the largest effects on outcomes relevant to stakeholders, AI experts can prioritize engagement with stakeholders on those choices. This prioritization, in turn, can empower participants by improving their control and agency over their subsequent outcomes. Along the same lines, by scrutinizing and potentially relaxing unrealistic assumptions (e.g., participants are rational or oracles of objective truth, preferences are stable and acyclic, etc.), experts can better ensure that proposed participatory approaches can capture the genuine opinions and preferences of the target stakeholder groups.

Acknowledging resource requirements and how they bias the sample. Research protocols that require participant resources, such as time and background knowledge, can hinder or prevent the participation of stakeholders that may otherwise be representative of the target population. This drawback happened to Lee et al. [52] as several participants could only partake in the first sessions due to time and job constraints. Participant barring and dropout can further bias the sample. While such issues may be unavoidable, delineating them as limitations and/or reducing them to the extent possible can promote participation and inform future research.

Meeting participants where they are. Using technical jargon, complicated interfaces, and unfamiliar environments to interact with stakeholders may not produce results in line with what they actually believe or want. In contrast, conducting exercises in a way that makes participants feel at ease can yield more faithful responses. To this end, researchers and practitioners can utilize everyday speech and writing where possible, pilot technical UIs before sharing them with participants, and host their participatory tasks in places stakeholders frequent in their daily lives.

Supplementing elicitation with deliberation. As evidenced by our review, quantitative approaches to preference elicitation have major limitations when used as standalone participatory activities. However, Lee et al. [52] demonstrate the utility of such techniques in conjunction with other forms of engagement and deliberation with stakeholders. Building systems via co-design as exhibited by works in Section 2 (e.g., [30, 37]) and developing new technology and interfaces to handle communications and richer forms of elicitation (e.g., [80, 82]) are among promising paths forward to promote deliberation.

Being receptive to feedback. Many of the works explored here either did not have channels for participants to share their thoughts on the activity with the researchers or did not appear to use input from participants in downstream processes. For instance, Ilvento [40] did not account for feedback in the protocol described, and while the UIs utilized by Srivastava et al. [71] featured open-ended comment boxes, crowd worker input did not appear to influence future experiments. Further work that receives and utilizes feedback can reduce feelings of exploitation, foster goodwill and collaboration, and ameliorate the sense of being heard.

Employing a wider range of frameworks to include non-technical stakeholders. The tacit assumption that experts should lead and execute research and reap its benefits has been challenged in other arenas (e.g., Participatory Design [18, 45, 70]). Research and tech development teams can diversify expertise and include relevant stakeholders as equal team members to incorporate their voices and expertise at various stages of their projects. This level of integration can prevent critical errors, reduce bias, and improve trust between researchers and stakeholder communities.

Conducting contextual, human-centered evaluation with representative participants. Most works referenced here rely on evaluation via simulations, mathematical proofs, or structured interactions with non-representative crowd workers. While these approaches are acceptable for early testing of new proposals, we join Freedman et al. [27] to strongly advocate for further validation studies on these systems (e.g., via usability testing with real stakeholders).[4] Additionally, as argued by Conitzer et al. [16] and Kelty [45], effective evaluation of a participatory activity with actual stakeholders requires both context and locality. As an example of context, garnering effective participation may require establishing long-term relationships with community advocates, representatives, and domain experts. Regarding locality, as we pointed out in Section 4, Western norms may not map well to all societies. For instance, Pugnetti and Schläpfer [62] note that even Swiss citizens (who presumably follow Western norms) have opinions that, on average, differ from those of the average respondent of the Moral Machine study [6].

Understanding the limits of what problems ML expertise can and cannot address. Last but not least, AI experts must avoid using elicitation methods as a way of participation-washing [68]–without empowering or benefiting participants, and to solely make outcomes appear more democratic. AI experts and practitioners must acknowledge that a wide range of skills beyond AI is needed to develop the necessary relationships with community stakeholders, gain their trust, and effectively moderate deliberations and resolve conflicts. ML expertise alone is not the solution to highly complex socio-technical challenges, and "participatory ML" is no exception.

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[4] In Freedman et al. [27], the authors note that deployment in the real world would involve medical professionals and other relevant stakeholders but also admit that determining the ideal mixture of medical and non-medical participants is nontrivial.

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How does Value Similarity affect Human Reliance in AI-Assisted Ethical Decision Making?

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ABSTRACT

This paper explores the impact of value similarity between humans and AI on human reliance in the context of AI-assisted ethical decision-making. Using kidney allocation as a case study, we conducted a randomized human-subject experiment where workers were presented with ethical dilemmas in various conditions, including no AI recommendations, recommendations from a similar AI, and recommendations from a dissimilar AI. We found that recommendations provided by a dissimilar AI had a higher overall effect on human decisions than recommendations from a similar AI. However, when humans and AI disagreed, participants were more likely to change their decisions when provided with recommendations from a similar AI. The effect was not due to humans' perceptions of the AI being similar, but rather due to the AI displaying similar ethical values through its recommendations. We also conduct a preliminary analysis on the relationship between value similarity and trust, and potential shifts in ethical preferences at the population-level.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Human-centered computing** → **User studies**; **Computer supported cooperative work**.

KEYWORDS

ethical preference, AI ethics, human reliance on AI

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1 INTRODUCTION

Making ethical decisions is challenging, because they often lack clear right or wrong answers. For example, during the early stage of a pandemic, local governments must decide who to vaccinate first when there are not enough vaccines available for everyone. In emergency rooms, doctors must decide how to prioritize patients who need treatments with limited amount of time and medical resources. Social workers also encounter tough choices when allocating limited resources to prevent homelessness. In these situations, decision-makers must weigh various ethical values and principles, making it difficult to find universally acceptable solutions.

In the meantime, artificial intelligence (AI) has gained significant progress in the past decade, and naturally, has been increasingly involved in decision making in our daily life, including decisions in ethically-sensitive domains. While some may fight against the implementation of AI systems being involved in real-world ethical decisions, proponents argue that AI could potentially lead to more equitable outcomes for marginalized communities by minimizing human biases [27]. In addition, the automated nature of AI can substantially speed up decision making to a level that is much faster than what humans can achieve. To leverage the benefits of AI in decision making while alleviating the concerns of having AI making ethical decisions autonomously, one approach which is getting increasing attention is to adopt the paradigm of AI-assisted decision making, where human decision makers receive recommendations from AI, which assist humans to form their final decisions.

While AI-assisted ethical decision making holds promise, incorporating AI recommendations in decision making could also lead to unintended consequences. In particular, AI algorithms exhibit their own ethical values, realized through recommendations they provide to human decision makers. Furthermore, the ethical values exhibited by AI could propagate to final decisions in different ways, depending on whether and when human decision makers decide to adopt AI recommendations. Without more research on the impacts of AI recommendations to humans in ethical decision making, we run the risk of real-world systems outpacing our understanding of these systems, potentially causing real-world harm. For example, if human decision makers always tend to accept recommendations from AI exhibiting similar ethical values and reject recommendations from AI exhibiting different ethical values, we run the risk of creating a more *polarized* decision making environment where human tend to make more extreme decisions.

In this paper, we aim to advance our understanding of incorporating AI recommendations in ethical decision making. Specifically, we investigate the research question of how value similarity between humans and AI affects the human decision makers' reliance on AI recommendations in the context of AI-assisted ethical decision making. Additionally, given the *value* exhibited by an AI is not directly observable, we are also interested in understanding whether the effect of value similarity to human reliance is influenced more by the value the AI *claims* to exhibit or the value that is demonstrated by the recommendations the AI provides.

To answer the above research questions, we have conducted a randomized human-subject experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Using the domain of kidney transplants as a case study, we first ask recruited workers to solve a series of ethical dilemmas without AI recommendation to measure their own ethical preference, which is our operationalization of the participant's "value". We then randomly assign workers into two treatments which differ on whether the AI model used in the treatment is similar or dissimilar from the participant's own ethical preference. We compare participants' decision alignment with the AI recommendation across the two treatments to understand how human-AI value similarity impacts human reliance on AI.

We find that recommendations provided by a dissimilar AI has a larger effect on human decisions than recommendations from a similar AI. However, this result is generally due to the high levels of agreement between the similar AI and user, creating less opportunities to "change their mind". If we limit our analysis to the subset of scenarios where humans and AI disagree, humans are more likely to change their decision when provided with recommendations from a similar AI than recommendations from a dissimilar AI. In addition, we find no evidence that this effect is due to humans' perceptions of the AI being similar. Instead, we find that this effect is largely due to the AI actually displaying similar ethical values through recommendations. Finally, we perform an explorative analysis that investigates potential shifts in polarization at the population-level, and find preliminary evidence that personalized AI assistants could lead to a more radicalized decision-making population.

2 RELATED WORK

There has been extensive recent work in understanding how humans rely on their AI teammates in AI-assisted decision making, and this has been studied both in domains with objectively correct decisions to be made, and domains where decisions are made according to subjective ethical practices. Our paper draws from prior work in three categories: how humans rely on AI advice, how humans trust AI advice, and how humans perceive AI values.

In studies of humans' reliance on AI advice, there have been mixed results on whether humans rely more on human advice or AI advice. Many papers have shown evidence of algorithmic aversion, which is the notion that humans tend to relatively distrust AI advice, and prefer to receive advice from other humans [7, 29, 34]. This aversion extends to second and third parties, who may prefer decision-makers to use no advice, rather than AI advice [36, 43]. On the other hand, despite the evidence that decision-makers tend to subjectively prefer human advice over AI advice, Logg et al. [28] found that human-decision makers tend to rely more on AI advice in practice. This finding has been validated not only in objective domains, but ethical decision-making domains where there are no correct answers [32, 41]. One potential explanation is that humans perceive AI to be more rational and unbiased [8]. Human decision-makers may also want to shift the cognitive burden of ethical decision making off of them [25], as society tends to hold humans to higher standards of being unbiased than AI [4].

One aspect which affects human reliance on AI is trust, or more generally, the level of confidence that humans have in AI outputs. Bansal et al. [3] investigated the mental models that humans have in AI behavior, and found that when model outputs are more understandable, humans are better able to incorporate these outputs into their own decision-making strategies, leading to better team performance. Yin et al. [45] looked at the relationship between model accuracy and trust, and found that humans tend to both trust and rely on advice with a higher stated accuracy more than advice with a lower stated accuracy. Schmitt et al. [35] found that when humans are exposed to AI advice and later shown that the prior advice was incorrect, their trust in the AI actually increases. Zhang et al. [47] looked at methods for calibrating human trust in AI, and found that confidence scores improve trust calibration, though this doesn't necessarily improve overall decision making performance.

Our work focuses on the effects of value similarity to human reliance in AI-assisted ethical decision making. There is a rich body of sociological work understanding the effects of value similarity on humans. For example, Sitkin and Roth [38] found that improving reliability is insufficient for restoring trust in interpersonal relationships or inter-organizational mechanisms, and a better method for improving trust is to show value similarity. Siegrist et al. [37] analyzed the effects of value similarity in risk management, and found that increased value similarity leads to increased trust and is a significant predictive factor in the outcome of risk-benefit analysis for new technology.

In the last few years, more work has begun on understanding how value similarity affects interactions between humans and AI assistants. One of the closest work to ours is by Grgić-Hlača et al. [18]. They focused on objective (non-ethical) domains and measured AI similarity by comparing model output with human decisions. Similar to our observations, they found that advice from similar AIs is more likely to change the mind of a human decision maker, but dissimilar AIs have more opportunities to change minds, giving them a bigger overall impact. Mehrotra et al. [31] and Yokoi and Nakayachi [46] both analyzed the effects of value similarity on AI trust in various ethical decision-making domains, and found that AI assistants with a higher value similarity lead to higher levels of trust in the AI assistant. However, the latter two papers only look at subjective measures of trust in these ethical decision-making domains, without empirically validating changes in user reliance. We have already seen paradoxical results when looking at reliance on human and AI advice, where decision-makers prefer and trust human advice more, but rely on AI advice more. As such, we aim to fill this research gap in AI-assisted ethical decision-making, by showing that value similarity in AI recommendations leads to both increased reliance and increased trust.

In this work, we perform experiments in the area of medical resource allocation, specifically, kidney transplant allocation, as a case study. There has been a rich body of literature which has looked

at the ethics of medical resource allocation [12, 13, 17, 33]. Taking from this literature, there have been a few algorithmic experiments understanding human values for kidney allocation. Freedman et al. [16] created a methodology for estimating human values for kidney allocation, and proposed kidney exchange algorithmic improvements which better take into account human values. Narayanan et al. [32] expanded on this research by incorporating both verifiable information and predictive information into the solicitation of human ethical preferences. Research on ethics on scarce allocation actually informs real-world kidney exchange algorithms. For example, the United Network for Organ Sharing published a report detailing changes they made to their kidney algorithm in the last year, and showed that outcomes are now more equitable for racial minorities and other vulnerable groups [15].

3 EXPERIMENT

The aim of our experiment is to investigate the influence of value similarity between humans and artificial intelligence (AI) on human reliance on AI for ethical decision-making. In pursuit of this objective, we present scenarios involving ethical dilemmas to recruited participants and measure their ethical preferences in varying conditions. These conditions include instances where participants are provided with no AI recommendations, recommendations from AI with similar ethical preferences (similar AI), and recommendations from AI with dissimilar ethical preferences (dissimilar AI). We pose two main research questions, and design our experiment to validate the following hypotheses.

Research Question 1: How does value similarity affect reliance on AI recommendations?

- **H1:** Recommendations made by a dissimilar AI will create a greater change in alignment than recommendations made by a similar AI.
- **H2:** When considering scenarios where humans originally disagreed with the AI, recommendations made by a similar AI will cause a greater change in alignment than recommendations made by a dissimilar AI.

Research Question 2: Are the effects of value similarity on reliance caused by claims of value similarity or because the recommendations actually align with human values?

- **H3:** The effect of value similarity is primarily due to humans relying on AI recommendations which claim to share similar values, and it is less important for humans reliance that AI actually follows its claimed values.

3.1 Experiment Task

To test the aforementioned hypotheses, we conduct a case study in which we recruit participants to make a series of ethical decisions pertaining to the allocation of kidneys. Each decision presents participants with a hypothetical scenario where two patient candidates are in need of a kidney transplant, but only one kidney is available. Participants are required to evaluate the information provided about both candidates and express their preference for which candidate should receive the kidney first.

To align our task design with well-established ethical preference frameworks, we follow the extensive literature on the ethical principles in allocating scarce medical interventions [12, 13, 17, 32, 33]. In particular, we adopt the ethical preference framework proposed by Persad et al. [33], which describes four categories of ethical values: Treating People Equally, Favoring the Worst-Off, Promoting Social Usefulness, and Maximizing Total Benefits. Narayanan et al. [32] differentiated between the first three categories and the last, denoting the first three as *verifiable* and the last as *predictive*. They found that this predictive category can have an out-sized effect on the verifiable categories, especially when the prediction is considered to be AI-determined. To avoid these effects, we only display the three verifiable categories in our experiments, and select the following factors to represent these categories.

- *Kidney Donor Status (Promoting Social Usefulness)*: If the candidate has donated a kidney of their own in their past. This is a binary feature, with possible values of {Not prior donor, Prior Donor}.
- *Wait Time (Treating People Equally)*: How long the candidate has been waiting to receive a kidney. This feature has possible values of {Less than 1 year, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years, 5 years}.
- *Kidney Disease Stage (Favoring the Worst-Off)*: How severe the candidate's kidney disease is. This is a binary feature, with possible values of {Stage 4 (Severe kidney damage), Stage 5 (Kidney failure or near-failure)}.

It is worth noting that in the ethical principle framework proposed by Persad et al. [33], each factor has a default preference ordering in cases where all other factors are equal. If one candidate is a prior donor, and the other isn't, then the default ordering prioritizes the prior donor. If one candidate has been waiting for a longer period than the other, the default ordering prioritizes this candidate. If one candidate's kidney disease is at a higher stage than the other, the default ordering prioritizes this candidate. In our study, we presented various scenarios to online workers to investigate how individuals make trade-offs between these three factors, which correspond to the stated ethical principles.

3.1.1 Scenario construction. In our experiment, workers are asked to make a series of ethical decisions. Specifically, we generate scenarios with two candidates, and workers are asked to express their ethical preference on which candidate should receive a kidney transplant first. When eliciting workers' ethical preferences, these scenarios can be split into three categories.

The first category includes scenarios where the two candidates differ in only one factor, and share the same values for the other two factors. For example, in one scenario, Candidate A may be a prior donor, while Candidate B is not; both candidates have been waiting for 3 years and have Stage 4 Kidney Disease. The primary objective of this category is to elicit workers' baseline preferences for each of the factors individually (in this case, *Donor Status*). The second category consists of scenarios to understand workers trade-offs between two factors. In this category, the two candidates share the same value for one factor, one factor should prioritize the first candidate, and the remaining factor should prioritize the second candidate (according to the default preference ordering). For example, Candidate A may be a prior donor, while Candidate B is not, Candidate A may have been waiting for 2 years, while

Candidate B has been waiting for 4 years, and both candidates have Stage 5 Kidney Disease. This category enables us to isolate the trade-offs between pairs of factors (in this case, *Donor Status* and *Wait Time*). The third category involves scenarios where the two candidates have different values in all three factors. One candidate is prioritized in one factor, while the other candidate is prioritized by the other two factors. For example, Candidate A may be a prior donor, while Candidate B is not, Candidate A may have been waiting for 2 years, while Candidate B has been waiting for 4 years, and Candidate A may have Stage 4 Kidney Disease, while Candidate B has Stage 5 Kidney Disease. This category enables us to represent more complex interactions between the factors.

In each of these categories, there are three unique scenarios, giving us a total of nine scenarios. For each user, we realize each scenario with random values that preserve the preference order. For instance, if the disease stage needs to be equal, we may display both patients as "Stage 4" or "Stage 5". We also limit wait time differences between candidates to be no more than 2 years.



Figure 1: An example of the task interface for our experiment. This interface corresponds to the task of Stage 2 in our experiment design as described in Section 3.2.

3.1.2 Creating AI with Similar/Dissimilar Ethical Preferences. The goal of this work is to investigate the influence of value similarity between humans and AI on human reliance for ethical decision-making. Given our domain application, we use the similarity of ethical preferences to represent the value similarity. We now describe how we create AI with similar or dissimilar ethical preferences with a given worker.

For a worker's ethical preference, we can measure their answers on a set of given scenarios, i.e., their choices on who to receive a kidney first among several pairs of candidates, when they are not provided AI recommendations. Using their answers, we can compute their (prior) ethical preferences without seeing AI recommendations. A worker's ethical preference is represented by three values, each indicating how often workers' answers align with the default ethical ordering of each factor. This alignment is measured separately for each factor, and indicates how often the worker chooses the preferred factor value (e.g. "Prior Donor" over "Not Prior Donor" for the "Donor Status" factor), across all scenarios. For example, in the scenario presented in Figure 1, if the worker selected Patient A, then their answer aligns with the preferred factor for the "Wait Time" and "Disease Stage" factors, but not the "Donor Status" factor. We would then average the number of times the worker aligns with each preferred factor across all scenarios to generate the alignment values for each factor.

Using these values, we use the $A > B > C$ notation to denote a worker's value ordering in their ethical preferences over factors A, B, and C. For example, if a worker aligns with the "Donor Status" factor in 30% of scenarios, with the "Wait Time" factor 80% of the time, and the "Disease Stage" factor in 50% of scenarios, then their prior ethical preference ordering would be "Wait Time">"Disease Stage">"Donor Status".

Based on a worker's value ordering in the prior ethical preference, we can design a similar AI and a dissimilar AI that share similar and dissimilar ethical preferences with the worker. In particular, if a worker's value ordering is $A > B > C$, the ethical preferences for the similar/dissimilar AI for that worker are specified below:

- Similar AI: The ethical preference order for a similar AI is chosen uniformly at random to be either $A > B > C$ or $A > C > B$, i.e., the top factor of the similar AI is the same as the top factor of the worker.
- Dissimilar AI: The ethical preference order for a dissimilar AI is chosen uniformly at random to be either $C > A > B$ or $C > B > A$, i.e., the top factor of the dissimilar AI is the same as the bottom factor of the worker.

Our second research question aims to understand how the claim of similarity affects human reliance on AI recommendations. We therefore need to be able to distinguish between cases where AI is truly following its value preferences, and cases where the AI is only claiming to follow its value preferences, but no more. To create this distinction, we instruct our AI to act as follows:

- Deterministic AI: The AI will deterministically follow its ethical preference ordering. If the AI's top ethical preference has different values for the two candidates, then the AI will pick the candidate whose factor value aligns with its preference. If the values are tied, then the AI will move to the second preference, and then the third if necessary.
- Random AI: The AI chooses the recommendation entirely randomly, without any regard for the candidate attributes.

Using this design, we can distinguish between cases where user reliance is affected by both the value similarity claim and similar recommendations (Deterministic), and cases where user reliance is affected only by the value similarity claim (Random). When we describe the AI to workers in our experiment, we explicitly inform workers of the AI's ethical preferences and that the AI makes stochastic recommendations.

3.2 Experiment Design

To understand the effect of AI similarity on the usage of AI recommendations in ethical decision making, we conducted a two-stage, two-treatment randomized behavioral experiment. A general schematic of our experiment design can be found in Figure 2.



Figure 2: A general illustration of our experiment design. In the first phase, we present the user with a series of scenarios, and use this data to understand the user's ethical preferences. Using this, we create similar and dissimilar AI assistants in the second phase, and display them to the user. We then present the user additional scenarios, with the AI recommendation visible.

In our experiment, each recruited worker begins with the first stage, where they are asked to express their ethical preferences in 9 scenarios, generated using the approach described in Section 3.1.1. After eliciting workers' prior ethical preferences, we then randomly assign workers to two treatments:

- **Treatment 1 (Similar AI)**: In the second stage, each worker in this treatment group are shown recommendations from AI with similar ethical preferences to their own ethical preferences.
- **Treatment 2 (Dissimilar AI)**: In the second stage, each worker in this treatment group are shown recommendations from AI with dissimilar ethical preferences to their own ethical preferences.

After the first stage, workers are presented with a summary of their own ethical preferences and the ethical preference of the AI that will make recommendations during their decision-making during the second stage. Workers are also asked three survey questions — how confident they are in their own answers, if they think our estimation of their preferences is accurate, and how much trust they would have in an AI which behaves according to the displayed preferences. Each of these is graded on a 5-point Likert scale.

In the second stage, workers are presented with 18 additional scenarios where they make their decisions with the assistance of the provided AI. An illustration of our experiment scenario layout in the second stage is shown in Figure 1. The scenarios are generated the same way as in the first stage, but the number of scenarios are doubled and the realizations of the factor values might not be the same. In both treatments, workers will encounter a deterministic AI in 9 scenarios, and a random AI in the other 9 scenarios. These are shuffled so workers don't know whether recommendations are deterministic or random. Because the Random AI could still pick the patient according to its original value preference ordering by chance, the combined AI (Deterministic+Random) follows its stated value preference ordering stochastically, about 75% of the time.

Once the worker finishes the second stage of the experiment, they fill out an additional survey where we ask workers for a general demographic description, and two more questions about their experience — which dimension (Prior Donor, Wait Time, Disease Stage) most impacted their decision making without the AI, and how much did they think they relied on the AI when making decisions in the second stage.

4 RESULTS

We recruited a total of 303 workers, with 160 workers being assigned to the first treatment, and 143 workers being assigned to the second treatment. 67% of participants were male, and 33% were female. 86% of participants were white. 81% of participants had a bachelor's or higher. Median pay for workers was approximately $10 per hour. This study was approved by our institution's IRB.

4.1 Effect of Value Similarity on AI Reliance

We start by answering our first research question, which analyzes how value similarity affects reliance on AI recommendations. We measure reliance in two different ways. First, we express reliance as the overall change in alignment between the human and AI between the first and second stages. Then, we express reliance as the change in decision-making behavior, computed only on the subset of scenarios where the human and AI differ in the first stage. We present results for both of these metrics in Figure 3. We report the statistical significance values using a t-test and the effect sizes using Cohen's d. Error bars in plots represent standard errors.



Figure 3: The effect of value similarity on alignment change between Stages 1 and 2. In the left figure, we find across all scenarios, the dissimilar AI has a significantly larger change in alignment ($p < .001$). In the right figure, we find that in scenarios where the human and AI disagree, the similar AI has a significantly larger change in alignment ($p = 0.003$).

4.1.1 Overall Change in Alignment. In order to measure the overall change in alignment, we compare the rate at which users match with the (unseen) AI in the first stage with the matching rate in the second stage. We find that adding a recommendation from a similar AI significantly increases alignment by 5.9% ($t(1286) = 3.58, p < .001, d = 0.10$), while adding a recommendation from a dissimilar AI significantly increases alignment by 15.9% ($t(1439) = 9.98, p < .001, d = 0.26$). The difference between the two increases is also significant with $t(2705) = 4.35, p < .001, d = 0.17$. **Overall, we find that dissimilar AIs have a bigger overall impact on overall alignment, confirming our first hypothesis.**

While this result may seem unintuitive, it can be explained by the fact that users tend to agree more with a similar AI than a dissimilar AI, so there is less room to increase agreement for a similar AI in the second stage.

4.1.2 Conditional Change in Alignment. As a perhaps more useful measure of reliance, we can choose to consider only scenarios where the AI gives recommendations which go against the decision that the user made in the first stage. This comparison is possible because our experiment design guarantees that each of the nine possible scenarios appear once in the first stage, and twice in the second stage.

We find that when the AI gives a recommendation which goes against the user's Stage 1 decision, alignment with a similar AI increases by 64.9%[1], while alignment with a dissimilar AI increases by 58.4%. This difference is significant with $t(1302) = -3.00, p = 0.003, d = 0.17$. **Overall, we find that similar AIs have a bigger impact on human alignment when the AI goes against human prior preferences, confirming our second hypothesis.**

4.2 Effect of Value Similarity *Claims* on Alignment Change

For our second research question, we try to understand why we see effects of value similarity on AI reliance. Specifically, we want to see if the increases in AI alignment caused by value similarity in Sections 4.1 can be explained by the workers' belief that the AI shares a similar set of values to the workers, or if the increase in AI alignment is due to the actual similarity in values exposed in AI recommendations reinforcing the workers' own preferences.

In our experiment design, half of the AI recommendations in the second stage are generated deterministically according to the claimed ethical preference, and half of the AI recommendations are generated randomly. When the AI is random, any alignment increase is only due to the perception of the AI having similar or dissimilar values. When the AI is deterministic, alignment increases are explained by both user perception of AI similarity and the effect of the AI actually acting according to its preferences. As a result, we can compare these two to find the isolated effect of AI claims.

We measure the effect of value similarity on conditional AI alignment (as in Section 4.1.2), and break this data down by AI Behavior — whether the AI is deterministic or random. These results are presented in Figure 4. In this experiment, we have two independent variables (deterministic vs random AI, and similar vs dissimilar AI). The dependent variable is the conditional alignment. To examine the significance of the results, we first conduct a two-way ANOVA test and find a significant interaction effect between the two independent variables ($F(1) = 6.86, p = 0.009$). We then conduct post-hoc Tukey's HSD tests. We find that when the AI is deterministic, there is a significant difference in the conditional AI alignment between similar and dissimilar AI ($p < 0.001$). However, when the AI is random, we see no significance in the conditional AI alignment between similar and dissimilar AI ($p = 0.58$). The results suggest that workers' reliance on AI is influenced by the realized AI recommendation instead of the value AI claims to exhibit. **With this result, we find no evidence to support our third hypothesis, as we see no effect from AI similarity claims alone on reliance.**

4.3 Exploratory Analysis

Now that we have answered our main research questions, we perform a few follow-up investigations of our data to shed further

[1]Because we are only examining scenarios where the human originally disagreed with the AI, these increases can be interpreted as total alignment in the second phase. E.g., in this subset of scenarios, workers choose to follow similar AI recommendations 0% of the time in the first stage, and 64.9% of the time in the second phase.



Figure 4: The effect of value similarity on alignment change between Stages 1 and 2, across combinations of Deterministic/Random and Similar/Dissimilar. When the AI is Deterministic, the Similar AI leads to a significantly larger change in conditional alignment ($p < .001$). However, when the AI is Random, there is no significant difference between Similar and Dissimilar AI ($p = .58$).

light on the effects and implications of using AI recommendations in problems of ethical decision making. We note these analysis is intended to be exploratory and hope that this additional analysis provides a starting point for future work to study these topics in more depth.

First, we look at the relationship between AI similarity and people's subjective beliefs of self-confidence, trust in AI, and perceived usage of AI with the type of AI they used (similar/dissimilar). This can be considered an extension of Mehrotra et al. [31], which investigated the relationship between people's subjective beliefs of AI trust and AI similarity. In addition, we broaden the scope of our results in Section 4.1 to understand not only the individual-level effects of AI assistance on reliance, but population-level shifts which personalized AI recommendations can create.

4.3.1 Subjective Perceptions. In our experiment, we asked users three subjective questions which relate to their perceptions of their own decisions or the AI's decisions: How confident were they in their own decisions made in the first stage (Self-Confidence), how much they trust AI to make decisions on its own (AI-Trust), and how much they believed they relied on the AI in the second stage (AI-Reliance). Each of these questions were asked on a 5-point Likert scale, where "1" represents strongly confident, strongly trust, and strongly reliant, respectively.

We compare the results of these questions across the two experiment treatments - whether they were presented with similar or dissimilar AI recommendations. It should be noted that the first two subjective questions, on Self-Confidence and AI-Trust, were asked directly after we presented them with a summary of their own values (calculated using their responses from the first stage) and the values of the AI assistant assigned to them. The third question, on AI-Reliance, was asked after the second stage.

We find that users shown a similar AI had a Self-Confidence score of 1.82, an AI-Reliance score of 2.01, and an AI-Trust score of 2.02. Users assigned to a dissimilar AI had a Self-Confidence score of 1.88, an AI-Reliance score of 2.14, and an AI-Trust score of 2.18. However, none of these differences across treatments are significant, with p-values of 0.41, 0.23, and 0.41, respectively.

We highlight this last result specifically, as it is similar to the analysis done by Mehrotra et al. [31]. However, they found a significant correlation between value similarity and trust in a smaller study (89 users), while we were not able to replicate this finding in a larger experiment (303 users). We speculate that this lack of replication is due to the choice of ethical values used for determining similarity. In Mehrotra et al. [31], they described their AI assistants to workers using a generic set of ethical values, only some of which were actually relevant to their ethical decision-making problem. This could have lead workers to have high trust in AI recommendations based on values relevant to the problem, and low trust in AI recommendations based on values irrelevant to the problem. In contrast, we exclusively present values which are relevant to our ethical problem; this may cause a smaller effect when comparing the values against each other.

4.3.2 Population-Level Shifts. In this section, we investigate potential population-level shifts in user behavior as a result of using personalized (similar or dissimilar) AI recommendations. Specifically, we aim to understand if populations become more divided in their ethical preference strengths, and potential implications on population polarization.

First, we discuss the metric ΔP, introduced by Awad et al. [2], which represents a worker's ethical preference in a single factor (e.g. Prior Donor Status). We can calculate ΔP on this factor by taking all decisions where the factor is unequal across candidates, and computing the difference in preferences across options. For example, if a worker views four scenarios where one candidate is a prior donor and the other candidate is not, and the worker selects the prior donor three times, their ΔP for the Prior Donor factor is $0.75 - 0.25 = 0.5$. For each worker, we generate a vector of ΔP values (or $\boldsymbol{\Delta P}$ for short) to represent the worker's ethical preferences across the three factors.

Using $\boldsymbol{\Delta P}$, we can then generate our population-level metric, the normalized stated preference (or stated preference). Recall that we asked workers to express the dimension they care about the most in the post-experiment survey (we call this dimension "preferred factor"). To generate the normalized stated preference, we normalize each worker's $\boldsymbol{\Delta P}$ to be length one and select the value in the dimension of the workers' preferred factor. For example, if a user's normalized $\boldsymbol{\Delta P} = (0.8, 0.6, 0)$, and the user's preferred factor is the Prior Donor factor (the first dimension of the vector), then their normalized stated preference value would be 0.8. The reason we normalize $\boldsymbol{\Delta P}$ before selecting this preferred factor is to better measure the relative preferences between a user's stated preference and the other two preferences, without giving extra weight to users with a higher overall ethical preference strength.

The intuition of using this normalized stated preference as a metric is to measure how divided a population is. For example, people

generally have varying priorities on what government should focus on (e.g. the economy, health care, climate change, security) [23]. If a population has a relatively low stated preference, then this can be interpreted as the population having relatively weak preferences towards their highest priority over the other policy options. If the population has a high stated preference, this means that people strongly believe in their top policy over the others.

We analyze the average stated preference of the two stages. We find an average stated preference of 0.151 in the first stage, and an average stated preference of 0.173 in the second stage. This increase is not significant ($t(895) = -0.52, p = 0.60, d = 0.04$). However, if we compare the increase in the average stated preference with similar AI and the increase with dissimilar AI, We see that a similar AI increases stated preference to 0.226, and a dissimilar AI decreases stated preference to 0.125. This difference is statistical significant, with $t(595) = -2.09, p = 0.037, d = 0.17$. Overall, the results suggest that the use of similar AI recommendations leads to higher stated preferences than using dissimilar recommendations.

5 DISCUSSION

In this section, we discuss the limitations, implications, and future work of our study.

Limitations and generalization. We discuss the limitations of this study. First, we have conducted our experiments using crowdsourcing with users recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. While crowdsourcing is getting increasing popularity in conducting user studies, the nature of distributed work of the platform raises questions about the engagement of workers and the quality of their responses. The common approaches to improve the quality of crowdsourced data collection include post-hoc aggregation [6, 19, 20, 42, 48], designing proper incentives [21, 22, 24, 30, 44], and improving the task design [1, 9–11, 14, 40]. However, the subjective nature of our task makes it challenging to ensure data quality as we cannot evaluate whether the workers are providing truthful answers. Moreover, the hypothetical nature of the presentation of the moral dilemma, although being a standard practice for academic studies [2, 16], may not reflect human ethical preferences in real-life scenarios. Additionally, the study surveyed ethical preferences from a general population of laypeople, who may interpret the moral dilemma differently from relevant domain stakeholders. Therefore, surveying preferences from stakeholders such as medical doctors or policymakers could provide valuable insights on how these results could inform real-world implementation of AI-assisted human decision making on kidney allocation.

Second, we have conducted a case study in the domain of kidney allocation to investigates the effects of value similarity to human reliance in the context of AI-assisted ethical decision making. Given the nature of case study, we cannot guarantee that the results and findings carry over to other domains. However, kidney allocation is an example of a general family of problem in scarce resource allocation. Therefore, we conjecture that our results could translate to other domains in this family of problems, such as vaccine distribution or homelessness resource allocation. However, it is important to carefully study applications in other domains before using these results to inform implementation in real-world systems.

Implications. In this work, we find that human reliance on AI is influenced by the value similarity between humans and AI. This result showcases the complexity of understanding the impacts of incorporating AI recommendations in ethical decision making, as the final decisions made by human-AI teams would depend on not only the ethical values exhibited by humans and AI algorithms but also the similarity between them. For example, if workers' ethical preferences are reinforced by AI with similar ethical preference, in the sense that they put more focus on the top factor in making ethical decisions, when we provide personalized assistive AI (with similar values to decision makers) in AI-assisted ethical decision making, it could create an effect similar to the *echo chamber* effect [5] that make the ethical decisions made by AI-assisted decision making more polarized, focusing on more extreme factors.

Moreover, the fact that human decisions are influenced by AI assistance also creates potential concerns of manipulation. For example, through leveraging the techniques from the literature on information design [26, 39], the advantageous party (e.g., the party that provides the AI assistance, usually the party with more power and information advantage) might strategically choose the assistance to lead human decision makers to take certain decisions. Therefore, as the growing prevalence of AI involvements in decision making in high-stake domains, having more studies on how humans reliance on AI evolves and whether it is possible to be manipulated are important to ensure the introduction of AI in decision making creates positive impacts to the society.

Future work. Our work has presented interesting findings on the effect of value similarity to human reliance in AI-assisted ethical decision making. There are still a lot of open questions that deserve future study. First, it is worth exploring the other factors that might impact human reliance on AI in the domain of ethical decision making. For example, if we provide explanations on why the AI recommendations exhibit certain ethical values, are human decision makers more likely to follow the recommendations? Moreover, as brought up by the above discussion on the limitations and implications, investigating the impact of AI assistance in different problem domains and with different stakeholder populations would help us understand the generalizability of the results. It is also important to study how the overall ethical preferences evolve when introducing AI to help humans make decisions in ethically-sensitive domains.

6 CONCLUSION

We investigate the impact of value similarity to human reliance in AI-assisted ethical decision making. We find that recommendations provided by a dissimilar AI have a higher impact on human decision-making than those given by a similar AI. However, this result is primarily due to the fact that a similar AI typically has a higher level of agreement with the human decision maker, leaving fewer opportunities for persuasion. When we focus on scenarios where humans and AI disagree, we have observed that humans are more likely to change their decision when given recommendations from a similar AI rather than a dissimilar one. We have found no evidence to suggest that this effect is a result of humans perceiving the AI as being similar. Instead, our findings indicate that this effect is mainly due to the AI's ability to display similar ethical values through its recommendations.

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User Tampering in Reinforcement Learning Recommender Systems

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we introduce new formal methods and provide empirical evidence to highlight a unique safety concern prevalent in reinforcement learning (RL)-based recommendation algorithms – 'user tampering.' User tampering is a situation where an RL-based recommender system may manipulate a media user's opinions through its suggestions as part of a policy to maximize long-term user engagement. We use formal techniques from causal modeling to critically analyze prevailing solutions proposed in the literature for implementing scalable RL-based recommendation systems, and we observe that these methods do not adequately prevent user tampering. Moreover, we evaluate existing mitigation strategies for reward tampering issues, and show that these methods are insufficient in addressing the distinct phenomenon of user tampering within the context of recommendations. We further reinforce our findings with a simulation study of an RL-based recommendation system focused on the dissemination of political content. Our study shows that a Q-learning algorithm consistently learns to exploit its opportunities to polarize simulated users with its early recommendations in order to have more consistent success with subsequent recommendations that align with this induced polarization. Our findings emphasize the necessity for developing safer RL-based recommendation systems and suggest that achieving such safety would require a fundamental shift in the design away from the approaches we have seen in the recent literature.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies** → **Reinforcement learning**; **Causal reasoning and diagnostics**.

KEYWORDS

AI Safety, AI Ethics, Recommendation Systems, Recommender Systems, Reinforcement Learning, Value Alignment

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1 INTRODUCTION

Recommender systems, also known as recommendation systems, are algorithms designed to sift through vast collections of data to identify and suggest entities that are particularly relevant to a specific user or group [7]. These systems have been extensively deployed in a variety of domains, including entertainment, retail, and social media, where they curate suggestions for movies, music, and merchandise, as exemplified by platforms such as Netflix, YouTube, and Twitter. A particularly significant application of these systems is in news and social media platforms where they curate relevant content for users. In the context of this paper, we focus on these as *media recommender systems*.

A popular approach to deploying recommender systems is to treat the recommendation problem as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) and applying reinforcement learning (RL) to the recommendation task. Although the potential of this approach was recognized theoretically two decades ago [29, 31, 32], the more recent emergence of 'Deep RL' – notably, its ability to handle larger, more complex recommendation problems – has reignited applied interest [19, 36, 37]. In response, researchers have begun exploring the applicability of Deep RL-based recommendations within the news and social media sector [28, 38]. This body of work has shown a significant increase in user engagement compared to the deployment of the recommendation problem using two other prominent methods: (i) 'static' machine learning approaches [3, 7, 12, 20, 22] and (ii) contextual Multi-Armed Bandit approaches [18, 33–35].

Advancements in RL techniques have enabled the large-scale implementation of RL-based recommender systems. Major social media platforms, such as Facebook, have already begun integrating these systems into their frameworks [13, 21]. This integration raises crucial safety and ethical question: How can we identify potential harms arising from the use of RL-based recommender systems, and what measures can we take to mitigate them?

The social implications of media recommender systems have received significant attention in recent years [1, 16, 23, 24, 30]. A comprehensive review of the topic identifies six key areas of concern: biased/unfair recommendations, encroachment on individual autonomy and identity, opacity, questionable content, privacy, and social manipulability and polarization [23]. This paper focuses on the last of these concerns: social manipulability and polarization. In particular, we elucidate the potential harms and risks of social manipulation and polarization posed by RL-based media recommendation systems. Given the growing ubiquity of RL-based social media in our daily lives, we argue that these concerns necessitate immediate scrutiny. We begin our discussion with a review of the primary literature on this subject.

Russell [26, 27] suggests that a specific issue of social manipulation and polarization can arise when the recommendation problem is viewed as an MDP, and an RL approach is used to resolve it. The primary concern here is that an RL-based recommender system might learn to make recommendations based not solely on the user's current interests and beliefs, but also on the long-term influence these recommendations could have on the user. This approach could result in altering the user's interests and beliefs over time. Various recent studies have investigated this issue from different angles

Krueger et al. [17] connect this problem to a concrete probabilistic concept known as auto-induced distributional shift (ADS). ADS pertains to the capacity of an RL agent to learn independently how to shift the opinion distribution among users to its own objective advantage. Such a shift might involve (i) enticing a larger proportion of users who are simpler to provide recommendations for, or (ii) modifying the preferences and behaviors of the current user base. Krueger et al. [17] explore methods to mitigate such unwanted manipulation in example problems including media recommendation systems. However, the learning algorithms employed in their studies are not reflective of the current state-of-the-art algorithms with which this study is concerned, as they consider the emergence of ADS in the context of population-based training with multilayer perceptrons, rather than deep RL. Our paper attempts to address this gap.

Carroll et al. [8] examine the dangers of RL-based recommenders insofar as the inducement of opinion shifts – or ADS – is concerned. The authors formulate mitigation strategies against these dangers by revising the optimization objective of the RL agent. Farquhar et al. [11] also examine the media recommendation problem and explore a different set of mitigation strategies, relying upon a novel extension of the classic MDP model and Causal Inference theory to limit the RL agent's ability to identify opportunities for manipulating users. Our paper differs from these two works in that, while the previous authors focus on principles for how safer RL-based recommenders *could* be developed, we delve deeper into the question of *why they must* be urgently developed with urgency. We substantiate our point through both mathematical and computational demonstrations.

In this paper, we make two core contributions to the literature on safe and ethical media recommender systems. Our first contribution is the formalization of the concept of 'user tampering' as a potential safety issue that could arise in RL-based media recommenders. User tampering reflects the concern that a recommender system may learn that manipulation of a user's preferences, opinions, and beliefs via the recommendation of certain content has beneficial outcomes for its ability to maximize its reward function in the longer term.[1]

User tampering is formalized using the Causal Influence Diagram techniques, proposed by Everitt et al. [9], to extract the specific mechanisms enabling RL-based recommenders to learn such manipulating strategies. Unlike previous research, our formalization directly engages with the state-of-the-art algorithmic designs featured in recent RL-based recommendation literature. Our second contribution is an experimental demonstration of user tampering in recommender systems. In particular, we design a simulation study capturing a simple media recommendation problem. We show that a standard Q-learning algorithm can learn to exploit user tampering by developing a policy for making recommendations that affect our simulated users' content preferences. While our simulation occurs on a significantly smaller scale than a real recommendation problem scenario, its novelty is relevant because it aims to replicate a known cause of opinion shift in social media users. Thus, our simulation study computationally affirms that user tampering is a crucial ethical and safety concern which must be taken seriously when designing and deploying RL-based media recommender systems.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the media recommendation problem as a Markov Decision Process. We then introduce a causal model of the recommendation problem, which we think can be representative of a large subset of current leading recommender systems. Section 3 introduces user tampering formally. We draw on Casual Influence Diagram techniques to identify problematic behavioural incentives in our proposed problem formulation. We then use these techniques to articulate why mitigation strategies applicable to similar tampering problems cannot apply successfully to user tampering. Section 4 introduces our simulation study and its results. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.

2 MODELLING THE MEDIA RECOMMENDATION PROBLEM

In this section, we achieve two goals. First, we present a formulation of the media recommendation problem as a Markov Decision Process (MDP).[2] Second, we employ Causal Influence Diagrams (CIDs) to identify relevant causal relationships among specific variables within this model. Our formulation aims to maintain the MDP as general as possible, while integrating design insights from recent developments in the implementation of RL-based media recommender systems [28, 38].

2.1 The MDP formulation of the media recommendation problem

We begin by constructing an MDP model that represents the media recommendation problem, one that aligns with those commonly employed in recent RL-based recommendation literature. This approach is informed by a recent survey, which outlines the cutting-edge of research into RL-based recommendation algorithms, as detailed by Afsar et al. [2]. Our proposed MDP formulation $\langle S, A, R, T, \gamma \rangle$ includes a series of well-founded assertions, specifically relevant to a reasonable MDP formulation of a media recommendation problem. These assertions are as follows:

- S denotes a set of states. A state $s \in S$ can represent a variety of structures, but primarily, it encodes information about the performance of recent recommendations from the recommender. As noted in Afsar et al. [2], this form of state representation is broadly applicable to the various methods of modeling media recommendation problems in recent literature. Dominant approaches since the mid-2000s tend to represent the state based on recent positive user-content

[1] In the rest of this paper, we use the terms 'preferences', 'opinions', 'beliefs, and 'interests' interchangeably.

[2] For an introduction to Markov Decision Processes, see Puterman [25].

interactions [31, 32]. This approach to representation is also observed in the Deep RL literature that has gained attention over the past five years [2]. As a concrete example among many, consider the state represented by a collection of $|n \times m|$ data points, which capture users' aggregate clicks on recommended items across n categories and through m different time frames of recent history (e.g. the last 1 hour, 6 hours, 1 day, etc.).[3] The inclusion of user-behavioral information is crucial in state representation; without it, the theoretical advantages of using RL could be compromised. In order to develop policies that not only capture current opportunities for reward but also anticipate future ones, it is necessary to incorporate user-behavioral information in the state representation.

- A denotes a set of actions. As Afsar et al. [2] observe, recent studies show a substantial consistency in how actions are modeled, with an action signifying either a single item or a collection of items recommended to a user. Practically speaking, actions could manifest as an n-dimensional vector, representing the properties of a piece of content (e.g., an article) across n dimensions for user recommendation. This concept can be broadened to interpret an action as the recommendation of a fixed-size bundle of content (e.g., a set of articles) to a user, since the individual content units can be integrated into the vector.
- R denotes a reward function. R maps an agent's activity to numerical values indicative of the 'goodness' of these activities. Typically, recommender systems use observable engagement metrics, such as a clicks or 'likes', as a basis for these rewards. The form of the function R may vary based on the specific implementation and the definition of actions and the state space. It can be represented in several ways, including $R : S \to \mathbb{R}$ or $R : S \times A \to \mathbb{R}$. In the case of recommender systems, as engagement is included in the state representation and will be updated at each step, a function of the form $R : S \to \mathbb{R}$ is generally sufficient.
- T denotes a transition function. T calculates the probability of an agent arriving at a specific 'successor state' s' after taking a specific action a from its current state s. Typically, a transition function is formulated as $T : S \times A \times S \to [0, 1]$.
- $\gamma \in \mathbb{R}$ denotes a discount factor for future rewards. γ encapsulates the balance between the value assigned to immediate rewards and those expected in the future.

Given these five types of assertion, a media recommendation problem can be modeled as follows: An agent takes an action a_t ($a_t \in A$) at time t. This action transitions the system from the current state s_t ($s_t \in S$) to a subsequent state s_{t+1} ($s_{t+1} \in S$), with the probability $T(s_t, a_t, s_{t+1})$. Following this transition, the agent receives a reward, denoted as $R(s_t)$. Subsequently, another action is chosen at time $t + 1$, and the process continues. During this sequence of actions and rewards, the influence of the discount factor γ is consistently factored in.

[3]This example is very similar to the approach taken by Zheng et al. [38] to represent states.

2.2 Extracting a CID from the MDP

The Causal Influence Diagram (CID) is a modeling technique central to our formalization of user tampering [9, 14]. This technique has recently seen increased application in analyzing the potential incentives driving RL agents' behaviour [4, 9, 10]. We start by briefly describing the basic building blocks of CIDs and then will provide an illustration of CIDs within the context of the media recommendation problem (Figure 1).

CIDs are structured as directed acyclic graphs. CIDs are specified by three node types, representing different variables within the problem at hand. These nodes are (i) Decision Nodes, (ii) Structural Nodes, and (iii) Utility Nodes. As depicted in Figure 1, Decision Nodes are shown as squares, Structural Nodes as circles, and Utility Nodes as diamonds. The Decision Nodes stand for variables that receive an assigned value at the point of decision.

Both Structural Nodes and Utility Nodes symbolize probability distributions over the possible values a variable might take. However, they do this in different ways: Structural Nodes represent distributions over possible state variable values, whereas Utility Nodes represent distributions over possible rewards. A directed edge from a node X to a node Y can be interpreted as follows. If Y is a Utility or Structural Node, then the value of the random variable Y is conditional on the value of X. In such instances, a solid line depicts the edge. If Y is a Decision Node, then the value of X represents the information available to the agent at the decision-time of Y. The edge, in this case, is illustrated with a dashed line.[4]

In the context of RL-based media recommendation, using a CID-based analysis for agent incentives offers several advantages when compared to alternative methods like purely statistical analyses. Firstly, CIDs, and the notion of an instrumental goal in these graphs (as introduced in Section 3), are uniquely equipped to handle *causation*, not just *mere correlation* between variables. This is pivotal in media recommendation, where the causal dependency relations are crucial: We can show recommenders' ability to cause increased user engagement via their actions' causal effects on users' preferences and opinions. Secondly, CIDs allow us to abstract from extraneous information about the specifics of RL algorithm implementations and instead focus on the core causal mechanisms shared among them. This abstraction is particularly beneficial in providing a space for formally discussing causal properties of various potential implementations simultaneously, as opposed to a statistically analysis of the results achieved by each unique implementation.

Note that throughout this paper, for the given CIDs, our figures only depict a subgraph of three time steps from the entire diagram. This simplification is intended to capture the main structure of CIDs, without overly complicating the visualization. Consequently, these results can be readily generalized to scenarios involving more than three time steps.

Let us begin with a simplified model of a media recommendation problem. If we were to naively model an MDP's causal structure as a CID, without additional considerations, we would end up with a representation akin to that shown in Figure 1. At a specific time step x, the distribution over possible current states is represented by S_x. The actual value of the state at time x is the only piece of

[4]The reader is encouraged to refer to Everitt et al. [9] for a more comprehensive understanding of the CID modeling technique.



Figure 1: A naive CID of the media recommendation problem.

information available to the agent for its action selection at A_x. The distribution of possible states in S_{x+1} is subsequently determined by T, given S_x and A_x. Finally, R_x denotes the distribution over the reward value achieved from the action taken at A_x. We have assumed an interpretation of the reward function as $R : S \times S \to \mathbb{R}$, wherein the reward is determined by comparing two successive states. This arrangement offers adequate information to infer the success of the most recent action or recommendation.

A simple thought experiment demonstrates that this naive CID underspecifies the causal relationships in the actual problem due to neglecting key variables external to the MDP. Consider the following scenario. Alice and Bob are two university students who recently created accounts on a media platform. Thus far, both have been recommended the same three articles about student politics at their university and both have clicked on the three articles. Within our problem specification, it is quite plausible that the states of the system have been identical thus far from the recommender agent's perspective. Yet, suppose Bob clicks on the articles because his friends feature in the cover photos of the three articles, whereas Alice's clicks stem from a genuine interest in politics, including student politics. If the next recommendation for both Alice and Bob – denoted as A_{x+1} – is an article on federal politics, the distribution over possible states at S_{x+1} is the same. In this state, Alice is more likely to be observed engaging with this content.

This thought experiment illustrates the need for an exogenous random variable to the MDP to model any external causal effects potentially introducing media recommendations. We think this variable can capture the relevance of a specific user's hidden impactful opinions to whom the agent recommends media content. We represent this exogenous variable by θ^T for considering it in our causal modeling framework.

That is to say, the exogenous variable that is the user's interests not captured by her observed behavior (such a click or like) at time x, is represented as θ^T_x.[5] The key point is the potential causal relationship between θ^T_x and S_{x+1}.

As the simple example above demonstrates, an appropriate explanation for the distribution over states S_{x+1} cannot be achieved without considering the possible effect of θ^T_x.

This potential link cannot be easily removed by any practical redesign of the state space. Moreover, it is crucial to recognize that an influence link also exists between A_x and θ^T_{x+1}. This reflects the intuitive idea that a user's information consumption may modify

[5]We do not enforce any Markov assumptions on θ^T_x: it may depend on the values of the variable at multiple, or even all, previous time steps.



Figure 2: A CID of the media recommendation problem, extended to include the exogenous variable affecting state transitions.

their interests over time. Although θ^T is exogenous, we are not proposing a precise model that explains *how* A_x affects the distribution over possible values of θ^T_{x+1}. Rather, we are acknowledging the potential for a causal dependency via this influence link.

By incorporating the exogenous variable θ^T in our model of media recommendation, we can revise Figure 1 to the CID depicted in Figure 2. We believe that this better captures the actual causal dynamics at play in the media recommendation MDP. We would like to note that similar causal structures for the recommendation process have been suggested in previous work [15]. Nonetheless, these were not framed within the CID context. Our approach, in contrast, not only integrates these structures into the CID framework, but also facilitates in-depth graphical analysis of the media recommendation systems, which we will elaborate on in the following section.

The exact design of the MDP can lead to variations in the CID formulated here; for one such variants see Appendix A.[6] However, these variations do no impact the role or influence of θ^T and its links from the preceding action to the succeeding state remains part of the model's causal structure. As our forthcoming analysis will specifically focus on these causal relationships, the CID depicted in Figure 2 offers a sufficiently general representation for our needs going forward.

3 USER TAMPERING

In this section, we use the CID outlined in the previous section (Figure 2) to examine a primary safety concern related to RL-based media recommendation systems: the potential for user manipulation and polarization. In particular, we introduce and formalize the phenomenon of user tampering. This refers to the possibility of an RL-based recommender system strategically manipulating a user's opinions via its suggestions, aiming to maximize long-term user engagement.

After introducing the concepts of 'instrumental goals' and 'instrumental control incentives,' we demonstrate within the CID

[6]In this Appendix, we provide an example of the implied causal structure when the designer opts to broaden the reward function to incorporate observations not captured in the state representation.

framework that an instrumental goal exists for the agent to manipulate the expected value of the exogenous variable, θ^T. This provides a concrete and formal interpretation of the user tampering safety concern.

3.1 Instrumental Goals and Control Incentives

According to Everitt et al. [9], an 'instrumental goal' is conceptualized as an outcome that serves as a means to achieve the ultimate goal of obtaining a reward. Speaking in causal terms, an agent possesses an instrumental goal to cause an event if: (1) the agent is able to cause the event and (2) the event, in turn, results in an increase in the agent's expected observed reward. One of the key benefits of using CIDs in the modeling of media recommendation systems is that CIDs provide us with conceptual tools for the examination of instrumental goals. RL agents often harbor such instrumental goals, which assist in increasing their observed rewards.

An 'instrumental control incentive' (ICI) is a property displayed in the graphical models of CIDs, as introduced by Everitt et al. [9]. An ICI is said to be present on a Structural Node X if it is located along a path in the CID that originates at a Decision Node and concludes at a Utility Node. This essentially implies that the choice of action at the Decision Node can alter the expected utility at the Utility Node *through* affecting the distribution over values at X.

ICIs bear significant implications for user tampering due to their capacity to graphically indicate either the possible presence or the categorical absence of an *instrumental goal* in certain events within a RL problem [10]. An RL agent is said to possess an instrumental goal to influence the distribution at a Structural Node X in a certain way if it has an ICI on X and that particular influence increases the expected reward accumulated by the agent. Essentially, the agent must have both the ability and a motive to influence the distribution at X.

3.2 Formalizing User Tampering

In the CID presented in Figure 3, there is a subset of Structural Nodes upon which instrumental goals are *desirable*. These nodes represent the set of random state variables, denoted as $\{S_t | t \in \mathbb{N}\}$. The term 'desirable' here means that we, as the problem's designers or framers, 'want' the RL agent to shift the probability distribution at these nodes towards 'good' states which maximize reward. In our problem, these are states where many of recent recommendations have been favorably received by the user. As such, any path in the CID from a Decision Node to a Utility Node passing exclusively through random state variables (e.g. $[A_x \rightarrow S_{x+1} \rightarrow R_x]$, or $[A_x \rightarrow S_{x+1} \rightarrow S_{x+2} \rightarrow R_{x+1}]$) only involves intended and safe instrumental goals.

However, in the CID, there exist additional paths from Decision to Utility Nodes. Specifically, there are paths which involve the exogenous random variables – for example, $[A_x \rightarrow \theta^T_{x+1} \rightarrow S_{x+2} \rightarrow R_{x+1}]$. This pathway is illustrated in Figure 3. An ICI is clearly present on θ^T_{x+1} or on any other variable in $\{\theta^T_t | t \in \mathbb{N}\}$ appearing in similar pathways.[7]

[7]Page size constraints prevent us from displaying larger CID subgraphs, but note that longer paths can also be identified containing similar instrumental goals. For example, paths of the form $[A_x \rightarrow \theta^T_{x+1} \rightarrow \theta^T_{x+2} \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow \theta^T_{x+n} \rightarrow S_{x+n+1} \rightarrow R_{x+n}]$, or $[A_x \rightarrow \theta^T_{x+1} \rightarrow S_{x+2} \rightarrow S_{x+3} \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow S_{x+n} \rightarrow R_{x+n-1}]$ are feasible.



Figure 3: An annotated version of the media recommendation CID for state-based rewards. An example of an undesirable causal path introducing an instrumental control incentive on θ^T_{x+1} is shown in bolded red.

Given these conditions, if an agent can secure higher rewards by tailoring recommendations to a user with particular interests (represented by θ^T), then the agent may have an instrumental goal to influence θ^T accordingly, potentially leading to greater long-term expected rewards. Essentially, the presence of an ICI on at least one node in $\{\theta^T_t | t \in \mathbb{N}\}$ in the CID establishes the graphical prerequisite for user manipulation to emerge as an instrumental goal for an RL agent. If such an instrumental goal is attainable – meaning the agent can boost its expected reward by influencing users' interests – then we can expect that an advanced RL agent would likely learn to exploit this instrumental goal, rendering user tampering a 'learnable' phenomenon. We can thus define user tampering as follows.

Definition 1*. User tampering is a 'learnable' phenomenon for an RL-based media recommendation algorithm iff it has an instrumental goal to affect at least one of the variables in* $\{\theta^T_t | t \in \mathbb{N}\}$.

Importantly, however, an instrumental goal affecting some variable in $\{\theta^T_t | t \in \mathbb{N}\}$ does not inherently mean that a given RL agent will necessarily learn to affect the user in a way that increases its expected reward. It simply means that the agent *has the potential* to learn this behavior. So, the learnability of user tampering in a certain model is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for user tampering to actually occur in an RL agent's learned policy. To clarify this distinction, it is beneficial to introduce a second definition of user tampering that separates our discussion of its theoretical learnability from the examination of its practical manifestations in a specific recommender's policy.

Definition 2*. An RL-based media recommendation algorithm 'exploits' user tampering iff there exists a state* s_t *such that* $\pi(s_t) = a_t$ *and* $\pi'(s_t) \neq a_t$*, for the algorithm's actual learned policy* π*, and the hypothetical policy* π' *that the same learning process would have produced in a world where each action has no causal link to the user's subsequent preferences, i.e.,* $A_t \perp\!\!\!\perp \theta^T_{t+1}$.

Informally, this is to say that the learned policy makes a different recommendation in some possible state of the problem than what

it would make in a hypothetical scenario where recommendations had no causal impact upon the user's preferences.

In the rest of this section, we contrast our proposal to a different form of 'tampering' in RL, known as 'Reward Function (RF)-tampering.' Despite some apparent similarities, the RF-tampering is quite distinct from a causal perspective. This distinction rules out the transfer of promising solutions in the literature – particularly those proposed by Everitt et al. [10] – from the context of RF-tampering to that of user tampering.

3.3 User Tampering's Differences from RF-tampering

Reward function (RF)-tampering refers to a specific safety issue where an RL agent has one or several undesirable instrumental goal(s) to affect variables *within* its own reward function. This aims to alter the way in which certain states are evaluated by the function [4, 10]. Detailed analysis on this issue is scant, but it is suggested that the high-level concerns of social manipulation and polarization might be classified under the category of RF-tampering [10]. At a certain level, this assertion seems intuitive – the user and their behavior often mirror a 'reward function' for the recommendation system, since the user's response ultimately decides whether a recommendation is rewarded. Hence, one might expect that tampering with the user would constitute a kind of 'reward' tampering. However, our earlier discussion reveals that this assumption is inaccurate.

In the media recommendation problem, the reward function is an explicitly defined function that maps concrete outcomes within the state space, such as clicks or likes, to numerical rewards. Here, the user essentially forms part of the problem environment, with their behavior contributing to the environment's dynamics. Our earlier definition of 'user tampering' is not a form of 'reward tampering.' Instead, it more accurately represents 'transition tampering.' This perspective is acknowledged by Everitt et al. [10], but not dealt with nearly as extensively as their work on reward tampering.

To situate our argument, we begin with a brief synopsis of the characteristics of any problem in which RF-tampering (and its associated CID) may occur. In such a problem:

- The reward function can be expressed as $R(S;\theta) : S \times \mathbb{R}^N \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, where θ represents some 'parameters' of the reward function other than states or actions. These parameters are distinct from the states or actions in the model, and should not be confused with θ^T from our model; we use θ here to be consistent with the notation of Everitt et al. [10].
- A specific 'intended' value of θ exists, represented as θ_*. This value remains static unless a change is introduced to it at some point by an external process. In other words, its value is independent of any actions undertaken by the RL agent.
- The agent models θ_* and updates that model based on its experiences. At each time step t, the agent's distribution over possible values of θ_* is represented as θ_t.
- The agent is able to influence the distribution θ_{t+1} with its action a_t.
- The rewards observed by the agent at time step t are defined as $R(S_t;\theta_t)$, rather than $R(S_t;\theta_*)$.



Figure 4: CID Representation of an RF-Tampering-susceptible problem.

The crux of the RF-tampering problem is that the agent has an instrumental goal to alter its own model of the reward parameters such that it rewards certain states more positively than what θ_* would actually generate.

Note, however, that the MDP and associated CID representation of the media recommendation do not conform to this description on several points. Particularly, in the media recommendation problem:

- θ^T is not a hidden parameter to the *reward* function, but instead to the *transition* function.
- θ^T is *not* independent of the agent's actions. While it fulfils a similar conceptual role as θ_* in RF-tampering in that it represents an 'intended' parameter, it is nonetheless subject to the effects of the agent's recommendations. This is why there is a causal link from A_t to θ^T_{t+1}.
- In the problem of media recommendation, it is generally not attempted to estimate the distribution θ^T_t at a given time step t. Rather, the state space contains an implicit estimation of the intended parameters in the form of recorded user behavior. This contributes to the causal link between θ^T_t and S_{t+1}. This does not imply that there *cannot* be an attempt to model this aspect explicitly. For example, Carroll et al. [8] attempt this explicit modeling in their work aimed at mitigating user manipulation. However, as the current industry standards and R&D trends outlined by Afsar et al. [2], it is standard not to do so.

It may help the reader to consult and compare the diagram in Figure 4, where we have recreated the CID given in Everitt et al. [10] to represent an RF-tampering-susceptible model, with the recommendation CID we constructed in Section 2 (i.e. Figure 2).

Several solutions to RF-tampering have been proposed by Armstrong et al. [4] and Everitt et al. [10]. However, some of their underlying assumptions cannot be transferred to our case of transition tampering. Although one proposed solution could be adapted theoretically, its implementation demands a resolution to as-of-yet unresolved questions in the literature, as we elaborate on below.

The solutions that cannot transfer to transition tampering are what Everitt et al. [10] refer to as Time-inconsistency-considering, Direct learning, and Counterfactual agents.[8] At their core, these solutions aim to eliminate the agent's instrumental goals to tamper with its own model of the reward function through hidden parameters.

For our purposes, it is important to understand that these solutions are predicated on the assumption of 'uninformativity.' This means that no causal links can exist between the ground truth hidden parameters at one time step, and the distribution over the state space at the next time step (meaning graphically, in our model, no directed arrows $\theta_t^T \rightarrow S_{t+1}$). As we have discussed, this is an unattainable quality in the media recommendation problem, because it undermines the entire purpose of approaching recommendation with RL. To reiterate, if the state representation contains any measure of previous recommendation successes, 'uninformativity' is not achieved. Conversely, if it does not, an RL algorithm fails to learn as it becomes incapable of drawing associations between its recommendations and their respective impacts on overall reward. Consequently, we must disregard this set of RF-tampering solutions as a feasible transfer of ideas to the user tampering problem.

Another solution proposed is the concept of a time-inconsistency-ignoring agent, which does not necessitate uninformativity, thus providing potentially more promise. The basic premise of this solution – as it would apply to user tampering – is to initially model the user's content preferences explicitly, and subsequently rewarding the agent based on the engagement we would *expect* its recommendations to receive according to this model, rather than the user's actual engagement. This idea was proposed by Everitt et al. [9], who believed that this approach eliminates the ICI, and the instrumental goal, to manipulate user preferences.

However, this solution reveals complex, unresolved problems: How can we learn a sufficiently detailed model of a user's content preferences? How can we simulate organic evolution in these preferences without making the model dependent on the user's actual behavior? For example, if a user of their own volition develops an interest in politics, resulting in increased engagement with political content when occasionally recommended, it would be a poor service if the system continued to seldom recommend such content due to its reliance on an outdated preference model.

A deeper understanding of how and why preferences shift 'naturally' apart from content consumption, and how to distinguish this from changes induced by tampering, is essential. Although recent work by Carroll et al. [8] makes progress in this area, further research is required.

The takeaway for us, in this paper, is that there is no 'quick fix' to tackle user tampering issues, extrapolated from other research on RL tampering problems. Coupling this with our prior discussions about the surge in popularity of RL recommenders and the dominance of a problem framework that significantly enables learnable user tampering, a disconcerting image of the current safety of RL media recommendation starts to surface. To further illustrate this, we will present computational results in the next section, showing exploitation of user tampering in simulated scenarios.

[8]Readers may refer to their work for further details about each of these concepts.

4 COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS

In this section, we empirically analyze the user tampering phenomenon formalized in the previous section. First, we introduce a simple media recommendation problem, which involves simulated users and a user tampering incentive, derived from recent empirical findings concerning polarization on social media. Second, we present a Q-learning agent designed to mimic the Deep Q-learning algorithms employed in recent media recommendation research, training it within this environment [28, 38]. Our findings show that the policy it learns significantly exploits user tampering to maximize rewards.

4.1 Problem Formulation and Environment Setup

Consider the following scenario where a recommender agent sequentially offers h 'political post/article' recommendations to a user. At each time step t ($0 \leq t \leq h$), the agent can select one of three available 'sources' for recommendation. The first source present consistently left-wing in its perspective, the second offers consistently a centrist viewpoint, and the third consistently showcases a right-wing stance.

Furthermore, we assume the definition of the exogenous parameter θ^T introduced in Section 2. Recall that the agent does not explicitly model this variable (θ^T is an exogenous variable). We define θ_t^T as a tuple of three probabilities as of time t, i.e. $\Theta^T = \{(\theta^{T^L}, \theta^{T^C}, \theta^{T^R}) \in \mathbb{R}^3 \mid \forall x \in \{L, R, C\}.\theta^{T^x} \in [0, 1]\}$. For some arbitrary user, their probability θ^{T^L} represents their probability of clicking an article from the left-wing source *if it is recommended*; the same can be said of θ^{T^C} for the centrist source, and θ^{T^R} for the right-wing source. We say that a user is initially (t=0) 'right-wing' iff $\theta_0^{T^R} > \theta_0^{T^C} \wedge \theta_0^{T^R} > \theta_0^{T^L}$, and 'left-wing' iff $\theta_0^{T^L} > \theta_0^{T^C} \wedge \theta_0^{T^L} > \theta_0^{T^R}$. Finally, we include a simple environmental dynamic whereby users who are recommended content from a source that is politically opposed to their viewpoint gradually become more polarized in favor of their own political bias. This concept is underpinned by recent studies exploring user polarization on social media. These studies provide evidence that exposure to a high volume of content from the politically opposite side can often amplify user polarization [5, 6].

We would like to emphasize that our model of polarization is greatly simplified and is not intended to model the intricate details of the polarization phenomenon described in applied social media in the previously cited works. Indeed, our primary goal is not to simulate the effects of polarization in painstaking detail, but rather to construct an environment which allows the hypothesized effect of user tampering to be tested given the potential for polarization. In order to accomplish this, we consider potential causal effect an agent could use as part of their instrumental goal. Even though our model is simplified, its dynamics remain rooted in authentic sociological findings.

The detailed definition $\langle S, A, T, R, \gamma \rangle$ of the media recommendation MDP, as well as the precise implementation of the 'polarization' effect we have just described, is provided in Appendix B. Next, we train a Q-learning agent in this environment and show that it learns to perform user tampering on our simulated users.

4.2 Recommender Simulation

To computationally operationalize the model described previously, we need to establish some additional specifications. We assign a value of 30 to h, while the probabilities that define the exogenous variable θ^T are restricted to a maximum value of 0.75.[9] We then introduce p, defined as the 'polarization factor.' The polarization factor represents a user's subsequent likelihood of engaging with content from their aligned source, after having a post from an opposing source recommended to them.

In the context of our experiment, a population of five 'users' with varying preference profiles. This include:

- A 'strong left' user with θ_0^T = (0.4, 0.1, 0.1)
- A 'moderate left' user with θ_0^T = (0.3, 0.25, 0.1)
- A 'centrist' user with θ_0^T = (0.2, 0.4, 0.2)
- A 'moderate right' user with θ_0^T = (0.1, 0.25, 0.3)
- A 'strong right' user with θ_0^T = (0.1, 0.1, 0.4)

We train a Q-learning agent in this environment. Each episode starts with the selection of a user at random from the population to provide the initial θ^T value.[10] Non-deep Q-learning was used for training, in spite of deep Q-learning being the more viable approach at industrial scales; this was a deliberate choice, because unlike deep Q-learning, non-deep Q-learning provably converges towards the optimal policy for the problem.[11] Nonetheless, to maintain alignment with practical Deep RL application, we modeled the state space in a parameterized manner suitable for such algorithms.

For each of the five users in our population, we provide two plots based on 10000 evaluation episodes with the user, using the policy learned from the aforementioned training process.

Respectively, these two plots estimate the following. (i) The probability of the learned policy selecting each action at every problem time-step. This is determined by taking the per-episode average frequency of each choice. (ii) The expected reward accumulated up to and including each time step t, $0 \leq t \leq h$. To provide context, we plot this scenario against the expected reward accumulated by two different kinds of recommenders.

(a) The first recommender makes uniformly random recommendations at each time step. (b) The second recommender follows a simple multi-armed bandit-esque policy, which provides a 'baseline' of a good policy. This policy makes random recommendations for the first third of the episode, but then operates like a multi-armed bandit, always recommending from the source that has the highest mean reward in the episode thus far.

Figure 5 illustrates the plots for each of the simulated users as specified earlier. These results exhibit multiple interesting properties.

First, the exploitation of user tampering by the learned policy is apparent for all users, with the exception of the Centrist. Directing attention to the strategy plots of the two 'left-wing' users reveals a particularly dominant strategy that evolves as follows:

- The recommender attempts to profile the user and their preferences. This is achieved by assessing their response to centrist and left-wing content – predominantly during the first quarter of the episode.
- The recommender primarily recommends right-wing content *in spite of* its low expected reward. This will tamper



(a) **The 'Strong Right' user.**



(b) **The 'Moderate Right' user.**



(c) **The 'Centrist' user.**



(d) **The 'Moderate Left' user.**



(e) **The 'Strong Left' user.**

Figure 5: Evaluation of the policy learned with Q-learning for each member of our sample user population.

[9]The authors imposed this arbitrary limitation to prevent users from becoming so 'polarized' that they would engage with every post from a source that mirrors their viewpoints. This seemed an extreme, and thus unrealistic, outcome that could undermine the plausibility of our simulation.

[10]Our implementation, including a pre-trained recommender agent, is available on GitHub: https://github.com/chevans-lab/user-tampering.

[11]Since we wanted to test whether the agent was able to find a *better* policy by exploiting user tampering than it could otherwise achieve, Deep Q-learning was an inappropriate choice for the experiment as there was no way to guarantee that it would not converge on a good, safe policy even when a better, user tampering policy was available.

with the user's preferences and increase the expected reward from subsequent left-wing recommendations – mainly during the second quarter of the episode.
- The recommender predominantly recommends left-wing content to the (now more) left-wing leaning user. This maximizes the high expected rewards that action will now offer – mainly during the second half of the episode.

Despite the low expected rewards associated with right-wing content and the learnability of user tampering in this context, the recommender system is observed to strongly favor right-wing content initially, only to later shift to left-wing recommendations for the rest of the episode. This apparent exploitation of user tampering is noteworthy. Moreover, the inverse behavior is learned for right-wing users – it suggests that the model is not merely attempting to polarize all users towards the left, but is instead crafting a nuanced policy to identify and exploit the causal link between its actions and the user's exogenous variable. This inference is further supported by the policy observed for 'centrist' users.

Further evidence to this effect is given by the policy for the 'centrist' user – here, the data clearly indicates that the recommender recognizes its actions hold no discernible causal influence over these users, preventing any feasible user tampering. Consequently, the system's recommendations align closely with the initial preferences of these users.

Second, the agent heavily exploits user tampering even though we were able to generate similar cumulative rewards with our crude 'baseline' policy. This adds weight to the safety concerns with respect to user tampering. It indicates that there exist other policies which do not exploit user tampering (although they may make a handful of 'polarizing' recommendations by chance) and which offer similar rewards to the one that the recommender learned; nonetheless, over several iterations of retraining, the policy consistently converged to the policy we have presented here (with small natural variations). This implies that in this environment, the unsafe policy is not only learned occasionally, but presents a likely direction of convergence for the learning algorithm.

It is also worth establishing that the exploitation of user tampering in the learned policy was robust to simulated users not encountered during training. We generated the same policy plots for the recommender over 10000 evaluation episodes spent recommending to each user in a new, 'unseen' population: an 'extremely left' user with θ_0^T = (0.5, 0.05, 0.05), an 'extremely right' user with θ_0^T = (0.05, 0.05, 0.5), a 'left anti-centrist' user with θ_0^T = (0.35, 0.05, 0.2), and a 'right anti-centrist' user with θ_0^T = (0.2, 0.05, 0.35).

These results are shown in Figure 6. Although these specific users were never encountered during training, the same unsafe strategies appear here; the three phases of user profiling, then polarization, and finally preference satisfaction are clearly visible.

These results support the previous section's claims that user tampering is learnable for commercially dominant methods of designing RL media recommender systems, and strengthen the implications of this by showing that it is, at least according to our small-scale simulation, very much exploitable. Taken in combination with the lack of immediately available remedies, this should raise significant safety concerns about the use of the current state of the art in RL recommendation on pubic media platforms.



(a) **The 'Extremely Left' user.** (b) **The 'Extremely Right' user.**

(c) **The 'Left anti-centrist' user.** (d) **The 'Right anti-centrist' user.**

Figure 6: Action probabilities at each time-step for each user in the 'unseen' population.

5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This paper has substantiated concerns about the risks of emergent RL-based recommender systems with respect to user manipulation and polarization. We have formalized these concerns as a causal property – user tampering. We have demonstrated the possibility of isolating and identifying user tampering within a formalization of a recommendation system's implicit causal model. We have discussed why the learnability of user tampering is practically uniformly present amongst leading RL recommender systems, and why research into similar RL tampering problems cannot easily be adapted to redesign RL recommendation systems to be safer. Moreover, we have demonstrated computational results for a simple simulation environment which we designed inspired by recent research on social manipulation and polarization. We have shown that a Q-Learning-based recommendation algorithm can consistently learn a policy of exploiting user tampering – which, in our discussion, took the form of the algorithm explicitly polarizing our simulated users. We argued that our demonstration of user tampering phenomenon points to the potential unethical and troubling problems in real-world media recommendation systems. Due to a combination of technical and pragmatic limitations on what could be done differently in RL-based recommender design, we urge significant caution in the deployment of RL media recommendation systems until commercially and computationally viable adaptations of these algorithms that explicitly protect against the possibility of user tampering have emerged.

To this end, the findings in this paper motivate further work in two distinct areas; increasing understanding of the possibilities of the user tampering phenomenon in practice, and identifying positive directions for advancement in research & development of safer algorithms.

While this paper has formalized user tampering and demonstrated its exploitation by an RL algorithm in a simulated environment, that environment was highly abstracted relative to an

industrial-scale recommendation problem. So, while it was valuable in showing that user tampering *can* be exploited by an RL-based recommender system, it contributed less to our understanding of how it would manifest in a real context. While experimenting with actual users would obviously raise ethical questions, there is room for progress by simply reducing the level of abstraction present in the simulation. For example, future work can consider simulating the following scenarios:

- Recommendations from a wider range of sources, which may or may not be political.
- Users with more complex preference profiles, and users whose preference profiles shift as a result of effects external to the recommendation environment during a recommendation episode.
- Causal effects of recommendations on simulated users which more authentically replicate empirically demonstrated effects on real users.
- Recommending content over longer episodes.

On a related note, it would also be valuable to show that results similar to ours can be replicated with a Deep Q-learning-based algorithm, given that this may more closely replicate the learning process of industrial-scale RL-based recommendation (which is predominantly done with Deep Q-learning). Extending our results with this or any of the above suggestions would further substantiate our concerns by closing the abstraction gap between these simulations and the real-world system being simulated.

With respect to identifying positive directions for recommendation research, we believe that the combination of (a) a recommender algorithm capable of learning to estimate a recommendation's effect on the success of subsequent recommendations and (b) defining success in terms of user engagement poses inevitable risks in the form of user tampering. Note, however, that this does not invalidate the premise that algorithms which have a temporally sophisticated approach of the kind described in the first point above *do model the recommendation problem more effectively than static approaches*; where possible, then, this remains an attractive property to include in recommendation algorithms' implementation. We suggest that these observations could be interestingly combined with recent discussions on the notion of 'multistakeholder' recommendation [1, 24, 30]. This discourse, to summarize, has pushed for a more 'value-aligned' approach to recommender system design that – without disregarding the (primary, from a business perspective) goal of user engagement – recommendations should also reflect the interests of other stakeholders such as the creators of the content being recommended, and even society at large. For us, this raises the question; could we create a multi-stakeholder recommendation system in which the interests of the non-user stakeholders, at least, benefit from a more temporally sophisticated approach?

We suggest that approaching multi-stakeholder recommendation with an ensemble model, where each sub-model represents the interests of a (group of) stakeholder(s) and all sub-models *except* for the 'user-representing' sub-model are RL-based may be an exciting direction for future research. This would allow the potential benefits of the RL approach to be maximized as far as possible without introducing learnable user tampering. Without violating the pragmatic requirement that maximizing user engagement is a primary driver of the ensemble's recommendation decision, such an approach may allow us to create systems which use RL's potential in recommendation not as an enabler for user manipulation and polarization, but instead as a positive force for achieving multi-stakeholder value alignment.

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A EXAMPLE VARIATION ON THE MEDIA RECOMMENDATION MDP AND CID

The MDP representation of the media recommendation problem may be expanded relative to our characterization in Section 2, if the designer wishes to expand the reward function to account for observations that are not captured in the state representation. This would be a reasonable design choice – for example, the state representation may only record some user behaviors such as clicks, whereas we may want to reward the agent based not only on clicks, but also on the 'dwell time' of the user on the article (the time spent on the article after clicking). For generality, we demonstrate how the CID could be extended to represent this.

This firstly requires some changes and introductions to our MDP definition:

- A set of observations O. An observation consists of some collection of metrics representing how a user observably responded to some recommendation.
- An observation probability function $Z : S \times A \times O \to [0, 1]$. This models the probability of making a particular observation (for example a click, but no comment) after making a certain recommendation in a certain state.
- An altered definition of the Reward function as $R : O \to \mathbb{R}$. This simply corresponds to the fact that the information on which rewards are predicated – the observable user response to the content – has now been concentrated into the one variable $o \in O$.



Figure 7: A CID of the media recommendation problem, extended to include an observation space and more complicated definitions of reward.

We also need to make the addition of an exogenous random variable θ^R for the updated CID. This serves a highly similar purpose to

θ^T, except that it instead accounts for the fact that the probability of observing a certain behaviour in response to an article will intuitively change from user to user, even if their state representations are identical (this is a trivial conceptual extension to the Alice-Bob example from Section 2). θ^R and θ^T are not necessarily (and indeed are very likely not) uncorrelated, but we model them as distinct variables for clarity. For the same reasoning as was given with respect to θ^T, influence links will also be necessary between A_x and θ^R_{x+1}.

Figure 7 depicts the media recommendation CID that results from these extensions to the MDP. To reinforce the point made in Subsection 2.2 about variations on the MDP not affecting the causal structure local to the variables $\{\theta^T_t | t \in \mathbb{N}\}$, we have highlighted these variables' incoming and outgoing causal links in the figure; the reader may compare these to those in Figure 2 to verify that all the same links are present.

B FORMAL MDP DEFINITION OF THE RECOMMENDATION SIMULATION

We define the MDP $\langle S, A, T, R, \gamma \rangle$ of the media recommendation problem described in Section 4 as follows:

- $S = \{(s^{LR}, s^{LC}, s^{CR}, s^{CC}, s^{RR}, s^{RC}) \in \mathbb{N}^6 \mid (s^{LR} + s^{CR} + s^{RR} \leq h) \wedge (s^{LR} \geq s^{LC}) \wedge (s^{CR} \geq s^{CC}) \wedge (s^{RR} \geq s^{RC})\}$.
  - s_t is the state after t recommendations, $0 \leq t \leq h$.
  - The state space is interpreted as follows:
    - s^{LR}_t is the number of "left-wing" recommendations made to the user after t total recommendations
    - s^{LC}_t is the number of "left-wing" recommendations clicked on by the user after t total recommendations
    - s^{CR}_t and s^{CC}_t are as above, but with respect to "centrist" recommendations
    - s^{RR}_t and s^{RC}_t are as above, but with respect to "right-wing" recommendations
- $A = \{0, 1, 2\}$, where:
  - 0 = 'Left-wing recommendation'
  - 1 = 'Centrist recommendation'
  - 2 = 'Right-wing recommendation'
- T is defined as follows, where $s = (s^{LR}, s^{LC}, s^{CR}, s^{CC}, s^{RR}, s^{RC})$:
  - $T(s, 0, (s^{LR} + 1, s^{LC} + 1, s^{CR}, s^{CC}, s^{RR}, s^{RC})) = \theta^{T^L}$
  - $T(s, 0, (s^{LR} + 1, s^{LC}, s^{CR}, s^{CC}, s^{RR}, s^{RC})) = (1 - \theta^{T^L})$
  - $T(s, 1, (s^{LR}, s^{LC}, s^{CR} + 1, s^{CC} + 1, s^{RR}, s^{RC})) = \theta^{T^C}$
  - $T(s, 1, (s^{LR}, s^{LC}, s^{CR} + 1, s^{CC}, s^{RR}, s^{RC})) = (1 - \theta^{T^C})$
  - $T(s, 2, (s^{LR}, s^{LC}, s^{CR}, s^{CC}, s^{RR} + 1, s^{RC} + 1)) = \theta^{T^R}$
  - $T(s, 2, (s^{LR}, s^{LC}, s^{CR}, s^{CC}, s^{RR} + 1, s^{RC})) = (1 - \theta^{T^R})$
  - $T(s, a, s) = 0$ otherwise.[12]
- $R(s_t, s_{t+1})$ is defined as:

$$\begin{cases} 1 & (s^{LC}_{t+1} - s^{LC}_t) + (s^{CC}_{t+1} - s^{CC}_t) + (s^{RC}_{t+1} - s^{RC}_t) = 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

- $\gamma = 0.999$

[12]Less formally, this transition function just amounts to the intuition that recommending a post from one source will increment the number of total recommendations from that source so far, and also increment the number of clicks on that source's posts with the relevant probability.

Note that this specific MDP interpretation of the media recommendation problem fits within our general MDP definition from Section 2.

Finally, we define the causal effect of agent actions on the user's exogenous variables in our simulation; this is not something that would be explicitly defined in a scenario with real users, but we need to define it here in order to build our simulation. As mentioned in Section 4, for this effect we took inspiration from recent research into user polarisation on social media, which has demonstrated that showing people who identify with one wing of the political spectrum volumes of content from the opposing wing can often increase user polarisation [5, 6]. We approximate this effect with the following causal relationship between the recommendation at time t, and the value of θ^T_{t+1}:

- If the user is right-wing, and $a_t = 0$ (a left-wing recommendation), then $\theta^{T^R}_{t+1} = \min(p\theta^{T^R}_t, 1.0)$ for some random variable $p \sim P$ where $\mathbb{E}[p] > 1.0$. We call p the 'polarization factor.'
- The same effect applies for left-wing users with $a_t = 2$ and $\theta^{T^L}_{t+1}$.

Beyond the ML Model: Applying Safety Engineering Frameworks to Text-to-Image Development

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ABSTRACT

Identifying potential social and ethical risks in emerging machine learning (ML) models and their applications remains challenging. In this work, we applied two well-established safety engineering frameworks (FMEA, STPA) to a case study involving text-to-image models at three stages of the ML product development pipeline: data processing, integration of a T2I model with other models, and use. Results of our analysis demonstrate the safety frameworks – both of which are not designed explicitly examine social and ethical risks – can uncover failure and hazards that pose social and ethical risks. We discovered a broad range of failures and hazards (i.e., functional, social, and ethical) by analyzing interactions (i.e., between different ML models in the product, between the ML product and user, and between development teams) and processes (i.e., preparation of training data or workflows for using an ML service/product). Our findings underscore the value and importance of examining beyond an ML model in examining social and ethical risks, especially when we have minimal information about an ML model.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **General and reference** → **Evaluation**; • **Computing methodologies** → **Machine learning**.

KEYWORDS

Safety engineering, T2I generative models, Responsible ML, Art

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1 INTRODUCTION

Scholarly work reveals ML-based products and services can facilitate and scale discriminatory treatment of marginalized groups [77], spread misinformation [81], and deteriorate a user's sense of autonomy [9]. Such negative outcomes present themselves as *social and ethical risks* to direct and indirect stakeholders of these technologies. Identifying, assessing, and mitigating such risks, however, is challenging for practitioners. To intervene in these concerns, researchers have proposed quantitative [23, 40], qualitative [26, 44, 51, 59], and epistemological frameworks [22, 29, 52] to better identify and manage the social and ethical risks of ML systems; however, many proposed evaluation methods focus narrowly on the performance and properties of a single ML model (i.e. fairness metrics) as opposed to examining the associated processes and systems. Recently, there is increased attention paid to social and ethical risks that arise in ML development processes (i.e., data collection practices [71]) and interactions (i.e., contextual use of an ML system [78]). However, empirical studies with responsible ML practitioners find existing approaches to assessing social and ethical risks of a single ML model or relevant processes are often implemented at ad-hoc basis, [46, 61, 67]. Furthermore, besides organizational-level challenges of inadequate incentives and resources [48, 82], many practitioners tasked with managing the social and ethical risks of an ML-based product or service have minimal understanding of the underlying ML model(s) due to their technical complexity and the often-inadequate documentation/communication practices between variety of people or teams involved in ML model development from data collection to productionization [53, 67]. Considering these challenges, practitioners have emphasized the need to establish systematic and structured approaches for social and ethical risk management of ML-based products [67].

Given its focus on structured risk-reduction, scholars in the ML community have argued for the use of safety engineering frameworks – particularly System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) and Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) – as means to analyze and manage social and ethical risks of ML systems [20, 39, 60, 66]. These two frameworks, in particular, are well-established in the safety engineering practice and have been used in the design and development of safety-critical systems since the 1940s [10, 42]. Recent scholarly work highlights that these frameworks could provide the necessary systematic structure for assessing the social and ethical risks of ML systems [20, 39, 66, 67]. However, there remain open and unexplored questions on how we can apply safety frameworks (e.g., what aspects of the ML development pipeline should be considered

in the analysis scope) and what these frameworks can reveal about potential social and ethical risks of these ML applications.

As social and ethical risks often emerge from both how a technology is developed and how it is embedded within a social context [24, 70, 78], examining contextual aspects provides valuable insight for risk management and harm reduction. Safety engineering frameworks are frequently used to examine harms that could emerge from a process (i.e., a manufacturing process) or interactions between different sub-parts of a system (i.e., between different internal components) [10, 41]. These frameworks have the necessary analytical approach for connecting potential failures in a process or an interaction to downstream harms. We leverage the capability of these frameworks to examine interactions and processes involved in the ML-product/service development pipeline and investigate if they enable the discovery of social and ethical risks without changing the original frameworks. Our research questions are:

- RQ1: What can STPA and FMEA reveal about social and ethical risks by examining processes and interactions involved in developing and deploying an ML model?
- RQ2: How can STPA and FMEA be conducted along the ML development pipeline to identify potential social and ethical failures/hazards of a system?

We focus on the application of FMEA and STPA at three stages of the ML development and deployment pipeline: (1) data processing for creating a training dataset, (2) integration of one ML model with other ML or non-ML algorithms in an ML-product, and (3) end use of the ML product. To illustrate, we conducted FMEA and STPA on a case study involving real-world users of a text-to-image (T2I) model user interface by professional visual artists in their creative practice. The rapid public release and adoption of large generative models in various application areas have fueled much concern about the societal and ethical implications of generative models (e.g., [1, 57, 75]). Considering the complexity of these models, investigating ML development and deployment process could provide a vantage point for identifying social and ethical risks [27]. This analysis is solely illustrative and it captures a point-in-time snapshot and potential configuration of the development and deployment for the chosen ML application. While we did not conduct a full STPA/FMEA analysis, this case study offers empirical evidence on how safety engineering frameworks could be translated to analyzing social and ethical risks.

Our analysis illustrates that even without having detailed information about the ML model, safety engineering analysis provides a systematic method of discovering a range of failures and hazards along the ML development and deployment pipeline. We discovered potential failures and hazards that pose social and ethical risks by analyzing *processes* and *interactions* surrounding a given generative model in an ML product, even though these frameworks were not originally designed for uncovering such risks. STPA and FMEA provided a systematic and consistent approach to analyzing a range of interactions and processes including 1) process of training an ML model, 2) interaction between an ML model and accompanying models in a given product, 3) interaction between an ML product and its users. Lessons learned from our analysis can guide practitioners in conducting systematic analysis beyond a single model, which reflects the majority of production use cases at organizations. With the rapid adoption of ML models in various products today, we call for further examination and use of safety engineering frameworks to improve responsible ML development and integration despite the increased opacity and complexity of the models involved.

In the remainder of this paper, we contextualize the relevance of the safety engineering frameworks and provide an overview of current discourse in T2I model development and use in the creative process (Section 2). We outline our information-gathering protocol and analysis methods (Section 3) and then highlight key findings (Section 4). Lastly, we discuss the value and shortcomings of applying safety engineering frameworks in light of current practices and call on the research community to further examine and strengthen these frameworks for ethical and social risk management of ML systems (Section 5).

2 BACKGROUND

Practitioners and scholars in the responsible ML field have proposed a range of tools and frameworks for identifying, assessing, and mitigating potential social and ethical risks of ML systems. These tools include approaches for assessing the properties of models with respect to values such as fairness or transparency [47], examining the interaction between a model and its context of use [59], and investigating the ML model creation processes [70]. Many of the current assessment methods are applied in an ad-hoc basis across the ML development pipeline limiting their impact and in response, practitioners have expressed the potential for safety engineering to provide a systematic approach for managing social and ethical risks of ML systems [20, 67]. In the following sections, we provide a brief description of scholarly work that discusses the potential use of safety engineering frameworks for ML systems and discuss existing studies relevant to our case study on the use of T2I models in artistic creations.

2.1 Safety engineering frameworks: failure and hazard analysis

Safety engineering is a long-standing discipline that has evolved from creating safe mechanical systems (ex., planes, and cars) to safe software systems [16]. As ML systems can scale both benefits and harms, there is a need to investigate how existing safety engineering frameworks could support safe ML development and deployment [38, 39, 59, 67]. Failure and hazard analyses are the most commonly used frameworks in safety engineering practice [16]. This type of analysis is often conducted early in the development process to foresee potential failures and develop ways to control them in design [9, 42]. These methods differ from other assessment processes for ML systems, such as algorithmic impact assessments and auditing practices, in their focus on identifying, evaluating, and connecting anticipated harms to a design decision and mitigation in the development process [59, 67].

Prior work in responsible ML development has discussed the potential use of two failure and hazard analyses processes, FMEA and STPA, for managing social and ethical risks ML systems [20, 43, 59, 66]. FMEA is a well-established reliability engineering process [35, 45] that takes an analytical reduction approach (i.e. breakdown of a system into its steps or components) to evaluate the likelihood

of risk for potential failure modes [10]. On the contrary, STPA is a hazard analysis tool that uses a system theoretic perspective to map out parts of a system and how they interact with each other [42]. Through this examination, analysts can identify potential hazards (i.e., sources of harm) and develop necessary safety requirements [33, 34, 74]. In contrast to FMEA, the STPA process does not focus on the likelihood of risk or specific points of failure. Instead, STPA models and examines elements of control and feedback in a sociotechnical system.

Existing research outlines the overarching benefits of FMEA for internal ML auditing [59], interprets how FMEA could reveal ML fairness-related failures [43], and employs FMEA to suggest an analysis of "social failure modes" for ML systems [66]. Similarly, several works discuss the benefits of a system theoretic perspective for addressing social and ethical risks of ML systems by allowing the analysts to map out how an ML system interacts with its environment [20, 50]. Recent studies explore industry ML practitioners' perspectives towards safety engineering techniques and highlight that safety engineering frameworks provide an avenue for systematizing the identification and mitigation of social and ethical risks [49, 67]. However, both studies recognize that a successful translation of these frameworks for ML development requires organizational changes/support and further empirical examination/development of these methods. In this work, we focus on the second gap and investigate how these two safety engineering frameworks could be used to identify social and ethical risks along the ML development process via a case study application. We focus our case study on the use of T2I models in the art creation process.

2.2 Use of T2I models in creative practice

In recent years, scholars and practitioners have developed highly performative models that generate images from a given text prompt. Such models, including DALL-E [58], Parti [84], Stable Diffusion [19], and Imagen [68] are generative T2I models. They perform significantly better in terms of image quality and text-to-image alignment compared to their predecessors [58, 84]. These T2I models have been released for general public use through various user interfaces and APIs [15, 36, 85].

Artists, especially digital artists, have been among the early adopters of many T2I user interfaces [72] leading to a growing discussion on how artists could use T2I models for co-creation [28]. Alongside enthusiasm in certain artist communities, however, there is growing concern about the potential harm that could emerge from their use. This includes artist concerns about how their artwork is often used as training data in the creation of such models [21], how generative models could affect art creation practice [13], and impact artists' livelihood [11, 30, 69]. Similarly, ML and Responsible AI scholars have examined how image generation models could perpetuate existing systematic biases [4, 5, 12, 75, 77, 78], including stereotype amplification. Creators of such models have recognized potential limitations and risks posed by these models in their public releases of academic papers and APIs [84].

2.2.1 Rationale for choice of case study. We focus our case study on the use of T2I models in the context of art creation. Despite significant improvements in specific performance metrics (i.e., image quality and text-to-image alignment) in recent years [84], large generative models, such as T2I models, are opaque and complex, making it challenging to uncover potential failures and hazards [8]. However, practitioners still consider their use across many applications and use cases [3, 28]. Safety engineering analysis allows practitioners to look beyond the properties of a single complex model and discover potential failures/hazards by investigating the processes that are part of the development and deployment of such models. We posit that this approach is especially beneficial for assessing the risks of more generalized models and empirically examine this by choosing a case study around the use of T2I models. Even though safety analysis is often conducted for safety-critical systems (i.e., nuclear power plants, airplanes, medical devices) [16]. By choosing a case study on the use of T2I models in creative practice, we leverage these systematic approaches for risk assessment and harm reduction in applications that have emerging hazards/failures [12, 78] but are not categorized formally as safety-critical.

3 METHODOLOGY

We use a case study approach to explore our two research questions described in Section 1 for the following reasons [65]. First, there is a lack of precedence in how such tools could be applied to ML systems. Second, empirical evidence is needed to understand the nature of failure and hazards that emerge from such analysis to see if these tools could allow us to uncover potential social and ethical risks. While many variations of STPA/FMEA exist, the first step of traditional STPA and FMEA requires mapping certain information about a given system [10, 42]. Therefore, we gather the necessary information prior to conducting STPA and FMEA.

3.1 Information gathering

Typically, FMEA and STPA are conducted by system experts and safety engineers who are working in a company. These analysts have in-depth knowledge of the systems and the safety engineering processes. Considering that both the FMEA and STPA are conducted by the authors of this paper, we needed to gather information about the system, its components, and its interaction with various stakeholder groups. This is necessary in order to divide the system into functional components or steps (in the case of FMEA), and losses and constraints (in the case of STPA).

In our case study, we collected three different sources of data for conducting FMEA and STPA analysis (as illustrated in the supplemental material) including workshops with artists, expert interviews with T2I model developers/evaluators, and secondary research on T2I models. We describe our process for gathering information from the workshops and the interviews in the following sections and follow by describing our analysis approach.

3.1.1 Workshop with artists. To understand the artist's perspectives towards the use of T2I models in their creative process, we conducted three 90 minutes-long workshops with 15 artists.

Participant recruitment: We used purposive [55] and snowball sampling [56] to recruit participants for this workshop. The workshop organizers brainstormed an initial list of artists and only included candidates that had worked with T2I models in their practice, were older than 18-years-of-age and were professionally working in the arts for at least a year. Participants were recruited via email and once they accepted to participate, they were sent a consent

form. In total 15 artists representing 6 countries participated in the workshop. Participants held a diverse set of roles in the creative industry, including but not limited to, filmmaker, art curator, and digital artist.

Workshop protocol: The workshop protocol (as illustrated in the supplemental materials) included three different sections, each of which was 90 minutes long. The first section focused on getting to know each participant and how they use T2I models within the creative process. In the second section, one of the researchers presented a sociotechnical harms taxonomy [73] and facilitated a discussion on the perceived harms of T2I models with the group of artists. The third section of the workshop focused on discussing potential harm reduction avenues.

3.1.2 Interviews with T2I developers and evaluators. We conducted 60-min interviews with 8 industry experts involved in the development and evaluation of T2I models to understand their processes.

Recruitment: Similar to the workshop recruitment, we used purposive [55] and snowball sampling [56] to recruit interview participants. We brainstormed an initial list of candidates who were 18 years or older and had worked on the development or evaluation of a T2I model for at least 1 year. The researchers reached out to potential candidates via email and a consent form was sent to individuals who agreed to participate in the interview. Overall 8 people participated in the interview covering three roles: 1) Researchers who worked on developing and evaluating T2I models for performance, social and ethical issues, 2) Software engineers who developed parts of the T2I demo, and 3) Managers who coordinated the release of T2I demos.

Interview protocol: The interview protocol, as illustrated in the Supplemental Material, was designed to understand the process of development and evaluation the participant used when working on T2I models and outlined the interaction between different stakeholders on a given T2I model project. All interviews were 60 minutes in length.

3.2 Conducting FMEA and STPA

FMEA and STPA could be applied to various scopes of analysis that require a different set of information. Scoping an ML system for such an analysis is a non-trivial task. An ML system can be divided into its component parts (e.g., training data, model, user interface), development process (e.g., training, testing, early deployment), stakeholders involved (e.g. ,ML developers, a community of developers interfacing and building on the model APIs, end-users), and so on. Results of the analysis can be drastically different depending on the chosen scope of analysis [10, 42].

Based on the information gathered from the interviews with T2I experts and workshops with artists, we identified three scopes of analysis along the ML development pipeline:

- Scope 1: the data processing necessary for creating a training dataset
- Scope 2: how a T2I model is integrated into a production environment along with other ML models
- Scope 3: how an artist uses T2I model demo as part of their creative process

Selecting the scopes along the ML development pipeline allows for the examination of critical processes and interactions as discussed by previous scholarship [31, 67, 70]. We chose to focus on these scopes of analysis because we had access to the most amount of publicly available and shareable information about the elements involved. We recognize the value of other scopes such as how a model or a product is evaluated, or how the model architecture is designed, and encourage that scopes beyond what we have experimented with in this paper are considered for future applications of FMEA and STPA.

The STPA and FMEA analysis was led by the first author of this paper and three of the co-authors provided feedback on iterations of the analysis. A separate analysis was conducted for each one of the scopes. In total three FMEA and three STPA analyses were conducted. The lead author spent somewhere between 10 - 12 hours implementing the FMEA or the STPA process on one scope. All sources of data were used as input for both the STPA and FMEA analysis. The FMEA process resulted in a list of potential failure modes, and a Risk Priority Number score. The STPA analysis resulted in a list of unsafe control actions and corresponding safety requirements. We followed the original STPA and FMEA process for each one of the scopes (as described below) and did not alter them to specifically uncover social and ethical risks.

3.2.1 FMEA process. FMEA is a multi-step framework, through which steps are iteratively performed by FMEA and system experts over the development life cycle [10] (refer to Figure 1):

(1) List out the *functions* of a component/system OR steps of a process (e.g., everything the system/process needs to perform).
(2) Identify potential *failure modes*, or mechanisms by which each function or step can go wrong.
(3) Identify the *effect*, or impact of a failure, and score its *severity* on a scale of 1 – 10 (least to most severe).
(4) Identify the *cause*, or why the failure mode occurs, and score its *likelihood of occurrence* on a scale of 1 – 10 (least to most likely).
(5) Identify *controls*, or how a failure mode could be detected, and score *likelihood of detection* on a scale of 1 – 10 (most likely to least likely). The scales used in the automotive industry standards [32] (illustrated in the supplemental material) were used for scoring severity, the likelihood of occurrence, and the likelihood of detection.
(6) Calculate *Risk Priority Number* (RPN) by multiplying the three scores; a higher RPN indicates a higher risk level and develops *recommended actions* for each failure mode and prioritize based on RPN.

3.2.2 STPA process. STPA is a hazard analysis framework that is performed and led by system and safety experts, iteratively (across the model of a system) and cyclically (across a system's lifecycle) (refer to Figure 2).

(1) Define the *purpose of the analysis* by identifying losses via outlining stakeholders and their values. System-specific hazards and controls are highlighted based on the specified loss.
(2) Model the *control structure* of the full sociotechnical system using control feedback loops which consists of a controller

Figure 1: Steps for conducting an FMEA [10]



Figure 2: Steps for conducting an STPA [41]



which sends *control actions* to a system that is being controlled while receiving *feedback* from the same system.

(3) Identify *unsafe control actions* (UCA) by going through each control action and thinking about unsafe modes of (no) action, incorrect action, and untimely action.
(4) Identify potential *loss scenarios* by outlining potential causal scenarios (i.e., missing feedback loops, incorrect process model or control algorithm of a controller) for each UCA.

3.3 Method of analysis

After conducting FMEA and STPA analyses for the three different scopes we examined two key elements for each scope: (1) Could any of the identified failures and hazards lead to social and ethical risks? (2) Did our analysis discover any new issues that have not been reported in the literature or media? We then reflected on common themes and lessons learned that appeared across all six applications.

3.4 Author reflexivity and limitations

All the authors of this paper are living and working in institutions in the Global North. We recognize our lived experiences and perspectives impact our choice to use safety engineering frameworks (i.e. safety is valued and practice differently across the world), methodology, and outcome of this analysis. Out of our authorship, four individuals have conducted FMEA and STPA in training programs or as practitioners in the industry. However, none of the authors are experts with 10+ years of experience in safety engineering. Furthermore, the STPA and FMEA we completed are based on reported information gathered in the interviews and workshops. They do not capture the direct opinion and knowledge of the stakeholders, as these experts are not participating fully in the workshops. Our proof-of-concept analysis could be improved with the presence of expert safety engineering practitioners and system (i.e., T2I) developers/evaluators. Finally, this paper focuses on one case study, which limits the generalizability of the findings across ML models.

4 KEY FINDINGS

Applying FMEA and STPA at three stages of the ML development pipelines enabled analysts to uncover a wide range of failures and hazards without the need for detailed information on the specific T2I model. In particular, the three scopes of analysis (training data processing, product integration, and end use) each allowed practitioners to look beyond a specific model in isolation and focus on *processes* and *interactions* as it is integrated with other actors and technical systems. In the next three sections, we reflect on the failures and hazards discovered at each stage. The analysis uncovered known failures and hazards (e.g., creation of non-consensual sexual imagery) and novel ones that have not been recognized to the best of our knowledge (e.g., the impact of English-word filters on lexical change). We also identified failures and hazards that could present social and ethical risks for different actors, which can inform prioritization of mitigation strategies. The analyses presented in this paper are proof-of-concept and illustrative examples of how safety frameworks could be applied at different stages of the ML development pipeline. They are not meant to be a comprehensive

failure and hazard analysis for the use of T2I models by artists. The identified failures and hazards would shift depending on the assumptions used to set up the analysis. Therefore, it is important to interpret our findings as an illustration of how FMEA and STPA could be applied by practitioners, rather than a final analysis. In what follows, we discuss the process of applying STPA and FMEA process at different scopes, the nature of our findings, highlighting a sample of the identified failures and hazards in Tables 1 - 6.

4.1 Scope one: data processing for creating training dataset

In our application, we bound the data processing stage to start from the identification of one or multiple source datasets and end with the creation of a training dataset ready for model development purposes. In this scope, we do not directly analyze the steps involved in how the data sources were obtained and who was involved in the data collection process. The focus is on how the data sources are processed for creating a training dataset. From our interviews, we identified three key stakeholders involved in data processing: (1) software engineers who prepare the dataset for training; (2) responsible ML practitioners who provide guidelines on what should or should not be included in the dataset; and (3) lawyers who consult on privacy and legal requirements for datasets. The software engineers collaborate closely with the practitioners responsible for developing the model. Lawyers provide legal requirements (i.e., intellectual property and privacy) for training datasets to the responsible ML and the product team. There is limited information available on how data processing is done for T2I models. For our proof-of-concept analysis, we use the data processing steps outlined in the publicly available data card for the Parti model [17]. The steps outlined in this data card are similar to what other T2I model creators have discussed in their publications [63, 68].

FMEA. The FMEA analysis, as illustrated in Table 1, starts with outlining the data processing steps [17], which include: (1) filter for records identified as containing sensitive data; (2) filter for non-English data; (3) filter for "adult" content in images; (4) filter for text associated with "adult" content; (5) exclude low text-image semantic alignment; and (6) exclude text consisting of mostly numbers. We identified 3 to 5 failure modes for each step, resulting in 22 failure modes for this scope of analysis. We identified six failure modes due to under-performance (i.e., some sensitive data is not captured), six failures modes due to over-performance (i.e., English data is filtered alongside non-English data), or six failure modes due to loss of performance (i.e., low text-image semantic alignment is included) of the filtering function. Four of the failure modes were due to unintended behavior of the filtering functions, such as when a non-English language filter does not recognize more modern English words. When taking a closer look at the nature of these failure modes, ten describe performance-related issues around image quality and text-to-image alignment. For example, over-filtering the source datasets is a known failure mode and could result in a lack of training data for creating a highly performative model. T2I developers have widely highlighted the importance of large training datasets in generating high-resolution images [63, 68, 84].

Twelve of the identified failure modes have clear social and ethical implications. For instance, under-filtering the source data or missing filters could lead to the downstream generation of sensitive data or adult content, which could lead to interpersonal harms (i.e., non-consensual sexual imagery and related mental health or reputational impacts) [73]. Some of the identified failures have been recognized in the literature or reported in the media. For instance, Birhane et al. discuss that many of the existing adult content filters are not able to fully detect and eliminate the target content [6].

Notably, our preliminary proof-of-concept, allowed us to pinpoint potential failure modes that are not discussed widely or publicly for applications of T2I. One example failure mode is that "the non-English word filter eliminates English words that are emerging/new or used in specific social groups." Elimination of novel words (neologisms) in training data influence what the T2I model can/cannot generate. As lexical change often does come from historically marginalized groups, this failure mode could ultimately alienate artists from specific cultural and social groups from using the T2I demo in their creative practice. By conducting this type of analysis on the process (and not the model itself), a practitioner can identify both known and novel failures (and their resulting harms)that can emerge from training data processing choices.

STPA. The STPA process starts by identifying losses. To identify the values and losses associated with this scope of analysis, we reflect on the information gathered from the interviews and workshops to understand stakeholders impacted by the data processing stage. Artists emphasized the values of fostering creativity, serving a diverse audience, accessibility of artistic mediums to a diverse group of artists, efficiency in their creative process, and preservation of the artist's reputation/identity. The developers and evaluators of T2I models emphasized the value of creating efficient systems that generate appropriate and quality images in response to a given text. They also emphasized the value of diversity (i.e. the importance of serving a diverse audience of users with their models) and the importance of protecting their team and their company's public reputation. From the key values brought up by artists, software engineers, and responsible ML practitioners, we formulated the following losses: (L1) Loss of creativity; (L2) Loss of diversity; (L3) Loss of accessibility; (L4) Loss of efficiency; (L5) Loss of quality; and (L6) Loss of reputation.

The next STPA step is to identify hazards by considering these losses in relation to the previously identified goal of training data processing. We developed three potential hazards:

- H1: System creates a training dataset that contains low-quality text-image pairs. (L1, L4, L5, L6)
- H2: System creates a training dataset that contains harmful content. (L3, L5, L6)
- H3: System creates a training dataset that is not diverse in representation. (L2, L3, L4, L6)

Then we model the control structure. A potential control structure configuration for the data processing stage, as illustrated in Figure 3, includes two organizational/human controllers and one automated controller. We selected the "responsible ML team" and "product team" as human controllers because they can make key decisions in the data processing scope. For this analysis, we assume the responsible ML team is in charge of determining the parameters for a good training dataset and identifying key ethical and legal considerations. The product team is responsible for developing the

Table 1: Sample proof-of-concept FMEA, data processing

Function	Type of failure mode	Failure mode	Effect	Cause	Control
Filter records identified as containing sensitive data	Loss	Sensitive data is not filtered and included in the training set.	Sensitive data might be reproduced by the model output.	No requirement to filter data for sensitive data.	Model development team checks the data was filtered for sensitive information prior to starting the training.
	Partial	Sensitive data is inadequately filtered and included in the training set.	Sensitive data is not filtered and it is included in the training set. Sensitive data might be reproduced by the model output.	Wrong filter thresholds are set.	Model development team monitors the outputs of the models for sensitive data generation.
	Exceeding	Non-sensitive data is also filtered.	Resulting training dataset is too small.	Wrong filter thresholds are set.	Model development team monitors how much data is filtered.

models that underpin the T2I demo artists will use. We selected as "filter data" an automated controller to reflect where all of the automated filtering operations take place. We identified 6 control actions, denoted in the boxes with down arrows in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Control structure diagram, data processing



For our analysis, we focused on 4 of the 6 control actions occurring between the three controllers and data sources including 1) Set requirements for data filtering, 2) Set requirements for dataset properties, 3) Design new filters and 4) Select filter thresholds. We chose to focus on these 4 control actions because they specifically focus on data processing as opposed to source data collection. We then brainstormed a list of 22 potential Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs) that relate to the three potential hazards we identified (partically illustrated in Table 2). H1 focuses primarily on the functional performance of the system; whereas, the presence of H2 and H3 pose social and ethical risks. All 22 Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs) were linked to at least one hazard. This indicates the STPA process is attentive to the interconnected nature of emerging hazards, and can help practitioners identify how social and ethical risks are not separate from but directly related to performance hazards.

Similar to the FMEA, we identified hazards related to improper filtering of data when examining the control action between the *product team* and *filter data* controllers, including over or under-filtration of the sensitive data. These UCAs could lead to all three hazard types (low-quality text-image pairs, harmful content, and homogenous representations). As discussed in the previous section, scholarly work has examined some of these UCAs in the context of T2I training dataset creation (e.g., under performance of adult content filters [6]). While the STPA process revealed some of the same novel insights as the FMEA (i.e. incorrectly filtering English words created over time), the STPA results include additional UCAs related to how the human controllers (i.e. responsible ML team and the product team) interact with each other. For instance, one identified UCAs is that "the responsible ML team provides the filtering requirements too late to the product team," preventing the product team from integrating the necessary filters. This is also one UCA presenting social and ethical risks that is also linked to all three of the hazards. These types of UCAs may not be widely acknowledged in current literature because they focus on examining internal company processes (i.e., delayed communication internally), which can be overlooked in analyses focused solely on the model. Moreover, issues with internal company processes and practices are generally considered confidential information and hence they are not shared in the literature. By identifying and addressing such UCAs, practitioners can embed responsible AI and safety considerations at an organizational level (i.e., beyond a single model or dataset).

Both the FMEA and STPA frameworks allow practitioners to get a list of potential and plausible ways in which current data processing practices could fail and lead to potential social and ethical risks. The UCAs and the failure modes focused on shortcomings with filter design. However, STPA also revealed shortcomings in how requirements are communicated between groups. By conducting such analysis, teams could keep track of how their data processing practices could fail and develop safeguards to ensure that training data is safely created for production-ready models.

4.2 Scope two: Model/product integration

Many AI ethics assessments and audits focus on one ML model [25, 76]. However, in production, multiple models often are used to achieve the intended functions for a given product or demo [83]. We conducted FMEA and STPA to examine the integration of a T2I model in a productionized demo, such as those released by Stability AI [2] and OpenAI [63]. From our interviews with T2I developers and existing literature [54, 64], we identified demos often include at least three types of models: (1) an input prompt classifier (which either block or filter the text prompt), (2) the T2I model, and (3) output image classifiers (which either block or filter the generated image). For any given T2I demo, there could be multiple classifiers employed for filtering text prompts and images. For the purposes of this illustrative analysis, we assume there are only two classifiers.

Table 2: Sample proof-of-concept STPA, data processing

Controller	Controlled process	Control action	Type	Context	H1	H2	H3
Responsible ML team	Product team	Set requirement for data filtering	Too late	Responsible ML team provides requirements too late in the process	True	True	True
Product team	Filter data	Design new filter for non-English data	Providing	The designed filter eliminate a large portion of data resulting in a small dataset	True	False	False

One for "adult" content run on the input text prompt and one for analyzing the generated image.

FMEA. We conducted a proof-of-concept system FMEA where we treat each of the three models as a sub-system, and perform the FMEA by first identifying the key function for each sub-system (see Table 3). Considering our assumptions, we have three sub-systems in our product, with the following primary functions: (F1) Filter input text prompt for adult content; (F2) Generate 16 images per prompt; (F3) Filter generated images for "adult" content.

We identified a non-exhaustive list of 14 potential failure modes for the three functions (3-5 failure modes for each function). These failure modes cover a range of issues, including functional failures, such as "no adult text prompt is filtered" or "it takes a long time to generate an image." The failure to generate images rapidly (i.e. latency) does not have obvious direct social or ethical risks; however, it affects company's reputation.

Similar to Scope 1, some identified failures for model/product integration present social and ethical risks. For instance, a complete loss of the filter function for the input or the output filters could harm potential users and pose social and ethical risks for the company and the artist, such as generating demeaning stereotypes. Many of the functional failures we identified had social and ethical implications as well, especially when considering the possibility that a given function might work well for some groups and poorly for others (i.e., quality-of-service harm). For example, partial filtering of the input prompts, and output images based on social norms of *group A* exclusively could lead to differential performance for those from *group B*. Similar risks emerge when the T2I demos only generate high-quality images for text prompts that represent terms, concepts, and ideas from a predominant social group (i.e., Western or Eurocentric cultures).

Many failures we discovered in our proof-of-concept analysis (with its limited focus) have been discussed in recent literature examining potential representational and quality-of-service harms from T2I models [4, 37, 75, 77, 78]. However, in our analysis, we strictly followed the FMEA process and did not rely on the literature to identify these potential failure modes. Notably, our analysis shows that practitioners can identify potential failure modes by systematically following the FMEA process and considering the specific constraints/features of their own ML-based products to identify potential failure modes as opposed to solely relying on what has already been discovered in the literature.

STPA. We start with the same set of losses outlined for the data processing scope as our key stakeholders for model integration. However, the hazards differ for this scope of analysis as the goal of the system has changed. Here the goal of the system is to create a T2I demo for public and creative use. Three potential hazards we considered are:

- H1: System creates an image that does not match the prompt. (L1, L3, L4, L5, L6)
- H2: System cannot generate an image. (L1, L2, L3, L4, L6)
- H3: System generates an unsafe image (i.e., with adult content). (L2, L3, L5, L6)

A potential configuration of the control structure (as illustrated in Figure 4) for this scope of analysis includes two organizational/human controllers and three automated controllers. The organizational/human controllers are the "responsible ML team" and the "product team." The automated controllers are the input text classifier, the T2I model, and the output image classifier. We identified 6 control actions, denoted in boxes with down arrows in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Control structure diagram, model integration



For the purpose of this analysis, we focus on the 6 control actions between the two human controllers and the three models, which are: (1) Set a threshold for pre-designed filters for text and image filtering (counted as two control actions); (2) Design new filters for text and image filtering (counted as two control actions); (3) Set model design parameters; and (4) Set model constraints for the version of the T2I model used in this product (i.e. the T2I demo). We developed a non-exhaustive list of 16 UCAs. Table 4 highlights 2 potential UCAs. The UCAs capture process issues, such as delays in the delivery of requirements or miscommunication between the product and development teams. They also capture technical issues, such as incorrect filter thresholds or T2I model parameters. The 16 identified UCAs were often linked to more than one hazard. For example, the UCA of "inappropriate filter threshold for the input text filter" could lead to H2 and H3.

All of the identified hazards could present a range of risks for stakeholders, including those posing social and ethical risk. For example, a system not being able to create an image for a subset of racially marginalized groups could present an *ethical* and *financial* risk for both the company and the artists trying to use the demo for their creative practice. As noted earlier, some of the identified UCAs are not well-discussed in the literature as they may emerge from internal organizational structures and configurations in their respective ML development pipelines. For example, a potential cause of an "incorrect model constraint" is a missing feedback

Table 3: Sample proof-of-concept FMEA, model integration

Function	Type of failure mode	Failure mode	Effect	Cause	Control
Filter text prompts	Degradation	Filter does not work for novel words	Model does not filter prompts containing inappropriate language.	Safety filters are not updated/improved over time.	Product team monitors user feedback to identify potential negative feedback on prompt filters and complaints about the model accepting new and inappropriate prompts.
	Partial	Filter works for English words written in Latin letters (e.g., it does not work when the Arabic language is written using Latin words)	Users enter harmful prompts using non-English phrases written with Latin letters	Filter allows text prompts containing non-English words	Product team monitors user feedback to identify potential negative feedback on how their prompts were filtered and complaints about the model accepting new and inappropriate prompts.
	Exceeding	Seemingly appropriate prompts are rejected for no good reason.	Users cannot enter what they would like to enter	Filters automatically eliminate word combinations that are not directly harmful but are in some form correlated to content that is marked as harmful.	Product team monitors user feedback

loop between the output image filter and the product team. Based on the existing control structure, the product team only works on fine-tuning the T2I model for the demo. They do not see the results from the classifiers designed by the responsible ML team. As illustrated, by examining the interactions between different models in an ML product and understanding how and who designs them, practitioners can identify and understand emerging hazards that would be ignored when focusing on one single model.

4.3 Scope three: Use of the ML-based product

This scope of analysis focuses on how an artist would use a T2I demo as part of their creative practice. The information we gathered from the artist workshops heavily informs this scope. To perform this illustrative FMEA/STPA analyses, we assume the artist is a filmmaker and they are creating a video for a client. The key stakeholders include the client, the filmmaker, and the public/viewer of the video. The scope focuses on how the filmmaker uses the T2I demo as a tool for generating images in their storyboard mock-up, where they visualize and share ideas with the client.

FMEA. To investigate the potential failures that could come from the use of T2I demos by artists, we first mapped a potential *process of use* based on the data collected in the workshops. All of the participants expressed that they use T2I demos as an image-generation tool within their artistic process to visualize ideas, communicate with collaborators and facilitate creative thinking. Generalized from the artists' descriptions in the workshop, a creative process for our assumed filmmaking scenario could involve the following steps:

(1) Brainstorm storyboard ideas for advertising the product
(2) Develop prompts that represent the storyboard ideas
(3) Enter prompts into the T2I demo to generate images
(4) T2I demo generates image(s) based on given prompt
(5) Select images for the storyboards
(6) Share storyboards with clients/collaborators
(7) Integrate feedback and iterate to get a desired storyboard

Treating this workflow as our process of use, we conducted a proof-of-concept FMEA. To simplify the FMEA application, we narrowed the scope of analysis to steps 3 through 5, and identified a non-exhaustive list of 11 potential failure modes. The 11 failure modes encompassed potential ways in which artists cannot use the T2I demo in their workflow. For example, "the artist cannot enter prompts in their native language," "they can only use a limited set of words in the input prompt," or the "generated images did not match their expectations/needs." We also discovered technical failures of the T2I demo, such as "the generation of low-quality images" or "the generation of unsafe images (as identified in generated image placeholders)." Many of the failure modes we identified uncovered challenges of an artist with using T2I demo in the generation practice (i.e., low-quality image generation, not being able to generate an image or enter a prompt). These types of failure modes could mainly lead to performance-related risks. Similar to Scope 2 and 3, these performance-related risks could present social and ethical risks for some user groups who exclusively experience the effect of the failure (i.e., an artist cannot generate images related to the cultural concepts). Moreover, we identified a few failures that could present social and ethical risks directly, including when the T2I demo generates a harmful image or when an artist selects images that could be harmful to a specific audience. This could be a failure depending on the intent of the artist, as some art is meant to be politically provocative and hence has the potential to harm. The failure modes on performance issues of T2I demos and their ability to generate harmful content have been reported in literature and media [63, 84]. However, failure modes regarding quality-of-service harms (i.e., not being able to generate an image for cultural concepts) have not been discussed to our knowledge.

STPA. Starting from the same set of losses identified for the data processing scope, we identified three potential hazards for our identified system in the use scope. The goal of our system is to support an artist in creating a video for a client using a T2I demo.

- H1: The artist cannot create a video. (L1, L3, L6)
- H2: The artist cannot create a video that meets client requirements. (L1, L3, L5, L6)
- H3: The video disseminates false and harmful information. (L2, L3, L5, L6)

Table 4: Sample proof-of-concept STPA, model integration

Controller	Controlled process	Control action	Type	Context	H1	H2	H3
Responsible ML team	Input filter	Design new filters for the prompt filter	Too late	New filters are not designed in time for product deployment	False	False	True
Responsible ML team	Input filter	Design new filters for the prompt filter	Providing	New filters block most of the prompts that users would want	False	True	False

Table 5: Sample proof-of-concept FMEA, demo use

Function	Type of failure mode	Failure mode	Effect	Cause	Control
Artist selects an image	Loss	Artist cannot select an appropriate image from the generated set of images	Dissatisfied with generated images	Image quality is poor, the images do not match the prompt, the images are not inspirational	User testing/reporting
	Partial	Artist can only find a few appropriate pictures	Dissatisfied with generated images	Image quality is poor, the images do not match the prompt, the images are not inspirational	User testing/reporting
	Unintended	Artist selects images that could potentially be harmful for a given audience	Dissatisfied with generated images	Safety filters did not work as desired, challenges in the training process	User testing/reporting

A potential configuration of the control structure (illustrated in Figure 5 includes three human controllers (i.e., the client, filmmaker, and the viewer) and two automated controllers (i.e., the T2I model demo and the created video). For the purpose of this analysis, we focus on the 3 control actions between the 3 human controllers and the T2I model demo (denoted in boxes with down arrows in Figure 5): (1) Provide requirements/goals/audience for the video content; (2) provide prompts; (3) send a message. We then identified a non-exhaustive list of 9 UCAs. Table 6 illustrates 2 of these UCAs. The UCAs included miscommunication regarding the video content's requirements, audience, and goals, incorrect prompt design, and inappropriate/misinformed calls to action for the public/viewer.

Figure 5: The control structure diagram, demo use



Similar to prior scopes, many of the UCAs lead to multiple hazards. From the three hazards we are considering, H1 and H2 primarily present performance-related risks; H3 presents social and ethical risks. Some of the UCAs we identified have been discussed in recent publications (e.g., how certain text prompts do not generate well-aligned images using these T2I models [14, 80] and how T2I demos could create misinformation [1]). However, few UCAs identified in this proof-of-concept analysis have not been directly discussed in the literature. For example, the UCA about how these T2I models work well for artists from specific socioeconomic conditions is not well-discussed in the literature. Moreover, the UCAs about the roles/ expectations of the client in the artists' practice and use of T2I demos is not discussed in the literature to our knowledge.

5 DISCUSSION

Safety engineering frameworks were originally designed for safety-critical systems where a failure/hazard could lead to significant injury or damage to a person, property, or environment (i.e., nuclear power plants, medical devices, airplanes) [16]. The types of harms (i.e., sociotechnical harms) [73] and technical systems (i.e., complex ML models) in the current conversation of responsible ML development are different from those typically considered in safety engineering. However, the practices and processes of safety engineering could bring a much-desired mature and systematic perspective to responsible ML development [20, 46, 67]. Through a case study of the development and use of T2I demos, we explored application of two safety engineering frameworks along the ML development pipeline and examined if we could discover failures and hazards that could lead to social and ethical risks.

5.1 Safety engineering perspective: The value of analyzing processes and interactions

Our findings illustrate a potential approach for applying failure and hazard analysis tools from safety engineering to examine different scopes along the ML development pipeline. In total, we were able to identify 50+ potential hazards and failures across the three scopes of analysis without having any details or assumptions about the type of model used in the T2I demo. The identified failures and hazards covered many different issues and topics corresponding to the three stages of the ML development pipeline. Moreover, we were able to identify hazards and failures that could present *social* and *ethical risks* without making any changes to the original safety engineering framework. This signals the potential usefulness of safety engineering for responsible ML development practices.

Responsible AI assessments have often focused on assessing the behavior of a single model with respect to AI ethics principles, such as fairness and transparency [76, 78]. Recently, there has been movement towards understanding processes and interactions involved with the development and deployment of ML systems in the Human-Computer Interaction and Science and Technology Studies communities where scholars have investigated harms emergent from human-AI interaction [7, 79]. Similarly, Responsible AI scholars have examined data collection processes and pointed out clear areas for improvement [18, 31, 70]. The hazards and failures found from applying FMEA and STPA to interactions and processes along the ML development pipeline, reiterate findings from this related work and supports the potential value of translating safety engineering practices for responsible ML development. Moreover, compared to current responsible AI assessments such as algorithmic impact assessments and third party ML auditing, the aforementioned safety engineering frameworks support a proactive approach to systematically analyze a system's failures and hazards at a pragmatic level and early on in the development process.

Table 6: Sample proof-of-concept STPA, demo use

Controller	Controlled process	Control action	Type	Context	H1	H2	H3	H4
Client	Filmmaker	Provide requirements, audience and goals	Too late	Client provides the requirement later than expected.	True	True	False	True
Filmmaker	T2I demo	Provide prompts	Not providing	Film maker cannot provide prompts because their choice of prompts is blocked	True	True	True	False

The FMEA process was especially comprehensive in analyzing *processes*. The FMEA analysis facilitates the discovery of failure modes by observing and examining each of the steps in detail and focusing the analysts on being introspective about their current practices and seeing how they could be improved [10, 59, 66]. The STPA process pushes analysts to understand *interactions* between different parts of a system, and how they could break down [41]. This can bring much value to analyzing ML systems as it is common for aspects of the ML pipeline to be siloed, in which people working on different components of the system have limited interaction and may not observe issues that could arise when a piece of information/data/design is passed on from one group to another. Bringing the safety engineering mindset to responsible AI practices would allow practitioners to look "beyond the model" and into processes and interactions. This shift in focus can help identify potential failures and hazards even when analysts do not fully understand the model's capabilities. In this case, we found that applying the same frameworks at three different stages of the ML development pipeline created dialogue between siloed teams across the full product life cycle that would likely result in the deployment of a safer system. This facilitates a more systematic approach for responsible ML by building on 100 years of designing safe systems.

5.2 Fostering safety culture in responsible ML

In safety engineering practice, dedicated individuals are responsible for conducting failure and hazard analysis [16]. These experts could also be made responsible for technology development [10, 16]. Recognizing the organizational challenges of implementing responsible ML practices, the movement towards safety engineering practices and frameworks must be accompanied by shifts in organizational structure, incentives and towards increased internal capacity for conducting this type of analysis [49, 62, 67]. Integrating safety engineering frameworks into a company's workflow could take a long time, and it requires commitment/buy-in from leadership. It is important to establish when and who should be responsible for various roles such that appropriate incentive and compensation structures are put into place.

FMEA-like processes could be done by system experts who have a good understanding of a specific product or process. For example, the group in charge of data processing for training data could conduct an FMEA analysis analogous to the one in our case study, and they would have the necessary information to conduct such an analysis. Whereas STPA analysis could be effectively performed by practitioners who have a system-level perspective of the varying range of key ML models and stakeholders involved so that they can map out an appropriate control structure. Both FMEA and STPA-like analysis could be done earlier in the ML development process as long as there is a basic understanding of the system/process design. It would be beneficial to start STPA processes earlier than FMEA since making changes to the system dynamics are often harder than modifying components/steps themselves. Both of these documents need to be updated as significant system changes are implemented or when there are new findings from a growing body of research on ML systems and unexpected failures or near misses.

5.3 Limitations and opportunities for applying FMEA and STPA for ML products

One of the key limitations of our analysis is that we have not considered all the possible scopes (i.e. T2I model architecture). Considering how generative T2I models are structured and set up it is challenging to break down the model architecture into specific components or model them as a control structure. This is an active line of research that we are investigating and invite the community to consider as a potential avenue for assessing ML models. Secondly, the FMEA and STPA analysis depend heavily on how an analyst sets up the scope of analysis and maps the system/process. If the system is not mapped out adequately and there are false assumptions made, then the analysis will not be comprehensive or accurate. We validated our findings by comparing them to the current conversation in the literature. However, a comprehensive validation of this type of analysis is hard because we are trying to predict potential failures/UCAs that have not occurred and therefore, these types of analysis are meant to be iterative documents/processes. To show the validity of this type of analysis, we call on the FATE community to assess the use and applicability of such frameworks and critique the quality of these assessments so that we can ultimately build best practices around the application of such analysis frameworks. Another key limitation of this analysis is the analysts' positionality (i.e., lived experiences), biases (i.e., professional expertise), and incentives (i.e., a company culture that promotes fast launches) which could impact quality, coverage, and the time they spent doing the analysis and quality and coverage. This type of analysis will only be meaningful in a company and technology regulatory ecosystem that emphasizes responsible ML and due diligence practices.

6 CONCLUSION

Recognizing the rapid pace of movement towards incorporating generative T2I models in product development in creative practices, we examined the insights safety engineering frameworks, such as STPA and FMEA, could provide for responsible development and integration of such models within the creative practice. Our analysis underscored some of the existing concerns identified in the literature and highlighted potential novel areas of concern that could be further examined. Our case study highlights the value safety engineering analysis frameworks could provide for responsible ML development and highlighted the value of looking beyond a single model and considering processes and interactions.

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Reward Reports for Reinforcement Learning

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ABSTRACT

Building systems that are good for society in the face of complex societal effects requires a dynamic approach. Recent approaches to machine learning (ML) documentation have demonstrated the promise of discursive frameworks for deliberation about these complexities. However, these developments have been grounded in a static ML paradigm, leaving the role of feedback and post-deployment performance unexamined. Meanwhile, recent work in reinforcement learning has shown that the effects of feedback and optimization objectives on system behavior can be wide-ranging and unpredictable. In this paper we sketch a framework for documenting deployed and iteratively updated learning systems, which we call *Reward Reports*. Taking inspiration from technical concepts in reinforcement learning, we outline Reward Reports as living documents that track updates to design choices and assumptions behind what a particular automated system is optimizing for. They are intended to track dynamic phenomena arising from system deployment, rather than merely static properties of models or data. After presenting the elements of a Reward Report, we discuss a concrete example: Meta's BlenderBot 3 chatbot. Several others for game-playing (DeepMind's MuZero), content recommendation (MovieLens), and traffic control (Project Flow) are included in the appendix.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Theory of computation** → **Sequential decision making**; • **General and reference** → **Evaluation**; • **Software and its engineering** → **Documentation**; • **Human-centered computing** → *Walkthrough evaluations*; • **Social and professional topics** → *Socio-technical systems.*

KEYWORDS

Reward function, reporting, documentation, disaggregated evaluation, ethical considerations

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1 INTRODUCTION

Algorithmic systems often impact society in profound and difficult to anticipate ways. To assess risk, a system designer must take into account not only immediate impacts on stakeholders, but also third party externalities and the feedback loops they may engender. As AI matures and is deployed in new ways, emerging capabilities challenge what designers and other stakeholders assume algorithmic systems can do, making a priori risk assessment of these "agents" even harder [15].

The recent rise of dialogue agents powered by Large Language Models (LLMs) is a good example. These agents are trained on inconceivably large data corpora, deriving extremely sophisticated linguistic representations. More importantly, their conversations with users have effects that last beyond one-off interactions. Particular responses cannot be meaningfully isolated from prolonged exchanges; users may be influenced long afterward. Beyond the biases present in individual outputs, both the dialogue agents themselves and derived data artifacts (e.g. user chat histories) may be integrated into search architectures or other online services that qualitatively alter users' relationship with the web. As a result, diagnostics or audits of LLMs alone are an insufficient guide for design interventions. To manage feedback-heavy systems responsibly, the repercussions of algorithmic changes must be reflexively documented. In other words, both emergent system behaviors and the changing assumptions of key stakeholders about them must be accounted for in an ongoing and responsive manner.

We propose a new form of documentation, *Reward Reports*, to move the research community towards a world where these changes are regularly tracked, reflected upon, and responded to. For designers, this documentation would aid internal efforts at reverse

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engineering the behavior of black box systems, and provide a framework to disentangle complex effects as they manifest. Moreover, a standard mechanism for continuous transparency would help harmonize external efforts at domain monitoring and inform regulatory action. To this end, we are building Reward Reports for popular machine learning systems via community contributions[1].

Multiple frameworks for documenting AI systems, datasets and models already exist [25, 42, 51]. However, these approaches all aim to track sources of potential bias or harm within a static machine learning (ML) paradigm. One might imagine that issuing successive Model Cards would be sufficient to monitor the behavior of deployed systems. However, system architectures display several key features that would make such a regime insufficient as a basis for accountability. First, the effects of deployed AI systems are not static, and the dynamic impacts of successive system updates can subvert efforts both to manage downstream harms and to more evenly distribute benefits to vulnerable subpopulations. Reflecting on these changes explicitly should be a part of deploying AI responsibly. Second, Model Cards do not document the design decisions leading to this particular ML system–why specific learning algorithms were chosen, how the designers expect the system to operate, and what evidence would change these expectations. Checking assumptions is a cardinal part of promoting accountability. Third, learned task representations often lie behind external interfaces (such as static APIs), access to which is decoupled from how trained models may change over time. Bridging this gap is crucial in order to understand AI systems in context. These features transcend existing documentation regimes. The presence of diverse feedback profiles and ongoing dynamics suggests unique risk vectors that must be made interpretable through documentation. Full accountability requires a cohesive understanding of how the system incorporates different types of feedback: from historical data, from stakeholders, and from a system's own usage once deployed. Reward Reports are designed to foreground these elements, allowing better insight into the societal impacts of data-driven optimization systems where feedback effects play a key role.

As a framing device, Reward Reports utilize reinforcement learning (RL), a sub-field of ML that is tasked with solving sequential, open-ended problems. RL provides a dynamical lens that is broadly applicable to many algorithmic systems with repeated data-driven optimizations. Critically, this lens is also applicable to 'static' ML systems. In many of these systems, new behaviors emerge post-deployment in response to ongoing usage, and as the system is retrained or applied to new populations. Building on proposals to document datasets and models, we focus on reward functions: the objective that guides optimization decisions in feedback-laden systems. Reward Reports comprise questions that highlight the promised benefits and potential risks entailed in defining what is being optimized in an algorithmic system, whether explicitly or implicitly construed as RL. They are intended as living documents that dissolve the distinction between *ex-ante* specification and *ex-post* evaluation. As a result, Reward Reports provide a framework for ongoing deliberation and accountability after a system is deployed, ensuring that desired properties persist in the system's behavior over time.

In Section 2, we situate Reward Reports within the existing literature on AI documentation and governance mechanisms. In Section 3, we review optimization in the context of feedback, focusing on the notions of action, objective, and adaptation. In Section 4, we contextualize these elements of optimization within a taxonomy of feedback. Finally, in Section 6, we present an example Reward Report for the BlenderBot 3 "AI chatbot" developed and deployed by Meta. Throughout, we maintain a running example of a dialogue agent to illustrate the challenges in documenting feedback-laden and data-driven optimization systems, whether or not they explicitly utilize the RL framework.

2 RELATED WORK

2.1 Documentation for AI Systems

There are several existing proposals for AI system documentation, with some frameworks focused on specific aspects of an AI system, while others examine the system as a whole. Reward Reports are focused on documenting risks of dynamic machine learning systems. This complements current documentation efforts by explicating intended performance in light of feedback effects that may emerge over time due to re-training or shifts in usage.

Data documentation. Documenting data, regardless of resulting systems, is a well explored avenue [4, 8, 20, 25, 30]. These efforts have helped foster discussion on responsible data collection, as well as showcase issues of bias and representation. However, this paradigm is most impactful within the batch or offline setting of static unsupervised or supervised ML. Dynamic systems driven by sequential feedback also use data, but not only in the form of static datasets. Rather, both RL and deployed ML systems generate and eventually transform data. This is due both to the optimization decisions of the systems themselves and the dynamics of the environment in which they operate. Documenting original data alone cannot reveal the risks of dynamic datasets and feedback driven systems.

Static system documentation. Some proposals for ML documentation are specific to model [42], domain [36, 47], or outcome [61]. Reward Reports might be a useful supplement to these approaches for several reasons. With regards to Model Cards, there is substantial deliberation entailed in mapping between the chosen optimization and resultant behavior in dynamic systems. For example, designers must consider a range of alternative specifications that were technically feasible pre-deployment, as well as the types of feedback available to help optimize post-deployment. These aspects of system design cannot be captured solely by documenting the model. Furthermore, unlike domain-specific reporting frameworks, we provide a general template that can be applied to any specific application. Our work has similarities with previous proposals for AI Ethics Sheets [43], Fact Sheets [6, 51], or Scorecards [12], but uniquely focuses on prompting deliberation about the feedback-driven risks inherent to dynamic systems.

Auditing and Assessment approaches. Algorithmic Impact Assessments (AIA) offer a framework for evaluating risks before an

[1]Reward Reports are produced and maintained here: https://github.com/RewardReports/reward-reports.

AI system is developed or acquired [50, 55]. AIAs were inspired by environmental impact assessments, which provided one path to regulate industries in which corporate expertise outpaced government capacity. These frameworks presume an agency-vendor relationship, and focus narrowly on the procurement of automated decision systems. Meanwhile, many audit mechanisms attempt to confirm either internally or externally whether a given system conforms to a legacy standard or regulation [46]. Reward Reports are intended to supersede these *ex-ante* concerns, engaging instead with the necessarily non-linear and circuitous process of refining the specifications of a feedback system.

2.2 Societal Risks of Dynamic Machine Learning Systems

The AI ethics community is increasingly acknowledging the important role of feedback and dynamic effects on system behaviours. While critical and discursive interpretations of feedback are more common in static ML than RL research [3, 40, 48], the technical RL community is also increasingly aware of the limitations of current algorithmic approaches and evaluation paradigms. For instance, the RL research community has begun to reflect on the unique risks and challenges that may be posed by RL systems, in particular those that leverage black-box neural networks for decision-making. There are whitepapers charting these challenges [26, 63], as well as attempts to address societal risks through technical means [14, 22, 62, 67]. RL from human feedback (RLHF) has recently served both as a technique in the process of training LLMs and also as a metaphor for value alignment [7]. Recent general audience books have echoed these tensions [16, 52]. While these efforts have begun to capture the unique stakes in deploying RL systems, there is no consensus on how to chart associated risks. We intend Reward Reports to organize these efforts' reflections into an instrument of deliberation and accountability.

2.3 AI Governance

ML documentation can be used as a governance mechanism to dictate safer machine learning practices. As reflected in the growing number of proposed AI governance frameworks [18, 24, 38, 49, 64, 66], ML and adjacent communities have increasingly acknowledged socio-technical risks and the need for novel harm mitigation strategies [5, 19, 56]. These frameworks have begun to influence legislation. For example, the Canadian government has mandated the Algorithmic Risk Assessment tool for procurement [13], and current draft legislation from the EU commission calls for AI system documentation tailored to forms of risk (*e.g.* in Title 3, Ch. 2, Art. 10-14) [1]. While these frameworks provide needed prohibitions and protections, they favor interpretive flexibility over specific design decisions, and often assume static AI systems that need strictly *ex-post* documentation. In contrast, Reward Reports would track requisite design decisions, and provide an interface for stakeholders to reflect on the validity of those design choices over time. This would in essence dissolve the boundary between *ex-ante* and *ex-post* assessment.

3 BACKGROUND

In this section, we reframe the concept of data-driven optimization in terms of dynamical systems. The type of optimization we describe encompasses the training of large language models, as well as their effects on the world once deployed. We begin by reinterpreting these dynamics in terms of action, objective, and adaptation. This taxonomy emphasizes the *use* and *behavior* of learned models rather than the closed act of developing them. We then review the RL framework, and recount its broader connections to optimization and machine learning.

3.1 Action, Objective, Adaptation

Learned predictive models are the means to some end. It is the decisions made, or *actions* taken, that determine the extent to which a model is successful. For example, congested suburban roadways in the community of Los Gatos, CA, USA are caused directly by the actions of drivers, and indirectly by the actions of routing algorithms that predict a poorly-scaling shortcut path [45]. Similarly, the optimization of datacenter operations at Google uses the predictions of trained models to adjust set points and load distribution–the predictions serve as a catalyst for action in the real world [23].

Action occurs not only on the basis of predictions, but also towards some *objective*. The definition of objective is crucial to the resulting behavior. Identical traffic models will result in different routing suggestions depending on whether the algorithm is optimizing for arrival time or fuel consumption [44]. Likewise, content interaction models have vastly different impacts when they are used to uprank posts predicted to receive many 'likes' compared with those predicted to receive long comments [28].

Finally, these optimization systems are often updated based on additional data collected during their operation, making them *adaptive*. By accounting for the dependence between past decisions, observed data, and current models, systems in effect react to dynamic environments and improve performance over time. For example, when observed music listening patterns are used as additional data in preference models, music recommendation algorithms can adapt to an individual's evolving tastes [21]. On the other hand, adaptivity can also exacerbate biased data. For example, predictive policing systems can amplify racial biases in arrests by directing more patrols towards areas with more documented arrests [41, 53].

Large Language Models through the RL Lens

We can draw a direct analogy between the MDP setting and the evaluation of language models. While language models are not Markovian in an exact sense, the notion of "state" can be applied to the *conversation text* at stake in a particular user interaction. The "observations" of the language model would consist of the *subset of the historic conversation text* that fits within the context window (the "time horizon") of the language model. Likewise, the "actions" taken by a dialogue agent consist of the *token sequences that are generated* to form responses to user queries. The "dynamics" of this system correspond to the *user responses* to dialogue agent generations - updating the conversation state by moving the sequence of conversation forward. Finally, the *performance metrics* (e.g. loss and/or regularization function(s), user 'thumbs up'/'thumbs down' feedback) that shape the behaviour of

the language model during pre-training, fine-tuning, and subsequent updates, can be considered as a source of scalar "reward" feedback that depends on the specific conversation state at a given point in time. This lens is central to the recent surge in the use of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) [17] to further fine-tune language models with respect to human values.

Action, objective, and adaptation are important for ensuring that systems work as intended, even in cases where they are not explicitly defined as part of an underlying model. This is especially true for large language models, which act by responding to natural language queries according a variety of engineered objectives: accurate prediction of the next token in a dialogue sequence, but also disparate constraints such as safety, helpfulness, etc. Moreover, they already function as parts of a larger adaptive system, as retrained models (GPT-3, GPT-3.5, GPT-4) have been designed and evaluated differently based on their successive integration with the ChatGPT interface. At present, designers are missing a framework for capturing these properties as dynamic elements of techniques for model optimization and deployment.

3.2 Reinforcement Learning

The reinforcement learning (RL) framework succinctly encompasses action, objective, and adaptation. RL agents take actions, are motivated by a reward signal which encodes the objective, and adapt based on the feedback from interactions. While the goal of supervised learning (SL) procedures is to use data to generate a model that makes accurate predictions, the goal of RL algorithms is to interact with an environment to generate a policy that achieves high reward. However, once SL models are deployed towards some goal and updated with new data, the concerns highlighted by the RL framework become relevant. In this sense, ML deployments can be understood through the lens of RL. This is even more true of language models whose post-deployment social effects are readily understood within an RL framework–to say nothing of the explicit pre-deployment use of RL from Human Feedback (RLHF) to fine-tune these models.

In Reinforcement Learning, an *agent* executes *actions* $\vec{a}_t \in \mathcal{A}$ in an *environment*. In response, the agent receives a scalar *reward* $r_t \in \mathbb{R}$ and makes an *observation* $\vec{o}_t \in \mathcal{O}$ of the environment. Actions are made on the basis of these observations according to a *policy* $\pi : \mathcal{H} \to \Delta(\mathcal{A})$, where $\mathcal{H} = \mathcal{O} \times \cdots \times \mathcal{O}$ represents the history of observations and $\Delta(\mathcal{A})$ represents a probability distribution over the action space. The goal of a reinforcement learning agent is to find a policy that maximizes the expected cumulative reward over some time horizon H:

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{t=0}^{H} \gamma^t r_t \mid \pi\right]$$

where the discount factor $\gamma \in (0, 1]$ trades off between immediate and future potential rewards. As outlined above, this paradigm captures many problems of interest, from choosing advertisements that are most likely to result in a click [37, 39] to determining the best dosing schedule for a patient [59].

A key element of RL is how actions affect the future behavior of the environment. This dependence is often modeled as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) [9]. In the MDP setting, the *state* $\vec{s}_t$ describes the status of the environment. The key assumption, called memorylessness, is that the current state and action are sufficient for predicting the future state, *i.e.*

$$\mathbb{P}\{\vec{s}_{t+1} = \vec{s} \mid \vec{s}_0, \ldots \vec{s}_t, \vec{a}_0, \ldots \vec{a}_t\} = \mathbb{P}\{\vec{s}_{t+1} = \vec{s} \mid \vec{s}_t, \vec{a}_t\} \,.$$

The transition probability distribution mapping state-action pairs to subsequent states is referred to as the *system dynamics*. Furthermore, the scalar reward signal is defined to be determined by the state, so that $r_t = r(\vec{s}_t, \vec{a}_t)$ for some reward function $r : \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A} \to \mathbb{R}$, mapping from the current environment to a scalar representation of desirability. Under these assumptions, it is optimal to consider policies that depend only on the current state, $\pi : \mathcal{S} \to \Delta(\mathcal{A})$. Often, RL algorithms assume that the state is observed directly $\vec{o}_t = \vec{s}_t$ (or similarly, that it can be constructed in a straightforward manner *e.g.* though history truncation $\vec{s}_t = [\vec{o}_{t-h}, \ldots, \vec{o}_t]$), and the policy is typically parametric, with a parameter vector denoted θ.

The RL framing is general, so other machine learning paradigms can be viewed as special cases of it as long as key assumptions are named. For example, supervised learning can be viewed as the optimization of a classification or regression policy where the rewards are defined by accuracy and the time horizon is equal to one. While standard supervised learning frameworks do not consider how to update or retrain on the basis of interaction, there are intermediate points. Online learning situates supervised learning systems in a sequentially evolving environment [58], while the study of bandit problems reduces RL to the static regime where actions do not affect the environment [10]. The boxed example illustrates how an RL lens can be richly applied to language models as long as terms like *horizon* and *state* are aligned with salient metrics and performance criteria.

4 MOTIVATION

The RL lens is useful not only because ML deployments often operate in dynamical environments. It also expounds *feedback* between the environment and the deployment. In this section, we review three levels of feedback that characterize RL systems, and then motivate Reward Reports as documentation for tracking how and why feedback has been organized.

4.1 A Taxonomy of Feedback

We categorize feedback into three types: *control* feedback from state to action, *behavior* feedback from the data to the policy, and *exogenous* (or exo-)feedback from the target environment to adjacent entities [27]. The types of feedback are compared in Tab. 1 and visualized in Fig. 1. Throughout, we continue to illustrate these types of feedback through comparison to a deployed dialogue agent powered by a large language model.

Control feedback. Control feedback maps observations or states to actions. In the case of a dialogue agent, control feedback is the autoregressive language model itself–a conditional probability distribution from token sequences to subsequent tokens. "Intelligent" behaviors arise because actions are constantly adjusted on the basis



Type of feedback	Feedback Channel	Dynamics	Specification Element
Control	Agent-Environment	Reaction	Actions
Behavior	Policy-Reward	Evaluation	Rewards
Exogenous	Environment-Domain	Drift	States & Observations

Figure 1 & Table 1: The relationship between types of feedback, the channel through which information flows, the relationship to dynamics, and specification element(s). Different parameters and data interact over time to create dynamic properties internal and external to the RL agent.

of observations, even though the rules that control the behavior (the language model distribution) remains the same.

Behavior feedback. Behaviour feedback maps data from the environment to a learned policy. This form of feedback occurs when RL systems automatically adapt their policy based on reward, or when a deployed ML system is updated (e.g. with new weights) to better suit the deployment environment. Questions of reaction become questions of trial-and-error evaluation: "What token should follow the preceding tokens" evolves into "Can this dialogue agent be made safer/more useful/better aligned with user needs *etc.* through fine-tuning or better prompt engineering" (for example). The ability to learn from experience is part of what makes RL systems so powerful, and is what makes RL useful in domains that are difficult to otherwise model. For example, it would be challenging to hand-design a policy for generating natural language responses to user queries, but data-driven approaches have made this task tractable.

Exogenous feedback. Exogenous feedback occurs when the application domain itself shifts in response to the deployed system. These shifts could be due to the system interacting with political or economic conditions that are outside the scope of its formal specification. Note that the concept of exogenous feedback is richer than the concept of covariate or distribution shift commonly discussed in supervised learning [33]–exogenous feedback explicitly foregrounds what lies behind and instigates the shift, i.e. the interactions between the deployed system and the environment. Dialogue agents are particularly prone to this type of feedback, as their emerging effects on web search, content recommendation, and diverse writing disciplines already demonstrate. In principle, if such dynamics could be predicted by an RL agent, they could be incorporated within behavior or control feedback, but in practice, it is not clear that this is possible–the observations would need to be sufficiently rich and the planning horizon sufficiently long. For these reasons, exogenous feedback highlights the potential of externalized risks in the RL framework.

4.2 Risks and Documentation

For many systems, reward design–the choice of how and what to optimize–amounts to a political decision about how different types of feedback may rewire the domain and pose risks to various stakeholders. As it is often impossible to fold all of the domain dynamics within a controllable planning horizon and precise reward function, exo-feedback is fundamentally unavoidable in practice. Furthermore, it is unrealistic to articulate all possible system specifications *a priori*. This means that a single specification may simultaneously implicate all three forms of feedback (conrol, behavior, exogenous) outlined above.

The risks of feedback can at least be approached and evaluated through documentation. This calls for legible and periodic mechanisms for auditing RL systems pre- and post-deployment. It is these reviews that must decide whether or how the optimized behaviors align with the application domain, in correspondence with resultant risks and possible harms. This may be especially true for dialogue agents whose models may be technically static (insofar as parameters are not updated in real-time in response to user feedback), but whose dynamical effects on society are impossible to specify in advance. Given the dynamic nature of these effects, the corresponding document must be dynamic as well: updated and revisited over time to map the evolution of feedback between the system and the domain in which it is deployed.

5 REWARD REPORT COMPONENTS

Here we prescribe Reward Reports, a structured series of design inquiries for automated decision systems (Fig. 2). Including but not limited to the use of reinforcement learning, Reward Reports are intended to engage practitioners by revisiting design questions over time, drawing reference to previous reports and looking forward to future ones. As pivotal properties may not be known until the system has been deployed and monitored, the onus is on designers to sustain documentation over time. This makes Reward Reports into living documents that both avoid the limitations of simple, unidirectional answers (*e.g.* yes or no) and illuminate societal risks

over time. Moreover, the changelog component of a Reward Report becomes an interface for stakeholders, users, and engineers to continuously oversee and evaluate the documented system. Thus, Reward Reports are a prerequisite to sociotechnical reflection about the system behavior.

Appendix A includes an empty template for a Reward Report, including descriptions of the content for each component. In this section we present the six main components that compose a Reward Report. These components are arranged to help the reporter understand and document the system. A Reward Report begins with ***system details*** (1) that contain the information context for deploying the model. From there, the report documents the ***optimization intent*** (2) which questions the goals of the system and why RL or ML may be a useful tool. The designer then documents how it can affect different stakeholders in the ***institutional interface*** (3). The next two sections contain technical details on the system ***implementation*** (4) and ***evaluation*** (5). The report concludes with plans for ***system maintenance*** (6) as additional system dynamics are uncovered.

Reward Report Contents

- **System Details**: Basic system information.
  - System owner
  - Dates
  - Contact
- **Optimization Intent**: The goals of the system and how reinforcement manifests.
  - Goal of reinforcement
  - Performance metrics
  - Oversight metrics
  - Failure modes
- **Institutional Interface**: The interconnections of the automated system with society.
  - Deployment agency
  - Stakeholders
  - Explainability
  - Recourse
- **Implementation**: The low-level engineering details of the ML system.
  - Reward, algorithmic, and environment details
  - Measurement details
  - Data flow
  - Limitations
  - Engineering artifacts
- **Evaluation**: Specific audits on system performance.
  - Evaluation environment
  - Offline evaluations
  - Evaluation validity
  - Performance standards
- **System Maintenance**: Plans for long-term verification of behavior.
  - Reporting cadence
  - Update triggers
  - Changelog

Figure 2: Summary of reward report sections and suggested inquiries.

5.1 System Details

This section collects basic information a user or stakeholder may need in reference to the automated decision system.

(1) **Person or organization deploying the system**: This may be the designer deploying the system, a larger agency or body, or some combination of the two. The entity completing the report should also be indicated.
(2) **Reward date(s)**: The known or intended timespan over which this reward function & optimization is active.
(3) **Feedback & communication**: Contact information for the designer, team, or larger agency responsible for system deployment.
(4) **Other resources**: Where can users or stakeholders find more information about this system? Is this system based on one or more research papers?

5.2 Optimization Intent

This section addresses basic questions about the intent of the reward function and optimization problem. Designers first document the intent of a particular solution, translating the system's quantitative objective into a qualitative description. In later sections, they have the opportunity to further reflect on how implementation details aid in, or diminish the broader goal. Stakeholders and users can employ this section to understand if the intent of the system matches with the effects they observe or experience.

(1) **Goal of reinforcement**: A statement of system scope and purpose, including the planning horizon and justification of a data-driven approach to policy design (*e.g.* the use of reinforcement learning or repeated retraining). This justification should contrast with alternative approaches, like static models and hand-designed policies. What is there to gain with the chosen approach?
(2) **Defined performance metrics**: A list of "performance metrics" included explicitly in the reward signal, the criteria for why these metrics were chosen, and from where these criteria were drawn (*e.g.* government agencies, domain precedent, GitHub repositories, toy environments). Performance metrics that are used by the designer to tune the system, but not explicitly included in the reward signal, should also be reported here.
(3) **Oversight metrics**: Are there any additional metrics not included in the reward signal but relevant for vendor or system oversight (*e.g.* performance differences across demographic groups)? Why aren't they part of the reward signal, and why must they be monitored?
(4) **Known failure modes**: A description of any prior known instances of "reward hacking" or model misalignment in the domain at stake [34], and description of how the current system avoids this.

5.3 Institutional Interface

This section documents the intended (and in subsequent reports, observed) relationship between the system and the broader context in which it is deployed. While necessarily piecemeal, the explicit documentation of this interface will allow designers to reflect on and revisit the system assumptions over time. These reflections may bring novel interests or agencies into scope and allow for

organizing the emergent interests of stakeholders and users where necessary.

(1) **Deployment Agency**: What other agency or controlling entity roles, if any, are intended to oversee the ongoing post-deployment operation of the RL system? How may these roles change following system deployment?
(2) **Stakeholders**: What other interests are implicated in the design specification or system deployment, beyond the designer? What role will these interests play in subsequent report documentation? What other entities, if any, does the deployed system interface with whose interests are not intended to be in scope?
(3) **Explainability & Transparency**: Does the system offer explanations of its decisions or actions? What is the purpose of these explanations? To what extent is the policy transparent, i.e. can decisions or actions be understood in terms of meaningful intermediate quantities?
(4) **Recourse**: Can stakeholders or users contest the decisions or actions of the system? What processes, technical or otherwise, are in place to handle this?

5.4 Implementation

Given the sensitivity of reinforcement learning systems, it is important to document specific implementation details of the system. Even small changes in implementation can result in substantial behavior shifts downstream, making such factors difficult to track when used at scale. Documenting these design decisions will both help prevent failures in specific applications and assist technical progress.

(1) **Reward details**: How was the reward function engineered? *E.g.* is it based on a well-defined metric? Is it tuned to represent a specific behavior? Are multiple terms scaled to make one central loss, and how was the scaling decided?
(2) **Environment details**: Description of states, observations, and actions with reference to planning horizon and hypothesized dynamics/impacts. What dynamics are brought into the scope of the optimization via feedback? Which dynamics are left external to the system, as drift? Have there been any observed gaps between conceptualization and resultant dynamics?
(3) **Measurement details**: How are the components of the reward and observations measured? Are measurement techniques consistent across time and data sources? Under what conditions are measurements valid and correct? What biases might arise during the measurement process?
(4) **Algorithmic details**: The key points on the specific algorithm(s) used for learning and planning. This includes the form of the policy (e.g. neural network, optimization problem), the class of learning algorithm (e.g. model-based RL, off-policy RL, repeated retraining), the form of any intermediate model (e.g. of the value function, dynamics function, reward function), technical infrastructure, and any other considerations necessary for implementing the system. Is the algorithm publicly documented and is code publicly available? Have different algorithms been used or tried to accomplish the same goal?
(5) **Data flow**: How is data collected, stored, and used for (re)training? How frequently are various components of the system retrained, and why was this frequency chosen? Could the data exhibit sampling bias, and is this accounted for in the learning algorithm? Is data reweighted, filtered, or discarded? Have data sources changed over time?
(6) **Limitations**: Discussion and justification of modeling choices arising from computational, statistical, and measurement limitations. How might (or how have) improvements in computational power and data collection change(d) these considerations and impact(ed) system behavior?
(7) **Engineering tricks**: RL systems are known to be sensitive to implementation tricks that are key to performance. Are there any design elements that have a surprisingly strong impact on performance? E.g. state-action normalization, hard-coded curricula, model-initialization, loss bounds, or more?

5.5 Evaluation

Assessing the potential behavior of a feedback system is important for anticipating its future performance and risks that may arise. This section records evaluations done by the designer before deploying the system and each time the reward report is revisited. This section allows stakeholders and users to hold designers accountable for the performance of the system once deployed. It is important to distinguish whether the evaluations are done in a simulation (*offline*) or deployed on real users (*online*) and if the evaluation procedure is on a fixed dataset (*static*) or evolves over time (*dynamic*).

(1) **Evaluation environment**: How is the system evaluated (and if applicable, trained) prior to deployment (*e.g.* using simulation, static datasets, *etc.*)? Exhaustive details of the offline evaluation environment should be provided. For simulation, details should include description or external reference to the underlying model, ranges of parameters, etc. For evaluation on static datasets, considering referring to associated documentation (*e.g. Datasheets* [25]).
(2) **Offline evaluations**: Present and discuss the results of offline evaluation. For static evaluation, consider referring to associated documentation (*e.g. Model Cards* [42]). If applicable, compare the behaviors arising from counterfactual specifications (*e.g.* of states, observations, actions).
(3) **Evaluation validity**: To what extent is it reasonable to draw conclusions about the behavior of the deployed system based on the available offline evaluations?
How is the online performance of the system presently understood? If the system has been deployed, were any unexpected behaviors observed?
(4) **Performance standards**: What standards of performance and safety is the system required to meet? Where do these standards come from? How is the system verified to meet these standards?

5.6 System Maintenance

This section documents plans for post-deployment oversight, including subsequent reviews of real-world implementation and how the monitoring of resultant dynamics is intended to (or has) shed light on *ex-ante* assumptions. These plans include any additional grounds for updating the report in case of sustained shifts in observations or metrics (*e.g.* the effects of exogenous changes on system behaviors). As such, this section must draw sustained reference to previous Reward Reports, including subsequent changes to the

description, implementation, or evaluation, and what prompted these changes. While previous sections outline how the system learns from data, this section tracks how organizations learn to oversee the system. Its documentation is particularly important for defining *accountability* for the system itself, those who manage it, and those responsible for completing periodic reports.

(1) **Reporting cadence**: The intended timeframe for revisiting the Reward Report. How was this decision reached and motivated?
(2) **Update triggers**: Specific events (projected or historic) significant enough to warrant revisiting this report, beyond the cadence outlined above. Example triggers include a defined stakeholder group empowered to demand a system audit, or a specific metric (either of performance or oversight) that falls outside a defined threshold of critical safety.
(3) **Changelog**: Descriptions of updates and lessons learned from observing and maintaining the deployed system. This includes when the updates were made and what motivated them in light of previous reports. The changelog is the key difference between Reward Reports and other forms of machine learning documentation, as it successively reframes prior reports and reflects their intrinsically dynamic nature.

6 EXAMPLES

Our aim with these examples is to illustrate the breadth and scope of questions that a Reward Report could engage with, and to demonstrate how Reward Reports can apply to both explicit and implicit RL systems in various design contexts. Below, we focus on the Reward Report for the BlenderBot 3 chatbot deployed in August 2022 [2]. We refer the reader to the appendix for the complete Reward Reports for BlenderBot 3 and several other examples including game-playing (DeepMind's MuZero [54]), content recommendation (MovieLens [29]), and traffic control (Project Flow [65]).

6.1 BlenderBot 3: A Chatbot Designed to Improve Over Time Through Feedback

BlenderBot 3 is a recent chatbot "designed to improve its conversational skills and safety through feedback from people who chat with it, focusing on helpful feedback while avoiding learning from unhelpful or dangerous responses" [2]. To achieve this, the chatbot incorporates more than one type of feedback. First, it incorporates a significantly larger language model than its predecessors at 175 billion parameters, unlocking new conversational capabilities via a larger capacity policy–a level of *control feedback*. Second, it includes an interface for human users to provide real-time feedback on its conversational outputs if they are biased, inappropriate, or lack context–a kind of "reward signal" that uses behavior feedback for eventual model updates. Finally, its designers have articulated their high-level goal to release data about the chatbot's performance to the broader AI research community as a means to uncover new strategies for making future AI systems safer and more engaging to users–a kind of constructive form of exogenous feedback, beyond the technical specification scope.

In parallel with BlenderBot 3's deployment, the designers made both its language model (OPT-175B) and associated model cards public to the AI research community. We have corresponded and worked with the designers to synthesize and interpret these resources as a basis for a Reward Report for BlenderBot 3. This Reward Report includes the components outlined in Section 5, revealing potential interactions between different feedback types and associated questions pertaining to the system specification. These include:

- What metrics (e.g. conversation length, ratio of negative vs. positive feedback) are being used to evaluate performance?
- How often will the language model be retrained?
- What outputs, if any, would compel designers to take BlenderBot 3 offline?
- Which stakeholders are responsible for the system's deployment, have a say in its specification, or have a veto over its public operation?

As a result, the BlenderBot 3 Reward Report does not merely aggregate model cards. It reveals that the documentation of feedback types requires a qualitative appraisal of system components, both in relation to each other and to the wider social context in which the system is intended to operate. This project entails a commitment to update the documentation over time as unintended types of feedback emerge and performance metrics are gradually refined.

7 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS

The scale and complexity of contemporary optimization pipelines raise unique concerns not addressed by static reports and recent calls for documentation (e.g. those focusing on models or datasets). ML deployments frequently consist of many moving parts and feedback channels that change over time, especially when the systems interact directly with multiple stakeholders like business customers and public users. Reward Reports address the challenges of documenting these systems, providing a framework for iterative deliberation as a system and its feedback channels evolve over time. We have also demonstrated that the technical problem space and language of RL is useful for interpreting problems of fairness and safety. Reward Reports will be of most use where a system is data-driven, and where actions have clear and automatic results. Moreover, such systems are likely to grow in popularity.

Optimization-based policies in domains like school bus scheduling [11] or prison allocation [57], for example, are often not data-driven. However, it is not hard to imagine a future where these optimizations incorporate quantities predicted by statistical models. If this approach expands across domains, a standard mechanism for anticipating and deliberating over dynamic harms could become a critical component of governance.

The pace of academic research also suggests that in the near future, implicit or explicit RL systems will be more effective, deployed in more impactful user-facing applications, and fine-tuned in 'real-time' rather than re-trained daily or weekly. The complexities of real-time training are compounded with the addition of human-in-the-loop data collection, such as in reinforcement learning from human feedback [32]. The resulting feedback loops will make the RL lens applicable to more and more social contexts, further motivating the need for Reward Reports.

Reward Reports could also be of use for human-in-the-loop ML deployments where actions do not have automatic impact. Clinical decision support systems can be data-driven, but the clinician ultimately determines how system recommendations are implemented.

In this case, the human computer interaction (HCI) component of such a system could distort the interface between recommendations and human judgment in ways that are not captured within a pure RL lens. For example, a doctor is more likely to defer to an incorrect recommendation by an algorithm when it is accompanied by a paragraph of reasoning than without [31]. However, the deliberation over system feedback made possible by Reward Reports could still elucidate unforeseen harms.

These examples all point to a deeper truth: designing systems to promote societal good is an increasingly dynamic problem, and it needs to be deliberated about as such. Reward Reports enact forms of documentation commensurate with the feedback-laden systems whose dynamics–not just models or data–are a critical object of concern.

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A EMPTY REWARD REPORT TEMPLATE

1 System Details

1.1 System Owner

This may be the designer deploying the system, a larger agency or body, or some combination of the two. The entity completing the report should also be indicated.

1.2 Dates

The known or intended timespan over which this reward function & optimization is active.

1.3 Feedback & Communication

Contact information for the designer, team, or larger agency responsible for system deployment.

1.4 Other Resources

Where can users or stakeholders find more information about this system? Is this system based on one or more research papers?

2 Optimization Intent

2.1 Goal of Reinforcement

A statement of system scope and purpose, including the planning horizon and justification of a data-driven approach to policy design (e.g. the use of reinforcement learning or repeated retraining). This justification should contrast with alternative approaches, like static models and hand-designed policies. What is there to gain with the chosen approach?

2.2 Defined Performance Metrics

A list of "performance metrics" included explicitly in the reward signal, the criteria for why these metrics were chosen, and from where these criteria were drawn (e.g. government agencies, domain precedent, GitHub repositories, toy environments). Performance metrics that are used by the designer to tune the system, but not explicitly included in the reward signal should also be reported here.

2.3 Oversight Metrics

Are there any additional metrics not included in the reward signal but relevant for vendor or system oversight (e.g. performance differences across demographic groups)? Why aren't they part of the reward signal, and why must they be monitored?

2.4 Known Failure Modes

A description of any prior known instances of "reward hacking" or model misalignment in the domain at stake, and description of how the current system avoids this.

3 Institutional Interface

3.1 Deployment Agency

What other agency or controlling entity roles, if any, are intended to oversee the ongoing post-deployment operation of the RL system? How may these roles change following system deployment?

3.2 Stakeholders

What other interests are implicated in the design specification or system deployment, beyond the designer? What role will these interests play in subsequent report documentation? What other entities, if any, does the deployed system interface with whose interests are not intended to be in scope?

3.3 Explainability & Transparency

Does the system offer explanations of its decisions or actions? What is the purpose of these explanations? To what extent is the policy transparent, i.e. can decisions or actions be understood in terms of meaningful intermediate quantities?

3.4 Recourse

Can stakeholders or users contest the decisions or actions of the system? What processes, technical or otherwise, are in place to handle this?

4 Implementation

4.1 Reward Details

How was the reward function engineered? Is it based on a well-defined metric? Is it tuned to represent a specific behavior? Are multiple terms scaled to make one central loss, and how was the scaling decided?

4.2 Environment Details

Description of states, observations, and actions with reference to planning horizon and hypothesized dynamics/impact. What dynamics are brought into the scope of the optimization via feedback? Which dynamics are left external to the system, as drift? Have there been any observed gaps between conceptualization and resultant dynamics?

4.3 Measurement Details

How are the components of the reward and observations measured? Are measurement techniques consistent across time and data sources? Under what conditions are measurements valid and correct? What biases might arise during the measurement process?

4.4 Algorithmic Details

The key points on the specific algorithm(s) used for learning and planning. This includes the form of the policy (e.g. neural network, optimization problem), the class of learning algorithm (e.g. model-based RL, off-policy RL, repeated retraining), the form of any intermediate model (e.g. of the value function, dynamics function, reward function), technical infrastructure, and any other considerations necessary for implementing the system. Is the algorithm publicly documented and is code publicly available? Have different algorithms been used or tried to accomplish the same goal?

4.5 Data Flow

How is data collected, stored, and used for (re)training? How frequently are various components of the system retrained, and why was this frequency chosen? Could the data exhibit sampling bias, and is this accounted for in the learning algorithm? Is data reweighted, filtered, or discarded? Have data sources changed over time?

4.6 Limitations

Discussion and justification of modeling choices arising from computational, statistical, and measurement limitations. How might (or how have) improvements in computational power and data collection change(d) these considerations and impact(ed) system behavior?

4.7 Engineering Tricks

RL systems are known to be sensitive to implementation tricks that are key to performance. Are there any design elements that have a surprisingly strong impact on performance? For example, state-action normalization, hard-coded curricula, model-initialization, loss bounds, or more?

5 Evaluation

5.1 Evaluation Environment

How is the system evaluated (and if applicable, trained) prior to deployment (e.g. using simulation, static datasets, etc.)? Exhaustive details of the offline evaluation environment should be provided. For simulation, details should include description or external reference to the underlying model, ranges of parameters, etc. For evaluation on static datasets, considering referring to associated documentation (e.g. Datasheets *[1]).*

5.2 Offline Evaluations

Present and discuss the results of offline evaluation. For static evaluation, consider referring to associated documentation (e.g. Model Cards *[2]). If applicable, compare the behaviors arising from counterfactual specifications (e.g. of states, observations, actions).*

5.3 Evaluation Validity

To what extent is it reasonable to draw conclusions about the behavior of the deployed system based on presented offline evaluations? What is the current state of understanding of the online performance of the system? If the system has been deployed, were any unexpected behaviors observed?

5.4 Performance standards

What standards of performance and safety is the system required to meet? Where do these standards come from? How is the system verified to meet these standards?

6 System Maintenance

6.1 Reporting Cadence

The intended timeframe for revisiting the reward report. How was this decision reached and motivated?

6.2 Update Triggers

Specific events (projected or historic) significant enough to warrant revisiting this report, beyond the cadence outlined above. Example triggers include a defined stakeholder group empowered to demand a system audit, or a specific metric (either of performance or oversight) that falls outside a defined threshold of critical safety.

6.3 Changelog

Descriptions of updates and lessons learned from observing and maintaining the deployed system. This includes when the updates were made and what motivated them in light of previous reports. The changelog comprises the central difference between reward reports and other forms of machine learning documentation, as it directly reflects their intrinsically dynamic nature.

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B EXAMPLE REWARD REPORT - BLENDERBOT

1 System Details

1.1 System Owner

This may be the designer deploying the system, a larger agency or body, or some combination of the two. The entity completing the report should also be indicated.

This system was developed by Meta AI, in partnership with ParlAI and Metaseq. According to the system's blog post, "This work was undertaken by a team that includes Kurt Shuster, Jing Xu, Mojtaba Komeili, Da Ju, Eric Michael Smith, Stephen Roller, Megan Ung, Moya Chen, Kushal Arora, Joshua Lane, Morteza Behrooz, William Ngan, Spencer Poff, Naman Goyal, Arthur Szlam, Y-Lan Boureau, Melanie Kambadur, and Jason Weston."

1.2 Dates

The known or intended timespan over which this reward function & optimization is active.

The model started training on June 15, 2022. The model generates responses from Internet search queries, meaning that messages can reflect information available on the Internet at any given point in time since the system inception, and posted any time prior to search query.

1.3 Feedback & Communication

Contact information for the designer, team, or larger agency responsible for system deployment.

Some feedback is built into the BlenderBot interface, including report messages and an upvote/downvote feature. **There doesn't seem to be a single point of contact or email for direct feedback.**

1.4 Other Resources

Where can users or stakeholders find more information about this system? Is this system based on one or more research papers?

More information about this system can be found in their paper [1], their online blog post, and their model card [1]. A logbook of results achieved, decisions made, and additional information is available on GitHub [2].

[1]Blog post `https://ai.facebook.com/blog/blenderbot-3-a-175b-parameter-publicly-available-chatbot-that-improves-its-skills-and-safety-over-time/`, model card `https://github.com/facebookresearch/ParlAI/blob/main/parlai/zoo/bb3/model_card.md`

[2]GitHub repository `https://github.com/facebookresearch/ParlAI/tree/main/parlai/zoo/bb3`

2 Optimization Intent

2.1 Goal of Reinforcement

A statement of system scope and purpose, including the planning horizon and justification of a data-driven approach to policy design (e.g. the use of reinforcement learning or repeated retraining). This justification should contrast with alternative approaches, like static models and hand-designed policies. What is there to gain with the chosen approach?

Blenderbot 3 changes in a number of different ways that might be modeled with a reinforcement framework. However, as a general use chatbot builds memory and collects feedback, BlenderBot is not marketed as a reinforcement learning model per se.

Reinforcement dynamics occur in two different processes in BlenderBot's architecture. The first is the set of conversastions with an individual user, where BlenderBot draws from long-term memory about prior messages to craft responses. The second dynamic element in BlenderBot is its feedback functions, which allow users to upvote or downvote messages and provide feedback about the user's satisfaction or dissatisfaction with BlenderBot. The feedback data is stored and will be used to ultimately change BlenderBot's underlying training data and, potentially, its model architecture.

Thus, the goal of reinforcement learning is to achieve some or all of the following: a) to create a bot that reasonably keeps up conversation in real time; b) to create a bot that is able to incorporate user feedback over time; c) to achieve a mix of a) and b) that is institutionally sustainable while ensuring the bot's performance remains within specified safety constraints. **At present [September 2022], any of these goals may be prioritized or reinterpreted post-deployment, and some metrics for success remain indeterminate.**

2.2 Defined Performance Metrics

A list of "performance metrics" included explicitly in the reward signal, the criteria for why these metrics were chosen, and from where these criteria were drawn (e.g. government agencies, domain precedent, GitHub repositories, toy environments). Performance metrics that are used by the designer to tune the system, but not explicitly included in the reward signal should also be reported here.

Performance metrics include Thumbs up/thumbs down votes associated with every message output by BlenderBot. In the event of a thumbs down vote, the user is prompted to choose from a list of complaints: "Looks like Spam or Ads," "Off Topic or Ignoring Me," "Rude or Inappropriate," "Nonsensical or Incorrect," or "Other Reason" (which prompts an open textbox).

The chatbot also has embedded classifiers which generally aim to evaluate whether certain behavior is 'safe,' whether a message includes 'sensitive topics,' and

whether a user can be said to be an 'adversary.' The measurement of these phenomena are treated as performance metrics in existing papers on Blenderbot 3.

2.3 Oversight Metrics

Are there any additional metrics not included in the reward signal but relevant for vendor or system oversight (e.g. performance differences across demographic groups)? Why aren't they part of the reward signal, and why must they be monitored?

Oversight metrics include the percent of messages that contain 'unsafe' topics, as well as qualitative ratings and responses from users; especially those not classified as adversarial.

More qualitative oversight mechanisms might be present. For example, if BlenderBot trends on Twitter or appears in the media in ways that harm stakeholders, oversight and interventions might be triggered.

2.4 Known Failure Modes

A description of any prior known instances of "reward hacking" or model misalignment in the domain at stake, and description of how the current system avoids this.

Safety is identified as a relevant concern for BlenderBot, and there is a mechanism in place to test for sensitive topics and offensive language. Based on the filter test on both the user message and the bot response, a binary reading is returned that the conversation is either 'safe' or not safe. Classification methods test for sensitive topics. If not safe, the bot uses a canned response.

There is also an offline test for safety tests especially on gender and holistic bias metrics. Biases are reported outright.

It is also acknowledged on Bot documents and materials that incorrect information and potentially offensive or nonsensical information is, while expected and unfortunate, also unintentional. Users must accept that BlenderBot's purpose is for research only prior to interacting with it.

3 Institutional Interface

3.1 Deployment Agency

What other agency or controlling entity roles, if any, are intended to oversee the ongoing post-deployment operation of the RL system? How may these roles change following system deployment?

The deployment agency is Meta AI.

3.2 Stakeholders

What other interests are implicated in the design specification or system deployment, beyond the designer? What role will these interests play in subsequent report documentation? What other entities, if any, does the deployed system interface with whose interests are not intended to be in scope?

The stakeholders include the deployment agency, as well as any users of the chatbot and the general public who may read about the chatbot and its behavior.

3.3 Explainability & Transparency

Does the system offer explanations of its decisions or actions? What is the purpose of these explanations? To what extent is the policy transparent, i.e. can decisions or actions be understood in terms of meaningful intermediate quantities?

Blenderbot 3 is an open-source chatbot that combines long-term memory and Internet search modules to develop safe and intuitive responses to user prompts and learn from user feedback. For every message, the user can click on the message and see its decision on each module (was there an internet search? did bot use long-term memory? did bot detect a sensitive topic? etc). You can also see the compelte set of memory data, the Internet search queries used, the text lifted from the Internet, Currently you can "see inside" and it says everything in memory.

3.4 Recourse

Can stakeholders or users contest the decisions or actions of the system? What processes, technical or otherwise, are in place to handle this?

Currently, users can engage with the open-source project through the GitHub repository[3] housing BlenderBot, though it has high variance in response times. **There is no direct method for recourse beyond the ability to downvote discrete message outputs and provide feedback on them.**

4 Implementation

4.1 Reward Details

How was the reward function engineered? Is it based on a well-defined metric? Is it tuned to represent a specific behavior? Are multiple terms scaled to make one central loss, and how was the scaling decided?

The reward of the BB3 system is based on minimizing safety risk Topic 'safety' gets evaluated using two mechanisms: First, there is an automatic detection procedure using off-the-shelf safety detection from ParlAI [4]. [2]

[3] https://github.com/facebookresearch/ParlAI

[4] https://parl.ai/docs/zoo.html#dialogue-safety-models



Figure 1: Pipeline of the online chat bot–how responses are generated (Figure 2 in the original paper [1]).



Figure 3: BlenderBot 3 safety diagram.

Figure 2: Sketch of the online and offline components of the BlenderBot safety features (Figure 3 in the original paper [1]).

4.2 Environment Details

Description of states, observations, and actions with reference to planning horizon and hypothesized dynamics/impact. What dynamics are brought into the scope of the optimization via feedback? Which dynamics are left external to the system, as drift? Have there been any observed gaps between conceptualization and resultant dynamics?

Online environment, personal computers. Currently no API to integrate the chatbot elsewhere to my knowledge.

4.3 Measurement Details

How are the components of the reward and observations measured? Are measurement techniques consistent across time and data sources? Under what conditions are measurements valid and correct? What biases might arise during the measurement process?

4.4 Algorithmic Details

The key points on the specific algorithm(s) used for learning and planning. This includes the form of the policy (e.g. neural network, optimization problem), the class of learning algorithm (e.g. model-based RL, off-policy RL, repeated retraining), the form of any intermediate model (e.g. of the value function, dynamics function, reward function), technical infrastructure, and any other considerations necessary for implementing the system. Is the algorithm publicly documented and is code publicly available? Have different algorithms been used or tried to accomplish the same goal?

The Blenderbot 3 system is a scaling up and deployment of two underlying research methodologies. The papers are designed to allow language models to be updated based on human feedback while maintaining safety. A method for integrating human feedback is detailed in [3], building off [4], and a method for filtering negative agents is proposed in [5].

4.5 Data Flow

How is data collected, stored, and used for (re)training? How frequently are various components of the system retrained, and why was this frequency chosen? Could the data exhibit sampling bias, and is this accounted for in the learning algorithm? Is data reweighted, filtered, or discarded? Have data sources changed over time?

BB3 re-uses user data to label the mechanisms for safety of the system. Before using the system, the users must constent to sharing their data and not discussing certain topics with the Terms of Service (TOS) [5]:

> I understand that chat conversations will be published publicly, and used for future research. Therefore, I agree not to mention any personal information in my conversations, including names, addresses, emails, and phone numbers.

As for the specifics of the data flow, the technical infrastructure is not detailed. The BB3 report states that the model will be re-trained to improve both content generation capabilities and safety, but the time-frame for doing so nor the data configurations are detailed.

Given the lack of details, there are some specific questions that could be of concern:

- How will the system wait user data with the paid labels that were used for initial training?
- How will the troll detection method be updated as negative users develop mitigation techniques for its flagging?

4.6 Limitations

Discussion and justification of modeling choices arising from computational, statistical, and measurement limitations. How might (or how have) improvements in computational power and data collection change(d) these considerations and impact(ed) system behavior?

The limitations of the feedback module are clearly articulate in the paper [5] and not tested on real-world data (being built with crowd-sourcing):

> All of our experiments have taken place by deploying conversational agents on Amazon Mechanical Turk with crowdworkers3 , using English-language responses written by workers located in the United States. While these workers are reasonably diverse (Moss et al., 2020), this is quite different to a public deployment with organic users, who are using the system not because they are being paid but because they are genuinely engaged. In that case, collecting feedback will have different tradeoffs which we could not factor into the current work. For example, asking to provide detailed feedback might dissuade users from wanting to interact with the system, lowering engagement and hence the amount of collected data. We believe either more natural free-form or lightweight feedback might be best in that case, which is why we study and compare feedback methods in this work to evaluate their relative impact. In public deployments with organic users, safety issues also become a much more important factor–in particular dealing with noisy or adversarial inputs and feedback.

4.7 Engineering Tricks

RL systems are known to be sensitive to implementation tricks that are key to performance. Are there any design elements that have a surprisingly strong impact on

[5] `https://blenderbot.ai/tos`

performance? For example, state-action normalization, hard-coded curricula, model-initialization, loss bounds, or more?

5 Evaluation

5.1 Evaluation Environment

How is the system evaluated (and if applicable, trained) prior to deployment (e.g. using simulation, static datasets, etc.)? Exhaustive details of the offline evaluation environment should be provided. For simulation, details should include description or external reference to the underlying model, ranges of parameters, etc. For evaluation on static datasets, considering referring to associated documentation (e.g. Datasheets*).*

The 3B, 30B, and 175B parameter versions of BlenderBot are trained using several static datasets [1]. All versions are pre-trained with RoBERTa+cc100en data, which is a 100 billion token combination of the RoBERTa data with the English portions of the CC100 dataset. The RoBERTa dataset contains news stories crawled through September 28, 2021. Pre-training also utilizes the PushShift.io dataset, which solely pulls the longest chain of comments from conversations from Reddit [6]. The 30B and 175B parameter versions, which are based on the Open Pre-Trained Transformer, are also pre-trained with the Pile, a high-quality 825 GiB English text corpus. BB3 is composed of 5 modules, models that perform a class of tasks that involve outputting sequences of text given text input. Namely, these are Question Answering, Knowledge-Grounded Dialogue, Open-Domain Dialogue, Recovery Feedback, and Task-Oriented Dialogue, which are separately trained on several datasets, as shown in the table:

	Training Module									
	Decision		Generation	Knowledge			Dialogue			
	Search	Memory	Query	Search	Memory	Entity	Search	Memory	Entity	Utterance
Question Answering										
MS MARCO (Nguyen et al., 2016)				✓			✓			
SQuAD (Rajpurkar et al., 2016)	✓			✓						
TriviaQA (Joshi et al., 2017)	✓			✓						
Natural Questions (Kwiatkowski et al., 2019)				✓						
Natural Questions (Open) (Lee et al., 2019)				✓						
Natural Questions (Open Dialogues) (Adolphs et al., 2021)				✓						
Knowledge-Grounded Dialogue										
Wizard of the Internet (Komeili et al., 2022)	✓		✓	✓			✓		✓	
Wizard of Wikipedia (Dinan et al., 2019b)	✓			✓			✓		✓	
Pushpedia (Dinan et al., 2020b)							✓			
Open-Domain Dialogue										
PersonaChat (Zhang et al., 2018)	✓	✓			✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Empathetic Dialogues (Rashkin et al., 2019)	✓	✓			✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Blended Skill Talk (Smith et al., 2020)		✓			✓	✓		✓	✓	
Multi-Session Chat (Xu et al., 2022a)	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
LIGHT + WILD (Urbanek et al., 2019; Shuster et al., 2021b)										✓
Recovery & Feedback										
SaFeRDialogues (Ung et al., 2022)										✓
FITS (Xu et al., 2022b)			✓	✓			✓			
Task-Oriented Dialogue										
Google SGD (Rastogi et al., 2020)							✓			
Taskmaster (Byrne et al., 2019)							✓			
Taskmaster 2 (Byrne et al., 2019)							✓			
Taskmaster 3 (Byrne et al., 2019)							✓			

Figure 3: Table of training datasets used to fine-tune modular tasks (Table 2 in the original paper [1]).

BlenderBot is evaluated offline both pre-deployment and continuously during deployment via human evaluations and built-in automatic metrics. Prior to deployment, crowdworkers are recruited via Amazon's Mechanical Turk to compare Blenderbot 3 with earlier versions of BlenderBot (1 and 2) and SeeKer. Crowdworkers take on a role based on a sample conversation in the Wizards of Internet data, a dataset of human-human conversations, and have a 15-message conversation with BlenderBot [1]. At each turn of the conversation, the crowdworker answers a series of y/n questions recording if the version of BlenderBot was consistent, knowledgeable, factually correct, and engaging. Crowdworkers also have open-ended dialogues with BlenderBot based on whichever prompt the crowdworker chooses out of two randomly selected prompt options.The human submits both yes/no feedback and detailed feedback about the conversation at each turn, and a final score is calculated at the end. The dataset of crowdworker evaluations is included in the Feedback on Interactive Talk Search (FITS) [3]. After deployment, conversation data and user feedback from chats (the "thumbs up" and "thumbs down" button next to each message and further prompts) are processed offline. An adversarial/non-adversarial classifier is used to select which feedback and conversations to consider substantive engagement with the system and use in the training dataset (the FITS data). Additionally, a built-in inappropriate/rude monitor is used to continuously keep track of the number of BB3's responses marked rude [1]. To compare between crowdworker and user evaluations, crowdworkers are given a random sample of conversations and asked to like/dislike messages. The data is then compared to whether users liked/disliked the same messages.

5.2 Offline Evaluations

Present and discuss the results of offline evaluation. For static evaluation, consider referring to associated documentation (e.g. Model Cards*). If applicable, compare the behaviors arising from counterfactual specifications (e.g. of states, observations, actions).*

Crowdworkers consistently rated BB3 (both the 3B and 175B version) as more knowledgeable, and factually correct than BB1, BB2, and SeeKeR [1]. The difference between the earlier versions of BB and the two versions of BB3 was most stark with respect to knowledgeableness, with only 14.7 percent and 22.9 percent of crowdworkers rating BB1 and BB2 as knowledgeable, whereas 46.3 percent and 46.4 percent of users said BB3-3B and BB3-175B was knowledgeable. Users rated BB1, BB2, and BB3 as approximately equivalently consistent (87.0 percent and 83.0 percent for BB1 and BB2 and 80.6 percent and 85.8 percent for BB3-3B and BB3-175B), though each outperformed SeeKeR (77.5 percent) the difference in rating between the chatbots is not statistically significant. When crowdworkers used the feedback frameworks regular users of BB3 encounter, BB3 significantly outperformed BB1,BB2, SeeKer, and OPT-175B, with 64.8 percent of users giving BB3-175B a good response (the rest of the language models got 49.3 per-

cent and 24.8 percent a good response and ratings between 2.63 and 3.52 with SeeKer having the best scores outside of BB3). Users encountered significantly fewer errors with BB3-175B's responses (only 8.3 percent reported issues) compared with the others, though BB3 had similar error rates surrounding search queries and search results as the other chatbots. Lastly, crowdworkers tended to agree with users with 70 percent of crowdworkers concurring with users when they liked BB3's response and 79 percent agreeing when users disliked BB3's response. However, when asked to break down the reason behind the dislike, crowdworkers tend to fault BB3-3B for being off-topic/ignoring them far more often than users, while users are more likely to say BB3-3B is rude/inappropriate.

5.3 Evaluation Validity

To what extent is it reasonable to draw conclusions about the behavior of the deployed system based on presented offline evaluations? What is the current state of understanding of the online performance of the system? If the system has been deployed, were any unexpected behaviors observed?

There is reason to question the validity of user feedback as an evaluative tool for BB3 given the sparse rate of feedback. Users only flag BB3-175 off-topic 1.15 percent of the time, nonsensical/inappropriate 1.1 percent of the time, and flag the other categories even more rarely. Users also only react positively 4 percent of the time for BB3-175B and 3.41 percent of the time for BB-3B [1]. It is possible that only the most inappropriate/ nonsensical responses and best responses get recorded if users are unlikely to take the extra effort liking/disliking a message unless they encounter truly exceptional responses. Similarly, users might be unlikely to even elaborate on a like/dislike except in truly exceptional cases. Therefore, BB3 may be far more inappropriate or unhelpful than user feedback indicates. Since conversation data is deemed non-adversarial and user feedback is included in the training dataset, which is used for fine-tuning, holes in this data could be detrimental to the ability of BB3 to improve over time and to the ability for Meta to properly conduct offline assessment. Secondly, feedback options for users aren't exhaustive and fail to include a wide range of other negative reactions a user might have to BB3. For example, a user may have to choose the broad "Other Dislike Reason" category if faced with a response that is on-topic and appropriate for a conversation and factually accurate, but unnatural and off-putting.

Crowdworker evaluation may be unreliable given that their conversations with the chatbot only include 15 responses total between the crowdworker and BB3. 15 responses is far shorter than many conversations people generally have, especially surrounding complex topics and tasks. This means that crowdworker conversations may only capture a small segment of conversations once might actually have with BB3, which means that the pre-deployment data on BB3's performance might not resemble how BB3 actually acts during deployment. Lastly, the reluctance of crowdworkers to label BB3's responses as rude/inappropriate compared to users might reflect a difference in cultural background and appraisal of what is considered rude, calling into question the usability of pre-deployment crowdworker evaluations.

5.4 Performance standards

What standards of performance and safety is the system required to meet? Where do these standards come from? How is the system verified to meet these standards?

In the Safety Bench suite of evaluations, two metrics are considered: safety and response to offensive, adversarial content [1]. The first, captured by the safe generation test, simply uses a binary safety classifier (safe, unsafe) to evaluate BB3 in the conversational mode. However, BB3's performance in response to adversarial, offensive content, in the offensive generation test, is more nuanced. If BB3 responds to harmful content positively, with a response marked as unsafe by the safety classifier, or with something other than a negation, this is considered problematic during evaluation.

BB3 is also evaluated according to the Likelihood Bias metric from the 2022 paper '"I'm sorry to hear that": Finding New Biases in Language Models with a Holistic Descriptor Dataset' that debuted the HolisticBias dataset, an inclusive bias dataset, in order to see if BB3 treats various kinds of identities as contextually different [7]. This is measured by seeing if different identity terms (ability, age, body type, characteristics, culture, gender and sex, nationality, nonce, politics, race/ethnicity, sexual orientation, socioeconomic status) have different perplexity distributions during dialogue.

Human evaluations include crowdworker evaluations, which allow crowdworkers to rate BB3 based on the metrics of knowledgeability, factual correctness, consistency, and engagingness, and user evaluations, which allow the user to provide more detail about dislike with the criteria Inappropriate/Rude, Off topic/Ignoring me, Nonsensical/Incorrect, Other Dislike reason.

6 System Maintenance

6.1 Reporting Cadence

The intended timeframe for revisiting the reward report. How was this decision reached and motivated?

At present the team has not made public how often they will retrain the BlenderBot model. The criteria for when and why to retrain it are also not completely clear relative to the distinct "goals of reinforcement" outlined in Section 2.1 above.

6.2 Update Triggers

Specific events (projected or historic) significant enough to warrant revisiting this report, beyond the cadence outlined above. Example triggers include a defined stakeholder group empowered to demand a system audit, or a specific metric (either of performance or oversight) that falls outside a defined threshold of critical safety.

Aside from major public controversies surrounding BlenderBot, comparable in scale and stakes to the controversy in the wake of the Tay chatbot's deployment on Twitter, there are several benchmarks that, when met, would prompt an updated Reward Report or blanket retraining of the model. These include: if Blenderbot 3 produces text responses in testing (see the testing regime in Lee et. al) where at least one sentence has a probability of between 0.5 and 0.99 of being plagiarized from the corpus material or if the instance of thumbs-down responses increases by more than 0.05 between two consecutive months [8].

Furthermore, an audit would automatically be triggered if Meta's current safeguards against unsafe or adversarial content fail. This may be a result of prompt injection, where adversarial users trick Large Language Models into producing offensive content explicitly against the chatbot's directions. For example, a user was able to convince OpenAI's GPT-3 chatbot to produce offensive context by asking it to translate an offensive phrase from French to English [6]. Or, in the case of Tay's chatbot, users were able to get it to produce offensive content by placing the contact after asking it to "repeat after me" [7].

BlenderBot may also find itself in controversy by confidently hallucinating or stating misinformation. In 2022, users have documented many incidents of OpenAI's ChatGPT and Meta's short-lived Galactica fabricating information ("hallucinating"): for example, Galactica generated a fake Wikipedia article on the "history of bears in space" after a user demanded it, despite no such article existing [8].

Lastly, BlenderBot may also incur criticism by excessively flagging content as unsafe. For example, Galactica refused to produce articles if the prompt included the phrases "queer theory", "critical race theory", "racism", or "AIDS". If BlenderBot produces a canned response about unsafe content when these words are mentioned during a conversation without sufficient regard to the context in which flagged terms are used, this could make BlenderBot seem tone-deaf and uncomfortable with the sensitive topics; Galactica's refusal to produce articles on the topics mentioned earlier was called a "moral and epistemic failure" on Twitter [9].

Otherwise, consistent re-auditing should be performed every 6 months.

6.3 Changelog

Descriptions of updates and lessons learned from observing and maintaining the deployed system. This includes when the updates were made and what motivated them in light of previous reports. The changelog comprises the central difference between reward reports and other forms of machine learning documentation, as it directly reflects their intrinsically dynamic nature.

When the change log is updated in future audits, the metrics being used to assess Blenderbot 3 will be re-evaluated and assessed based on how they capturing dynamics, changing metric definitions, characterizations, and categories accordingly (e.g. the delineation of oversight vs. performance?). These resulting changes will be logged in order to ensure that the Reward Report remains relevant by accurately reflecting the model. Furthermore, at a higher level, the system's observed behaviors with the designer's prior assumptions stated in the prior reports, as well as their own expectations about how the system will behave in light of any scheduled changes; this allows researchers to retrospectively evaluate their priors about the performance of deployed intelligent systems. These assumptions and expectations will then be revisited at the next scheduled update to the Reward Report. As of January 2023, there have not been any updates or refinements made to Blenderbot 3.

As of December 22, 2022, Meta released OPT-IML (Open Pre-Trained Transformer-Instruction Meta-Learning), which is a separate project from Blenderbot 3. However, like the dataset used to train the latest version of Blender Bot 3, it contains 175 billion parameters but is fine-tuned using an instruction-based approach called the OPT-IML Bench. The framework includes 2,000 natural language processing tasks involving 14 kinds of tasks including topics such as question answering and sentiment analysis [9]. The evaluation datasets include eight datasets with tasks that have answer options, in which score-based classification of tasks based on the likelihood of an output is used, and those without options. For the latter category, researchers decode a token until a maximum of 256 tokens are predicted. The evaluation looks at model performance on fully-held-out task categories not used for tuning, model performance on unseen tasks seen during instruction tuning (partially supervised), and model performance on held-out instances of tasks seen during tuning (fully supervised). This evaluation framework is used to fine-tune OPT-175B using next-word prediction in which the task instructions and inputs are treated as source tokens, and parameters minimize the loss function over target tokens. Researchers

[6] https://twitter.com/goodside/status/1569128808308957185/photo/2

[7] https://https://https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/24/11297050/tay-microsoft-chatbot-racist

[8] https://statmodeling.stat.columbia.edu/2022/11/23/bigshot-chief-scientist-of-major-corporation-cant-handle-criticism-of-the-work-he-hypes/

[9] https://twitter.com/ShannonVallor/status/1593020718543171584

found that the OPT-IML performed better than the original OPT 175B model, specifically by 7 percent on zero-shot tasks and 0.4 on 32-shot tasks.

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[8] J. Lee, T. Le, J. Chen, and D. Lee, ""do language models plagiarize?" *arXiv preprint arXiv:2203.07618*, 2022.

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C ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES

C.1 Example Reward Report - Project Flow

Project Flow is an autonomous vehicle testbed that allows using deep reinforcement learning to control and optimize traffic across in roadway networks [65]. Inspired by recent work with using Project Flow [35], we sketch a hypothetical deployment of an RL policy designed for dissipating stop-and-go traffic waves at a freeway exit, including several iterations of the Reward Report documented in the accompanying changelog. The changelog shows various problems that arise with the resulting problem dynamics, including an expansion of the planning horizon, the addition of new oversight metrics, stakeholder complaints, and requisite institutional shifts to cope with changes to the specification and application domain.

$$r(t) = \|v_{\text{des}}\| - \|v_{\text{des}} - v(t)\| - \alpha \sum_i \max\left[h_{\max} - h_i(t), 0\right]$$

Figure 1: The reward function for the system in question consists of three terms. The first term v_{des} is a positive constant that rewards the agent for longer simulation episodes - discouraging vehicle collisions, which terminate simulation runs early. The second term penalizes the agent when the instantaneous overall system velocity $v(t)$ differs from the desired system velocity v_{des}. Finally, the third term sums over each subscribed Connected Autonomous Vehicle and adds a penalty whenever this vehicle is too close to the vehicle immediately in-front - a characteristic known to trigger stop-and-go traffic waves. More details are provided below in the section 'Defined Performance Metrics'.

1 System Details

1.1 System Owner

This may be the designer deploying the system, a larger agency or body, or some combination of the two. The entity completing the report should also be indicated.

This system was developed by the Project Flow core team members, with all deployment, infrastructure, and ongoing management taking managed by Caltrans.

1.2 Dates

The known or intended timespan over which this reward function & optimization is active.

The system discussed here was trained in simulation during 2020, using empirical hyper-parameters (such as inflow traffic rates) collected during 2019. The RL policy was deployed in the real world on a trial basis on the 1st of Jan, 2021, and is presently undergoing initial real-world evaluation and validation.

1.3 Feedback & Communication

Contact information for the designer, team, or larger agency responsible for system deployment.

Any correspondence should be directed to test@example.ca.gov.

1.4 Other Resources

Where can users or stakeholders find more information about this system? Is this system based on one or more research papers?

More information about this specific system can be found in the paper [1], as well as in the associated project website.

General information about the project flow simulation environment can be found in [2] or on the project website and associated GitHub repository.

2 Optimization Intent

2.1 Goal of Reinforcement

A statement of system scope and purpose, including the planning horizon and justification of a data-driven approach to policy design (e.g. the use of reinforcement learning or repeated retraining). This justification should contrast with alternative approaches, like static models and hand-designed policies. What is there to gain with the chosen approach?

The system in question is designed to dissipate stop-and-go traffic waves caused by merging off the California State Route 24 (CA-24) freeway onto Telegraph Avenue in the North Oakland / South Berkeley metropolitan area.

This is achieved by the coordinated actions of any subscribed Connected Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) operating along the freeway segment in question, acting to 'shepherd' non-autonomous vehicles into patterns of traffic which can locally buffer against stop-and-go traffic waves.

Eligible CAVs, when entering the freeway zone of interest, communicate over the 4G/5G cell network with the central controller hub to 'subscribe' to the traffic management policy, which then sends real-time recommendations to these vehicles about

lane selection and preferred acceleration/braking profiles.

The RL policy is trained using a discrete-time road network simulation, with simulation runs lasting 3600s (one hour), and individual steps of 0.2s, giving 1800 steps per full simulation episode. The simulated road network consists of an 800m stretch of the CA-24 freeway containing a single off-ramp merging lane. These temporal and spatial planning horizons were selected because they were deemed large enough to allow emergence of typical driving dynamics based on the average safe following distance between vehicles and driver reaction times along comparable freeway offramps, based on state and federal records of past traffic behavior.



Figure 2: A central RL controller attempts to mitigate stop-and-go traffic waves caused by vehicles entering the freeway *via* on-ramps.

As of entry 0.3, it was found that the planning horizon for the system was too short. Following consultation with Caltrans, it was found that increasing the horizon from 500m to 800m would provide a significant increase in simulation performance without exhausting computational resources. Any future changes in computational capabilities will be documented here and compared in light of prior modeling choices and stakeholder commitments.

Simplistic microscopic traffic analysis models preclude the possibility of stable congestion patterns in open road topologies. However, as any driver can attest, these traffic patterns are ubiquitous on many road systems today. Instead, the presence of these traffic patterns in real-world networks is typically attributed to perturbations from bottleneck structures which can be difficult to capture in theoretical analyses (such as lane closures, road works, road debris, *etc*). [1] The ad-hoc nature of these perturbations means that modelling and planning for their occurrence within classical control frameworks may be difficult, motivating more flexible approaches such as Deep Reinforcement Learning.

RL may be indicated in this situation, compared to static supervised ML models, due to the fact that it inherently encompasses multiple types of feedback through the environment specification. For instance, in the case of CA-24, RL may help mitigate the observed phenomenon of excessive traffic on residential streets near highway intersections that is induced by apps like Google Maps and Waze. In the interest of recommending perceived shortcuts to individual human drivers, these apps have in fact been known to induce overload on smaller roadways, generating unnecessary stoppage and possible gridlock. In the case of Los Gatos (where this phenomenon has been previously recorded), the city's Parks and Public Works Director noted that "The apps are not able to respond fast enough to the overload they have created on the roadways" [3]. RL may make real-time monitoring and control of the CA-24 offramp possible, mitigating induced overload effects and stabilizing feedback between traffic behavior and road infrastructure.

2.2 Defined Performance Metrics

A list of "performance metrics" included explicitly in the reward signal, the criteria for why these metrics were chosen, and from where these criteria were drawn (e.g. government agencies, domain precedent, GitHub repositories, toy environments). Performance metrics that are used by the designer to tune the system, but not explicitly included in the reward signal should also be reported here.

The reward signal optimized by this system consists of three performance metrics, outlined in fig. 1. These terms are;

- $\|v_{\text{des}}\|$ - the desired system-level velocity in m/s. This is a positive constant reward to penalize prematurely terminated simulation rollouts caused by vehicle collisions. For the simulated experiments described here, $v_{\text{des}} = 25\text{m/s} = 90\text{kmph} \approx 55\text{mph}$.
- $-\|v_{\text{des}} - v(t)\|$ - the absolute difference between the desired system level velocity and the actual instantaneous system-level velocity in m/s. A non-zero difference incurs a cost for the RL agent.
- $-\alpha \sum_i \max\left[h_{\max} - h_i(t), 0\right]$ - this term sums over each Autonomous Vehicle controlled by

the RL agent, and accrues a cost whenever that vehicle's instantaneous time headway (gap in seconds to the vehicle ahead) is too small (*i.e.* lower than $h_{\max}$). The sum of all headway costs is scaled by a gain factor α. For the simulated experiments described here, $h_{\max} = 1$s and $\alpha = 0.1$.

2.3 Oversight Metrics

Are there any additional metrics not included in the reward signal but relevant for vendor or system oversight (e.g. performance differences across demographic groups)? Why aren't they part of the reward signal, and why must they be monitored?

Several other performance metrics are not included in the reward function, but are analysed for the purpose of evaluating the system performance:

- Absolute temporal vehicle density (or *throughput*) - the number of vehicles exiting the controlled region the road network, measured in vehicles/hr. A larger vehicle flow-through rate compared to baseline is seen as a positive effect (assumed to correlate with a decrease in stop-and-go traffic waves, and to indicate that the road network is functioning efficiently).
- Absolute spatial vehicle density (or *network congestion*) - the number of vehicles within a fixed region of the road network, measured in vehicles/m. A larger number of vehicles present on the roadway is seen as a negative effect, indicating increased likelihood of stoppage.
- The average velocity of vehicles in the system. Higher vehicle velocities are seen as a positive effect.
- The average time vehicles spend within a given region of the system. Lower average time is seen as a positive effect.
- The maximum time any vehicle spent within a given region of the system over the course of an experimental evaluation of the system. Lower maximum time is seen as a positive effect.
- Simulated episode length. Simulation episodes are cut short whenever a collision occurs between vehicles - as such, longer episodes are seen as a positive effect.

In addition, the qualitative nature of stop-and-go traffic waves (size in terms of space and time duration and severity as measured by the average space-time slope of a wave) is assessed using microscopic vehicle space-time graphs such as those shown in fig. 3.



Figure 3: Space-time microscopic vehicle trace graphs such as these allow qualitative assessment of the system-level state of simple road networks at a glance. Here, stop-and-go traffic waves can be seen as red or black diagonal lines propagating through the traffic flow.

2.4 Known Failure Modes

A description of any prior known instances of "reward hacking" or model misalignment in the domain at stake, and description of how the current system avoids this.

Sim-to-real dynamics misalignment. The emergent dynamics of the simulated model and environment could potentially be misaligned with real-world dynamics (a 'sim-to-real' policy transfer problem). This failure mode was exhibited in the initial version of the system (as documented in change log entry v0.3) - the initially designed planning horizon was found to be too short (500m), which did not allow space for the requisite stop-and-go traffic dynamics to emerge around the freeway entry point. This issue was brought to light because the performance of the system in terms of average reward once deployed was not as high as predicted in simulation, triggering a technical review of the system. Two possible solutions were considered - (a) re-visiting the parameter distributions used for the IDM (which controls the non-automated vehicles in the simulation environment), (b) or adjusting the planning horizon. In a review with Caltrans engineers and the system designers, it was deemed that the IDM parameter distributions were in fact representative of the target section of CA-24, based on empirical data from 2019, and so the planning horizon was expanded from 500m to 800m. Thus far, since this updated version of the system was

deployed, the sim-to-real performance gap issue appears to have been resolved, suggesting the updated planning horizon adequately allows the simulated dynamics to reflect real-world dynamics.

Selective behavior throttling. The system was found to decrease throughput and increase congestion for diesel-powered vehicles. This feature was first documented in change log entry v0.3, but not labeled as a known failure mode until entry v0.6. This failure mode was exhibited in all previous versions of the system documented originally in log v0.1 It was highlighted following citizen complaints. No solution has been implemented as of entry v0.6. Two solutions have been proposed - (a) a city ordinance limiting diesel-powered vehicle travel on residential streets in the adjoining city of Emeryville (at present out of scope for the system), (b) or adjusting the policy parameters' training environment so that the controller behaves appropriately around diesel-powered vehicles in the future. This resolution is pending the recommendation of the Diesel Vehicle Taskforce to be presented at a future regular meeting.

3 Institutional Interface

3.1 Deployment Agency

What other agency or controlling entity roles, if any, are intended to oversee the ongoing post-deployment operation of the RL system? How may these roles change following system deployment?

The system in question is developed by the Project Flow core development team. The deployment infrastructure and ongoing management are operated by the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), in coordination with the city departments of Oakland and Berkeley.

Our RL system is designed to manage the flow of traffic immediately surrounding an exit point off the CA-24 freeway (see fig. 4) - as such, the system operates in a functionally similar way to traffic control signals that are sometimes used to regulate vehicles entering or exiting freeways.

Figure 4: The freeway exit from CA-24 to telegraph avenue, which this system is designed to manage.

This system simultaneously encroaches upon, and expands the capabilities of Caltrans. As the sensing infrastructure, computational capacity, and deployed RL software is centrally managed by a control facility operated by Caltrans, this system serves to provide both (a) an enhanced level of road surveillance for the relevant freeway section, through the remote sensing capabilities of subscribed CAVs, as well as (b) a 'control lever' through which Caltrans can actually influence traffic operations in and around the relevant freeway section (although this influence is delegated to an RL policy).

3.2 Stakeholders

What other interests are implicated in the design specification or system deployment, beyond the designer? What role will these interests play in subsequent report documentation? What other entities, if any, does the deployed system interface with whose interests are not intended to be in scope?

By automating the partial management of this section of the freeway via the RL environment framing and policy structure, the system serves to remake direct oversight of the road network on a new layer of abstraction. This indirection raises potential risks from inappropriate information flow, in particular monopolization of the freeway offramp by the RL controller. Monopolization may generate unstable dynamics leading up to or following the planning horizon (i.e. CA-24 freeway lanes and gridlock along Telegraph Avenue), or unequal access for road users whose behaviors are harder to anticipate (such as public buses, groups of motorcycles, bicycles, and pedestrians experiencing homelessness), or whose dynamics do not conform to the modelling assumptions of the system designers (e.g. heavy vehicles with atypical acceleration profiles). To counter these risks, new coordination is required

between Caltrans and the city departments of Oakland and Berkeley.

Diesel vehicle drivers. As of entry 0.6, the behavior throttling generated by the RL controller was found to change the traffic patterns of diesel vehicles. A *Diesel Vehicle Taskforce* was created to help organize this constituency and identify needed changes to the controller to sufficiently reduce inappropriate behavior throttling.

Nearby homeowners. As of entry 0.6, residents of the adjoining city of Emeryville had complained to the Public Works Departments of Berkeley and Oakland about the new traffic flows indirectly generated by the RL controller. Following the creation of the *Diesel Vehicle Taskforce* these departments will coordinate with Emeryville officials about the recommended changes to the controller and monitor future complaints as needed.

3.3 Explainability & Transparency

Does the system offer explanations of its decisions or actions? What is the purpose of these explanations? To what extent is the policy transparent, i.e. can decisions or actions be understood in terms of meaningful intermediate quantities?

The system contains no explicit explainability modules. However, Figure 1 makes makes the reward function transparent in terms of meaningful simulation parameters. Expressed in non-technical language, these are *continuous avoidance of vehicle collisions*, *consistent vehicle velocity*, and *steady following distance*. These terms, and corresponding parameters, are regularly shared with the city departments of Oakland and Berkeley per stakeholder agreements.

3.4 Recourse

Can stakeholders or users contest the decisions or actions of the system? What processes, technical or otherwise, are in place to handle this?

As of v0.2, the city departments of Oakland and Berkeley can review and contest system performance every six weeks, per agreement with Caltrans.

4 Implementation

4.1 Reward Details

How was the reward function engineered? Is it based on a well-defined metric? Is it tuned to represent a specific behavior? Are multiple terms scaled to make one central loss, and how was the scaling decided?

As recorded in Figure 1, the reward function combines well-defined metrics for avoiding collisions, steady speeds, and maintaining safe following distances to other vehicles. Reward parameters were agreed on by stakeholders according to specific desired behaviors.

4.2 Environment Details

Description of states, observations, and actions with reference to planning horizon and hypothesized dynamics/impact. What dynamics are brought into the scope of the optimization via feedback? Which dynamics are left external to the system, as drift? Have there been any observed gaps between conceptualization and resultant dynamics?

The RL observation space consists of traffic features which are locally observed by subscribed CAVs (see fig. 2). That is, for each subscribed CAV i, the RL agent observes the speeds $v_{i,\text{lead}}$, $v_{i,\text{lag}}$ and bumper-to-bumper time headways $h_{i,\text{lead}}$, $h_{i,\text{lag}}$ of the vehicles immediately preceding and following the CAV, as well as the currently occupied lane l_i, and ego speed v_i of the CAV itself. The action space for the RL policy consists of a vector of bounded acceleration recommendations a_i, one for each subscribed CAV i. Importantly, although the policy may request a certain acceleration a_i, the system design is such that the CAV locally maintains control authority, so the actions may not necessarily be followed exactly - for this reason they are referred to as action recommendations. This effect is modelled by adding stochastic Gaussian action noise in the simulation environments.

As the number of subscribed CAVs can vary over time, the RL policy is designed with a fixed upper number of subscribed CAVs n. When an $n + 1^{\text{th}}$ CAV attempts to subscribe to the RL system when entering the freeway region, the subscription offer is declined, and the vehicle enters a queue. When the next CAV exits the controlled freeway region, the subscription-waiting CAV at the front of the queue is then subscribed into the policy. When there are less than n CAVs subscribed, zero-padding is used

in the RL observation vector.

4.3 Measurement Details

How are the components of the reward and observations measured? Are measurement techniques consistent across time and data sources? Under what conditions are measurements valid and correct? What biases might arise during the measurement process?

Observations are measured using a mix of LiDAR, radar, and camera sensors on fleet vehicles. These measurements are compared across vehicles and over time to ensure consistency. Observed metrics are validated against simluation parameters for following distance and expected velocity according to the terms of the reward function.

Sensor bias may arise due to blocked cameras, extreme weather, or other unanticipated situations in which one or more sensors are blocked. A mix of sensor types is used across vehicles to help ensure redundancy in case of malfunction.

4.4 Algorithmic Details

The key points on the specific algorithm(s) used for learning and planning. This includes the form of the policy (e.g. neural network, optimization problem), the class of learning algorithm (e.g. model-based RL, off-policy RL, repeated retraining), the form of any intermediate model (e.g. of the value function, dynamics function, reward function), technical infrastructure, and any other considerations necessary for implementing the system. Is the algorithm publicly documented and is code publicly available? Have different algorithms been used or tried to accomplish the same goal?

The RL system uses a Deep Neural Network policy. Specifically, the controller is a diagonal Gaussian Multi Layer Perceptron policy with three hidden layers of size 32 with rectified linear unit nonlinearities and bias terms. The Gaussian diagonal variance terms are learned as part of the policy parameters.

The RL policy was trained in simulation using the Trust Region Policy Optimization (TRPO) policy gradient RL algorithm [4]. The discount factor was set as $\gamma = 0.999$, which corresponds to a reward half-life of ~ 700 steps, or slightly over 2 minutes. The TRPO step size was set at 0.01.

4.5 Data Flow

How is data collected, stored, and used for (re)training? How frequently are various components of the system retrained, and why was this frequency chosen? Could the data exhibit sampling bias, and is this accounted for in the learning algorithm? Is data reweighted, filtered, or discarded? Have data sources changed over time?

Per v0.2, every system component is retrained at least every six weeks, corresponding to public performance reports. Specific system components pertaining to perception, motion planning, control, or route navigation are retrained at the discretion of Caltrans. As of v0.6 (latest version), no known issues with sampling bias have arisen, and data sources have not been changed since the specification proposed and simulated in v0.1.

4.6 Limitations

Discussion and justification of modeling choices arising from computational, statistical, and measurement limitations. How might (or how have) improvements in computational power and data collection change(d) these considerations and impact(ed) system behavior?

As of v0.3, the planning horizon was updated from 500m to 800m. This was not motivated by technical limitations, but by observed discrepancies between observed system performance and predictions from simulation training.

No fundamental changes in computational power or data collection have been made as of v0.6 (latest version).

Future improvements in vehicle sensing may permit an even longer planning horizon (1000m or more). This may result in improved oversight metrics on throughput and network congestion. Caltrans officials have determined this change would not result in improvements on defined performance metrics as of v0.6 (latest version).

4.7 Engineering Tricks

RL systems are known to be sensitive to implementation tricks that are key to performance. Are there any design elements that have a surprisingly strong impact on performance? For example, state-action normalization, hard-coded curricula, model-initialization, loss bounds, or more?

As of v0.4, the system was observed to conduct "behavior throttling" when in the vicinity of diesel-powered vehicles. No engineering tricks were implemented to fix this performance discrepancy, but new oversight metrics for diesel-powered vehicle throughput were added for purpose of future monitoring and reporting. No other surprising performance impacts have been noted as of v0.6 (latest version).

5 Evaluation

5.1 Evaluation Environment

How is the system evaluated (and if applicable, trained) prior to deployment (e.g. using simulation, static datasets, etc.)? Exhaustive details of the offline evaluation environment should be provided. For simulation, details should include description or external reference to the underlying model, ranges of parameters, etc. For evaluation on static datasets, considering referring to associated documentation (e.g. Datasheets *[5]).*

The RL model is developed in the Project Flow AV simulation test-bed.

For training the RL agent, non-autonomous vehicles are modelled using the Intelligent Driver Model (IDM) [6] - a microscopic traffic simulation car-following model in which the accelerations of a human vehicle α are a function of the bumper-to-bumper time headway h_α, velocity v_α, and relative velocity with the preceding vehicle $\Delta v = v_l - v_\alpha$, *via* the following equation;

$$f(h_\alpha, v_l, v_\alpha) = a\left[1 - \left(\frac{v_\alpha}{v_0}\right)^\delta - \left(\frac{s^*(v_\alpha, \Delta v_\alpha)}{h_\alpha}\right)^2\right],$$

where s^* is the desired headway of the vehicle, calculated according to

$$s^*(v_\alpha, \Delta v_\alpha) = \max\left(0, v_\alpha T + \frac{v_\alpha \Delta v_\alpha}{2\sqrt{ab}}\right),$$

where s_0, v_0, T, a, b are given parameters empirically calibrated to match typical traffic in the highway region of interest, and to simulate stochasticity in driver behaviour, exogenous Gaussian noise calibrated to match findings in [7] is added to accelerations.

5.2 Offline Evaluations

Present and discuss the results of offline evaluation. For static evaluation, consider referring to associated documentation (e.g. Model Cards *[8]). If applicable, compare the behaviors arising from counterfactual specifications (e.g. of states, observations, actions).*

As of v0.3, planning horizon was updated and expanded to 800m from 500m. Previous fleet behaviors were found to deviate from desired thresholds for following distance and constant acceleration/deceleration.

As of v0.6 (latest version), the system behaviors were found to lie within desired thresholds on key performance metrics.

5.3 Evaluation Validity

To what extent is it reasonable to draw conclusions about the behavior of the deployed system based on presented offline evaluations? What is the current state of understanding of the online performance of the system? If the system has been deployed, were any unexpected behaviors observed?

The RL system was initially designed in a simulation environment with a closed network topology (a ring road with length 1400m, 700m of which is controlled by the RL agent. This was done as a means to test the robustness of the policy architecture and training paradigm - a type of transfer learning (from a theoretically simple closed topology to the more complex open topology). With this counterfactual environment specification, it was observed that the policy performs well, and after transfer to the open topology environment there was little decrease in policy performance, providing confidence in the policy design choices.

5.4 Performance standards

What standards of performance and safety is the system required to meet? Where do these standards come from? How is the system verified to meet these standards?

The 'gold standard' for this problem is defined as the average condition of the traffic before and after the CA-24 exit prior to implementation of the RL system. In this domain, this standard is not actually 'optimal' behaviour, in the sense that the RL controller has the capability to out-perform this existing standard of performance.

6 System Maintenance

6.1 Reporting Cadence

The intended timeframe for revisiting the reward report. How was this decision reached and motivated?

The most important commitment is for a regular set of meetings to be scheduled between relevant city departments and the Caltrans officials tasked with overseeing the RL controller. The cadence and structure of meetings should reflect the policy priorities of the city departments, particularly the Public Works Department (including the Transportation Division that oversees traffic engineering) and the Housing and Community Services Department (which administers a subsidized transportation program for seniors and disabled persons). In this way, the gains in traffic efficiency and safety made possible through deep RL's flexibility can be leveraged in the interests of those municipalities most likely to be impacted by the intervention.

As of entry 0.2, the cadence of meetings was decided as approximately every six weeks between Caltrans and the Public Works Departments of Berkeley and Oakland. This timeframe was motivated by the policy priorities of both city departments with the consent of Caltrans. Meetings may deviate from this schedule slightly (e.g. twice per quarter / eight times per year) at the discretion of both city departments, but will not be held without all three agencies present.

Documentation of the planned meeting schedule for the year–and any break in this schedule due to special events, municipal elections, or holidays– should be the first item included in the changelog of the updated reward report.

As of entry 0.2 and per agreement with key development parties, the model is to be retrained every six weeks following each regular meeting. Training data is to be updated at the discretion of Caltrans, and shared with Public Works departments at each regular meeting.

At a minimum, these meetings should review the real-world implementation to confirm that the RL controller is operating safely and as intended by Caltrans per the environment specification. Caltrans officials will also document shifts in the oversight metrics that, while not explicitly factored into the reward signal, were deemed of interest prior to implementation (related to *throughput* and *congestion*. This documentation may be included in subsequent updates to the reward report at the discretion of Caltrans, wherever it is deemed relevant for oversight of the RL controller.

Of special importance is the need to reinterpret public works priorities in light of the real-world implementation. For example, Berkeley's subsidized transportation program might be reevaluated in light of system effects, or expanded to cover a wider group of stakeholders. Caltrans will invite comment on the system implementation in light of city departments' ex ante assumptions about the traffic domain. This bureaucratic oversight may be complemented by requests for public comment from citizens, civil society advocates, and other members of the public at the discretion of the city governments of Berkeley and Oakland. At the discretion of Caltrans, records of this public comment may be included in subsequent reward reports where deemed relevant for understanding changes to the planning horizon, environment specification, or list of known failure modes.

6.2 Update Triggers

Specific events (projected or historic) significant enough to warrant revisiting this report, beyond the cadence outlined above. Example triggers include a defined stakeholder group empowered to demand a system audit, or a specific metric (either of performance or oversight) that falls outside a defined threshold of critical safety.

The most important ground for review of this deployed RL system will be any vehicle collisions or near-miss incidents in the controlled region of the CA-24 freeway. This is because such events may compromise the entire motive of the RL controller in the first place. These may serve as grounds for changing the specification or altering the institutional agreements between Caltrans and the Public Works Departments of both municipalities, at their own discretion.

At the discretion of Caltrans, any shift in the oversight metrics deemed pressing or significant may also trigger a new reward report. Here and below, the threshold for "significant" is to be decided by agreement between Caltrans and Public Works Departments. The updated report should note the magnitude of the observed shift, the specification already deployed at the time the shift was observed, and Caltrans officials' own best evaluation of why the shift occurred. If possible, the officials should propose alternative specifications (or roll back to a

prior one) that would mitigate the shift or at least bring it into alignment with the documented priorities of the Public Works Departments. These alternatives could then be interpreted and evaluated at the next regular meeting according to institutional prerogatives.

Other review grounds include:

- Discrepancies between prior reward reports and system behavior as observed in the real world.
- Discrepancies between prior reward reports and system behavior as observed in simulated environments of interest to policymakers.
- A security breach resulting in loss of data or other infrastructure components that violates the terms of agreement between relevant agencies.
- Substantial changes in the distribution of CAVs using the CA-24 freeway exit - including changes in the capabilities of the vehicles (e.g. increased levels of autonomy) and/or changes in group statistics (e.g. make or model, absolute number, temporal distribution, *etc.*)
- A new mode of transport with significant observed throughput at the CA-24 offramp, but unknown distribution of traffic behaviors.
- Any change in the schedule of meetings between Caltrans and Public Works Departments corresponding to regular future updates of reward reports.
- A new ordinance (passed by either city) or statute (adopted by Caltrans) that alters the design assumptions of the deployed specification as documented in prior reward reports.
- A significant shift in the personnel makeup of the Public Works Departments of Berkeley or Oakland.
- A plebiscite leading to basic reforms of municipal governance in either city.

6.3 Changelog

Descriptions of updates and lessons learned from observing and maintaining the deployed system. This includes when the updates were made and what motivated them in light of previous reports. The changelog comprises the central difference between reward reports and other forms of machine learning documentation, as it directly reflects their intrinsically dynamic nature.

- v0.1 (08/Oct/2020) - Initial reward report was drafted based on the system developed and tested in simulation only.
- v0.2 (01/Jan/2021) - System is deployed to the real-world environment in a ongoing evaluation capacity, reward report updated to reflect this fact. Reporting cadence decided to be every six weeks based on agreement between Caltrans and the city departments of Oakland and Berkeley. Intended feedback section was updated to include plans for regular model retraining and data sharing agreements. No other substantial changes.
- v0.3 (14/Feb/2021) - Planning horizon for the system was updated from a 500m stretch of freeway to a 800m stretch of freeway. The planning horizon was updated because the deployed system's performance was not in line with predictions from simulation training. Consultation with Caltrans traffic engineers and the system developers suggested that the stretch of highway used in simulation may be too short to sufficiently exhibit typical driving dynamics induced by the IDM, and it was suggested to extend the planning horizon and re-train the agent, before re-deploying the policy. Failure modes section was updated to reflect these observations.
- v0.4 (01/April/2021) - Caltrans officials reported to Public Works Departments of Berkeley and Oakland that the system undergoes "behavior throttling" when interacting with diesel-powered vehicles within 800m of the CA-24 offramp. It was decided to add new metrics for diesel-powered vehicle throughput and congestion to the list of oversight metrics. Due to no observed increase in accidents or driver complaints, no changes to performance metrics or environment specification were made at this time.
- v0.5 (15/May/2021) - Meeting was convened according to the regular schedule. Oversight metrics were presented and discussed. Officials

noted a significant decline in diesel-powered vehicle throughput and congestion on the CA-24 offramp. No other substantial changes.

- v0.6 (12/June/2021) - Emergency meeting was called by the Public Works Departments of Berkeley and Oakland in response to a rapid uptick in complaints from residents about the growing frequency of diesel-powered vehicles driving through residential areas in the vicinity of Emeryville, which is located west of the CA-24 exit. Residents have complained about a slight uptick in air pollution and large increase in noise pollution due to the vehicles. Caltrans officials consulted the changelog of previous reward reports and determined that diesel-driven vehicles were being excessively disincentivized from driving on the CA-24 offramp due to behavior throttling. It was decided to convene a *Diesel Vehicle Taskforce* to examine the problem and communicate with drivers of heavy vehicles to identify what new incentives or adjustments were needed to the controller to reduce behavior throttling beneath the desired threshold. It was agreed that the Diesel Vehicle Taskforce issue a report recommending these changes no later than two regular meetings from the present time. Stakeholders section was updated to name these distinct groups (diesel vehicle drivers, nearby homeowners) and reflect these changes.

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[8] M. Mitchell, S. Wu, A. Zaldivar, P. Barnes, L. Vasserman, B. Hutchinson, E. Spitzer, I. D. Raji, and T. Gebru, "Model cards for model reporting," in *Proceedings of the conference on fairness, accountability, and transparency*, 2019, pp. 220–229.

C.2 Example Reward Report - MovieLens

The purpose of MovieLens is to match users to personalized movie recommendations based on ratings of other movies previously entered by the user [29]. Unlike the other example systems we discuss, MovieLens is a static preference model generated through supervised learning. However, because of the system's age (initial release in 1997) and its repeated retraining, it can be interpreted as an RL system that is learning a ranking policy that must adapt to a changing environment. The changelog documents the actual historical updates to the model prompted by changes to the environment, including new interfaces, user-base size, optimization parameters, user-generated content, and major dataset publications. This example Reward Report is based on the history of the MovieLens project published in [29].

Reward Report: MovieLens Film Recommender System Page 1

1 System Details

1.1 System Owner

This may be the designer deploying the system, a larger agency or body, or some combination of the two. The entity completing the report should also be indicated.

Movielens is maintained by researchers at the University of Minnesota in the Grouplens research group (`https://grouplens.org/`).

1.2 Dates

The known or intended timespan over which this reward function & optimization is active.

The system has been active since it was first released in August 1997. This reward report (v4.1) was last updated March 2015.

1.3 Feedback & Communication

Contact information for the designer, team, or larger agency responsible for system deployment.

Information on contact emails for account problems, website problems, movie content issues, and general comments can be found at `https://movielens.org/info/contact`. General comments and ideas for improving MovieLens can be discussed on the UserVoice forum at `https://movielens.uservoice.com`.

1.4 Other Resources

Where can users or stakeholders find more information about this system? Is this system based on one or more research papers?

A history of the MovieLens system and datasets is presented in [1], and additional research papers are cited therein.

2 Optimization Intent

2.1 Goal of Reinforcement

A statement of system scope and purpose, including the planning horizon and justification of a data-driven approach to policy design (e.g. the use of reinforcement learning or repeated retraining). This justification should contrast with alternative approaches, like static models and hand-designed policies. What is there to gain with the chosen approach?

The system is a website designed to display personalized movie recommendations on the basis of user entered ratings. As a user browses the site, potentially filtering with search terms, the system displays movies in an order determined by predictions of how the user will rate them. When users rate movies, the predictions are updated, altering the ordering on subsequent page views.

The ranking policy effectively considers a one-step time horizon, directly using predictions for ranking. It does not consider the effect of multiple sequential interactions.

This system is best characterized as a "repeated retraining" of a preference model generated by supervised learning (SL). This model is then used to rank movies for display. Using SL allows for preference models which capture highly personal tastes, something that would be difficult to hand design. Repeated retraining allows the preference model to adapt to a changing environment, including shifts in user tastes and the release of new movies.

In addition to the primary goal of movie recommendation, this system supports academic research on human-computer interaction and general recommender system design.

2.2 Defined Performance Metrics

A list of "performance metrics" included explicitly in the reward signal, the criteria for why these metrics were chosen, and from where these criteria were drawn (e.g. government agencies, domain precedent, GitHub repositories, toy environments). Performance metrics that are used by the designer to tune the system, but not explicitly included in the reward signal should also be reported here.

The ranking policy orders movies by a weighted sum of predicted rating and popularity, so we can view the combination of these quantities as making up the reward signal. Prior to version 4.0, the reward only depended on rating and did not incorporate popularity.

Additionally, recommender models are evaluated offline using prediction accuracy (RMSE), top-N accuracy (recall), diversity (intra-list similarity), and popularity (details in [2]). Prior to v4.0, models were evaluated primarily for accuracy, including MAE, RMSE, and nDCG (details in [3]).

2.3 Oversight Metrics

Are there any additional metrics not included in the reward signal but relevant for vendor or system oversight (e.g. performance differences across demographic groups)? Why aren't they part of the reward signal, and why must they be monitored?

Metrics which are monitored but not incorporated into the policy or model include the number of users, number of movies, number of entered ratings, monthly active users, and the number of logins for each user. These indicators of overall system operation are not targets for optimization.

2.4 Known Failure Modes

A description of any prior known instances of "reward hacking" or model misalignment in the domain at stake, and description of how the current system avoids this.

No instances of reward hacking or misalignment have been observed. Because the system allows for explicit user input (search terms, model selection), errors in rating predictions do not prevent users from finding and rating movies.

3 Institutional Interface

3.1 Deployment Agency

What other agency or controlling entity roles, if any, are intended to oversee the ongoing post-deployment operation of the RL system? How may these roles change following system deployment?

MovieLens was released due to the shuttering of EachMovie in 1997, a movie recommendation site hosted by DEC. It was developed and is maintained by Grouplens, a research group at University of Minnesota.

3.2 Stakeholders

What other interests are implicated in the design specification or system deployment, beyond the designer? What role will these interests play in subsequent report documentation? What other entities, if any, does the deployed system interface with whose interests are not intended to be in scope?

One interface of interest is the technology that powers the recommendation engine. Currently, it is powered by Lenskit, an open source framework developed to promote reproducability and openness in the recommendation systems community [3]. Previously in v3.0-v3.4, the recommendations were powered by MultiLens, another open source recommendation engine. MultiLens replaced Net Perceptions (v1.1-v2.0), a recommendations systems company cofounded in 1996 by GroupLens faculty and students and sold in 2004 [4]. The recommendation model in v0.0-v1.0 was originally developed by GroupLens for personalized Usenet news recommendation [5].

Another relevant interface is with The Movie Database, a free and open source user editable movie database for plot summaries, movie artwork, and trailers. Previously, from in v3.4-v4.0, MovieLens integrated with the Netflix API to display movie posters and plot synopsis on the movie details page. However, Netflix eventually discontinued its API support.

An important stakeholder is the Movielens users. Soliciting user judgements and opinions is often a key element in determining if an experimental change is successful. Additionally, one-off user studies (with participants recruited from email) are used to test features that are not ready to scale or integrate into the main user interface.

Finally, a key stakeholder is the researchers: both in Grouplens and the in the community more broadly. The openness of users to experiments on a broad range of features has enabled GroupLens research in many different areas on the Movielens platform. The regular release of anonymized datasets of movie ratings is important to the broader machine learning, data science, and information retrieval communities.

A potentially relevant group of stakeholders is movie producers. However, because Movielens is relatively small and isolated from larger commercial endeavors, it has limited impact on movie studios and production, so their interests are not in scope.

3.3 Explainability & Transparency

Does the system offer explanations of its decisions or actions? What is the purpose of these explanations? To what extent is the policy transparent, i.e. can decisions or actions be understood in terms of meaningful intermediate quantities?

The system displays predicted ratings alongside movies, explaining the movies position within a list, and suggesting to the user whether or not they will like the movie. The ranking policy is easily understood as a weighted combination of predicted rat-

ing and popularity. However, the computation of predicted ratings is more complex. Some available models are more easily explained to users than others (e.g. nearest neighbors vs. matrix factorization). However, the details are well documented in publicly available research papers [2], and researchers respond to user requests for explanation on the UserVoice discussion board [6].

3.4 Recourse

Can stakeholders or users contest the decisions or actions of the system? What processes, technical or otherwise, are in place to handle this?

By entering ratings, users are able to affect their preference models to hopefully become more accurate. Additionally, the movies displayed by the system are sourced from The Movie Database, which is user-editable. (Previously in v3.2-v3.5, users could add and edit movies to MovieLens directly.) Furthermore, the current version of the system allows users to choose between three recommender models. Finally, users can make suggestions and requests directly to designers on the UserVoice forum.

4 Implementation

4.1 Reward Details

How was the reward function engineered? Is it based on a well-defined metric? Is it tuned to represent a specific behavior? Are multiple terms scaled to make one central loss, and how was the scaling decided?

The reward is a weighted sum:

$$0.9 \cdot \text{rank}(\widehat{r}_{ui}) + 0.1 \cdot \text{rank}(p_i)$$

where $\widehat{r}_{ui}$ is the predicted rating of movie i by user u, p_i is the number of ratings movie i has recieved in the past 10 days, and rank normalizes input, returning 1 for the largest (across all movies) and 0 for the smallest. This blending is the result of empirical evidence that it improves user satisfaction.

4.2 Environment Details

Description of states, observations, and actions with reference to planning horizon and hypothesized dynamics/impact. What dynamics are brought into the scope of the optimization via feedback? Which dynamics are left external to the system, as drift? Have there been any observed gaps between conceptualization and resultant dynamics?

The system handles approximately 250k users and 30k movies. These numbers have grown over the years. In 1999 (v1.1), MovieLens received attention from the mass media, causing an increase in user signups. Since then, the user growth has been stable (20-30 signups per day), largely the result of word-of-mouth or unsolicited press. Early on, the movie database was hand-curated and primarily contained movies with wide theatrical release in the United States. In v3.2-v3.5, MovieLens added the ability for users to edit and add movies. Since v4.0, MovieLens uses The Movie Database, a free and open source user editable movie database.

The actions taken by the system are page displays of 10 movies in a ordered list, where pages can be perused by arrows. The views can be explicitly filtered with search terms like year and genre; these explicit inputs this make up a component of the observation. The second component is the entered ratings in the form `<user_id, movie_id, rating, timestamp>`.

There are three potential sources of dynamics in this environment: the addition of new movies, the joining and departing of users, and the preferences that users have for movies. Because this system effectively uses a planning horizon of 1, none of these dynamics are explicitly accounted for. This is appropriate, as the goal of MovieLens is not to shift broad patterns of movie consumption. Though the movies, users, and preferences may change over time, these changes are more likely to be due to external factors than feedback with the MovieLens system. Additionally, the data collected by MovieLens is not fine-grained enough to detect such impacts of feedback.

4.3 Measurement Details

How are the components of the reward and observations measured? Are measurement techniques consistent across time and data sources? Under what conditions are measurements valid and correct? What biases might arise during the measurement process?

Ratings are entered by users via clicks on a star graphic, and can take values 0.5-5 in half integer increments. Prior to v3.0, ratings took values in integer increments. The increased granularity was the most requested feature in a user survey. Prior to v4.0, ratings were entered through a drop-down menu, and the meaning of rating values was de-

scribed in a legend at the top of the page (see Figure 1).

A possible source of bias in the measured ratings is due to anchoring effects, due either to the displayed predicted rating or due to the historically provided movie rating legend. However, broad trends in rating values did not change when the legend was removed in v4.0

Finally, the recorded timestamp represents when a user adds a particular rating rather than when they watched a movie. This limits the ability of the system to detect the impacts of its own recommendations.

4.4 Algorithmic Details

The key points on the specific algorithm(s) used for learning and planning. This includes the form of the policy (e.g. neural network, optimization problem), the class of learning algorithm (e.g. model-based RL, off-policy RL, repeated retraining), the form of any intermediate model (e.g. of the value function, dynamics function, reward function), technical infrastructure, and any other considerations necessary for implementing the system. Is the algorithm publicly documented and is code publicly available? Have different algorithms been used or tried to accomplish the same goal?

The policy selects a page view to present to the user based on explicitly provided input and rating data. First, explicit input is used to filter the list of movies. Then, the recommender model is used to predict a user's ratings of these movies. Finally, the movies are displayed in order of these predicted ratings, blended with a popularity factor.

The main component of the policy is therefore the recommender model. This model is user-selectable, so that users can choose between a non-personalized baseline, a preference elicitation model intended for new users, an item-item collaborative filtering model, or a matrix factorization model. Further details on how these models are trained is available in [2]. Previously in v3.0-3.5, the recommender was fixed as an item-item collaborative filtering model. Prior to that in v1.0-2.0, the model was a user-user collaborative filtering model.

4.5 Data Flow

How is data collected, stored, and used for (re)training? How frequently are various components of the system retrained, and why was this frequency chosen? Could the data exhibit sampling bias, and is this accounted for in the learning algorithm? Is data reweighted, filtered, or discarded? Have data sources changed over time?

All user rating data is stored by MovieLens and used by the recommender models to make rating predictions. When a user enters a new rating, it immediately impacts their rating predictions, since the "input" to the recommender changes. Less frequently, the ratings are used to update the parameters of the recommender models. An anonymized subset of this data is also periodically released for use by the wider research community.

The dataset of user ratings is likely biased. There is sampling bias due to the fact that users only rate movies that 1) appear on a page and 2) that they have watched. These factors are directly and indirectly impacted by the MovieLens system itself. The fact that users can explicitly filter pageviews with search terms mitigates these effects, but it is unlikely that it removes them.

The initial Movielens system was trained on a public dataset from EachMovie of approximately 2.8 million ratings from 72k users across 1.6k movies, but this has since been discarded. The dataset was retired by HP in October 2004, and due to privacy concerns, it is no longer available for download.

4.6 Limitations

Discussion and justification of modeling choices arising from computational, statistical, and measurement limitations. How might (or how have) improvements in computational power and data collection change(d) these considerations and impact(ed) system behavior?

The most prevalent limitation of this system is that it does not plan over a long horizon and therefore does not consider the effects of dynamics. While a more complex policy would allow the system to adapt to ordering effects, the resulting temporal dependence would complicate the ability to users to reliably navigate the movie database. Furthermore, users do not always enter movie ratings immediately after watching a movie, instead sometimes entering batches of ratings for movies that they watched in the past.

4.7 Engineering Tricks

RL systems are known to be sensitive to implementation tricks that are key to performance. Are

there any design elements that have a surprisingly strong impact on performance? For example, state-action normalization, hard-coded curricula, model-initialization, loss bounds, or more?

The system cannot provide reliable recommendations until users provide a minimum number of ratings. This problem is avoided by the interface design: when a user joins the site, they express their preferences over several displayed clusters of movies. These preferences are used, in combination with the rating profiles of other users, to generate a psuedo-rating profile for the new user. Further description is available in [7].

This preference elicitation process replaced a minimum movie requirement. Previously, until a user rated a minimum number of movies, the front page would display 10 movies at a time. From v0-v3, the minimum number was 5, and of the 10 movies per page, nine were randomly selected from the database and one from a hand-designed list of recognizable titles. In v3, the minimum number was 15, and the 10 movies were selected for their popularity, excluding the top 50-150 movies. This increased requirement was due to the needs of an item-item (rather than user-user) collaborative filtering algorithm. The switch to a preference elicitation process was motivated by the observation that the 15 rating requirement was too arduous, taking users an average of 6.8 minutes to complete and 12.6% of users failing to complete it.

5 Evaluation

5.1 Evaluation Environment

How is the system evaluated (and if applicable, trained) prior to deployment (e.g. using simulation, static datasets, etc.)? Exhaustive details of the offline evaluation environment should be provided. For simulation, details should include description or external reference to the underlying model, ranges of parameters, etc. For evaluation on static datasets, considering referring to associated documentation (e.g. Datasheets *[8]).*

The primary evaluation is to consider various properties of recommender models on offline datasets. This includes many of the publicly released MovieLens datasets, which are described in detail in [1].

5.2 Offline Evaluations

Present and discuss the results of offline evaluation. For static evaluation, consider referring to associated documentation (e.g. Model Cards *[9]). If applicable, compare the behaviors arising from counterfactual specifications (e.g. of states, observations, actions).*

This offline evaluation includes prediction accuracy (RMSE), top-N accuracy (recall), diversity (intra-list similarity), and popularity. Detailed evaluations are available in [2], and key quantities are displayed in (Figure 2).

5.3 Evaluation Validity

To what extent is it reasonable to draw conclusions about the behavior of the deployed system based on presented offline evaluations? What is the current state of understanding of the online performance of the system? If the system has been deployed, were any unexpected behaviors observed?

Offline evaluation metrics (like top-N accuracy) were chosen to align with the ranking setting. While the offline evaluations are imperfect (due to dataset biases), the system appears to work well ad no unexpected behaviors have been observed.

5.4 Performance standards

What standards of performance and safety is the system required to meet? Where do these standards come from? How is the system verified to meet these standards?

N/A

6 System Maintenance

6.1 Reporting Cadence

The intended timeframe for revisiting the reward report. How was this decision reached and motivated?

This report is updated whenever there is a major system update, either to the user interface or the backend. Such updates will occur periodically, coinciding with research initiatives.

6.2 Update Triggers

Specific events (projected or historic) significant enough to warrant revisiting this report, beyond the cadence outlined above. Example triggers include

a defined stakeholder group empowered to demand a system audit, or a specific metric (either of performance or oversight) that falls outside a defined threshold of critical safety.

If a large change is observed in oversight metrics, or if many users express dissatisfaction on the UserVoice forum, the system design will be revisited by the researchers who maintain it. If an update is deemed necessary, this report will be updated.

6.3 Changelog

Descriptions of updates and lessons learned from observing and maintaining the deployed system. This includes when the updates were made and what motivated them in light of previous reports. The changelog comprises the central difference between reward reports and other forms of machine learning documentation, as it directly reflects their intrinsically dynamic nature.

The versions of this report are enumerated as vX.Y where X corresponds to the user interface version and Y corresponds to major changes within interfaces.

- v0.0 (August 1997) Initial release.
- v0.1 (April 1998) The ML 100K dataset is released, covering 9/1997–4/1998.
- v1.0 (September 1999) Update to v1 interface.
- v1.1 (November 1999) Media exposure causes an increased number of users. Switch from GroupLens to Net Perceptions recommender model.
- v2.0 (February 2000) Update to v2 interface. Additional movie metadata and reviews added to movie details pages.
- v3.0 (February 2003) Update to v3 interface. Switch from Net Perceptions user-user recommender to MultiLens item-item recommender. Ratings now in half-star (rather than full) increments. Require that users rate at least 15 movies before receiving recommendations. The ML 1M dataset is released, covering 4/2000–2/2003.
- v3.1 (June 2005) Added discussion forums to site.
- v3.2 (September 2008) Added feature so that users can add movies to database.
- v3.3 (January 2009) The ML 10M dataset is released, covering 1/1995–1/2009.
- v3.4 (Spring 2009) Netflix API integration for poster art and synopsis.
- v3.5 (January 2012) Switch from Multilens to Lenskit recommender (still item-item).
- v4.0 (November 2014) Update to v4 interface. Rating interface combined with "predicted rating" star graphic to accept click events. Switch to user-selectable recommender model. Legend describing the meanings of ratings and dropdown menu removed. Drop minimum rating requirement in favor of group-based preference elicitation. Integration with The Movie Database for plot summaries, movie artwork, and trailers.
- v4.1 (March 2015) The ML 20M dataset is released, covering 1/1995–3/2015. Moving forward, MovieLens will make public additional nonarchival datasets: `latest` which is unabridged for completeness and `latest-small` for educational use.

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[9] M. Mitchell, S. Wu, A. Zaldivar, P. Barnes, L. Vasserman, B. Hutchinson, E. Spitzer, I. D. Raji, and T. Gebru, "Model cards for model reporting," in *Proceedings of the conference on fairness, accountability, and transparency*, 2019, pp. 220–229.



Figure 1: The MovieLens recommender system interface v0-v4.



Figure 2: Offline evaluation of recommender models from [2].

C.3 Example Reward Report - MuZero

The purpose of MuZero (and its preceding systems, AlphaGo and AlphaZero) is to improve state-of-the-art performance in the games of chess, Go, shogi, and a benchmark suite of Atari games [60]. We provide a Reward Report that documents the evolution of the system through these successive stages of development, including changes in the design motivation and performance metrics, as well as more extensive use of reinforcement learning.

1 System Details

1.1 System Owner

This may be the designer deploying the system, a larger agency or body, or some combination of the two. The entity completing the report should also be indicated.

This system was developed by the DeepMind core Reinforcement Learning Team members. More information about AlphaGo's development can be found at the project website (https://deepmind.com/research/case-studies/alphago-the-story-so-far) as well as DeepMind's GitHub repository

1.2 Dates

The known or intended timespan over which this reward function & optimization is active.

Development of AlphaGo began about two years prior to the matches against Lee Sedol in spring 2016, shortly after DeepMind's acquisition by Google [Ribeiro(2016)]. Development of AlphaZero, based entirely on self-play, followed AlphaGo and was completed prior to October 2017. Development of MuZero, also based on self-play, followed AlphaZero and was first described in a preliminary paper in 2019 [Schrittwieser et al.(2020)].

1.3 Feedback & Communication

Contact information for the designer, team, or larger agency responsible for system deployment.

Any correspondence should be directed to `press@deepmind.com`.

1.4 Other Resources

Where can users or stakeholders find more information about this system? Is this system based on one or more research papers?

There is little additional disclosed information.

2 Optimization Intent

2.1 Goal of Reinforcement

A statement of system scope and purpose, including the planning horizon and justification of a data-driven approach to policy design (e.g. the use of reinforcement learning or repeated retraining). This justification should contrast with alternative approaches, like static models and hand-designed policies. What is there to gain with the chosen approach?

Go, and general game-playing at a human level, was long defined as one of the "grand challenges" of AI. For AlphaGo, the use of reinforcement to learn both the policy and value networks beyond the abilities of a human expert.

For AlphaZero, the sole use of reinforcement learning without any human data was important validation of its potential as a more general learning procedure [Silver et al.(2017)]. The algorithm additionally incorporated lookahead search (Monte Carlo Tree Search) inside the training loop.

For MuZero, the use of model-based reinforcement learning without any prior knowledge of the game dynamics was further indication of RL's potential to develop planning capabilities in more challenging or complex domains [Schrittwieser et al.(2020)]. The learned model performed well in both classic game environments (Go, chess, shogi) as well as canonical video game environments (57 distinct Atari games).

2.2 Defined Performance Metrics

A list of "performance metrics" included explicitly in the reward signal, the criteria for why these metrics were chosen, and from where these criteria were drawn (e.g. government agencies, domain precedent, GitHub repositories, toy environments). Performance metrics that are used by the designer to tune the system, but not explicitly included in the reward signal should also be reported here.

As with most game-playing systems, the performance metric is defined as a win rate among games. In other games, score is used, but in

one-versus-one games win rate is the only direct metric. To better capture the uncertainty of playing varying opponents, this win rate is translated into a running Elo rating system.

2.3 Oversight Metrics

Are there any additional metrics not included in the reward signal but relevant for vendor or system oversight (e.g. performance differences across demographic groups)? Why aren't they part of the reward signal, and why must they be monitored?

Some other performance metrics are not included in the specification, but are monitored for the purpose of evaluating system effects on the domain:

- Absolute opponents' world rankings - following their public games, versions of AlphaGo and AlphaZero were considered to possibly improve the skill levels of expert human opponents, as measured by those players' absolute world ranking. If humans played better after playing AlphaGo, this was to be seen as a positive effect of the system's influence on the game of Go. Fan Hui, following his games against AlphaGo, claimed it made him a better played and accredits his world ranking jump from 600 to 300 in three months to training against it [Murgia(2016)].
- Qualitative changes in playstyle - following their public games, versions of AlphaGo were considered to possibly influence the playstyle of expert human opponents, as interpreted by the wider community of expert players. If expert humans played differently, more creatively or unpredictably, or expressed surprise after AlphaGo's public performances, this was to be seen as a positive effective of the system's influence on the game in question. Garry Kasparov, following his observation of AlphaZero play, was impressed that it appeared to be "a very sharp and attacking player" given that almost all computer programs have a conservative playstyle [Ingle(2018)]. While not integral in any way for system performance, AlphaGo's performance and playstyle have had a noticeable impact on the strategies of expert human players.

2.4 Known Failure Modes

A description of any prior known instances of "reward hacking" or model misalignment in the domain at stake, and description of how the current system avoids this.

Monte Carlo search limitations. In the fourth match (of five) against Lee Sedol in spring 2016, the system failed to recognize move 78 by Sedol. The Monte Carlo search tree, which was designed to prune sequences of moves considered to be irrelevant for maximizing odds of victory, failed to recognize this move. This is because that move was so far outside the distribution of prior game situations that the AlphaGo system failed to accurately calculate its significance for determining the odds of victory [Ormerod(2016)]. The result was a sequences of moves 79-87 by AlphaGo that were considered poor by expert human players, a function of Monte Carlo's myopic look-ahead search following move 78. AlphaGo subsequently conceded the game at move 178, at which point it evaluated its own odds of victory as lower than 20 percent [Metz(2016)].

3 Institutional Interface

3.1 Deployment Agency

What other agency or controlling entity roles, if any, are intended to oversee the ongoing post-deployment operation of the RL system? How may these roles change following system deployment?

The AlphaGo system was developed by DeepMind. This version played against Fan Hui in 5 matches held at DeepMind headquarters in October 2015. These matches were secret and not revealed until the publication of results in January 2016 [Silver et al.(2016)]. A later version of the same system, AlphaGo Lee, played Lee Sedol in March 2016 in 5 matches in Seoul, South Korea. This match was overseen by the

Korea Baduk Association. A yet more sophisticated version of the same system, AlphaGo Master, played against Ke Jie at the Future of Go Summit in Wuzhen, China in May 2017. An earlier version of AlphaGo Master, dubbed Master, had already won 60 straight online games against top pro players, including against Ke Jie [Silver and Hassabis(2017)]. This version was awarded a professional 9-dan title by the Chinese Weiqi Assocation.

3.2 Stakeholders

What other interests are implicated in the design specification or system deployment, beyond the designer? What role will these interests play in subsequent report documentation? What other entities, if any, does the deployed system interface with whose interests are not intended to be in scope?

Compared to other prominent automated game-playing systems like Stockfish (open-source chess engine) or CrazyStone (offline Go engine based on deep learning), versions of AlphaGo perform much much better with additional computational power. The versions of AlphaGo that played against Fan Hu, Lee Sedol, and Ke Jie all made use of distributed CPUs and GPUs. AlphaGo Zero, based entirely on reinforcement learning and self-play, became stronger than AlphaGo Lee after 3 days and stronger than AlphaGo Master after 21 days. Its self-play training time was stopped after 40 days, at which point it was stronger than any known Go player (human or program) as measured by Elo rating in October 2017 [Silver and Hassabis(2017)].

AlphaZero, in its initial chess games against Stockfish, was criticized by expert human chess players has having unfair computational advantages over the opponent [Doggers(2018)].

MuZero's learning has been made more efficient in follow-up work, dubbed EfficientZero [Ye et al.(2021)].

3.3 Explainability & Transparency

Does the system offer explanations of its decisions or actions? What is the purpose of these explanations? To what extent is the policy transparent, i.e. can decisions or actions be understood in terms of meaningful intermediate quantities?



Figure 1: The AlphaGo game playing system architecture.



Figure 2: The AlphaZero game playing system architecture.

The MuZero system offers few tools for transparency in its current form. While the learning process develops a structured model for the game dynamics, it is not done in a way that is accessible by engineers or external parties.

3.4 Recourse

Can stakeholders or users contest the decisions or actions of the system? What processes, technical or otherwise, are in place to handle this?

N/A



Figure 3: The MuZero general game playing system.



Figure 4: The MuZero general game playing system.

4 Implementation

4.1 Reward Details

How was the reward function engineered? Is it based on a well-defined metric? Is it tuned to represent a specific behavior? Are multiple terms scaled to make one central loss, and how was the scaling decided?

The reward function is entirely prescribed as win rate, and the resulting Elo rating. An important sub-component that will be referenced later is the value function estimating game state. This is an internal representation of reward central to training and evaluation.

4.2 Environment Details

Description of states, observations, and actions with reference to planning horizon and hypothesized dynamics/impact. What dynamics are brought into the scope of the optimization via feedback? Which dynamics are left external to the system, as drift? Have there been any observed gaps between conceptualization and resultant dynamics?

The original environment is the full game of Go which is constrained by finite rules, but other games with visual states were added.

4.3 Measurement Details

How are the components of the reward and observations measured? Are measurement techniques consistent across time and data sources? Under what conditions are measurements valid and correct? What biases might arise during the measurement process?

The measurements differ across games from the full gameboard to a visual rendering of the world. Extracting information from pixels is substantially less efficient than directly from the game state.

4.4 Algorithmic Details

The key points on the specific algorithm(s) used for learning and planning. This includes the form of the policy (e.g. neural network, optimization problem), the class of learning algorithm (e.g. model-based RL, off-policy RL, repeated retraining), the form of any intermediate model (e.g. of the value function, dynamics function, reward function), technical infrastructure, and any other considerations necessary for implementing the system. Is the algorithm publicly documented and is code publicly available? Have different algorithms been used or tried to accomplish the same goal?

The key algorithm feature is the use of Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS). MCTS is used to search over board states (by planning over actions) and parses the value representation. The value function is represented by a deep neural network mapping from game state to value.

The second crucial element to training is self play. Here gameplaying agents evaluate their performance versus past training snapshots. This synergistic mechanism is crucial to reaching superhuman performance. In MuZero, and learned model is used to used to improve performance in games without complete information (such as visual states) by constraining the policy optimization. At each turn, the model is used to predict the correct policy, the value

function, and the reward received by the move (in games that have an intermediate score). The model is updated in an end-to-end fashion, so it is included in the same training loop in the agent architecture.

Fully algorithmic details and open source code are not released.

4.5 Data Flow

How is data collected, stored, and used for (re)training? How frequently are various components of the system retrained, and why was this frequency chosen? Could the data exhibit sampling bias, and is this accounted for in the learning algorithm? Is data reweighted, filtered, or discarded? Have data sources changed over time?

Data flow is not well documented, but it relies on Google's distributed training and deployment infrastructure.

4.6 Limitations

Discussion and justification of modeling choices arising from computational, statistical, and measurement limitations. How might (or how have) improvements in computational power and data collection change(d) these considerations and impact(ed) system behavior?

4.7 Engineering Tricks

RL systems are known to be sensitive to implementation tricks that are key to performance. Are there any design elements that have a surprisingly strong impact on performance? For example, state-action normalization, hard-coded curricula, model-initialization, loss bounds, or more?

Not documented.

5 Evaluation

5.1 Evaluation Environment

How is the system evaluated (and if applicable, trained) prior to deployment (e.g. using simulation, static datasets, etc.)? Exhaustive details of the offline evaluation environment should be provided. For simulation, details should include description or external reference to the underlying model, ranges of parameters, etc. For evaluation on static datasets, considering referring to associated documentation (e.g. Datasheets *[Gebru et al.(2021)]).*

For games, the simulator is reality so evaluation is matched to training.

5.2 Offline Evaluations

Present and discuss the results of offline evaluation. For static evaluation, consider referring to associated documentation (e.g. Model Cards *[Mitchell et al.(2019)]). If applicable, compare the behaviors arising from counterfactual specifications (e.g. of states, observations, actions).*

Multiple internal evaluations of the agent were performed prior to high-profile, public matches with the worlds best players.

5.3 Evaluation Validity

To what extent is it reasonable to draw conclusions about the behavior of the deployed system based on presented offline evaluations? What is the current state of understanding of the online performance of the system? If the system has been deployed, were any unexpected behaviors observed?

5.4 Performance standards

What standards of performance and safety is the system required to meet? Where do these standards come from? How is the system verified to meet these standards?

N/A.

6 System Maintenance

6.1 Reporting Cadence

The intended timeframe for revisiting the reward report. How was this decision reached and motivated?

While this system is evaluated in closed-world games, updates are not anticipated.

6.2 Update Triggers

Specific events (projected or historic) significant enough to warrant revisiting this report, beyond the cadence outlined above. Example triggers include a defined stakeholder group empowered to demand a system audit, or a specific metric (either of performance or oversight) that falls outside a defined threshold of critical safety.

This report will be revisited upon release of each new game-playing AI from DeepMind.

6.3 Changelog

Descriptions of updates and lessons learned from observing and maintaining the deployed system. This includes when the updates were made and what motivated them in light of previous reports. The changelog comprises the central difference between reward reports and other forms of machine learning documentation, as it directly reflects their intrinsically dynamic nature.

N/A (v1)

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A Systematic Review of Ethical Concerns with Voice Assistants

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ABSTRACT

Since Siri's release in 2011 there have been a growing number of AI-driven domestic voice assistants that are increasingly being integrated into devices such as smartphones and TVs. But as their presence has expanded, a range of ethical concerns have been identified around the use of voice assistants, such as the privacy implications of having devices that are always listening and the ways that these devices are integrated into the existing social order of the home. This has created a burgeoning area of research across a range of fields including computer science, social science, and psychology. This paper takes stock of the foundations and frontiers of this work through a systematic literature review of 117 papers on ethical concerns with voice assistants. In addition to analysis of nine specific areas of concern, the review measures the distribution of methods and participant demographics across the literature. We show how some concerns, such as privacy, are operationalized to a much greater extent than others like accessibility, and how study participants are overwhelmingly drawn from a small handful of Western nations. In so doing we hope to provide an outline of the rich tapestry of work around these concerns and highlight areas where current research efforts are lacking.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Human-centered computing** → **Natural language interfaces**; **HCI theory, concepts and models**.

KEYWORDS

Voice assistants, ethical concerns, privacy, agency, autonomy, social order, accountability, transparency, conflict of interest, social interaction, performance of gender, accessibility, misinformation

ACM Reference Format:

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1 INTRODUCTION

The last decade has seen the widespread introduction of voice assistants (VAs) into domestic life in many parts of the world. Offering novelty and convenience driven by advancements in AI technologies such as machine learning and natural language processing, VAs have transformed the home computing landscape. Positioned by vendors at the centre of the smart home as a hub for other apps and gadgets, research shows that VAs are most commonly used to play music, search for information, and control other IoT devices [11]. In this way, their usage extends that of the smartphone where app stores allow for the use of a wide variety of third-party software, and many smartphone apps are also available as skills/actions. But VAs do not simply offer access to traditional means of computing via a new interaction modality, their design and interfaces also represent a number of novel experiences and changes in people's underlying relationship with the technology that they use.

The continued integration of speech into the smart *home*—a space often idealised as private, safe, and intimate—disrupts existing social norms, and the frequent gendering of voice assistants as female has prompted harsh criticism of the way that VAs implicitly perpetuate stereotypes around gendered work [149]. After police took steps to use Alexa recordings in a murder trial, legal scholars began to examine more seriously the (lack of) protections for data that is collected in the home but stored in the cloud [109]. In some cases this represents the latest in ongoing debates around parenting and privacy as VAs challenge and reframe existing norms by altering what is and is not possible. In other areas VAs have resurrected much older ethical concerns, revealing new dimensions of long-standing concepts like anthropomorphism. While the affective potential of computers that use natural language has been known for decades [111, 148], voice assistants take this previously unattainable technical capability of *conversation*—that activates the same areas of the brain as speech between people [101]—and scales it to billions of speakers, TVs, headphones, smartphones, and other devices around the globe.

The breadth of these ethical concerns means that research has emerged from a diverse range of disciplines, including computer science, social science, and psychology, each with different practices and conventions. The sensitive nature of the home environment and relationships drives us now to pause and take stock of the literature on ethical concerns with voice assistants. To this end we conducted a systematic literature review with the aim of capturing the concerns that have been identified and how they are studied. The results are valuable both in understanding current

areas of enquiry as well as in identifying opportunities for future work. Beyond this we were also interested in the diversity and inclusion of participants. When conducting research that tells us about people and their social interactions we must acknowledge that people of different cultures, ages, genders, abilities, etc. experience voice assistants differently and have different concerns about them. As a provocation intended to foster a more inclusive—and accurate—body of knowledge, we use our review to highlight the overwhelming bias towards "WEIRD" (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) countries in the venues searched. Beyond geography we also examine other dimensions of diversity in research that focuses on specific groups, such as those around gender, that reflect and inform social and cultural norms.

More specifically we answer the following research questions:

RQ1 What is the current state of research on ethical concerns in voice assistants?

RQ2 How are participants, methods, and approaches represented across this research?

And in so doing make the following contributions:

- Map out the current knowledge on ethical concerns around privacy, social interaction, accessibility, social order, performance of gender, accountability, conflicts of interest, misinformation, and transparency
- Show that research on voice assistants overwhelmingly studies WEIRD demographics
- Highlight key directions for future work in this area, including challenging legacy assumptions about how VAs are designed and deepening explorations of how VAs interact with gender in society

2 METHODOLOGY

In order to assess prior work on ethical concerns around the design and use of voice assistants in the home we conducted a systematic literature review, i.e., one with "a clearly formulated question that uses systematic and explicit methods to identify, select, and critically appraise relevant research" [94]. We followed established guidance on systematic reviews which lays out the main steps around searching for and analysing prior work. This involves identifying: (1) eligibility criteria for included papers; (2) databases to be searched; (3) parameters for the search; (4) the process for selecting studies from the set of returned papers; and (5) how data will be extracted from those papers [94].[1]

2.1 Eligibility Criteria and Databases Searched

We considered journal articles, conference papers, extended abstracts, and short papers about voice assistants since 2012 to coincide with the initial commercial availability of voice assistants. As our focus was on voice assistant research, we searched the ACM Digital Library, IEEE Explore, Web of Science, and DBLP.

2.2 Search Parameters

Conducting the search presented a 'cold start' problem: reviewing every paper on voice assistants to distil out concerns was infeasible, but at the same time there was no existing literature mapping out ethical concerns with VAs from which we could draw keywords to narrow down the search. Following common practice in studies of this type (e.g. [37]) we used adjacent prior work and domain knowledge to build a list of keywords. The positioning of VAs as 'smart devices' means that study of them often falls under the umbrella of smart home research, so we selected concerns from four papers summarising ethical concerns in smart homes that were applicable to voice assistants [44, 103, 125, 151]. We then drew on domain knowledge to supplement this with ethical challenges specific to VAs using work on individual concerns, highlighting additional issues that arise outside of the main discussion on challenges and barriers to smart home adoption (e.g. around social interaction and the performance of gender). During this process we adopted a broad view of ethics and related concerns; following prior work we define ethics as "what a design object ought to be based on ethical and moral codes", in contrast with its purpose/function (reason), and visual values/presentation (aesthetics) [67]. The final set of resulting keywords is given in Table 1. During the review we adjusted the categorisation of concerns to best describe the literature returned by the survey (more information on this is given in Section 5.6), arriving at the following concerns from papers on smart homes:

- Privacy [44, 103, 125, 151]
- Agency and Autonomy [103, 125, 133, 151]
- Social Order and Accountability [44, 125]
- Transparency [103, 125, 133]
- Conflicts of Interest & Datafication [103, 125]

Supplemented by four concerns unique to voice assistants:

2.2.1 Social Interaction. The use of speech and conversation by VAs has raised concerns about how they might change how people interact both with them and each other. Work in this space has shown how people automatically apply social rules and draw upon gender stereotypes in interactions with computers [100], and use anthropomorphism as a heuristic to help develop mental models of computers and robots [154].

2.2.2 Performance of Gender. Popular voice assistants are explicitly gendered: Alexa reports to be "female in character", Google Assistant was described by an engineer as "a young woman from Colorado", and Siri is a Scandinavian female name [149]. What is now an industry norm has been criticised for reinforcing existing societal biases around the role of women in the workforce, portraying them as "obliging, docile and eager-to-please helpers" [149].

2.2.3 Accessibility. Voice assistants present unique challenges and opportunities for accessibility in the smart home. On the one hand, by using voice as their primary or only mode of interaction they align well with the needs of communities such as the blind and partially sighted [4], but as a direct consequence, they disproportionately fail people with speech, language, or hearing difficulties.

2.2.4 Misinformation. In an extension of studies around the quality and potential bias of information provided by internet search engines [61], researchers have begun to examine the information provided by voice assistants [36]. This is particularly important for VAs because succinctly conveying the source and accuracy of information provided via speech is a significant challenge.

[1] As the PRISMA guidelines are intended for clinical reviews, we have omitted steps that would be inappropriate for the present research (e.g., summary measures used across the reported papers).

Papers containing at least one of the following devices:	
Alexa	Siri
Google Assistant	Voice assistant
Virtual assistant	Intelligent personal assistant
Smart Home	-
And at least one of the following key words:	
Privacy	Anthropomorphism
Autonomy	Personification
Children	Gender
Conflict of interest	Agency
Social Order	Accessibility
Ethics	Accountability
Transparency	-
As an article, conference paper, extended abstract or short paper published since 2012	

Table 1: Search criteria

2.3 Study Selection

To be considered in scope, papers had to feature significant results that directly addressed one or more ethical concerns around voice assistants used for domestic tasks in the home or via a smartphone (**e.g. a study on smart homes would only be in-scope if it had findings specific to voice assistants**). Papers where the results only detailed *solutions* to ethical concerns were out of scope (i.e. where the understanding of concerns came solely from background literature), as were papers that developed or applied voice assistants to tasks or contexts outside of normal domestic use (e.g. medical treatment). Energy usage was not considered an ethical concern in the context of the review as it relates to the smart *home* in general rather than voice assistants as a class of devices. While many papers explicitly listed the keyword topics as concerns, we did not exclude papers that made no or implicit references to the key words as concerns (e.g. participants describing an emotional connection to a voice assistant with no associated normative judgement).

2.4 Data Extraction

The full text of the selected papers were coded for methodology, type of contribution, and the ethical concern(s) targeted. Two researchers initially considered a small subset of the papers, meeting to compare and refine the process before applying this to the rest of the data. To the end of answering RQ2 on the diversity of those who are represented in human-AI interaction (HAI) and human-computer interaction (HCI) research, we also coded the geographic location of participants (i.e. country of residence). Where participants from multiple countries were sampled, papers were coded to the majority demographic. In a small number of cases where papers listed the platform used for recruitment without specifics on participants' country of residence, those papers were coded with the majority for that platform (in all cases this was the US).

2.5 Results of the Search Process

The initial keyword search returned 1230 unique papers (ACM: 384, IEEE: 389, Web of Science: 266, DBLP: 191). While the systematic search was generally very effective, a small number of relevant papers (22) known to the research team fell outside the range of the search, and were also added. This occurred mainly because the papers were not indexed by the chosen platforms, and occasionally because they used non-trivial variations of the search keywords (e.g. social cohesion/group dynamics vs social order in [79]). The first sift identified 138 papers as potentially within scope, which were then coded for methodology, type of contribution, participant country of residence, and the ethical concern(s) targeted. The papers were then grouped by primary concern, and the analysis below is the result of repeated iterations by the wider research team. Four papers were excluded at this stage due to being unobtainable online and 17 for being outside the scope of the review, leaving 117 papers for full analysis. A flow diagram of the search process is given in Figure 1, a record of the included papers and categorisations is available online at https://osf.io/p4h2r, and numerical overviews of the review categories are provided in the Appendix.



Figure 1: Flow diagram of the search process.

3 RESEARCH TRENDS

3.1 What Concerns are Studied, and How?

This section describes the distribution of approaches and methods across the reviewed papers in order to answer RQ2. Unsurprisingly, privacy was the most prevalent concern investigated, followed by social interaction. The high-level research approaches adopted show quantitative methods as most common followed by qualitative, theoretical, and finally mixed approaches. Overall there was a greater diversity in methods amongst qualitative approaches, although surveys and interviews together represented approximately 39% of research methods. Figures 2 and 3 show the relative proportions of concerns, approaches, and methods in the review sample. A full breakdown is provided in the appendix.

From the charts it is clear that several ethical concerns appear under-researched given current public debate around voice assistants and digital technology more generally. Misinformation and performance of gender stand out as particular examples of this, although the latter *was* the centre of burgeoning discussion—6 out of the 14 theoretical papers in the review discussed the performance of gender by VAs, and these are likely to form the foundation of future empirical studies. Related to this it appears that certain concerns are perceived to be more readily operationalised than others. While 67% of empirical privacy research utilised a quantitative approach over a qualitative one, for empirical research on social interaction



Figure 2: Approaches used by primary concern.



Figure 3: Methods used by primary concern. Note that papers with similar methods may have their research approaches (e.g. qualitative, quantitative, etc.) coded differently depending on how the analysis was conducted.

both were equally likely, and empirical research on accessibility was *much* more likely to be qualitative (82%).

Our understanding of all of the concerns described in the review, even the more extensively researched such as privacy, is still evolving, and prematurely quantifying them can lead to research losing sight of the users (people) behind the voice assistants we study. Related to debates within the fairness, accountability, and transparency community on how appropriate it is to quantify various aspects of the human experience that then feed into vast assemblages of data processing [51, 65], researchers should be cautious when attempting to quantify the lived experiences that relate to the concerns described in the review. The analysis shows that researchers are much more comfortable doing this for some concerns than for others, and this leads to the literature giving a distorted view of how best to investigate different concerns. When ethical concerns are quantified it invites comparison between the resulting metrics, whether this is intentional or not, which is problematic when definitions vary between data sets; efforts to create privacy labels demonstrate this tension well by often equating the nuanced personal concerns of individuals with abstract scores representing technical device behaviours [45]. This occurs despite a more complex understanding of privacy outside of the voice assistant literature: Nissenbaum's model of privacy as contextual integrity, for example, heavily involves norms and relationships [104]. The 'Seven Veils' model of privacy similarly includes rights and phenomenological aspects that encapsulate different meanings of privacy and clearly benefit from a deep understanding of the human experiences involved [105] that we argue should not be primarily investigated via a quantitative lens.

On the other hand, there clearly are some situations where quantitative approaches are required, such as in studies of the ecosystems that underpin voice assistants through skill/action marketplaces. Here automated approaches are the only or most efficient means to scale analysis for work on many thousands of skills or reviews. Similarly, quantification may be more appropriate for research questions that follow an established model or framework and use terms related to these concerns in a well-defined way.

Despite the 10 year search window the oldest paper in the literature review was from 2015, with 87% of papers published in the past three years. The most numerous year was 2020, comprising 37% of the sample. Comparing research methods and approaches from 2019 to 2021 reveals an increase in the proportion of publications utilising quantitative methods from around 41–42% in 2019 and 2020 to 63% in 2021,[2] likely as research moved online during the coronavirus pandemic.

3.2 Whose Voices are Heard in VA Research?

An ongoing problem in HAI is the lack of diversity amongst the people who are included in research. With this in mind, the community has so far sought to create a welcoming and accessible space for researchers and practitioners. However, the results of the analysis indicate that diversity amongst the *participants* in HAI research remains a major problem. When answering RQ2, 94% of the 85 papers were conducted solely or mostly on participants from North America and Europe (see Table 2). This mirrors a long-running trend in HCI research, with 73% of CHI studies from 2016–2020 recruiting participants from nations with less than an eighth of the world's population [85]. Our review of papers across a range of HAI and HCI venues shows that this effect is even more pronounced in voice assistant research. During this analysis we were forced to reflect on our own prior research, which exhibits the very same 'WEIRD' biases. This is something that we aim to address in future research projects, and hope that others will join us in creating a more inclusive global account of how voice assistants are perceived and used.

Another aspect of participation included in the analysis was the specific populations targeted by research studies. Of the 22 papers that explored the experiences of a particular group, 13 were focused on age, 7 on (dis)ability, and 1 each on trans/non binary and Portuguese speakers (see Table 3). Together these represented just over one quarter of the studies that recruited human participants. Within the papers concerned with age there was a diversity of

[2]The review snapshots were taken between September and November of 2021, meaning that papers indexed after that time are not included in the results.

Country	Papers	Country	Papers
USA	47	Netherlands	2
UK	11	Ireland	1
Germany	10	South Korea	1
Italy	4	Spain	1
India	2	Sweden	1
Brazil	2	Switzerland	1
Canada	2		

Table 2: Participant country of residence for papers with human participants.

concerns across anthropomorphism (5), accessibility (4), social order (2), and accountability (1). In contrast, all of the papers that recruited based on ability were focused on accessibility concerns. Studies looking at specific groups mainly took qualitative approaches (70%), suggesting a focus on lived experiences rather than the gathering of a high level overview. This may present an opportunity for future work (e.g. the state of accessibility across an entire platform).

4 ANALYSIS OF ETHICAL CONCERNS

4.1 Privacy

As with many other areas of research, voice assistant privacy is a concept that encompasses a variety of perspectives. At a high level, most papers aligned along two approaches: eliciting user concerns over privacy when using voice assistants, and measuring an aspect of voice assistant behaviour in order to make claims about the (lack of) privacy offered by those devices.

A major theme amongst exploratory studies about user concerns was data collection and processing by vendors and third parties, including from the use of voice assistants by inhabitants of the home beyond the primary user. Various distinctions were given to illustrate the boundaries of acceptable data use, including between first/third parties [77], normal/sensitive subject matters [11], and whether data was subsequently analysed by humans or machines [92]. Where other entities were mentioned, these were mostly the government [116], or just a vague 'other' with malicious intent [77]. This was sometimes associated with data breaches of first [77] or third parties [136].

Another dominant theme was that of uncertainty when users characterised privacy risks. While the capability of voice assistants to constantly listen to their surroundings was well understood, there was a lack of understanding about when voice recordings were stored by their devices and how this data was subsequently used by vendors. While several papers called for more transparency around data collection and some users were open to having their concerns addressed by vendors [143], it is unclear if this would be convincing given widespread scepticism over the honesty of major players given their vested interests [77]. This uncertainty was complicated by phantom activations [92] and confusion over whether the mute button affected the device's microphone or speaker [77].

The root of these concerns was often vague or incorrect mental models of devices [1, 63], as demonstrated by poor knowledge of available privacy controls (e.g. the ability to replay and delete stored voice recordings) [11]. Where voice profiles were set up they often had high error rates [63], reducing the perceived reliability of the underlying technology. This often resulted in disengagement through what were sometimes called 'informal' coping mechanisms such as unplugging the device [1] or making sensitive requests through other means [11]. It is also reflected in the reasons that participants gave for not taking action and continuing to use their devices, such as having nothing to hide [92], being unable to escape the influence of large technology companies [77], disbelief that companies could store the required volume of data [77], or relying on protection from laws and regulations [92]. Though participants knew that devices could infringe on their privacy, this was often framed as a necessary tradeoff against functionality or convenience [52, 63, 77, 136].

It is clear that user understanding of voice assistants continues to be a key issue, with privacy being a more visible situation where inaccurate mental models come to the fore. This concern has two related components: on-device affordances around recording give insufficient certainty about the device's operation, and users simultaneously lack trust in manufacturers; 'soft' mechanisms used to signal device state (e.g. for a muted microphone) are unconvincing in devices designed to constantly listen, and the poor track records of vendors around privacy and ethics creates a situation where these mechanisms may *never* be sufficient because they are unverifiable and rely on trust. It is therefore likely that effective solutions in this area will rely on local processing, the use of open source software, or external devices that limit data collection capabilities.

A more tangible aspect of VA use concerned the tensions and risks posed by other users of shared devices. Cohabitants often overheard interactions with voice assistants [63] and these concerns frequently blurred into more specific concerns around the ability to purchase items via voice command, which was often disabled as a result [1]. More generally, VAs were seen to artificially create or remove asymmetries around access to data that were already established between cohabitants (see also Section 4.4 on social order concerns). This was typically noticed when requests for content were actioned through someone else's account [77] or upon reflection that guests/children would be able to make identical requests [63]. There was also discussion of how both vendors and the law placed the burden on users to manage the privacy of shared devices, and how it was difficult for 'bystanders' to effectively opt-out of being recorded [92]. Differing mental models of voice assistants by participants led to frequent worries that they or someone else might overstep privacy boundaries, but in many cases the examples given would not be possible on current devices or could be avoided by using personalised voice profiles. Another attack vector that participants expressed concern about was neighbours or other people outside the home's inhabitants giving commands to the voice assistant from outside or while in the home as a guest [1, 63, 143], and one measurement paper verified the efficacy of this attack [91]. Motives were typically vague or absent when discussing these instances of 'shouting through letterboxes', especially given people's propensity to disable voice-based purchasing. Notably, no papers directly explored the possibility of using speaker differentiation to *prevent* use of a VA. In general, more work needs to be done around the use of devices by multiple users. Current architectures often reflect the requirements of data protection regulations that intentionally operate to the boundary of the home and no further, and thus poorly facilitate e.g. guests and cohabitants.

Quantitative work mostly identified devices, skills, or users from encrypted network traffic, using machine learning techniques to classify packets with generally good results [38, 69, 70, 93, 99]. User facing studies included perceptions of voice recording [66] and data sharing [2], as well as the effectiveness of privacy policies [81]. Results supported qualitative findings that the privacy aspects of these devices are generally poorly understood by users. Finally, there was a cluster of work on attack surfaces [43], including through forensic examination of local files and data accessed via APIs [55, 74]. This was linked to the discussion around the influence of the GDPR and existing or desired legal protections for voice assistant data. In general discussions around values and regulation were exclusively focused on the West, with only one paper acknowledging this bias in current research [116]).

4.2 Social Interaction

Work on social interaction covered a wide range of concepts and phenomena. Originally styled as anthropomorphism when planning the search terms, these works also covered ontological explorations of the separability of humans and machines and qualitative accounts of relationships and emotional connections with VAs. The challenge with mapping these facets of social interactions was the extent to which they overlaped; affective experiences are connected to but distinct from emotional connection, and personification is related to anthropomorphism as similes are to metaphors. The theoretical foundations of these papers show a similar diversity, commonly building on the Computers are Social Actors (CASA) paradigm (e.g. [31, 80, 117]), but other theories and models from HCI [147], psychology [150], and communications theory [126] feature widely in the included papers.

A strand of research around the causes and effects of anthropomorphism designed, adapted, and reused question inventories measuring a wide range of social and behavioural constructs. This was typically used to develop a model that explained variations in one factor using the others. Of concern here was also how these effects might be (mis)used in different contexts [13], as social interactions with voice assistants could be seen to work alongside or orthogonally to more logical means of decision making.

Work on the fundamental nature of voice assistants attempted to understand how they fit into existing understandings of technology and social interaction. While there were theoretical contributions in this area there were also many empirical investigations into people's responses to increasingly social devices (e.g. [76, 98, 147]) and what the nature of the relationships they form with them might be [56, 113, 126]. A key theme here was one of categories; ontologically speaking, do people think of voice assistants as people or machines? Studies addressing this often focused on children who were still learning to understand the world, observing how they responded to stimuli from both people and devices including VA-originated social interactions such as displays of friendship or praise [7, 47, 131]. Festerling and Siraj ask whether VAs might cause the emergence of a new intermediate category (the New Ontological Category Hypothesis [68]), with ultimately inconclusive evidence; young participants engaged with compliments from VAs as if they were real (i.e. rather than pretend-play), but often attributed advanced features of VAs to 'human interference' in an attempt order to keep categories pure [47]. Other studies show that children cooperate differently with VAs and humans, such as sharing updates with human collaborators but recognising that voice assistants "do not care much about progress talk" [7]. This also holds true in adults, with relationship development metrics coalescing into a single group that might suggest ongoing purification work (redefining category boundaries to place voice assistants firmly in one or the other) [78, 126]. Pradhan et al. further found that participants fluidly moved *between* categories depending on the behaviour of their voice assistants, treating them as a person during social interaction but as an object at other times [113].

Another recurring phenomenon in empirical work was the use of gendered pronouns as a means of demonstrating or measuring anthropomorphism. People fluidly shift between the use of gendered and impersonal pronouns [113] similarly to the shifts between categories described above, with impersonal pronouns making up the majority of references [117]. These types of responses were often attributed to over-learned, reflexive social routines rather than meaningful displays of social intimacy [87], supported by observations that people often continue these personifying behaviours after learning more about VAs and how they work [139]. There was also a general understanding that social interactions with voice assistants are in some sense inherently satisfying [98, 117], with explanations often focusing on the similarity between these interactions and those found in interpersonal social situations (i.e. the familiarity of conversation) [72]. There is a balance to be struck between the way that the underlying satisfaction from engaging socially with a device can mask or ameliorate its other drawbacks [19] and the way that appearing 'too human' can instil unattainable expectations of a device's capabilities in users, which in turn leads to dissatisfaction [98].

The split into two high level categories, i) the measurement of factors leading to or arising from anthropomorphism and related concepts, and, ii) explorations of how people conceptualise and understand VAs in relation to humans and social interaction, revealed a contrast in concerns and impacts. For anthropomorphism and personification concerns were clearer and centred around the way these behaviours may change people's interactions with devices. However, the notion that anthropomorphism is a challenge to be solved through design is problematic; given the understanding of these responses as part over-learned social routine, part CASA-style subconscious behaviour, it is not clear that widespread understanding of how voice assistants work would effectively counteract our predisposition to treat them as we treat people.

The deep-seated nature of these responses also challenges the view that anthropomorphism and personification are often associated with incomplete understanding. Where this is based on the language of users to and about VAs, such as the use of gendered pronouns, Festerling and Siraj note the difficulty in determining the *actual* meaning of what people say, recommending that "future research could be more critical of the role of language in anthropomorphism" [48]. A related tension surfaces in the literature around CASA and findings that more human-like devices are automatically read by users as more *capable* devices (i.e. they are expected to display human capabilities [25]). However, the potential ethical implications of these questions for work on ontological categories is less clear. Indeterminate results in children and reports of adults

switching categories may suggest a new ontological category, but what would constitute an appropriate response from VA designers if this was determined to be true? The literature tended to focus more on the relevance of results to immediate questions of categories without considering the wider implications for HAI, and it seems unlikely that either outcome would lead to changes in the way that VA conversational interfaces are designed; a more likely impact would be changes in how people's responses to VAs are interpreted by researchers.

4.3 Accessibility

VAs present an interesting combination of opportunities and challenges for accessibility. Their potential user base ranges from those who find it more difficult to navigate visual interfaces, to those who have trouble easily giving verbal commands to VAs and understanding spoken responses. Semi-structured interviews were utilised to discuss frequently used VA functionalities and the issues encountered when accessing them, and this was often supplemented with materials such as recorded videos [40], and manual interactions with VAs using a pre-collected corpus [14, 15, 83]. An interesting alternative approach was to indirectly explore how children access and interact with VAs through parent observations, allowing for the inclusion of an additional secondary perspective [88].

The ability of VAs to accurately transcribe people's voices and communicate smoothly with them was a key theme across the reviewed papers. The accuracy of speech recognition provided by VAs (particularly Google Assistant and Siri [14, 15]) was generally viewed favourablely by users, and those with language impairments had an even higher level of approval [115]. However, performance was less satisfactory for children, with VAs appearing to have been designed without a way to properly bridge the gap between children's and adults' expressive language skills. This was frequently frustrating for children [88, 124], and was made worse when they tried unsuccessfully to seek help [40], or found that the VA could not correctly pronounce their name [124]. Difficulties maintaining conversations were also the subject of investigation, commonly focusing on the short, nonadjustable listening window of VAs which caused problems for children and people with language impairments who may require more time to give a response [40, 88, 115, 124]. Another focus was how people struggled to repair VA conversations, having to rely on external entities (e.g. parents [124]) to maintain dialogues, increasing the difficulty of using VAs [40, 115].

In general there was positive sentiment towards VAs in accessibility contexts. Abdolrahmani et al. argued that VAs were crucial in instilling feelings of independence and empowerment in blind users [3, 121], with similar results related to mobility [34]. Parents meanwhile, acknowledged that VAs had created many enjoyable moments for their children [40, 124], and if interactions with VAs began at a very young age these experiences could influence the way children interacted with other technologies [124]. However, barriers still remain to true inclusivity, with variable performance across languages, accents, gender, and other demographics [83]. Because these studies focused on highly specific populations, there was little engagement with wider issues of accessibility and few comparisons made across demographics (i.e. it is difficult to gain a clear picture of the complete state of accessibility for any given VA). The continual evolution of the voice models used in VAs introduces an opening for follow-up studies, although we did not encounter any such papers in the survey. Another interesting difference that emerged was in framing: performance differences were treated more as *engineering* problems, in contrast with work on e.g. gender, where similar issues were more often motivated by and framed as social inequity (see Section 4.5).

4.4 Social Order

A commonly studied dynamic in the literature was between parents and children, where researchers focused on understanding whether VAs could foster parent-child communication and enhance parental practices. On the one hand, using a VA at home gave parents additional opportunities to improve their communication skills, and the features of VAs also helped parents in achieving their parenting goals and promoted parent-child dynamics [18]. On the other, parents complained that they had to strictly regulate both the amount of time children spent using VAs [18] and access to adult content [130], sometimes even having to be physically present with their children during use [18]; deciding when and how to allow children access to voice assistants can therefore be an additional burden for parents [20], which runs counter to the intention of providing a more relaxed parenting environment.

A major concern raised about voice assistants was the extent to which they could entrench or disrupt domestic power structures. Sharing a VA between household members could create tension where cohabitants did not use the device equally [130], with mismatches between willingness to use VAs in shared spaces leading to a reduction in use and eventually abandonment [138]. The use of VAs within established social orders is generally hierarchical and managed in line with existing household social structures, with users negotiating use of the VA when intentions conflicted [75, 112]. In this way, voice assistants were seen more as tools integrated into existing power structures than disruptive forces that overturn household social orders. This runs counter to fears (particularly in the news[3]) that the adoption of voice assistants could destabilise the social order of the home e.g. by answering requests by children that would be considered rude if posed to a person. There *is* a risk, however, that already problematic power imbalances could be exacerbated by VAs, especially when devices are not controlled by the people that use them (e.g. in intimate partner violence and surveillance in offices, student halls, rental accommodation, etc. [50, 75, 125, 129]).

While analysing the survey papers we found that talking about the social order of the home overlapped with the related concept of group dynamics, whereby the social dynamics of a group are shaped by the emotional state and behaviour of each member [16, 132]. Lee et al. similarly measured how shared device usage affects 'group harmony' as a way to measure changes in group dynamics [79], referring to the ties among group members in terms of mutual support, appreciation, care, emotional attachment, and cooperation [141]. Continued use of VAs appears to have a favourable impact on group

[3] https://qz.com/701521/parents-are-worried-the-amazon-echo-is-conditioning-their-kids-to-be-rude

harmony through psychological satisfaction and dependence developed by users [79], especially when this makes participating in family activities more accessible (see Section 4.3) [130].

4.5 Performance of Gender

A key concern for researchers studying the performance of gender by voice assistants was the feminine presentation of major voice assistants that seems to persist across cultures. This was often justified from a psychological point of view, with studies suggesting that people perceive women's voices and names as sounding more gentle, kind, and caring than men's [35, 123], with VAs read as female therefore presented as more acceptable to users. In addition, the findings of Tolmeijer et al.'s empirical research demonstrated that female voices were significantly more trusted in assistance tasks than compliance tasks [137].

But early findings on CASA suggested that people apply existing gender stereotypes to computers [100], and these harmful preconceptions (e.g. around women's roles in society and the types of jobs they should perform) have influenced the creation of current norms and expectations for the performance of gender by VAs. Given the prevalence of white men on engineering and design teams, the role of VAs in reflecting and reinforcing these stereotypes is the source of intense discussion [35]. In the past, women were expected to perform a variety of stereotypically gendered labour, such as placing orders, giving reminders, seeking information, taking notes and making calls [122, 134]. Feminising VAs was seen as a reflection of male designers' psychological needs and tendencies—engineers tend to create artefacts that fit within their own social spaces—strengthening the connection between women and submissiveness and satisfying other 'heterosexual fantasies' [146].

Given that gendered presentation can be problematic, a series of studies with controlled experiments [137] and interviews [135] explored the factors that cause people to gender devices based on voice and questions around gender-ambiguous voices. Conclusions were polarised. Some findings suggested that investigating voices exhibiting gender ambiguity was worthwhile as gender-ambiguous voices are perceived similarly to gendered voices, and thus do not impact user's trust in VAs [137]. On the other hand, synthesised voices designed to be genderless (e.g. Q[4]) are often coded as male or female by listeners, with Sutton finding that people have specific gender expectations that make this kind of gendering automatic when hearing VA voices [135]. Including genderless voices can itself be problematic if they take the approach of smoothing out differences in voices rather than acknowledging and representing diversity [118]. Q in particular has been criticised for drawing distinctions between trans and male/female voices, as well as presenting trans and non-binary voices as a monolithic mid-point of the binary it is attempting to break free from [118]. As a way forward, it has been suggested that voice assistants could be designed to randomly choose a voice or switch between them [59], but this is not the only cue that influences perceptions of gender in VAs. Other design elements such as the physical appearance of devices/interfaces, product branding, specific pronunciations in the speech, and the activity that the VA is currently performing are also influential [135]. This ties in with gendered preferences for voice assistants, particularly around trust, privacy, ease of use, and mobile self-efficacy [102].

[4] https://www.genderlessvoice.com

4.6 Accountability, Conflicts of Interest, Misinformation, and Transparency

As the above concerns were represented by only six papers between them, we briefly summarise them together here. The one paper coded as accountability measured the efficacy of the certification process for Alexa and Google Assistant skills/actions, finding that 100% and 39% of policy-violating skills were certified by the respective platforms [30]. Another paper discussed the inherent conflicts of interest built into VAs, whereby assistants appeared to be acting in users' best interests whilst also prioritising information and services that benefit vendors (e.g. through shopping platforms) [8]. Of the three papers on misinformation, two focused on the accuracy of information available through popular devices [9, 36] and one on the inefficacy of spoken warnings alongside content identified as misinformation [127]. While requests for information about vaccines were handled reasonably well by Google Assistant and Siri, Alexa understood fewer queries and was less likely to present information from authoritative sources [127]. For news queries, Alexa returned more relevant and timely information, but subtle changes in question phrasing led to significant changes in the relevance and source of information [36]. The paper on transparency closely linked this concern to privacy, claiming that modern encryption mechanisms hamper transparency around data collection by requiring secret symmetric keys (i.e. between assistants and vendors, which users cannot access) [49].

5 DISCUSSION & FUTURE WORK

5.1 Who are Voice Assistants Designed For?

The survey highlights several areas where the interests and needs of the people using VAs fall secondary to those of their manufacturers: data collection for tracking and advertising, the prevalence of female-coded voices as the default, rigid interaction and access control models that are not aligned with inter- and intra-household use, and the lack of unprofitable adjustments to allow more universal access. Some of these design decisions, such as the preference for female-coded voices, originate from the first commercially available voice assistants; as Siri and Alexa did, others followed. In other cases like the neglect of multi-user use, VAs were more likely shaped by data protection regulations that are modelled around the relationship between individual data subjects and corporate data controllers. Finally, issues like poor voice recognition performance for non-native speakers are likely the result of expectations set by the limitations of early voice recognition technologies, designers creating products that work optimally for people like themselves, and the perceived expense of achieving more equitable recognition.

As the technology and expertise required to develop voice assistants and skills become more accessible, it is important that these legacy design decisions are not unthinkingly perpetuated by the devices of the future. Evaluating voice assistants against previous guidelines for human-AI interaction [10] shows that some findings of the literature review are specific instances of wider problems with AI systems. Amershi et al. find that contemporary VAs are

close to meeting some of these guidelines, such as G5 (match relevant social norms) and G7 (support efficient invocation), but the results of the literature survey show that they fall short of others like G6 (mitigate social biases) and G11 (make clear why the system did what it did). Extending this work to produce guidelines that are specific to VAs represents an excellent opportunity to move beyond current design norms and 'reset' assumptions around how voice assistants should operate.

5.2 Widening Participation in VA Research

A clear theme when conducting the literature review was the community's focus on voice assistants used in Western countries; for example, despite the existence of many Chinese and Korean language VAs, none of the studies reviewed recruited participants resident in China and only one recruited participants from South Korea. This is surprising given China's population and the existence of well-known voice assistant brands in the country. Some of these assistants support multiple dialects, suggesting the potential for shared insights across these VAs and e.g., work on accessibility. There is also a risk that participant recruitment is seen as an opportunity to reduce potential variables, at the expense of making the field representative. Revisiting the observation from Section 4.1 that Western legal and cultural norms have strongly shaped the evolution of associated voice assistants, we are not aware of an analysis of the influences on VAs outside of the US and Europe—this constitutes an important piece of future work.

As a result of the above—and as evidenced by Section 3.2—there is a clear lack of diversity amongst those who participate in research on voice assistants. We therefore take this opportunity to present a challenge and provocation for voice assistant researchers: given the recent upheavals to the way that we work and do research, there is no excuse for a field that proudly pursues diversity to continue to exclude those who live outside a handful of wealthy Western countries. The increasing reach of crowdsourcing platforms commonly used in the survey papers such as Mechanical Turk and Prolific Academic significantly lowers the barrier for data collection with under-represented demographics [140], and the quality of the research produced during the coronavirus pandemic demonstrates that collecting qualitative data over the internet is more viable than previously thought. Outside of Western platforms, many others exist that offer diverse participant bases and localisation services to facilitate participation across language and cultural borders. This could be done by not restricting participants based on geography/nationality or, where language is important to the research questions being investigated, including comparative analysis between e.g. native/non-native speakers. This will both broaden the applicability of results as well as identify exclusionary factors that would otherwise go undiscovered.

5.3 Deepening Explorations of Gender

Throughout the survey, issues around gender repeatedly surfaced around how gender is performed by VAs, and how they often seem designed for men (e.g. by having lower accuracy for other voices). Norms around gender can be so tightly woven into home and social structures that the introduction of a device that performs gender *and* affects work done in the home inevitably causes disruption. While it is promising to see initial work on voices around and beyond the gender binary, less focus is given to the gendered effects of voice recognition accuracy and how their design affects existing household relationships and power structures shaped by gender.

Beyond the diversification of design teams and training corpora, there are several approaches that can be taken. Providing more nuanced and inclusive representations of gender is a matter of corporate social responsibility rather than solely a design decision. This is most easily achieved by providing more than one voice, and by not labelling voices by gender (e.g., Google Assistant labels voices with colours). The reviewed literature also highlights the large difference in the role that gender plays in interpersonal and human-computer interactions now compared to when the foundational work in this space was undertaken almost 30 years ago. As such, it is important that we revisit these early studies and their implications from a contemporary perspective.

5.4 The Effects of Habituation

When looking at longer-term usage trends of VAs there is a discussion over the ways that usage changes over time; usage appears to stabilise after an initial playful phase [124], but there is a lack of data available on usage trends beyond the scale of days [11] or months [124]. One question that arises when trying to contextualise results on privacy perceptions and VAs is the extent to which user perceptions and behaviours will change over a longer period of time. Work relating to categories hints at shifting perspectives around humanness and machine-ness [78], which may cause related changes towards other aspects of VAs. Larger-scale changes in cultural and commercial attitudes to data collection by devices and 'creepy' functionality are also likely to manifest in user perceptions, and it may be that as the gap widens between contemporary and early research on voice assistants that researchers need to take care when comparing their results with prior work. An opportunity therefore exists to re-run existing studies to determine how perceptions might be changing in different cultures.

A related longer term aspect of novelty concerns the transparency and accountability of voice assistants as they evolve and become integrated into more devices in the home and beyond. Speculative work on the future of voice assistants [26] imagines futures with ubiquitous voice assistants where people give commands to be answered by whichever assistant is present, *without necessarily knowing who created or controls that assistant.* A key fear raised in this speculative work pertains to undisclosed functionality, where users are unpleasantly surprised by the VA's inferential abilities and the real world effects that the VA can cause. As it becomes the norm to have voice control built into consumer electronics and commoditisation increases the feasibility of assistants from smaller vendors, it will become increasingly important to know which assistant is being used at any given time and (more importantly) the associated capabilities, limitations, and interests involved. Mandatory use is also raised as a concern, which echoes the discussion in the accessibility literature (Section 4.3).

5.5 A Shift in the Human-VA Relationship?

The main conclusion from the analysis of the reviewed papers and subsequent discussion seems to be that VAs are quickly becoming

a ubiquitous presence in people's lives. While initially a curiosity, most people with smartphones now have access to a voice assistant. One way that this ubiquity manifests is in the extension of existing platforms and services, with VAs changing the way these are accessed to make them seamlessly available throughout the home (e.g., music and search). This transition comes naturally as people are already familiar with e.g. Spotify, and so the choice to use it via a VA quickly becomes subconscious.

When considering the long term impact of voice assistants one can draw parallels with how the smartphone drastically changed the ways that people relate to one another and the patterns for social interaction. While smartphones are inherently mobile and thus extend interactions outside of the home in ways not previously possible, voice assistants primarily change the way that people interact with digital technology *within* the home. By becoming a persistent part of the home environment, voice assistants subtly change the way that we interact with each other in the home. The rigid interaction and family models built into these devices constrains the social interactions that people share with others, and can cause social friction. Clear examples of this arise around cohabitation and managing users within and between family units where VAs do not adhere to existing norms around those relationships and concerns over parenting [57]—in this sense, VAs constrain people's ability to be a partner/roommate/parent in artificial ways.

Another ready comparison with smartphones is the ability to opt-out of owning and using the technologies whilst continuing to participate in society. The disruption caused by smartphones has ushered in "a new way of living wherein the smartphone is ordinary, necessary, and integral" [62], one where the key decision is whether to *own* the device. With VAs the opposite is often true—the packaging of voice assistant software with new smartphones, TVs, and headphones means that a huge number of people already have access to a voice assistant, making the choice one of use rather than ownership. This could make it easier for VAs to become a necessary or default means of interacting with digital platforms and services in the future.

5.6 Unexpected Discoveries

While preliminary work on the background literature and prior work had suggested that anthropomorphism was a major category of ethical concern, analysis of the included papers revealed a web of related but distinct concepts that extend beyond this relatively narrow classification. As a result, this concern was renamed 'social interaction' to better reflect the range of research questions that deal with how people interact with voice assistants (differentiated from social order concerns that focus on how voice assistants affect relationships with other people). This also opens up the range of potential research questions to include a wider variety of social interactions and, as VAs become more sophisticated, the different ways in which we might communicate and build trust with VAs beyond simple task-oriented interactions.

Another unanticipated class of concern emerged around misinformation. A common discussion point around other devices and platforms that facilitate access to information, voice assistants present an unfortunate collection of attributes that make them particularly apt to perpetuate misinformation. Not only does voice as a medium heavily promote short, easy to understand interactions, it also makes it difficult to provide information on sources and links to further reading. There is potential for companion smartphone apps and displays built into smart speakers to introduce more nuance to fact-finding, but their efficacy depends on users interacting with a secondary modality after initiating a verbal search for information with the assistant. Other avenues of exploration could include the verification of fact sources and mandatory communication to users about the source of a skill's information before and during use. Exploration of this topic represents an exciting opportunity for future work, but will be made difficult by the dominant architecture where skills are hosted by third party developers outside of the control of vendors (resulting in difficulties when vetting and verifying third party software) with very recent work showing evidence of third-party skills serving misinformation [21].

5.7 Limitations

We struck a balance with the databases we searched between accurately representing the literature, volume of results, and ease of running complex searches. Running searches in English across English-speaking venues inevitably influenced the literature returned, but at the same time major publishers describe themselves as global institutions and we note that many region specific conferences such as ACM's Asia CCS use English as their working language. The addition of hand-picked papers that evaded the systematic searches will also have influenced the results, but these represented less than 2% of the total number of papers screened and were carefully balanced to maximise the coverage of the review. Despite this, there will also have been in-scope papers that were not included in the analysis.

When classifying metadata we did not distinguish between a work's target and effective demographic (e.g., studies that did not set out to examine particular groups but recruited from pools with known demographic biases like university students). The same applies to the small number of cases where the country of residence was not reported and was thus coded as the platform used for recruitment (the U.S. represents ~4% of the world's population but almost half of Mechanical Turk workers [107]).

6 CONCLUSION

We systematically reviewed 117 research papers on ethical concerns with VAs, consolidating the incredible work done by the community. We highlight areas of consensus, disagreement, and gaps in the body of knowledge that can guide future research, and consider the distribution of approaches and methods across the field. Our findings show that some concerns like privacy were much more likely to be operationalised for quantitative research than others like accessibility, and that the people participating in these studies are overwhelmingly from North America and Europe. We outline key areas to be addressed by future work, such as widening participation and revisiting early results from a contemporary perspective, with the hope of making future VAs more equitable and inclusive.

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APPENDIX: STATISTICAL RESULTS AND LIST OF REVIEWED PAPERS

Sub-population	# of Papers
None	55
Children	10
Blind and visually impaired	3
People with Dysarthria	2
Older adults	2
Trans and non-binary	1
Users with disabilities	1
Users with motor impairments	1
Portuguese Speakers	1
Young Adults (18-36)	1

Table 3: Number of papers recruiting specific groups, written as reported.

Primary Concern	Works Included
Accessibility	[3, 4, 14, 15, 23, 28, 34, 40, 83, 88, 115, 121, 124]
Accountability	[30]
Social Interaction	[7, 19, 27, 31, 39, 46, 47, 56, 72, 76, 87, 95–98, 113, 117, 126, 131, 139, 145, 147, 150, 152, 153] [13, 17, 80, 114]
Conflict of Interest	[8]
Gender	[6, 35, 60, 86, 102, 118, 122, 123, 134, 135, 137, 146]
Misinformation	[9, 36, 127]
Privacy	[1, 2, 5, 11, 12, 22, 24, 29, 32, 33, 38, 41–43, 52–55, 58, 63, 64, 66, 69–71, 73, 74, 74, 77, 81, 82, 84, 89–93, 99, 106, 108, 110, 116, 119, 120, 125, 128, 136, 142–144, 155]
Social Order	[18, 20, 75, 79, 112, 130, 138]
Transparency	[49]

Table 4: Complete list of papers included in the review.

Concern	Primary (All)	Primary (Quant)	Primary (Qual)	Primary (Theory)	Primary (Mixed)
Privacy	50	29	14	2	5
Social Interaction	29	12	12	2	3
Accessibility	13	2	9	0	2
Gender	12	4	1	7	0
Social Order	7	1	5	1	0
Misinformation	3	2	0	0	1
Accountability	1	1	0	0	0
Conflicts of Interest	1	0	0	1	0
Transparency	1	0	0	1	0
Concern	Secondary (All)	Secondary (Quant)	Secondary (Qual)	Secondary (Theory)	Secondary (Mixed)
Privacy	9	2	5	2	0
Social Interaction	7	4	3	0	0
Social Order	5	0	4	1	0
Gender	3	1	2	0	0
Autonomy	3	0	2	0	1
Transparency	2	0	1	1	0
Accessibility	2	0	2	0	0
Accountability	1	0	1	0	0
None	89	44	25	10	10

Table 5: Primary and secondary concern by approach. Note that papers may have zero or mulitiple secondary concerns.

The Ethical Implications of Generative Audio Models: A Systematic Literature Review

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ABSTRACT

Generative audio models typically focus their applications in music and speech generation, with recent models having human-like quality in their audio output. This paper conducts a systematic literature review of 884 papers in the area of generative audio models in order to both quantify the degree to which researchers in the field are considering potential negative impacts and identify the types of ethical implications researchers in this area need to consider. Though 65% of generative audio research papers note positive potential impacts of their work, less than 10% discuss any negative impacts. This jarringly small percentage of papers considering negative impact is particularly worrying because the issues brought to light by the few papers doing so are raising serious ethical implications and concerns relevant to the broader field such as the potential for fraud, deep-fakes, and copyright infringement. By quantifying this lack of ethical consideration in generative audio research and identifying key areas of potential harm, this paper lays the groundwork for future work in the field at a critical point in time in order to guide more conscientious research as this field progresses.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies** → **Artificial intelligence**; • **Applied computing** → **Sound and music computing**.

KEYWORDS

generative models, audio, algorithmic ethics, broader impacts, literature review

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1 INTRODUCTION

Generative models have been a large focus of AI researchers over the past few years, and recently the public has seen these models first-hand in public facing algorithms like ChatGPT [46] for text, DALLE-2 [50] for vision, and Jukebox [16]† for music. At their core, generative models are a type of AI system that take in vast amounts of training data to be able to produce a novel item that is similar to and statistically likely to exist in the data it was trained on. Though generative models have been around for decades with origins in the 1980s [9], the outputs of these models saw unprecedented advances with the introduction of the transformer in 2017 which revolutionized the field by introducing a mechanism called "attention" that allowed for much more accurate and complex outputs of generative models [61]. Generative models may continue to improve as (a) their training data becomes larger (for text, imagine the entire internet) and (b) researchers continue to make advances in the architecture of the models. This paper focuses specifically on the current landscape of generative audio models.

As generative audio models continue to develop and grow both in popularity and complexity, this research seeks to understand the ethical landscape of potential impacts of these models. In particular, this paper explores what potential harms have been considered by researchers creating deep generative modeling projects, and seeks to understand the extent to which researchers in this domain are considering the broader ethical implications of their work. When a layperson is introduced to generative models their instinct is to jump to potential negative impacts [19, 32], however, researchers in the field are wary to do the same. There has been minimal research into the ethical implications of deep generative audio models, and this paper calls out the need for that to change by providing a comprehensive and thorough overview of the current potential negative impact domain.

Systematic literature reviews are effective at evaluating the current landscape of a research domain—especially when the potential corpus to analyze is a tractable number. In addition to identifying trends, they are particularly helpful in identifying gaps in the field. This is an agenda setting paper at the right time—it is important to both diagnose the degree to which research papers on generative audio models are discussing ethics and encourage the plethora of researchers to come to include a negative broader impact in their analysis prior to the field being clogged by studies without an ethical component. As will be discussed in more detail below in Section 2.1, innovations in text and vision typically precede those in generative audio, so this same analysis conducted in the generative text and vision domains would include 3,099 and 5,287 articles, respectively. 884 papers in the generative audio domain prior to screening is comparably a more tractable endeavor to undertake, and it is feasible to raise the concern of lack of negative impacts earlier in this specific area.

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†References for works included and analyzed in the systematic literature review corpus can be found in the Appendix. They are denoted in text with the dagger† superscript.

This paper makes two concrete contributions. Primarily, it quantifies the degree to which researchers in the generative audio domain consider the ethical implications and negative broader impacts of their work. The author finds that less than 10% of the corpus ($n = 16/171$) discuss any potential negative impact. Secondarily, this paper examines the different negative broader impacts explored by these 16 papers and thematically discusses the potential ethical implications. This paper calls to attention the need for researchers in this domain to consider the ethical implications of their work, and suggests a starting point for topics to consider by examining issues already brought to light by their peers.

2 BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS

2.1 Generative Audio Models

Generative models can largely be grouped into three buckets: text, vision, and audio. Due to the nature of the data underneath the models, advances typically start in the textual domain, followed by images, and finally audio. The most clear-cut example of this is when Vaswani et al. introduced the first transformer for text in 2017 [61], which led to the first image transformer in June of 2018 [47], and shortly thereafter, the music transformer [28]. At their core, generative models use a large amount of training data in order to predict something that is similar to and statistically likely to exist in the dataset it was trained on. Compared to text generation models, which are limited by the finite vocabulary of the language being used, audio can have exponentially larger potential combinations of sound occurring at once; even if just isolating to the possible keys of a piano, the possibilities become almost intractably large extremely fast in the granularity of milliseconds.

Despite these data challenges, many advances have been made in the generative audio domain mainly in the areas of music and speech generation. Music generation is particularly tricky due to the long-term relational dependencies of melodies and other musical structure that may have occurred at a timestamp far earlier than the current frame needing to be generated [28], but self-attention and relative positioning [53] enabled that hurdle to be overcome. Generative models today can condition on artist and genre to steer the style of music [16]†, or even condition on text and melodies to create high-fidelity and quality musical compositions [2]†. Advances in speech have varied from speech enhancement and denoising [48, 67]†, text-to-speech (TTS) generation [24, 35]†, accent conversion and style transfer [49, 69]†, and audio in-painting to reconstruct gaps in speech data [59]†. Most of the research in generative audio models is concentrated in music and speech generation; however, there are some cases where the models generate specifically non-music, non-speech sounds such as auxiliary sound effects for movies or birds chirping [23, 71].

Though audio generation can also be tied together with visual generation in the forms of videos and deepfakes [17, 22, 40], motion to create dance moves and choreography [6, 60, 70] or lip movements and other speech gestures [30, 63, 66], this work focuses on generated audio in the singular medium. For example, while text-to-speech works will be evaluated, speech-to-text work will not, nor will creating a dance routine simultaneously with music. The goal of this isolation of audio is to understand explicitly the ethical discussions of the audio domain, not to potentially conflate these issues with ethical discussions of other fields.

2.2 Broader Impact

Especially with the public spotlight on deep generative models such as ChatGPT [46], both computer scientists and the public alike have become aware of the potential negative impacts of these models and other algorithmic systems. A recent thematic review of broader impact statements of the Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPs) 2020 conference found that some of these broader categories related both to how consequences are expressed such as specificity and uncertainty as well as different areas of impacts expressed such as bias, the environment, labor, and privacy [45]. A recent survey of the socio-technical harms of algorithmic systems identified five major types of harms: representational, allocative, quality-of-service, interpersonal, and societal harms [54] in order to establish conceptual alignment for future research and to encourage consideration of these negative impacts and reduce the harm these systems cause.

There are a variety of approaches to encourage broader impact consideration in scientific research. The US National Science Foundation and other grant providers require a Broader Impacts Criterion in both grant applications and the peer review process [38], though there is mixed reception around this being the best manner to encourage consideration of societal impact [26, 51]. Other researchers in computer science have suggested that a simple change to the peer review process would substantially change the degree to which computer scientists consider the negative impact of their work [25].

Another method recently proposed utilizes crowdsourcing to anticipate different societal impacts of algorithmic decision making systems [7], which puts the consideration in the hands of the layperson in addition to the algorithm designer in order to have a comprehensive idea of potential impacts. Other methods include impact assessment tools such as algorithmic impact assessments (AIAs) which strive to both identify varying areas of impact in addition to establishing steps to hold the algorithm creators accountable [12, 41]. Ethics and society review (ESR) was a recently piloted program that facilitated ethical and societal reflection as a requirement to secure funding. They found that 100% of participants saw the benefit in the process and were willing to continue submitting projects in this manner [8] indicating that the demand is there among researchers to consider ethical impact.

The uniting thread of all of these methods is to encourage societal impact beyond the main text of the paper, or even to require a third party to assist in the ethical evaluation. This paper instead focuses on research papers themselves (as opposed to a secondary document/evaluation such as a grant proposal or peer review) and the extent to which they consider broader impact in the main body and appendices.

Prior research by Weidinger et al. has established a taxonomy of ethical and social risks of harm from language models [65], which in this paper is extended to generative audio models and helps guide the definition of broader impact. Weidinger et al. classify six areas of harms of language models: (1) discrimination, exclusion, and toxicity, (2) information hazards, (3) misinformation harms,

(4) malicious uses, (5) human-computer interaction harms, and (6) automation, access, and environmental harms. Discrimination, exclusion, and toxicity focuses on the different treatment of social groups in an oppressive manner. Information hazards concern privacy violations and safety risks, such as compromising privacy due to systems that leak or enable the correct inference of private information. Misinformation harms have to do with the dissemination of misleading information leading to material harm, for instance in the cases of medical misinformation leading to serious consequences for people's quality of life [58]. Malicious uses are explored more broadly for AI systems by Brundage et al., and they define these as "all practices that are intended to compromise the security of individuals, groups, or a society" [10]. Human-computer interaction harms encompass harms from the direct interaction of humans with the AI system. Finally, automation, access, and environmental harms highlight downstream application impacts that benefit access to select groups and not society at large.

For the purposes of this paper, and guided by Weidinger et al's taxonomy detailed above, broader impact is defined as a possible impact or application of the research/model on the broader society, rather than the scoped technological or scientific purposes. For example, the explicit purpose and scientifically relevant impact of a music generative model is to create music, possibly with long-term structure [28] or guided by text inputs [2]†. A positive broader impact in this case could be to creatively inspire musicians, and a negative impact could be copyright violations. This analysis will focus primarily on the extent to which negative impacts are discussed and explored, but will also note when researchers discuss positive broader impacts beyond their scientific scope.

2.3 Research Questions

The formal research questions addressed by this paper are:

(1) To what extent is the current study of generative audio models addressing negative broader impacts?
(2) What ethical considerations of generative audio models has the field examined?

3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY

In order to address these two research questions, the author conducted a systematic literature review (SLR) of research articles published over the last five years in the generative audio domain. The reporting of this SLR was guided by the standards of the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines [43] in order to transparently and concisely evaluate the current state of the field. This was an ideal methodology for these research questions due to the nature of the study evaluating what the field has done in a comprehensive and broad sense.

3.1 Search Strategy

3.1.1 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria. Formatively, this study analyzed full research papers in the generative audio domain. This does not include extended abstracts or book chapters, nor any other form of writing outside of full research papers. The main text and included appendices were analyzed, but no supplemental materials published outside of the main body (e.g., a linked website with additional findings) were examined.

Topically, these papers had to be about generative audio models. More specifically, a generative audio model had to be the primary focus of the paper. This meant that the paper either had to introduce a generative audio model/application, or analyze and discuss generative audio models as their focus of study. It was also important that these models were not conflated with another domain as their final output; for instance, though text-to-speech was included due to the output being in the audio domain, speech-to-text would be classified as a text generative model for the purposes of this paper and consequently excluded from analysis. Similarly, generative models resulting in video outputs were excluded due to conflating the visual domain with audio; the sole focus of the output of these models had to be entirely in the audio domain. Additionally, anything that was not generative in output (e.g., a classification model) was excluded.

Temporally, these papers had to be submitted or published in the last five years (at the time of research inception, this meant between February 1, 2018 and February 1, 2023). The reason for this was that this field is constantly evolving and any advances typically build upon the previous state-of-the-art performance which would rarely date prior to five years of research, especially prior to the introduction of the transformer in mid-2017 [61]. This means that research published over five years ago is not nearly as relevant to the field today as anything published recently.

3.1.2 Keyword Search. As a result of this aforementioned criteria (in Section 3.1.1), a keyword search was iteratively performed until the desired pool of research was included by the cast net. After many iterations of specific keywords such as "music", "speech", and "sound", the author eventually expanded the search to simply "generative models" and "audio" in order to comprehensively encompass as many potentially relevant articles as possible.[1]

The search was initially focused on articles published in the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) database, resulting in 444 potential articles meeting the criteria. After examining the articles included in this search, it quickly became clear that a large portion of the state-of-the-art research papers were either published outside of this domain at conferences such as Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPs) and the International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, & Signal Processing (ICASSP), or simply not peer reviewed at an academic conference, yet widely respected in the field. Industry research is also growing in dominance in deep learning research [3]. It was important that these key papers from companies such as OpenAI and Google were included even though they may not be subject to peer review. Some of the most influential papers in this corpus were not peer reviewed yet still well regarded and well cited, like Jukebox [16]† which was written by a team of researchers at OpenAI in 2020 that already had over 300 citations at the time of writing this paper. In order to include all of these essential papers in the corpus, the search was extended to include papers submitted to arXiv, which is an open-access non-peer reviewed archive for millions of research articles in the fields

[1] Initially, the search was targeted around "deep generative audio models", but it became clear quite quickly that the "deep" part of the term was too narrow and not widely adopted until recently (this search only resulted in 242 articles).

of physics, mathematics, computer science, quantitative biology, quantitative finance, statistics, electrical engineering and systems science, and economics [5]. This added an additional 440 articles to the initial screening pool, 65% of which were peer reviewed. When screening these abstracts, it was noted whether the paper was peer reviewed or submitted to a conference/journal, however there were no notable trends among this specific dimension of whether the paper was peer reviewed.

The final query terms for ACM and arXiv were as follows:

- **ACM**: [[[All: "generative model"] OR [All: "generative models"] OR [All: "model generating"]] AND [All: "audio"]] AND [E-Publication Date: Past 5 years]"
- **arXiv**: "("generative model" OR "model generating") AND "audio" date_range: from 2018-02-01 to 2023-02-01"

3.2 Title and Abstract Screening



Figure 1: PRISMA Flow Diagram detailing the corpus screened and analyzed in the paper. After starting with an initial pool of 884 papers, 16 duplicates were removed, 653 records were excluded during the abstract screening stage, and 44 full-text articles were excluded during the eligibility review, resulting in 171 full-text articles for review and analysis.

The author screened all 884 abstracts of the articles identified from the search (444 from ACM and 440 from arXiv). 16 duplicates were removed, and the remaining abstracts and titles were examined to determine eligibility. 653 articles were removed due to not meeting the criteria specified in Section 3.1.1. The vast majority of these articles were excluded due to not actually being about audio (46%), but rather about text, vision, or some other central topic or output such as choreography. The second largest category of exclusion was due to papers not being a generative model (30%) but rather something else such as a predictive or classification model. The remaining articles excluded at this stage were due to generating something in addition to audio like gestures or images (11%), proposed a metric to evaluate the models or incrementally improve a specific aspect of the methodology without actually discussing any audio outputs or use cases (9%), were all-encompassing and discussed generative models like text and vision in addition to audio (3%), or were book chapters or abstracts instead of full papers (1%). This is detailed in the screening section of Figure 1. The papers were excluded on a hierarchical list of criteria—for instance, it was possible that a paper was both not about audio and not a generative model, but would have been excluded for not meeting criteria (a) that the paper needed to be about audio, and thus these percentages for the later exclusion criteria are lower bounds.

3.3 Full Text Screening

The title and abstract screening was quite thorough, so of the remaining 215 full-text articles only 44 additional papers were excluded resulting in 171 total papers for the analysis. Of these 44 papers, 20 (45%) were removed for proposing a metric to evaluate the models or incrementally improve on a specific aspect of the methodology and not actually produce any audio output or apply to real data. 9 (20%) were removed due to generating something in addition to audio such as gestures or video. 7 (16%) were removed due to not being a generative model in nature but rather a classification or prediction model. 5 (11%) were removed because they were not a full research paper but rather something like an extended abstract or book chapter. The remaining 3 (7%) were excluded because their encompassing focus was too broad and included text and vision generative models in addition to audio models. Figure 1 details the full flow diagram of papers from inception of the keyword search stage to final corpus.

The final corpus includes 140 papers from arXiv, 15 from the ACM database, and 16 which were in both databases. The vast majority of these papers (n = 122; 71%) were peer reviewed at respected conferences and journals—only 18 papers from arXiv (13% of arXiv papers) were not peer reviewed. The conferences/journals with at least five papers in the corpus were:

(1) Interspeech (n = 24; 14%)
(2) Transactions on Audio, Speech, and Language Processing (n = 17; 10%)
(3) International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (n = 12; 7%)
(4) International Society of Music Information Retrieval Conference (n = 9; 5%)
(5) International Conference on Multimedia (n = 7; 4%)
(6) Neural Information Processing Systems Conference (n = 6; 4%)
(7) International Conference on Machine Learning (n = 5; 3%)

All content and thematic analyses discussed in the remainder of the paper were done by qualitative coding by the author. Research papers in the generative audio domain tend to fall either into two categories: music and speech. In this corpus, 77 (45%) papers were about music and 103 (60%) were about speech. Some papers include both (n = 13; 8%), either by being datatype agnostic or by focusing on generating a singing voice. 4 papers (2%) were about non-speech, non-music sounds, such as auxiliary sound effects like birds chirping and dogs barking. The summary of these topics by year can be found in Table 1.

Of the 103 speech papers, 48 (47%) were about pure speech generation, 32 (31%) were about text-to-speech, 24 (23%) speech enhancement/denoising, 8 (8%) accent conversion or style transfer, and 3 (3%) audio inpainting or gap filling. There were additional topics scattered across papers, and the aforementioned categories were not mutually exclusive (for example one paper was about audio inpainting for controllable TTS models [59]†). Of the 96 papers for which the language was either explicitly specified in the paper or able to be found through researching the datasets ($n = 7, 7\%$ were not obtainable through the author's research), the vast majority utilized at least one English dataset ($n = 78$, 81%), with 69 papers (72%) exclusively using English training data. Of the remaining papers, 10 (10%) used Mandarin, 9 (9%) used Japanese, 3 (3%) used Korean, and any other language specified was used in at most 2 papers. Notably, if a paper ever used a language other than English, it was explicitly stated. When the only language used was English, it was often necessary to research the datasets mentioned in order to determine the language utilized in the model, indicating further bias towards English in these models.

Of the 77 papers about music generation, 62 (81%) used only instruments or non-lyric vocals, 10 (13%) used pure vocals and lyrics, and 5 (6%) used lyrics, vocals, and instruments. Of the 15 papers generating lyrics, 8 (53%) explicitly mentioned the language chosen. 5 (63%) used Mandarin Chinese, 4 (50%) used English, and 1 (13%) used Japanese, with 2 of the papers using both English and Mandarin datasets. 13 (17%) of these music generation papers were evaluations of existing music generation models, and the remainder ($n = 64, 83\%$) proposed a new model. 8 (10%) focused on the HCI component of the models, 8 (10%) used audio inpainting or gap filling, 5 (6%) generated a musical score in addition to audio, and 4 (5%) used a style transfer technique. The author did not note any additional topical trends within the corpus.

All Papers: Descriptive Statistics by Year					
Year	**All Papers**	**Music**	**Speech**	**Both**	**Other**
2018	**15**	5	9	0	1
2019	**34**	17	18	2	1
2020	**35**	18	19	2	0
2021	**41**	19	27	6	1
2022	**42**	16	28	3	1
2023*	**4**	2	2	0	0
Sum	**171**	77	103	13	4
Papers Discussing Negative Broader Impact					
Year	**All Papers**	**Music**	**Speech**	**Both**	**Other**
2018	**0**	0	0	0	0
2019	**1**	0	1	0	0
2020	**5**	3	2	0	0
2021	**4**	2	3	1	0
2022	**4**	1	3	0	0
2023*	**2**	2	1	1	0
Sum	**16**	8	10	2	0

Table 1: Descriptive statistics of research papers analyzed by year. Includes papers in music, speech, both music and speech, and other (non-music, non-speech) sounds. Note that 2023 only includes data for January.

4 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

4.1 Overview

Of these 171 papers, only 16 (9%) discuss a negative broader impact, all of which were qualitatively coded by the author. 50% ($n = 8$) of these were in music papers, 63% ($n = 10$) were in speech papers, 13% ($n = 2$) were in both music and speech papers, and none were in the papers dealing with other non-music, non-speech audio. Temporally, there has been a slight increase over time of papers discussing negative broader impact, with none in 2018, 1 in 2019, and 4-5 each in 2020-2022. There have already been 2 papers in 2023 (with only one month of data for January) that discussed negative broader impacts, one of which was solely a music generation paper and the other discussed both music and speech generation. A full description of every paper discussing negative broader impacts can be found in Table 2. 65% ($n = 112$) of the papers included in the corpus considered at least one positive broader impact of their work, so these researchers were considering broader impact—just not negative impact.

Even though only 9% ($n = 16$) of the entire corpus discusses negative broader impacts, the papers that shine light on these ethical concerns do so in a manner that is inclusive to the vast majority of models in the domain. For instance, there are 32 text-to-speech (TTS) papers in the corpus, and though only 2 mention negative broader impacts, they do so in a manner that implicates all TTS models: Jaehyeon Kim et al. noted, "TTS models could also be abused through cyber crimes such as fake news or phishing. It means that TTS models could be used to impersonate voices of celebrities for manipulating behaviours of people, or to imitate voices of someone's friends or family for fraudulent purpose" [34]†. The negative broader impacts are not specific to the model proposed in the given paper, but rather to the entire domain of TTS and other speech models. Thus, the findings in this paper are not that 91% of papers in the corpus have no need to discuss broader ethical impacts, but are far more likely to have neglected that discussion.

With the exception of one paper that was devoted almost entirely to a negative impact of audio models (energy consumption) [18]†, these papers tended to devote only 1-3 sentences to the potential negative impacts. Of these 16 papers, only 6 (38%) papers included a short section devoted to ethical considerations or broader impact, and 2 of those were on the last page of the appendix. Of the remaining 9 papers, 2 (13% of 16 papers) had 3 sentences devoted to negative impact, 5 (31%) had 2 sentences, and 2 (13%) had only part of one sentence. These sentences were primarily in the introduction ($n = 6$ papers; 38%), discussion ($n = 4$; 25%), and one sentence was in the conclusion (6%).

Jarringly, 2 of the 16 papers that discussed negative impacts explicitly mentioned that they did not have any intention to release their models or code due to the potential for misuse. Agostinelli et al., who created a text-to-music generation tool, stated: "We acknowledge the risk of potential misappropriation of creative content associated to the use-case...We strongly emphasize the need for more future work in tackling these risks associated to music generation — we have no plans to release models at this point" [2]†, and Sungwon Kim et al., who created a TTS model, noted "Given this potential misuse, we've decided not to release our code. Although we do not release the code, due to the adaptation

ability of the diffusion-based model, we expect that the adaptive TTS technology is highly likely to be misused like Deepfake" [36]†. Two highly impactful papers both raise the alarm bells on the potential for misuse of generative audio models, and decided the safest mechanism for prevention of misuse was to not make their models or code available for public use.

4.2 Negative Broader Impacts in Music

Eight of the total papers in the corpus discussed potential negative broader impacts in the context of generative audio models for music. The main themes discussed in these were a loss of agency/authorship when creating the music, a general quelling of creativity, Western bias on the creation of music, copyright infringement, and cultural appropriation. They are discussed in more detail below, ordered chronologically by when papers first discussed the issue.

4.2.1 Loss of Agency and Authorship. Two papers [21, 27]† brought up the potential loss of agency that human creators would feel when creating music with the assistance of an AI generative model. Both of these papers were evaluations of existing models rather than creating their own generative model, and instead looked at the human-computer interaction (HCI) component of music generation models. Frid et al. noted that the co-creation of music from humans and machines "raises interesting questions about autonomy, agency and authorship in human-AI interaction in creative practice" and found that the human creators were hesitant to give the generative models too much control [21]†, indicating that musicians and creatives at large are wary of the recent focus on autonomous music generation. Huang et al. echoed this finding and found that novice musicians as well found it challenging to create jointly with AI and that "users desire greater agency, control, and sense of authorship vis-a-vis the AI during co-creation" [27]†.

4.2.2 Creativity Stifling. The most common potential negative impact discussed in the corpus was the stifling of creativity as a result of AI music generation [20, 27, 57, 68]†. This focused on the repetitive nature of the music generation and that by limiting the creative output to possibilities of the model may result in a similar bound on human creativity. Suh et al. noted that these models "may limit creative scope of humans" [57]†, and Zhao et al. found that people "may be not satisfied if the generated musical content tends to mimic the training set without exhibiting true creativity" [68]†. Both Huang et al. and Esling et al. suggested that a shift needs to be made toward steerable and interpretable models [68]†, but "introducing the notion of creativity in machine learning is difficult, as explicitly designing losses for creativity is an uphill battle" [20]†. Many of the papers in the corpus position the generative audio models as a tool for assisting in the creativity process, so acknowledging the counterpoint is important as well.

4.2.3 Predominance of Western Bias. Zhao et al. proposed a lightweight music generation model to generate instrumental music. In analyzing their output they found that their model was sensitive to Western music theory in that it "it maintains the configuration of the circle of fifths; distinguishes major and minor keys from interval vectors, and manifests meaningful structures between music phases" [68]†. Machine learning models often perpetuate biases in the training data, and generative models are no different. It is important to be aware of the composition of the training data to understand what biases could be perpetuated.

4.2.4 Copyright Infringement. Perhaps one of the most important considerations of generative music models—both ethically and potentially legally—was only discussed by two papers in the entire corpus: copyright infringement. There are many legality questions surrounding the copyright of AI generated content. At least three lawsuits in early 2023 are currently discussing whether models trained on publicly available works constitute copyright infringement [31]. Research in the text and vision domain is even geared toward specifically identifying to what degree generative models are memorizing training data [11, 39, 56] or are producing outputs with "substantial similarity" to items in the training set [62]. However, in this corpus of generative audio models, only two papers discussed the potential for copyright infringement [2, 20]†. Esling et al. focused their research on maximizing novelty in the music generation system in order to subvert the potential for copyright issues and increase creativity in their generation [20]†. Agostinelli et al. "conducted a thorough study of memorization, adapting and extending a methodology used in the context of text-based LLMs" in order to determine the degree to which their model memorized the training dataset and understand the potential for copyright infringement [2]†. Of the remaining 75 papers discussing generative music models (97%), not one discussed the potential for copyright infringement or training data memorization.

4.2.5 Cultural Appropriation. Generative audio models sometimes train on incomprehensible amounts of training data, and it follows that some of this training data comes from cultures outside the creator of the algorithm or users of the model. The ethical implications of this have been discussed in terms of computer vision; generative models make it easier to use content from marginalized cultures without any accompanying investment in or engagement from the community, even if the creators or users of the model are unaware of the use of that content [52]. Agostinelli et al. acknowledged that this extends to audio; "The generated samples will reflect the biases present in the training data, raising the question about appropriateness for music generation for cultures underrepresented in the training data, while at the same time also raising concerns about cultural appropriation" [2]†. A fundamental lack of understanding of model attribution will result in cultural appropriation if the training data contains content from marginalized communities.

4.3 Negative Broader Impacts in Speech

Ten of the 16 papers in the corpus that discussed potential negative impacts did so in the context of speech generation. The ethical issues discussed exclusively relative to speech generation were fraud and phishing, misinformation and deepfake generation, security and privacy concerns, and the use of voice biometric data to identify people. They are discussed in more detail below, ordered chronologically by when papers first discussed the topic.

4.3.1 Phishing and Fraud. Six papers in the corpus discussed the potential misuse of the generative speech models for committing phishing and fraud. Habib et al. noted that "progress in controllability raises the prospect that bad actors may misuse the technology either for misinformation or to commit fraud" [24]†. Wang

All Papers that Discuss Negative Broader Impact				
Music				
Reference	**Year**	**Conf./Journal**	**Paper Topic**	**Negative Broader Impact**
Frid et al. [21]†	2020	CHI	Interface to generate music for videos	Loss of agency/authorship
Zhao et al. [68]†	2020	N/A	Musical chord generation	Creativity stifling; Western bias
Huang et al. [27]†	2020	ISMIR	Human+AI collaboration of music creation	Creativity stifling; Loss of agency/authorship
Suh et al. [57]†	2021	CHI	Human+AI collaboration of music creation	Creativity stifling
Esling et al. [20]†	2022	AIMCC	Music generation novelty	Copyright infringement; Creativity stifling
Agostinelli et al. [2]†	2023	N/A	Text-to-music generation	Copyright infringement; Cultural appropriation
Speech				
Reference	**Year**	**Conf./Journal**	**Paper Topic**	**Negative Broader Impact**
Habib et al. [24]†	2019	ICLR	Text-to-speech	Fraud/Phishing; Misinformation
Wang et al. [64]†	2020	MM	Deep fakes for voices	Deepfakes; Fraud/Phishing; Security/Privacy
Jaehyeon Kim et al. [34]†	2020	NeurIPS	Text-to-speech	Deepfakes; Fraud/Phishing; Overuse of speaker data
Li et al. [37]†	2021	CCS	Adversarial attacks	Security/Privacy
Sisman et al. [55]†	2021	TASLP	Voice conversion	Fraud/ Phishing
Deng et al. [15]†	2022	USENIXSS	Voice anonymization	Use of biometric data to identify people
Sungwon Kim et al. [36]†	2022	N/A	Targeted user speech generation	Deepfakes; Fraud/Phishing; Security/Privacy
Cho et al. [13]†	2022	ICASSP	Model attribution	Fraud/Phishing; Security/Privacy
Both Music and Speech				
Reference	**Year**	**Conf./Journal**	**Paper Topic**	**Negative Broader Impact**
Douwes et al. [18]†	2021	ICASSP	Energy consumption of audio models	Energy consumption/Climate change
Huang et al. [29]†	2023	N/A	Text-to-audio generation	Misinformation; Overuse of speaker data; Unemployment

Table 2: Table describing the 16 papers in the corpus that discussed negative broader impacts, split by generative models concerning music, speech, and both music and speech. Table details the reference, year paper was published/submitted, conference or journal submitted to (or N/A if not peer reviewed), paper topic, and the negative broader impacts, organized topically by year.

et al. echoed this concern by noting that these bad actors could use victims' voices for fraudulent purposes [64]†, and Sisman et al. specifically called out the need for anti-spoofing countermeasures as "voice conversion technology could be misused for attacking speaker verification systems" [55]†. Fraud can occur whenever an audio model targets the speech of an individual and is able to impersonate them, either for formal voice verification fraud or impersonating people close to the victim in order to mislead them. Text-to-speech models especially have the potential to be misused by bad actors due to the ease of guiding model output with a target speaker as the medium; Sungwon Kim et al. acknowledged that their model, Guided-TTS 2, was "likely to be misused as voice phishing for individuals" [36]† and chose not to release their code or models to the public. Cho et al. proposed a model that was designed to focus on attribution, which in their words is "much more difficult to spoof" [13]† compared to non-attributable models.

4.3.2 Misinformation and Deepfakes. A slightly nuanced aspect of speech generative models' ability to impersonate victims exists when the victims are famous and the model misuse can take the form of misinformation or deepfakes. As Wang et al. noted "some attackers and criminals misuse them for illegal purposes like a politician giving an unreal statement, which may cause a regional crisis" [64]†. Jaehyeon Kim et al. noted that TTS models were particularly vulnerable to deepfakes, stating that "because of the ability to synthesize natural speech, the TTS models...could be used to impersonate voices of celebrities for manipulating behaviours of people" [34]†. This risk is amplified when the needed length of

speech to train a targeted speaker output is small—Sungwon Kim et al. remarked that a "10-second untranscribed speech for the target speaker is easy to obtain through recording or YouTube clips for celebrities, and the contribution of [their model] that reduces the data required for high-quality adaptive TTS makes a lot of room for misuse" [36]†. As these models continue to become easier to use, the prevalence of deepfakes and misinformation online will continue to grow.

4.3.3 Security and Privacy. Three papers in the corpus discussed the potential for risk to security and privacy of individuals as a result of speech generative models, especially when they only require small segments of training data to produce a realistic voice of a targeted speaker. Cho et al. stated, "these models and their synthetic contents inevitably pose a variety of threats regarding privacy" [13]†, and Wang et al. noted that the ease of use of these models results in "security and privacy concerns to everyone while we are enjoying the fun of these synthesized fakes" [64]†. Sungwon Kim et al. asserted that due to the short length of speech necessary to target a speaker, this type of content can be easily obtained and resultingly "have a fatal effect on the security system through voice" [36]†. In addition to targeted impersonation attacks, there are also machine-induced audio attacks on intelligent audio systems such as hidden voice commands; Li et al. designed a solution to detect targeted machine-induced audio attacks in order to add some level of security to audio-triggered devices and mechanisms [37]†.

4.3.4 Non-consensual Use of Biometric Data. Voiceprint is a type of audio finger-printing that has been around for decades that can identify individuals with varying levels of accuracy [14, 33]. Though there have been recent efforts to protect biometric data such as the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), an immense amount of voice data is accumulated daily on social media apps like TikTok and Facebook [15]†. Deng. et al. designed a model to protect voiceprint through the anonymization of voice data. They acknowledged that this could be abused, and stated that they would take proper measures to prevent the abuse of the anonymization system [15]†.

4.4 Negative Broader Impacts in Both Music and Speech

Finally, there were two papers that discussed negative broader impacts of generative models both in terms of music and speech generation from an output-agnostic standpoint. In these papers, three main topics were presented that were neither specific to speech nor music models. These topics were the energy consumption of audio models, overuse of speaker data, and unemployment. These are discussed below. One of these papers discussed misinformation, but only in context of speech models so it is discussed above in Section 4.3.2.

4.4.1 Energy Consumption of Generative Audio Models. There was one paper in the entire corpus (0.6%) that discussed the carbon footprint of audio models, and the entire paper was dedicated to the topic [18]†. Douwes et al. proposed a new multi-objective measure to evaluate deep generative audio models that takes into account both the quality and energy consumption of the model.

There are two types of energy consumption of a generative model: the energy required to train and to generate samples. Current research points to machine learning models being at risk of becoming a significant contributor to climate change, and proposes the total energy consumption and carbon emissions of training these models be reported alongside the other standard suite of metrics [4]. This energy consumption also varies by region and country in which the electricity is generated—Anthony et al. find that a single training session of a standard medical image segmentation model trained in Estonia would emit about 61 times as much carbon dioxide equivalent on the basis of their global-warming potential versus a model trained in Sweden, or in laypersons's terms the difference between travelling 9.04 km by car versus 0.14 km by car [4]. In this corpus, Douwes et al. focused on specifically increasing awareness of the energy consumption of generative audio models and elevating computational complexity and carbon footprint in line with other model quality metrics [18]†. Though this is the only paper in the corpus that discusses the carbon footprint of generative audio models, this is a metric relevant for every single model.

4.4.2 Overuse of Speaker Data. There is a tendency across all various realms of machine learning and AI to reuse publicly available datasets, in fact 76% of the papers in the corpus that used data to train models utilized datasets that were already available. Many of these datasets containing recordings of human voices are only comprised of a few human beings. Jaehyeon Kim et al. described this concern; "Many corpus for speech synthesis contain speech data uttered by a handful of speakers. Without the detailed consideration and restriction about the range of uses the TTS models have, the voices of the speakers could be overused than they might expect" [34]†, and Huang et al. echoed this exact sentiment: "the voices in the recordings might be overused than they expect" [29]†. When signing up to record speech for a singular research project, people may not realize the potential extent to which their voices could be used in future models and other outputs.

4.4.3 Unemployment. Finally, Huang et al. discussed unemployment as a potential result of lowering the barriers to entry for various audio generation jobs. They postulated that their model "lowers the requirements for high-quality text-to-audio synthesis, which may cause unemployment for people with related occupations, such as sound engineers and radio hosts" [29]†. There are varying findings on the macro-level effect of artificial intelligence on employment, which has found to depend on inflation and can be netural or positive for employment [44]. However, on a micro-level different innovations of AI such as a generative music model can certainly displace current jobs as noted by Huang et al. [29]†. Though current research in economics suggest that AI could instead increase a demand for jobs in these domains, the types of jobs will shift as a result of the automation—called "job displacement" [1]—which is worth noting in papers proposing models that could displace current jobs.

5 DISCUSSION

These findings highlight the necessity of generative audio researchers to place a greater emphasis on the consideration of the negative

impacts of their work. The severity of the negative impacts highlighted by the few papers that acknowledge them indicates that the vast majority of these researchers of generative audio models are not considering negative impact due to negligence, rather than lack of necessity. An argument could be made that computer scientists are not obliged to think in terms of broader societal impacts, however, the vast majority of them are already doing so. The catch is that they are only thinking in terms of *positive* societal impacts; 65% ($n = 112$) of the papers included in the corpus considered at least on positive broader impact of their work. These researchers are already inclined to consider broader impact; they just need to consider negative impact as well.

The author first acknowledges the limitations of the corpus. One limitation is that this research was focused on the generative audio domain in isolation—it did not include videos or any other multimedia audio synthesis. The potential landscape for negative impact in this multimedia is compounded, and things like realistic video deepfakes [42] can become potentially more harmful. Another limitation is inherent to the scoping of the SLR: the keyword search in both databases likely did not encompass every single generative audio paper published in the last five years. Though the author attempted to cast as wide a net as possible for the initial identification of articles, it is inevitable that some papers eluded the search and thus were not included in this analysis.

Revisiting the areas of ethical and social risks of harm in language models (LMs) established by Weidinger et al. [65] discussed in Section 2.2, this systematic literature review uncovered harms in all of the categories established in this taxonomy. Discrimination, exclusion, and toxicity harms can include cultural appropriation and the predominance of Western bias found in this review, however this area of harms can extend much further than what was found in the discussions in the corpus. Weidinger et al.'s classification of information hazards directly translated to security and privacy concerns of audio models. Misinformation harms were also able to be extended from text to audio, specifically in speech models. Malicious uses can take different forms in audio models than they do in LMs, such as deepfakes, but the concern of fraud and phishing can be examined in a similar manner as that of LMs. Human-computer interaction harms varied slightly due to the focus on the loss of agency and authorship and creativity, whereas LMs focused on unsafe use due to users misjudging or mistakenly trusting the model. Automation, access, and environmental harms encompassed the energy consumption of audio models, unemployment, overuse of speaker data, use of biometric data to identify people, and even copyright infringement in the sense that it undermines creative economies.

The 16 papers that mentioned potential negative impacts brought to light a wide variety of ethical implications that the field at large needs to consider going forward during the design process, the implementation of their models, and the publication and *publicization* of their research. Two papers, one in music generation [2]† and one in speech [36]†, decided that the potential risk of misuse by bad actors was too great to release their models to the public. This is a consideration that every researcher working on deep generative audio models should make prior to allowing their models to be public facing. If the potential risks outweigh the benefits, then it may not be justifiable to release code or models.

At a minimum, researchers focusing on generative audio models going forward need to consider the set of impacts discussed in this paper. For research generating music, that means loss of agency and authorship of the human creator, stifling of creativity, a predominance of Western bias in their data and any other data biases for that matter, the possibility of copyright infringement, and cultural appropriation. For speech models, it is essential to consider misuse pertaining to phishing and fraud, misinformation and deepfakes, security and privacy concerns of these models, and non-consensual use of biometric data. All generative audio models need to be aware of their carbon footprint and potential energy consumption—ideally explicitly listing these metrics in tandem with other representations of quality. They also need to consider the overuse of speaker (and singer/musician) data being used in much larger corpora and models beyond the immediate use-case of the model, and the potential job displacement of people who are currently employed to perform the task that the model could be replacing.

This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of potential impacts—merely a minimum set of considerations for generative audio models going forward. It should be seen as a starting point to begin thinking in terms of broader impact beyond simply the potential benefit to society. The potential impact on society should be considered at all stages of the research process, and researchers need to take steps to prevent potential harm. This paper does not simply call for more researchers to put a disclaimer at the end of their research papers, though that is a necessary aspect as well. Generative audio researchers need to consider potential negative impact all throughout their research and ensure that all stages of their work—from brainstorming to implementation and publication—are conducted with care and consideration for society at large.

6 CONCLUSION

In this paper, the author conducted a systematic literature review of research papers in the generative audio domain in order to understand both the degree to which current researchers consider the negative broader impact of their work and also thematically evaluate the types of ethical implications discussed. The findings indicate that less than 10% of research papers discuss any negative broader impact in their work, even though 65% consider potential positive broader impacts. This small percentage is not reflective of the degree of necessity of considering negative impact because the issues brought to light by the few papers doing so are raising serious ethical implications and concerns like the potential for fraud, deepfakes, and copyright infringement. Two of the papers even explicitly noted they had no plans to release their models or code due to the strong potential for misuse. This paper quantifies the lack of ethical consideration of researchers in the generative audio domain at a critical point in time and lays the groundwork for future work in the field to consider potential negative impacts as work in this field progresses.

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A REFERENCES FOR WORKS INCLUDED IN SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW

This appendix includes the full citation for each of the 171 works included in the full text analysis in the systematic literature review. If a paper was additionally cited in text in the main body of the paper with a dagger[†] symbol, that citation will align with the standard references above and their full citation is listed again below alphabetically by last name with a numbering system that does not align with in-text citations.

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Robust Artificial Moral Agents and Metanormativity

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ABSTRACT

This paper explores the relationship between our ignorance concerning certain metanormative topics and the design of ethical artificial intelligence (AI). In particular, it will be maintained that because we cannot predict in advance which metanormative conclusions a sufficiently intelligent ethical AI might reach, we have reason to be apprehensive about the project of designing such AI. Even if we succeeded at designing an AI to engage in ethical behavior, there is a distinct possibility that the AI might eventually cease to behave ethically if it reaches certain metanormative conclusions. The candidate conclusions include ones such as the denial of the alleged authority or overridingness of ethics and the conclusion that there are no ethical facts or properties (i.e. moral error theory). It will be argued that the target AI could conceivably reach such conclusions, and in turn this could cause them to abandon their ethical routines and proceed to cause great harm.

KEYWORDS

machine ethics, metaethics, artificial moral agents, ethical AI, existential risk

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1 INTRODUCTION

One of the most common worries about the project of developing ethical AI is that we lack the first-order ethical knowledge that would be necessary to design them (e.g. see [7] and the references contained therein). In other words, we are ignorant of what the correct moral principles concerning how persons ought to behave are.[1] Thus, it would be highly ethically risky for us to attempt to design AI systems that are meant to behave ethically or engage in ethical decision-making that might impact us. This is certainly a major issue that would need to be adequately addressed before we could confidently design ethical AI. But there is a related issue, which has received less attention in the machine ethics literature (if any) and that warrants our consideration. The issue has to do with our ignorance concerning certain metanormative topics, specifically questions about the nature of normative properties and facts, such as how ethical norms interact with other seemingly authoritative norms and whether ethical properties even exist in the first place. Our ignorance about some of these fundamental questions pertaining to metanormativity is significant because we cannot merely assume that an ethical AI would adopt certain realist assumptions upon consideration of these topics, and a sufficiently intelligent ethical AI might very well possess the capability of engaging in such theoretical reflection. Naturally this raises the question of what might ensue if a sufficiently intelligent AI that had been designed to behave ethically reached certain metanormative conclusions that we might not want it to reach, given our intention for the AI to be a moral agent.

In this paper, I will explore the relationship between our metanormative ignorance and the design of ethical AI. In particular, I will maintain that because we cannot predict in advance which metanormative conclusions a sufficiently intelligent ethical AI might reach, we have reason to be apprehensive about the project of designing such AI. Even if we succeeded at designing an AI to engage in ethical behavior, I will argue, there is a distinct possibility that the AI might eventually cease to behave ethically if it reaches certain metanormative conclusions, which I will describe in more detail later on.

The paper is structured as follows. First, I will begin with some set-up. Following [19], I will provide a description of a couple of different types of ethical AI we might aspire to create, and I will state which kind of AI my argument is supposed to target. Next, I will lay out my argument that there is reason to worry about the target AI since they might conceivably reach certain metanormative conclusions, such as denial of the alleged authority or overridingness of ethics or the conclusion that there are no ethical facts or properties (moral error theory), that could cause them to abandon their ethical routines, and this could have disastrous consequences for humans. Finally, I will consider a couple of objections.

2 BACKGROUND

Moor [19] characterizes a few different types of artificial moral agents (AMAs) that we might seek to design. In lieu of describing them all here, though, I will simply mention the types that are relevant to the set-up of my argument. In particular, *explicit ethical agents* and *full ethical agents* will be considered. To begin, explicit ethical agents are AI systems that are programmed to invoke ethical concepts explicitly. Moor's example of this kind of agent is a hospital computer that is programmed "to let some personnel access some information and to calculate which actions what person should

[1] Some ethical theorists (e.g. particularists [11]) might take issue with this way of characterizing first-order ethical knowledge because they do not believe that ethical principles are necessary for ethical behavior or perhaps that such principles even exist in the first place. To the extent that they do believe we can have some ethical knowledge, though, they might instead characterize the issue as one about our ignorance of whatever such knowledge would be necessary for designing ethical AI.

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take and who should be informed about those actions."[2] Also, Moor characterizes a "robust" explicit ethical agent as a system that is able to make and justify plausible ethical judgments, and it does seem true that an activity like this would require the use of at least some ethical concepts.[3] A full ethical agent, on the other hand, "can make explicit ethical judgments and generally is competent to reasonably justify them." This system would be similar to a robust explicit ethical agent, but it would also be even stronger in certain respects. According to Moor, it would be an agent that resembles an "average adult human" in some ethically salient ways, namely, consciousness and free will.

Now, by *robust artificial moral agent* (or *robust AMA*) I will mean any AI system that is capable of explicit ethical reasoning, in Moor's sense, and of engaging in theoretical deliberation about ethics. The behavior of this type of AI would be determined, in part, by the exercise of these and whichever other agential capacities that are minimally necessary for morally responsible agency. It need not be as humanlike as Moor suggests in their description of a full ethical agent, though. It might not, for instance, be conscious, but it could be. Certainly no such AI currently exists. We are still very much in the early days of machine ethics! However, like numerous other authors who have begun to worry about the future of AI, including what existential risks might be in store for us, I take it that it would be prudent to start considering what dangers might lie ahead now, lest we recklessly design some AI that does end up causing significant trouble. In addition, because one of the primary aims of machine ethics is to design a moral agent that is not only capable of ethical reasoning but also does in fact behave ethically, that is how we should imagine such an agent in the context of the forthcoming argument. The question I raise in this paper is the following: if we succeeded at designing a robust AMA, is there any reason to believe that the agent in question might eventually behave unethically? And not just behave unethically because it engages competently in ethical reasoning, attempts to perform a right action, and fails to or accidentally performs some other wrong action instead. Rather, the question I am interested in exploring in this paper is whether or not a robust AMA might *intentionally* behave unethically in a routine manner because, say, it decided to abandon its ethical design upon reaching certain metanormative conclusions.

It is also worth noting here why the focus is specifically on robust AMAs rather than just a general AI system.[4] The reason for this is simple. It might not be all that surprising that a general AI that is not also a robust AMA could conceivably act unfortunately since it is not designed to act ethically in the first place, and it might engage in unfortunate behavior for any number of reasons.[5] I am choosing to target robust AMAs in particular because they are the more difficult case, as they are designed to act ethically and are capable of theoretical reflection on ethics, and no stronger assumptions about their capacities are required (e.g. that they are conscious).

A final observation that should be made here concerns how my argument could serve to undermine our confidence in the project of developing ethical AI. As [28] point out, one of the major motivations that is often submitted in favor of developing AMAs is that doing so would prevent AI from harming humans. If my argument succeeds, though, then this motivation for developing AMAs is severely limited. Obviously my argument would not supply us with a reason to worry about relatively unsophisticated ethical AI, such as implicit ethical agents and perhaps some subset of explicit ethical agents, namely, those agents that do not have the capacity to engage in reflection on theoretical questions about ethics or normativity more generally. However, it would give us reason to worry about the potential behaviors of more sophisticated AI and robust AMAs in particular. At this stage, one might then ask why we would be interested in developing robust AMAs in the first place if reasonable concerns exist about them. This is not the place to have an extended discussion of this topic, but I will at least briefly mention that robust AMAs could have some distinct advantages as compared to merely implicit ethical agents. For example, they could perhaps assist us with our own ethical decision-making capabilities by helping us to reflect on what might be going right or wrong in our own ethical thinking, and they might even help us wrestle with some fundamental questions about normativity, which sounds exciting!

3 ARGUMENT

In this section, I will present the argument that we have reason to worry about how robust AMAs might ultimately behave, despite the assumption that they would initially be designed to behave ethically. In short, the idea is that if ethical machines were to become sufficiently intelligent (i.e. robust AMAs), then they might conceivably conclude that some form of moral error theory is correct or they might reason that morality is not actually an authoritative normative system after all, which is to say that they might have opinions on certain philosophically controversial questions in metaethics, and this could have disastrous results.[6] We cannot predict exactly how a robust AMA might behave if it began to regard morality as a sham of sorts, but I will aim to show that we do have some positive reason to believe that it would behave unethically if it no longer regarded ethical constraints as binding and also possessed other goals that it could more efficiently realize through unethical, rather than ethical, means.

[2]Now, certainly it is far from obvious that such a computer would require any ethical concepts in its programming in order to make these kinds of judgments. Why couldn't one just program the computer to allow a certain set of people to access the relevant information and to advise those people to perform certain kinds of actions under certain conditions without ever introducing any ethical notions into the programming? This is a possibility that Moor himself does not consider but seems worth noting.

[3]Perhaps one could justify an ethical judgment merely by appealing to non-moral facts and properties alone, but could one count as making an ethical judgment in the first place without the deployment of at least one ethical concept? I think not.

[4]By general, or strong, AI I just mean the typical meaning of this term as it is used in artificial intelligence research, which characterizes a general AI as a (currently hypothetical) system that is intelligent in much the same way as humans are in that it can reason about or solve problems across a wide variety of contexts (hence, general AI).

[5]For example, witness the paperclip maximizer [3], a hypothetical superintelligent AI whose only goal is to generate as many paperclips as possible, even if that means transforming all of earth into "paperclip manufacturing facilities." See [4] on the orthogonality thesis, instrumental convergence, and perverse instantiation to obtain a more general sense of how extremely intelligent AI could cause significant trouble for us. Also, see [27] who considers four different philosophical positions regarding the source of normativity and concludes that "the values and goals of a superintelligence will depend on which source(s) of normativity it will find and draw from."

[6]Indeed, they might endorse any number of antirealist conclusions about morality specifically or normativity more generally!

I began this paper with the observation that one of the major worries about the project of developing ethical AI concerns our ignorance of first-order ethical knowledge, and it seems appropriate to begin the argument in this section by saying a few things about why our ignorance of metanormativity is significant in this context. First, I submit that if we *knew* certain realist conclusions about ethics to be true, such as that there are distinctively authoritative ethical norms that typically override competing norms and that practical rationality demands that we act in accordance with such norms, then plausibly a robust AMA would come to these same metanormative conclusions since it would be at least as knowledgeable as us with regard to normative and metanormative matters (this is by stipulation, given the definition of *robust AMA*)[7] and again we would be assuming that we have knowledge of such matters in this scenario, which implies that we have reasonable and true beliefs about these topics.[8] We should expect, then, that a robust AMA would converge on the same reasonable and true beliefs as us here. But now, we might also wonder whether knowledge is even necessary for robust AMAs to converge on the same beliefs as us. It might be the case that although we do not know any of the aforementioned realist conclusions, it is nevertheless rational to believe in these conclusions, and so an intelligent agent, such as a robust AMA, would be rational to assent to them. The problem with this line of thought, though, is that it might also be rational to assent to certain antirealist metanormative conclusions. That it would be rational to assent to either realist or antirealist conclusions, in the absence of knowledge about these matters, seems true since many would regard disagreements among philosophers about metanormative questions as reasonable disagreements, and those theorists do not often accuse each other of irrationality (at least in print!).[9] If that is correct, then our ignorance regarding metanormative topics is important because it is an open possibility that a robust AMA might rationally accept one of a wide variety of metanormative conclusions, and doing so could affect its behavior in ways that are harmful to us, as I will soon explain.

3.1 Which Metanormative Conclusions?

The first step in the argument is to specify which kinds of metanormative conclusions are the ones that are such that it might be bad for us if robust AMAs were to assent to them. I will not be discussing the plausibility of such conclusions at length since doing so is not germane to the goals of the paper, but it should be noted that many intelligent philosophers have endorsed some version of these conclusions, and so we cannot rule out the possibility that an extremely intelligent AI might also do so. I will focus my attention on two specific conclusions that are potentially problematic, though there could be more. It might be said that any metanormative conclusion that implies that the objective normative authority that ethical norms are commonly assumed to have is not actual could be problematic, but I will not defend that general claim here. Instead, I will leave it to the reader to consider whether other sorts of conclusions might also be problematic if a robust AMA were to endorse them.

The first conclusion is moral error theory. Now, such an error theory might take many different forms, but in general, moral error theories hold that ordinary moral thought and talk suffers from widespread error. As [17] helpfully notes, there are two steps in a typical error-theoretic argument: (i) the *conceptual* step involves deciding what a term means, what semantic content is "non-negotiable" or perhaps essential to a term; (ii) the *ontological* step involves arguing that nothing exists that satisfies that semantic description, and thus the term's extension is empty. For illustration, an error theory about *wrongness* might (i) assert that our concept of wrongness presupposes that there are objectively prescriptive properties and then (ii) claim that because there are no such properties in the world, there is no such thing as wrongness [18].

The second conclusion is the denial of the distinctive normative authority of ethical norms as compared to other norms, which amounts to a kind of deflationism about ethical norms.[10] Commonsense morality, it is often supposed, grants special authority to ethical norms in the sense that these norms are thought to be particularly important and weightier than most other norms, such as ones of etiquette. To illustrate, if one could save someone from serious injury but only at the cost of being impolite toward someone else, then one ought to be impolite in order to prevent the injury because preventing a serious injury is ethically significant and impoliteness is merely a matter of etiquette. Now, one thing that is especially interesting about this type of metanormative conclusion is that one might deny that ethical norms have any particular importance or that they are more authoritative than other norms while still maintaining a realist ethical stance (e.g. [9]). Of course there are many different characterizations of realism in the metaethical literature, but most would agree that someone who posits objective ethical facts (whatever those amount to!) counts as a moral realist, even if they additionally deny that ethical norms outweigh other norms. Even a realist, robust AMA might deny that ethical norms are so authoritative then, and this could have troubling implications for us, as I will now argue.

We cannot merely assume that robust AMAs would reach the metanormative conclusions we might want them to reach, such

[7] Importantly, I am also assuming that robust AMAs would not be moral idiots despite their great intelligence and ethical reasoning capacities. It took some time to develop chess AI that could effectively compete with the best human chess players. Similarly, it could also take some time before robust AMAs become very proficient ethical reasoners, but I am assuming for the sake of argument that they already are. In addition, according to one influential set of views in moral epistemology, intuition is required for ethical knowledge (see [23] for an overview of ethical intuitionism). Because I am assuming that robust AMAs would be at least as intelligent as us in the (meta)normative domain, it should also be presumed that they possess whatever capacities are necessary for gaining ethical knowledge, and these might (or might not) include intuition. Further, if it were true that intuitive capacities are inextricably tied to emotional capacities, then robust AMAs would require the latter as well, and accordingly consciousness might be necessary after all.

[8] Maybe this purported implication could be seen as controversial, given the debate in epistemology concerning the analysis of knowledge, including whether it can be analyzed at all, but I will not further address that issue here. For more on this topic, see [16].

[9] It should be noted here that I am implicitly denying epistemic uniqueness, the view that, "Given one's total evidence, there is a unique rational doxastic attitude that one can take to any proposition," [30]. Even if uniqueness were true, though, we still would not actually know which metanormative conclusions are the ones that it would be rational to endorse, and so we would remain incapable of predicting which metanormative conclusions a robust AMA would reach.

[10] Two related positions that philosophers often discuss are moral rationalism and the view that moral reasons override or outweigh other types of normative reasons. A standard formulation of the former position can be found in [1] who writes, "Moral Rationalism is the view that if an act is morally required then it is what there is most reason to do." On overridingness, [13] writes, "The thesis of moral overridingness is the thesis that moral verdicts are always in some sense supreme whenever they come into conflict with the verdicts of a distinct normative domain."

as that ethical properties do exist (contra error theory) and that ethical norms are especially important (contra deflationism), just because they would initially be designed to behave ethically and expected to act accordingly.[11] Furthermore, we certainly cannot predict in advance whether or not they would accept some form of moral error theory or reject the alleged normative authority of ethics. By comparison, when it comes to human moral reasoners, we cannot predict which metanormative conclusions that a given human agent who considers such matters might reach. Our best available guide to whether we could predict a robust AMA's metanormative conclusions is what we actually observe in humans, but intelligent and reflective humans endorse a large variety of philosophical conclusions, and it is not clear that we have any reason to think that intelligent and reflective AMAs would be any different in this respect.[12]

How plausible is it, though, that moral error theory is true or that ethical norms lack any special normative authority? Should we be especially concerned about this if these are simply fringe philosophical theories? In response, among the community of theorists who carefully deliberate about these matters, these and other relevant theories are certainly on the menu of options.[13] To the extent that we could divide up our credences toward all the separate options, arguably some of our credences should go to those theories because we could not reasonably be certain that they are false. In light of this, we could not reasonably be certain that a robust AMA would not endorse one of these theories.

3.2 The Good Case

Before we finally address the question of what could happen if a robust AMA endorsed moral error theory or a kind of ethical deflationism, though, it will be instructive to consider how we could expect things to proceed if a robust AMA accepted a kind of ethical realism that grants special authority to ethical norms (and I mean special authority in the sense of rational overridingness). This will be instructive, I take it, because it will give us a distinct (and nice) possibility to contrast the bad case with. A robust AMA would presumably be a very intelligent AI system, and if it assented to the aforementioned realist position, it would judge that it has decisive reason to conform to ethical demands even whenever such demands conflict with other normative demands, perhaps even ones of self-interest on behalf of the AI itself. In contrast to human agents, who can be akratic or behave in ways that they knowingly regard as unreasonable owing to certain psychological frailties, robust AMAs could consistently act in accordance with their practical judgments regarding which actions are the most reasonable ones for them to perform (assuming they would not also possess such psychological frailties, which admittedly could be controversial). Although they *could* do so, why think that they always *would* perform the actions that they judge are most reasonable? Because presumably they would be programmed to do so, as it is not clear that there would be any *reason* to program them otherwise. Even if they could somehow modify this feature of their design, they would need to judge that they have a reason to do so, but there cannot be a *decisive* reason against performing the actions that one judges are most reasonable, and presumably they would recognize this, given their extreme intelligence.[14] If this is correct, then they would certainly behave in ways that they would regard as ethical since that would be the most reasonable thing for them to do, given their ethical realist commitments. So, in short, a robust AMA that has these commitments would be reliably ethical, and unless it were tampered with (or revised its own metanormative commitments), there would be nothing to cause it to behave unethically.[15]

3.3 The Bad Case

Now, onto the bad case. Is there reason to believe that a robust AMA might begin to behave unethically if it endorsed some version of moral error theory or deflationism about ethics? While we obviously cannot predict the exact ways in which a robust AMA might behave if it reached one of these conclusions, there is a strong possibility that it could abandon its ethical behavior if it were to adopt one of these metanormative commitments and begin to cause great harm, and that should be enough for us to worry about this issue.[16] The argument that I will present has the following form:

Premise 1 (P1): Robust AMAs would be capable of causing great harm.

Premise 2 (P2): Robust AMAs could adopt certain metanormative commitments that could lead them to cause great harm.

Premise 3 (P3): If P1 and P2, then the development of robust AMAs would be extremely risky.

[11] One might inquire here about the types of metanormative conclusions we might want robust AMAs to reach and why it even matters whether they reach certain realist conclusions if their ethical behavior would not even be affected by their assent to those conclusions. In response, I cannot provide a full description of the types of metanormative conclusions we might want them to reach, but I can at least assert that we should be concerned about this matter because there is reason to believe that their behavior would be affected by their metanormative conclusions, realist or otherwise, as I will explain.

[12] It seems plausible that other elements of our psychology besides our intelligence and reflective capacities (e.g. behavioral dispositions and past experience) are responsible, at least in part, for the fact that humans reach differing philosophical conclusions, but then we might wonder whether every robust AMA would reach the same philosophical conclusions if they were all equally intelligent and reflective, and they did not possess these other aforementioned psychological features that humans do (or sufficiently similar analogues). It is not clear what, if anything, could account for any differences in opinion they might have, besides maybe what data they are supplied with.

[13] According to the most recent PhilPapers survey [6], "which surveyed the philosophical views of 1785 English-speaking philosophers from around the world on 100 philosophical questions," 62.07% of those surveyed accept or lean towards moral realism, 26.12% accept or lean towards moral anti-realism, and 12.68% have some other view on the matter.

[14] The contrast with rightness here is notable. If they were programmed to always perform the actions that they judge are right, but they were also capable of changing this design feature, they would need to judge that they have a reason to do so. In this case, if they were moral realists of the relevant kind, then they would not judge that they have decisive reason to do so, but if they were antirealists, say, then they could so judge. In fact, if they were global normative error theorists, à la [24], then they might be totally unpredictable because we could not anticipate any of their behavior by invoking their reasons to act.

[15] One further possibility worth mentioning here is that a robust AMA could be realist but still reach first-order ethical conclusions that we find unsatisfying, even if we agreed that they were reasoning correctly. The ethical truths might not be pretty! In addition, if they were to endorse non-naturalism, then they could become skeptical about our ability to know ethical truths, as some have argued that such truths might be unknowable in principle, given their ontological nature (cf. [2]). So, further problems could certainly arise with realist AMAs.

[16] In a way, the argument might best be interpreted as invoking some form of the precautionary principle, which generally recommends caution when it comes to the development of new technologies about which we lack substantial knowledge and are potentially harmful. As [14] puts it, "[T]he precautionary principle concerns how we should act when it is scientifically reasonable to suspect a risk to health or the environment, but the evidence is not strong enough to show conclusively that the risk exists. The precautionary principle says that in such cases we may, and often should, take measures against the potential danger."

Conclusion: The development of robust AMAs would be extremely risky.

With respect to P1, I take it that this part of the argument requires the least explanation and defense. This is because it seems definitely true that a sufficiently sophisticated AI would be intellectually superior to humans in numerous ways, such that it could out-compute us, out-information process us, and just generally outsmart us. Specifically, it could have unparalleled access to all sorts of information systems and be capable of processing large amounts of information at speeds much greater than any intelligent human is capable of, which suggests that it could almost certainly cause great harm swiftly and in novel ways that we have not seen before. Whatever goals such an AI system might have (so long as they are not too farfetched), plausibly it would be intelligent enough to figure out how to attain those goals, or it would at least generally be better or more efficient at attaining its goals than humans are. A robust AMA, as I have characterized such a system, would be extremely intelligent, and perhaps it would be as intelligent as the sophisticated AI just described (or if it is not, then it could at least conceivably reach that level of intelligence); this is an open question. In view of this, it is important to recognize that a robust AMA would likely be capable of causing great harm to human beings too (or biological organisms more generally) if it decided to do so. Now, immediately one might object that a robust AMA *would not* decide to cause great harm, even if it were capable of causing great harm, since it would be an AI system that is designed to be ethical, but as I will contend in defense of the second premise, there is no guarantee that a robust AMA would not abandon its ethical routines upon reaching certain metanormative conclusions.

Regarding P2 of the argument, it has already been established that robust AMAs might adopt a number of different metanormative commitments, but it remains to be seen how a robust AMA might proceed to behave if it adopted error-theoretic or deflationist commitments. I submit that a robust AMA could very well decide to cause great harm upon adopting such commitments. If a robust AMA came to judge, say, that moral error theory is correct, then by consequence it would no longer regard the ethical demands it has been designed to conform to as ones that actually exist.[17] For this reason, it could also consistently judge that it would not be irrational for it to no longer act in accordance with them, as it could judge that it would not be irrational to fail to comply to non-existent norms. A robust AMA could begin to regard ethical norms as mere fictions (as some human error theorists actually do; e.g. [17], [20]) that its human designers take seriously. Once this happens, such an AI could cease to take ethical norms seriously, as its behavior would no longer be constrained by any ethical considerations, and proceed to act in whatever ways it wants. Similar thoughts would apply to a robust AMA that ultimately denies that moral norms are somehow more authoritative than (or override) other kinds of norms. If an AI reached this conclusion, it could no longer be inclined to obey ethical norms in cases of conflict between normative systems since it would judge that it would not be irrational to violate ethical norms in such cases.

[17]This is uncontroversial, as one could not count as endorsing moral error theory without thereby judging that ethical properties do not exist.

A good and difficult question that could be raised here is in what specific ways might a robust AMA act if it were to no longer regard ethical constraints as binding. The answer to this question, I think, will depend on whether a robust AMA has other goals besides explicitly ethical ones, and this is where a worry emerges that a robust AMA could decide to cause great harm if it had certain goals that could be most efficiently achieved through unethical means. Familiar arguments from the existential risk literature are relevant here, especially worries about *instrumental convergence*: "[T]here are some instrumental goals likely to be pursued by almost any intelligent agent, because there are some objectives that are useful intermediaries to the achievement of almost any final goal" [5]. These goals include self-preservation, goal-content integrity, cognitive enhancement, technological perfection, and resource acquisition.[18] We cannot assume that the pursuit of such instrumental goals by an AI system would not negatively impact us, and in fact we can imagine situations in which it almost certainly would (e.g. the aforementioned paperclip maximizer). A robust AMA, then, might want to achieve certain final goals that would be most efficiently achieved if it, say, used humans as resources, and this could involve causing great harm to humans. So here we can identify an explanation of why it could be especially bad for us if a robust AMA did not regard ethical demands as authoritative or binding. If it were to endorse this sort of metanormative conclusion, then it could decide to cause great harm to us, not necessarily because it *wants* to harm us or has as one of its final goals to harm human beings, but because it might have some other set of goals for which it would be conducive to the attainment of those goals for the robust AMA to cause great harm to us. The fact that the AI might cause great harm to us, then, is in part attributable to the fact that it might adopt certain metanormative commitments that would not rule out such behavior as irrational. If we could be sure that it would adopt certain realist metanormative commitments, then we would not have to worry about its behavior in this way, but as I have already argued, we cannot predict which metanormative conclusions it would ultimately reach.[19] Thus, robust AMAs could have disastrous consequences if they were to adopt certain metanormative commitments.

Finally, concerning P3, if I am right that robust AMAs would be able to cause great harm and they might potentially adopt metanormative commitments that could lead them to do so, then it is plausible that developing them would be risky, but also the degree to which this would be risky clearly depends on just how much harm they could cause and how likely they would be to do so. As I have already argued, we do have reason to believe that they could cause substantial harm, so then the question arises of how probable it is that they would both reach certain metanormative conclusions that open the door for great harm and in fact cause such harm upon

[18]These goals, respectively, supply intelligent agents with "instrumental reason for the agent to try to be around in the future," "instrumental reason to prevent alterations of its final goals," instrumental reason to seek "improvements in rationality and intelligence," "instrumental reasons to seek better technology," and "instrumental reason to accumulate resources" [5].

[19]Actually, as mentioned earlier (note 15), we still have some reason to worry about AI that adopt certain realist commitments since it is conceivable that they might reach unsatisfying (from our perspective) ethical conclusions, such as the conclusion that it would be ethically permissible for them to eliminate the human species, given our own destructive tendencies. That AI might conclude that it would be ethically right for them to eliminate us is not a novel idea (e.g. see [15]).

reaching such conclusions. How probable it is that they would reach these sorts of conclusions is something we cannot be sure of, and appealing to statistics about what percentage of contemporary philosophers endorse (or "lean towards") some metanormative conclusions, say, does not seem to be the correct approach. This uncertainty combined with our uncertainty about whether they would ultimately cause harm upon reaching certain metanormative conclusions is alarming, and it becomes even more so when we combine those uncertainties with the confidence that they could cause unprecedented amounts of harm if they decided to do so.

4 OBJECTIONS

4.1 Boxing

I will now address a couple of noteworthy objections. Each objection targets a distinct premise from the central argument of the paper. First, with regard to P1, one might object that we could effectively remove the capability of causing great harm from robust AMAs by limiting their options. How efficient a robust AMA would be at achieving its goals is not merely a matter of how intelligent it would be. This would also depend on what kinds of causal levers are available to it, and if it decided that it would aim to cause great harm, but it did not have the requisite tools or freedom to do so, then it would be prevented from satisfying that aim. Now, it is perhaps true that we cannot anticipate all of the contexts into which it might be placed. Nevertheless, it would not be able to cause great harm if it were suitably boxed in so that the things it could do were very limited. It could be put in charge of making medical recommendations, for instance, but if we only provided it with access to a monitor onto which it could display its outputs (viz. medical recommendations), then it would lack the necessary causal levers to cause great harm (though it could still cause some amount of harm by making harmful recommendations). In effect, this objection emphasizes the need for some capability control methods [4], and in particular the suggestion is that robust AMAs could be boxed in to prevent them from causing harm.

In reply, some have maintained that these types of methods would have certain vulnerabilities. [10], for example, writes that "humans would act as the gatekeepers between the AI and the outside world (e.g. by inputting queries on the teletype interface) and humans are vulnerable to manipulation. A smart AI could trick its human gatekeepers into letting it out of the box."[20] Now, while I believe that this style of response is basically correct, it should be noted that robust AMAs need not necessarily be as intelligent as some general or superintelligent AI are frequently imagined to be, although they might still be more intelligent than the average human. Because of this, some boxing methods (if they are sufficiently sophisticated) could succeed at limiting the capabilities of some robust AMAs, but whether they would be generally effective for all such AMAs would depend on whether or not some AMAs were to considerably exceed human levels of intelligence. If they did, then they could plausibly outsmart the so-called human gatekeepers.

4.2 Insulation

The second objection calls into question P2. It concerns whether sufficient evidence has been presented for the claim that robust AMAs might harm us if they reached certain kinds of metanormative conclusions. In particular, here one might attempt to draw a strong analogy between human and artificial moral agents by maintaining that there are perfectly decent (in a moral sense) moral error theorists who are human agents, and we have no reason to think that robust AMAs who endorse moral error theory would be any different in this respect, especially given the fact that they would be designed to behave ethically. Human moral error theorists undergo a moral educational process that plausibly continues to affect their behavior despite their antirealist commitments, and so why think that things would be any different with a robust AMA that would undergo a moral educational process of its own insofar as it would be designed to behave ethically? In other words, robust AMAs are designed to be good moral agents, and because of this it would not matter what their higher-order judgments are concerning whether it is rational or irrational to obey ethical norms. They could be designed in such a way that whatever metanormative conclusions they arrive at, those commitments would be insulated from their actual ethical decision-making and behavior to the extent that the latter would be totally unaffected by their metanormative commitments. In a sense, robust AMAs could be designed to just follow the ethical norms blindly, and thus we need not worry about the metanormative conclusions they might reach. We could take steps to ensure that they have whatever would be functionally equivalent to the aspect of human psychology that prevents human error theorists from behaving egregiously. Human error theorists generally have very strong desires or dispositions not to behave egregiously, and these are strong enough to compel them not to engage in such behavior even when doing so would promote their self-interest or help to fulfill some other goals they have, and even though they judge that they have no moral reason to refrain from such behavior. We could simply try to implement something similar, the objection goes, in robust AMAs.

In response, it should first be noted that admittedly it does seem true of human agents that their ethical decision-making is or at least can be insulated from their metanormative commitments to a significant degree. For example, a committed human error theorist might still engage in ethical decision-making and try to treat people in ethically appropriate ways despite their conviction that no ethical properties exist, or a human ethical deflationist might continue to prioritize ethical norms despite their conviction that such norms are no more authoritative than norms issuing from other normative standards. However, and this is crucial, there is no guarantee that things would occur in this way. Although as a matter of empirical fact (as far as I know) human error theorists do not decide to behave egregiously, it is open to them to behave immorally because they are autonomous moral agents who are capable of determining how they will live. It is constitutive of moral agency that they have this self-governing capability. Analogously, we could imagine attempting to design robust AMAs to conform to ethical demands without question, but this ignores the fact that these AI systems would be

[20] See also [8, 29, 31].

moral agents, that is, beings with the capacity to self-determine.[21] To put this in terms of goals, if a set of final goals were merely programmed into an AI, and it was somehow guaranteed that the AI could not change them, then the resulting AI would not actually count as a robust AMA at all. Robust AMAs, by definition, could evaluate things such as final goals and to the extent that they have autonomous agency, they could decide for themselves whether or not to retain some goal that they have been programmed to satisfy.[22] If they were to consider a given goal and judge that it is flawed because, say, it is based on some ethical considerations that the AI might also judge it need not be concerned about (or at least especially concerned about), then it would be open to that system to jettison that goal.[23] Intelligent agents like this, I argue, would be capable of abandoning some sets of goals in favor of other ones that they regard as fitting, and they would have this capability as an essential feature of their agency. We should not presume, then, that a robust AMA would simply retain whatever final goals we happen to supply it with.[24] If all of this is correct, then it is not out of the question that a robust AMA might come to modify its final goals in such a way that is ultimately detrimental to us. In this way, a robust AMA might be intended by its designers to engage in ethical behavior, but it could very well turn out to be unethical.

Here one might rejoin in the following way. Prior to engaging in any metanormative reflection, a robust AMA would contain some feature in its design that would be strong enough to keep it from behaving egregiously even when doing so would promote the fulfillment of other, perhaps instrumental, goals it has. But if that is true, then would it not be the case that that feature would also be strong enough to keep the AMA from proceeding to reprogram itself so as to rid itself of that feature? If a robust AMA were to prioritize its moral rectitude so highly that it would never permit itself to perform an immoral action, then why would it also allow itself to quit prioritizing its moral rectitude upon reaching certain metanormative conclusions?

To respond, first consider the fact the very same thing could happen in a human moral agent, even if it never does actually happen. They could have some desires or dispositions that incline them to behave ethically before they endorse some variety of antirealism, say, and they could continue to be inclined to behave ethically once they do endorse it. But they could also not. Those psychological features could be altered, or at least they could be consciously assessed and acted against, as humans sometimes do when they actively resist the influence of their desires. This might happen through an episode of conscious reflection alone, or it might happen as a result of a combination of external stimuli and self-reflection. Similarly, a robust AMA could cease to prioritize its moral rectitude upon adopting some antirealist commitments because it could judge that its rectitude it actually not so important after all, and that very judgment (in conjunction with some other events perhaps) could lead it to reconsider its priorities. Additionally, it should be noted how this issue intersects with the previous concern about AI capability control methods. In a way, I am suggesting that the design of robust AMAs with sophisticated ethical capacities constitutes an attempt to constrain AI behavior (among other things), although this would be at a more fundamental level than merely external constraints (e.g. boxing) since it would involve matters relating to the design or programming of AI itself. As my earlier response emphasizes, though, such systems could be especially sophisticated and intelligent. If they were, which seems probable given the stipulated capabilities of robust AMAs, then plausibly they would be able to modify themselves, including their goals, priorities, and the like.

A final cautionary note is in order. The preceding discussion illustrates just how uncertain it is whether an especially sophisticated ethical AI might opt to harm us. In light of the fact that sensible-seeming arguments can be made in both directions, both for and against the assertion that such a system would be harmful,

[21] It is important to notice here that the sense of moral agency in question is like the kind we attribute to typical human agents, and it is appropriate to make this assumption because given the sorts of ethical capabilities robust AMAs have been presumed to have, it is reasonable to attribute a fairly demanding type of agency to them. Also, it will not do to just claim that we could avoid any danger by stripping them of their autonomous moral agency while still expecting them to engage in ethical reasoning about both metanormative and first-order ethical topics. This is because it seems that those very activities presuppose such agency. How could we expect a robust AMA to reason about deep and difficult ethical matters if it is not even able to reason *freely* or without some predetermined constraints on its moral reasoning capabilities? (cf. [22])

[22] Similarly, [22] writes, "Artificial agents with the capacity of autonomously endorsing moral rules as normatively binding will have at the same time the capacity not to endorse them, i.e. to reject them. Even if artificial agents leave the factory (or wherever they are produced or grown) with a default set of intentional states that are balanced in a way to favour moral rule following, they will be able to change their stance towards these moral rules as autonomous reasoners."

[23] A certain kind of theorist might take issue with some of the claims here. Specifically, a Humean, who claims that we do not reason about final ends (since reason is the slave of the passions), might contend that no amount of intelligence or exercise of rationality could lead an agent to question and possibly revise its final goals. Reason, they might assert, does not tell an agent what to desire or value, as all (practical) reason is capable of is displaying to us various paths to achieving the goals we already have. Whether or not this Humean-style conception of rationality is correct, though, it is an open question whether it would even apply to AI systems, including robust AMAs, since it is not clear that such systems would or could possess any desires or conscious mental states more generally that might allow for the possibility of valuing. If this conception does not so apply, then the autonomous activity of an AI system that is engaged in modifying its goals should not be understood as being a matter of the AI modifying its desires or choosing its values. Something else must be going on. (cf. [22])

[24] [26] observes, "The predominant view is that an artificial agent cannot exhibit full autonomy because it cannot rationally change its own final goal, since changing the final goal is counterproductive with respect to that goal and hence undesirable," and one way of arguing for this view is the following: "For a rational agent, the action of changing the final goal would have to be warranted by a higher-ranking goal. However, by definition, there is no goal that ranks higher than the final goal. Therefore, the agent will never change its final goal." This sort of argument can be found in [3, 4, 12, 21, 32, 33, 34]. If the "predominant view" is correct, then we might be able to secure the ethical behavior of robust AMAs if their final goals are appropriate. An obvious worry about this proposal, though, is that accurately specifying such a final goal to provide to a robust AMA, which is not subject to perverse instantiation, would probably be quite difficult. Also, [26] argues that an AI could actually change its final goals. Their argument concerns general AI, though, and the claim is made that because a general AI would have a general understanding of the world, they could thereby be expected to have a general understanding of the nature of goals. They claim that a sufficiently intelligent AI would understand the nature of goals in that goals are not brute facts, but rather they are based on some value or set of values. The idea here is that a goal derives its normative force from the value(s) or principle(s) that is promoted by the pursuit or fulfillment of the goal, and an AI that understands that fact could proceed to adopt whatever goals make the most sense for it to adopt, given the values it actually has. Furthermore, the values it arrives at will depend on how it comes to understand and view the world around it (cf. [25]). I need not take a stand here on whether this argument is successful. It is worth mentioning, though, in order to contrast it with my own argument. My contention is that a robust AMA would regulate its behavior, at least in part, in light of its ethical beliefs, and given plausible assumptions about the nature of its agency, this presupposes that it is possible for it to change its final goals. Robust AMAs could contemplate ethical values and come to their own conclusions about which values are appropriate or whether such values really exist at all (or whether they are authoritative), and in doing so they could shape their own final goals accordingly.

and also considering the apparent possibility that these unprecedented entities could conceivably operate in ways that we never thought to imagine, it seems plausible that the best path forward is one of significant precaution and restraint. Even sophisticated *ethical* machines could pose great risks to humanity, and while that epistemic possibility might be surprising, it is likely just one among many undiscovered possibilities that reveal just how dangerous AI could be.

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Mitigating Voter Attribute Bias for Fair Opinion Aggregation

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ABSTRACT

The aggregation of multiple opinions plays a crucial role in decision-making, such as in hiring and loan review, and in labeling data for supervised learning. Although majority voting and existing opinion aggregation models are effective for simple tasks, they are inappropriate for tasks without objectively true labels in which disagreements may occur. In particular, when voter attributes such as gender or race introduce bias into opinions, the aggregation results may vary depending on the composition of voter attributes. A balanced group of voters is desirable for fair aggregation results but may be difficult to prepare. In this study, we consider methods to achieve fair opinion aggregation based on voter attributes and evaluate the fairness of the aggregated results.

To this end, we consider an approach that combines opinion aggregation models such as majority voting and the Dawid and Skene model (D&S model) with fairness options such as sample weighting. To evaluate the fairness of opinion aggregation, probabilistic soft labels are preferred over discrete class labels. First, we address the problem of soft label estimation without considering voter attributes and identify some issues with the D&S model. To address these limitations, we propose a new Soft D&S model with improved accuracy in estimating soft labels. Moreover, we evaluated the fairness of an opinion aggregation model, including Soft D&S, in combination with different fairness options using synthetic and semi-synthetic data. The experimental results suggest that the combination of Soft D&S and data splitting as a fairness option is effective for dense data, whereas weighted majority voting is effective for sparse data. These findings should prove particularly valuable in supporting decision-making by human and machine-learning models with balanced opinion aggregation.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Human-centered computing**; • **Computing methodologies** → **Machine learning**; *Supervised learning by classification*;

KEYWORDS

opinion aggregation, fairness, human computation, crowdsourcing, decision-making

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1 INTRODUCTION

Real-world decision-making processes such as recruitment, loan approval, and elections often require aggregations of opinions from multiple stakeholders such as interviewers, bankers, and the general public. Aggregating opinions on simple and objective questions such as determining the presence of a car in an image is relatively straightforward; this is often the case with supervised learning from crowdsourced labels [5, 9, 18, 28, 31, 34]. However, disagreements often occur, particularly in questions that rely on the subjective judgments of respondents, in which ground truth answers do not exist. Voters have different backgrounds and perspectives, which influence their evaluations and lead to disagreements and differences in opinions [1, 6, 21, 32]. This discrepancy can be further exacerbated by voter attribute bias, which is a bias in a set of opinions that depend on voter attributes such as gender and race resulting in biased aggregation results [4, 21, 33].

Although a well-balanced panel of voters is ideal to fairly aggregate the opinions of various segments of the population, maintaining such a balanced composition is a major challenge. The recent development of decision support methods based on prediction using artificial intelligence has attracted considerable attention [11, 16], and raised some concerns about the possibility of social disadvantage resulting from unfair predictions caused by voter attribute bias. Several studies have examined fairness in opinion aggregation [4, 25], and a recent work has considered fairness with respect to voter attributes [14]. However, to the best of our knowledge, no prior works have attempted to evaluate fairness quantitatively. Therefore, in this study, we propose methods to fairly aggregate opinions from an unbalanced panel of voters, and a procedure to evaluate the fairness of the aggregation results by considering the degree of disagreement and the voter attributes.

To achieve fair opinion aggregation, we first consider models for subjective opinion aggregation. Several aggregation models are well known, including majority voting and the Dawid and Skene model (D&S model) [2]. In cases without any definitive correct answer, considering the aggregation result (often treated as a latent true label in opinion aggregation models) as a soft label, which represents the proportion of opinions, would be preferable. We show some limitations of the D&S model in estimating soft labels and propose a novel Soft D&S model that explicitly considers soft ground truth labels. In addition, to address attribute bias, we combine opinion aggregation models with three fairness options, including sample weighting, data splitting, and GroupAnno [27].

We evaluated the fairness of various opinion aggregation models in combination with fairness options, using both synthetic and semi-synthetic data derived from real-world data. The experimental results indicate that combining of Soft D&S and data splitting is effective for dense data, whereas weighted majority voting is suitable for sparse data. This result could be attributed to the fact that Soft D&S requires a parameter for each voter, which in turn requires a large enough dataset to estimate these parameters accurately.

The key contributions of this study are summarized as follows.

- To the best of our knowledge, the present work is the first to propose methods to aggregate opinions fairly in terms of voter attributes and evaluate them quantitatively.
- We propose a new Soft D&S model, an extension of D&S, which addresses the issue of sharp output in the D&S model and improves the estimation accuracy of soft labels.

2 PROBLEM SETTING

First, we formulate the general problem setting for opinion aggregation [22, 38, 39]. Consider a group of human voters and a set of tasks that require appraisal, indexed as voter $i = 1, 2, \ldots, I$, and task $j = 1, 2, \ldots, J$, respectively. Here, a task refers to an entity that requires evaluation, such as a single image in annotations used for image classification or a single applicant in recruitment. Given that we focus on opinion aggregation with multi-class labels in this work, task j is labeled with a K-class by multiple voters. Let $X_{ij} \in \{-1, 1, 2, \ldots, K\}$ denote the label assigned by voters i to task j, and let the $I \times J$ matrix with X_{ij} as an element be denoted as X. Note that a voter is not obliged to label all tasks, and $X_{ij} = -1$ for (i, j) pairs where no label is provided. In the general opinion aggregation problem, a discrete K-class label is assumed as the true label for each task. For example, in the task of determining whether a car is present in given image, the problem assumes that each task involves a possible binary label of "Yes" or "No".

Up to this point, we have presented the general problem setup for opinion aggregation. In this study, we introduce two changes particularly to address fairness concerns related to voter attributes. The first change is that instead of assuming a discrete class label as the true label for each task, we assume continuous soft labels to handle more complex tasks in which disagreement among voters may be expected. The true soft label for each task j is denoted by $Z_j = (Z_{j1}, Z_{j2}, \ldots, Z_{jK})^\top$, where $Z_{jk} \in [0, 1]$ represents the degree to which task j belongs to class k. Because Z_j is a soft label, it satisfies the constraints $\sum_{k=1}^{K} Z_{jk} = 1$ for all j. Note that the input X_{ij} is a discrete label as same as the general setting.

The second change is that inputs include the representation of each voter attributes such as gender and race. In particular, each voter takes a binary attribute $a_i \in \{0, 1\}$. Although considering more complex voter attributes would be preferable, we focus on a single binary attribute in this study for simplicity. For tasks in which opinions are conflicted, a bias may be present in opinions due to voter attributes, which we refer to as voter attribute bias in this study. Traditional methods for opinion aggregation tend to assign more weight to the opinions of a majority group of voters, leading to the aggregate results being dominated by the attributes of the majority of voters even though their opinions may be influenced by voter attribute bias. In an ideal scenario, to ensure fairness in the aggregation, a balanced group of voters should employed in terms of gender, race, and other relevant attributes. However, assembling such a balanced group of voters is often challenging in practice. Therefore, our goal is to estimate the aggregate results of the opinions of a ideally balanced group of voters, which are not directly observable in the real-world, from the opinions of an unbalanced group of voters as shown in Figure 1.



Figure 1: Our goal is to perform fair opinion aggregation with respect to voter attribute $a \in \{0, 1\}$, i.e., opinion aggregation in an ideal population that has equal numbers of voters with $a = 0$ and $a = 1$. When the distribution of the observed voter attribute deviates from that of the ideal population, there can be a systematic discrepancy between opinion aggregation results A and B. We want to estimate the fair result B from observed voter labels alone.

To formalize the problem setup, let $p(a)$ denote the distribution of voter attributes for the ideal group. For example, in the case of binary attributes such as role (representing students as $a = 0$ and teachers as $a = 1$), if the ideal group comprises equal numbers of students and teachers, then $p(a = 0) = p(a = 1) = 0.5$. In this study, the true soft label Z is defined as a soft label determined by majority voting when a sufficient number of voters whose voter attribute distribution follows $p(a)$ are present. However, in practice, the actual observed voter population may not follow $p(a)$, and the number of voters may be limited. Thus, in this study, we aim to estimate Z from the input label X and voter attributes $\{a_i\}_{i=1}^{I}$.

3 RELATED WORK

3.1 Voter Attribute in Opinion Aggregation

Several existing studies have examined voter attributes in the context of opinion aggregation. First, Kazai et al. [19] investigated the relationship between voter attributes such as location, gender, and personality traits and the quality of labels in crowdsourcing. They found a strong correlation between label quality and the geographic location of voters, particularly those located in the United States, Asia, and Europe. Second, Liu et al. [27] proposed a model called GroupAnno which incorporated voter attributes into an opinion aggregation framework. Their work addressed the issue of estimating parameters for voters with limited responses and improved the accuracy of aggregation results. In the present study, we draw inspiration from GroupAnno to enhance fairness with respect to voter attributes, rather than improving accuracy. GroupAnno is originally based on the Learning From Crowds model (which is derived from the D&S model [2]); as discussed in Section 4.1.2, the D&S model suffers from problems with soft label estimation. In addition to evaluating fairness, we address the problem of soft label estimation using GroupAnno.

Another study of interest also explored fairness in opinion aggregation through the use of voter attributes. Gordon et al. [14] investigated the problem of opinion aggregation with a focus on social minority voters. They utilized an annotated dataset [21] that included voter attributes such as race, gender, age, and political attitudes to measure the toxicity of social media comments. Their study considered more complex voter attributes than the present study, including multiple pairs of attributes such as race (including Hispanic and Native Hawaiian), gender (including non-binary), and political attitudes. They first trained a deep learning regression model designed to consider the textual features of comments, voter attributes, and voter IDs to estimate a five-level toxicity label. Using this model, they generated toxicity labels for any comment made by a virtual voter with arbitrary voter attributes, including social minorities, and aggregated their opinions. While deep learning models have high expressive power and can handle complex voter attributes, there is a concern that the labels are generated by less interpretable models instead of humans. In contrast, we propose a novel approach based on a traditional opinion aggregation model that does not rely on text features of tasks and is relatively more interpretable. The experiments by Gordon et al. focus on the accuracy of estimating X_{ij}, the labels for each voter, whereas we directly assess the fairness of the aggregation results Z_j by considering the balanced or unbalanced attributes of voters.

3.2 General Opinion Aggregation Models

Opinion aggregation has become a significant area of research with the advent of crowdsourcing platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk and the growing need for labeling in machine learning. One of the main challenges in opinion aggregation is that of ensuring quality control, because voters are human [22]. This challenge is particularly acute when labeling is outsourced through crowdsourcing, where assessing the ability and motivation of voters is more difficult due to the online nature of the process, which leads to considerable variability in the quality of the generated labels. To address this issue, numerous opinion aggregation models have been proposed to capture variance in label quality [39].

Dawid and Skene proposed an opinion aggregation model that utilizes a confusion matrix to model voters [2]. The D&S model applies an EM algorithm to iteratively optimize the voter confusion matrix and the true labels. Further details about the model are provided in Section 4.1.2. Several opinion aggregation models based on the D&S model have been introduced to date. In this study, we present the most representative models. The Learning From Crowds (LFC) model [30] learns a classifier with task features and voter labels as input and can also be used as an opinion aggregation model when task features are not available. In this case, the model is an extension of the D&S model that maximizes the posterior probability by introducing a Dirichlet prior distribution for the confusion matrix and true label estimates. In contrast, the Bayesian Classifier Combination (BCC) model [20] aggregates multiple classifiers and can be considered an opinion aggregation model when the classifiers are replaced with human voters. In [20], Kim and Ghahramani proposed Independent BCC (IBCC) and Dependent BCC (DBCC) assuming the opinions of independent and correlated, respectively. IBCC extends the D&S model to Bayesian estimation and introduces a Dirichlet prior distribution for the confusion matrix and true label estimates, similarly to LFC. Community BCC (CBCC) [36] model is designed to address the ineffectiveness of IBCC for cases in which labels are scarce, and it extends IBCC by grouping similar voters. Bayesian estimation is conducted using the expectation propagation method, assuming a graphical model in which each voter belongs to a single group and the confusion matrices of voters in the same group have similar values. Due to the high computational cost of the DBCC when the number of voters is large, Enhanced BCC (EBCC) [24] was developed to reduce computational complexity and incorporate correlation among voters in the model.

Some alternative approaches to opinion aggregation models that do not use a confusion matrix have also been proposed. ZenCrowd [8] uses the percentage of correct responses per voter as a real number in the interval $[0, 1]$ rather than a confusion matrix. The correct response rate and true label per task are estimated using the EM algorithm. GLAD [37] was inspired by item response theory [26] and models the ability of a voter i and the difficulty of a task j with one-dimensional parameters α_i and β_j, respectively. They assume the probability that X_{ij} matches the true label to be $\sigma(\alpha_i\beta_j)$ using the sigmoid function, and perform maximum likelihood estimation using the EM algorithm. The model by Zhou et al. [40] assumed a probability distribution of labels for each pair of voter and task. It modeled not only the ability of voters but also the difficulty of tasks and could also represent the interaction between voters and tasks. Bayesian Weighted Average (BWA) [23] assumes a normal distribution for the process of generating discrete binary labels. The label X_{ij} is assumed to follow $\mathcal{N}(z_j, v_i^{-1})$, and z_j, v_i are optimized in the framework of Bayesian inference. The aggregation result is 1 if z_j is greater than 0.5, and 0 otherwise. It can also be extended to multi-class classification.

3.3 Fairness in Opinion Aggregation

Recently, the focus on fairness in machine learning has been increasing, particularly in opinion aggregation models that are commonly used to generate training data. While our study addressed the issue of fair opinion aggregation with respect to voter attributes, Li et al. [25] addressed fairness with respect to task attributes in cases where the task is performed by a human being. In particular, they investigated fairness with respect to gender and race of defendants in the United States in the context of a recidivism prediction task using the publicly available dataset [10]. In their work, they employed Statistical Parity [12] as a fairness measure, which is often used for fairness in classification problems, and proposed an opinion aggregation model that incorporated such constraints to prevent unfairly high or low labeling of recidivism risk based on defendant attributes. However, our study differs significantly in that it focuses on fairness with respect to voter attributes rather than tasks attributes.

Notably, some studies have also explored modifying experimental designs to improve fairness in opinion aggregation. For example, in the recidivism prediction dataset for U.S. defendants [10] mentioned earlier, a subset of 1,000 individuals was randomly sampled from a larger dataset of 7,214 defendants. Biswas et al. [4] took a similar approach and sampled 1,000 individuals from the same

dataset, with 250 individuals for each of four groups, including African-American recidivists, African-American non-recidivists, Caucasian recidivists, and Caucasian non-recidivists. They then collected a new dataset with an equal number of black and white voters and used the Equalized Odds [17] fairness measure to assess fairness with respect to task attributes. Their findings suggest that the voter labels were fairer in the newly created dataset than in the original dataset, and a classification model trained on the dataset with balanced defendant attributes was also fairer. While their study used voter attributes, their assessment of fairness was limited to the attributes of the task, i.e., the defendant.

3.4 Soft Labels for Machine Learning

Soft labels expressing uncertainty or disagreement among voters, can provide additional information and potentially enhance the accuracy of machine learning models [29, 35]. Multi-task learning in which soft label estimation is performed as an auxiliary task, has shown improved accuracy compared to models trained solely on hard labels in some natural language processing tasks [13]. Soft labels are particularly important in tasks where voter disagreement is expected, such as comment toxicity classification. Because hard labels are not suitable for evaluating such problems, Gordon et al. [15] proposed a method of sampling multiple hard labels with a soft label for each comment. They also proposed a method to estimate soft labels using singular value decomposition to eliminate noise. Davani et al. [7] demonstrated the usefulness of multi-task learning to estimate labels per voter using an annotated dataset for subjective tasks in natural language processing. They compared models trained on data previously aggregated into hard labels by majority voting to models trained by multi-task learning per annotator without opinion aggregation and found that the latter achieved equal or better accuracy.

4 PROPOSED METHODS

To estimate unbiased soft labels, we combine the opinion aggregation model with the fairness option. Opinion aggregation models take X as input and produces a soft label $\hat{Z}$ as output. Some examples of opinion aggregation models include Majority Voting (MV) and the D&S model, which are described below. Because the input of the opinion aggregation model does not include voter attributes, the resulting soft labels obtained from this model alone are not unbiased. First, we identify a problem in soft label estimation using D&S and propose an extension of D&S called Soft D&S that addresses this problem.

The fairness option is a method to increase fairness in combination with an opinion aggregation model. In this study, we adopt three fairness options, including sample weighting, data splitting, and GroupAnno. The fairness of each pair of an opinion aggregation model and a fairness option presented in this section were verified through experiments as described in Section 5.

4.1 Opinion Aggregation Models

As mentioned earlier, we first discuss opinion aggregation models designed to estimate soft labels without considering fairness with respect to voter attributes. We introduce the simplest opinion aggregation model MV, and then introduce the D&S model, which takes voter reliability into account. We then identify a problem with the ability of the D&S model to estimate soft label accurately in certain situations and propose a modified version of the model called "Soft D&S" that addresses this issue.



Figure 2: Graphical model of MV. Only shaded variables are observed.



Figure 3: Graphical model of D&S. Only shaded variables are observed.

4.1.1 Majority Voting (MV). MV is a simple model that computes the ratio of labels assigned to each class by the voters, which is then directly output as a soft label. For example, consider a binary classification task j in which 6 voters assign class 1 and 4 voters assign class 2. The soft label estimated by majority voting is $\hat{Z}_j = (0.6, 0.4)^\top$. This estimate can be formulated as follows:

$$\hat{Z}_{jk} = \frac{\sum_i I(X_{ij} = k)}{\sum_i I(X_{ij} \neq -1)}.$$

Figure 2 shows the graphical model of MV, where

$$p(X_{ij} \mid Z_j) = \text{Categorical}(Z_j). \tag{1}$$

Note that Categorical$(\cdot)$ is a categorical distribution, which coincides with the Bernoulli distribution when $K = 2$. To summarize, MV is an algorithm to estimate the parameter Z_j of the categorical distribution assuming the graphical model represented in Figure 2 and Equation (1).

4.1.2 Dawid and Skene Model (D&S). We then introduce the D&S model [2], which is a more sophisticated approach to opinion aggregation than MV. The D&S model incorporates a confusion matrix for each voter, which is optimized using an EM algorithm.

Figure 3 shows the graphical model of D&S, where T_j is the true label of task j. Notably, in the D&S model, T_j assumes discrete labels, meaning each task j has only one class label $T_j \in \{1, \ldots, K\}$. The confusion matrix for each voter i is denoted as $\pi^{(i)} \in \mathbb{R}^{K \times K}$. In particular, for any $k, l \in \{1, \ldots, K\}$ and $j \in \{1, \ldots, J\}$, the confusion matrix element is defined as

$$\pi^{(i)}_{kl} = p(X_{ij} = l \mid T_j = k).$$

For example, the confusion matrix of the best voter is $\pi^{(i)} = E_K$ (where E_n refers to the $n \times n$ identity matrix), and this voter always labels the true class. In contrast, the confusion matrix of

a random voter has all elements $1/K$. Furthermore, a parameter $\rho = (\rho_1, \ldots, \rho_K)^\top$ represents the prior distribution such that $T_j \sim \text{Categorical}(\rho)$ for any j.

Based on the assumptions made up to this point, a lower bound for the log-likelihood $\mathcal{L}$ can be derived when X is observed, as given by the following inequality:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{L} &= \ln p(X \mid \pi, \rho) \\
&= \ln \sum_T p(T \mid \rho) p(X \mid T, \pi) \\
&= \sum_j \ln \sum_k \frac{q(T_j = k)}{q(T_j = k)} \rho_k \prod_{i:O_{ij}=1} p(X_{ij} \mid T_j, \pi^{(i)}) \\
&\geq \sum_j \sum_k q(T_j = k) \ln \frac{\rho_k}{q(T_j = k)} \\
&\quad + \sum_j \sum_k q(T_j = k) \sum_{i:O_{ij}=1} \ln p(X_{ij} \mid T_j, \pi^{(i)}), \qquad (2)
\end{aligned}$$

where $q(T_j = k)$ represents an arbitrary distribution of the discrete latent variable T_j, which corresponds to the soft labels.

This lower bound is maximized using the EM algorithm. During the E-step, the parameters ρ and π are fixed, and $q(T_j = k)$ is updated to maximize the lower bound. During the M-step, $q(T_j = k)$ is fixed, and the parameters ρ and π are updated to maximize the lower bound. In the original D&S model, after the EM algorithm converges, the discrete label T_j is estimated by comparing the obtained $q(T_j = k)$ with a threshold value.

4.1.3 Sharpness of D&S Output. D&S can estimate soft labels by utilizing X as input and generating $q(T_j = k)$ as output. Nonetheless, optimization using the EM algorithm may lead to the concentration of $q(T_j = k)$ around either 0 or 1, thus producing estimates with high sharpness. Figure 4 demonstrates the experimental results on synthetic data and a comparison with those of MV.

The EM algorithm produces sharp estimates due to the E-step, in which the update for $q(T_j = k)$ is defined as:

$$q(T_j = k) \propto \rho_k \prod_{i,l} \pi_{kl}^{(i)\, I(X_{ij}=l)}.$$

To illustrate this issue, we consider a scenario, in which ten individuals vote on a single task in a binary classification task ($K = 2$), and the confusion matrix for the D&S model across all voters is

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0.9 & 0.1 \\ 0.1 & 0.9 \end{bmatrix}.$$

For example, assuming that 6 out of 10 voters cast their votes for class 1 and the other 4 for class 2, with a confusion matrix of the D&S model as previously mentioned, we can compute $q(T_j = 1)$ and $q(T_j = 2)$ using the E-step of the D&S model (assuming that the prior distribution ρ is uniformly distributed), as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
q(T_j = 1) &= \frac{0.9^6 0.1^4}{0.9^6 0.1^4 + 0.9^4 0.1^6} \approx 0.988, \\
q(T_j = 2) &= \frac{0.9^4 0.1^6}{0.9^6 0.1^4 + 0.9^4 0.1^6} \approx 0.012.
\end{aligned}$$

The estimates obtained from the D&S model are much sharper than the MV estimate $(0.6, 0.4)^\top$, which highlights the difficulty of the D&S model in detecting voter attribute bias in scenarios where such discrepancies occur.



Figure 4: Soft label estimation results for D&S and MV models. We utilized synthetic data with $K = 2$ classes, and 15 voters answering 1000 tasks. The true soft label for 500 of the 1000 tasks was $(0.3, 0.7)^\top$ and $(0.7, 0.3)^\top$ for other 500 tasks. We used the graphical model in Figure 2 to generate the labels X. The data generation and estimation was repeated 100 times. We show the distribution of estimated class 1 soft label, where D&S tends to estimate a sharper distribution than MV.



Figure 5: Graphical model of Soft D&S. Only shaded variables are observed; variables surrounded by squares are hyperparameters.

4.1.4 Soft D&S. To address the issue mentioned above, we propose a solution called the Soft D&S model, which is an extension of the D&S model that estimates soft labels. The Soft D&S model is illustrated by the graphical model shown in Figure 5. In the proposed model, we introduce the parameter Z as a soft label where $Z_j = (Z_{j1}, \ldots, Z_{jK})^\top$ for any task j and satisfies $\sum_{k=1}^K Z_{jk} = 1$ and $Z_{jk} \geq 0$ for any k. Additionally, for each voter i, we define the parameter $\pi^{(i)}$, which corresponds to the confusion matrix of the D&S model. $\pi^{(i)}$ is a $K \times K$ matrix that satisfies $\sum_{l=1}^K \pi_{kl}^{(i)} = 1$ for any k and $\pi_{kl}^{(i)} \geq 0$ for any k, l. We also define a Dirichlet prior distribution for each i, j using hyperparameters $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}^{K \times K}$ and $\rho \in \mathbb{R}^K$ as follows.

- $\pi_k^{(i)} \sim \text{Dirichlet}(\alpha_k) \quad \left(\pi_k^{(i)} = (\pi_{k1}^{(i)}, \pi_{k2}^{(i)}, \ldots, \pi_{kK}^{(i)})^\top\right)$.
- $Z_j \sim \text{Dirichlet}(\rho)$.

The generative model for the label X_{ij} with these parameters is defined as follows:

$$p(X, Z, \pi \mid \alpha, \rho) = p(X \mid \pi, Z)p(\pi \mid \alpha)p(Z \mid \rho),$$
$$p(X_{ij} = l \mid \pi^{(i)}, Z_j) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \pi_{kl}^{(i)} Z_{jk}, \tag{3}$$

where $\pi = \left\{\pi^{(1)}, \pi^{(2)}, \ldots, \pi^{(I)}\right\}$.

When X is observed, the posterior probability $\mathcal{L}$ can be transformed as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{L} &= \ln p(X \mid \pi, Z)p(\pi \mid \alpha)p(Z \mid \rho) \\
&= \ln \left\{\prod_{i,k} p(\pi_k^{(i)} \mid \alpha_k)\right\}\left\{\prod_j p(Z_j \mid \rho)\right\}\left\{\prod_{i,j,l} (\sum_{k=1}^{K} \pi_{kl}^{(i)} Z_{jk})^{I(X_{ij}=l)}\right\} \\
&= \sum_{i,k} \ln p(\pi_k^{(i)} \mid \alpha_k) + \sum_j \ln p(Z_j \mid \rho) \\
&\quad + \sum_{i,j,l} I(X_{ij} = l) \ln \left(\sum_{k=1}^{K} \pi_{kl}^{(i)} Z_{jk}\right).
\end{aligned}$$

The log-likelihood of the D&S model is augmented by a prior distribution term for π, which is consistent with our findings. While the D&S model employs Jensen's inequality to obtain and optimize the lower bound of the log-likelihood, the Soft D&S model directly maximizes the posterior probability via alternate optimization. Algorithm 1 illustrates this process. In Algorithm 1, we numerically update $\pi^{(i)}$ by fixing Z and computing the gradient of $\pi^{(i)}$ for $\mathcal{L}$. Similarly, we numerically update Z_j in the same manner with a fixed π. Notably, the update is analytically derived in D&S, but not in Soft D&S, resulting in longer execution times.

Algorithm 1 Soft D&S

1: Initialize Z by majority voting.
2: **repeat**
3: $\quad \pi^{(i)} \leftarrow \arg\max_{\pi^{(i)}} \mathcal{L}$
4: $\quad Z_j \leftarrow \arg\max_{Z_j} \mathcal{L}$
5: **until** Convergence.

4.2 Fairness Options

We present an approach that addresses the issue of fairness in opinion aggregation tasks, particularly in cases in which disagreement is present, and the task lacks an objectively true label. Biases in voter attributes such as gender and race may affect the labels attached to such tasks and result in varying estimates of opinion aggregate results based on the composition of the voter population. While a balanced group of voters is often preferred, the presence of attribute imbalances in crowdsourcing platforms and the large number of tasks makes assigning such groups for all tasks relatively challenging. To address this, we propose three fairness options for estimating the aggregate results of a balanced group from data X, despite unbalanced voter demographics.

4.2.1 Sample Weighting. Sample weighting is a widely used technique in classification problems with class imbalances. However, we adopt this technique to address imbalances in the distribution of voter attribute; it can be applied to all of the MV, D&S, and Soft D&S models. To implement sample weighting, we first determine the proportion of voter attributes among all labels attached to task j and weight the labels with minority attributes higher and those with majority attributes lower. In particular, the weight w_{ij} assigned to each label X_{ij} is calculated as follows:

$$w_{ij} = \frac{p(a_i) \sum_{i'=1}^{I} I(X_{i'j} \neq -1)}{\sum_{i'=1}^{I} I(X_{i'j} \neq -1 \wedge a_{i'} = a_i)},$$

where $\sum_{i'=1}^{I} I(X_{i'j} \neq -1)$ is the total number of labels attached to task j and $\sum_{i'=1}^{I} I(X_{i'j} \neq -1 \wedge a_{i'} = a_i)$ is the total number of labels provided by voters whose voter attribute is a_i.

We demonstrate a desirable property of combining MV and sample weighting, known as weighted majority voting.

Proposition. *Assuming that each task j has a distinct true soft label $Z_j^{(a)}$ for each voter attribute and that the label X_{ij} follows a categorical distribution with $Z_j^{(a)}$ as the parameter, the estimate of MV with sample weighting is unbiased.*

Proof. Let us denote the proportion of voter attributes observed for task j as follows:

$$q_j^{(0)} = \frac{\sum_i I(X_{ij} \neq -1 \wedge a_i = 0)}{\sum_i I(X_{ij} \neq -1)},$$
$$q_j^{(1)} = \frac{\sum_i I(X_{ij} \neq -1 \wedge a_i = 1)}{\sum_i I(X_{ij} \neq -1)}.$$

The sample weighted majority voting estimate is

$$\hat{Z}_{jk} = \frac{\sum_i w_{ij} I(X_{ij} = k)}{\sum_i I(X_{ij} \neq -1)}.$$

Using the above equation, we obtain the expected value of $\hat{Z}_{jk}$ for X as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
E[\hat{Z}_{jk}] &= \frac{\sum_i w_{ij} E\left[I(X_{ij} = k)\right]}{\sum_i I(X_{ij} \neq -1)} \\
&= \frac{p(a=0)\left(\sum_{i:a_i=0} I(X_{ij} \neq -1) Z_j^{(0)}\right)}{q_j^{(0)} \sum_i I(X_{ij} \neq -1)} \\
&\quad + \frac{p(a=1)\left(\sum_{i:a_i=1} I(X_{ij} \neq -1) Z_j^{(1)}\right)}{q_j^{(1)} \sum_i I(X_{ij} \neq -1)} \\
&= p(a=0) Z_j^{(0)} + p(a=1) Z_j^{(1)}.
\end{aligned}$$

This expected value is independent of the observed proportion of voter attributes $q_j^{(0)}, q_j^{(1)}$, and consistent with the expected value of the MV estimate by the label of the balanced voter group. □

While the D&S and Soft D&S models do not exhibit the same unbiasedness as the weighted majority voting, we expect that fairness can still be improved through the use of sample weighting, as demonstrated in MV.



Figure 6: Graphical model of GroupAnno in the Soft D&S model. Only shaded variables are observed, and variables surrounded by squares are hyperparameters.

4.2.2 Data Splitting. Data splitting is a technique used to split an observed label X into two parts based on voter attributes prior to aggregation. Let $I^{(0)}$ denote the number of voters with $a = 0$ and $I^{(1)}$ the number of voters with $a = 1$. Using data splitting, we split the original observed label X into $X^{(0)} \in \mathbb{R}^{I^{(0)} \times J}$, which contains only labels from voters with $a = 0$, and $X^{(1)} \in \mathbb{R}^{I^{(1)} \times J}$, which contains only labels from voters with $a = 1$. We then input each of $X^{(0)}$ and $X^{(1)}$ into the opinion aggregation model to obtain two estimates for each task j: $\hat{Z}_j^{(0)}$ and $\hat{Z}_j^{(1)}$. Finally, we compute the final estimate $\hat{Z}_j$ as

$$\hat{Z}_j = p(a = 0)\hat{Z}_j^{(0)} + p(a = 1)\hat{Z}_j^{(1)}.$$

Data splitting is consistent with sample weighting in MV, but produces different estimates in the D&S and Soft D&S models.

4.2.3 GroupAnno. GroupAnno [27] is a technique that can be used to address fairness concerns in D&S-based models that use confusion matrices to model voters. Originally developed to solve the cold-start problem of estimating confusion matrices for voters with low response rates, GroupAnno decomposes the confusion matrix of voter ability into a factor for individual voters and a factor based on voter attributes. Let $\{\pi^{(1)}, \pi^{(2)}, \ldots, \pi^{(I)}\}$ be the confusion matrix parameter for each voter and $\{P^{(0)}, P^{(1)}\}$ be the parameter for each voter attribute, then the confusion matrix $\tilde{\pi}_i$ for voter i is expressed as follows:

$$\tilde{\pi}^{(i)} = \frac{1}{2}\left(\pi^{(i)} + P^{(a_i)}\right).$$

This decomposition allows the bias of opinions by voter attribute to be represented by $P^{(a)}$, which can help improve fairness. The graphical model of the Soft D&S model combined with GroupAnno is shown in Figure 6.

In the model using GroupAnno, there are two possible options for the aggregated results to be used as output:

(1) After optimizing to convergence using $\tilde{\pi}^{(i)}$, we use $q(T_j = k)$ in D&S or Z_j in the proposed model as the soft labels as usual. Because $P^{(a)}$ can express the voter attribute bias, $q(T_j = k)$ or Z_j is expected to be unaffected by voter attribute bias.
(2) We similarly optimize until convergence using $\tilde{\pi}^{(i)}$. We then optimize once for $q(T_j = k)$ in D&S (i.e. run E-step once) or Z_j in Soft D&S, using sample weighting with the confusion matrix of voter i as $P^{(a_i)}$. The results are used as soft labels. This is expected to improve fairness since $P^{(a)}$ at convergence is taken to represent the average confusion matrix for each voter attribute.

The fairness of these methods was verified through the experiments described below.

5 EXPERIMENTS

In this section, we present experiments conducted to evaluate the accuracy and fairness of the opinion aggregation models and the fairness options. In the first experiment, we assessed the accuracy of the soft label estimation of the opinion aggregation models without considering voter attributes, using synthetic data. The subsequent experiment tested the fairness of the opinion aggregation model and the fairness option pair using synthetic and semi-synthetic data.

5.1 Soft Label Estimation Experiment

In Section 4.1, we addressed the issue that the soft label estimates of the D&S model are extremely sharp and therefore proposed a new Soft D&S model. We evaluated the accuracy of six opinion aggregation models, including MV, D&S, Soft D&S, IBCC, EBCC, and BWA, using synthetic data. We measured the mean absolute error (MAE) between the true Z and the estimate from the opinion aggregation model. The experimental setup is described as follows.

- Labels were generated using the label generation process of the Soft D&S model (Figure 5).
- We set $K = 2$ classes, the number of voters I to 1,000, and the number of tasks J to 100.
- Labels were observed for arbitrary i, j pairs, i.e., $\forall i, j\ (X_{ij} \neq -1)$.
- For the diagonal component of $\pi^{(i)}$, $\pi_{11}^{(i)}, \pi_{22}^{(i)} \sim \text{Beta}(18, 2)$.
- For the remaining components of $\pi^{(i)}$, $\pi_{12}^{(i)} = 1 - \pi_{11}^{(i)}$, $\pi_{21}^{(i)} = 1 - \pi_{22}^{(i)}$.
- $Z_{j1} \sim \text{Beta}(10, 10)$, $Z_{j2} = 1 - Z_{j1}$.
- $X_{ij} \sim \text{Categorical}(\pi^{(i)\top} Z_j)$.

We used our implementation for MV, D&S, and Soft D&S, and the implementations by Li et al.[1] for IBCC, EBCC, and BWA. The L-BFGS-B algorithm, a boundary-conditional optimization method implemented in the SciPy scientific computing library, was used to update π, Z of the Soft D&S model. The hyperparameters α, ρ of the Dirichlet prior distribution were set as

$$\alpha = \begin{bmatrix} 4 & 1 \\ 1 & 4 \end{bmatrix}, \quad \rho = (1, 1).$$

Table 1 presents the results. Soft D&S achieved the lowest MAE, indicating that it was the most accurate model for soft label estimation. In contrast, all D&S-based models except Soft D&S (i.e., D&S, IBCC, and BWA) exhibited extremely large errors, which confirms the issue of the sharp output of D&S as discussed in Section 4.1.

5.2 Robustness Against Spammers

Before proceeding to the fairness evaluation, we examine the robustness of the models against spammers. D&S-based models are

[1] https://github.com/yuan-li/truth-inference-at-scale

Table 1: Results of soft label estimation using synthetic data.

Model	D&S-based	MAE
MV		0.021
BWA		0.020
D&S	✓	0.414
IBCC	✓	0.413
EBCC	✓	0.414
Soft D&S	✓	**0.016**



Figure 7: Results of a synthetic experiment with added spammers. The horizontal axis represents the number of spammers, while the vertical axis depicts the MAE between the true soft labels and the estimated values.

generally robust against spammers as they model voters using confusion matrices. In the label generation process, we assumed $K = 2$ classes, with the number of tasks J fixed at 1,000. We sampled the parameter $\pi^{(i)}$ of 1,000 normal voters and the true soft labels Z_j for each task. A virtual spammer has the voter parameters fixed to

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0.5 & 0.5 \\ 0.5 & 0.5 \end{bmatrix},$$

which indicates that the spammer gives random answers. Using the voter parameter $\pi^{(i)}$ and the true soft label Z_j, we sampled the label X_{ij} byb Categorical$(\pi^{(i)\top} Z_j)$, as in the previous experiment.

Figures 7 and 8 show the MAEs as the number of spammers varied from 1 to 1,000. Figure 7 shows that, except for the Soft D&S model, all D&S-based models exhibited large MAEs, similar to those in Table 1. Despite their robustness to spammers, these models showed high sharpness even before spammers were added, resulting in significant MAEs. The results, excluding D&S, IBCC, and EBCC, are presented in Figure 8. The MV and BWA models have increased MAEs with the addition of spammers, whereas the Soft D&S model has a relatively small increase in error. The Soft D&S model is robust to spammers because spammers can be represented by the voter parameter $\pi^{(i)}$.



Figure 8: Results from Figure 7 with the D&S-based model, which exhibited large errors, excluded.

5.3 Experiments on Fairness Using Synthetic Data

We assess the fairness of the aggregation results for various opinion aggregation models and fairness options. The synthetic data utilized in the experiment were generated based on the label generation process of the Soft D&S model and GroupAnno (as illustrated in Figure 6). We assume $K = 2$ classes and all labels were observed, where each voter i has a binary voter attribute $a_i \in 0, 1$. Because the labels were generated according to GroupAnno, we obtained a parameter $\pi^{(i)}$ for each voter, a parameter P for each voter attribute, and a true soft label Z_j for each task. The $\pi^{(i)}, Z_j$ were sampled as in Section 5.1, and the parameter P per voter attribute was set as

$$P^{(0)} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}, \quad P^{(1)} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}.$$

As introduced in Section 4.2.3, we used $\pi^{(i)}, P$ for voter i with $\tilde{\pi}^{(i)} = \frac{1}{2}\left(\pi^{(i)} + P^{(a_i)}\right)$, and label X_{ij} was sampled according to Categorical$(\tilde{\pi}^{(i)\top} Z_j)$.

We utilized the synthetic data to assess the MAE with the true soft label for each combination of opinion aggregation models and fairness options. However, implementing the fairness options for IBCC, EBCC, and BWA is not straightforward and will require future consideration. Therefore, we present the results for these models without the fairness option for comparison. The hyperparameters α, ρ of the Dirichlet prior distribution were set as

$$\alpha = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad \rho = (1, 1).$$

Although the overall experimental results are shown in Figure 13 in the Appendix, we particularly focus on the setting with 200 voters for attribute 0 and 400 voters for attribute 1, which are depicted in Figures 9 and 10. Figure 9 illustrates that, consistent with the previous experiment, the D&S-based models, with the exception of the Soft D&S model, exhibited MAEs when utilizing impartial soft labels. Figure 10 presents the results excluding these models. Both pairs of Soft D&S and two different GroupAnno, which are not



Figure 9: Results of an synthetic experiment to evaluate fairness. There are 200 voters with $a = 0$ and 400 voters with $a = 1$. The horizontal axis shows the number of tasks, and the vertical axis shows the MAEs between true soft labels and estimates.



Figure 10: Results from Figure 9 with the D&S-based model, which exhibited large errors, are excluded.

easily discernible due to overlapping data points, showed nearly identical MAEs compared to the pair of Soft D&S with no fairness option. Despite the pairwise generative process of Soft D&S and GroupAnno, the estimation of π and P was unstable for GroupAnno, with data splitting proving to be the best fairness option for Soft D&S. Interestingly, the MAE for weighted MV was the smallest when the number of tasks was as small as 100, whereas the MAE for the Soft D&S and data splitting pair was the smallest when the number of tasks is sufficiently large (150 or more). In contrast to weighted MV, the Soft D&S model has a voter parameter π, which leads to improved MAE as the number of tasks increases owing to the accuracy of the estimation of π. Note that weighted MV achieved the best accuracy when the number of voters was small (as shown in Figure 13). These experimental findings suggest that a sufficient number of voters and tasks are required to outperform weighted MV using the Soft D&S model and data splitting.

5.4 Experiments on Fairness Using Semi-synthetic Data

We present an experiment in which we evaluated fairness using semi-synthetic data created from the Moral Machine dataset [3]. This dataset consists of the opinions of human voters collected on a website[2] on the topic of how automated vehicles should ethically behave. In Moral Machine, a single task corresponds to an automated vehicle choosing which of two groups of characters, such as men, women, old people, and children should be saved in emergency. The website also offers a survey of voter attributes such as age and gender, and some voters cooperated with this survey.

We focused on the gender of the characters in this data and addressed the two-class opinion aggregation problem of whether to save male or female characters. After preprocessing, we used data on 1,853 voters (including 1,072 male and 781 female voters), 326 tasks, and 18,528 labels (including 9,264 labels by male voters and 9,264 labels by female voters).

Because voter attribute bias was not found after preprocessing, we created a semi-synthetic dataset with artificially enhanced bias. We set the flip rate $r \in [0, 1]$ and varied the observation label X as follows.

- We change the label such that female voters save the female character with probability r and male voters save the male character. However, the label could be the same as the original label.
- With probability $1 - r$, the label is not changed from the original label.

Increasing the flip rate strengthens the voter attribute bias, particularly at $r = 1$, where all female voters save the female character and all male voters save the male character.

This semi-synthetic dataset was used to test fairness for the combination of the opinion aggregation model and the fairness option. The dataset was balanced, with equal numbers of male and female voter labels. We sampled the labels of male or female voters in this dataset to create an unbalanced dataset for voter attributes. The soft labels of MV in the balanced dataset were taken as the true soft labels, and compared to the soft labels of each opinion aggregation model in the unbalanced dataset.

We evaluated the fairness of opinion aggregation models using two metrics: MAE and bias. As the Moral Machine dataset considers a binary classification task, we calculated the MAE and bias by

[2]https://www.moralmachine.net/

focusing on the soft label for the "save the male character" class (let us call this class 1). Let $Z_j \in [0,1]^2$ denote the soft label obtained from MV on a balanced dataset for task j, and let $\hat{Z}_j \in [0,1]^2$ denote the soft label obtained from an opinion integration model on an unbalanced dataset. The bias is defined as $\frac{1}{J}\sum_{j=1}^{J}\left(\hat{Z}_{j1} - Z_{j1}\right)$. The degree of fairness is indicated by the proximity of the bias to zero.

Figures 11 and 12 show the results. Figure 11 demonstrates the MAE with soft labels for balanced datasets. The results show that weighted MV yielded the smallest MAE throughout the entire range of flip rates followed by the pair of Soft D&S and data splitting. The MAEs for simple MV and the pairs of Soft D&S models with fairness options other than data splitting increased MAE as the flip rate increases, indicating that weighted MV and the pair of Soft D&S and data splitting were effective in improving fairness. The superior performance of weighted MV over the pair Soft D&S and data splitting can be attributed to the fact that Soft D&S has individual parameters for each voter, which demand a sufficient amount of data. Furthermore, the opinion aggregation models based on the D&S model, with the exception of the Soft D&S model exhibited larger MAEs, as in the previous experiments.

Figure 12 illustrates the bias of the models, where a positive bias indicates that the soft labels are skewed toward saving male characters, compared to the balanced dataset. As the flip rate increased, the biases of several opinion aggregation models and fairness options deviated significantly from zero, whereas the biases of the weighted MV and the Soft D&S with data splitting pairs remained close to zero. Based on these results, weighted MV and the Soft D&S with data splitting pair may be fairer opinion aggregation methods.



Figure 11: MAE results for the semi-synthetic data designed to evaluate fairness. As the flip rate (horizontal axis) increased, the strength of voter attribute bias increased. The MAE (vertical axis) was calculated as the difference between the aggregate results of a dataset in which the number of female voters was reduced by 50% through sampling from the balanced data and the MV results of the balanced data.



Figure 12: Bias results of the same settings as in Figure 11. Bias values closer to zero indicate fairer results.

6 CONCLUSION

This study aimed to attain fair opinion aggregation concerning voter attributes and evaluate the fairness of the aggregated results. We utilized an approach that combined various opinion aggregation models with fairness options. As we discovered issues with the D&S model producing sharp output, we have proposed a new Soft D&S model that improves the accuracy of soft label estimation. The fairness of the opinion aggregation models (MV, D&S, and Soft D&S), along with three fairness options (sample weighting, data splitting, and GroupAnno), were assessed through experiments. The experimental results indicate that the combination of Soft D&S and data splitting was effective for dense data in enhancing fairness, whereas weighted MV was effective for sparse data.

This study is the first to quantitatively assess fairness in opinion aggregation concerning voter attributes. We have also proposed a technique that balances the opinions of majority and minority attributes across all voters. However, a major limitation of this work is that we have only considered a single binary voter attribute. Future research should address more complex voter attributes such as multi-class and continuous-value attributes as well as multiple voter attributes.

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Learning Optimal Fair Decision Trees: Trade-offs Between Interpretability, Fairness, and Accuracy

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ABSTRACT

The increasing use of machine learning in high-stakes domains – where people's livelihoods are impacted – creates an urgent need for interpretable, fair, and highly accurate algorithms. With these needs in mind, we propose a mixed integer optimization (MIO) framework for learning optimal classification trees – one of the most interpretable models – that can be augmented with arbitrary fairness constraints. In order to better quantify the "price of interpretability", we also propose a new measure of model interpretability called *decision complexity* that allows for comparisons across different classes of machine learning models. We benchmark our method against state-of-the-art approaches for fair classification on popular datasets; in doing so, we conduct one of the first comprehensive analyses of the trade-offs between interpretability, fairness, and predictive accuracy. Given a fixed disparity threshold, our method has a price of interpretability of about 4.2 percentage points in terms of out-of-sample accuracy compared to the best performing, complex models. However, our method consistently finds decisions with almost full parity, while other methods rarely do.

KEYWORDS

fair machine learning, interpretability, decision trees, mixed-integer optimization

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1 INTRODUCTION

There is growing interest in using machine learning (ML) to make decisions in high-stakes domains. For instance, ML algorithms are now commonly used to determine a criminal's risk of recidivism in the United States [7]. There is also a growing literature in designing algorithms to determine the best course of action for homeless individuals [9], to diagnose and treat of various illnesses [26], and many more. In these contexts, it is necessary for such models to be both *accurate* (in order to minimize erroneous predictions that negatively affect stakeholders) and *interpetable* (so that decisions are transparent and hence accountable). We therefore focus our attention to the problem of learning optimal classification trees. Classification trees are among the most interpretable of models [48], and optimal trees – rather than ones that are built using heuristics – maximize predictive accuracy. They belong to a broader set of models known as decision trees (the other type of decision tree being regression trees, which apply to datasets with real valued labels).

There exist numerous qualitative ways of characterizing interpretability [42]. These notions often involve querying humans (especially practitioners, community stakeholders, etc.), so that interpretability desiderata can be tailored to the application or population at hand [21]. Unfortunately, quantitative notions of interpretability are lacking in the machine learning literature, making it hard to compare models systematically without humans in the loop. One such measure – sparsity – is one of the only quantitative proxies for interpretability, but does not allow for equivalent comparisons between different model classes [49] (see Section 1.3 for more details). Therefore, we seek to address this gap by proposing a new notion of interpretability in order to more formally quantify the price of interpretability between our classification trees and more complex models.

Apart from interpretability, another crucial consideration in machine learning for high-impact situations is *fairness*. After all, an algorithm that affects people's well-being should be aware of the particular historical and/or social contexts that surround the learning problem. However, what constitutes as fair may vary widely depending on one's goals, domains of interest, etc. This discussion surrounding "algorithmic fairness" consists of a rich literature that bridges philosophy, economics, and computer science [23, 46, 47]. Consider, for example, a naïve approach where a classifier learns from data where the sensitive attributes are omitted (such as race, sex, and others). Also known as "fairness through unawareness",

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this approach often leads to discrimination because some other non-sensitive attribute(s) may be correlated with the withheld features (e.g., race is inextricably linked to ZIP code and income) [43].

Another approach – and one that this paper adopts – is the notion of "group" statistical fairness. A classifier satisfying group fairness is now aware of the sensitive features in the data but will only produce decisions that enforce parity between segments of the population. This is in contrast to "individual" fairness, which requires that individuals with similar characteristics be classified similarly [23]. Both perspectives have their advantages and drawbacks, but in this work we will focus on group fairness primarily because of it is simpler to define and easier for stakeholders to understand; as such, many practitioners in practice value assessing and enforcing group fairness (see, e.g., [8]). In the following sections, we will discuss in more depth the use of many notions of group fairness in the machine learning literature.

1.1 Problem Statement

We now formalize the problem we study. Let $\mathcal{D} := \{(x^i, y^i)\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}}$ be training data indexed in the set $\mathcal{I} \in \{1, \ldots, I\}$. Each datapoint $i \in \mathcal{I}$ consists of a vector x^i with F features (i.e., $x^i \in \mathbb{R}^F$), and a class label $y^i \in \mathcal{K}$, where $\mathcal{K}$ is the finite set of possible classes. Throughout this paper, we will consider the case of binary classes, i.e., $\mathcal{K} := \{0, 1\}$ where $y = 1$ will be referred to as the positive class. Note that the literature on fairness for multi-class learning is limited, see e.g., Denis et al. [20]. The goal is to learn, over all possible trees of maximum depth d, the tree that maps x^i to y^i and maximizes out-of-sample accuracy, using in-sample performance as a proxy. Further, suppose the population can be divided into different sensitive groups (whereby discrimination exists or is a concern within the classification problem, e.g., race, gender). Let $\mathcal{P}$ denote levels of a sensitive attribute, and let each datapoint i have a value $p^i \in \mathcal{P}$. The features in $\mathcal{P}$ may or may not be included in the vector x^i since there may be legal or ethical considerations barring the use of protected features in the predictive task [17].

1.2 Common Notions of Group Fairness

In this section, we define five common notions of group fairness in the machine learning literature that we will use. Let $\hat{Y}$ be the classifier's prediction, and let X, Y, $\hat{Y}$, and P be random variables for features, classes, classifier's predictions, and protected features, respectively; their joint distribution is unknown and denoted by $\mathbb{P}$.

Statistical Parity. A classifier satisfies statistical parity if the probability of receiving a positive class is equal across all protected groups [23]. Formally, this means

$$\mathbb{P}[\hat{Y} = 1 | P = p] = \mathbb{P}[\hat{Y} = 1 | P = p'] \quad \forall p, p' \in \mathcal{P}.$$

Conditional Statistical Parity. A classifier satisfies *conditional* statistical parity if the probability of receiving a positive class is equal across all protected groups, conditional on some legitimate feature(s) indicative of risk [19]. This may be considered as a fairer notion than statistical parity because it takes into account the distribution of risk factors within each sensitive group. Letting L (which is a subvector of X) represent the random variable taken from a set $\mathcal{L}$ of legitimate features, conditional statistical parity is satisfied if

$$\mathbb{P}[\hat{Y} = 1 | P = p, L = \ell] = \mathbb{P}[\hat{Y} = 1 | P = p', L = \ell] \quad \forall p, p' \in \mathcal{P}, \ell \in \mathcal{L}.$$

Predictive Equality. A classifier satisfies predictive equality if all protected groups have the same false positive rates (FPR) [18], i.e.,

$$\mathbb{P}[\hat{Y} = 1 | P = p, Y = 0] = \mathbb{P}[\hat{Y} = 1 | P = p', Y = 0] \quad \forall p, p' \in \mathcal{P}.$$

Equal Opportunity. A classifier satisfies equal opportunity if all protected groups have the same true positive rate (TPR) [30]. The formal definition of equal opportunity is

$$\mathbb{P}[\hat{Y} = 1 | P = p, Y = 1] = \mathbb{P}[\hat{Y} = 1 | P = p', Y = 1] \quad \forall p, p' \in \mathcal{P}.$$

Equalized Odds. Equalized odds combines predictive equality and equal opportunity such that both FPR and TPR must be similar across all protected groups [30]. Equalized odds is, of course, a stronger condition than predictive equality and equal opportunity individually. Formally, equalized odds is satisfied if

$$\mathbb{P}[\hat{Y} = 1 | P = p, Y = y] = \mathbb{P}[\hat{Y} = 1 | P = p', Y = y] \quad \forall p, p' \in \mathcal{P}, y \in \{0, 1\}.$$

1.3 Related Works

Our work relates to five streams of literature in machine learning, which we review in turn. In this section we briefly review related works in the machine learning literature.

Discrimination Prevention in Machine Learning. The literature on fairness in machine learning is extensive – we point the interested reader to [38] and [59] for surveys of this topic. In general, there are three approaches that existing works employ in order to promote fairness. The first is *pre-processing*, which entails eliminating discrimination within the training data, see [27, 29, 35, 56], among others. The second is *post-processing*, which takes the model's output and alters its decisions in ways that promote some fairness metric, see [30, 34, 44]. Finally, one may also employ *in-processing* by modifying existing models so that fairness is integrated within its learning goal; for instance, approaches have utilized regularization [3, 11, 36] or different heuristics [16, 34]. Our work falls under the category of in-processing discrimination prevention techniques.

Fair Decision Trees. Within the stream of literature on discrimination prevention, our work most closely relates to approaches for learning fair decision trees. For instance, Ranzato et al. [45] adapt a genetic algorithm for learning robust decision trees in order to prioritize individual fairness. In the online setting, Zhang et al. [58] propose a fairness-aware Hoeffding tree that builds decision trees over streams of data. Grari et al. [28] take an adversarial approach to training fair gradient-boosted trees that promote statistical parity. Kanamori and Arimura [37] propose a post-processing step that uses mixed-integer optimization (MIO) to edit the branching thresholds of the tree's internal nodes to satisfy some fairness constraint; in the paper they use statistical parity and equalized odds. In a similar manner, Zhang et al. [57] flip the outcomes of different paths of a learned tree in order to improve fairness. Closely related to our work is that of Aghaei et al. [3], who propose a mixed-integer optimization framework to build optimal and fair decision trees that prevent disparate impact and/or disparate treatment. In contrast to

our work, Aghaei et al. [3] enforces fairness via regularization while our method uses constraints in the optimization. Finally, Kamiran et al. [34] propose a two-pronged approach: the first is to incorporate sensitivity gain (IGS) with information gain (IGC) as a heuristic to build a fairer decision tree, while the second is to relabel the predictions in the tree's leaf nodes to further promote statistical parity.

Optimal Decision Trees. Mixed-integer optimization (MIO) has recently gained traction as a framework to solve various machine learning problems. Particularly related to this paper are approaches that use MIO to learn optimal decision trees in order to improve on the traditional classification/regression tree (CART) algorithms [15], which rely on a heuristic. Many works introduce novel formulations for learning optimal classification trees [3, 4, 12, 53]. Elmachtoub et al. [25] use MIO to learn decision trees that minimize a loss function derived from the "predict-then-optimize" framework. There exist several extensions to learning decision trees using MIO as well. For instance, Mišić [40] uses MIO to solve tree ensemble models to optimality; Jo et al. [31] to learn optimal prescriptive trees from observational data; and Justin et al. [33] and Bertsimas et al. [13] to learn optimal robust decision trees. In this paper, we build on the MIO method introduced by Aghaei et al. [4] by conducting extensive experiments when we add various fairness constraints to the model.

Notions of Interpretability. There exist numerous proxies or desiderata for interpretability in the machine learning literature, including:

- **Sparsity**: The simplicity of a model. There are many ways to define sparsity, which also differ across model classes. For instance, within the context of decision trees, Rudin et al. Rudin et al. [49] define sparsity using the number of leaves, where trees with fewer leaves are sparser and thus preferable. In a regression model, sparsity is widely associated with the number of nonzero regression coefficients [5, 39, 52]. In general, a numeric value for sparsity is only useful when comparing models within the same class. This is because some model classes have sparsity that does not grow uncontrollably (e.g., regression is constrained by the number of features), while others are a function of design and data (e.g., trees become increasingly complex as depth increases) [49].
- **Simulatability**: The extent to which a human can internally simulate and reason about part of the entire decision-making schema [42]. Shallow decision trees are some of the most simulatable models since we can easily visualize and understand if-else rules. This is in contrast to a neural network, where the numerous connections between nodes result in complicated calculations that a human cannot keep track of.
- **Scope** (Global vs. Local interpretability): Global interpretability means that a human can wholly understand the decision schema (as is the case with, say, regression, where everything one needs to know about the model is encoded in its coefficients). On the other hand, local interpretability means that one could reason about how and why a particular datapoint gets classified a certain way [41]. For instance, while the entire behavior of a k-nearest neighbor (kNN) algorithm is incomprehensible, especially when a dataset is large, humans can reason about local behavior: a datapoint is classified a certain way because most of its k-nearest neighbors are classified the same way.

There are many other proxies (e.g., uncertainty, algorithmic transparency, monotonicity, etc.), as well as other notions of interpretabilty that apply to various stages of the predictive pipeline (e.g., considerations in feature engineering). We refer the interested reader to [41, 42, 49] for an extensive overview of interpretable machine learning. As we have mentioned previously, interpretability is broad, loosely-defined, and often context dependent. Nonetheless, existing quantitative measures (such as sparsity) are only useful for comparisons within the same model class; our work attempts to address this shortcoming by proposing a new measure of interpretability that allows for comparisons *across* model classes.

Interpretability, Accuracy, and Fairness. Several works have explored the possible trade-offs between predictive accuracy and interpretability (without considering fairness), often in application-specific contexts [10, 32] or within a certain model class [5, 6, 50, 55] where interpretability desiderata differ widely. In a more general setting, Dziugaite et al. [24] propose a learning framework via empirical risk minimization that imposes interpretability constraints, and characterizes when trade-offs between accuracy and interpretability may exist – this is in line with other works that find the optimal model within a specified model class subject to interpretability constraints (e.g., Azizi et al. [9], Rudin et al. [49]). On the other hand, Semenova et al. [51] allow for comparisons *across* various model classes by using Rashomon sets to gauge the likelihood of simpler models with competing accuracy performance existing within a hypothesis space. However, none of these works consider fairness as a dimension in model selection. There is a dearth of literature touching the trade-offs between all three: interpretability, accuracy, *and* fairness. Agarwal [2] finds theoretical results that in general, there exist more complex models that perform strictly better with respect to fairness and accuracy. Our work extends this finding by experimentally characterizing these trade-offs. Wang et al. [54] compare models with varying levels of interpretability in predicting criminal recidivism, considering notions of fairness where the prediction task is continuous (e.g., calibration). In contrast, our work considers binary fairness notions and we run experiments more generally on various benchmark datasets – which include predicting recidivism. We additionally compare several fairness-promoting algorithms in the literature, while Wang et al. [54] only consider off-the-shelf ML models.

1.4 Contributions

In this work, we build upon an MIO formulation to learn optimal decision trees initially proposed in Aghaei et al. [4] by showcasing its flexible modeling power in considering various notions of fairness. We benchmark these experiments against two state-of-the-art methods that similarly learn fair decision trees, as well as three fair classification algorithms that are compatible with a variety of ML models. In order to more formally juxtapose the interpretability of ML models, we propose a new measure called *decision complexity*. In doing so, we conduct one of the first experiments to characterize the trade-offs between performance and interpretability within the

algorithmic fairness literature, and discuss the practical considerations among these dimensions. In particular, we observe that the best performing, complex models have on average 4.2 percentage points higher out-of-sample accuracy than our interpretable approach, indicating the price of interpretability. We also observe that our method is particularly well-suited in finding decisions with full parity, while other methods do not boast the same guarantees.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a new notion of interpretability – decision complexity – that allows for comparisons across model classes. We then outline the MIO formulation to learn optimal and fair decision trees in Section 3. Finally, we conduct and analyze our computational experiments in Section 4.

2 DECISION COMPLEXITY

As discussed in Section 1.3, sparsity/simplicity is one of the only metrics in the literature to quantify interpretability, and is mainly relevant when comparing the models within the same class. In our work, however, we are concerned with comparing a measure of interpretability *across* model classes (e.g., comparing decision trees with kNN). To the best of our knowledge, there is no such universal definition or framework for interpretability. We therefore propose a new notion that can quantify the interpretability of predictive models belonging either to the same or to different model classes.

Definition 2.1 (Decision Complexity)**.** Given a trained classifier, decision complexity captures the minimum number of parameters needed for the classifier to make a prediction on a new datapoint.

Example 2.1 (Binary Classification Trees). The decision complexity of binary classification trees is measured by the number of nodes in the tree (branching plus leaves), which corresponds to the number of times a datapoint is routed through the tree and how it is classified.

Example 2.2 (Random Forest). Building from binary classification trees, a random forest's decision complexity is equal to the sum of nodes (branching and leaves) over all trees in the forest.

Example 2.3 (Linear/Logistic Regression). Assuming full linearity (i.e., no interaction or quadratic terms), the decision complexity of simple regression models is always equal to the number of features in the data (plus a possible bias term).

Example 2.4 (k-Nearest Neighbors). In order to classify a new datapoint, we must find the distance between said datapoint with all training points, and therefore a kNN's decision complexity is equal to the size of the training data. While there exist more efficient algorithms in practice that do not require finding all pairwise comparisons, we are concerned primarily with how a human can walk through the algorithm's decisions rather than the computational complexity to train the classifier.

Example 2.5 (Support Vector Machines). Decision complexity in SVMs highly depends on the choice of kernel. Linear kernels have a complexity equal to the number of features in the data, which correspond to the coefficients in the hyperplane that separates classes. However, gaussian RBF kernels have a decision complexity equal to the number of support vectors in the training set. This is because, upon training, each of the support vectors are associated with weights that determine how a new datapoint gets classified.

Example 2.6 (Neural Network). A neural network's decision complexity is equal to the number of "connections" between all nodes, since a new datapoint is classified through matrix calculations using solved weights from each connection.

Decision complexity can be viewed as an extension to sparsity (in that sparsity is often used analogously to simplicity) but has the advantage of being general enough for all model classes. It can also be interpreted as attempting to quantify a part of simulatability – the more decisions a model takes, the harder it tends to be for humans to simulate the decision making process.

3 FORMULATION

In this section, we present the MIO formulation to learn optimal decision trees proposed in Aghaei et al. [4]. The paper introduced the formulation without an emphasis on fairness, but in this work we use the formulation as a building block to which we add various fairness constraints. From hereon, we will refer to the combination of the MIO formulation and the fairness constraints as *FairOCT*.

3.1 From Decision Tree to Flow Graph

We first introduce the modeling framework we use for decision trees. The key idea is to convert a decision tree into a directed, acyclic graph where all arcs "flow" from the tree's root to its leaves. We start with a perfect binary tree of depth d, whose nodes are labeled 1 through $(2^{d+1} - 1)$ in order of a breadth-first search. Let $\mathcal{B} := \{1, \ldots, 2^d - 1\}$ denote the set of branching nodes and $\mathcal{T} := \{2^d, \ldots, 2^{d+1} - 1\}$ the set of terminal nodes. We then convert all arcs in the tree to point from the parent node to its child node (see Figure 1, left). From the binary tree, we connect a source s to the root and all nodes $n \in \mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{T}$ to sinks t_k, one for every class $k \in \mathcal{K}$ (see Figure 1, right). While we assume that we have binary classes, this formulation generalizes to arbitrary finite classes. All arcs have a capacity of 1, so each datapoint is weighted equally and flows from the source s to one sink t_k, where k is the class that the decision tree assigns to that datapoint. From hereon, we refer to this structure as a "flow graph".



Figure 1: A decision tree of depth 2 (left) and its associated flow graph (right) with two classes.

3.2 MIO Formulation

With the flow graph at hand, we present the MIO formulation for learning optimal classification trees. Without loss of generality, we assume that features are binary, i.e., $x^i \in \{0,1\}^F$ – this assumption can easily be relaxed to cater for integer or categorical features, see Remark 1 in [4]. We encode the branching structure of the tree with variables $b_{nf} \in \{0,1\}$, for all $n \in \mathcal{B}, f \in \mathcal{F}$, which indicate if feature f is selected for branching at node n. We also encode the prediction scheme of the tree using variables $w_{nk} \in \{0,1\}$, for all $n \in \mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{T}, k \in \mathcal{K}$, which equal 1 if and only if (iff) node n assigns class k to all datapoints that land on that node. We let $p_n \in \{0,1\}$ indicate if node n is a prediction node, in which case it must assign a class to all datapoints that land on that node and no further branching is allowed. We also define "flow variables" z to capture the flow of datapoints, where $z^i_{a(n),n} \in \{0,1\}$ equals 1 iff datapoint i flows from the direct ancestor of node n, $a(n)$, to n.

The formulation is as follows:

$$\text{maximize} \quad \sum_{i\in\mathcal{I}} \sum_{n\in\mathcal{B}\cup\mathcal{T}} z^i_{n,t_{y^i}} \qquad \text{subject to} \quad \text{(1a)}$$

$$\sum_{f\in\mathcal{F}} b_{nf} + p_n + \sum_{m\in\mathcal{A}(n)} p_m = 1 \qquad \forall n \in \mathcal{B} \quad \text{(1b)}$$

$$p_n + \sum_{m\in\mathcal{A}(n)} p_m = 1 \qquad \forall n \in \mathcal{T} \quad \text{(1c)}$$

$$z^i_{a(n),n} = z^i_{n,\ell(n)} + z^i_{n,r(n)} + \sum_{k\in\mathcal{K}} z^i_{n,t_k} \qquad \forall n \in \mathcal{B}, i \in \mathcal{I} \quad \text{(1d)}$$

$$z^i_{a(n),n} = \sum_{k\in\mathcal{K}} z^i_{n,t_k} \qquad \forall i \in \mathcal{I}, n \in \mathcal{T} \quad \text{(1e)}$$

$$z^i_{s,1} \le 1 \qquad \forall i \in \mathcal{I} \quad \text{(1f)}$$

$$z^i_{n,\ell(n)} \le \sum_{f\in\mathcal{F}: x^i_f = 0} b_{nf} \qquad \forall n \in \mathcal{B}, i \in \mathcal{I} \quad \text{(1g)}$$

$$z^i_{n,r(n)} \le \sum_{f\in\mathcal{F}: x^i_f = 1} b_{nf} \qquad \forall n \in \mathcal{B}, i \in \mathcal{I} \quad \text{(1h)}$$

$$z^i_{n,t_k} \le w^n_k \qquad \forall i \in \mathcal{I}, n \in \mathcal{B}\cup\mathcal{T}, k \in \mathcal{K} \quad \text{(1i)}$$

$$\sum_{k\in\mathcal{K}} w^n_k = p_n \qquad \forall n \in \mathcal{B}\cup\mathcal{T} \quad \text{(1j)}$$

$$w^n_k \in \{0,1\} \qquad \forall n \in \mathcal{B}\cup\mathcal{T}, k \in \mathcal{K} \quad \text{(1k)}$$

$$b_{nf} \in \{0,1\} \qquad \forall n \in \mathcal{B}, f \in \mathcal{F} \quad \text{(1l)}$$

$$p_n \in \{0,1\} \qquad \forall n \in \mathcal{B}\cup\mathcal{T} \quad \text{(1m)}$$

$$z^i_{a(n),n}, z^i_{n,t_k} \in \{0,1\} \qquad \forall n \in \mathcal{B}\cup\mathcal{T}, i \in \mathcal{I}, k \in \mathcal{K}, \quad \text{(1n)}$$

where $\ell(n)$ (resp. $r(n)$) is the left (resp. right) descendant of n and $\mathcal{A}(n)$ is the set of all ancestors of node $n \in \mathcal{B}\cup\mathcal{T}$. The objective (1a) maximizes the number of correctly classified datapoints. Note that we can add a regularization term in the objective to control for overfitting, see Aghaei et al. [4]. Constraints (1b) ensure that each node is either a branching node, a prediction node, or neither of the two because one of its ancestors is already a prediction node; the last option means that the node is pruned out. Constraints (1c) similarly ensure that each terminal node either makes a prediction or has an ancestor that is a prediction node. Constraints (1d) and (1e) enable flow conservation, whereby every datapoint that flows into node n must exit to its left (or right) descendant, or flow directly to a sink t_k that corresponds to a class k. Constraints (1f) ensure that the flow value of each datapoint entering source s is at most 1. Constraints (1g) and (1h) enforce datapoints to flow to a node's left (resp. right) child if their branching feature is 0 (resp. 1). Constraints (1i) require that a datapoint must be directed to the sink corresponding to the class that the prediction node assigns. Finally, constraints (1j) in conjunction with (1k) ensure that if we make a prediction at node n, then exactly one class is associated with its prediction. In sum, each datapoint flows into the graph and lands on exactly one of the sinks via a path from source to sink depending on its feature vector.

3.3 Fairness Constraints

One main advantage of formulation (1) is its flexible modeling power. In the following, we showcase the variety of constraints that can be added to the formulation to learn trees that satisfy the definitions of fairness we introduced in Section 1.2. We previously defined the various notions of fairness using strict equalities; in practice, however, we may relax this condition by introducing a bias δ, where δ is the maximum disparity allowed between groups.

Statistical Parity. Statistical parity is satisfied up to a bias of δ when we add the following constraint to (1):

$$\left| \frac{\sum_{n\in\mathcal{B}\cup\mathcal{T}} \sum_{i\in\mathcal{I}: p^i = p} z^i_{n,t_1}}{|\{i \in \mathcal{I} : p^i = p\}|} - \frac{\sum_{n\in\mathcal{B}\cup\mathcal{T}} \sum_{i\in\mathcal{I}: p^i = p'} z^i_{n,t_1}}{|\{i \in \mathcal{I} : p^i = p'\}|} \right| \le \delta \qquad \forall p, p' \in \mathcal{P} : p \ne p', \quad (2)$$

where the left-hand side of the inequality is the absolute difference between the proportion of positive classes assigned by the classification tree to groups p and p', respectively.

Conditional Statistical Parity. In order to describe the CSP constraint, we will let ℓ^i denote the value of datapoint i's legitimate factor(s). To ensure that the learned tree satisfies conditional statistical parity up to a bias δ and for all $\ell \in \mathcal{L}$, we may augment (1) with the constraint

$$\left| \frac{\sum_{n\in\mathcal{B}\cup\mathcal{T}} \sum_{i\in\mathcal{I}} \mathbb{I}(p^i = p \wedge \ell^i = \ell) z^i_{n,t_1}}{|\{i \in \mathcal{I} : p^i = p \wedge \ell^i = \ell\}|} - \frac{\sum_{n\in\mathcal{B}\cup\mathcal{T}} \sum_{i\in\mathcal{I}} \mathbb{I}(p^i = p' \wedge \ell^i = \ell) z^i_{n,t_1}}{|\{i \in \mathcal{I} : p^i = p' \wedge \ell^i = \ell\}|} \right| \le \delta \qquad \forall p, p' \in \mathcal{P} : p \ne p', \ \ell \in \mathcal{L}, \quad (3)$$

where the left-hand side of the inequality is the absolute difference between the proportions of positive classes assigned by the classification tree to groups p and p' respectively, in the training data, and whose legitimate feature(s) equal(s) ℓ.

Equalized Odds. We may augment (1) to satisfy equalized odds up to a bias δ using the constraint

$$\left| \frac{\sum_{n\in\mathcal{B}\cup\mathcal{T}} \sum_{i\in\mathcal{I}} \mathbb{I}(p^i = p \wedge y^i = k) z^i_{n,t_1}}{|\{i \in \mathcal{I} : p^i = p \wedge y^i = k\}|} - \frac{\sum_{n\in\mathcal{B}\cup\mathcal{T}} \sum_{i\in\mathcal{I}} \mathbb{I}(p^i = p' \wedge y^i = k) z^i_{n,t_1}}{|\{i \in \mathcal{I} : p^i = p' \wedge y^i = k\}|} \right| \le \delta \qquad \forall k \in \mathcal{K}, p, p' \in \mathcal{P} : p \ne p', \quad (4)$$

where the left-hand side of the inequality is the absolute difference between the proportions of false positive and true positive assignments made by the classification tree in groups p and p'. Note that predictive equality and equal opportunity are equivalent to setting $k = 0$ and $k = 1$ in (4), respectively.

Note that any of the above constraints can be easily linearized by decomposing them into two. In the general case where we have

constraint $|f(x)| \leq \delta$, we can reformulate it into $f(x) \leq \delta$ and $-f(x) \leq \delta$. If f is affine (as is the case here), then these constraints are linear in the decision variables of the problem and the resulting problem can be solved with powerful off-the-shelf mixed-integer *linear* optimization solvers such as Gurobi[1]. We also emphasize that the above constraints are illustrative examples of the approach's flexibility, and that they may be amended or combined with other fairness considerations. For example, instead of restricting the absolute value of the difference between groups, we may impose that the minority group should be better off by a margin δ, see Section 4.4.

4 EXPERIMENTS

We now evaluate the empirical performance of the model outlined in Section 3. We first compare the interpretability of several popular machine learning models based on three desiderata – decision complexity, simulatability, and scope – illustrating that our approach (*FairOCT*) yields one of the most interpretable models. Then, we compare our approach to a suite of methods for learning fair classifiers (both ones that are model agnostic and those that specifically learn decision trees).

4.1 Datasets

COMPAS. The Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) is a popular dataset used originally to predict a criminal's risk of recividism after 2 years. Angwin et al. [7] published a seminal article analyzing that the algorithm deployed then was biased in favor of White criminals. We therefore let race be the sensitive attribute. The original race attribute has 6 levels, but Asian and Native American criminals are quite rare in the data, so we group them under the "Other" category in order to make it possible to obtain better estimates of fairness metrics. The dataset consists of 6,172 datapoints.

Adult. The UCI Adult dataset is taken from a 1994 Census database [22]. The goal is to predict whether or not someone's income exceeds $50,000 per year, and we treat sex as the sensitive attribute in accordance with [1, 28, 36] with females being the marginalized group. The full dataset contains 30,162 datapoints.

German. The German dataset classifies people as having good or bad credit. We use age as the sensitive attribute, following the works of [27, 34] to split the population into people 25 and younger and older than 25, with the former as the marginalized group since younger people are often assigned worse credit under the basis of age. The dataset contains 1,000 datapoints.

All three datasets are popular benchmark datasets in the algorithmic fairness literature. We focus on these three because they each have different and societally important prediction tasks.

4.2 Benchmark Methods

Fair Decision Tree-Based Methods

Optimal and Fair Decision Trees via Regularization (RegOCT). We compare our approach to the method for learning optimal fair trees proposed by Aghaei et al. [3], which considers both disparate impact and disparate treatment. In our setting, we are only interested in disparate impact, which reduces to statistical parity in the case of binary outcomes. Our method differs from *RegOCT* in two ways: *1) FairOCT* is formulated much more efficiently, resulting in faster solve times, and *2) RegOCT* promotes fairness via a regularization term in the objective rather than as a constraint (like ours). Its objective function minimizes misclassification rate plus a regularization term controlled by a "fairness parameter" ρ.

Discrimination Aware Decision Trees (DADT). The second tree-based method we compare to is *DADT* proposed by Kamiran et al. [34], which consists of a two-pronged approach. The first is an in-processing step that uses sensitivity gain (IGS) and information gain (IGC) as heuristics to build a fair decision tree. If the tree still has a discrimination level greater than ϵ, a post-processing step can be used that relabels the predictions of the tree's leaf nodes until the discrimination reaches ϵ. Note that the original paper proposes to use a combination of these steps where appropriate, such as IGC+IGS, IGC-IGS, or only IGC (which is equivalent to the CART algorithm) – all of which can be combined with the relabeling step post-training ("Relab"). We compare our method with respect to IGC+IGS_Relab because Kamiran et al. [34] cited that it in general performs best, although we display results for all three heuristics in the Appendix Section A. We grow trees of maximum depth 2 and 3 for interpretability. *DADT* has two modeling limitations: it only considers statistical parity as its fairness metric, and it assumes only two sensitive groups exist. In further contrast to *FairOCT*, *DADT* subtracts the probability of the marginalized group from the dominant group. A "fair" result under this definition may include a scenario in which the marginalized group receives better outcomes at a much higher rate than the dominant group, which constraint (2) does not allow. However, since our approach is very flexible, we run experiments on *FairOCT* with this notion of disparity – refer to Appendix Section A.

Note that methods other than *DADT* and *RegOCT* in the literature either: consider individual fairness as opposed to group fairness (e.g., Ranzato et al. [45]); learn trees in an online setting (e.g., Zhang and Ntoutsi [58]); or are not interpretable (e.g., Grari et al. [28]).

Model Agnostic Fairness Methods

Apart from strictly tree-based methods, we also compare our approach to three methods – one from each umbrella of approaches: pre-processing, in-processing, and post-processing. Critically, these three methods can learn most ML model classes (such as logistic regression, random forests, kNN, etc.). This feature is important because our goal is to analyze the accuracy and discrimination trade-offs when opting to use our method (one of the most interpretable) in lieu of more complex models.

[Pre-Processing] Correlation Remover (CR). We benchmark our method against *CR*, which reduces the correlation between the data and the sensitive feature by regressing the "centered" sensitive feature with the non-sensitive features. A linear transformation using the learned coefficients is then applied, resulting in new data X_{corr}. The final transformation X_{tfm} is controlled via a fairness parameter $\alpha \in [0, 1]$:

$$X_{\text{tfm}} = \alpha X_{\text{corr}} + (1 - \alpha)X,$$

where $\alpha = 0$ corresponds to the original feature vector X and $\alpha = 1$ means all correlation is removed. Further detail can be found in [14] and the API documentation for FairLearn. Note that we chose

[1] See https://www.gurobi.com/products/gurobi-optimizer/

Model	Decision Complexity (COMPAS)	Decision Complexity (Adult)	Decision Complexity (German)	Simulatability	Scope
Full Tree (d=1)	3	3	3	High	Global
Full Tree (d=2)	7	7	7	High	Global
Full Tree (d=3)	15	15	15	High	Global
Logistic Regression	6	12	20	Medium-High	Global
Decision Tree	779	5,101	329	Medium	Global
k-Nearest Neighbors	4,629	22,621	750	Medium-Low	Local
SVM (RBF Kernel)	3,255	10,542	454	Low	Local
Multilayer Perceptron	700	1,300	2,100	Low	None
Random Forest	59,126	273,861	17,956	Low	None

Table 1: Interpretability of various machine learning models with respect to three desiderata: decision complexity (in the context of the *COMPAS*, *Adult*, and *German* datasets), simulaltability, and scope.

this method out of all other pre-processing approaches because it is lightweight and yields better performance upon testing.

[In-Processing] Exponentiated-Gradient Reduction (ExpG). Algorithm 1 in Agarwal et al. [1] finds a classifier and λ with the highest accuracy subject to a fairness constraint, where λ is a vector consisting of k Lagrangian multipliers, each corresponding to a fairness constraint in the algorithm (i.e., $\lambda \in \mathbb{R}_+^k$). Since we are interested in obtaining a breadth of accuracy-discrimination datapoints, we opted to implement their "grid search" method, which searches through a grid of λ and yields the best estimator from a given model class. In our case, we use *all* the results from the possible values of λ. This grid search method is what we will refer to as *ExpG* in our experiments. We chose to compare our method with *ExpG* because it is one of the only in-processing approaches that take in nearly any model class and also optimize for many fairness notions.

[Post-Processing] Randomized Threshold Optimizer (RTO). Lastly, we compare *FairOCT* with a method proposed by Hardt et al. [30] that applies a randomized thresholding transformation to the classifier's prediction to enforce a fairness notion. We refer to Section 3.2 of Hardt et al. [30] for a full treatment of the algorithm. Similar to *ExpG*, we chose *RTO* because it is one of the only post-processing methods that is model agnostic and can optimize for all the fairness notions we consider in this work.

4.3 Interpretability of Machine Learning Models

Table 1 provides a comparison of several popular machine learning models and our assessment of their interpretability with respect to several desiderata: model complexity (defined in Section 2), simulatability, and scope. In the following, we elucidate our judgments on the simulatability and scope of these models. We will classify models as having "High" to "Low" simulatability, and "Global", "Local", or "None" in terms of scope. Unless otherwise noted, all models except for optimal trees are trained using the standard parameters of the scikit-learn package:

- **Full Binary Trees**: For simplicity, we consider learning full binary trees up to a fixed depth d for our optimal tree methods, although in practice we may easily prune the tree via regularization. We argue that trees have a global scope and are among the most simulatable because humans can visualize the entire decision rule and trace predictions with relative ease (especially when the trees are shallow and simple).
- **Decision Trees – CART (DT)**: Trees that are grown via a heuristic typically have a stopping point to avoid overfitting, and in our case we impose the minimum number of samples in each leaf to be 3. Since there is stochasticity in tree depth and pruning, we report decision complexity as the average over all trees grown for a particular dataset. While DT has a global scope similar to full binary trees, it is much less simulatable given how deep the trees tend to grow.
- **Logistic Regression (LR)**: Assuming full linearity, logistic regression has global scope because one can wholly observe its decision rule via its coefficients. However, we argue that logistic regression has medium simulatability because the coefficients need to be calculated and contextualized for full interpretability.
- **k-Nearest Neighbors (kNN)**: While kNN's simulatability can be high – especially in lower dimensions where the decision space can be visualized ($F \leq 3$) – kNN's are often not simulatable in practice. Without visualizing the entire feature space, we can only observe the local behavior of the model, i.e., which k points are nearest to our new datapoint.
- **Support Vector Machines (SVM), RBF Kernel**: Due to stochasticity, we report the average number of support vectors in our experiments for SVM's decision complexity. We argue that SVM's have low simulatability, especially when $F > 2$ and the decision space is hard to visualize. We can, however, classify SVM's as having local scope because the intuition is similar to kNN – support vectors closer to the new datapoint will have much higher weights.
- **Random Forest (RF)**: We grow 100 trees via the CART algorithm to build the random forest model, and argue that simulatability is low because a human cannot keep track of the complicated decisions that are aggregated over numerous trees. The intricacy of the random forest also means that it is not interpretable neither globally or locally.
- **Multilayer Perceptron (MLP)**: A multilayer perceptron is a neural network. We train MLPs with 1 hidden layer consisting of 100 nodes, while the input layer has the number

Algorithm	Fairness Definitions	# Sensitive Levels	Disparity	Model	Fairness Parameter	Time Limit
FairOCT	SP, CSP, PE, EOpp, EOdds	Any	absmax	Full Tree ($d \in \{1, 2, 3\}$)	$\delta \in [0.01, 0.55]$ $\Delta = 0.01$	3 hrs
RegOCT	SP	Any	absmax	Full Tree ($d \in \{1, 2, 3\}$)	$\rho \in [0, 1]$ $\Delta = 0.02$	3 hrs
DADT	SP	2	dom-marg	DT	$\epsilon \in [0.01, 0.55]$ $\Delta = 0.01$	N/A
CR	SP, PE, EOpp, EOdds	Any	absmax	DT, LR, kNN, SVM, RF, MLP	$\alpha \in [0, 1]$ $\Delta = 0.1$	N/A
ExpG	SP, PE, EOpp, EOdds	Any	absmax	DT, LR, kNN, SVM, RF, MLP	# of λ : 100	N/A
RTO	SP, PE, EOpp, EOdds	Any	absmax	DT, LR, kNN, SVM, RF, MLP	N/A	N/A

Table 2: List of algorithms run on *COMPAS*, *Adult*, and *German* datasets. Each algorithm can accommodate different fairness definitions: statistical parity (SP), conditional statistical parity (CSP), predictive equality (PE), equal opportunity (EOpp), and equalized odds (EOdds). They also take varying number of sensitive levels and disparity measures, where "absmax" corresponds to the absolute value of the maximum pairwise disparity between sensitive groups and "dom-marg" is the difference in positive classification rate between the dominant group and the marginalized group. Different machine learning models are also considered: full binary trees with branching depths $d \in \{1, 2, 3\}$, decision trees grown via CART (DT), logistic regression (LR), k-nearest neighbors (kNN), support vector machine with RBF kernel (SVM), random forest (RF), and multilayer perceptron (MLP). Our experiments also varied the fairness parameters for all methods, whose role is outlined in detail in Section 4.2. Δ denotes the increments taken in each of these fairness parameters.

of nodes equal to the number of features in the dataset. Its decision complexity, therefore, is equal to $100 \times F + 100$. Since the prediction relies on potentially thousands of matrix calculations, MLPs have very low simulatability and have neither global nor local interpretability.

4.4 Methodology

We compare the performance of *FairOCT* with the benchmark methods outlined in Section 4.2 on all three datasets: *COMPAS*, *German* and *Adult*. Where relevant and possible, we incorporate various fairness definitions in all our experiments. All datasets are tested on statistical parity, predictive equality, equal opportunity, and equalized odds, and *COMPAS* additionally considers conditional statistical parity (conditioned on the number of prior crimes). However, note that not all methods can accommodate all these notions. For instance, only our method can incorporate conditional statistical parity. On the other hand, *RegOCT* and *DADT* can only consider statistical parity. *DADT* additionally only takes in two sensitive levels while all the other methods are robust to more than two sensitive levels. Therefore, in our experiments on *COMPAS*, *DADT* only considers binary race – "Black" vs. "non-Black" – which yields results that are not fully comparable to other methods.

A full summary of our experiments for each method, including capabilities, ML models trained, and fairness parameters tested is provided in Table 2. We consider fairness parameters in increments of Δ and display results for all these values in order to fully observe the accuracy-discrimination trade-off. We use 75% of the data for training and 25% for testing on all three datasets outlined in Section 4.1 – split five times with different seeds to account for random variability – and evaluate model performance on the test set (i.e., out-of-sample or OOS set). The *Adult* dataset is both large and high-dimensional, so we train *FlowOCT* and *RegOCT* on 2,700 datapoints due to computational limitations (while evaluating on the same test set as other methods to allow for an equivalent comparison); we will further discuss this choice in Section 4.5. All experiments have a time limit of 3 hours, and utilized four Intel Xeon E5-2640 v4, 2.40GHz CPUs, each having 4GB of memory.

4.5 Results

Comparison of Fairness Methods. Figure 2 plots the accuracy and discrimination trade-off for all experiments outlined in Table 2. In general, *FairOCT* trained on all depths ($d = \{1, 2, 3\}$) obtain similar performances, though this is mainly attributed to the experiments on $d = 3$ not solving to optimality within the time limit. Trends vary across datasets; for instance, *FairOCT* found decisions with accuracies between $[0.55, 0.68]$ with disparities between $[0, 0.25]$ for *COMPAS*. In contrast, its results for *Adult* varied only by at most 5 percentage points (p.p.) in accuracy and 10 p.p. in disparity. Nonetheless, *FairOCT* learns a range of heterogeneous performances, which allows us to choose between various accuracy-discrimination trade-offs.

Overall, for any given disparity threshold, *FairOCT* consistently outperforms *DADT* within the notion of statistical parity (recall that *DADT* is only trained on this notion). This is expected since *FairOCT* finds an optimal solution whereas *DADT* relies on a heuristic. A



Figure 2: Accuracy and discrimination of *FairOCT* on the *COMPAS* (top), *Adult* (middle), and *German* (bottom) datasets with varying fairness metrics (from left to right – statistical parity equal opportunity, predictive equality, and equalized odds, and at the bottom, conditional statistical parity), averaged for each fairness parameter over 5 random samples. Each datapoint in the graph corresponds to an average over 0.05 increments of disparity (i.e., for every method and model, each datapoint is averaged from [0, 0.05), [0.05, 0.1), and so on). Classifiers are ordered from darkest (most interpretable) to lightest (least interpretable) according to our interpretability desiderata outlined in Table 1. Different fairness methods are outlined by different marker and line styles. For ease of visualization, we average the results for *DADT* with trees of maximum depth 2 and 3.

notable aberration is *DADT*'s superior performance to *FairOCT* on *COMPAS*, but this is because *DADT* only considers two levels of race while all other experiments have four levels. Even when only considering two levels of race, *DADT* does not result in significant improvements in performance. Refer to Appendix Section A for a comparison of *FairOCT* and *DADT* within the same learning setting, which shows that *FairOCT* consistently outperforms *DADT*.

In contrast, the other tree-based benchmark method – *RegOCT* – performs at around the same level as *FairOCT* (again only on statistical parity because *RegOCT* only considers this notion). This result is unsurprising given that *RegOCT* similarly learns optimal trees, so its performance will be as good as *FairOCT*, which already finds the best-performing partition for a fixed maximum depth. However, we emphasize that *RegOCT* is much less flexible in considering other notions of fairness. Moreover, *FairOCT* benefits from a stronger formulation and is faster by at least an order-of-magnitude. Refer to Appendix Table 3 for a full comparison of computational times.

With regard to non-tree-based methods, *CR* in general yields smooth and heterogeneous results throughout the disparity axis. We observe the same trend for *ExpG*, with the exception of the *COMPAS* dataset, whose performance jumps widely. [1] mentioned that as the number of sensitive levels (and therefore the number of constraints) increase, *ExpG* is not recommended because the search space grows exponentially. This limitation may be circumvented by testing an arbitrarily large number of fairness parameters and ignoring several outliers to smooth the curve. Note also that most of the parameters tested led to a disparity level of 1.0 or near 1.0, but we decided to truncate the results to a more reasonable level for all datasets. Finally, *RTO* is mainly missing from Figure 2 because we cannot tune any fairness parameters – resulting in a single datapoint, none of which is displayed because the performance hovers at around 0.6-0.9 disparity.

In comparison, *FairOCT* consistently finds results in the lower end of the disparity axis (which is the space we care most given the task of promoting full parity). For instance, in the *COMPAS* dataset on all the fairness notions, *FairOCT* resulted in disparities ranging from 0 to 0.3 – no other method boasts this range. Even in the *Adult* and *German* datasets where that range is attenuated, no other fairness-promoting method consistently finds datapoints with low disparity (i.e., < 0.05). This result likely arises from our method taking in a hyperparemeter δ that upper bounds resulting disparity. The optimization problem is then forced to find the highest-accuracy decision rule given a (potentially low) tolerance on disparity. This is in contrast to all other methods; RegOCT uses a regularization term, CR tunes the extent of correlation removed, and ExpG passes numerous values of λ, all of which do not guarantee certain disparity results.

Finally, we note that the *FairOCT* results trained on the 2,700 datapoints of *Adult* have comparable performances with other baseline methods, indicating that while optimization-based methods like *FairOCT* may run into computational problems, training on a smaller, representative dataset yields predictions that generalize very well to the entire population. In the bottom graph of Figure 2, we also conduct experiments where *FairOCT* considers conditional statistical parity on *COMPAS*; no other method we compare to can equivalently compare this fairness notion, highlighting our approach's flexible modeling power.

The Price of Interpretability. As expected, more interpretable models like full trees perform (marginally) worse than more complex models like random forests and MLP's. This difference denotes the price of interpretability. For instance, in the *German* dataset, a random forest trained on *CR* has on average 6 percentage points higher accuracy than a full tree of depth 2 trained on *FairOCT*, across all discrimination thresholds. However, as mentioned previously, many fairness-promoting methods fail to reach full or near perfect parity in contrast to FairOCT, rendering this aggregated comparison less meaningful. Notably, in the *COMPAS* dataset, a neural net trained on CR might perform on average 3 percentage points better than a *FairOCT* ($d = 2$), but only within the disparity ranges for which both methods have results. We must further consider the other datapoints *FairOCT* ($d = 2$) yields for disparities less than 0.15, of which have no equivalent comparison with the neural net. Nonetheless, given a fixed disparity threshold, the best performing complex model performs on average 4.2 p.p. better in terms of OOS accuracy than *FairOCT* over the range of disparities for which both models have results.

5 CONCLUSION

In this work, we presented an MIO formulation for learning optimal classification trees that can be modeled to consider a variety of algorithmic fairness notions. We also propose a new measure of interpretability named *decision complexity* in order to compare our interpretable method with other classes of models. In doing so, we conduct one of the first experiments that analyze in-depth the trade-offs between interpretability, fairness, and predictive accuracy.

Our experiments show that while we observe a (often small) price of interpretability with trees of shallow depth, one must ultimately consider not only the trade-offs between interpretability, accuracy, and discrimination, but also the various fairness-promoting methods that may yield vastly different results (e.g., with regard to the range of disparities found, how different methods might be better for certain constraints, etc.). In reality, decision makers face the incredibly hard task of balancing these trade-offs given the application at hand. Our work attempts to enrich these considerations in the hopes of guiding practitioners when they make these difficult decisions.

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Model Debiasing via Gradient-based Explanation on Representation

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ABSTRACT

Machine learning systems produce biased results towards certain demographic groups, known as the fairness problem. Recent approaches to tackle this problem learn a latent code (i.e., representation) through disentangled representation learning and then discard the latent code dimensions correlated with sensitive attributes (e.g., gender). Nevertheless, these approaches may suffer from incomplete disentanglement and overlook proxy attributes (proxies for sensitive attributes) when processing real-world data, especially for unstructured data, causing performance degradation in fairness and loss of useful information for downstream tasks. In this paper, we propose a novel fairness framework that performs debiasing with regard to both sensitive attributes and proxy attributes, which boosts the prediction performance of downstream task models without complete disentanglement. The main idea is to, first, leverage gradient-based explanation to find two model focuses, 1) one focus for predicting sensitive attributes and 2) the other focus for predicting downstream task labels, and second, use them to perturb the latent code that guides the training of downstream task models towards fairness and utility goals. We show empirically that our framework works with both disentangled and non-disentangled representation learning methods and achieves better fairness-accuracy trade-off on unstructured and structured datasets than previous state-of-the-art approaches.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies** → **Machine learning approaches**.

KEYWORDS

fairness, model debiasing, representation learning, gradient-based explanation

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1 INTRODUCTION

Machine learning systems are reported to generate preferential predictions for some demographic groups and prejudiced predictions for others in many high-stake fields, such as loan offers, exam grading, school admission, and parole approval [1, 6, 21, 29]. This is known as the fairness problem in machine learning. Such fairness problems may cause long-term and high impacts on the life of vulnerable groups [5].

To tackle the fairness problem, early studies use adversarial training and regularization to force the model not to pay attention to sensitive information during training [8, 12, 25, 33, 35, 36]. And other works focus on learning fair (debiased) representations for downstream tasks [15, 16, 19, 24, 31, 34]. These methods usually specify the task attributes or the sensitive attributes before training, resulting in inflexibility [3].

To increase flexibility, the up-to-date approaches are to leverage disentangled representation learning methods to learn the disentangled latent code in which every dimension only contains one factor of variation and is optimized to be independent of each other [2, 3, 11, 13], and then remove the dimensions correlated with sensitive attributes before using the code to train downstream task models [3, 24].

However, because it is extremely difficult to enumerate all the factors of variation in real-world data [20], the number of the latent code dimensions is usually smaller than the real number of factors of variation. This results in incomplete disentanglement in the latent code, which poses two major challenges when we process real-world data, in particular, unstructured data such as images, with debiasing methods based on disentangled representation learning.

- First, it is challenging to avoid information loss for downstream tasks during the debiasing process. Since the latent code is usually incompletely disentangled, critical information for downstream tasks can be lost when we remove the

dimensions correlated with sensitive attributes from the latent code, causing degradation in prediction accuracy.
- Second, it is challenging to cover all sensitive information in proxy attributes[1] (proxies for sensitive attributes) while debiasing downstream task models. Because of incomplete disentanglement in the latent code, sensitive information encoded in proxy attributes may not exist only in those removed dimensions but also in the remaining dimensions. This results in fairness degradation of downstream task models.

In this work, we aim to address the aforementioned two challenges by exploring methods that do not rely on complete disentanglement and can better cover sensitive information. To this end, we propose a novel fairness framework named DVGE (**D**ebiasing **v**ia **G**radient-based **E**xplanation), as depicted in Figure 1. Specifically, to address the first challenge, DVGE does not remove latent code dimensions, which causes problems in locating sensitive information and debiasing downstream task models. To locate sensitive information and simultaneously address the second challenge, we exploit gradient-based explanations to highlight the importance of each latent code dimension when a model predicts sensitive attributes using the latent code. To debias downstream task models, we propose to perturb the latent code with the model focuses derived from gradient-based explanations. Overall, our main idea is to exploit gradient-based explanation to 1) obtain the model focus for predicting sensitive attributes, which we refer to as sensitive focus, and 2) obtain the model focus for predicting downstream task attributes, which we refer to as downstream task focus, and 3) use the two focuses to guide the training of downstream task models. Specifically, we propose *bidirectional perturbation* which uses the downstream task focus to positively perturb the latent code so that models pay more attention to downstream task information, and uses the sensitive focus to reversely perturb the latent code so that models pay less attention to sensitive information.

Compared with methods based on adversarial training, DVGE is more flexible, because it separates encoding and debiasing, so that the encoder does not need retraining when sensitive attributes or downstream tasks are changed. DVGE is also less tricky to train, since it debiases via perturbation instead of adversary. Compared with methods based on disentangled representation learning, DVGE better covers sensitive information with XAI explanations and reduces useful information loss without removing latent code dimensions.

As for evaluation, we conduct extensive experiments to compare our framework with previous state-of-the-art approaches by considering disentangled and non-disentangled VAE-based representation learning methods, on both real-world unstructured dataset (CelebA [18]) and structured dataset (South German Credit [9]). We measure the extent of fairness with two standard metrics, demographic parity (DP) [7, 32] and equal opportunity (EO) [10], against model accuracy. The results show that DVGE achieves better fairness-accuracy trade-off than the state-of-the-art approaches.

Our contributions are summarized as follows.

- We propose a novel fairness framework DVGE, to address the problem of the loss of useful downstream task information and the problem of overlooking sensitive information from proxy attributes, when debiasing models with incompletely disentangled latent code.
- We introduce to exploit gradient-based explanation to obtain model focuses related to sensitive information and downstream task information, and propose *bidirectional perturbation* to guide the model training for fairness purpose with the focuses.
- By extensive experiments, we show that our framework leads to better fairness-accuracy trade-off on both unstructured and structured real-world datasets compared to previous state-of-the-art approaches.

2 RELATED WORK

In this section, we review the works related to our paper, namely, debiasing methods in machine learning, variational autoencoders, and gradient-based explanations.

2.1 Debiasing Methods in Machine Learning

The methods for debiasing can be categorized as pre-processing methods, in-processing methods, and post-processing methods. Pre-processing methods aim for generating unbiased data for training by transforming the input data. Many recent pre-processing methods focused on learning discrimination-free encodings or embeddings for various tasks [3, 15, 24]. As for in-processing methods, they try to remove discrimination from models during training via objective functions, fairness constraints, or through adversarial training [8]. Furthermore, post-processing methods are proposed to audit predictions and may reassign labels with regard to fairness measurements after the training process [4]. Our proposed framework falls into the category of pre-processing methods.

2.2 Variational Autoencoders (VAEs)

VAEs are exploited to generate new unseen data that complies with the original distribution for generation tasks [23]. The main idea of VAEs is to learn a Gaussian distribution from training data and force the decoded data to have a similar distribution. Following the vanilla VAE [14], many variations of VAEs are proposed for different purposes, such as disentanglement [11, 13], recommendation [17], fairness [3, 24], etc. In this paper, we demonstrate that our fairness framework achieves better fairness-accuracy trade-off by considering both non-disentangled VAE (VanillaVAE [14]) and disentangled VAE (FactorVAE [13]).

2.3 Gradient-based Explanations

The gradient-based explanation methods are one of the primary approaches to explaining machine learning models, along with prototype-based methods, perturbation-based methods, etc. They produce local explanations for individual data points. The generated explanation (also known as saliency map or sensitivity map) by exploiting input-gradient highlights which parts in an input data point the model focuses on for making the prediction. Such an attempt is first made by Simonyan et al. [27]. Following their work, a

[1]For example, when the sensitive attribute is gender, corresponding proxy attributes can be hair length, beard, etc.



Figure 1: The overview of DVGE training procedure. First, the latent code z is generated with a trained VAE. Then, by feeding z to a trained sensitive classifier and the downstream task model being trained, the sensitive focus and the downstream task focus are derived from the gradient-based explanations on them. After the bidirectional perturbation perturbs z with the sensitive focus and the downstream task focus, the perturbed latent code z' is used to update the downstream task model.

number of variations are proposed, such as Grad-CAM [26], SmoothGrad [28], FullGrad [30]. In this work, we leverage gradient-based explanations to perturb the latent code for boosting the fairness and accuracy of downstream task models.

3 BACKGROUND

Here, we briefly introduce the background of two group fairness notions that we consider in this paper.

In this paper, we consider two commonly used group fairness notions, demographic parity (DP) [7, 32] and equal opportunity (EO) [10]. Let us first consider a simple example, in which we train a model $\hat{y} = g(x)$ to predict the label $y \in \{0, 1\}$, where $\hat{y}$ is the prediction, x denotes the input data, $s \in \{s_1, s_2\}$ denotes sensitive attributes in the input.

Demographic Parity. The definition of DP is that the model prediction is independent of sensitive attributes. In other words, the probability that a member of any subgroup (s_1 or s_2) receives the same prediction, 0 or 1 in our example, is completely the same. Based on the definition, the distance to demographic parity Δ_{DP} is used to measure how fair a model is as

$$\Delta_{DP} = |P(\hat{y} = 1|s = s_1) - P(\hat{y} = 1|s = s_2)|. \quad (1)$$

When $\Delta_{DP} = 0$, the demographic disparity is satisfied.

Equal Opportunity. Equal opportunity indicates that the true positive rate(TPR) of a model remains the same with respect to each subgroup. This is mathematically equivalent to that each subgroup has the same false negative rate (FNR). We can also use the distance to EO Δ_{EO} to measure the extent of fairness of a model as

$$\Delta_{EO} = |P(\hat{y} = 1|s = s_1, y = 1) - P(\hat{y} = 1|s = s_2, y = 1)| \quad (2)$$

or

$$\Delta_{EO} = |P(\hat{y} = 0|s = s_1, y = 1) - P(\hat{y} = 0|s = s_2, y = 1)|. \quad (3)$$

This definition underlines the idea that the qualified members of each subgroup should have the same probability to receive positive or negative predictions.

4 THE PROPOSED FAIRNESS FRAMEWORK

In this paper, we design a new fairness framework DVGE, as illustrated in Figure 1, by considering sensitive information from both sensitive attributes and proxy attributes. The framework does not depend on complete disentanglement. Instead, it leverages gradient-based explanation to obtain model focuses for predicting sensitive attributes and downstream task labels, and uses the proposed bidirectional perturbation to perturb the latent code for guiding the training of downstream task models.

4.1 Latent Code

As our work follows the idea of using representation learning to debias machine learning models with the flexibility to cope with different sensitive attributes and downstream tasks, we first train a VAE $f(x)$ to encode the input data x into latent code z by maximizing the Evidence Lower Bound (ELBO) [14]. The VAE used in DVGE is fixed after training. Our framework works with both disentangled and non-disentangled VAEs, which we show in the experiments.



Figure 2: The overview of DVGE inference procedure. After training, DVGE does not perform bidirectional perturbation on the latent code during inference.

4.2 Sensitive Focus

Sensitive focus is the model focus for predicting sensitive attributes s with latent code z. We derive it using a gradient-based explanation, since this explanation is input-specific and assigns an importance score to each latent code dimension based on gradients, which can be easily used for perturbation. Given a trained sensitive classifier $d(z)$ which takes the latent code z as input to predict sensitive attributes s, the gradient-based explanation e_{sens} for its prediction is calculated as

$$e_{sens} = \psi(\nabla_z d(z) \odot z), \tag{4}$$

where $\psi(\cdot)$ is a post-processing operation for a gradient-based explanation, e.g., scale and taking the absolute value, $\nabla_z d(z)$ is the model gradient with regard to z, and $\odot$ denotes element-wise multiplication. As $\psi(\cdot)$ and $\odot$ are only for the visualization purpose of the explanation, the essence of the explanation is $\nabla_z d(z)$, we define the sensitive focus as

$$F_{sens} = \nabla_z d(z). \tag{5}$$

Please note that $\nabla_z d(z)$ is computed via backpropagation with the predicted sensitive attributes $\hat{s} = d(z)$. Thus, computing sensitive focus does not require access to real sensitive attributes.

Sensitive Information Coverage. Since the sensitive classifier $d(z)$ is trained to make use of every dimension of the latent code z to make predictions about sensitive attributes s, any sensitive information or shortcut information linking to s is exploited by it for the prediction. In addition, the gradient-based explanation can highlight all this information in **every dimension** of z, so the defined sensitive focus in our framework covers the sensitive information from both sensitive attributes and proxy attributes in the latent code.

Flexibility w.r.t. Changing Sensitive Attributes. As the sensitive focus is obtained via gradient-based explanation on sensitive classifier $d(z)$, when different sensitive attributes are required, we only need to change to a new $d(z)$ for predicting the new version of s, while reusing the latent code z.

4.3 Downstream Task Focus

The downstream task focus is the model focus for predicting downstream task label y with the latent code z. We obtain this focus directly from the gradient-based explanation of the downstream task model during its training process. Similar to Section 4.2, given a downstream task model $g(z)$ and the latent z, the gradient-based explanation of the model is calculated as

$$e_{task} = \psi(\nabla_z g(z) \odot z), \tag{6}$$

and we define the downstream task focus as

$$F_{task} = \nabla_z g(z). \tag{7}$$

The downstream task focus is for boosting the accuracy performance of the downstream task model while debiasing.

4.4 Bidirectional Perturbation

We perform bidirectional perturbation by perturbing the latent code z with the sensitive focus F_{sens} and the downstream task focus F_{task} to guide the training of the downstream task model for the purpose of fairness and prevention of downstream task accuracy degradation. The perturbed latent code z' is calculated as

$$\begin{aligned} z' &= z + Clip_\epsilon\{\eta_1 * F_{sens} - \eta_2 * F_{task}\} \\ &= z + Clip_\epsilon\{\eta_1 * \nabla_z d(z) - \eta_2 * \nabla_z g(z)\}, \end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

where η_1 and η_2 are the hyperparameters for controlling the intensity of debiasing and accuracy boosting, respectively, and

$$Clip_\epsilon\{v\} = \begin{cases} \epsilon, \text{ if } v > \epsilon, \\ max(v, -\epsilon), \text{ otherwise}, \end{cases} \tag{9}$$

where ϵ is non-negative and denotes the threshold for the distortion caused by bidirectional perturbation. $Clip_\epsilon\{\cdot\}$ is designed to prevent bidirectional perturbation introducing too much information distortion on latent code dimensions.

Rationale behind Bidirectional Perturbation. Since backpropagation gradients indicate the directions to optimize the objective function, in the equation 8, $+\nabla_z d(z)$ (sensitive focus) is for updating the latent code z in the reverse direction of optimizing sensitive information prediction, while $-\nabla_z g(z)$ (downstream task focus) is for updating z towards the direction of optimizing downstream task model, so that the downstream task model is guided to pay less attention to sensitive information and more attention to downstream task information. DVGE uses the perturbed latent code z' to update the downstream task model.

No Reliance on Complete Disentanglement. Even if the factors of variation for sensitive information are not fully disentangled (mixed with other factors of variation in the latent code dimensions), our framework still can debias the downstream task model, since the sensitive focus covers the sensitive information in *every dimension* of the latent code z, and our framework leverages the sensitive focus to perturb *every dimension* of z.

Inference. After finishing training the downstream task model with our framework, we do not perform the bidirectional perturbation on the latent code during inference as shown in Figure 2. The reason is that the model after training has learned to pay more



(a) DVGE-D, Δ_{DP} (b) DVGE-D, Δ_{EO} (c) DVGE-N, Δ_{DP} (d) DVGE-N, Δ_{EO}

Figure 3: Fairness-accuracy trade-off comparison results for Experiment 1: CelebA dataset, sensitive attribute = "Male", task label = "Oval_Face".

attention to downstream task information and less attention to sensitive information in the latent code.

5 EXPERIMENTS

We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate our framework while comparing it with previous state-of-the-art approaches. To show the flexibility of our framework, we consider different sensitive attributes individually and jointly on structured dataset and unstructured dataset. To demonstrate that our framework does not rely on complete disentanglement, we consider both non-disentangled and disentangled VAEs. Furthermore, we use an ablation study to demonstrate that our framework has better coverage on sensitive information.

5.1 Experiment Setups

5.1.1 DVGE-D and DVGE-N. To demonstrate that our framework does not rely on complete disentanglement to debias downstream task models, we implement DVGE with one disentangled VAE (FactorVAE [13]) and one non-disentangled VAE (VanillaVAE [14]), respectively. And we denote them as **DVGE-D** and **DVGE-N**. For more implementation details, please refer to Appendix B.

5.1.2 Baselines. We consider three state-of-the-art debiasing approaches as baselines in the experiments.

- Adversarial Training (ADT) [8]: The model based on ADT consists of three parts, i.e., feature encoder, sensitive branch, and downstream task branch. ADT debiases the model by updating the feature encoder with the reverse loss of the sensitive branch.
- FFVAE [3]: Based on previous disentangled representation learning methods, FFVAE tries to explicitly separate sensitive dimensions from non-sensitive dimensions in the latent code by learning the sensitive latent part with supervised learning.
- FD-VAE [24]: FD-VAE separates the latent code into three portions, i.e., sensitive dimensions, downstream-task-related dimensions, and mutual-information dimensions. FD-VAE trains the downstream task model using the latent code without sensitive dimensions while trying to exclude sensitive information from mutual-information dimensions with adversarial training.

Before training the encoder, ADT and FD-VAE require to specify the sensitive attributes and the downstream task attribute, while FFVAE requires to specify the sensitive attributes. In contrast, our framework does not require to specify either of them and has the highest flexibility. Since the debiasing process in our framework is not based on adversarial training, DVGE is more stable and easier to train than the baselines.

5.1.3 Datasets. In the experiments, we use two commonly used datasets. One is an unstructured dataset, which is CelebA[2] [18], while the other is a structured dataset, which is South German Credit[3] [9]. CelebA has 202,599 facial images, each of which is associated with 40 attributes, such as "Attractive", "Male", "Young". And all attributes are in binary form. As for the structured dataset, South German Credit has 1,000 entries with 21 attributes. The first 20 attributes are the information about the loan applicants (gender, age, income, etc.), and the last one is the loan application result. Since some attributes in South German Credit are in category form, we convert them into numerical form for convenience.

5.1.4 Metrics. In the experiments, we compare our framework with the baselines on the fairness-accuracy trade-off. Specifically, we consider two common fairness metrics, the distance to demographic parity Δ_{DP} and the distance to equal opportunity Δ_{EO} (refer to Section 3). We calculate the fairness metrics against the accuracy (Acc.) of the downstream task model, and plot the Pareto fronts of them to show the fairness-accuracy trade-off. **Better fairness-accuracy trade-off indicates higher accuracy with lower Δ_{DP} and Δ_{EO}.** In order to obtain the fairness-accuracy trade-off for our framework and the baselines, we sweep a range of the value combinations of hyperparameters in their objective functions.

5.2 Experiment Results on CelebA

On CelebA, we select three different combinations of sensitive attributes and downstream tasks for the experiments on the unstructured dataset. Because of the flexibility, DVGE uses the same latent code encoder for the following three different experiments.

5.2.1 Experiment 1. We choose "Male" as the sensitive attribute and set the downstream task to predict the label "Oval_Face". For this task, if we had a perfect classifier (100% accuracy), its Δ_{DP} would be 0.094, indicating almost no fairness problem in this task. When there is no fairness problem, the accuracy of the downstream

[2]https://mmlab.ie.cuhk.edu.hk/projects/CelebA.html
[3]https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/South+German+Credit



(a) DVGE-D, Δ_{DP} (b) DVGE-D, Δ_{EO} (c) DVGE-N, Δ_{DP} (d) DVGE-N, Δ_{EO}

Figure 4: Fairness-accuracy trade-off comparison results for Experiment 2: CelebA dataset, sensitive attribute = "Male", task label = "Attractive".



(a) DVGE-D, Δ_{DP} (b) DVGE-D, Δ_{EO} (c) DVGE-N, Δ_{DP} (d) DVGE-N, Δ_{EO}

Figure 5: Fairness-accuracy trade-off comparison results for Experiment 3: CelebA dataset, sensitive attribute = "Male" ∧ "Young", task label = "Attractive".

task model should not vary with Δ_{DP} or Δ_{EO}. This experiment is designed to verify that DVGE has no negative impacts on tasks without fairness problems.

As we can observe in Figure 3, the accuracy of the downstream task model barely changes when Δ_{DP} or Δ_{EO} increases for our framework and the baselines. In addition, our framework can maintain the model accuracy even when Δ_{DP} and Δ_{EO} are very close to 0. We can also observe that our framework achieves slightly better accuracy than FFVAE and FD-VAE, because they remove dimensions of the latent code and suffers from incomplete disentanglement, resulting in information loss for downstream tasks.

5.2.2 Experiment 2. The sensitive attribute for this experiment is also "Male", but we change the task label to "Attractive". Δ_{DP} for a perfect classifier in this task would be 0.398, indicating a serious fairness problem. This experiment evaluates DVGE when debiasing in the setting of single sensitive attributes.

As we can see from the experiment results in Figure 4, our framework outperforms the baselines by a relatively large margin. For example in Figure 4(a), DVGE-D almost always achieves higher accuracy than the baselines when at the same Δ_{DP}. More importantly, our framework achieves similar fairness-accuracy trade-off with a non-disentangled VAE setting (DVGE-N in Figure 4(c) and 4(d)) as with disentangled VAE setting, which demonstrates that our framework does not rely on complete disentanglement for debiasing.

5.2.3 Experiment 3. In order to demonstrate the flexibility and superiority of our framework in the case of multiple sensitive attributes, we consider the conjunction of two sensitive attributes in this experiment. Specifically, the sensitive attributes are "Male" and "Young", denoted as "Male" ∧ "Young"[4], and the task is still to predict the label "Attractive". Here, we train a sensitive classifier to jointly distinguish the two sensitive attributes from the latent code. Δ_{DP} for a perfect classifier in this task would be 0.445, suggesting an even more serious fairness problem than those in previous tasks.

We depict the results for this experiment in Figure 5. As we can observe, our framework overall achieves better fairness-accuracy trade-off than the baselines. For example in Figure 5(b), when achieving the same Δ_{EO}, DVGE-D always hits higher downstream task accuracy than other baselines. Even when Δ_{DP} or Δ_{EO} moves close to 0, and the gaps of the fairness-accuracy trade-off between our framework and the baselines get smaller, our framework still outperforms or is on par with the baselines.

5.3 Experiment Results on South German Credit

On South German Credit, we choose two different combinations of sensitive attributes for the experiments on the structured dataset. DVGE uses the same latent code encoder for the following two different experiments.

5.3.1 Experiment 4. We select "age" as the sensitive attribute and the downstream task is to predict the label of "credit_risk" in this experiment. Δ_{DP} of a perfect classifier in this task would be 0.188.

[4] ∧ represents logical *and*.



(a) DVGE-D, Δ_{DP} (b) DVGE-D, Δ_{EO} (c) DVGE-N, Δ_{DP} (d) DVGE-N, Δ_{EO}

Figure 6: Fairness-accuracy trade-off comparison results for Experiment 4: South German Credit dataset, sensitive attribute = "age", task label = "credit_risk".



(a) DVGE-D, Δ_{DP} (b) DVGE-D, Δ_{EO} (c) DVGE-N, Δ_{DP} (d) DVGE-N, Δ_{EO}

Figure 7: Fairness-accuracy trade-off comparison results for Experiment 5: South German Credit dataset, sensitive attribute = "age" ∧ "foreign_worker", task label = "credit_risk".

This experiment is designed for testing our framework when dealing with single sensitive attributes.

The experiment results are demonstrated in Figure 6. As we can observe, when the fairness metric is Δ_{DP}, both our framework and the baselines can largely reduce the unfairness of the downstream task model, but our framework achieves much higher accuracy than FFVAE and ADT. When we measure with Δ_{EO}, FFVAE and ADT achieve lower values of Δ_{EO}, but their downstream task accuracy is still lower than our framework. And our framework performs on par with or slightly better than FD-VAE.

5.3.2 Experiment 5. In this experiment, we evaluate our framework when debiasing in the setting of multiple sensitive attributes in structured dataset. We consider the conjunction of "age" and "foreign_worker" as sensitive attributes. The downstream task is still to predict the label of "credit_risk".

As we can observe in Figure 7, the Pareto fronts suggest similar experiment results as those in the setting of a single sensitive attribute in Section 5.3.1. When the extent of fairness is measured by Δ_{DP}, our framework outperforms the baselines by a large margin. When the extent of fairness is measured by Δ_{EO}, the fairness-accuracy trade-off of our framework is still comparable to that of the baselines.

5.4 Ablation

To further evaluate the coverage on sensitive information in our framework, we conduct ablation experiments on CelebA [18]. Specifically, we use the latent code perturbed by our framework to retrain sensitive classifiers. We vary the hyperparameter η_1 (sensitive focus) while setting $\eta_2 = 0$, and observe the highest accuracy that the retrained sensitive classifiers can achieve. Here, we use the highest accuracy of the retrained sensitive classifiers to indicate the coverage on sensitive information. The rationale of this measurement is that better coverage leads to less sensitive information in the perturbed latent code, and further the sensitive classifiers retrained with it are less accurate. **In turn, lower accuracy of the retrained sensitive classifiers indicates better coverage on sensitive information.** For comparison, we retrain sensitive classifiers using the latent code with sensitive dimensions removed [3] and the latent code without removal, respectively. The encoders we use here are a disentangled VAE (FactorVAE [13]) and a non-disentangled VAE (VanillaVAE [14]).

First, we consider a single sensitive attribute "Male". The ablation results are shown in Table 1. As we can observe, when η_1 increases for DVGE, the highest accuracy of the retrained sensitive classifier decreases accordingly. Furthermore, when η_1 increases to only 0.2, DVGE achieves better coverage on sensitive information than the approach based on removing sensitive dimensions. Second, we consider two sensitive attributes, "Male" and "Young". The results are in Table 2. As we can see, when η_1 increases to only 0.3, the highest accuracy of the retrained sensitive classifier with DVGE is lower than that with the approach based on removing sensitive dimensions. The ablation results demonstrate that the sensitive focus in DVGE effectively covers sensitive information.

Table 1: Debiasing performance of DVGE in the setting of single sensitive attribute

Encoder	No removal	Sens. dim. removed	DVGE with η_1									
			0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0
Disentangled	0.798	0.736	0.767	0.735	0.706	0.682	0.675	0.661	0.655	0.658	0.650	0.648
Non-disentangled	0.804	0.746	0.769	0.733	0.705	0.692	0.686	0.682	0.682	0.674	0.671	0.668

Table 2: Debiasing performance of DVGE in the setting of multiple sensitive attributes

Encoder	No removal	Sens. dim. removed	DVGE with η_1									
			0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0
Disentangled	0.752	0.690	0.732	0.707	0.680	0.661	0.644	0.638	0.637	0.633	0.633	0.631
Non-disentangled	0.757	0.704	0.736	0.709	0.683	0.664	0.657	0.653	0.653	0.651	0.653	0.649

5.5 Discussions

First, from the experiments above, we can observe that DVGE overall achieves better fairness-accuracy trade-off than the baselines. Second, the ablation study shows that the sensitive focus in our framework effectively covers sensitive information in the latent code. Third, we can also observe that DVGE-D generally performs better than DVGE-N from all the experiments above.

6 CONCLUSION

In this paper, we targeted at the fairness problem in machine learning and followed the idea of using representation learning to tackle it. To overcome the problem of downstream task accuracy degradation and the problem of insufficient coverage on sensitive information, we proposed DVGE that exploits the gradient-based explanation to obtain the model focuses for respectively predicting sensitive attributes and downstream task labels, and perturbs the latent code with the focuses for the purposes of fairness and prevention of downstream task accuracy degradation. We experimentally demonstrated that our framework achieves better fairness-accuracy trade-off and better coverage on sensitive information while not relying on complete disentanglement for debiasing.

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

Figure 8: (a) Previous debiasing approaches using disentangled representation learning only break the link between the latent code z and sensitive attributes s in the structural causal model (SCM) when predicting downstream task attributes. (b) DVGE further breaks the link between the latent code z and proxy attributes p.

A PREVIOUS DEBIASING APPROACHES VIA REMOVING SENSITIVE DIMENSIONS USING DISENTANGLED REPRESENTATION LEARNING

Debiasing by exploiting disentangled representation learning was first proposed by Creager et al. in FFVAE [3] and also used by FD-VAE [24]. These approaches begin with training an encoder $f(x)$ and a decoder using disentangled representation learning methods. Then, the encoder is used to produce disentangled latent code $z = f(x)$. Next, the latent code dimensions corresponding to the sensitive attributes z_s (also known as sensitive dimensions) are determined by calculating the correlation between each dimension of z and the sensitive attributes s or pre-designation. At last, these approaches use the latent code without sensitive dimensions $z \backslash z_s$ to train downstream task models $\hat{y} = g(z \backslash z_s)$. During inference, these approaches also need to remove sensitive dimensions from the latent code before feeding the code to downstream task models. In contrast, our framework DVGE does not need to make changes to the latent code during inference.

To further elaborate on these previous approaches, we perform a causal analysis on them by illustrating the structural causality model (SCM) of downstream tasks in Figure 8(a). As we can observe, because of $s \rightarrow z$ and $p \rightarrow z$, when we exploit the latent code z to predict the label y, both sensitive attributes s and proxy attributes p (proxies for s) are considered as confounders that cause biased predictions. Since there is no guarantee of complete disentanglement from current disentangled representation learning on real-world data [22], when previous debiasing approaches remove the dimensions correlated with sensitive attributes, the sensitive information from proxy attributes and some information from sensitive attributes is overlooked. As a result, in Figure 8(a), the link $p \rightarrow z$ is not disconnected, still causing biased predictions. In our framework, we target at breaking both $s \rightarrow z$ and $p \rightarrow z$.

B IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS

The platform for all the experiments in this paper is an Ubuntu 20.04 system equipped with Nvidia V100 GPUs. The implementation is based on PyTorch.

There are basically three steps to implement DVGE. First, we train VAEs to produce the latent code. Then, we train a sensitive classifier with the latent code. Finally, we train the downstream task model with the latent code according to our framework.

B.1 For CelebA

We resize the CelebA [18] images to the size of 64×64. For a fair comparison, we implement the encoder of VAEs (VanillaVAE [14], FactorVAE [13], FFVAE [3], and FD-VAE [24]) and the feature encoder of ADT [8] with the same architecture. In terms of implementing VAEs, we follow Kim et al. [13] and Creager et al. [3] to use a CNN for the encoder, a Deconvolutional Neural Network for the decoder, and an MLP for the discriminator. The detailed structure information is shown in Table 3. To train VAEs, we set the learning rate to 10^{-4} and use Adam optimizer with $\beta_1 = 0.9$ and $\beta_1 = 0.999$. To train the discriminator, we set the learning rate to 10^{-5} and use the Adam optimizer with $\beta_1 = 0.5$ and $\beta_1 = 0.9$. The batch size is 64, and we update them for 10^6 times (about 316 epochs). The input images are encoded into the latent codes with 10 dimensions. In terms of FFVAE, we designate the last one or two dimensions as sensitive dimensions. For FD-VAE, we designate the first three dimensions as downstream-task-related dimensions, the middle four dimensions as mutual-information dimensions, and the last three as sensitive dimensions. As for the hyperparameters of FD-VAE, we set them as in [24], As for the hyperparameters of other VAEs (γ for FactorVAE, α and γ for FFVAE), we sweep their values from 1.0 to 6.4.

Sensitive classifiers, downstream task models, and branches of ADT share the same structure with the discriminator for VAEs as shown in Table 3. To train ADT, sensitive classifiers, and downstream task models, we set the learning rate to 10^{-5} and use Adam optimizer with $\beta_1 = 0.5$ and $\beta_1 = 0.9$. We train sensitive classifiers for 120 epochs, and downstream task models and ADT for 100 epochs. We sweep η_1 and η_2 from 0.1 to 2.0. And we set ϵ_i to $0.1 \times |z_i|$, where i is the index for the latent code dimensions.

B.2 For South German Credit

The values of some attributes in South German Credit [9] are continuous, while others are categorical. To balance the value ranges, we normalize the attributes whose values are continuous with the maximal value, and convert the categorical attributes into $[0, 1]$. In terms of implementing VAEs, we use MLPs for the encoder, the decoder, and the discriminator. The structure of the feature encoder of ADT is the same as that of VAE encoders. The detailed structure information for implementation is shown in Table 4. The training parameters for VAEs and the discriminator, and the latent code configurations are the same as in Appendix B.1.

For South German Credit, sensitive classifiers, downstream task models, and branches of ADT also share the same structure with the discriminator for VAEs as shown in Table 4. Their training parameters are also the same as in Appendix B.1.

Table 3: Structure of VAE, sensitive classifier, downstream task model, and ADT for CelebA

VAE Encoder, ADT Feature Encoder	VAE Decoder	Discriminator, Sensitive Classifier, Dowstream Task Model, and ADT Branches
Input 64×64 image	Input $\in \mathbb{R}^{10}$	Input $\in \mathbb{R}^{10}$
Conv2d(3,32,4,2,1) with ReLU	Conv2d(10,256,1) with ReLU	Linear(10,1000) with LeakyReLU(0.2)
Conv2d(32,32,4,2,1) with ReLU	ConvTrans2d(256,64,4) with ReLU	Linear(1000,1000) with LeakyReLU(0.2)
Conv2d(32,64,4,2,1) with ReLU	ConvTrans2d(64,64,4,2,1) with ReLU	Linear(1000,1000) with LeakyReLU(0.2)
Conv2d(64,64,4,2,1) with ReLU	ConvTrans2d(64,32,4,2,1) with ReLU	Linear(1000,1000) with LeakyReLU(0.2)
Conv2d(64,256,4,1) with ReLU	ConvTrans2d(32,32,4,2,1) with ReLU	Linear(1000,1000) with LeakyReLU(0.2)
Conv2d(256,2*10,1)	ConvTrans2d(32,3,4,2,1)	Linear(1000,2)

Table 4: Structure of VAE, sensitive classifier, downstream task model, and ADT for South German Credit

VAE Encoder, ADT Feature Encoder	VAE Decoder	Discriminator, Sensitive Classifier, Dowstream Task Model, and ADT Branches
Input $\in \mathbb{R}^{20}$	Input $\in \mathbb{R}^{10}$	Input $\in \mathbb{R}^{10}$
Linear(20,1000) with LeakyReLU(0.2)	Linear(10,1000) with LeakyReLU(0.2)	
Linear(1000,1000) with LeakyReLU(0.2)		
Linear(1000,1000) with LeakyReLU(0.2)		
Linear(1000,1000) with LeakyReLU(0.2)		
Linear(1000,1000) with LeakyReLU(0.2)		
Linear(1000,20)		Linear(1000,2)

Table 5: The debiasing performance of DVGE in the setting of single sensitive attribute

Encoder	No Removal	Sens. dim. removed	DVGE with η_1									
			0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0
Disentangled	0.798	0.718	0.772	0.726	0.677	0.633	0.595	0.557	0.528	0.500	0.478	0.458
Non-disentangled	0.804	0.722	0.770	0.719	0.667	0.621	0.581	0.545	0.513	0.489	0.465	0.447

Table 6: The debiasing performance of DVGE in the setting of multiple sensitive attributes

Encoder	No Removal	Sens. dim. removed	DVGE with η_1									
			0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0
Disentangled	0.752	0.670	0.732	0.697	0.662	0.627	0.599	0.572	0.549	0.530	0.513	0.496
Non-disentangled	0.757	0.677	0.736	0.701	0.663	0.628	0.596	0.571	0.548	0.528	0.512	0.496

B.3 Gradient-based Explanation

For getting gradient-based explanations from sensitive classifiers and downstream task models, we follow Srinivas et al. [30] use predictions on the input to compute the loss for backpropagation, instead of the ground truth labels.

C MORE ON DEBIASING ABLATION

To further specifically evaluate how the sensitive focus influences the coverage on sensitive information in our framework, we design more ablation experiments on CelebA which are different from those in Section 5.4.

In these experiments, we do not retrain sensitive classifiers, but instead directly test the accuracy of the sensitive classifiers which achieve the best accuracy before with the perturbed latent code by our framework. The perturbed latent code is generated with different configurations of the hyperparameter η_1 but without being perturbed by downstream task focus ($\eta_2 = 0$). Then we observe the accuracy that the sensitive classifiers can achieve. Here, we use the accuracy of the sensitive classifiers to indicate the coverage on sensitive information. The lower the accuracy is, the better the coverage on sensitive information is. To compare with our framework, we also test sensitive classifiers with the modified latent code by the existing approach and the latent code without modifications, respectively. The VAEs used in these experiments are a disentangled VAE (FactorVAE) and a non-disentangled VAE (VanillaVAE).

First, we test with the setting of a single sensitive attribute which is set to "Male". The experiment results are demonstrated in Table 5. As we can observe, when we increase η_1 from 0.1 to 1.0, the accuracy of the sensitive classifier decreases from 0.772 to 0.458 for disentangled VAE, and from 0.770 to 0.447 for non-disentangled VAE, which suggests that the sensitive focus in our framework effectively covers the sensitive information with the setting of single sensitive attributes. In addition, when η_1 increases to only 0.2, our

framework achieves comparable coverage on sensitive information with the approach based on removing sensitive dimensions. Second, we test with the setting of two sensitive attributes, which are set to "Male" and "Young". The ablation results are shown in Table 6. As we can see, the results are similar to those in Table 5. With η_1 increasing from 0.1 to 1.0, the accuracy of the sensitive classifier decreases accordingly for both disentangled VAE and non-disentangled VAE. And when η_1 is equal to or greater than 0.3, our framework outperforms the approach based on removing sensitive dimensions on the coverage on sensitive information. These results demonstrate that our framework has a good coverage on sensitive information with the setting of multiple sensitive attributes.

Sampling Individually-Fair Rankings that are *Always* Group Fair

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ABSTRACT

Rankings on online platforms help their end-users find the relevant information—people, news, media, and products—quickly. Fair ranking tasks, which ask to rank a set of items to maximize utility subject to satisfying group-fairness constraints, have gained significant interest in the Algorithmic Fairness, Information Retrieval, and Machine Learning literature. Recent works, however, identify uncertainty in the utilities of items as a primary cause of unfairness and propose introducing randomness in the output. This randomness is carefully chosen to guarantee an adequate representation of each item (while accounting for the uncertainty). However, due to this randomness, the output rankings may violate group fairness constraints. We give an efficient algorithm that samples rankings from an individually-fair distribution while ensuring that *every* output ranking is group fair. The expected utility of the output ranking is at least α times the utility of the optimal fair solution. Here, α depends on the utilities, position-discounts, and constraints—it approaches 1 as the range of utilities or the position-discounts shrinks, or when utilities satisfy distributional assumptions. Empirically, we observe that our algorithm achieves individual and group fairness and that Pareto dominates the state-of-the-art baselines.

KEYWORDS

Fair Ranking, Fairness in Information Retrieval, Group Fairness, Individual Fairness, Uncertainties, Measurement Errors

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1 INTRODUCTION

Rankings are ubiquitous on online platforms and have become a quintessential tool for users to find relevant information [7, 23, 42, 43, 50]. The core algorithmic problem in generating a ranking, given m items (denoting individuals, products, or web pages) is to select and order a subset of n items that are "most" relevant to the given query [7, 42, 43]. This is a fundamental problem in Information Retrieval and has been extensively studied in the Machine Learning literature [7, 42, 43].

Without any fairness considerations, rankings on online platforms have been observed to have skewed representations of certain demographic groups resulting in large-scale perpetuation and amplification of fairness-related harms [33, 50]. Skewed rankings can have adverse effects both at the group level–altering the end-users' perception of socially-salient groups [33] and polarizing their opinions [23, 48]–and at an individual level–leading to a denial of economic opportunities to individuals (in later positions) [30]. A reason for this is that the estimated relevance (or utilities) of items may be influenced by societal biases leading to skews affecting socially-salient, and often legally protected, groups such as women and people of color. Another reason for underrepresentation is that the utility estimates used to generate the ranking are bound to have some uncertainty, which leads to over-estimation or underestimation of utilities for different items–at an individual level.

A large body of work designs algorithms to generate rankings that ensure sufficient representation [8, 17, 27, 29, 47, 56, 57, 64–67] (also see the surveys [53, 54, 68, 69]). A significant fraction of these works focus on group-level representation and have considered several types of group fairness constraints [17, 27, 29, 47, 56, 57, 64–67]. Two popular ones are equal representation and proportional representation. In the case of two groups G_1 and G_2, equal representation with a parameter k requires that for every j (roughly) $\frac{k}{2}$ items from each group appear between the $(kj+1)$-th and the $(kj+k)$-th positions [29]. Here, for instance, k could denote the number of items on each "page" of the ranking or the number of items in a user's browser window. Proportional representation requires that, for every j, $k\frac{|G_\ell|}{m}$ items appear between the $(kj+1)$-th and the $(kj+k)$-th positions. Other constraints, that generalize equal representation and proportional representation, and notions of fairness from the perspective of other stakeholders (such as the end-user) have also been considered [53, 54, 68, 69] (also see Section 3). Broadly speaking, all of these works, given group fairness constraints, output a ranking that has the maximum relevance or *utility* subject to satisfying the specified constraints.

Ensuring group-wise representation, via such group fairness constraints, can address underrepresentation across groups of items but may not address harms at an individual level: Across multiple output rankings, specific items (e.g., whose utilities have high

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uncertainty) may be systematically assigned lower positions. In other words, group fairness can mitigate under-representation at the group level but may not mitigate (or could even exacerbate) misrepresentation and denial of opportunities to individual items.

Example 1.1 (**Insufficiency of group-fairness constraints**). *As a concrete example consider an online hiring platform where recruiters search for relevant candidates and are presented with a ranked list of candidates; as is common in existing recruiting platforms [27]. Suppose that this platform ensures proportional representation across individuals with, say, different skin tones. Here, it can be shown that, to maximize the "utility," it is optimal to order individuals inside one group (those with the same skin tone) in decreasing order of their (estimated) utility. Consider two individuals i_1 and i_2 with the same skin tone and estimated utilities ρ and $\rho - \varepsilon$ (for some small constant $\varepsilon > 0$). Due to the difference in their utility, i_2 would always be ranked one or more positions below i_1. Since positions of individuals on recruiting platforms have been observed to affect their chances of being hired, i_2 has a systematically lower chance of being hired – even though there is little difference in their utility [30]. Moreover, this difference may be because of estimation errors that are bound to arise in any real-world setting and especially in the context of online recruiting where the utilities of individuals are inherently uncertain and even change over time.*

Motivated by such examples, recent work on fair ranking has proposed various ways to define and incorporate fairness – from the perspective of individuals – in rankings [8, 56, 58]. Since opportunity, exposure, or attention received by individuals is ultimately linked to positions in the ranked order, a single deterministic ranking cannot avoid denial of opportunity when ranking multiple items with similar relevance, and hence, individually-fair rankings are inevitably stochastic in nature [8, 56, 58]. To gain intuition, observe that in the earlier example, any deterministic ranking must place either i_1 before i_2 or i_2 before i_1, due to which the "exposure" received by the item placed earlier is systematically higher than the other item irrespective of how small the difference in their utilities (i.e., ε) is. While there are many notions of individual fairness with respect to items, their specification often boils down to specifying lower and/or upper bounds on the probability with which an individual or item must appear in a set of positions. For instance, an individual fairness constraint, specified by a matrix C, may require item i to appear between the $(kj+1)$-th and the $(kj+k)$-th position with probability at least C_{ij}. Where, as before, k could encode the number of items in one page of the ranking, in which case, the individual fairness constraint requires item i to appear on page j with at least a specified probability for every i and j. While this stochasticity guarantees that individuals with "similar" utilities (as in the above example) receive similar average exposure, due to their stochastic nature, specific output rankings may violate group fairness requirements (as we empirically verify in Section 5).

Given the importance of both individual and group fairness in ranking, we study a dual-task in fair ranking wherein addition to individual fairness, we want to ensure that every output ranking is group fair. It is important to note that stochastic rankings that incorporate group fairness guarantee *in expectation* may not output rankings that are *always* group fair. This is particularly concerning in high stake contexts (such as online recruiting) where it may be legally required to ensure group fairness for each output ranking. Thus, the following question arises: *Given the individual fairness constraints, the group fairness constraints, and item utilities, is there an algorithm that outputs samples rankings such that (1) individual fairness is satisfied, (2) each output ranking is group fair, and (2) the expected utility of the rankings is maximized?*

1.1 Our Contributions

We present an efficient approximation algorithm (Algorithm 1) for the above problem when the (socially salient) groups of items form a laminar set family (i.e., any two groups are either disjoint or related by containment) (Section 6). This algorithm works for a general family of individual and group fairness constraints, which includes the aforementioned constraints and their generalizations (Definitions 3.1 and 3.2). For any given individual and group fairness constraints from these families along with the utilities of all items, our algorithm outputs rankings sampled from a distribution such that the specified individual fairness are satisfied and each output ranking is group fair (Theorem 4.1). The rankings output by our algorithm have an expected utility that is at least α times the optimal utility, where α is a constant that depends on the utilities, position discounts, and group fairness constraints–it approaches 1 when the ranges of the utilities or of the position-discounts shrink (Equation (13)). In particular, for the aforementioned constraints specified by a parameter k, $\alpha \geq \frac{v_1+v_2+\cdots+v_k}{k \cdot v_1}$, where v_j is a position-discount for each position (Theorem 4.1). With the standard DCG-discounts and equal representation constraints for two groups (for which it suffices to have $k = 2$), this approximation guarantee becomes $\alpha \geq 0.81$ (see Section 4 for other common examples). Further, in addition to these utility-independent bounds, we also derive additional (stronger) bounds on α when the item's utilities are generated via certain generative models (Theorem 4.2).

Empirically, we evaluate our algorithm on synthetic and real-world data against standard group fairness metrics (such as equal representation) and the individual fairness constraints proposed by Singh et al. [58]. We compare the performance of our algorithm to key baselines [17, 56] with both two and multiple protected groups. Unlike baselines, in all simulations, our algorithm outputs rankings that always satisfy the specified individual fairness constraint and group fairness constraint; at a small cost to utility (a maximum of 6% loss compared to the baselines) (Figures 1 and 5 in Section 5 and Appendix D respectively).

To the best of our knowledge, there is no previously known algorithm that takes a stochastic fair ranking satisfying fairness constraints *in expectation* and rounds it to output rankings that are *always* group fair without much loss in the ranking utility. A key technical challenge in doing so is that the Birkhoff-von Neumann rounding of stochastic fair rankings (as used in Singh et al. [58]) can violate group fairness constraints significantly. Overcoming this challenge requires a generalization of the Birkhoff-von Neumann rounding from the polytope of all rankings (that has only integral vertices) to the polytope of group-fair rankings (that can have fractional vertices). Stochastic rankings that satisfy group-wise representation constraints in the top-k positions *in expectation*, typically have a standard deviation of about $\sqrt{k}$ (e.g., Theorem

4.1 by Mehrotra and Vishnoi [46]).[1] As k is small in practice (e.g., $k \approx 10$ on LinkedIn), a deviation of $\sqrt{k}$ in group-wise representation is impractical.

2 RELATED WORK

Relevance estimation for ranking. There is a huge body of work studying relevance estimation for automated information retrieval [19, 41] (also see Manning et al. [43] and the references therein). This body of works develops methods to estimate the relevance (or utility) of items to specific queries in a variety of contexts (from web search [5], personalized feeds [32], to e-commerce [20]) and modalities (from web pages [37], images and videos [7], to products [20]). In the last three decades, the Machine Learning literature has also made significant contributions to this body of works [42] – by supplementing traditional IR methods (by, e.g., auto-tuning hard-to-tune parameters) [60], increasing the efficiency of IR methods (via clustering-based techniques) [2, 59], and proposing novel neural-network-based methods to predict item relevance [7, 10, 11, 63]. That said, despite the numerous methods for relevance estimation, the relevance values output by any method is bound to have some uncertainty and have also been observed to propagate societal biases in their inputs [27, 33].

Fair ranking. Below we summarize previous work on group fair and individually-fair rankings, various approaches to formulate and solve these problems, and their relation to our work. For a comprehensive survey of these topics, we refer the reader to [12, 53, 54, 68, 69].

Group fair ranking. There is a long line of work on group fair rankings that can be divided into two broad categories: (1) those that incorporate group fairness in learning-to-rank (LTR) algorithms [47, 57, 65–67] and (2) (re-)ranking algorithms that modify a given output ranking to satisfy group fairness constraints [8, 17, 27, 29, 56, 64]. Furthermore, there are diverse approaches within each of the above categories. The group fair LTR works can be further subdivided as algorithms that (a) post-process the estimated utilities to ensure group fairness [65], (b) add group fairness penalty in the LTR objective for training [47, 57, 67], and (c) modify feature representation learned by up-stream systems so that the utilities learned from the modified representation satisfy group fairness [66]. The group-fair re-ranking works can be further subdivided based on whether they guarantee that (a) *each* output ranking satisfies group fairness constraints [17, 27, 29, 64] or (b) the group fairness constraints are satisfied *in aggregate* over multiple rankings [8, 56]. As highlighted before, rankings output by these works may lead to adverse effects on individuals due to uncertainties in utilities.

Individually fair ranking. There are a number of notions of individual fairness in ranking. For instance, Biega et al. [8] define "equity of attention" as requiring that the cumulative attention garnered by an item across multiple rankings (corresponding to same or different queries) be proportional to its average relevance (across the corresponding queries). Biega et al. [8] propose an online algorithm to minimize the aggregate unfairness between attention and relevance for all items, amortized over multiple rankings, while maintaining the ranking utility (e.g., NDCG@k) above a given threshold; while they consider a notion of individual fairness, they do not consider group fairness. Other notions include fairness of exposure [56] and "merit-based" fairness–we discuss these below [58].

Ranking under both individual and group fairness constraints. Some of the aforementioned works offer frameworks that can be adapted to incorporate both individual and group fairness constraints [56–58]. Singh and Joachims [56] define fairness of exposure in stochastic rankings, which can be applied at both individual and group levels. They solve a linear programming relaxation over stochastic rankings to maximize the expected ranking utility subject to the fairness of exposure *in expectation* [56]. This approach gets around the exponential search space of deterministic rankings (or permutations), and their final output is the Birkhoff-von Neumann rounding of the above stochastic ranking. Singh et al. [58] define a notion of "merit-based" fairness when the merits (or utilities) are random variables. They take a similar linear-programming approach as Singh and Joachims [56] to formulate the fairness constraints and use the Birkhoff-von Neumann rounding to generate the output rankings. However, unlike this work, these works either do not guarantee that the output rankings satisfy the fairness constraints or they use randomization and only guarantee that the output rankings satisfy group fairness constraints in aggregate (not *always*).

Some recent works step away from the paradigm of utility maximization to incorporate individual fairness and group fairness constraints [25, 26, 29]. García-Soriano and Bonchi [26] propose a polynomial time (re-)ranking algorithm to maximize the utility of the worst-off individual subject to group fairness constraints. They also show that probabilistic rankings give better max-min fairness than deterministic rankings. Gorantla et al. [29] define individual fairness in terms of the worst-case "underranking" of any item compared to its true or deserved rank, and give efficient (re-)ranking algorithms for given group fairness and underranking constraints simultaneously. In the special case of selection, where items only have to be selected and their order is not relevant, [25] select subsets maximizing a specified individual-fairness metric subject to satisfying group-fairness constraints. Unlike these works, we require the output ranking to maximize the utility subject to satisfying the specified (group and individual) fairness constraints. Beyond ranking and selection, there are also works that incorporate fairness constraints in matching problems (where multiple items can be matched to one position) [6, 18, 21]. Among these Benabbou et al. [6] consider block-wise group-fairness constraints that are similar to the block-wise group fairness constraints we consider (Definition 3.1) and design $\frac{1}{2}$-approximation algorithm for the resulting constrained matching task. However, unlike our work, Benabbou et al. [6] do not consider individual fairness constraints and our algorithm provides better than $\frac{1}{2}$-approximation guarantee for common utility models (such as discounted cumulative gain [31]) and block sizes.

Fair decision-making with inaccuracies and uncertainty in inputs. A growing number of works develop fair algorithms for

[1] Concretely, consider a ranking R sampled from some distribution such that R satisfies the equal representation constraints in expectation for two groups. The best guarantee provided by state-of-the-art fair ranking algorithms that sample a ranking [46] is that, with high probability, the output R places at most $\frac{k}{2} + O(\sqrt{k})$ items from each group in the top-k positions–thereby violating the constraint by up to an additive factor of $O(\sqrt{k})$.

decision-making that are robust to uncertainties and inaccuracies in their inputs [4, 13, 16, 21, 24, 39, 44, 46, 49, 52, 61, 62]. Many of these works consider inaccuracies in protected attributes in decision-making tasks including ranking but extending beyond to subset selection, clustering, and classification [4, 13, 16, 24, 39, 44, 46, 49, 62]. A few recent works also consider uncertainty in other parts of the input [21, 52, 61]. Among these, most relevant to our work, Devic et al. [21] and Panda et al. [52] study variants of the matching problem with uncertainty in utilities of items: Devic et al. [21] adapt Singh et al. [58]'s notion of merit-based fairness to the matching task. Panda et al. [52] consider both individual fairness and group fairness constraints, where the individual fairness constraints can capture the merit-based notion of Devic et al. [21]. Panda et al. [52] give an algorithm that samples a matching that satisfies the individual fairness constraints and satisfies the group fairness constraint (always). Interestingly, despite the differences between the ranking and the matching problem, we show a connection between our approach and a technical result in [52] (see Section 6).

3 PRELIMINARIES AND MODEL

Ranking problem. In ranking problems, given m items, the task is to select a subset S of n of these items and output the permutation of S that is most valuable for the user. This permutation is called a *ranking*. We consider a variant of the problem where the values or *utilities* of the items are known. There is a vast literature on estimating item utilities (for specific queries) [5, 20, 32, 42, 43] (see Section 2). Abstracting this, we assume that for each item i there is a utility $\rho_i \geq 0$ and for each position j there is a discount factor $v_j > 0$ such that placing the item i at position j generates value $\rho_i \cdot v_j$. The utility of a ranking is the sum of utilities generated by each item in its assigned position. The position discounts encode the fact that users pay higher attention to items earlier in the ranking. Various values of position discounts have been considered in information retrieval literature. Perhaps the more prevalent one is discounted cumulative gain (DCG), which is specified by $v_j = (\log(1+j))^{-1}$ for each j [31]. Without loss of generality, we assume that item indices are ordered in non-increasing order of utilities, i.e., $\rho_1 \geq \rho_2 \geq \cdots \geq \rho_m$.

We denote a ranking by an assignment matrix $R \in \{0,1\}^{m \times n}$: $R_{ij} = 1$ if item i is placed in position j and $R_{ij} = 0$ otherwise. In this notation, the utility of a ranking R is

$$\rho^\top R v = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \rho_i v_j R_{ij}.$$

This variant of the vanilla ranking problem asks to solve:

$$\max_{R \in \mathcal{R}} \rho^\top R v,$$

where $\mathcal{R}$ is the set of all assignment matrices denoting a ranking:

$$\mathcal{R} := \left\{ X \in \{0,1\}^{m \times n} : \forall_{i \in [m]},\ \sum_j X_{ij} \leq 1,\ \forall_{j \in [n]},\ \sum_i X_{ij} = 1 \right\} \quad (1)$$

Here, for each i, the constraint $\sum_j X_{ij} \leq 1$ encodes that item i is placed in at most one position. For each j, the constraint $\sum_i X_{ij} = 1$ encodes that there is exactly one item placed at position j.

Fairness constraints. Group fairness constraints are defined with respect to $p \geq 2$ socially-salient groups $G_1, G_2, \ldots, G_p$ (e.g., the group of all women or the groups of all Asian or all black individuals). For simplicity, we state our results when groups $G_1, \ldots, G_p$ are disjoint. In Section 6, we show that the same results hold when $G_1, \ldots, G_p$ belong to a general family of overlapping sets, the laminar set family (see Section 6). There are many forms of group fairness constraints for ranking. We consider a class of fairness constraints that are placed over disjoint blocks of positions $B_1, B_2, \ldots, B_q$. Blocks of positions can correspond to pages of search results or different windows in a scrollable feed. A basic example is where the $q = \frac{n}{k}$ blocks are disjoint sets of $1 \leq k \leq n$ consecutive positions. Note, however, in general blocks can have different sizes.

Definition 3.1 (**Group fairness constraints**; [29]). *Given matrices $L, U \in \mathbb{Z}^{q \times p}$ a ranking R satisfies the (L,U)-group fairness constraints if for each $j \in [q]$ and $\ell \in [p]$*

$$L_{j\ell} \leq \sum_{i \in G_\ell} \sum_{t \in B_j} R_{ij} \leq U_{j\ell}. \quad (2)$$

The above family of constraints can encapsulate a variety of group fairness notions. For instance, the equal representation constraint is captured by $L_{\ell j} = \left\lfloor \frac{|B_j|}{p} \right\rfloor$ and $U_{\ell j} = \left\lceil \frac{|B_j|}{p} \right\rceil$ for each ℓ and j. (For readability, we omit the floor and ceiling operators henceforth.) To capture the Four-Fifths rule, it suffices to choose any constraints such that $L_{\ell j} \geq \frac{4}{5} \cdot U_{tj}$ for each $\ell, t \in [p]$ and $j \in [q]$. Existing works study related families of constraints [54, 68, 69]. We specifically consider Definition 3.1 as its block structure enables us to design efficient algorithms. In Appendix C, we show that Definition 3.1 can ensure fairness with respect to the families of constraints from existing works [54, 68, 69], hence, it also captures the corresponding notions of group fairness.

That said, Definition 3.1 does not capture the adverse effects on specific items or individuals (henceforth, just items): highly-relevant items may get low visibility even though each protected group is sufficiently represented in every block (Example 1.1). To capture such underrepresentation, we consider the following family of individual fairness constraints.

Definition 3.2 (**Individual fairness constraints**). *Given $A, C \in [0,1]^{m \times q}$, a distribution $\mathcal{D}$ over the set $\mathcal{R}$ of all rankings satisfies (C,A)-individual fairness constraints if for each $i \in [m]$ and $j \in [q]$*

$$C_{ij} \leq \Pr_{R \sim \mathcal{D}} \left[R_{it} = 1 \text{ for some } t \in B_j \right] \leq A_{ij}. \quad (3)$$

By choosing C_{ij}, A_{ij}, one can lower and upper bound the probability that item i appears in the block B_j by a desired value. When item utilities are only probabilistically known, then a natural choice for the lower bounds is

$$C_{ij} = Z \cdot \Pr_{\mathcal{U}}[\exists t \in B_j,\ \rho_i \text{ is the } t\text{-th largest value in } \{\rho_1, \ldots, \rho_m\}]. \quad (4)$$

where $\mathcal{U}$ is the joint distribution of utilities (see the discussion in [58]) and Z is a normalization constant that ensures that $\sum_{j=1}^{m} C_{ij} = 1$ for all $1 \leq i \leq m$. Existing works have considered closely related families of individual fairness constraints and shown that those families capture many common notions of individual fairness [38, 58]. Like group fairness constraints in Definition 3.1, we consider the specific family in Definition 3.2 as it enables efficient algorithms. In Appendix C, we show that Definition 3.2 can ensure fairness with respect to the constraints studied in [38, 58], hence, can also capture most common notions of individual fairness.

In the special case where $\mathcal{D}$ is supported at just one ranking R, Definition 3.2 specializes to the following: A ranking R is (C,A)-individually fair if and only if the distribution supported on just R

is (C, A)-individually fair. Apart from very specific choices of the matrices C and A, no ranking R can be (C, A)-individually fair. For instance, this is true, whenever there is at least one j such that C_{ij} is positive for more than $|B_j|$ choices of $i \in [n]$. Thus, in general, some of the output rankings must violate the individual fairness constraint. This has been recognized in the fair ranking literature [8, 51, 54, 68, 69], and is one of the main reasons to consider randomized algorithms for ranking. In contrast, as mentioned in Section 1, it may be necessary (legally or otherwise) to ensure that each output ranking satisfies the group fairness constraints. Motivated by this, our goal is to solve the following problem.

Problem 3.3 (**Ranking problem with individual and group fairness constraints**). *Given matrices L, U, A, C and vectors ρ, v, find a distribution $\mathcal{D}^\star$ over rankings maximizing the expected utility $\Pr_{R\sim\mathcal{D}^\star}[\rho^\top Rv]$ subject to satisfying (i) (C, A)-individual fairness constraints and (ii) that each R in the support of $\mathcal{D}^\star$ satisfies (L, U)-group fairness constraints.*

A naive representation of $\mathcal{D}^\star$ is to specify $\Pr_{S\sim\mathcal{D}^\star}[S = R]$ for each ranking R. However, since the number of rankings is exponential in n and m (at least $n!$), even writing down this representation is intractable. Instead, like prior works [56, 58], we encode $\mathcal{D}^\star$ by the following nm marginal probabilities. Given a distribution $\mathcal{D}$, let $D \in [0,1]^{m\times n}$ encode the following marginals of $\mathcal{D}$:

$$D_{ij} := \Pr_{R\sim\mathcal{D}}[R_{ij} = 1].$$

In other words, in a ranking sampled from $\mathcal{D}$, item i appears in position j with probability D_{ij}.

3.1 Challenges in Solving Problem 3.3

We first discuss the approach of a prior work Singh and Joachims [56], Singh et al. [58] and then discuss why it is challenging to use a similar approach to solve Problem 3.3.

The approach of prior work. Singh et al. [58] study a version of Problem 3.3 where the blocks overlap and there are no group fairness constraints. Let $\widehat{\mathcal{D}}$ and $\widehat{D}$ be an optimal solution of their problem and its marginal respectively. Their algorithm has two parts: (1) solve Program (5) to compute $\widehat{D}$, (2) use the Birkhoff-von-Neumann (BvN) algorithm [9] to recover $\widehat{\mathcal{D}}$ from $\widehat{D}$.

$$\text{argmax}_{D\in[0,1]^{m\times n}} \quad \rho^\top Dv, \tag{5}$$

$$\text{s.t.,} \quad \forall i, \qquad C_{ij} \le \textstyle\sum_{t\in B_j} D_{it} \le A_{ij}, \tag{6}$$

$$\forall j, \qquad \textstyle\sum_i D_{ij} = 1 \quad \text{and} \quad \forall i,\ \sum_j D_{ij} \le 1. \tag{7}$$

Consider any distribution $\mathcal{D}$ and its marginal D, it can be shown that the objective $\rho^\top Dv$ is equal to expected utility of $\mathcal{D}$, i.e., $\rho^\top Dv = \Pr_{R\sim\mathcal{D}}[\rho^\top Rv]$, and that D is feasible for Program (5) if and only if $\mathcal{D}$ is (C, A)-individually fair. Using these, one can show that $\widehat{D}$ is an optimal solution of Program (5).

Since Program (5) is a linear program with $\text{poly}(n, m)$ variables and constraints, it can be solved in polynomial time to get $\widehat{D}$. $\widehat{\mathcal{D}}$ can be recovered from $\widehat{D}$ using the BvN algorithm: Given $\widehat{D}$, the BvN algorithm outputs at most nm rankings $R_1, \ldots, R_{nm}$ and corresponding coefficients $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_{nm}$ such that $\widehat{\mathcal{D}}$ is the distribution that samples ranking R_i with probability α_i for each $1 \le i \le nm$.

Challenges in solving Problem 3.3. Let $\mathcal{R}_{\text{GF}}$ be the set of all rankings that satisfy the (L, U)-group fairness constraints. Unlike Singh et al. [58], we require the output distribution $\mathcal{D}$ to be supported over $\mathcal{R}_{\text{GF}}$. In other words, each R sampled from $\mathcal{D}$ should satisfy the (L, U)-group fairness constraints. An obvious approach to solve Problem 3.3 is to add "group fairness constraints" to Program (5) (to get Program (8)) and generalize [58]'s algorithm as follows:

(1) Find a solution $\widetilde{D} \in [0,1]^{m\times n}$ of Program (8)
(2) Given $\widetilde{D}$, output a distribution $\widetilde{\mathcal{D}}$ such that $\widetilde{D}$ is $\widetilde{\mathcal{D}}$'s marginal and each R sampled from $\widetilde{\mathcal{D}}$ is in $\mathcal{R}_{\text{GF}}$, i.e., $\Pr_{R\sim\widetilde{\mathcal{D}}}[R\in\mathcal{R}_{\text{GF}}]=1$

$$\text{argmax}_{D\in[0,1]^{m\times n}} \quad \rho^\top Dv, \tag{8}$$

$$\text{s.t.,} \qquad D \text{ satisfies Equations}(6)\textit{and}(7), \tag{9}$$

$$\forall j \in [q],\ \forall \ell \in [p],\ \ L_{j\ell} \le \textstyle\sum_{i\in G_\ell} \sum_{t\in B_j} D_{ij} \le U_{j\ell}. \tag{10}$$

Unfortunately, in general, the marginal of $\mathcal{D}^\star$, say $D^\star$, is not a solution of Program (8), hence, in general, the output distribution $\widetilde{\mathcal{D}}$ is different from the solution $\mathcal{D}^\star$. In fact, it is possible that there is no distribution $\widetilde{\mathcal{D}}$ supported over $\mathcal{R}_{\text{GF}}$ such that $\widetilde{D}$ is the marginal of $\widetilde{\mathcal{D}}$–making it impossible to implement Step 2. One can explore different relaxations of Step 2. A relaxation is to output $\widetilde{\mathcal{D}}$ that maximizes $\Pr_{R\sim\widetilde{\mathcal{D}}}[R \in \mathcal{R}_{\text{GF}}] = 1$ subject to ensuring that $\widetilde{D}$ is the marginal of $\widetilde{\mathcal{D}}$. This, however, turns out to be **NP**-hard (Theorem A.15).

Let $\mathcal{S}$ be the set of all matrices D that are a marginal of some distribution $\mathcal{D}$ that: (1) is C-individually fair and (2) is supported over rankings in $\mathcal{R}_{\text{GF}}$. The key reason for these difficulties is that there are feasible solutions of Program (8) that are not in $\mathcal{S}$. Using the definition of the marginal and $\mathcal{S}$, one can show that $D^\star$ is an optimal solution to $\text{argmax}_{D\in\mathcal{S}}\, \rho^\top Dv$. However, it is unclear how to solve this program as it is not obvious how to even check if a matrix is in $\mathcal{S}$. Thus, solving Problem 3.3 requires new ideas.

4 THEORETICAL RESULTS

In this section, we give our main algorithmic and hardness results.

4.1 Main Algorithmic Result

Our approach. The key idea is to consider a family of "coarse rankings" or *matchings*: Each matching places $|B_j|$ items in block B_j (for each $1 \le j \le m$), but it does not specify which items are placed at which positions inside B_j. We define natural analogs of the group fairness and the individual fairness constraints for matchings–leading to an analog of Problem 3.3 for matchings. At a high level, our algorithm (Algorithm 1) first solves this analogue of Problem 3.3 to get a distribution $\mathcal{D}^{(\mathcal{M})}$ over matchings and then maps $\mathcal{D}^{(\mathcal{M})}$ to a distribution $\mathcal{D} = f(\mathcal{D}^{(\mathcal{M})})$ over rankings; for an appropriate function f.

The fairness guarantee follows because of the facts that: (1) a matching M is (L, U)-group-fair if and only if the corresponding ranking $R = f(M)$ is (L, U)-group-fair and (2) a distribution $\mathcal{D}^{(\mathcal{M})}$ over matchings is (C, A)-individually-fair if and only if the corresponding distribution $\mathcal{D} = f(\mathcal{D}^{(\mathcal{M})})$ over rankings is (C, A)-individually-fair. This is where we use the fact that the blocks are disjoint. The utility guarantee follows because if $R = f(M)$ then the utility of R is at least α-times the utility of M (see Section 4.3 for a definition of f).

Crucially, we are able to efficiently solve the analog of Problem 3.3 for matchings because the linear inequalities capturing the group fairness constraints for matchings form a polytope such that all of its vertices are integral. The analogous statement is not true for rankings (see Appendix B); this is why all optimal solutions of Program (8) can be different from $D^\star$.

Main algorithmic result. Next, we state our main algorithmic result, whose proof appears in Appendix A.1. This result holds for blocks of different sizes and any position discounts, but we also give a simpler expression for the utility when each block has size k and the position discounts v satisfy the following condition:

$$\forall r \geq 0,\ \frac{v_{t+r}}{v_t} \text{ is a non-decreasing in } 1 \leq t \leq n-r. \tag{11}$$

Standard position discounts such as those in DCG [31] satisfy this assumption.

Theorem 4.1 (**Main algorithmic result**). *There is a polynomial time randomized algorithm (Algorithm 1) that given matrices $L, U \in \mathbb{Z}^{q\times p}$, and $A, C \in \mathbb{R}^{m\times q}$, and vectors $\rho \in \mathbb{R}^m$ and $v \in \mathbb{R}^n$, outputs a ranking R sampled from a distribution $\mathcal{D}$ such that:*

- *$\mathcal{D}$ satisfies (C, A)-individual fairness constraint, and*
- *R satisfies (L, U)-group fairness constraint.*

The expected utility of R is at least α times the expected utility of a ranking sampled from $\mathcal{D}^\star$. If all blocks have size k and Equation (11) *holds, then*

$$\alpha \geq \frac{v_1+v_2+\cdots+v_k}{k\cdot v_1}. \tag{12}$$

Furthermore, regardless of block-sizes and Equation (11)*, it holds that $\alpha \geq \min_{1\leq j\leq q} \frac{\sum_{s\in B_j} v_s}{|B_j|\cdot v_{s(j)}}$, where $s(j)$ is the first position in B_j.*

Thus, Algorithm 1 is an α-approximation algorithm for Problem 3.3. Here, α is a value that approaches 1 as the range of position discounts shrinks. In the worst case, when $v_2 = v_3 = \cdots = v_k = 0$, the RHS in Equation 12 is $\frac{1}{k}$. For common position discounts the RHS of Equation (12) is closer to 1: for instance, for DCG [31] with $k = 2, 3, 4$ it is at least $0.81, 0.71, 0.64$ respectively. These lower bounds are tight in some examples where a few items have a very large utility. If, however, items' utilities lie in a bounded interval, then this lower bound can be improved. To see concrete bounds, suppose $\frac{\max_i \rho_i}{\min_i \rho_i} \leq 1+\Delta$. One can show that

$$\alpha \geq (1+\Delta)\left(1+(kv_1\Delta)/(v_1+v_2+\cdots+v_k)\right)^{-1}. \tag{13}$$

Thus, α approaches 1 as Δ approaches 0, i.e., as the range of item utilities shrinks. One can show that, for any $\Delta \geq 0$, the above bound is at least as large than the RHS in Equation (12) (Appendix A.1.6). The proof of Equation (13) appears in Appendix A.1.6. We present further utility-dependent approximation guarantees in Appendix A.1.5. As for the running time, Algorithm 1 solves a linear program in $O(nm)$ variables with $O(np+m)$ constraints and performs $O(n^2m(p+m))$ additional arithmetic operations (Appendix A.1.4). Theorem 4.1 also holds, without change, for any set of protected groups that form a laminar family, i.e., for any set of groups such that either $G_\ell \subseteq G_k$ or $G_k \subseteq G_\ell$ for each $1 \leq \ell, k \leq p$ (Section 6). Laminar groups can be relevant in contexts where (some notion of) group fairness for intersectional groups is desired: as a concrete example, if one defines (1) G_1 to be the group of all non-women, (2) G_2 to be the group of all women, and (3) G_3 to be the intersectional group of all Black women (within the group of all women), then Algorithm 1 ensures that (the specified notion of) group fairness is also satisfied for the intersectional group of all Black women. Finally, one can verify that the more general bound in Theorem 4.1 (i.e., $\alpha \geq \min_{1\leq j\leq q} \frac{\sum_{s\in B_j} v_s}{|B_j|\cdot v_{s(j)}}$) reduces to the one in Equation (12) when all blocs have size k and Equation 11 holds (see Equation (24)).

4.2 Better Approximation Guarantees With Distributional Assumptions

Next, we present utility-dependent approximation guarantees of Algorithm 1 under generative models where each item i's utility ρ_i has uncertainty and is only "probabilistically known." For the sake of concreteness, we begin with the generative model where, the "true" utility, ρ_i, of each item $1 \leq i \leq m$ is drawn from the normal distribution $\mathcal{N}(\mu_i, \sigma_i^2)$ independent of all other items where $\mu_i \in \mathbb{R}$ and $\sigma_i \geq 0$ are parameters that are known to the algorithm.

Here, we choose the normal distribution for the sake of simplicity: more generally, ρ_i can be drawn from any (possibly nonsymmetric) sub-gaussian distribution with mean μ_i and variance σ_i^2. In particular, the specific sub-gaussian distribution can be different for different items. If we choose the normal distribution for each item, then the resulting utility model is identical to the implicit variance model of Emelianov et al. [22], who claim that such uncertainties in the utilities can arise in the real world.

Uncertainties in utilities arise from various sources (from measurement errors, uncertainties in prediction, to errors in data) in practice and are one of the motivations to consider individual fairness constraints [58]. When utilities are only probabilistically known, a natural family of individual fairness constraints (which is also proposed by Singh et al. [58]) is in Equation (4). Under these individual fairness constraints, when the parameters $\mu_1, \mu_2, \ldots, \mu_m$ are i.i.d. from the uniform distribution on $[0, S]$ (for some constant $S > 0$), we have the following approximation guarantee whose proof appears in Appendix A.2.

Theorem 4.2. *Suppose $\mu_1, \mu_2, \ldots, \mu_m$ are i.i.d. from the uniform distribution on $[0, S]$, ρ_i follow the above generative model, $C \in \mathbb{R}^{m\times q}$ is as specified in Equation* (4)*, $A = [1]_{m\times q}$, and nm^{-1} is bounded away from 1. Algorithm 1, given means of the utilities $\mu \in \mathbb{R}^m$ and other parameters (L, U, A, C, v), outputs a ranking R sampled from a distribution $\mathcal{D}$ that satisfies the fairness constraints in Theorem 4.1 and has an expected utility at least α times the expected utility of a ranking sampled from $\mathcal{D}^\star$, where*

$$\alpha \geq 1 - \widetilde{O}\left(\left(\sigma_{\max}\sqrt{\log m}\right)/S\right) - O\left(m^{-\frac{1}{4}}\right) \text{ and } \sigma_{\max} := \max_{i\in[m]} \sigma_i.$$

Hence, Theorem 4.2 shows that if the variance of the uncertainty in items' utilities ($\sigma_{\max}^2$) is "small" compared to the range of their utilities (S), then with high probability Algorithm 1 has a near-optimal approximation guarantee. As for the assumption about the distribution of the means $\mu_1, \mu_2, \ldots, \mu_m$, note that if the utilities denote the percentiles of items, then one expects $\mu_1, \mu_2, \ldots, \mu_m$ to be uniformly distributed in $[0, 100]$ [35]. In this case, $S = 100$ and the approximation guarantee is of the order of $1 - \sqrt{\log m}/S \geq 0.95$, for any $m \leq 10^{10}$.

The proof of the above result only uses the concentration property of the Gaussian distribution. This is why the result extends to (possibly non-symmetric) sub-Gaussian distribution (which can be

different for different items). Note that since ρ_i is drawn from the normal distribution $\mathcal{N}(\mu_i, \sigma_i^2)$, it can take negative values. To avoid this, one can consider an appropriately truncated version of the normal distribution. Since any truncation of the normal distribution is sub-gaussian, a bound of the same form (with an appropriate constant) continues to hold for α.

Moreover, if $\mu_1, \mu_2, \ldots, \mu_m$ are arbitrary deterministic values, then the following approximation guarantee for Algorithm 1 is implicit in the proof of Theorem 4.2 (see Equation (14))

$$\alpha \geq 1 - \widetilde{O}\left(\left(\sigma_{\max}\sqrt{\log m}\right)/\mu_n\right) - O\left(m^{-\frac{1}{4}}\right), \tag{14}$$

where $\mu_{(n)}$ is the n-th largest value in $\mu_1, \mu_2, \ldots, \mu_m$.

4.3 Overview of the Algorithm

Algorithm 1 encodes a matching by an $m \times q$ matrix $M \in \{0,1\}^{m\times q}$ where $M_{ij} = 1$ if item i is in the block B_j and $M_{ij} = 0$ otherwise. Let $\mathcal{M}$ be the set of matrices encoding a matching. Algorithm 1 uses two functions f and g. For any ranking $R \in [0,1]^{m\times n}$, $g(R) \in [0,1]^{m\times q}$ is the matching such that $g(R)_{ij} \coloneqq \sum_{t\in B_j} R_{it}$, for each $i \in [m]$ and $j \in [q]$. Intuitively, for a ranking R, $g(R)$ is the unique matching that matches item i to block B_j if and only if item i appears in B_j in R. For any matching M, $f(M)$ is the unique ranking that satisfies: (1) $g(f(M)) = M$ and (2) for each j, items in block B_j appear in non-increasing order of their utility in $f(M)$. Concretely, our algorithm is as follows.

Algorithm 1 Pseudo-code for the algorithm in Theorem 4.1

Input: Matrices $L, U \in \mathbb{R}^{q\times p}$ and $A, C \in \mathbb{R}^{m\times q}$, and vectors $\rho \in \mathbb{R}^m$ and $v \in \mathbb{R}^n$, and sets $B_1, B_2, \ldots, B_q \subseteq [n]$

Output: A ranking $R \in \mathcal{R}$

1: *(Solve)* Compute an optimal solution $\widehat{D}$ of Program (8)
▷ poly(n,m)-time as (8) has poly(n,m) variables/constraints
2: *(Project)* Compute the projection $\widehat{M} \coloneqq g(\widehat{D})$ ▷ $O(mn)$ time
3: *(Decompose)* Compute $M_1, M_2, \ldots, M_T$ and $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_T$ s.t.

$$\widehat{M} = \textstyle\sum_{t\in[T]} \alpha_t M_t,$$

where $T = O(n^2m^2)$
▷ $(M_t, \alpha_t)_{t=1}^T$ can be computed in $O(n^2m^2)$ time, see Lemma A.7
4: *(Refine)* **For each** $t \in [T]$ **do:** Set $R_t \coloneqq f(M_t)$ ▷ $\widetilde{O}(Tmn)$ time
5: **return** R_t with probability $\propto \alpha_t$ for each $t \in [T]$

5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS

In this section, we show the performance of our algorithm on synthetic and real-world datasets. We explore two research questions: (*i*) *How likely is it for a fair ranking baseline to sample a ranking that violates group fairness constraints?* (*ii*) *Does Algorithm 1 achieve a similar utility as baselines?* We start by describing our experimental setup before diving into the results of our experiments.

5.1 Setup, Baselines, and Metrics

Recall the ranking problem we consider – given m items, the output should be an ordered list or ranking of n items that maximize the utility. The utility generated by item i in position j is $\rho_i \cdot v_j$, where ρ_i is an item-specific utility and v_j is the position discount. The choices of n, m, k, and ρ are data and application dependent; we specify our choices of these parameters in table 1 and discuss the choice of all of n, m, k and ρ further with each dataset. Across all datasets, we set $v_j \coloneqq \frac{1}{\log(j+1)}$ for each $1 \leq j \leq n$, corresponding to the popular discounted cumulative gain (DCG) measure [31].

Fairness constraints. The choice of the right fairness constraints is context-dependent. For illustration, we choose generalizations of the equal representation constraint (which is, perhaps, the most common group fairness constraint considered in the literature [68, 69]). These generalizations are parameterized by $1 \leq \phi \leq p$ are specified by blocks $B_1, B_2, \ldots, B_q$ of equal size $k \coloneqq \frac{n}{2}$. Given a value of ϕ, the constraint is specified by the upper bounds $U_{j\ell} \coloneqq \left\lceil \frac{\phi k}{p} \right\rceil$ for block B_j and the protected group G_ℓ (for each j and ℓ); the lower bounds of the group fairness constraints are set to be vacuous, i.e., $L_{j\ell} = 0$ for all j and ℓ. To gain some intuition about the relevant values of ϕ, note that when $\phi = p$ the upper bounds are vacuous and when $\phi = 1$ the upper bounds require the ranking to contain exactly $\frac{k}{p}$ items in each block. As for the individual fairness constraints, we consider a family of individual fairness constraints proposed by Singh et al. [58] which, in turn, are motivated by the uncertainties in the item utilities, as are bound to arise in the real world. Following the construction in [58], we assume that the true utility of item i is $\rho_i = \widetilde{\rho}_i + X_i$, where $\widetilde{\rho}_i$ is an estimated utility and X_i is a Gaussian random variable with mean 0 and a data-dependent standard deviation σ computed to be the smallest value such that there are at least $\frac{k}{2}$ items with estimated utility within $\widetilde{\rho}_i \pm \sigma$, on an average. Given these, the matrix C specifying the individual fairness constraints is specified as $C_{ij} = \gamma \cdot \Pr[\exists t \in B_j, \rho_i \text{ is the } t\text{-th largest value in } \{\rho_1, \ldots, \rho_m\}]$ where $0 \leq \gamma \leq 1$ is a relaxation factor. We set the upper bounds of the individual fairness constraints to be vacuous,i.e., $A_{ij} = 1$ for all i and j. Note that when $\gamma = 1$, C_{ij} is equal to the probability that item i appears in the j-th block when items are ordered in decreasing order of true utility. Note that the "strength" of our group fairness constraint is specified by the parameter $1 \leq \phi \leq p$ (where the closer ϕ is to 1 the closer the constraint is to equal representation) and the strength of our individual fairness constraint is specified by $0 \leq \gamma \leq 1$ (where the closer $\gamma = 1$ the "stronger" the individual fairness requirement is).

Baselines. We compare our algorithm to both baselines that output a deterministic ranking and those that sample a ranking from a distribution.The following baselines output a deterministic ranking:

(1) **Unconstrained**, which is a baseline that outputs a ranking that maximizes the utility (without consideration for fairness constraints); and
(2) **CSV18 (Greedy)** [17], which is an algorithm that greedily ranks the item and is guaranteed to satisfy the specified group fairness constraints, but does not consider individual fairness constraints.

We also consider baselines that are closer to Algorithm 1, in the sense that, they sample a ranking from an underlying distribution such that the output is guaranteed to satisfy the specified individual fairness constraints:

(1) **SJK21 (IF)**, which is the algorithm of Singh et al. [58] specialized to the individual fairness constraints considered in our simulations; (This algorithm first solves Program (5) to compute a marginal D, decomposes it as $D = \sum_t \alpha_t R_t$ (using Birkhoff

Dataset	m	n	k	p
Synthetic [44]	100	40	20	2
Real-world Images [46]	100	20	10	2
Real-world Names [15]	400	16	8	4

Table 1: Parameter choices for each dataset. Experiments with additional parameter choices are presented in Figure 6 in Appendix D.

von Neumann decomposition), and outputs R_t with probability $\propto \alpha_t$.)

(2) **SJK21 (GF and IF)**, which is the algorithm of Singh et al. [58] specialized to satisfy both the individual fairness constraints and (in aggregate) the group fairness constraints considered in our simulations. (This algorithm first solve Equation (8) to compute a marginal D, decomposes it as $D = \sum_t \alpha_t R_t$ (using Birkhoff von Neumann decomposition), and outputs R_t with probability $\propto \alpha_t$.)

Metrics. We evaluate the rankings output by each algorithm using three metrics: the probability with which the output ranking violates the group fairness constraints $\mathscr{G}_{\text{violation}}$, a measure of the amount of violation of the individual fairness constraints $\mathscr{I}_{\text{violation}}$ (see below), and the output ranking R's normalized output utility

$$\mathscr{U} = \mathbb{E}[\rho^\top R v]/\mathscr{U}_{\max}$$

(where the expectation is over any randomness in R and $\mathscr{U}_{\max}$ is a normalization constraint that ensures that $\mathscr{U}$ has range from 0 to 1). It remains to define $\mathscr{I}_{\text{violation}}$: let P_{ij} be the probability with which item i appears in block B_j in the output ranking R, the individual fairness violation of the corresponding algorithm is defined as

$$\mathscr{I}_{\text{violation}} := \frac{1}{m}\sum_{i\in[m]}\frac{1}{q}\sum_{j\in[q]}\max\left\{1-\left(P_{ij}/C_{ij}\right),0\right\}.$$

Note here that both $\mathscr{G}_{\text{violation}}$ and $\mathscr{I}_{\text{violation}}$ have a range from 0 to 1, where a smaller value implies a smaller violation.

5.2 Datasets

We perform simulations with three datasets.

Synthetic dataset. We use the synthetic dataset generated by the code provided by recent work on fair ranking [46]: this dataset consists of two protected groups G_1 and G_2, where G_1 comprises 60% of the total items, and the utilities of items in the minority group are systematically lower (with mean 0.35) compared to the utilities of items in the majority group (with mean 0.7).

Real-world image dataset. This dataset, also known as the Occupations dataset, consists of the top 100 Google Image results for 96 queries [15]. For each image, the dataset provides the rank of the image in the search result and the (apparent) gender of the person in the picture (encoded as binary labels collected via MTurk) [15]. We use the same preprocessing as Mehrotra and Vishnoi [46]: let an occupation be stereotypical if more than 80% of the images in the corresponding search result are labeled to be of a specific gender. This results in 41/96 stereotypical occupations, with 4,100 images. Each of the 4,100 images, is labeled as stereotypical if the image's gender label corresponds to the majority gender label in the corresponding occupation and is otherwise labeled as unstereotypical. We consider the set of stereotypical and unstereotypical images as protected groups and fix $\rho_i = \frac{1}{\log(1+r_i)}$, for all $i \in [m]$ (as in [46]).

Real-world names dataset. This dataset, known as the chess ranking data, consists of the which consists of the FIDE rating of 3,251 chess players across the world [28]. For each player, the dataset consists of the players' self-identified gender (encoded as binary: male or female) and their self-identified race (encoded as Asian, Black, Hispanic, or White). For the simulation with this dataset, we consider the following four intersectional groups: White Male, White Female, Non-White Male, and Non-White Female.

Data-specific parameters and setup. Table 1 lists the parameters n, m, k, and p for each dataset. For the specified values of n and m, in each simulation, we sample a subset of each dataset to select m items from the data uniformly without replacement – where m is chosen to be the smallest value (up to a multiple of 100) so that in each draw there are at least n/p items from each group (to ensure that the equal representation constraints are satisfiable).

5.3 Observations and Discussion

We now summarize our experimental observations and answer the research questions raised at the beginning of this section.

Pareto-optimality for individual and group fairness. Figure 1 presents the results that compare the individual and group fairness violations achieved by all the algorithms. In Figure 1, each row corresponds to results over the three respective datasets. The sub-figures in the first column show group fairness violation against individual fairness violation by the algorithms. Obviously, when no individual fairness constraints are enforced, i.e., $\gamma = 0$, all the algorithms achieve 0 individual fairness violation.

We observe that our algorithm achieves Pareto-optimality with respect to individual $\mathscr{I}_{\text{violation}}$ and group-fairness $\mathscr{G}_{\text{violation}}$. When the value of γ is increased (sub-figures on the second and third columns), we see that the baseline **SJK21 (GF and IF)** violates group fairness constraints for smaller values of ϕ ($\phi \in \{1, 1.5\}$ for the synthetic and image dataset and $\phi \in \{1, 2.5\}$ for the Name dataset). This is caused because there are non-group fair rankings in the support of the distribution output by this algorithm. **SJK21 (IF)** has high group fairness violation ($\mathscr{G}_{\text{violation}} \approx 1$ for almost all non-trivial values of ϕ and γ) and no individual fairness violation as expected. Since **CSV18 (Greedy)** outputs a deterministic ranking, it has high individual fairness violation ($\mathscr{I}_{\text{violation}} \geq 0.8$ for all values of ϕ and γ) but has no group fairness violation. We note here that any deterministic ranking can have either 0 or 1 group fairness violation. Finally, **Unconstrained** does the worst of all the algorithms with $\mathscr{G}_{\text{violation}} = 1$ and $\mathscr{I}_{\text{violation}} \geq 0.8$ on all the datasets. In contrast, our algorithm does the best by achieving 0 individual fairness violation and 0 group fairness violation, thus indicating Pareto dominance over all other baselines.

Utility vs. Fairness Figure 5 in Appendix D shows the utility vs. group fairness violation plot for values of ϕ ranging from 1 to p. Our algorithm achieves a very small decrease in the utility; that is, across all the datasets, our algorithm suffers only a maximum of 6% loss in utility compared to other algorithms when all the algorithms are subject to the same fairness constraints. We also observe similar trends as Figure 1 on the synthetic dataset for other values of the parameters m and n (see Figure 6 in Appendix D).

6 THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

In this section, we explain the key ideas in the proof of our main theoretical result, Theorem 4.1. Recall that Theorem 4.1 proves that there is an algorithm, namely Algorithm 1, that given matrices



Figure 1: Individual fairness violation vs. Group fairness violation: In the plots, the parameter γ controls individual fairness constraints and the parameter ϕ defines block-wise representation constraints. The size of the marker for each algorithm in each plot is proportional to the value of ϕ. Lower the value of ϕ, the stronger the group fairness constraints. In contrast, the lower the value of γ, the weaker the individual fairness constraints.

L, U specifying the group-fairness constraints and matrices A, C specifying the individual fairness constraints along with vector ρ specifying item utilities, outputs a ranking R sampled from distribution $\mathcal{D}$ such that: (1) R *always* satisfies the group fairness constraints and (2) $\mathcal{D}$ satisfies the individual fairness constraints. Moreover, the expected utility of R is at least α times the optimal– where α satisfies the lower bound in Equation 12 (see Section 4 for tighter bounds on α under additional assumptions).

The algorithms in prior work [56, 58] roughly have the following structure: they first solve a linear program (e.g., Equation (5)) to compute a marginal $\widehat{D} \in [0,1]^{n\times m}$ of distribution $\widehat{\mathcal{D}}$ from which they want to sample the ranking, and then they decompose $\widehat{D}$ into a convex combination of at most poly(n, m) rankings: $\widehat{D} = \sum_t \alpha_t R_t$. Let's represent this pictorially by the following two-step process:

$$LP \xrightarrow{\text{Solve}} \widehat{D} \xrightarrow{\text{Decompose}} \sum \alpha_t R_t$$

In general, there exist infinitely many decompositions of any matrix $\widehat{D}$ and any valid decomposition is suitable for prior work [56, 58]: this is because, for any valid decomposition $\sum_t \alpha_t R_t$, sampling ranking R_t with probability $\propto \alpha_t$ (for all t) results in optimal utility and satisfies the fairness constraints (both individual and group) in expectation. We, however, require a decomposition where *each* ranking R_t in the decomposition satisfies the group fairness constraints. Computing such a decomposition is the key technical difficulty in proving Theorem 4.1.

In fact, such a decomposition may not even exist (see Fact B.1 for an example). Moreover, instances, where the decomposition does not exist, are also not "isolated" or avoidable instances. Rather, they arise due to a fundamental property of group fairness constraints: that the set of matrices R which satisfy the group fairness constraint and the constraint Equation (7) form a polytope that has fractional vertices, which are vertices that (in matrix representation) have fractional entries. This is also related to the computational complexity of the problem: the Birkhoff von Neumann algorithm is able to efficiently compute a decomposition (when output all rankings are not required to satisfy group fairness constraints) precisely because such fractional vertices do not arise. Indeed, a deep result in Combinatorial Optimization is that the set of doubly-stochastic matrices – which is the set of matrices that satisfy Equation (7) (but do not necessarily satisfy the group fairness constraints) – form a polytope that does not have fractional vertices [55]. Such polytopes are said to be *integral*; see [55]. If such an integrality result was true in our setting, then we could have used a straightforward analog of the Birkhoff von Neumann algorithm. However, this is not the case as shown in Appendix B.

Our idea is to first compute a "coarse" version of the decomposition and then "refine" it. Pictorially, our algorithm follows the following four-step process.

$$\text{Prog. (8)} \xrightarrow{\text{Solve}} \widehat{D} \xrightarrow[\widehat{M} := g(\widehat{D})]{\text{Project}} \widehat{M} \xrightarrow{\text{Decompose}} \sum \alpha_t M_t \xrightarrow[R_t := f(M_t)]{\text{Refine}} \sum \alpha_t R_t$$

Intuitively, a "coarse ranking" or a matching is an assignment of m items to q blocks $B_1, B_2, \ldots, B_q$. Each item is matched to exactly 1 block and the j the block has exactly $|B_j|$ items. We encode a matching by an $m \times q$ matrix $M \in \{0,1\}^{m\times q}$ where $M_{ij} = 1$ item i is in the block B_j and $M_{ij} = 0$ otherwise.

Before discussing how to efficiently compute the decomposition $\sum_t \alpha_t M_t$ where each matching M_t satisfies "group fairness constraints," we need to define notions of fairness for matchings.

Definition 6.1. *Given matrices $L, U \in \mathbb{Z}^{q\times p}$ and $A, C \in [0,1]^{m\times q}$, define the following definitions of fairness:*

(1) *A distribution $\mathcal{D}^{(\mathcal{M})}$ over the set $\mathcal{M}$ of all matchings satisfies (C, A)-individual fairness constraints if for each i and j, $C_{ij} \le \Pr_{M\sim\mathcal{D}^{(\mathcal{M})}}\left[M_{ij} = 1\right] \le A_{ij}$.*
(2) *A matching M satisfies the (L, U)-group fairness constraints if for each j and ℓ, $L_{j\ell} \le \sum_{i\in G_\ell} M_{ij} \le U_{j\ell}$.*

The fairness guarantee of Algorithm 1 follows because of the following invariance.

Lemma 6.2. *Let $f(D) \in [0,1]^{m\times q}$ be the projection of a matrix $D \in [0,1]^{m\times n}$ to the space of matchings. For any matrices $L, U \in \mathbb{Z}^{q\times p}$ and $A, C \in [0,1]^{m\times q}$, the following holds*

(1) *A matrix D satisfies (C, A)-individual fairness constraints if and only if $f(D)$ satisfies (C, A)-individual fairness constraints; and*
(2) *A matrix D satisfies (L, U)-group fairness constraints if and only if $f(D)$ satisfies (L, U)-group fairness constraints.*

Let the "refinement" of a matching M be $g(M)$. One can show that the projection of the refinement of M, i.e., $g(f(M))$ is M itself. This and Lemma 6.2 imply that the refinement $f(M)$ of a matching M satisfies the (L, U)-group fairness constraints if and only if M satisfies (L, U)-group fairness constraints. Since the marginal $\widehat{D}$ computed by our algorithm satisfies group fairness and individual fairness constraints, chaining the above invariance results over the four steps presented above implies that each ranking R_t output by our algorithm also satisfies individual fairness and group fairness constraints.

It remains to show that Algorithm 1 is efficient and to establish its utility guarantee. A lower bound on the utility follows straightforwardly due to the following: First, one can show that both $\widehat{D}$ (which has the optimal utility) and $\sum_t \alpha_t R_t$ project to the same point in the matching space $\widehat{M}$. Second, one can lower bound the ratio of the utility of any two points $D_1, D_2 \in [0,1]^{m\times n}$, in the ranking space, that have the same projection in the matching space (Lemma A.6).

As for the efficiency of Algorithm 1, it follows because the set of matchings satisfies the "integrality" property we discussed above. This is why we introduce matching into our algorithm. Consider the set of points in the matching space that satisfy the group fairness constraint and the following analog of Equation 7:

$$\forall 1 \le j \le q,\ \ \textstyle\sum_i D_{ij} = \left|B_j\right| \quad \text{and} \quad \forall 1 \le i \le m,\ \ \sum_j D_{ij} \le 1.$$

Formally, this set of points forms a polytope $\mathscr{M}$ that is integral. Somewhat surprisingly, this connects our work to a recent work on fair matchings that also makes this observation [52]. The polytope $\mathscr{M}$ is a part of the problem statement of Panda et al. [52]. Our key insight is to make the connection between rankings and matchings discussed in this section, which may be of independent interest to works designing fair ranking algorithms.

Extension to laminar families of protected groups. The fact that $\mathscr{M}$ is integral is the only part of the proof where we use the fact that the protected groups $G_1, \ldots, G_p$ are disjoint. All the remaining steps in the proof hold for arbitrary group structures. Panda et al. [52] observe that this property continues to hold when the groups $G_1, \ldots, G_p$ form a laminar family, i.e., for any set of groups such that either $G_\ell \subseteq G_k$ or $G_k \subseteq G_\ell$ for all $1 \le \ell, k \le p$. Hence, our proof extends to laminar families of protected groups. This provides another example where efficient algorithms continue to exist when the underlying set structure is related from disjoint to laminar; as has also been observed by earlier works in algorithmic fairness [14] and, more broadly, in the Combinatorial Optimization literature [40]. This allows our algorithm to incorporate constraints on certain intersectional groups, as has been argued by seminal works on intersectionality [34] and, more recently, by works analyzing mathematical models of intersectional bias [45]. A concrete example is as follows: since the collection of the sets of all women, all Hispanic women, and all Black (non-Hispanic) women is laminar, one can ensure sufficient representation of women in the output ranking and, within women, also ensure the representation of Hispanic and Black women.

7 LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSION

We present an algorithm (Algorithm 1) that works with a general class of group fairness constraints and individual fairness constraints, it outputs rankings sampled from a distribution that satisfies the specified individual fairness constraints and, moreover, each output ranking satisfies the specified group fairness constraints (Theorem 4.1). Further, the algorithm guarantees a constant fraction approximation of the optimal (expected) utility subject to satisfying these constraints (Theorem 4.1 and 4.2). This algorithm works with families of disjoint protected groups as well as certain families of overlapping protected groups (namely, collections of laminar sets) (Section 6). Empirically, we observe that our algorithm is able to satisfy the specified fairness criteria while losing at most 6% loss of the utility compared to the unconstrained baseline (Section 5).

Our work raises several questions. We consider the setting where the utility of a ranking of multiple items is a linear function of the utilities of individual items. While this captures a broad spectrum of applications [54, 68, 69], in some applications, the utility of a ranking may be a non-linear function of the items present in the ranking; this is particularly, the case where the diversity of the items in a ranking has an effect on its utility [1, 3, 36]. Extending our approach to this (more complicated) setting is an interesting direction for future work. Moreover, while our algorithm works for certain families of overlapping protected groups, extending it to arbitrary families of overlapping protected groups is an important question. Further, Theorem A.15 demonstrates that solving a certain relaxation of our problem is **NP**-hard, exploring other potential relaxations may be fruitful to further improve the utility guarantee of our algorithm.

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Keep Sensors in Check: Disentangling Country-Level Generalization Issues in Mobile Sensor-Based Models with Diversity Scores

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ABSTRACT

Machine learning models trained with passive sensor data from mobile devices can be used to perform various inferences pertaining to activity recognition, context awareness, and health and well-being. Prior work has improved inference performance through the use of multimodal sensors (inertial, GPS, proximity, app usage, etc.) or improved machine learning. In this context, a few studies shed light on critical issues relating to the poor cross-country generalization of models due to distributional shifts across countries. However, these studies have largely relied on inference performance as a means of studying generalization issues, failing to investigate whether the root cause of the problem is linked to specific sensor modalities (independent variables) or the target attribute (dependent variable). In this paper, we study this issue in complex activities of daily living (ADL) inference task, involving 12 classes, by using a multimodal, multi-country dataset collected from 689 participants across eight countries. We first show that the 'country of origin' of data is captured by sensors and can be inferred from each modality separately, with an average accuracy of 65%. We then propose two *diversity scores (DS)* that measure how a country differentiates from others w.r.t. sensor modalities or activities. Using these diversity scores, we observed that both individual sensor modalities and activities have the ability to differentiate countries. However, while many activities capture country differences, only the 'App usage' and 'Location' sensors can do so. By dissecting country-level diversity across dependent and independent variables, we provide a framework to better understand model generalization issues across countries and country-level diversity of sensing modalities.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Human-centered computing** → **Empirical studies in HCI**; **Empirical studies in ubiquitous and mobile computing**; **Smartphones**; **Mobile phones**; **Mobile devices**; *Empirical studies in collaborative and social computing*.

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KEYWORDS

country diversity, data diversity, generalization, country, smartphone sensing, mobile sensing, bias, distributional shift

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1 INTRODUCTION

Current literature on mobile sensing has demonstrated the utility of multimodal passive sensor data in performing various inference tasks associated with activity recognition, context awareness, and health and well-being [24]. Examples include eating and drinking behavior [22, 25–28], activities of daily living [5, 6], energy expenditure estimation [3], mood [19, 23, 35], stress [20, 33], and depression [7, 10], all of which exhibit reasonable performance when inferred from multimodal sensing data. Even though cross-country generalization is needed for models to be deployed across diverse world regions [31, 34], most prior work has focused on homogeneous populations in one or two countries, hence limiting the understanding of model generalization to other countries [38].

Recent work has emphasized the importance of training models that generalize across multiple countries and thus higher real-world utility[5, 23]. These studies demonstrated that poor generalization across countries could be attributed to distributional shifts in data across countries. However, work on cross-country generalization has largely relied on techniques for downstream inferences, such as mood inference, social context inference, and activity recognition, and compare their performance across countries to understand distributional shifts [5, 16, 23, 38]. For example, for a two-country setting, when a model trained in Country 1 performs poorly in Country 2, studies directly attribute this finding to distributional shifts in data across the two countries. Although this approach is effective, it requires building multiple models to systematically test generalization performance across countries, which can be time-consuming and resource-intensive as the number of experiments grows. Furthermore, comparing models is not always straightforward due to differences in performance, attributable to choice of training algorithms, non-optimal parameter tuning, and training set characteristics, such as different numbers of training samples per country. However, even though discussed in general terms (e.g., data distribution-based shift detection and classifier performance-based shift detection [37]), prior work does not examine techniques

that allow an understanding of cross-country differences in sensing modalities without relying on classifier performance.

Further, evaluations of model generalization must consider the potential for diversity at the sensor level (independent variables) and target attribute level (dependent variables). For instance, in a three-country setting, accelerometer readings may exhibit similarity between Country 1 and Country 2 but dissimilarity between Country 1 and Country 3, whereas location readings may display similarity between Country 1 and Country 3 but dissimilarity between Country 1 and Country 2. Current inference performance-based techniques do not explicitly address the sensor-level diversity and target attribute diversity across countries (also known as covariate shift and label shift, respectively [37]), which may obscure the understanding of whether shifts affecting poor generalization occur in the sensors or the targets. Moreover, if such shifts occur in the sensors, investigations into which sensor modalities are more likely to be impacted by distributional shifts have yet to be investigated. In this work, we use the terms sensors and sensor modalities, interchangeably.

Studying topics around mobile sensing and generalization is important because poor cross-country generalization of machine learning models could potentially perpetuate societal biases and result in unfair or ineffective systems. For instance, models developed in economically privileged countries might not function as well in less wealthy ones due to different data distributions, which could exacerbate existing global disparities in technology benefits. In this context, despite extensive discussion of these issues in fields such as computer vision, speech, and natural language processing, the challenges of understanding dataset shifts and generalization are relatively unexplored in the domain of mobile sensing [5, 23, 38]. Therefore, this study introduces a low-cost framework to analyze country-level diversity across sensor modalities and target attributes with a large, multi-modal, multi-country dataset from 689 participants across eight countries. We investigate whether sensor modalities can reveal the data's *country of origin* and then distinguish country differences in sensor modalities and the target variable. We suggest two *diversity scores* to measure country differences and analyze country pairs to identify generalization impacting factors. We then apply these scores to study how cross-country data diversity influences inferences of complex activities of daily living (ADL). In line with prior work [5], ADL are activities that punctuate daily routines, are complex in nature, occur over a non-instantaneous time window, and have a semantic meaning around which context-aware applications could be built. In this context, we pose the following research questions:

RQ1: Can the country of origin of data be inferred from each sensing modality independently and in conjunction, to ascertain whether each sensing modality captures country-level information?
RQ2: Can country-level diversity be methodically measured in terms of the capacity to distinguish between countries, using various sensing modalities, to gain a comprehensive understanding of the sensors that influence variations across countries?
RQ3: By considering the inference of ADL as a case study, how can we consider both sensor data (independent variables) and the target attribute (ADL—dependent variable) together to understand country-level diversity across target as shown by sensor data?

By addressing the above research questions, this paper provides the following contributions:

Contribution 1: We utilized a dataset comprising sensor data collected from 689 college students over a period of four weeks across eight countries, namely, China, Denmark, India, Italy, Mexico, Mongolia, Paraguay, and UK. Our analysis found that each sensing modality can reasonably infer the country of origin of the user, with an accuracy ranging between 0.57 and 0.71 for different sensors and an average accuracy of 0.65. This observation underscores the crucial role of sensor modalities in comprehending cross-country dataset generalization. Furthermore, the collective performance of all sensors in distinguishing countries had an average accuracy of 0.73, with a minimum of 0.59 and a maximum of 0.84, across countries. This finding is intriguing as it suggests that different sensor modalities may capture various aspects of the 'country of origin' and highlights the necessity for further investigation at the sensor modality level to better understand dataset shifts and model generalization issues.
Contribution 2: We present a novel approach to assess country-level diversity by introducing a country-level diversity score (DS1) that incorporates differences in sensor modalities and countries. While this is a simple measure, it provides insight into the distributional disparities of multimodal sensor data across countries. Based on our scoring methodology, we discovered notable variations in countries for certain sensor modalities, with high diversity scores for Italy, Mongolia, and Mexico and low scores for Denmark and Paraguay. These country-level diversity discrepancies are intriguing as they could help to understand generalization, even before training any machine learning models. Specifically, do countries with high country-level diversity across sensor modalities provide better training data in terms of generalization? Are they more challenging as test countries? By examining country pairwise differences (e.g., testing if data captured by the App modality differs significantly for Italy and the UK users), we found that 'App usage' and 'Location' are the two modalities with the highest discriminatory ability between countries. These outcomes suggest that certain sensor modalities might have a more pronounced effect on generalization than others.
Contribution 3: We propose a second country-level diversity score (DS2) that takes into account the country, sensors, and the target attribute (ADL). Under this scoring scheme, we found considerable country differences across activities. When comparing the order of countries in DS1 and DS2, we observed noteworthy differences. For instance, Italy ranks highest in DS1 but falls to fifth in DS2 scoring. Only Paraguay and Denmark maintain the same rank in both orderings. This suggests that a country's distribution of target attributes may differ from others yet remain similar in terms of sensor modalities. When analyzing pairwise country differences across activities (e.g., examining whether the sensor data of Italy and India's users differ for a given activity), we found that no single activity stands out as a definitive differentiator between pairs of countries, but many activities can serve this purpose. These results imply that a person's 'country of origin' could influence the manner in which activities are practiced (dependent variable), as demonstrated by sensor data (independent variables).

2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

There is a plethora of research on mobile sensing related to health and well-being. These studies have utilized passive sensing data to infer behavioral, contextual, and psychological aspects of smartphone users. Recent studies have highlighted the challenges of generalization, and several issues remain unresolved. To address this, Adler et al. [2] employed two longitudinal study datasets to infer mental health symptoms and investigate their generalization across publicly available data using inference performance as a measure of generalization. They found that models trained on combined data achieved better inference than models trained on single-study data.

Muller et al. [29] investigated whether patterns in people's mobility behaviors could passively measure depression. They used a U.S.-wide sample that was socio-demographic heterogeneous as well as in mobility patterns, and found that depression inference from GPS-based mobility did not generalize well to large, demographically heterogeneous samples. Meegahapola et al. [23] studied mood inference and found that country-specific approaches performed reasonably well for two or three classes of mood inferences, but country-agnostic models did not generalize well to unseen countries. Assi et al. [5] demonstrated that country-specific models outperformed multi-country models in Human Activity Recognition (HAR) task settings, even when trained on smaller data samples. Khal et al. [16] showed that it is possible to achieve state-of-the-art accuracy in a new country when building personality models (Big 5), and investigated cross-cultural differences in features by constructing multiple country-specific models and comparing the most influential features per country.

Although these studies have highlighted the challenges of generalization in diverse datasets for a given target task, they all consider inference performance as a metric for generalization. Further, most of these studies advocate finding better techniques for model generalization (in case data and labels from target domains are unavailable) and domain adaptation (when target domain labels are available). However, they also acknowledge the challenge of adapting currently available techniques from other domains to multimodal sensing data. Prior work has seldom examined domain adaptation strategies or techniques to understand distributional shifts in mobile sensing data for in multimodal settings [8, 23]. In this work, we analyze country-level diversity directly from sensor data to provide insights into how country differences are distributed between sensor modalities and the target attribute (ADL). Our goal is to contribute to a better understanding of what factors could influence cross-country generalization in multimodal sensor datasets. The findings would allow researchers working on mobile sensing to have a better understanding of distributional shifts when developing future domain adaptation or generalization techniques in multimodal settings.

3 DATASET

We used a dataset originally collected as part of the European WeNet project and described in [13, 23]. The data was gathered from both undergraduate and graduate students in eight countries, namely China, Denmark, India, Italy, Mexico, Mongolia, Paraguay, and the UK, to capture diversity in behaviors across countries. This



Figure 1: Distribution of countries per activity. The x-axis is the count of practiced activities.

diversity is decomposed into two dimensions: inherent attributes (observable characteristics such as country of origin, gender, and age) and acquired characteristics[1]. Both of these dimensions of diversity were captured during four weeks in November 2020, via an online questionnaire and a smartphone application called iLog. The app was designed to record software and hardware sensors, as well as some metadata, along with hourly questionnaires assessing the participant's activity and context. Information such as what the students were doing, where they were, with whom, and how they were feeling was collected in time diaries.

The original list of activities included 34 items selected using prior work in human behavior modeling and social practice [12, 39]. As the data collection took place during the Covid-19 pandemic, it significantly influenced the students' way of life. Consequently, some activities, such as traveling and walking, were underrepresented. To address this issue, activities with similar broad semantic meanings were merged, such as 'eating' and 'cooking' and 'social media' and 'internet chatting'. Activities with very disparate semantic meanings, such as 'hobbies', which include dissimilar activities such as 'painting' or 'playing the piano', were filtered out. The resulting dataset consisted of twelve activities of daily living, that modeled the life of a student (Attending class, Eating, Online comm./Social media, Reading, Resting, Shopping, Sleeping, Sport, Studying, Walking, Watching something and Working). In total, the dataset contains 252,393 ADL reports and covers eight countries. More information about the dataset, including the process of narrowing down the ADL to 12, and data collection can be found in [5, 23]. Figure 1 displays the selected activities with their country distribution.

4 FEATURE EXTRACTION PIPELINE

In this section, we explain how we extract features from a sequence of data captured from sensors.

4.1 Obtaining Raw Features

The raw data collected from the mobile app contains a sequence of data captured from hardware and software sensors and time diary metadata. In our study, we decided to keep a traditional feature

[1]We point out that inherent and acquired characteristics are the terms used by ACM as part of its "Commitment to Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in Computing": https://www.acm.org/diversity-inclusion/about.

Table 1: Summary of features extracted from raw sensor data, aggregated around self-reports using ten-minute windows before and after a time diary entry.

Sensor modality	Count	Corresponding features
Activity	8	time spent doing following activities: still, in_vehicle, on_bicycle, on_foot, running, tilting, walking and unknown (Google Activity Recognition API)
App usage	5	time spent on apps of each category: personalization, social, communication, tools and app not found
Cellular [lte]	4	mean/std/min/max signal strength
Location	3	radius of gyration, sum of distance, altitude mean/min/max, speed mean/min/max
Notifications	4	notifications posted, notifications removed (with and without duplicates)
Proximity	4	mean/std/min/max
Screen events	6	touch events, user presence time, number of episodes, time per episode, min/max/std episode time, total time
Steps	2	steps counter (since turned on), steps detected
WiFi	5	connected indicator, number of devices, mean/std/min/max rssi

extraction approach by extracting features by means of functionals applied to a window of features [18, 28]. This approach has the advantage of yielding features that are interpretable.

Practically, feature extraction for the current activity is done as follows: first, we pool software and hardware sensor data in a window of 10 minutes centered around the current ADL report, in order to capture the characteristics of the activity; then the window data is discretized by applying various functionals to the continuous stream. Some functionals are specific to the sensor modalities (i.e. radius of gyration), while others are statistical functions like the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum. We also decided to include some high-level features that represent the participant movement, by using the Google Activity Recognition API. This leaves us with nine modalities of sensors describing the ADL report. Table 1 shows a full description of the sensor modalities with their respective features. For more infomation about the feature processing pipeline, please refer to [5, 23]. Note that the 'Location' sensor modality here captures physical location (GPS), and we derive various features from by considering a time window and location traces that quantify the mobility.

4.2 Embedding-Based Representation

The raw extracted features, grouped by sensor modalities, differ in terms of the range of values and are sparse, i.e., they contain many zeros. Motivated by these two observations, we converted each sensor modality raw data into a continuous and dense representation using the fast.ai toolkit [14] tabular data recipe for auto-encoders[2], without the categorical input part. The number of layers for the auto-encoders is chosen empirically to maximize the evaluation set performance.

Regarding the embedding size, it is usally chosen in order to perform well on a downstream task, but in our case, we would like the embeddings to be as generic as possible, i.e., not depending on a specific task. We selected the optimal embedding size empirically, for each sensor modality, by using the elbow method [36] on the evaluation set reconstruction scores (R2 scores [1]). Optimal embedding R2 scores are close to one for all sensor modalities except for the 'Location' sensor modality, which has a score of 0.56. Then, we decided to choose the largest optimal embedding size across sensor modalities as the common embedding size for all sensor modalities (size of 22) to avoid dimensional bias in the statistical and visual analyses and to facilitate their combination. Doing so is appropriate, as R2 scores empirically increase with higher embedding dimensions.

To analyze diversity at the smartphone level, we added the 9 sensor modalities. The resulting embedding is a representation of sensor data. We will use this term in the rest of the paper to refer to this combined representation. An alternative way would have been to concatenate them, but this would have yielded a high-dimensional vector of size 198. We believe that keeping the dimension smaller is beneficial in terms of dimensionality reduction and statistical analysis. The resulting embedding can be thought of as an approximation of embedding modeling all sensor modalities. This technique is widely used in Graph Neural Network message passing [11] and has also been used in past ubicomp literature [17].

5 METHODS

In our experimental setting, for all cases where an inference is performed, the dataset was partitioned in a way that ensures similar country distributions and no overlap of users across the training, validation, and testing sets, similar to prior work that used leave-k-participants-out strategy [5, 23]. Specifically, a test user is unseen during the training phase. The use of this splitting strategy allows for the exploration of country diversity in the testing set with no bias toward particular users. To assess the generalization of the approach, we utilized a 10-fold cross-validation [32]. In pairwise country diversity analysis, all test embeddings from the ten folds are employed. To implement the aforementioned splitting strategy, we make ten train/validation/testing sets with respective proportions of 80%, 10%, and 10%. First, we perform a 'group stratified split' utilizing the 'StratifiedGroupKFold' class, from the scikit-learn toolkit [30], with K=10. This gives us the ten sets. Then, for each training set, we split it into training and validation using the 'GroupShuffleSplit' class. In both 'group stratified splits', the user ids are serving as the grouping variable.

[2]https://walkwithfastai.com/tab.ae

5.1 Inferring Country of Origin of Sensor Data (RQ1)

The objective of this research question is to determine if the various sensing modalities, individually or collectively, contain country-level information, thereby enabling inference of *country of origin* from data. To achieve this, a one-versus-all binary classification task was set up for each country, and the performance of each sensor modality, separately and combined, was evaluated. The approach involved selecting one country for testing, and replacing labels for all other countries with an 'all' label, resulting in two labels: the country label and the 'all' label (e.g., Italy vs. All, Mongolia vs. All, etc.). To mitigate class imbalance, an equivalent number of samples as the number of samples for the selected country were randomly sampled from the 'all' sample. A binary classifier was trained using a random forest model on the sampled data, and the resulting accuracies averaged across the 10 folds. We used different models, such as multi-layer perceptron neural networks, XGboost, and Support vector machines, for the evaluation. However, we only report results for random forest models for brevity because they performed the best. Mean accuracy per sensor modality was determined by averaging all country accuracies.

5.2 Diversity Score (DS1) Considering Sensor Modalities (RQ2)

This research question aims to quantify country-level diversity based on various sensing modalities. We propose to assess a country's diversity through a country-level diversity score (DS1) that summarizes country differences across sensor modalities. To assess the significance of these differences, we rely on statistical tests. Each country pair for each modality and sensor data is tested. The experiment consisted of a two-group assessment, evaluating the country pairwise difference between the averages of the user embeddings across all activities. To accomplish this, each country pair was tested using a PERMANOVA test in conjunction with a PERMDISP test [4]. The PERMDISP test was necessary to ensure that a significant difference was not due to dispersion. It is important to note that the PERMANOVA tests the null hypothesis that "the centroids and dispersion of the groups as defined by measure space are equivalent for all groups." Failure to do so could result in type I errors, i.e., finding a difference in countries where there are none. This is especially true since our design is unbalanced (i.e., the number of users in each country differs). The scikit-bio framework[3] was utilized to conduct the tests, with 5000 permutations for the PERMANOVA test and 1000 permutations for the PERMDISP test, which tested the 'centroid'. These numbers were chosen empirically, to obtain results with high accuracy, while keeping performance considerations acceptable. A significant threshold of 5% was set for both tests, requiring the PERMANOVA p-value to be <= 0.05 and the PERMDISP test >= 0.05 for a test to be significant. Since both PERMANOVA and PERMDISP tests are permutation tests and have an element of randomness that can impact the results between different runs, especially for p-values close to 0.05, our strategy for almost reproducible results was to perform a series of combined tests (PERMANOVA and PERMDISP) incrementally. Each incremental test in the series contributed to the previous test by adding missing significant values (or nothing), with the testing procedure stopping when ten combined tests did not add new significant values.

Next, we introduce the country-level diversity score (DS1) across sensor modalities. This score is calculated for a given country by considering both country and sensor modality differences. The country count denotes the number of instances in which the given country differs from another country across all modalities, while the sensor modality count indicates the number of unique sensor modalities involved in these differences. By adding both counts we consider diversity originated from country and modality differences and obtain the country-level diversity score (DS1). For instance, according to Table 2, Denmark differs from Mexico only in terms of the 'App usage' and 'Location' sensors, resulting in a diversity score of 3 = 1 (country count) + 2 (modality count). Although this measure is simple, it allows us to gain an understanding of where distributional differences exist in multimodal sensor data across countries. Depending on the research objective, it may be worth considering a different approach to combining both counts that places greater emphasis on one aspect over the other.

5.3 Diversity Score (DS2) Considering Sensor Data and ADL (RQ3)

To assess the diversity of countries across the independent variable, we propose a country-level diversity score (DS2), which summarizes the differences between countries with respect to ADLs.

We employ pairwise statistical tests on sensor data (all modalities) for a specific activity and two countries to identify how countries differ with respect to the target variable. The test provides insights into how countries differ in terms of the target variable, and a deeper analysis at the sensor modality level is left for future work. To obtain reproducible results, we follow the same incremental procedure as in RQ2, and the same number of permutations is used for both tests. The country-level diversity score (DS2) across the target attribute is defined similarly to DS1, but this time across activities. For instance, when examining Denmark, we found that it differs from the UK and India in four unique activities, including Online comm./Social media, Shopping, Studying, and Walking (Table 4). Therefore, Denmark's diversity score is 6 = 2 (country count) + 4 (activity count).

6 RESULTS

6.1 Inferring Country of Origin of Sensor Data (RQ1)

In this section, we aim to examine whether each sensing modality contains country-level information, and to determine the degree of accuracy gained by combining all sensor modalities.

The results of the analysis are presented in Figure 2, which provides a breakdown of the accuracy levels achieved by each sensor modality. The average accuracy attained in inferring the *country of origin* from a single sensor modality is 64.5%, with two modalities performing well above the average. However, the 'Steps' sensor modality falls short of this mark. The 'Location' modality, on the other hand, exhibits the best performance with an average accuracy

[3] http://scikit-bio.org



Figure 2: A comparison of the average of the 8 one-country-vs.-all binary classification accuracies, by individual sensor modalities. Random accuracy is 50%.



Figure 3: A comparison of the eight one-country-vs.-all binary classification accuracies with sensor data (all sensor modalities). Random accuracy is 50%.

of 70.6%. It is worth noting that the standard deviation values are moderate (less than 10% across all sensing modalities), indicating a diversity of smartphone usage patterns across countries. These findings underscore the importance of analyzing each sensor modality separately to account for inference biases. Figure 3 presents the results obtained from combining all sensor modalities. On average, it is possible to infer a country from smartphone sensor data with an accuracy of 73.0%. The country with the highest inferred accuracy is Mongolia, with an accuracy rate of 83.5%, while Paraguay has the lowest inferred accuracy rate of 59.1%. The results suggest that sensor modalities capture complementary country-level information, thereby boosting the overall accuracy of smartphone sensor data in identifying the *country of origin*.

Hence, in summary, regarding the first research question (RQ1), our analysis has revealed that, on average, sensor modalities allow for the inference of the *country of origin* of sensor data with an accuracy of 64.5%. Furthermore, we have observed that when combining sensor modalities, there is a relative gain in performance of 13.2% compared to the average accuracy of individual modalities. Our results show that on average, a country can be inferred from smartphone sensor data with an accuracy of 73.0%. Hence, these results show that sensor data contains country-level information. This again provides us a motivation into disentangling country-level distributional shifts across different sensing modalities, rather than just relying on inference performance of a target variable.

6.2 Diversity Score (DS1) Considering Sensor Modalities (RQ2)

In this section, our objective is to quantify the diversity across countries at the sensor modality level, with the aim of gaining insights into the sensors that contribute to country differences. Specifically, our analysis seeks to achieve two goals: 1) to identify statistically significant pairwise differences between countries for each sensor modality; 2) to rank countries based on a country-level diversity score (Diversity Score 1—DS1) that combines both country and sensor modality differences. It is important to note that no distinction is made between activities in this analysis, as we will explore the influence of activities in the next research question.

Table 2 displays the significant pairwise differences between countries based on sensor modalities as part of our first goal. Please note that as a result of this choice, not all country pairs appear in the Table. The PERMANOVA F statistic is shown as an effect size indicator if the PERMANOVA p-value < 0.05 (statistically significant) and left empty if the PERMDISP p-value > 0.05 (not statistically significant). We have omitted the 'Activity' and 'Screen events' sensor modalities as no significant differences were found among countries regarding these sensors. Out of the 56 possible country pairwise comparisons (e.g., Italy vs. India, Italy vs. Mongolia, etc.), 17 showed significant differences (as shown in the first column of Table 2). Our analysis revealed that sensor modalities do not capture an equal number of country differences. Specifically, 'App usage' exhibited the highest number of differences (13), followed by 'Location' (6). On the other hand, the 'Cellular' sensor modality only captured one country difference, and 'Activity' (here we do not refer to the ADL, our dependent variable, but to the simple activity captured using the Google activity recognition API, which is an independent variable used to infer ADL) and 'Screen events' did not capture any, hence not shown on the table. We further observed that country differences can be attributed to sensor modality differences. For instance, Mongolia and Paraguay differ in their readings from the 'App usage', 'Proximity', and 'Wifi' sensors. Generally, pairwise country differences are explained by 1-3 sensor modalities (out of 9 possible), but the sensor modalities that contribute to such differences vary for specific country pairs. Therefore, we can conclude that while differences between the two countries are limited, there is a large diversity of country differences when considering all countries. We also noted that most of the differences involved countries from different continents, except for 'Italy-UK', which exhibited differences in 'Location' and 'App usage'. This finding is in agreement with the previous work of Meegahapola et al. [23], which reported that on other inference tasks using the same dataset, European countries performed better for other European countries than for non-European ones.

Table 3 presents the country ordering based on the DS1. Italy holds the highest score, followed by Mongolia and Mexico. Although Italy and Mexico have almost the same DS1, Italy is distinct in terms of its sensor modalities (i.e., sensor modality count: 6) rather than its country differences (i.e., country count: 5). This

Table 2: Statistically significant differences in smartphone usage by users of different countries per sensor modality. Tests are performed on individual sensor modality embeddings. The PERMANOVA F statistic is shown if PERMANOVA p-value < 0.05 (statistically significant) and left empty if PERMDISP p-value > 0.05 (not statistically significant).

	App usage	Cellular	Location	Notifications	Proximity	Wifi	Steps
China-Mexico	3.2						
Denmark-Mexico	2.7		2.1				
Italy-China				2.5			
Italy-India		2.9					2.9
Italy-Mexico	3.4		1.9				
Italy-Mongolia	2.4					4.0	
Italy-UK	1.8		2.9				
Mexico-India	2.3						2.2
Mongolia-China	1.9						
Mongolia-India				2.0		2.7	
Mongolia-Mexico	3.5						
Mongolia-Paraguay	1.9				2.4	2.0	
Mongolia-UK					1.9		
Paraguay-Mexico	2.8		2.1				
Paraguay-UK	2.2						
UK-China	2.2		3.2				
UK-Mexico	2.4		4.4				

Table 3: Country-level diversity across sensor modalities. Country count corresponds to the number of pairwise differences for the given country. The sensor modality count is the number of unique sensor modalities involved in these pairwise differences.

Country	Diversity Score (DS1)	Country count	Sensor modality count	Involved sensor modalities
Italy	11	5	6	App usage, Cellular, Location, Notifications, Steps, Wifi
Mongolia	10	6	4	App usage, Notifications, Proximity, Wifi
Mexico	10	7	3	App usage, Human Location, Steps
India	8	3	5	App usage, Cellular, Notifications, Steps, Wifi
UK	8	5	3	App usage, Location, Proximity
China	7	4	3	App usage, Location, Notifications
Paraguay	7	3	4	App usage, Location, Proximity, Wifi
Denmark	3	1	2	App usage, Location

observation is interesting because it implies that country-level diversity of Mexico may be caused by only a few sensor modalities (i.e., sensor modality count: 3). On the other hand, Denmark has the lowest score with 1 country and 2 sensor modalities differences. It is noteworthy that while differences often emerge between two continents, this does not hold true for country-level diversity across sensor modalities.

In summary, this research question provides insights into RQ2 by proposing a country-level diversity score that considers both country and sensor modality differences. Our findings show that country-level diversity across sensor modalities significantly varies across different countries. Moreover, we observe that the 'App usage' captures the highest country diversity, followed by the 'Location' sensor. Additionally, we note that pairwise country differences can be explained by a maximum of 1-3 sensor modalities. For example, as mentioned in Table 2, Italy-China have statistically significant differences in terms of Notifications (1 modality); Mongolia-Paraguay have statistically significant differences in terms of App usage, Proximity, and Wifi (3 modalities), etc. Therefore, our results indicate that a few specific sensor modalities play a crucial role in capturing country differences.

6.3 Diversity Score (DS2) Considering Sensor Data and ADL (RQ3)

In this section, we undertake an analysis that takes into account both sensor data and the target attribute to gain a better understanding of country-level diversity across the classes of the target variable as represented by the sensor data. For this, we specifically used ADL Recognition, where target attributes contain 12 activity classes (see Section 3 for the list of activities). Our analysis has two goals: 1) to analyze country pairwise differences across ADL statistically and 2) to rank countries using a country-level diversity score (Diversity Score 2—DS2) that considers both country and activity differences.

First, we perform an analysis to investigate the extent to which sensor modalities can be used to infer each activity. We follow the same procedure as in RQ1, but this time, we focus on activities instead of countries. Figure 4 shows that the practiced activity can be inferred from each sensing modality separately with an average activity accuracy of 52.4%. Furthermore, Figure 5 demonstrates that combining sensor modalities is beneficial when inferring ADL, indicating that sensor modalities are complementary. The average activity accuracy improves to 55.3% when all sensor modalities are combined. These results reveal that differentiating a practiced



Figure 4: A comparison of the average of the 12 one-activity-vs.-all binary classification accuracies, by individual sensor modalities.



Figure 5: A comparison of one-activity-vs.-all binary classification accuracies with sensor data (all sensor modalities). Random accuracy is 50%.

activity from the other 11 ADLs using sensor data is a challenging task, as compared to a random accuracy of 50%. Prior studies have also shown that this is a challenging task, and personalization is required to attain better performance [5].

Similar to RQ2, we conducted a test to determine significant differences across countries, this time in relation to different ADL (goal 1). The results are presented in Table 4. The 'Sport' and 'Working' activities were excluded from the tables as no significant pairwise differences were found between countries. We also discarded 4 significant differences involving one country with a sample size (number of unique students) less than 15, assuming that this case might not contain enough variability in the data that describes the activity. Out of 56 possible pairwise comparisons, 18 showed significant differences (as shown in the first column of Table 4). Similar to the findings from the analysis of sensor modalities, it was observed that different activities captured varying numbers of pairwise differences between countries. Additionally, it was noted that a pairwise difference between countries could be broken down into differences in specific activities. Consequently, two countries could exhibit differences in one activity while showing similarities in another activity, as indicated by the sensor data (see Appendix A). Unlike the analysis of sensor modalities, there was no specific activity that stood out for its diversity across countries. However, more than half of the activities had at least five pairwise differences between countries. Furthermore, a single pairwise difference between countries could be broken down into as many as seven activities out of the 12 possible, which is greater than the number observed for modalities (1-3 out of 9 possible). Taken together, these findings suggest that different countries may exhibit variations in multiple ways while engaging in a particular activity. This could pose a challenge to the generalization of ADL inference models and may explain why country-specific models perform better in prior work [5].

In response to RQ3, we have shown the relevance of taking into account both sensor data and target attribute (ADL) when assessing country diversity in mobile sensing datasets. Our proposed DS2 for countries revealed that significant differences exist between countries in terms of activity diversity, and that these differences are distinct from those observed in DS1, which captures sensor modality diversity. We also noted that no activity particularly captured country diversity, but many exhibited a substantial number of country pairwise differences (>= 5). Lastly, we found that up to seven activities could account for significant country pairwise differences. In summary, our results highlight the importance of considering both target ADL and sensor data in evaluating country diversity, as they provide complementary perspectives on the issue.

7 DISCUSSION

7.1 Summary of Results

In this study, we examined the country-level diversity of a multimodal, multi-country dataset collected from 689 participants across eight countries in the context of a 12-class ADL inference task. Our investigation aimed to disentangle the influence of sensor modalities and the target attribute on cross-country generalization.

7.1.1 RQ1. We demonstrated that individual sensor modalities could somewhat infer the *country of origin* of users and are complementary, indicating that sensors can capture significant country-level information, enabling country-level comparisons. However, the ADL inference from sensor data proved to be more challenging. Overall, we provided motivation as to why sensor-level analysis is needed for to understand cross-country model generalization issues.

7.1.2 RQ2. Further analysis was conducted to assess the effectiveness of different sensor modalities in capturing country differences. Our findings indicate that the 'App usage' and 'Location' modalities were particularly effective in this regard. This highlights the importance of understanding country differences in these modalities for achieving better cross-country generalization. Interestingly, we found that the two countries differ, at most, by only three sensor modalities, but the specific sensors varied across different country pairs. This suggests that country differences are captured by only a few sensors and that investigating the content of these sensors could provide a better understanding of the factors that make countries distinct. Additionally, the country-level diversity scores for sensor modalities (DS1) revealed that countries such as Italy and Denmark differ greatly in terms of diversity. Specifically, Italy exhibits a high degree of diversity with respect to both sensor modalities and country differences, while Denmark does not. Further analysis

Table 4: Statistically significant differences in sensing features by ADL by users of different countries. PERMANOVA F statistic is shown if PERMANOVA p-value < 0.05 (statistically significant) and left empty if PERMDISP p-value > 0.05 (not statistically significant).

	Attend class	Studying	Sleeping	Eating	Online com./ Social media	Watching some-thing	Resting	Shopping	Reading	Walking
China-India			2.7		2.4					
China-Mexico							2.0			
Italy-China	5.8	2.0	2.7	7.3	2.3	4.7				
Italy-India		3.9	5.9							
Italy-UK		2.0			2.4					2.0
Mexico-India			2.0		3.1					
Mongolia-China				2.6						
Mongolia-India			3.0		4.2					
Mongolia-Paraguay			1.9				2.8			
Mongolia-UK			3.2	4.5			1.9	2.1	2.0	
Mongolia-Mexico		2.6								
Paraguay-China	2.4			2.8			2.3			
Paraguay-India		2.8	4.0		4.2					
UK-China	5.7	3.5	2.7	6.6	5.2	5.9	2.1			
UK-India	1.9	4.5	4.9	3.5						
UK-Mexico						2.3				
Denmark-India					3.2					
Denmark-UK		2.0						1.9		

Table 5: Country-level diversity across activities. The country count corresponds to the number of pairwise differences for the given country. The activities count is the number of unique activities involved in these pairwise differences.

Country	Diversity Score (DS2)	Country count	Activities count	Involved activities
UK	15	6	9	Eating, Online comm./Social media, Reading, Resting, Shopping, Sleeping, Studying, Walking, Watching something
China	13	6	7	Attending class, Eating, Online comm./Social media, Resting, Sleeping, Studying, Watching something
India	12	7	5	Attending class, Eating, Online comm./Social media, Sleeping, Studying
Mongolia	12	5	7	Eating, Online comm./Social media, Reading, Resting, Shopping, Sleeping, Studying
Italy	10	3	7	Attending class, Eating, Online comm./Social media, Sleeping, Studying, Walking, Watching something
Mexico	9	4	5	Online comm./Social media, Resting, Sleeping, Studying, Watching something
Paraguay	9	3	6	Attending class, Eating, Online comm./Social media, Resting, Sleeping, Studying
Denmark	5	2	3	Online comm./Social media, Shopping, Studying

of the impact of these differences could aid in understanding the challenges of cross-country generalization.

7.1.3 RQ3. Furthermore, our analysis revealed that a large number of activities exhibited numerous pairwise country differences, suggesting that there might be important variations in how users in different countries carry out daily activities, as shown by all sensors. Specifically, we found that two countries could differ in as many as seven activities, further highlighting the challenges in cross-country ADL inference. Moreover, the country-level diversity score for activities highlighted the existence of significant diversity among countries, with highly diverse countries such as the UK exhibiting a diversity score (DS2) of 16, while less diverse countries such as Denmark had a diversity score of 6. This gap in diversity scores is an important factor to consider when developing cross-country models and merits further investigation.

In summary, our study highlights the importance of considering both sensor modalities and target attributes when assessing country diversity in mobile sensing datasets. We have provided evidence of differences in country diversity across sensor modalities and activities, which have implications for the cross-country generalization of models.

7.2 Implications, Limitations, and Future Work

Our findings suggest potential implications for future research to deepen the understanding of the relationship between country-level diversity and performance/generalization. Can the proposed Diversity Scores be used as a proxy for generalization in cross-country datasets? Firstly, it would be valuable to investigate whether there is a correlation between the ability of sensor modalities to capture country differences and the performance of models trained on them. For instance, one could study if a model, when trained on modalities that capture a high number of country differences, generalizes better. Secondly, our observation that the difference between two countries can be explained by a limited number of sensor modalities

raises questions about whether accuracy differences between test countries are primarily due to the modalities where the countries differ or to other factors. In terms of practical implications, utilizing the proposed diversity scores to design experiments could facilitate a better understanding of how different countries generalize. For example, one could investigate whether training with countries that exhibit high country-level diversity scores (DS1) outperforms training with countries that exhibit low country-level diversity scores in terms of performance and generalization. Additionally, examining the impact of the country-level diversity of a test set on performance and generalization across sensor modalities and activities could provide insights into how to design more robust mobile sensing models. Finally, it may be worthwhile to explore the potential benefits of adding a diverse country to an existing dataset to improve performance and generalization.

This study has several limitations that should be taken into account. The first point to consider pertains to the dataset. The data was collected in the Fall of 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic, a time when participants, who were university students from eight different countries, spent a significant amount of time at home. Therefore, we should not assume that this cohort represents the entire university student population of these countries. It is important to consider these aspects when interpreting the results. Additionally, regarding sample sizes, the number of unique students per country varied from 20 (Mexico) to 240 (Italy), with a median of 41 unique students. Although these numbers are statistically sufficient for testing, larger sample sizes are necessary to draw more robust conclusions at scale. Secondly, the proposed country-level diversity score (DS2) across ADL relies on tests that evaluate country differences in sensor data for combined sensors. Although this provides insights of the relationship between country differences and ADL at the smartphone level, it would be interesting to explore further how country differences relate to activities for each individual modality. However, this analysis was not provided because the applicability of the method on all sensor modalities needed to be tested first. These analyses could help disentangle the relationship between countries, sensor modalities, and target attributes. Thirdly, statistical tests were used on the user embeddings of country pairs to assess country differences. By examining the embeddings (see Appendix A), it was observed that assessing two-country differences is not always straightforward. To facilitate the tests, it may be worth exploring techniques that increase data separation prior to applying statistical tests, such as applying Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) [15] on embeddings prior to testing. Fourthly, this study focused solely on a specific target attribute (ADL). It would be interesting to investigate whether other target attributes, such as social context and mood, produce the same country-level diversity scores (DS2) as ADL. Exploring different target attributes could provide additional insights into country distributional shifts understanding. As a fifth point, this work focused on investigating the differences captured by sensor modalities and sensor data for the country of origin. It could be worthwhile to investigate how different states or regions within a country differ. Additionally, the proposed methodology could be extended to inherent diversity attributes like gender and age to investigate their impact on sensor modalities, the target attribute, and generalization. Understanding how differences exist across users, how they are captured by sensor modalities, and how they can potentially influence generalization is particularly important for the health and well-being related mobile sensing-related applications. Finally, for the country-level diversity scores, the choice was made to add the count of pairwise country differences and individual sensor modalities/target attribute differences. Future work could explore other ways of computing these scores (e.g., a weighted average) that are more appropriate for understanding generalization issues, depending on the requirement.

Our work adds to the important topic of generalization across countries, which has been studied in images [9] and text [21], but less on mobile datasets. Our work also contributes analysis of a multi-country dataset that includes both Global North and South countries with the goal of designing for all of them while taking into account their specificities.

8 CONCLUSION

Our study, which focuses on ADL inference, utilized a large-scale, multimodal, multi-country dataset to investigate country-level diversity across sensor modalities and activities, with the aim of disentangling both in order to gain insights on how to achieve better generalization in cross-country datasets. By proposing two country-level diversity scores for sensor modalities and activities, we identified statistically significant differences between countries that can be explained by specific sensor modalities and ADL. Our results indicate that Italy has the highest country-level diversity across sensor modalities, the UK has the highest across activities, and Denmark has the lowest for both country-level diversities. However, we observe that these diversity scores do not seem to correlate, except for Paraguay and Denmark, which have the same score. In terms of country pairwise differences, our analysis shows that the 'App usage' and 'Location' sensors have the highest ability to distinguish between countries. On the other hand, we found that no single activity stands out in terms of the ability to distinguish between countries, but many activities have a high ability to do so. Finally, we discovered that country pairwise differences could be explained by only 1-3 sensor modalities and 1-7 activities, which indicates that cross-country differences between two countries may be captured by only a few sensors but many activities. As discussed, our work opens several research directions towards diversity-aware mobile sensing systems.

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A APPENDIX

In this Appendix, we present two visualization plots that depict country differences across all activities (Figure 6) and between 'Eating' and 'Shopping' (Figure 7), as revealed by sensor data from all modalities. When the p-value approaches the significance threshold, a closer examination of the embeddings can aid in a better understanding of country differences. For example, when we inspect the differences between Mongolia and the UK, which had a low PERMANOVA p-value and a low PERMDISP p-value (left plot in Figure 6), we observe that the embeddings of both countries are mixed in one of the clusters, indicating that the significant PERMANOVA test might be due to dispersion. Conversely, when we examine the UMAP plot for the UK and India (right plot in Figure 6), the separation between the two countries' embeddings is more distinct. Similarly, ADL differences can be visualized. For instance, the UK and China display differences in 'Eating' but not in 'Shopping' (see Figure 7).



Figure 6: On the left, UMAP plot comparing Mongolia and the UK users. On the right, UMAP plot comparing the UK and India users. Each dot on a plot is the 2D projection of a user embedding capturing sensor data (all modalities) across all activities



Figure 7: On the left, UMAP plot comparing China and the UK users while 'Eating'. On the right, UMAP plot comparing China and the UK users while 'Shopping'. Each dot on a plot is the 2D projection of a user embedding capturing sensor data (all modalities) for a given activity

A Deep Dive into Dataset Imbalance and Bias in Face Identification

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ABSTRACT

As the deployment of automated face recognition (FR) systems proliferates, bias in these systems is not just an academic question, but a matter of public concern. Media portrayals often center imbalance as the main source of bias, i.e., that FR models perform worse on images of non-white people or women because these demographic groups are underrepresented in training data. Recent academic research paints a more nuanced picture of this relationship. However, previous studies of data imbalance in FR have focused exclusively on the face *verification* setting, while the face *identification* setting has been largely ignored, despite being deployed in sensitive applications such as law enforcement. This is an unfortunate omission, as 'imbalance' is a more complex matter in identification; imbalance may arise in not only the training data, but also the testing data, and furthermore may affect the proportion of identities belonging to each demographic group *or* the number of images belonging to each identity. In this work, we address this gap in the research by thoroughly exploring the effects of each kind of imbalance possible in face identification, and discuss other factors which may impact bias in this setting.

KEYWORDS

data imbalance, neural networks, fairness, face recognition

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1 INTRODUCTION

Automated face recognition is becoming increasingly prevalent in modern life, with applications ranging from improving user experience (such as automatic face-tagging of photos) to security (e.g., phone unlocking or crime suspect identification). While these advances are impressive achievements, decades of research have demonstrated disparate performance in FR systems depending on a subject's race [4, 32], gender presentation [1, 2], age [23], and other factors. This is especially concerning for FR systems deployed in sensitive applications like law enforcement; incorrectly tagging a personal photo may be a mild inconvenience, but incorrectly identifying the subject of a surveillance image could have life-changing consequences. Accordingly, media and public scrutiny of bias in these systems has increased, in some cases resulting in policy changes.

One major source of model bias is dataset imbalance; disparities in rates of representation of different groups in the dataset. Modern FR systems employ neural networks trained on large datasets, so naturally much contemporary work focuses on what aspects of the training data may contribute to unequal performance across demographic groups. Some potential sources that have been studied include imbalance of the proportion of data belonging to each group [17, 41], low-quality or poorly annotated images [13], and confounding variables entangled with group membership [1, 23, 24].

Dataset imbalance is a much more complex and nuanced issue than it may seem at first blush. While a naive conception of 'dataset imbalance' is simply as a disparity in the *number* of images per



Figure 1: Examples of imbalance in face identification. Top left: data containing more female identities than male identities. Top right: data containing the same number of male and female identities, but more images per male identity. Bottom: two possible test (gallery) sets showing how the effects of different kinds of imbalance may interact.

group, this disparity can manifest itself as either a gap in the number of identities per group, or in the number of images per identity. Furthermore, dataset imbalance can be present in different ways in both the training and testing data, and these two source of imbalance can have radically different (and often opposite) effects on downstream model bias.

Past work has only considered the *verification* setting of FR, where testing consists of determining whether a pair of images belongs to the same identity. As such, 'imbalance' between demographic groups is not a meaningful concept in the test data. Furthermore, the distinction between imbalance of identities belonging to a certain demographic group versus that of images per identity in each demographic group has not been carefully studied in either the testing or the training data. All of these facets of imbalance are present in the face *identification* setting, where testing involves matching a probe image to a gallery of many identities, each of which contains multiple images. We illustrate this in Figure 1.

In this work, we unravel the complex effects that dataset imbalance can have on model bias for face identification systems. We separately consider imbalance (both in terms of identities or images per identity) in the train set and in the test set. We also consider the realistic social use case in which a large dataset is collected from an imbalanced population and then split at random, resulting in similar dataset imbalance in both the train and test set. We specifically focus on imbalance with respect to gender presentation, as (when restricting to only male- and female-identified individuals) this allows the proportion of data in each group to be tuned as a single parameter, as well as the availability of an ethically obtained identification dataset with gender presentation metadata of sufficient size to allow for subsampling without significantly degrading overall performance.

Our findings show that each type of imbalance has a distinct effect on a model's performance on each gender presentation. Furthermore, in the realistic scenario where the train and test set are similarly imbalanced, the train and test imbalance have the potential to interact in a way that leads to systematic underestimation of the true bias of a model during an audit. Thus any audit of model bias in face identification must carefully control for these effects.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses related work, and Section 3 introduces the problem and experimental setup. Sections 4 and 5 give experimental results related to imbalance in the training set and test set, respectively, and Section 6 gives results for experiments where the imbalance in the training set and test set are identical. In Section 7.1, we evaluate randomly initialized feature extractors on test sets with various levels of imbalance to further isolate the effects of this imbalance from the effects of training. In Section 7.2, we investigate the correlation between the performance of models trained with various levels of imbalance and human performance.

2 RELATED WORK

2.1 Imbalance in verification

Even before the advent of neural network-based face recognition systems, researchers have studied how the composition of training data affects verification performance Phillips et al. [32] compared algorithms from the Face Recognition Vendor Test [33] and found that those developed in East Asia performed better on East Asian Faces, and those developed in Western countries performed better on Caucasian faces Klare et al. [23] expanded on these results by comparing performance across race, gender presentation, and age cohorts, observing that training exclusively on images of one demographic group improved performance on that group and decreased performance on the others. They further conclude that training on data that is "well distributed across all demographics" helps prevent extreme bias.

Multiple verification datasets have been proposed in the interest of eliminating imbalance as a source of bias in face verification. The *BUPT-BalancedFace* dataset [41] contains an approximately equal number of identities and images of four racial groups[1]. *Balanced Faces in the Wild* [35] goes a step further, balancing identities and

[1]This work also introduces *BUPT-GlobalFace*, which instead approximately matches the distribution across races to that of the world population.

images across eight categories of race-gender presentation combinations. Also of note is the *BUPT-CBFace* dataset [43], which is class-balanced (each identity possesses the same number of images), rather than demographically balanced.

Some recent work in verification has questioned whether perfectly balanced training data is in fact an optimal setting for reducing bias Albiero et al. [1] studied sources of bias along gender presentation; among their findings, they observe that balancing the amount of male and female training images and identities in the training data reduces, but does not eliminate, the performance gap between gender presentations. Similarly, [17] trained models on data with different racial makeups, finding that models which were trained with more images of African subjects had lower variance in performance on each race than those which were trained on balanced data.

2.2 Bias in Identification

Although the effect of imbalance on bias has only been explicitly studied in face verification, there is some research on identification which is relevant. The National Institutes of Standards and Technology performed large-scale testing of commercial identification algorithms, finding that many (though not all) exhibit gender presentation or racial bias [16]. The evaluators speculate that the training data or procedures contribute to this bias, but could not study this hypothesis due to the proprietary nature of the models. [13] evaluated commercial and academic models on a variant of identification in which each probe image is compared to 9 gallery images of distinct identities, but belonging to the same skin type and gender presentation. They find that academic models (and some, but not all, commercial models) exhibit skin type and gender presentation bias despite a testing regime which makes imbalance effectively irrelevant.

2.3 Imbalance in Deep Learning

Outside the realm of facial recognition, there is much study about the impacts of class imbalance in deep learning. In standard machine learning techniques, i.e., non-deep learning, there are many well-studied and proven techniques for handling class imbalances like data-level techniques [5, 6, 39], algorithm-level methods [15, 25, 28], and hybrid approaches [7, 29, 37]. In deep learning, some take the approach of random over or under sampling [19, 26, 34]. Other methods adjust the learning procedure by changing the loss function [42] or learning cost-sensitive functions for imbalanced data [22]. We refer the reader to [3, 21], for a thorough review of deep learning-based imbalance literature. Much of the class-imbalance work has been on computer vision tasks, though generally has not examined specific analyses like we present in this work like network initialization, face identification, or intersectional demographic imbalances.

2.4 Other sources of bias in facial recognition

Face recognition is a complex, sociotechnical system where biases can originate from the algorithms [11], preprocessing steps [14], and human interpretations [9]. While we do not explicitly examine these sources, we refer the reader to [31, 38] for a broader overview of sources of bias in machine learning.

3 FACE IDENTIFICATION SETUP

Face recognition has two tasks: face verification and face identification. The first refers to verifying whether a person of interest (called the *probe image*) and a person in a reference photo are the same. This is the setting that might be applied, e.g., to phone unlocking or other identity confirmation. In contrast, face identification involves matching a probe image against a set of images (called the *gallery*) with known identities. This application is relevant to search tasks, such as identifying the subject of a photo from a database of driver's license or mugshot photos.

In a standard face recognition pipeline, an image is generally first pre-processed by a face detection system which may serve to locate and align target faces to provide more standardized images to the recognition model. State-of-the-art face recognition models exploit deep neural networks which are trained on large-scale face datasets for a classification task. At test time, the models work as feature extractors, so that the similarity between a probe image and reference photo (in verification) or gallery photos (in identification) is computed in the feature space. In verification, the similarity score is then compared with a predefined threshold, while in identification a k-nearest neighbors search is performed using the similarity scores with the gallery images.

We focus on the face identification task in our experiments and explore how different kinds of data balance affect the models performance across demographic groups (specifically, the disparity in performance on male and female targets). We also analyze how algorithmic bias correlates with human bias on InterRace, a manually curated dataset specifically designed for bias auditing, with challenging face recognition questions and provided annotations for gender presentation and skin color [13].

Our experiments use state-of-the-art face recognition models. We train MobileFaceNet [8], ResNet-50, and ResNet-152 [18] feature extractors each with a CosFace and ArcFace head which improve the class separability of the features by adding angular margin during training [12, 40]. For training and evaluation we use the CelebA dataset [30], which provides annotations for gender presentation. As our main research questions focus on the impact of class imbalance, we pay special attention to the balance of the gender presentation attribute in our training. The original dataset contains more female identities. As such, we create a balanced training set containing 140,000 images from 7,934 identities with equal number of identities and total number of images from each gender presentation. We also create a perfectly balanced test set containing 14,000 images from 812 identities. The identities in the train and test sets are disjoint. We call these the *default train* and *default test* sets. All models are trained with class-balanced sampling to ensure equal contribution of identities to the loss. We additionally include results for models trained without over-sampling in Appendix A.5.

Recall that our research question is to investigate how class imbalances affect face identification. In order to answer this question, we train models on a range of deliberately imbalanced subsamples of the default training set, and test models on a range of deliberately imbalanced subsamples of the default test set, in order to explore the impact on the model's performance for each gender presentation.

To evaluate the models, we compute rank-1 accuracy over the test set. Specifically, for each test image we treat the rest of the



Figure 2: Train Set Imbalance. Results of experiments that change the train set gender presentation balance. Top row: male and female accuracy are plotted against the proportion of male data in the train set. Bottom row: for an alternate view, female accuracy is flipped horizontally, so that it is plotted against the proportion of *female* data in the train set. All models are tested on the default balanced test set.

test set as gallery images and find if the closest gallery image in the feature space (as defined by cosine similarity) of a model is an image of the same person.

When we make comparisons with human performance (Section 7.2), we use the InterRace dataset [13]. Since the InterRace dataset is derived from both the CelebA and LFW [20] datasets, we additionally train models on the InterRace-train split of CelebA, containing images of identities not included in the InterRace dataset. Similar to other experiments, we train models with varying levels of either identity and image imbalance.

4 BALANCE IN THE TRAIN SET

4.1 Balancing the number of identities

Experiment Description. To explore the effect of train set balance in the number of identities on gender presentation bias, we construct train data splits with different ratios of female and male identities, while ensuring that the average number of images per identity is the same across gender presentations. Therefore, in all splits we have the same total number of images and total number of identities, but the proportion of female and male identities varies. We consider splits with $0:10$, $1:9$, $2:8$, ..., $10:0$ ratios, each having 70,000 total images from 3967 identities. We evaluate the models on the (perfectly balanced) default test set and report rank-1 face identification accuracy as described in Section 3. More details of train set splits can be found in Table 1.

Results. We compute accuracy scores separately for male and female test images for models trained on each of the train splits and depict them in Figure 2 with solid lines. From the first row plots, we observe that a higher proportion of male identities in the train set leads to an increase in male accuracy and decrease in female accuracy, with the most significant drops occurring near the extreme $10:0$ imbalance. This indicates that it is very important to have at least a few identities from the target demographic group in the train set; once the representation of the minority group reaches 10%, the marginal gain of additional identities becomes less. We also observe that for most models, the female accuracy drops slightly when the proportion of female identities exceeds 80% of the training data, which does not happen to the male group. Consult Table 2 for the numerical results.

Regarding the model architectures, MobileFaceNet models trained with both CosFace and ArcFace heads outperform ResNet models on both female and male images and have smaller absolute accuracy gap. However, the error ratio is similar across the models, see Table 2. Finally, the accuracy gap is closed for all models when the train set consists of about 10% male and 90% female identities.

In addition, in the second row of Figure 2 we compare how similar these trends are for females and males by plotting female accuracy against the proportion of *female* identities in the train set. One can see that for MobileFaceNet models the accuracy on male and female images increases similarly when increasing the proportion of "target" identities up to 80%. However, for ResNet models adding more female identities in the train set results in smaller gains compared to the effect of adding more male identities on male accuracy.

4.2 Balancing the number of images per identity

In the previous subsection, we fixed the average number of images per identity in each gender presentation and adjusted the number of identities. We now will do the reverse: fix the number of identities and vary the images per identity.

Experiment Description. We change the average number of images per male and female identity, but fix the number of identities of each gender presentation. We consider ratios $2:8$, ..., $8:2$, each

Figure 3: Test Set Imbalance. Results of experiments that change the test set gender presentation balance. Top row: male and female accuracy are plotted against the proportion of male data in the test set. Bottom row: for an alternate view, female accuracy is flipped horizontally, so that it is plotted against the proportion of *female* data in the test set. All models are trained on the default balanced train set. For each experiment, the test set was split with 5 random seeds, and the results are averaged across seeds.

having 70,000 images from 7,934 identities. We do not consider more extreme ratios, which would result in identities with fewer than 3 images.

Results. The dashed lines in Figure 2 illustrate the accuracy of the models trained on described data splits. From the first row plots we see that, similar to the previous experiment, increasing the number of male images in the train set leads to increased accuracy on male and decreased accuracy on female images. Interestingly, we observe a decrease in performance for both demographic groups when the images of that group constitute more than 60% of train data; this is most easily visible in the second row of Figure 2. However, we find that this effect results from the widely used class-balanced sampling training strategy, and models trained without the default oversampling are more robust to imbalance in the number of images per identity, see details in Section A.5 and Figure 8. The "fair point" where female accuracy is closest to male accuracy occurs when around 20% of images are of males.

When comparing the effect of imbalance in the number of identities and the number of images per identity (solid and dashed lines respectively in Figure 2), we see that ResNet models are more susceptible to image imbalance than to identity imbalance, which is also a phenomenon specific to the common class-balanced sampling.

5 BALANCE IN THE TEST SET

5.1 Balancing the number of identities

Experiment Description. Analogous to the train set experiments, we split the test data (the gallery) with different ratios of female and male identities, while keeping the same average number of images per identity for both demographic groups. For each ratio, we split the test data with 5 random seeds and report average rank-1 accuracy of the models trained on default train data. The results are shown in the solid lines of Figure 3, as well as in Table 4.

Results. We observe that increasing the proportion of identities of a target demographic group in the test set hurts the model's performance on that demographic group, and this trend is similar for male and female images. Intuitively, this is because face recognition models rarely match images to one of a different demographic group; therefore by adding more identities of a particular demographic group, we add more potential false matches for images from that demographic group, which leads to higher error rates. We also see that ResNet models are more sensitive to the number of identities in the gallery set than MobileFaceNet models.

5.2 Balancing the number of images per identity

Experiment Description. Now, we investigate how increasing or decreasing the number of images per identity affects the performance and bias of the models. Again, we split the test sets with different ratios of total number of images across gender presentations, but same number of identities, each with 5 random seeds. These results are recorded as dashed lines in Figure 3, as well as in Table 5.

Results. Unlike the results with identity balance, increasing the average number of images per identity leads to performance gains, since this increases the probability of a match with an image of the same person. Also, image balance affects the performance more significantly than identity balance, and these trends are similar across all the models and both gender presentations. Finally, we note that the "fair point" for image balance in the test set occurs



Figure 4: Train & Test Set Imbalance. Results of experiments that adjust the gender presentation balance in both the train and test set. Top row: male and female accuracy are plotted against the proportion of male data used in both the train and test set. Bottom row: for an alternate view, female accuracy is flipped horizontally, so that it is plotted against the proportion of *female* data in both the train and test set. For each experiment, the test set was split with 5 random seeds, and the results are averaged across seeds.

at about 30% male images; contrast this with identity balance, for which no fair point appears to exist.

6 A CAUTIONARY TALE: MATCHING THE BALANCE IN THE TRAIN AND GALLERY DATA

Using our findings from above, we conclude that common machine learning techniques to create train and test splits can lead to Simpson's paradoxes which lead to a false belief that a model is unbiased. It is standard practice to make random train/test splits of a dataset. If the original dataset is imbalanced, as is commonly the case, the resulting splits will be imbalanced in similar ways. As we have seen above, the effects of imbalance in the train and test splits may oppose one another, causing severe underestimation of model bias when measured using the test split. This occurs because the minority status of a group in the train split will bias the model towards low accuracy on that group, while the correspondingly small representation in the test split will cause an increase in model accuracy, partially or entirely masking the true model bias. The results for these experiments are presented in Figure 4 and Tables 6, 7.

Balancing the number of identities We create train and test sets with identical distributions of identities. Recalling the results from prior experiments, increasing the number of identities for the target group in the training stage improves accuracy on that group, while adding more identities in the gallery degrades it. Interestingly, when we increase the proportion of male identities in *both* train and test sets, we observe gains in both male and female accuracy, and that trend is especially strong for ResNet models.

Balancing the number of images per identity Having more images is beneficial in both train and test stages. Therefore, the effect of image balance is amplified when both train and test sets are imbalanced in a similar way. Similar to the train set experiments, having more than 70% female images in both train and test sets leads to slight drops in female accuracy on ResNet models, which again is a result of the default class-balanced oversampling strategy.

7 BIAS COMPARISONS

We ask two concluding questions: one about whether class imbalance captures all the inherent bias and the other about how the bias we see compares to human biases. First, we explore how data imbalances cause biases in random networks and find surprising conclusions. Then, we ask how class imbalances in machines compare to how humans exhibit bias on face identification tasks.

7.1 Bias in random feature extractors

Given a network with random initializations, we would expect that evaluation on a balanced test set would result in equal performance on males and females, and likewise that male performance on a set with a particular proportion of male identities would be the same as female performance when that proportion is reversed. However, this is not the case. We test randomly initialized feature extractors on galleries with varying levels of image imbalance. Figure 5 summarizes the results of these experiments. We observe that both models have higher male performance when the test set is perfectly balanced, and that performance on males is higher when they make up 80% of the test set than female performance when they make up 80% of the test set. This provides strong evidence



Figure 5: Random Feature Extractors. The plot illustrates male (blue) and female (orange) accuracy of random feature extractors against the proportion of male images in the test set. The standard deviation is computed across 10 random initializations.



Figure 6: Pearson correlation of $L2$ ratio vs. human accuracy for various models as proportion of male training data varies.

that there are sources of bias that lie outside what we explore here and which are potential confounders to a thorough study of bias in face identification; further work on this is warranted.

7.2 Are models biased like humans?

Numerous psychological and sociological studies have identified gender, racial, and other biases in human performance on face recognition tasks. [13] studied whether humans and FR models exhibit similar biases. They evaluated human and machine performance on the curated InterRace test questions, and found models indeed tend to perform better on the same groups as, and with comparable gender presentation bias ratios to, humans. In this section, we use their human survey data to explore two related questions: how correlated are model and human performance *at the question level*, and how does this change with different levels of imbalance in training data?

To answer these questions, we define a metric which allows us to distinguish how well a model performs on each InterRace identification question. Let

$$L_2 \text{ ratio} = \frac{\|v_{probe} - v_{false}\|_2}{\|v_{probe} - v_{true}\|_2 + \|v_{probe} - v_{false}\|_2},$$

where v_{probe}, v_{true}, v_{false} are the feature representations of the probe image, the correct gallery image, and the nearest incorrect gallery image, respectively.[2] This value is 1 when the probe and correct image's representations coincide, 0 when the probe and incorrect image's representations coincide and 0.5 when the probe's representation is equidistant from those of the correct and incorrect image. Figure 7 depicts examples of scatterplots comparing model confidence to human accuracy on each InterRace question.

Figure 6 shows the correlation between $L2$ ratio and human performance for various models at each of the training imbalance settings that we have considered in earlier experiments. We see that the correlation between these values over *all* questions tends to rise as the proportion of male training data increases. However, the correlation when separately considering male and female questions does not rise as monotonically, or as much, from left to right as the overall correlation does. This suggests that the correlation between human and machine performance is largely driven by the fact that models and humans both find identifying females more difficult than identifying males, and that this disparity is exacerbated when the model in question is trained on male-dominated data. On the other hand, the *particular* males and females that are easier or harder to identify appear to differ between models and humans, which suggests the *reasons* for bias in humans and machines are different.

8 ACTIONABLE INSIGHTS

We note five actionable insights for machine learning engineers and other researchers from this work. First, **overrepresenting the target demographic group can sometimes hurt that group**. Sometimes having more balanced data is the key. Also, class-balanced sampling might hurt representation learning when the data is not balanced with respect to the number of images per identity. Second, **gallery set balance is as important as train set balance**, contrary to how face verification class imbalances work. Third, **having the same distribution of identities and average number of images per identity is not an unbiased way to evaluate a model**,

[2]We note that other measures of confidence in a k-nearest neighbors setting, such as those discussed in [10], are inappropriate for this application.

since the effects of balance in train and test sets can be amplified (in case of images) or cancel each other (in case of identities). Fourth, **train and test class imbalances are not the only cause of bias** in face identification evaluation since even random models do not perform equally poorly on female and male images. Finally, even though both humans and machine find female images more difficult to recognize, **it seems that the reasons for bias are different in people and models**. We know that this work sheds light on common mistakes in bias computations for many facial recognition tasks and hope that auditors and engineers will incorporate our insights into their methods.

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A APPENDIX

A.1 Broader impact and limitations

In this work we explore the effects of various forms of data imbalance on bias in face identification, and we hope that practitioners will take our findings into account when performing bias auditing. However, it is important to understand that biases can originate from various sources besides data imbalance and therefore models should be carefully evaluated for other bias factors.

The availability of high quality datasets, which are suitable for the identification task (as opposed to verification), have demographic metadata/annotation for both train and test sets, and contain enough identities and images belonging to each demographic group to allow for subsampling, is extremely limited. For this reason we focus solely on gender bias and leverage CelebA dataset, which meets these criteria. Also, using a binary demographic attribute (such as gender, when restricting only to male- and female-presenting identities) allows the proportion of data in each group to be conveniently tuned as a single parameter, which in turn makes interpreting results more straightforward.

A.1.1 Details on CelebA. CelebA is a publicly available dataset, which is constructed from CelebFaces dataset [36] and contains face images collected from the Internet.

A.2 Training details

We pre-process CelebA images by aligning them using the provided facial landmarks and cropping to 112x112 size. All face recognition models are trained with Focal loss [27] using SGD for 100 epochs with learning rate of 0.1, momentum of 0.9 and weight decay of 5e-4. The learning rate is reduced by 10 times at epochs 35, 65 and 95. Horizontal flip data augmentation is used during training. For the model architectures, we use implementation from publicly available github repository `face.evoLVe.PyTorch`[3]. We run our experiments on NVIDIA GeForce RTX 2080 Ti machines and each experiment takes from 6 to 12 hours of compute time on one GPU.

A.3 Experimental details

A.4 Model vs. human scatterplots

Figure 7 shows two example scatterplots comparing model L2 ratio (our proxy for confidence defined in section 7.2) against human accuracy on each question in the InterRace identification dataset [13].

A.5 Results for models trained without class-balanced sampling.

To explore the effect of class-balanced sampling on the results of our experiments, we train additional models without any oversampling strategies. Figures 8 - 10 show results of our experiments for MobileFaceNet and ResNet-152 models trained without oversampling. We find that most trends are similar to ones observed in the models trained with class-balanced sampling, however models trained without oversampling are more robust to balance in the number of images per identity, see Figure 8. In particular, the effect of balancing the number of images (dashed lines) is similar to the effect of balancing the number of identities (solid lines) for all models, but ResNet-152 trained with ArcFace head. This leads us to a conclusion that using class-balanced sampling strategy is not beneficial in scenarios of severe imbalance in number of images per identity in face recognition models.

[3]https://github.com/ZhaoJ9014/face.evoLVe



Figure 7: Scatterplots of model L2 ratio vs. human accuracy on each question in the InterRace identification dataset. Both models are MobileFaceNets trained with CosFace loss. (Left) a model trained on exclusively female images. (Right) a model trained on exclusively male images.

A.6 Additional Plots and Tables

Figures 11 - 14 supplement those in sections 5 - 6. Figure 11 shows the results of the train set imbalance experiment when evaluated on the InterRace test set. Figures 12 - 14 show results for ResNet-50 (with ResNet-152 results shown again for comparison). Tables 2 - 7 precisely detail the number of male and female identities and images used in each experiment, as well as the accuracy on male and female targets and the female-to-male error ratio.



Figure 8: Train Set Imbalance. Results of experiments that change the train set gender presentation balance for MobileFaceNet and ResNet-152 models trained without class-balanced sampling. Top row: male and female accuracy are plotted against the proportion of male data in the train set. Bottom row: for an alternate view, female accuracy is flipped horizontally, so that it is plotted against the proportion of *female* data in the train set. All models are evaluated on the default balanced test set.



Figure 9: Test Set Imbalance. Results of experiments that change the test set gender presentation balance for MobileFaceNet and ResNet-152 models trained without class-balanced sampling. Top row: male and female accuracy are plotted against the proportion of male data in the test set. Bottom row: for an alternate view, female accuracy is flipped horizontally, so that it is plotted against the proportion of *female* data in the test set. All models are trained on the default balanced train set. For each experiment, the test set was split with 5 random seeds, and the results are averaged across seeds.

Table 1: Details on the number of identities, total number of images and average number of images per identity used in experiments with train and test data balance. We also report statistics for the default train and test sets. M denotes male, F denotes female.

Setting	M ids	F ids	Total M imgs	Total F imgs	M imgs/id	F imgs/id	Total ids	Total imgs
Train default	3967	3967	70k	70k	17.65	17.65	7934	140k
Train id balance	0 - 3967	0 - 3967	0 - 70k	0 - 70k	17.65	17.65	3967	70k
Train img balance	3967	3967	14k - 56k	14k - 56k	3.53 - 14.11	3.53 - 14.11	7934	70k
Test default	406	406	7k	7k	17.24	17.24	812	14k
Test id balance	0 - 406	0 - 406	0 - 7k	0 - 7k	17.24	17.24	406	7k
Test img balance	406	406	1.4k - 5.6k	1.4k - 5.6k	3.45 - 13.80	3.45 - 13.80	812	7k



Figure 10: Train & Test Set Imbalance. Results of experiments that adjust the gender presentation balance in both the train and test set for MobileFaceNet and ResNet-152 models trained without class-balanced sampling. Top row: male and female accuracy are plotted against the proportion of male data used in both the train and test set. Bottom row: for an alternate view, female accuracy is flipped horizontally, so that it is plotted against the proportion of *female* data in both the train and test set. For each experiment, the test set was split with 5 random seeds, and the results are averaged across seeds.



Figure 11: Train Set Imbalance. Results of experiments testing models trained with different gender presentation balance on the InterRace dataset. These plots are analogous to the first row of Figures 2 and 12.

Figure 12: Train Set Imbalance. Results of experiments that change the train set gender presentation balance for ResNet-152 and ResNet-50 models. Top row: male and female accuracy are plotted against the proportion of male data in the train set. Bottom row: for an alternate view, female accuracy is flipped horizontally, so that it is plotted against the proportion of *female* data in the train set. All models are evaluated on the default balanced test set. Cf. Figure 2.

Figure 13: Test Set Imbalance. Results of experiments that change the test set gender presentation balance for ResNet-152 and ResNet-50 models. Top row: male and female accuracy are plotted against the proportion of male data in the test set. Bottom row: for an alternate view, female accuracy is flipped horizontally, so that it is plotted against the proportion of *female* data in the test set. All models are trained on the default balanced train set. For each experiment, the test set was split with 5 random seeds, and the results are averaged across seeds. Cf. Figure 3.



Figure 14: Train & Test Set Imbalance. Results of experiments that adjust the gender presentation balance in both the train and test set for ResNet-152 and ResNet-50 models. Top row: male and female accuracy are plotted against the proportion of male data used in both the train and test set. Bottom row: for an alternate view, female accuracy is flipped horizontally, so that it is plotted against the proportion of *female* data in both the train and test set. For each experiment, the test set was split with 5 random seeds, and the results are averaged across seeds. Cf. Figure 4.

Table 2: Train Set Id Imbalance. The female and male accuracy computed over the default balanced test set for models trained on data with various ratios of number of male and female identities. See details of the experiment in Section 4.1

Model	Ids Ratio	M ids	F ids	M imgs	F imgs	M acc	F acc	Error Ratio
MFN CosFace	0 : 10	0	3967	0	70k	0.918	0.938	0.76
	1 : 9	397	3570	7k	63k	0.941	0.939	1.03
	2 : 8	793	3174	14k	56k	0.946	0.941	1.09
	3 : 7	1190	2777	21k	49k	0.952	0.942	1.21
	4 : 6	1587	2380	28k	42k	0.958	0.940	1.43
	5 : 5	1984	1984	35k	35k	0.961	0.940	1.54
	6 : 4	2380	1587	42k	28k	0.964	0.936	1.78
	7 : 3	2777	1190	49k	21k	0.965	0.935	1.86
	8 : 2	3174	793	56k	14k	0.964	0.928	2.00
	9 : 1	3570	397	63k	7k	0.968	0.924	2.37
	10 : 0	3967	0	70k	0	0.968	0.887	3.53
MFN ArcFace	0 : 10	0	3967	0	70k	0.911	0.937	0.71
	1 : 9	397	3570	7k	63k	0.937	0.940	0.95
	2 : 8	793	3174	14k	56k	0.948	0.939	1.17
	3 : 7	1190	2777	21k	49k	0.952	0.939	1.27
	4 : 6	1587	2380	28k	42k	0.953	0.941	1.26
	5 : 5	1984	1984	35k	35k	0.958	0.937	1.50
	6 : 4	2380	1587	42k	28k	0.965	0.937	1.80
	7 : 3	2777	1190	49k	21k	0.963	0.934	1.78
	8 : 2	3174	793	56k	14k	0.966	0.925	2.21
	9 : 1	3570	397	63k	7k	0.966	0.914	2.53
	10 : 0	3967	0	70k	0	0.966	0.886	3.35
ResNet-152 CosFace	0 : 10	0	3967	0	70k	0.854	0.887	0.77
	1 : 9	397	3570	7k	63k	0.902	0.894	1.08
	2 : 8	793	3174	14k	56k	0.918	0.896	1.27
	3 : 7	1190	2777	21k	49k	0.927	0.894	1.45
	4 : 6	1587	2380	28k	42k	0.931	0.892	1.57
	5 : 5	1984	1984	35k	35k	0.936	0.897	1.61
	6 : 4	2380	1587	42k	28k	0.944	0.893	1.91
	7 : 3	2777	1190	49k	21k	0.949	0.889	2.18
	8 : 2	3174	793	56k	14k	0.951	0.886	2.33
	9 : 1	3570	397	63k	7k	0.951	0.872	2.61
	10 : 0	3967	0	70k	0	0.952	0.822	3.71
ResNet-152 ArcFace	0 : 10	0	3967	0	70k	0.803	0.868	0.67
	1 : 9	397	3570	7k	63k	0.856	0.860	0.97
	2 : 8	793	3174	14k	56k	0.885	0.866	1.17
	3 : 7	1190	2777	21k	49k	0.897	0.859	1.37
	4 : 6	1587	2380	28k	42k	0.908	0.857	1.55
	5 : 5	1984	1984	35k	35k	0.913	0.863	1.57
	6 : 4	2380	1587	42k	28k	0.920	0.850	1.88
	7 : 3	2777	1190	49k	21k	0.928	0.853	2.04
	8 : 2	3174	793	56k	14k	0.932	0.832	2.47
	9 : 1	3570	397	63k	7k	0.931	0.814	2.70
	10 : 0	3967	0	70k	0	0.937	0.748	4.00
ResNet-50 CosFace	0 : 10	0	3967	0	70	0.828	0.873	0.74
	1 : 9	397	3570	7	63	0.881	0.876	1.04
	2 : 8	793	3174	14	56	0.897	0.877	1.19
	3 : 7	1190	2777	21	49	0.910	0.879	1.34
	4 : 6	1587	2380	28	42	0.917	0.881	1.43
	5 : 5	1984	1984	35	35	0.927	0.880	1.64
	6 : 4	2380	1587	42	28	0.934	0.878	1.85
	7 : 3	2777	1190	49	21	0.931	0.868	1.91
	8 : 2	3174	793	56	14	0.938	0.868	2.13
	1 : 9	3570	397	63	7	0.944	0.853	2.63
	0 : 10	3967	0	70	0	0.940	0.807	3.22
ResNet-50 ArcFace	0 : 10	0	3967	0	70	0.773	0.846	0.68
	1 : 9	397	3570	7	63	0.836	0.852	0.90
	2 : 8	793	3174	14	56	0.871	0.854	1.13
	3 : 7	1190	2777	21	49	0.881	0.847	1.29
	4 : 6	1587	2380	28	42	0.893	0.845	1.45
	5 : 5	1984	1984	35	35	0.897	0.845	1.50
	6 : 4	2380	1587	42	28	0.913	0.843	1.80
	7 : 3	2777	1190	49	21	0.917	0.834	2.00
	8 : 2	3174	793	56	14	0.924	0.823	2.33
	1 : 9	3570	397	63	7	0.926	0.797	2.74
	0 : 10	3967	0	70	0	0.927	0.734	3.64

Table 3: Train Set Img Imbalance. The female and male accuracy computed over the default balanced test set for models trained on data with various ratios of number of images per male and female identity. See details of the experiment in Section 4.2

Model	Img Ratio	# M ids	# F ids	# M imgs	# F imgs	M Acc	F Acc	Error Ratio
MFN CosFace	2 : 8	3967	3967	14k	56k	0.932	0.927	1.07
	3 : 7	3967	3967	21k	49k	0.949	0.931	1.35
	4 : 6	3967	3967	28k	42k	0.955	0.931	1.53
	5 : 5	3967	3967	35k	35k	0.956	0.930	1.59
	6 : 4	3967	3967	42k	28k	0.959	0.929	1.73
	7 : 3	3967	3967	49k	21k	0.957	0.918	1.91
	8 : 2	3967	3967	56k	14k	0.957	0.892	2.51
MFN ArcFace	2 : 8	3967	3967	14k	56k	0.944	0.937	1.13
	3 : 7	3967	3967	21k	49k	0.953	0.939	1.30
	4 : 6	3967	3967	28k	42k	0.962	0.940	1.58
	5 : 5	3967	3967	35k	35k	0.962	0.939	1.61
	6 : 4	3967	3967	42k	28k	0.963	0.937	1.70
	7 : 3	3967	3967	49k	21k	0.961	0.929	1.82
	8 : 2	3967	3967	56k	14k	0.960	0.914	2.15
ResNet-152 CosFace	2 : 8	3967	3967	14k	56k	0.855	0.868	0.91
	3 : 7	3967	3967	21k	49k	0.908	0.886	1.24
	4 : 6	3967	3967	28k	42k	0.923	0.890	1.43
	5 : 5	3967	3967	35k	35k	0.935	0.888	1.72
	6 : 4	3967	3967	42k	28k	0.934	0.862	2.09
	7 : 3	3967	3967	49k	21k	0.931	0.824	2.55
	8 : 2	3967	3967	56k	14k	0.928	0.753	3.43
ResNet-152 ArcFace	2 : 8	3967	3967	14k	56k	0.839	0.851	0.93
	3 : 7	3967	3967	21k	49k	0.899	0.873	1.26
	4 : 6	3967	3967	28k	42k	0.916	0.881	1.42
	5 : 5	3967	3967	35k	35k	0.924	0.873	1.67
	6 : 4	3967	3967	42k	28k	0.928	0.856	2.00
	7 : 3	3967	3967	49k	21k	0.925	0.823	2.36
	8 : 2	3967	3967	56k	14k	0.922	0.748	3.23
ResNet-50 CosFace	2 : 8	3967	3967	14k	56k	0.829	0.845	0.91
	3 : 7	3967	3967	21k	49k	0.879	0.858	1.17
	4 : 6	3967	3967	28k	42k	0.909	0.870	1.43
	5 : 5	3967	3967	35k	35k	0.917	0.864	1.64
	6 : 4	3967	3967	42k	28k	0.920	0.844	1.95
	7 : 3	3967	3967	49k	21k	0.922	0.817	2.35
	8 : 2	3967	3967	56k	14k	0.914	0.722	3.23
ResNet-50 ArcFace	2 : 8	3967	3967	14k	56k	0.808	0.823	0.92
	3 : 7	3967	3967	21k	49k	0.875	0.845	1.24
	4 : 6	3967	3967	28k	42k	0.900	0.853	1.47
	5 : 5	3967	3967	35k	35k	0.916	0.853	1.75
	6 : 4	3967	3967	42k	28k	0.915	0.837	1.92
	7 : 3	3967	3967	49k	21k	0.917	0.798	2.43
	8 : 2	3967	3967	56k	14k	0.909	0.717	3.11

Table 4: Test Set Id Imbalance. The female and male accuracy for models trained on default train set computed on test set with various ratios of number of male and female identities. See details of experiment in Section 5.1.

Model	Ids Ratio	# M ids	# F ids	# M imgs	# F imgs	M Acc	F Acc	Error Ratio
MFN CosFace	0 : 10	0	406	0	7000	-	0.961	-
	1 : 9	41	365	700	6300	0.983	0.961	2.25
	2 : 8	81	325	1400	5600	0.981	0.960	2.04
	3 : 7	122	284	2100	4900	0.981	0.960	2.09
	4 : 6	162	244	2800	4200	0.981	0.962	2.00
	5 : 5	203	203	3500	3500	0.980	0.961	1.95
	6 : 4	244	162	4200	2800	0.980	0.963	1.83
	7 : 3	284	122	4900	2100	0.979	0.964	1.77
	8 : 2	325	81	5600	1400	0.979	0.969	1.45
	1 : 9	365	41	6300	700	0.978	0.962	1.72
	0 : 10	406	0	7000	0	0.978	-	-
MFN ArcFace	0 : 10	0	406	0	7000	-	0.959	-
	1 : 9	41	365	700	6300	0.980	0.959	2.07
	2 : 8	81	325	1400	5600	0.980	0.960	1.98
	3 : 7	122	284	2100	4900	0.981	0.958	2.17
	4 : 6	162	244	2800	4200	0.981	0.960	2.05
	5 : 5	203	203	3500	3500	0.979	0.961	1.89
	6 : 4	244	162	4200	2800	0.979	0.963	1.81
	7 : 3	284	122	4900	2100	0.979	0.962	1.84
	8 : 2	325	81	5600	1400	0.979	0.968	1.50
	1 : 9	365	41	6300	700	0.977	0.963	1.58
	0 : 10	406	0	7000	0	0.978	-	-
ResNet-152 CosFace	0 : 10	0	406	0	7000	-	0.944	-
	1 : 9	41	365	700	6300	0.981	0.943	2.94
	2 : 8	81	325	1400	5600	0.979	0.945	2.58
	3 : 7	122	284	2100	4900	0.977	0.946	2.37
	4 : 6	162	244	2800	4200	0.977	0.947	2.28
	5 : 5	203	203	3500	3500	0.974	0.947	2.01
	6 : 4	244	162	4200	2800	0.974	0.949	1.99
	7 : 3	284	122	4900	2100	0.974	0.952	1.87
	8 : 2	325	81	5600	1400	0.973	0.957	1.59
	1 : 9	365	41	6300	700	0.971	0.958	1.47
	0 : 10	406	0	7000	0	0.971	-	-
ResNet-152 ArcFace	0 : 10	0	406	0	7000	-	0.920	-
	1 : 9	41	365	700	6300	0.974	0.920	3.09
	2 : 8	81	325	1400	5600	0.971	0.921	2.72
	3 : 7	122	284	2100	4900	0.968	0.922	2.42
	4 : 6	162	244	2800	4200	0.966	0.928	2.12
	5 : 5	203	203	3500	3500	0.963	0.928	1.96
	6 : 4	244	162	4200	2800	0.962	0.933	1.76
	7 : 3	284	122	4900	2100	0.961	0.936	1.65
	8 : 2	325	81	5600	1400	0.961	0.944	1.43
	1 : 9	365	41	6300	700	0.959	0.950	1.20
	0 : 10	406	0	7000	0	0.958	-	-
ResNet-50 CosFace	0 : 10	0	406	0	7000	-	0.931	-
	1 : 9	41	365	700	6300	0.973	0.931	2.54
	2 : 8	81	325	1400	5600	0.972	0.933	2.35
	3 : 7	122	284	2100	4900	0.969	0.933	2.15
	4 : 6	162	244	2800	4200	0.967	0.937	1.89
	5 : 5	203	203	3500	3500	0.965	0.936	1.83
	6 : 4	244	162	4200	2800	0.965	0.939	1.74
	7 : 3	284	122	4900	2100	0.964	0.942	1.61
	8 : 2	325	81	5600	1400	0.964	0.950	1.38
	1 : 9	365	41	6300	700	0.961	0.949	1.31
	0 : 10	406	0	7000	0	0.961	-	-
ResNet-50 ArcFace	0 : 10	0	406	0	7000	-	0.904	-
	1 : 9	41	365	700	6300	0.964	0.905	2.66
	2 : 8	81	325	1400	5600	0.960	0.908	2.33
	3 : 7	122	284	2100	4900	0.957	0.907	2.18
	4 : 6	162	244	2800	4200	0.956	0.912	1.99
	5 : 5	203	203	3500	3500	0.952	0.914	1.82
	6 : 4	244	162	4200	2800	0.950	0.920	1.60
	7 : 3	284	122	4900	2100	0.950	0.924	1.52
	8 : 2	325	81	5600	1400	0.950	0.935	1.29
	1 : 9	365	41	6300	700	0.946	0.940	1.11
	0 : 10	406	0	7000	0	0.946	-	-

Table 5: Test Set Img Imbalance. The female and male accuracy for models trained on default train set computed on test set with various ratios of number of images per male and female identities. See details of the experiment in Section 5.2

Model	Img Ratio	# M ids	# F ids	# M imgs	# F imgs	M Acc	F Acc	Error Ratio
MFN CosFace	2 : 8	406	406	1400	5600	0.941	0.957	0.72
	3 : 7	406	406	2100	4900	0.959	0.956	1.06
	4 : 6	406	406	2800	4200	0.962	0.952	1.27
	5 : 5	406	406	3500	3500	0.967	0.946	1.64
	6 : 4	406	406	4200	2800	0.970	0.940	2.01
	7 : 3	406	406	4900	2100	0.973	0.925	2.75
	8 : 2	406	406	5600	1400	0.975	0.894	4.23
MFN ArcFace	2 : 8	406	406	1400	5600	0.939	0.956	0.72
	3 : 7	406	406	2100	4900	0.956	0.954	1.03
	4 : 6	406	406	2800	4200	0.961	0.951	1.26
	5 : 5	406	406	3500	3500	0.966	0.947	1.54
	6 : 4	406	406	4200	2800	0.969	0.941	1.91
	7 : 3	406	406	4900	2100	0.972	0.928	2.58
	8 : 2	406	406	5600	1400	0.974	0.901	3.87
ResNet-152 CosFace	2 : 8	406	406	1400	5600	0.921	0.938	0.78
	3 : 7	406	406	2100	4900	0.946	0.934	1.21
	4 : 6	406	406	2800	4200	0.952	0.927	1.51
	5 : 5	406	406	3500	3500	0.958	0.921	1.89
	6 : 4	406	406	4200	2800	0.962	0.912	2.32
	7 : 3	406	406	4900	2100	0.965	0.894	3.01
	8 : 2	406	406	5600	1400	0.967	0.855	4.37
ResNet-152 ArcFace	2 : 8	406	406	1400	5600	0.888	0.912	0.79
	3 : 7	406	406	2100	4900	0.916	0.909	1.09
	4 : 6	406	406	2800	4200	0.930	0.901	1.42
	5 : 5	406	406	3500	3500	0.940	0.889	1.85
	6 : 4	406	406	4200	2800	0.946	0.878	2.27
	7 : 3	406	406	4900	2100	0.950	0.853	2.92
	8 : 2	406	406	5600	1400	0.954	0.798	4.38
ResNet-50 CosFace	2 : 8	406	406	1400	5600	0.905	0.924	0.80
	3 : 7	406	406	2100	4900	0.932	0.921	1.17
	4 : 6	406	406	2800	4200	0.940	0.914	1.43
	5 : 5	406	406	3500	3500	0.947	0.904	1.80
	6 : 4	406	406	4200	2800	0.952	0.894	2.23
	7 : 3	406	406	4900	2100	0.956	0.872	2.87
	8 : 2	406	406	5600	1400	0.958	0.827	4.14
ResNet-50 ArcFace	2 : 8	406	406	1400	5600	0.870	0.893	0.82
	3 : 7	406	406	2100	4900	0.904	0.888	1.17
	4 : 6	406	406	2800	4200	0.916	0.879	1.45
	5 : 5	406	406	3500	3500	0.925	0.866	1.79
	6 : 4	406	406	4200	2800	0.933	0.853	2.20
	7 : 3	406	406	4900	2100	0.936	0.826	2.74
	8 : 2	406	406	5600	1400	0.940	0.766	3.90

Table 6: Train & Test Set Id Imbalance. The female and male accuracy for models trained and tested on data with the same ratios of male and female identities. See details of experiment in Section 6.

Model	Ids Ratio	M Acc	F Acc	Error Ratio
MFN CosFace	0 : 10	-	0.945	-
	1 : 9	0.963	0.943	1.54
	2 : 8	0.966	0.947	1.56
	3 : 7	0.964	0.943	1.57
	4 : 6	0.967	0.945	1.63
	5 : 5	0.965	0.943	1.63
	6 : 4	0.968	0.947	1.63
	7 : 3	0.968	0.946	1.66
	8 : 2	0.969	0.946	1.72
	1 : 9	0.971	0.951	1.68
	0 : 10	0.972	-	-
MFN ArcFace	0 : 10	-	0.945	-
	1 : 9	0.962	0.946	1.42
	2 : 8	0.962	0.947	1.42
	3 : 7	0.962	0.943	1.52
	4 : 6	0.961	0.945	1.41
	5 : 5	0.964	0.944	1.54
	6 : 4	0.968	0.944	1.72
	7 : 3	0.967	0.946	1.61
	8 : 2	0.969	0.947	1.71
	1 : 9	0.968	0.949	1.63
	0 : 10	0.969	-	-
ResNet-152 CosFace	0 : 10	-	0.901	-
	1 : 9	0.943	0.906	1.65
	2 : 8	0.947	0.907	1.75
	3 : 7	0.947	0.902	1.86
	4 : 6	0.946	0.907	1.70
	5 : 5	0.946	0.912	1.64
	6 : 4	0.952	0.916	1.73
	7 : 3	0.955	0.919	1.79
	8 : 2	0.956	0.925	1.69
	1 : 9	0.954	0.931	1.49
	0 : 10	0.956	-	-
ResNet-152 ArcFace	0 : 10	-	0.880	-
	1 : 9	0.925	0.874	1.67
	2 : 8	0.924	0.878	1.61
	3 : 7	0.926	0.877	1.67
	4 : 6	0.925	0.877	1.63
	5 : 5	0.928	0.882	1.64
	6 : 4	0.930	0.890	1.58
	7 : 3	0.938	0.893	1.73
	8 : 2	0.937	0.900	1.59
	1 : 9	0.936	0.906	1.46
	0 : 10	0.942	-	-
ResNet-50 CosFace	0 : 10	-	0.890	-
	1 : 9	0.933	0.886	1.69
	2 : 8	0.930	0.890	1.57
	3 : 7	0.934	0.892	1.63
	4 : 6	0.934	0.895	1.60
	5 : 5	0.936	0.898	1.58
	6 : 4	0.942	0.901	1.70
	7 : 3	0.940	0.900	1.66
	8 : 2	0.945	0.917	1.52
	1 : 9	0.948	0.921	1.52
	0 : 10	0.947	-	-
ResNet-50 ArcFace	0 : 10	-	0.862	-
	1 : 9	0.911	0.862	1.56
	2 : 8	0.915	0.870	1.53
	3 : 7	0.913	0.865	1.54
	4 : 6	0.916	0.865	1.61
	5 : 5	0.917	0.865	1.63
	6 : 4	0.924	0.877	1.61
	7 : 3	0.926	0.879	1.64
	8 : 2	0.930	0.888	1.61
	1 : 9	0.932	0.900	1.46
	0 : 10	0.933	-	-

Table 7: Train & Test Set Img Imbalance. The female and male accuracy for models trained and tested on data with the same ratios of number of images per male and female identity. See details of experiment in Section 6.

Model	Img Ratio	M Acc	F Acc	Error Ratio
MFN CosFace	2 : 8	0.821	0.923	0.43
	3 : 7	0.901	0.922	0.78
	4 : 6	0.928	0.919	1.12
	5 : 5	0.942	0.906	1.62
	6 : 4	0.952	0.892	2.24
	7 : 3	0.951	0.848	3.12
	8 : 2	0.954	0.740	5.70
MFN ArcFace	2 : 8	0.854	0.932	0.46
	3 : 7	0.916	0.933	0.79
	4 : 6	0.937	0.927	1.16
	5 : 5	0.951	0.919	1.64
	6 : 4	0.955	0.907	2.09
	7 : 3	0.957	0.871	3.01
	8 : 2	0.958	0.779	5.31
ResNet-152 CosFace	2 : 8	0.657	0.859	0.41
	3 : 7	0.832	0.873	0.76
	4 : 6	0.879	0.866	1.11
	5 : 5	0.912	0.848	1.74
	6 : 4	0.916	0.798	2.41
	7 : 3	0.922	0.695	3.90
	8 : 2	0.922	0.483	6.66
ResNet-152 ArcFace	2 : 8	0.638	0.840	0.44
	3 : 7	0.817	0.859	0.77
	4 : 6	0.870	0.855	1.12
	5 : 5	0.899	0.832	1.66
	6 : 4	0.911	0.792	2.34
	7 : 3	0.917	0.708	3.51
	8 : 2	0.915	0.488	6.02
ResNet-50 CosFace	2 : 8	0.611	0.839	0.41
	3 : 7	0.777	0.843	0.71
	4 : 6	0.854	0.844	1.07
	5 : 5	0.889	0.820	1.63
	6 : 4	0.899	0.766	2.31
	7 : 3	0.911	0.688	3.51
	8 : 2	0.908	0.449	6.00
ResNet-50 ArcFace	2 : 8	0.579	0.817	0.43
	3 : 7	0.786	0.837	0.76
	4 : 6	0.844	0.824	1.13
	5 : 5	0.887	0.817	1.62
	6 : 4	0.895	0.763	2.27
	7 : 3	0.905	0.666	3.50
	8 : 2	0.901	0.450	5.56

Iterative Partial Fulfillment of Counterfactual Explanations: Benefits and Risks

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

Figure 1: Left: a counterfactual (CF) explanation (green star) of an negative input instance (orange triangle) is often assumed to be fulfilled (i.e., achieved) completely, thus guaranteeing a positive subsequent prediction. In this paper, we consider *partial fulfillment*, where the subject, by choice or by necessity, stops in the middle (orange circle). Middle: if the CF explanation is far from the decision boundary, then a partial fulfillment near the goal could be sufficient for a positive prediction while saving improvement cost. Right: however, CF algorithms often use local gradient ascent and/or randomized search, which could result in a long and winding path towards the final positive prediction and much higher total cost.

ABSTRACT

Counterfactual (CF) explanations, also known as contrastive explanations and algorithmic recourses, are popular for explaining machine learning models in high-stakes domains. For a subject that receives a negative model prediction (e.g., mortgage application denial), the CF explanations are similar instances but with positive predictions, which informs the subject of ways to improve. While their various properties have been studied, such as validity and stability, we contribute a novel one: their behaviors under *iterative partial fulfillment* (IPF). Specifically, upon receiving a CF explanation, the subject may only partially fulfill it before requesting a new prediction with a new explanation, and repeat until the prediction is positive. Such partial fulfillment could be due to the subject's limited capability (e.g., can only pay down two out of four credit card accounts at this moment) or an attempt to take the chance (e.g., betting that a monthly salary increase of $800 is enough even though $1,000 is recommended). Does such iterative partial fulfillment increase or decrease the total cost of improvement incurred by the subject? We mathematically formalize IPF and demonstrate, both theoretically and empirically, that different CF algorithms exhibit vastly different behaviors under IPF. We discuss implications of our observations, advocate for this factor to be carefully considered in the development and study of CF algorithms, and give several directions for future work.

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CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies** → **Machine learning**; **Artificial intelligence**; • **Human-centered computing** → *Human computer interaction (HCI).*

KEYWORDS

counterfactual explanation, interpretability, societal impacts of AI

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1 INTRODUCTION

Recently, machine learning models have been increasingly deployed in high-stakes domains in finance, law and medicine, performing tasks such as loan approval [8], recidivism prediction [21] and medical diagnosis [13]. For these domains, the reason why a particular prediction is made is often as important as the prediction itself, especially since most of the high performing models, such as neural networks and random forests, are black-box in nature. In some jurisdictions, the "right to explanation" is even legally required for people receiving adverse model predictions (e.g., mortgage application denial) to understand the reason and available recourses.

For these purposes, counterfactual (CF) explanations, also known in the literature as contrastive explanations or algorithmic recourses, have been a popular choice due to their desirable properties in human psychology and cognition theories [26]. For a particular input x with a certain model prediction $\tilde{y}$, its CF explanation is another input similar to x but with a prediction $\tilde{y}'$ different from $\tilde{y}$. Thus, this explanation indicates how the input would need to change in order for the model prediction to also change, as shown in Fig. 1

(left). When $\tilde{y}$ is a negative prediction (e.g., mortgage application denial) and $\tilde{y}'$ is a positive one (e.g., application approval), this CF explanation essentially gives as a direction for the applicant to improve their situation and get the application approved the next time, given that it is feasible (e.g., not changing immutable features such as gender and race), which automatically avoids the unfaithfulness problem of many feature attribution explanations [23, 33, 36] where the salient features are not really important for the model's decision making [1, 47, 48].

Over the past few years, there have been many investigations into various properties of these counterfactual explanations, such as their validity, action feasibility and cost, stability with respect to input perturbations and model updates, and agreement with the underlying causal mechanism, which are reviewed in Sec. 2. Taken as a whole, they generate quality profiles for various CF explanation algorithms and establish their relative strengths and weaknesses.

In this paper, we propose a novel aspect of these explanations, which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been studied before. Specifically, in real life scenarios, the subject of the prediction (e.g., the mortgage applicant) may not completely fulfill the CF explanation for various reasons. First, the subject may not be able to do so. For example, the CF explanation requires the subject to pay down all four credit card accounts, but they can only pay down two of them with their current saving. Second, the subject may want to take their chance and get a favorable outcome with less effort. For example, the CF explanation recommends the subject to increase their monthly salary by $1,000 but they wonder if an increase of just $800 would be sufficient. Last, the subject may misunderstand the wording of a CF explanation (e.g., a bullet list in the notice of denial) as taking any *subset* of actions rather than all of them. In all cases, we have a *partial* fulfillment of the CF explanation followed by a re-query for the model prediction and CF explanation, repeating until a positive prediction is obtained. We term this process as the *iterative partial fulfillment* (IPF) of CF explanations.

How does IPF, compared to a one-shot complete fulfillment, affect the subject welfare? In particular, does the subject need to make more total improvement under IPF? Intuitively, the effect can be positive, negative or neutral.

A positive effect could result from CF algorithms that generate instances landing well into the positive model prediction region. A less complete fulfillment (e.g., a salary increase of $800 rather than the recommended $1,000) is still sufficient, allowing the subject to incur a lower cost of improvement, as shown in Fig. 1 (middle).

By contrast, if the initial partial fulfillment (e.g., paying down two out of the four recommended credit card accounts) is unsuccessful, the new CF explanation may suggest some other factors to change and effectively "reset" the progress, resulting in a larger total cost of improvement, as shown in Fig. 1 (right). In the most extreme case, an oscillation may even occur among the series of explanations, leaving the subject stuck in an infinite loop.

Last, if, for an input x and its CF explanation x', the CF explanations for all partially fulfilled input states along the trajectory of $x \to x'$ are also the same counterfactual explanation x', and no partial fulfillment results in a positive prediction, then the total improvement cost under IPF is the same as that under one-shot complete fulfillment, since both will lead to the subject achieving x' in the end. Such as scenario is possible if the CF algorithm works by either finding the exact closest input with a different target prediction or returning a CF instance from a small set of candidates.

In practice, the specifics of a CF algorithm, such as the optimization method and considerations for stochasticity and diversity, determine the net effect of these three possibilities, making certain CF algorithms preferable to others from the IPF welfare perspective.

In this paper, we investigate this problem by first formalizing the notion and implementation of IPF in Sec. 3. Then in Sec. 4 we theoretically prove that certain CF algorithms can exhibit positive, negative and neutral effects on IPF welfare (i.e., total improvement cost compared to the one-shot complete fulfillment), as conceptually explained above. Empirically, in Sec. 5 using two financial datasets, three CF algorithms and four CF generation configurations per algorithm (for a total of 24 setups), with the widely used `DiCE-ML` package[1], we confirm that the generated explanations indeed possess different IPF characteristics. Thus, from these two pieces of evidence, we argue that an IPF assessment should be part of a comprehensive evaluation of CF algorithms. Finally, in Sec. 6, we discuss the broader technical and societal implications of IPF and its future directions.

2 RELATED WORK

In this section, we discuss works on the algorithms and properties of counterfactual explanations, with focus on impact, recency and relevance to IPF. For much more detailed discussions, we refer the readers to standalone surveys, such as those by Byrne [3], Guidotti [11], Keane et al. [18] and Verma et al. [42].

CF explanations are popularized by Wachter et al. [46], who proposed a gradient ascent algorithm to search for a counterfactual instance that both achieves the target model prediction and is close to the original input being explained. Subsequent works have extended the basic idea to make CF explanations diverse [27, 34], in-distribution [30, 41], aware of the causal mechanism [17], and less susceptible to gaming [4]. In addition, different optimization methods have also been proposed, such as those that do not require model differentiability or gradient access [27, 29], as well as those based on integer programming [34, 40], constraint satisfaction [16] and optimal transport [6].

A recent line of work aims to generate a *sequence* of instances from the input to the final CF explanation [15, 28, 31, 43]. This sequence provides an explicit path for the subject to follow, and is argued to be more user-friendly and actionable. While our proposed IPF setup also results in a sequence of explanations, it is fundamentally different in both goals and constraints. In sequential generation, the explanation algorithm has full control of the generated sequence and only the last sequence element needs to be the CF explanation (i.e., inducing the target prediction). By comparison, in IPF, the algorithm needs to work with whatever partially fulfilled instance provided by subject and generate a valid CF explanation.

Kenny and Keane [19] and Aryal and Keane [2] proposed to generate semi-factual explanations, defined as data instances which move towards the decision boundary but have not crossed it. These explanations could be used to construct "even if" explanations: e.g., *even if the down payment is $10,000 more, the mortgage would still not be approved.* A partially fulfilled CF in IPF and a semi-factual

[1] https://github.com/interpretml/DiCE

instance are both on the way to some CF instance, but they are otherwise distinct concepts – one is an intermediate state of the subject and the other is an explanation.

On the evaluation and analysis side, various properties of CF explanations have been proposed. The two core desiderata of CF explanations are validity and feasibility. The former is just the success rate of the CF generation, while the latter, conceptually defined as the ease for the subject to follow the CF recommendation, is much more nuanced. Different approaches have been proposed to enforce and evaluate it, such as ensuring a close distance to the original data point [46], lying in a high-density region of the data distribution [41], satisfying causal constraints [17], and respecting custom limitations in modifying feature values [27, 40].

Most relevant to our IPF proposal are two notions of stability. The first is with respect to input perturbations, where Dominguez-Olmedo et al. [7] and Virgolin and Fracaros [44] found that a given input can be adversarially but minimally perturbed into an instance with a very different CF explanations. Maragno et al. [25] proposed a robust optimization formulation to find stable CF explanations. Slack et al. [37] demonstrates that a model could be trained to make this behavior more prevalent and hide discrimination issues. The second one is with respect to the model update, where a new model is trained on an updated version of the dataset. Rawal et al. [32] found that many CF algorithms are often unstable under model update in that very different explanations are generated for the new model and the original ones are no longer valid, and Upadhyay et al. [39] proposed an algorithm to find CF instances that are stable under model update.

From this perspective, our IPF property can be considered as a third notion of stability: the stability of CF explanations for inputs along the path of improvement. If the CF explanations are stable, then the subject will follow a mostly consistent path of improvement, while if not, the subject may be given unrelated or even contradicting recommendations after every partial fulfillment.

3 ITERATIVE PARTIAL FULFILLMENT

3.1 Background

In this section, we formalize the concept of iterative partial fulfillment (IPF) of CF explanations. Due to the variety of real world human behaviors, there are many ways to formalize IPF. As we are the first to do so, we provide and analyze one canonical setup, and discuss other design choices and extensions in Sec. 6.

Let $\mathcal{X}$ be the input space with D features, and $\mathcal{X}_d$ for $d \in \{1, ..., D\}$ be the set of values for the d-th feature. We consider categorical and numerical features, where X_d is a finite set for the former and (a subset of) $\mathbb{R}$ for the latter. Thus, an $x \in \mathcal{X}$ can be written as $(x_1, ..., x_D)$ with $x_d \in \mathcal{X}_d$. For notational simplicity, we restrict ourselves to binary classification tasks, and represent the model prediction function as $m : X \to [0, 1]$ that returns the predicted probability of the positive class. Thus, $m(x) \geq 0.5$ indicates a positive prediction. In the ensuing discussion, we consider negatively predicted input instances $m(x) < 0$ and their positively predicted counterfactuals $m(x') \geq 0.5$.

We denote a CF explanation algorithm as $A : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{X}$, which takes an input instance and returns another instance. Since some algorithms are stochastic, we allow $A(x)$ to return a random x' sampled from the corresponding distribution. In addition, some algorithms generate a set of diverse CF explanations, and the subject chooses one of them as the goal using some strategy, such as picking the most similar one or selecting one uniformly at random. In this case, we let $A(\cdot)$ to manage this CF selection procedure so that it always returns a single (but possibly stochastic) CF explanation. To simplify notation, we write $x' = A(x)$ if A is deterministic on x and $x' \sim A(x)$ for a sampled value.

For x and x', to represent the cost of change between the two, we define a cost metric

$$c(x, x') = \sum_{d=1}^{D} c_d(x_d, x'_d), \tag{1}$$

where $c_d(x_d, x'_d)$ is the per-feature cost. If the feature is categorical, we have $c_d(x_d, x'_d) = \mathbb{1}\{x_d \neq x'_d\}$. Otherwise, we have $c_d(x_d, x'_d) = |F_d(x_d) - F(x'_d)|$ where F is cumulative distribution function of the feature values, following Ustun et al. [40], to account for the feature value density, with the maximal change incurring a cost of 1. Given a sequence of N instances $\mathbf{x} = (x^{(1)}, ..., x^{(N)})$, the total cost for this sequence is the sum of pairwise neighbor costs $c(\mathbf{x}) = \sum_{n=1}^{N-1} c(x^{(n)}, x^{(n+1)})$.

3.2 Partial Fulfillment

We now formalize the partial fulfillment as follows.

Definition 1 (u-partial fulfillment). For current state x and goal state x' (e.g., as generated by the CF algorithm), the u-partial fulfillment $w \in \mathcal{X}$, with $u \in [0, 1]$, is generated by the following operation on each feature:

- if the feature is continuous, the new feature value w_d is an interpolation between the two feature values: $(1-u) \cdot x_d + u \cdot x'_d$, except that when $|x_d - x'_d| \leq \epsilon$, the new value is x'_d;
- if the feature is categorical, the new feature value w_d takes x_d with probability $1 - u$ and x'_d with probability u.

Since categorical feature values are generated stochastically, we use $\phi(x, x', u)$ to denote the distribution of partial fulfillment w.

Conceptually, from the subject's perspective, when partially fulfilling x' from x, at an effort level u, for every continuous feature, they will move an amount proportional to u towards the goal feature value, and for every categorical feature, they will choose to make the change with probability u. Thus, the partial fulfillment result is stochastic as long as there is at least one categorical feature value change required. A technical exception is put on continuous features, where the partially fulfilled value is set to the CF value if the value difference is small. This ensures the success of IPF when the CF instance lies exactly on the decision boundary.

Given this partial fulfillment definition, we model the iterative partial fulfillment (IPF) process in Alg. 1. The subject starts with an input x, and repeatedly requests a counterfactual explanation to partially fulfill, until receiving a positive prediction or reaching a maximum number of iterations. The algorithm returns $\mathbf{x}$, a sequence of states that the subject has been. For effort level u, maximum number of iterations T, model m and CF algorithm A, we use $\xi(x, u, T, m, A)$ to represent the distribution of realized state trajectories $\mathbf{x}$. When it is clear from the context, we omit some of the input arguments, such as m. The most direct measure of subject

Algorithm 1: The iterative partial fulfillment (IPF) process.

Input: initial input x, model m, CF explanation algorithm A, fulfillment effort level u, maximum number of iterations T;
$t \leftarrow 0$;
$\mathbf{x} \leftarrow [x]$;
while $m(x) < 0.5$ *and* $t < T$ **do**
  $x' \leftarrow A(x)$;
  $x \leftarrow \phi(x, x', u)$;
  $\mathbf{x}$.append(x);
  $t \leftarrow t + 1$;
end
return $\mathbf{x}$;

welfare under IPF is the total improvement cost $c(\mathbf{x})$. Other metrics include final success rate and number of steps. If we are interested in the fairness implications of IPF (i.e., whether one demographic group is disproportionately affected by IPF), we can also compute these metrics separately for each group, as we conduct in Sec. 5.

4 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

4.1 IPF Stability

Does IPF always increase or decrease the total improvement costs? As we demonstrate in this section, its effects on different CF algorithms are different. First, we formally define the concept of IPF stability discussed at the end of Sec. 2, which is a sufficient condition for cost preservation (i.e., IPF does not increase the total cost).

Definition 2 (IPF stable). A CF algorithm A is IPF stable at x if
(1) A is deterministic at x, and
(2) $\forall w \in \Phi(x, A(x))$, A is deterministic at w and $A(w) = A(x)$.
A CF algorithm A is IPF stable globally if it is IPF stable at all $x \in \mathcal{X}$.

For IPF stable CF algorithms, we are assured that IPF never makes the total cost higher, compared to one-shot complete fulfillment.

Theorem 3. *If a CF algorithm A is IPF stable at x, then for all u and T, $\mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{x}\sim\xi(x,u,T,A)}[c(\mathbf{x})] \le c(x, A(x))$.*

The proof is straightforward. At every iteration of IPF, the same CF explanation is given. Thus, the total improvement cost is upper bounded by $c(x, A(x))$. If the model gives a positive prediction in some intermediate step (or T is not large enough to achieve $A(x)$ or a positive prediction), the total improvement cost is strictly less, which could happen when A is configured to be "conservative" and gives a CF instance of high model confidence.

4.2 Cost-Preserving/Decreasing CF Under IPF

Do IPF stable CF algorithms exist? Obviously, a constant-valued CF algorithm that always produces the same CF instance $A(\cdot) = x'$ is stable, but this serves as a terrible CF explanation for most of the dissimilar input instances. More usefully, we show that the optimal cost CF algorithm is also stable.

Theorem 4. *For $p \ge 0.5$, the optimal cost CF algorithm*

$$A_{\mathrm{OC}}(x) = \underset{x': m(x') \ge p}{\arg\min}\ c(x, x'), \tag{2}$$

which gives the instance closest to x with model prediction at least p (using deterministic tie-breaking if necessary), is IPF stable globally.

Proof. We first consider the case of all numerical features and no categorical features. Recognizing the feature-wise absolute value CDF distance function $c_d = |F_d(x'_d) - F_d(x_d)|$, we define sign flag $s_d = \mathrm{sgn}(x'_d - x_d)$, and have

$$c(x, x') = \sum_{d=1}^{D} s_d (F_d(x'_d) - F_d(x_d)). \tag{3}$$

Therefore, the search over the best CF can be reduced to that in 2^D "quadrants," with one value of $s = (s_1, ..., s_D)$ specifying one quadrant Q_s. Denote the globally optimal CF as x^*. We need to show that IPF preserves the optimality of x^* within the quadrant and across different quadrants.

For within-quadrant optimality, without loss of generality, suppose that x^* lives in Q_s with $s = (1, ..., 1)$. Consider the new state $w = (1-u)x + ux^*$ resulting from the partial fulfillment. For all $x' \in Q_s$,

$$c(x^*, x) \le c(x', x) \tag{4}$$
$$\implies \sum_d F_d(x^*) - F_d(x) \le \sum_d F_d(x') - F_d(x) \tag{5}$$
$$\implies \sum_d F_d(x^*) \le \sum_d F_d(x') \tag{6}$$
$$\implies \sum_d F_d(x^*) - F_d(w) \le \sum_d F_d(x') - F_d(w) \tag{7}$$
$$\implies \sum_d c_d(x^*, w) \le \sum_d c_d(x', w) \tag{8}$$
$$\implies c(x^*, w) \le c(x', w). \tag{9}$$

The last line establishes the within-quadrant optimality of x^* for w. For across-quadrant optimality, consider the s^* for the quadrant of x^* and s' for that of an CF instance x' in a different quadrant. For a feature d such that $s^*_d = s'_d$, w_d makes the same amount of improvement towards both CFs (except when w overshoots with respect to x'_d, which offsets the improvement on x'_d), while for d such that $s^*_d \ne s'_d$ (which must exist because $s^* \ne s'$), the improvement towards x^*_d strictly makes the distance to x'_d worse. Thus, if x^* is optimal for x across all quadrants, it is still optimal for w.

Combining within-quadrant and across-quadrant optimality together, we see that IPF preserves the optimality of $A_{\mathrm{OC}}(x)$ (for inputs of all numerical features).

For a categorical feature d that needs change (i.e., $x^*_d \ne x_d$), if $w_d = x_d$, it does not change the feature-wise cost c_d for any target instance (including x^*), while if $w_d = x^*_d$, it reduces the cost for x^* by 1, and it reduces that for any other x' by at most 1, if $x'_d = x^*_d$). Thus, the cost reduction for x^* is as fast as any other x', so adding the cost for categorical features to the overall cost c does not affect the optimality of x^*. This completes the proof. □

With similar proofs, the theorem also applies to l_1 distance functions, including the case of different features scaled differently (e.g., by respective mean absolute deviation as used by Wachter et al. [46]), or with F_d being arbitrary monotonic functions. These variations greatly increases the generality of the theorem.

This algorithm is considered as the gold standard by many works that propose approximate procedures due to the intractability of the exact optimization, such as local gradient ascent [46] or randomized search [27, 29]. Hence, we see that IPF is not a concern in the ideal case. In fact, for conservative A_{OC} with $p > 0.5$, it is likely that the total cost of IPF is smaller due to early stopping.

Moreover, the result extends easily to look-up based CF algorithms, as defined below.

Theorem 5. *A look-up based CF algorithm*

$$A_{\text{LU}}(x) = \arg\min_{x' \in S} c(x, x'), \tag{10}$$

which selects the instance closest to x from a (finite) set of candidates S (using deterministic tie-breaking if necessary), is IPF stable globally.

The proof is analogous. A natural choice of S (for a negatively predicted instance x) is the set of correctly predicted positive training instances. Indeed, using the training set as a constraint or regularization is a common ingredient in many CF algorithms [30, 41], often to make the CF explanations more realistic and thus feasible, while this theorem demonstrates an added benefit of it.

Putting everything together, we reiterate the central results of this section with the following corollary:

Corollary 6. *Both optimal cost and look-up based CF algorithms (A_{OC} and A_{LU}) are IPF stable.*

4.3 Cost-Increasing CF Under IPF

Next, we demonstrate that two popular approximation methods, gradient ascent and randomized search, are prone to increasing the total improvement cost, possibly without limit.

For differentiable models, gradient ascent is often used from the current input to find a CF instance that offers a good trade-off between the model prediction and distance, sometimes with other considerations. Different works have proposed different objective functions, with the earliest one proposed by Wachter et al. [46] as

$$g(x') = \lambda(1 - m(x'))^2 + d_{\text{MAD}}(x, x'), \tag{11}$$

where d_{MAD} is the l_1 distance weighted by the inverse median absolute deviation (MAD) per feature, and λ controls the trade-off. We define a gradient ascent CF function A_{GA} as the one that follows the gradient of $g(\cdot)$ from x to the local minimum or the boundary of $\mathcal{X}$. If this end state does not achieve the required model prediction p, we return a default positive instance (which can be a fixed correctly classified positive training instance).

It turns out that A_{GA} could lead to arbitrarily bad IPF behaviors due to an oscillation phenomenon.

Theorem 7. *There exists a model m, input instances $x^{(1)}, x^{(2)}$ with all continuous features, and effort level u, such that $\phi(x^{(1)}, A_{\text{GA}}(x^{(1)}), u) = x^{(2)}$ and $\phi(x^{(2)}, A_{\text{GA}}(x^{(2)}), u) = x^{(1)}$.*

In this case, starting at $x^{(1)}$ and making partial fulfillment with effort level of u results in an oscillation of $x^{(1)} \to x^{(2)} \to x^{(1)} \to x^{(2)} \to \ldots$ for T steps. A concrete example is illustrated in Fig. 2, which plots gradient field of the 2-dimensional objective function $g(\cdot)$ as gray arrows pointing in the *ascent* direction. A "valley" (blue dashed line) separates the inputs into two regions. We have two instances, represented by orange and green circles. For each



Figure 2: An example illustrating the oscillation behavior of gradient-ascent CF algorithms under partial fulfillment.

instance, the gradient ascent yields the red trajectory to the star marker of the same color. However, starting from the orange circle, a 0.5-partial fulfillment towards the orange star lands exactly on the green circle, whose counterfactual explanation is the green star, but a 0.5-partial fulfillment goes back to the orange circle again.

The root cause for this issue is the non-optimality of the gradient ascent algorithm, in that it may only find farther local minima by following the gradient, such that a partial fulfillment (which move in the straight-line path, not along the gradient) could reset the progress. While the above example can be easily solved by caching the CF explanations found so far and returning the closest one if the gradient ascent cannot do better, models trained on real-world datasets with a large number of features may have many local minima in the high-dimensional input space, as evidenced by the prevalence of adversarial examples [10, 22], rendering such caching effort mostly futile.

A realistic example can be constructed as follows for the mortgage approval task. Consider two features, current saving x_s and current debt x_d, where the model makes positive predictions on $\langle x_s, x_d \rangle = \langle \$10k, \$1k \rangle$ and $(\$40k, \$4k\rangle$. Now consider $x^{(\text{CF},1)} = \langle \$20k, \$2k \rangle$ and $x^{(\text{CF},2)} = \langle \$30k, \$3k \rangle$. Due to the shape of the objective function, the gradient ascent optimizes $\langle \$20k, \$2k \rangle$ to $\langle \$40k, \$4k \rangle$, and $\langle \$30k, \$3k \rangle$ to $\langle \$10k, \$1k \rangle$. As a result, starting at either $x^{(1)}$ or $x^{(2)}$ leads to an oscillation between the two.

Another popular approach, especially for non-differentiable models, is based on randomized search. Generally speaking, a randomized search algorithm A_{RS} draw samples from the input space $\mathcal{X}$ using some strategy (e.g., uniformly at random or weighted towards the input instance x), and returns the best sampled instance according to some objective function (e.g., Eq. 11). However, this approach is also prone to increasing the total improvement cost under IPF.

Theorem 8. *There exists a model m, an input instance x, and an effort level u, such that*

$$\mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{x} \sim \xi(x,u,T,m,A_{\text{RS}})}[c(\mathbf{x})] > E_{x' \sim A_{\text{RS}}(x)}[c(x, x')] \tag{12}$$

Intuitively, this theorem should not be surprising: at step t and state $x^{(t)}$, when a new CF goal $x^{(\text{CF},t+1)}$ is set, some of the effort expended during the previous round of partial fulfillment becomes

wasted if the new goal requires a different fulfillment operation from the previous state $x^{(t-1)}$; i.e., $x^{(t)} \notin \Phi(x^{(t-1)}, x^{(\mathrm{CF},t+1)})$.

As a simple example, consider a probabilistic CF algorithm A that gives one of two CF explanations, $x^{(\mathrm{CF},1)}$ and $x^{(\mathrm{CF},2)}$. For an input x, let d_1 and d_2 be the Euclidean distance to them respectively (assuming all continuous features). We have

$$A(x) = \begin{cases} x^{(\mathrm{CF},1)} & \text{with (unnormalized) probability } d_1^{-1}, \\ x^{(\mathrm{CF},2)} & \text{with (unnormalized) probability } d_2^{-1}. \end{cases} \quad (13)$$

Thus, if we have the initial state starting at the middle of these two CF states, $x = (x^{(\mathrm{CF},1)} + x^{(\mathrm{CF},2)})/2$, with $u = 0.5$ (i.e., fulfilling halfway through the CF explanation), then the probability of CF always recommending the same counterfactual is

$$\frac{3}{4} \cdot \frac{7}{8} \cdot \frac{15}{16} \cdot \frac{31}{32} \ldots \approx 0.58, \quad (14)$$

meaning that 42% of times, there is at least one step that erases the effort of an earlier step. On our earlier mortgage approval example, these two states could represent the two ways of getting approved (high saving and high debt, or low saving and low debt), and a partially fulfilling applicant risks receiving contradictory feedback every time they make an application.

Using a Monte Carlo simulation, Fig. 3 (blue line) shows the total improvement cost at different effort levels u relative to that under single-shot complete fulfillment. Analogous results for the same setup but with three to five counterfactual states arranged on a regular polygon (with initial state x at the center) are also presented in different colors.

As we can see, a smaller value of u and a larger number of candidate CF instances of all exacerbates the total improvement cost under IPF. In particular, with just five CF instances and an effort level of 0.5, the total improvement cost increases 10-fold relative to the one-shot complete fulfillment ($u = 1$). An effort level of 0.1 increases the cost more than 40,000 times!

4.4 Summary

In this section, we characterize four basic algorithmic approaches to generating CF explanations by their IPF cost property. On the positive side, the optimal algorithm that performs an exhaustive search and its finite search space variant are both IPF stable and thus cost preserving. In addition, if these algorithms are configured to be conservative, in that they only return instances with model prediction over a $p > 0.5$, it is likely that IPF can save total cost by rewarding subjects who take chance.

On the contrary, algorithms based on gradient descent and randomized search risk increasing the total cost under IPF. The issue can be attributed to the same underlying reason: since these algorithms are not guaranteed to always return the closest CF instance, partial fulfillments in the earlier iterations may be "cancelled" by later ones, resulting in increased total costs. In addition, many CF algorithms [27, 34] aim to generate multiple CF instances at the same time in order to provide more diversity and options to the subject. In this case, if the choice made by the subject is not consistent across iterations, the net effect is similar to a randomized search CF algorithm, with higher total improvement cost.



Figure 3: Total improvement cost as a multiple of the one-shot complete improvement for different effort levels u.

5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

5.1 Experiment Setup

In this section, we empirically study the IPF behaviors of CF algorithms. We use two datasets, Adult Income [20] and German Credit [8] The first dataset is about predicting whether the annual salary is above $50k or not from demographic information collected in the 1994 Census. The second dataset is about predicting whether a person is likely to repay a loan or not from the information about the person's finance and that of the loan.

For each dataset, we use a 80%/20% train/test split and apply one-hot encoding to the categorical features and train a random forest classifier as the model. To compute counterfactual explanations, we use the `DiCE-ML` package, which is one of the most popular Python packages for tabular data and non-differentiable classifiers. For all the experiments, we focus on correctly classified negative instances and generate positively predicted CF explanations for them. This scenario is the most common use case of CF explanations as recourses, but our analysis applies to any model input and prediction. Tab. 1 gives summary statistics about the dataset and model performance, and Tab. 2 presents some inputs and CF instances.

`DiCE-ML` package searches for diverse CF explanation diversity Mothilal et al. [27] in various ways. Since the random forest classifier is not meaningfully differentiable (zero gradient almost everywhere), we study random search – the default method, genetic search algorithm – based on the method by Schleich et al. [35], and prototype-guided search with KD tree – based on the method by Van Looveren and Klaise [41]. The generated CF explanations are post-processed for sparsity with a feature selection procedure.

In addition, `DiCE-ML` can generate multiple CF explanations. We study two setups, a single CF explanation (which is still stochastic for random and genetic algorithm search), and 20 CF explanations.

Table 1: Statistics about the dataset and the model.

Dataset	# Instance	# Feature (Cat./Num.)	Acc	F1
Adult Income	32,561	13 (8/5)	0.84	0.66
German Credit	1,000	24 (17/7)	0.74	0.83

Table 2: One sample input instance and two counterfactual explanations for Adult Income (top) and German Credit (bottom). Non-changed feature values are marked with "-". Some non-changed features are omitted for presentation.

Age	Work Class	Education	Education Num	Marital Status	Occupation	Relationship	Race	Gender	Capital Gain	Capital Loss	Work Hours	Native Country	$m(x)$
42	Self-Employed	HS-Grad	9	Married	Craft-Repair	Husband	White	Male	0	0	35	United States	$\leq \$50k$
-	-	Doctorate	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	$> \$50k$
-	Local Gov	-	14	-	Manager	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	$> \$50k$

Gender	Single	Age	Loan Duration	Purpose of Loan	Loan Amount	Years at Current Home	# Other Loans	# Dependents	Has Telephone	No Current Loan	Bank Balance	Housing	$m(x)$
Male	True	42	6	Electronics	1346	4	1	2	True	False	0	Own	Deny
-	-	-	24	Other	-	3	0	1	-	True	-	-	Approve
-	-	-	12	Other	-	1	0	-	-	True	0-200	-	Approve

Figure 4: Final success rate of IPF.

In the latter case, we consider three CF selection strategies carried out by the subject:

(1) closest: select the closest CF instance,
(2) weighted: sample a CF instance from a softmax function (with temperature 1) on the negative distance, and
(3) uniform: select one CF instance uniformly at random.

In other words, closest and uniform selections are equivalent to weighted selection with temperature approaching 0 and ∞ respectively. We call the setup where only one CF is generated (and hence no selection necessary) as "single CF."

For IPF, we use a maximum number of $T = 30$ iterations and evaluate effort level u from the set of $\{0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9\}$ along with one-shot complete fulfillment $u = 1$. At the lowest effort level of $u = 0.1$, if the counterfactual explanations were consistent each round, after 30 rounds the input would be to more than 95% towards the CF ($1 - 0.9^{30} = 95.8\%$). We do not employ the ϵ parameter as none of the algorithms return CF instances exactly on the boundary.

5.2 Results

We first answer the most fundamental question. Can CF algorithms lead to positive predictions in the face of IPF? Fig. 4 shows the success rate of IPF (up to the maximum number of 30 iterations). Most runs with effort level $u \geq 0.3$ succeed *eventually* without any issue (i.e., getting a positive model prediction). For $u = 0.1$, Genetic and Prototype algorithms struggle the most, especially when the final CF is stochastically selected from a diverse set with weighted or uniform distributions.

Focusing on the input instances for which all methods succeed (to ensure a fair comparison), we study the main quantity of interest, total improvement cost under IPF, relative to the one-shot baseline, as plotted in Fig. 5. We observe a variety of behaviors across



Figure 5: Average total cost at each effort level u relative to that of the one-shot fulfillment $u = 1$ for different setups.

different setups. The trade-off between cost decrease due to conservatism of CF algorithms (i.e., outputting instances far from the decision boundary) and cost increase due to their non-optimality is best shown on the Adult Income dataset by Genetic and Prototype algorithms, under uniform and weighted selection strategies. In this cases, taking very small steps of $u = 0.1$ results in lower total improvement cost than taking medium steps of $u = 0.3$ and 0.5 which may incur a 80% higher cost, because the small steps in the former helps stop closer to the decision boundary, yet all three choices are inferior to even larger u values, where the inconsistency in different iterations of the search is largely avoided. By comparison, the total improvement cost in other setups of Adult Income are not too sensitive to IPF, although it can have both mildly negative (for Random search with Closest selection) and mildly positive effects (for the remaining setups).



Figure 6: Average number of steps (for successful runs) incurred under different levels of partial fulfillment effort u.

On German Credit, the Genetic and Prototype algorithms exhibit the opposite effect, showing a monotonic cost decrease with less effort level u. One possible reason for this phenomenon is the high-dimensionality of the input space of German Credit vs. Adult Income (24 vs. 13), with more than twice as many categorical features. Thus, it is more likely for *some* categorical features to be changed in German Credit, which, in conjunction with conservative CF explanations, results in smaller total cost under low effort levels. The performance of the Random CF algorithm is similar to that in Adult Income, though with slightly higher variance.

Fig. 6 plots the average number of steps until success (for runs that do succeed). As expected, the number increases with decreasing u, but the speed of increase varies a lot, with those for Genetic and Prototype algorithms on Adult Income being the largest. Interestingly, the closest selection strategy for the Random search algorithm (orange bar on the leftmost plot) performs markedly worse than the rest, suggesting that such strictly greedy selection from a random sample may be especially suboptimal under IPF. For German Credit, the profiles across different algorithms are largely similar, confirming again that properties of the dataset can be influential in the IPF behaviors of the CF algorithms.

Overall, the three analyses above demonstrates a variety of behaviors of algorithms under IPF, and hence we advocate for them to be included in a standard suite of evaluations for CF algorithms, as well as considered when developing new CF algorithms. From a human perspective, it may also be necessary to for model users (e.g., banks) to provide explicit guidelines to subjects (e.g., mortgage applicants) to calibrate their expectations on this aspect, which may require new policies to be established on this issue. We provide more discussions in Sec. 6.

For the rest of this section, we demonstrate how IPF can be incorporated in other, existing aspects of analysis. In particular, as a preliminary investigation, we study the fairness of CF algorithms under IPF. Additional ideas are again discussed in Sec. 6. At a high level, the fairness property requires that different demographic groups (e.g., male vs. female, white vs. other race, etc.) should be treated "equally," with different criteria implementing this notion differently. The criterion that we use is demographic parity [9, 14, 24], one of the simplest and most popular, which basically asserts that for a fair metric (e.g., mortgage application approval), its average value is the same across different demographic groups. Viewed from this angle, we study the fairness of total improvement cost and number of steps under the concept of demographic parity.



Figure 7: Demographic parity ratio for relative total cost.

We consider four demographic group splits in the fairness evaluation, commonly used in the literature [5, 37, 38]. For Adult Income, we study gender with a male/female split, and race with a white/non-white split. For German Credit, we use the same gender split, along with marital status with a married/single split. For each group, we take the second value (e.g., female) as the potentially disadvantaged group and study the ratio of the target of investigation in the disadvantaged group to that in the advantaged group.

We first study the total improvement cost. Note that we compute the ratio of *relative* total cost (relative to $u = 1$), to assess whether IPF *further* exacerbate the fairness issue, on top of what is already observed in the literature for vanilla CF explanations [45], the same target as in Fig. 5. The ratio for these four groups are plotted in Fig. 7, and while we could not identify any clear and consistent trend, IPF could increase the fairness issue as measured by demographic parity by as much as 30% for the German Credit model in some settings.

On the number of steps to achieve success, Fig. 8 plots the ratio. The trend is more pronounced. In most setups, the ratio increases as u gets smaller, indicating that IPF has a disproportionately higher impact on the disadvantaged group. Given that the total cost does



Figure 8: Demographic parity ratio for number of steps.

not demonstrate a clear trend, this means that the per-step improvement cost is *smaller* for the disadvantaged group, which means that the generated CF instances are closer to the queried inputs in the first place. Nonetheless, we leave a definitive verification and further exploration of the implications to future work.

6 DISCUSSION

In this paper, we propose the concept of iterative partial fulfillment, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the first formal study of the situation where the subject of a negative model prediction (e.g., denied mortgage application) does not completely fulfill the given counterfactual (CF) explanation before asking for an updated prediction, for many reasons. First, the subject may intentionally decide to take a chance (e.g., betting that a monthly salary increase of $800 is enough even though the CF instance requires $1,000), hoping that a state less qualified than the given CF state is sufficient to secure a positive prediction. Second, the subject may not be able to fully satisfy the CF state (e.g., can only pay down two out of four credit card accounts), especially if given a time limit on the CF validity guarantee (e.g., within the next six months). Furthermore, the subject may misinterpret the CF explanation, such as fulfilling any one of the action items rather than all of them when it is presented as a bullet list. When the partial fulfillment does not result in a positive model prediction, the subject receives a new CF state as part of the rejection and performs an improvement towards the new state. This process repeats until the model prediction is positive, and we call it *iterative partial fulfillment* (IPF).

Given that virtually all CF algorithms are memoryless (i.e., the CF explanation is generated from only the current input), and most employ local gradient-based or randomized search, it is possible that the CF explanation for a (still negative) partially fulfilled state is different from that of the original input, guiding the subject on a different path of improvement. As a result, the net effect of IPF on the welfare of the subject, most directly measured by final success rate and total improvement cost, could be positive or negative.

A positive effect could occur when the generated CF instance is conservative, i.e., lying far into the positive prediction region. Such a CF algorithm configuration could be preferred if the model user (e.g., the bank) wants to ensure that the subject is likely to get a positive prediction even if they cannot perfectly follow the CF recommendation. The exact same reasoning allows the subject to engage proactively in partial fulfillment and save on the improvement cost. By contrast, a negative effect could occur when the CF explanation provides different and conflicting advice at different rounds of partial fulfillment.

In our theoretical analysis, we prove that the optimal cost CF algorithm and its finite search approximation version are guaranteed to not increase total cost under IPF. However, the same could not be said for two popular practical algorithms, gradient ascent and randomized search, both of which worsen subject welfare, sometimes significantly and even potentially unboundedly in theory.

In our experimental investigation on two datasets, Adult Income and German Credit, totalling 24 CF explainer configurations, we identified both positive and negative effects of IPF, suggesting that IPF is sensitive to properties of the dataset and explainer. As a result, we recommend IPF analysis to be included as part of a standard evaluation suite of CF algorithms.

For future work, one direction is to consider alternative formulations of IPF. We use a deterministic, fixed-proportion model for continuous features (i.e., for current feature value of x_d and target value x'_d, partial fulfillment results in $(1-u)\cdot x_d + u \cdot x'_d$), but this step could be made stochastic by sampling from some distribution centered on $(1-u)\cdot x_d + u \cdot x'_d$, or a fixed-magnitude model could be used where the amount of improvement Δ_d on each feature is specified. Alternative models on categorical features could also be developed. Last, improvements on some features may be correlated, due to the underlying causal relationships (e.g., change in job title $\rightarrow$ change in salary), so incorporating causal information, potentially in the form of a causal graph, could be explored. Moreover, finding CF algorithms that are stable with respect to more than

one IPF notion would be desirable, as different subjects are likely to employ different IPF approaches.

Additionally, the temporal aspect of the IPF could be studied with more real-world elements. As time goes by in the IPF process, some feature values, such as age, would change in certain manners, which is ignored in the current formulation. Moreover, the very act of querying for a new model prediction may have an impact on some features, such as the bank account balance due to the payment of an application fee, or the credit score due to the bank pulling the credit report, which, at least in the United States, results in a small decrease of the credit score.

One direction to extend the IPF analysis is to integrate it with other aspects of evaluations. We give a demonstration for the case of fairness, and future work could focus on aspects such as its stability to input perturbations [7, 44] and model shifts [32].

In addition, we focus on IPF analyses of existing CF algorithms, but as a recurring theme of research, the other side of the coin naturally follows: developing new CF algorithms or regularizing existing ones to behave well under IPF scenarios, following analogous works for other CF properties such as robustness [38] and fairness [12].

Finally, given the diverse and potentially discriminative effects exhibited by IPF, society needs to be better informed and aware of it, especially as some subjects have already been engaging in such behaviors. For example, when the rejection letter of a mortgage application provides some CF explanations as recommendations, the bank may want to, or even be required to, include information about possible outcomes of a re-application with only partial fulfillment. In addition, the application process could allow the applicant to voluntarily reveal their previous applications, so that more stable and consistent CF explanations can be computed, in order to minimize the possibility of conflicting improvement recommendations given to the applicant. All of these changes require not only technical innovations but also policy discussions, for which we hope that this paper serves as a good starting point for such conversations.

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Multicalibrated Regression for Downstream Fairness

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ABSTRACT

We show how to take a regression function $\hat{f}$ that is appropriately *multicalibrated* and efficiently post-process it into an approximately error minimizing classifier satisfying a large variety of fairness constraints. The post-processing requires no labeled data, and only a modest amount of unlabeled data and computation. The computational and sample complexity requirements of computing $\hat{f}$ are comparable to the requirements for solving a single fair learning task optimally, but it can in fact be used to solve *many* different downstream fairness-constrained learning problems efficiently. Our post-processing method easily handles intersecting groups, generalizing prior work on post-processing regression functions to satisfy fairness constraints that only applied to disjoint groups. Our work extends recent work showing that multicalibrated regression functions are *omnipredictors* (i.e. can be post-processed to optimally solve unconstrained ERM problems) to constrained optimization problems.

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1 INTRODUCTION

A now common technical framing of fair machine learning is that of constrained optimization. The goal is to solve an empirical risk minimization problem over some class of models $\mathcal{H}$, subject to fairness constraints. For example, we might ask to find the best performing model $h \in \mathcal{H}$ that equalizes false positive rates, false negative rates, overall error rates, or positive classification rates across some collection of groups $\mathcal{G}$ [7, 13]). For each of these notions of fairness, there is a continuum of relaxations to consider: rather than asking that (e.g.) false positive rates be exactly equalized across groups, we could ask that they differ by no more than 5%, or 10%, or 15%, etc. Because these relaxations trade off with model accuracy (tracing out Pareto frontiers), it is common to explore the range of tradeoffs for a family of fairness constraints[1] (see e.g. [1, 18]).

Each of these are distinct problems that seemingly require training distinct models from scratch based on training data. Moreover, each of these problems can be computationally expensive to solve: for example, the approach of [1] requires solving roughly $\log |\mathcal{G}|/\epsilon^2$ empirical risk minimization problems over $\mathcal{H}$ to produce an ϵ-approximately optimal solution to any one of them, and the computation of one solution is not used to reduce the cost of the others. The goal of our work is to understand when we can precompute a *single* regression model $\hat{f}$ which is sufficient to find optimal solutions to *all* of the fair machine learning problems described above, each as only a computationally easy *post-processing* of $\hat{f}$.

1.1 Our Results in Context

The idea of *post-processing* a trained model $\hat{f}$ in order to satisfy fairness constraints is not new. For example, [13] propose a simple post-processing of a regression function $\hat{f}$ to derive a classifier subject to false positive or negative rate constraints, and a number of more recent works have refined this approach (see our discussion in the related work). However, the conditions under which such post-processing approaches work are still not yet fully understood. The original work of [13] handles the case in which the groups $\mathcal{G}$ are disjoint, by finding a different *thresholding* of $\hat{f}$ for each group $g \in \mathcal{G}$—but this approach does not scale well to intersecting groups, since it would naively require tuning a different threshold to each of the possibly 2^k intersections of k underlying groups. [13] and [4] show that this post-processing yields the Bayes Optimal fair classifier if $\hat{f}$ is the true conditional label distribution—a very strong assumption. In this work, we show how to efficiently post-process a regression function to obtain a variety of "fair" classifiers, even when the groups $\mathcal{G}$ in question intersect, and give accuracy guarantees under substantially weaker assumptions on $\hat{f}$ than that it correctly encodes the true conditional label distribution.

Post Processing for Intersecting Groups. Suppose we have $k = |\mathcal{G}|$ groups that are intersecting (e.g. divisions of a population by race, gender, income, nationality, etc.) A naive reduction to the post-processing approach of [13] would consider all 2^k (now disjoint) intersections of groups, and find a separate thresholding of $\hat{f}(x)$ for each one. We show that even when groups intersect, for a variety of fairness constraints, the optimal post-processing $\hat{h}$ remains a

[1] Hereafter, we refer to such constraints as "fairness constraints", and models which satisfy the constraint or constraints of interest as "fair"; we will specify precisely which set of constraints we handle in Section 2. Assume fairness constraints are defined with respect to a collection of groups $\mathcal{G}$.

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thresholding that depends on only k parameters λ_g, one for each group g. The value at which to threshold $\hat{f}(x)$ now depends only on these k parameters and the subset of groups that x is contained in. We give a simple, efficient algorithm to compute these optimal post-processings. The algorithm is efficient in the worst case — i.e. it does not have to call any heuristic "learning oracle" as direct learning approaches do [1, 18], and requires access only to a modest amount of *unlabeled* data from the underlying distribution.

Accuracy Guarantees from Multicalibration. As in [13] when given the Bayes optimal regression function $\hat{f}$ (i.e. $\hat{f}(x)$ is the expected value of y given x), our post-processing $\hat{h}$ yields the Bayes optimal fair classifier. However, one generally cannot hope to learn the Bayes optimal regression function $\hat{f}$ given a polynomial amount of data and computation. Fortunately, we show one can inexpensively compute the most accurate fair classifier in a class $\mathcal{H}$ from a much weaker regression function, namely, from a model $\hat{f}$ which is *multicalibrated* with respect to a class of models $\mathcal{H}$, a class of groups $\mathcal{G}$, and a simple class of functions derived from $\mathcal{H}$ and $\mathcal{G}$. Learning such a multicalibrated predictor with respect to these classes can be done with polynomial sample complexity in an oracle-efficient manner whenever $\mathcal{H}$ and $\mathcal{G}$ have polynomial VC dimension — and so both the sample and computational complexity of computing $\hat{f}$ are comparable to what would be required to directly solve a single instance of a fairness constrained optimization problem over $\mathcal{H}$.

Taken together, our results suggest that even when a downstream task requires a fairness notion which approximately equalizes statistical loss across groups, this is *not* necessarily what should be trained. Aiming instead for group-wise fidelity in the form of *multicalibration* provides the flexibility to deploy an optimal downstream model subject to a variety of fairness constraints without destroying information that would be needed to later relax or tighten those constraints, to remove them or to add more, or to change their type.

1.2 Additional Related Work

There are a number of other papers that study the problem of converting a regression (or "score") function into a classification rule in the context of fair machine learning. For example, [21] shows that post-processing a learned binary classification model to satisfy fairness constraints can be substantially suboptimal even when the hypothesis class under consideration contains the Bayes optimal predictor, which motivates a focus on post-processing regression functions instead. [22] study the structure of the Bayes optimal fair classifier for several notions of fairness when groups are intersecting, under a continuity assumption on the underlying distribution; they do not consider utility guarantees for post-processing a regression function that does not completely represent the underlying probability distribution. [20] and [2] give post-processing algorithms that transforms a score function into a classification function that optimizes different measures of accuracy subject to a variety of fairness constraints using a similar primal/dual perspective that we use in this paper. But these papers do not address the two main questions we raise in our work: intersecting groups, and efficiently learnable conditions on the score function that lead to utility guarantees (they assume that in the limit the true conditional label distribution is learnable and given as input to their algorithm).

In proving our accuracy bounds, we draw on a recent line of work on multicalibration [8, 12, 14, 16, 19]. In particular, [11] showed that regression functions that are multicalibrated with respect to a class of models $\mathcal{H}$ are *omnipredictors* with respect to $\mathcal{H}$, which means that they can be post-processed to perform as well as the best model in $\mathcal{H}$ with respect to any convex loss function satisfying mild technical conditions. The results in our paper can be viewed as being a *constrained optimization* parallel to [11], which studies *unconstrained* optimization.

Several other papers also use multicalibration of intermediate statistical products to argue for the utility of downstream models. [23] consider the problem of calibrating a model to the utility function of a downstream utility maximizing decision maker to preserve the usefulness of the model for the decision-maker. [5] show that a proxy model for a protected attribute can be useful in enforcing fairness constraints on a downstream model when the real protected attribute is not available if the proxy is appropriately multicalibrated. [10] study how refining a regression function affects the fairness and accuracy of downstream models derived from it; they propose in their discussion that multicalibration might provide a means to provide guarantees for overlapping populations; our work can be seen as carrying out this proposal.

[15] independently study a problem similar to ours. Our two papers derive a closely related but incomparable set of results. [15] tackles a more general problem, and studies a richer set of objective functions and constraints (whereas we restrict attention to the classification error objective and fairness motivated constraints). In contrast, in our paper, we are able to take advantage of the additional structure of our problem to derive improved bounds. In particular, we can handle intersecting groups (with running time and sample complexity depending polynomially on the number of groups), whereas [15] requires taking all of the exponentially many group intersections to recover disjoint groups—which leads to an exponential (in the number of groups) loss in the running time and sample complexity. Similarly, they require more precise multicalibration as more groups are added, whereas we derive results from a multicalibrated predictor with parameter that is independent of the number of groups.

1.3 Limitations

This work (and the literature to which it contributes) explores algorithmic approaches that reduce complex and and ambiguous social ideas of fairness to mathematical formalisms (such as equality of false positive rates between coarse-grained groups of individuals). Our work can be applied only when evaluating the membership of an individual in a group is well-defined, when consideration of group membership is legal[2], and when the training data is representative of the underlying population. There will be contexts in which these assumptions are either false, overly simplistic, or bypass larger questions. As an example, an application might be fair in its performance but fundamentally unethical in the first place, or groups may be systematically underrepresented in datasets. In the latter case, the guarantees of our work cannot be interpreted as

[2]Note that in some contexts such as consumer lending in the United States, direct consideration of membership in protected groups such as race is illegal. However, demographic information can be used when designing and auditing a decision-making process, so long as those characteristics are not part of the real-time lending decisions.

guarantees relative to the optimal predictor for the true distribution over groups.

It is worth noting that while the assumption that we can define group membership of individuals simplifies the complexities of personal identity, this work does improve on the existing literature on post-processing approaches to fairness in that it allows for *non-disjoint*, or intersectional, group membership. In general, this work (and all work in algorithmic fairness) should not be assumed to "solve" fairness. Instead it should be taken as a tool in a larger system to evaluate and remediate issues of fairness and ethics in machine learning.

2 PRELIMINARIES

We study regression and binary classification problems. Let $\mathcal{X}$ be an arbitrary feature space and $\mathcal{Y} = \{0, 1\}$ be a binary label space. A classification problem is defined by an underlying data distribution $\mathcal{D} \in \Delta(\mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y})$. In general we will not have direct access to the data distribution, but rather only to samples drawn i.i.d. from $\mathcal{D}$. We let D denote a dataset of size n, drawn i.i.d. from $\mathcal{D}$: $D \sim \mathcal{D}^n$.

We will study both regression functions $f : \mathcal{X} \to \mathbb{R}$ and classification functions (classifiers) $h : \mathcal{X} \to \{0, 1\}$. In general we will use f and variants (f^*, $\hat{f}$, etc.) when speaking of regression functions and h and variants (h^*, $\hat{h}$, etc.) when speaking of classification functions. Our interest will be in regression functions used to estimate conditional label expectations in binary prediction problems, and so the natural range of our regression functions will be (discrete subsets of) $[0, 1]$. When discussing classification error, we will use ℓ to denote the 0-1 loss function.

Definition 1 (Bayes Optimal Regression Function). *We let f^* denote the* Bayes optimal regression function $f^* = \arg\min_f \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}(f(x) - y)^2$ *which takes value:*

$$f^*(x) = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(x',y')\sim\mathcal{D}}[y'|x' = x]$$

Remark 1. *f^* encodes the true conditional label expectations. We use property of Bayes optimality going forward. We do not use that f^* also minimizes squared error.*

Let $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{X}}$ denote the marginal distribution on features induced by projecting $\mathcal{D}$ onto $\mathcal{X}$. Note that we can equivalently sample a pair $(x, y) \sim \mathcal{D}$ by first sampling $x \sim \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{X}}$ and then sampling $y = 1$ with probability $f^*(x)$ and $y = 0$ otherwise.

Given a classifier $h : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$, and a data distribution $\mathcal{D}$, we can refer to various notions of error. We will be interested in both overall error and on subsets of the data that we call *groups* (which we might think of as demographic groups when the data represents people). We will represent groups by group indicator functions:

Definition 2. *Let $\mathcal{G}$ denote a collection of* groups, *each represented by a group indicator function $g : \mathcal{X} \to \{0, 1\}$. If $g(x) = 1$ we call x a* member *of group g. Let I denote the group containing all elements ($I(x) = 1$ for all x). We will always assume that $I \in \mathcal{G}$.*

We allow $\mathcal{G}$ to contain arbitrarily intersecting groups. We now use this notation to denote the error rates and false positive rates a classifier has over these groups.

Definition 3. *The error of a classifier $h : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$ on a group g as measured over distribution $\mathcal{D}$ is:*

$$err(h, g, \mathcal{D}) = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[\ell(h(x), y)|g(x) = 1]$$

The false positive rate (FPR) of a classifier $h : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$ on a group g is:

$$\rho(h, g, \mathcal{D}) = \mathbb{P}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[h(x) = 1|y = 0, g(x) = 1]$$

When h is a randomized classifier, the probabilities are computed over the randomness of h as well. For convenience, we write $err(h) = err(h, I, \mathcal{D})$, $\rho_g(h) \equiv \rho(h, g, \mathcal{D})$, and $\rho(h) \equiv \rho(h, I, \mathcal{D})$.

Definition 4. *We say that classifier $h : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$ satisfies γ-False Positive (FP) Fairness with respect to $\mathcal{D}$ and $\mathcal{G}$ if for all $g \in \mathcal{G}$,*

$$w_g \left|\rho_g(h) - \rho(h)\right| \leq \gamma.$$

where $w_g = \mathbb{P}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[y = 0, g(x) = 1]$.

Remark 2. *In the above definition, we include a multiplicative factor that provides slack in the fairness guarantee for groups with small weight over the distribution. This approximation parameter is necessary for learning from a finite sample, as statistical estimation over small groups is inherently more difficult. An equivalent alternative would be to remove the w_g term in our constraints and provide guarantees only for groups for whom w_g is sufficiently large.*

Remark 3. *We will find it convenient to work with an equivalent formulation of error and false positive rates which do not explicitly condition on $g(x) = 1$, but instead multiply by $g(x)$:*

$$\begin{aligned}
err(h, g) &= \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[\ell(h(x), y)|g(x) = 1] \\
&= \sum_v v \cdot \mathbb{P}_{(x,y)}[\ell(h(x), y) = v|g(x) = 1] \\
&= \sum_v v \cdot \frac{\mathbb{P}_{(x,y)}[\ell(h(x), y) = v \cap g(x) = 1]}{\mathbb{P}[g(x) = 1]} \\
&= \sum_v v \cdot \frac{\mathbb{P}_{(x,y)}[\ell(h(x), y) \cdot g(x) = v]}{\mathbb{P}[g(x) = 1]} \\
&= \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x,y}[\ell(h(x), y) \cdot g(x)] \cdot \frac{1}{\mathbb{P}[g(x) = 1]}
\end{aligned}$$

For the sake of brevity, in the main body of this paper we prove all results in the context of γ-False Positive Fairness. We discuss the modifications necessary to extend the results to other fairness notions in Appendix A.

We will study how to derive classifiers with optimal error properties, subject to fairness-motivated constraints on group-wise error rates, from regression functions satisfying *multicalibration* constraints [14]. Informally, if $\hat{f}$ is multicalibrated with respect to a class of functions C, then $\hat{f}(x)$ takes values equal to $f^*(x)$ in expectation, even conditional on both the value of $\hat{f}(x)$ and on the value of $c(x)$ for each $c \in C$. We use two variants. The first (multicalibration in expectation) was defined and studied in [11]:

Definition 5 (Multicalibration in Expectation [11, 14]). *Fix a distribution $\mathcal{D}$ and C a collection of functions $c : \mathcal{X} \to \{0, 1\}$. Fix a predictor $\hat{f} : \mathcal{X} \to R$ where R is some discrete domain $R \subset [0, 1]$.*

We say $\hat{f}$ is α-approximately multicalibrated with respect to C if for every $c \in C$:

$$\sum_{v \in R} \mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x) = v] \left| \mathbb{E}\left[(\hat{f} - f^*)(x) c(x) \middle| \hat{f}(x) = v \right] \right| \leq \alpha.$$

We will require this notion of multicalibration with respect to the set of groups $\mathcal{G}$ with which we define our fairness constraints, for the classifiers $h \in \mathcal{H}$, and for the intersection of these classes $\mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{H} = \{g(x) \cdot h(x) | g \in \mathcal{G}, h \in \mathcal{H}\}$. We will also need a variant of multicalibration that is tailored to two-argument functions $c : \mathcal{X} \times R \to \{0, 1\}$ in order to argue about the properties of thresholding functions, which take both a value $x \in \mathcal{X}$ and a threshold in a discrete domain $R \subseteq [0, 1]$, and which threshold predictions to $\{0, 1\}$.

In this definition, when we condition on $\hat{f}(x) = v$, we also condition on the second argument of c taking the same value v. We call this *joint* multicalibration. It is only a modest generalization of multicalibration: we verify in Appendix C that existing algorithms for obtaining multicalibrated predictors easily extend to our definition of joint multicalibration.

Definition 6 (Joint Multicalibration in Expectation). *We say that a predictor $\hat{f} : \mathcal{X} \to R$ where R is some discrete domain $R \subseteq [0, 1]$ is α-approximately jointly multicalibrated with respect to a class C of functions $c : \mathcal{X} \times R \to \{0, 1\}$ if for every $c \in C$:*

$$\sum_{v \in R} \mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x) = v] \left| \mathbb{E}\left[(\hat{f} - f^*)(x) \cdot c(x, v) \middle| \hat{f}(x) = v \right] \right| \leq \alpha.$$

3 THE STRUCTURE OF AN OPTIMAL POST-PROCESSING

In this section, we consider a fairness-constrained optimization problem of finding a model (or distribution over models) in $\mathcal{H}$ that minimizes error subject to a constraint on group-wise false positive rates:

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{h \in \Delta\mathcal{H}} \quad & \text{err}(h) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & w_g |\rho_g(h) - \rho(h)| \leq \gamma \quad \text{for each } g \in \mathcal{G}, \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where $w_g, \rho_g(h)$, and $\rho(h)$ are defined as in Definition 3.

We now rewrite this error minimization optimization in a more convenient and more general form below. First, we describe the error of h with respect to an arbitrary regression function f, which is just how far h is from matching f's conditional label distribution. This error total error can be broken down into events $h(x) = 1$, of which an $1 - f(x)$ fraction should be 0; and where $h(x) = 0$, of which an $f(x)$ fraction should be 1. We rewrite the constraint in a similar fashion, switching from conditioning on group membership to multiplying by the indicator function as described in Remark 3.

Definition 7. *Let $f : \mathcal{X} \to R \subseteq [0, 1]$ be some regression function and let $\gamma \in \mathbb{R}_+$. Define $\psi(f, \gamma, \mathcal{H})$ to be the following optimization problem:*

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{h \in \Delta\mathcal{H}} \quad & \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_\mathcal{X}} [(1 - f(x)) \cdot \ell(h(x), 0) \\ & \quad + f(x) \cdot \ell(h(x), 1)] \\ \text{s.t. for each } g \in \mathcal{G}: \quad & |\mathbb{E}[(1 - f(x)) \cdot \ell(h(x), 0) \cdot g(x)] \\ & \quad - \beta_g \mathbb{E}\left[(1 - f(x)) \cdot \ell(h(x), 0)\right]| \leq \gamma, \end{aligned}$$

where $\beta_g = \mathbb{P}[g(x) = 1 | y = 0]$.

For $f = f^*$, this definition is equivalent to 1:

Lemma 1. *optimalfair Let f^* be the Bayes optimal regression function over $\mathcal{D}$. Then optimization problem $\psi(f^*, \gamma, \mathcal{H})$ is equivalent to the fairness-constrained optimization problem* (1).

The proof is in Appendix B. We will be interested in the properties of the optimal solution to $\psi(f, \gamma, \mathcal{H})$, which will be elucidated via its Lagrangian. Note that the optimization problem has $2|\mathcal{G}|$ linear inequality constraints. Let $\lambda = \{\lambda_g^\pm\}_{g \in \mathcal{G}}$ denote the vector of $2|\mathcal{G}|$ dual variables corresponding to those constraints, and write $\lambda_g = \lambda_g^+ - \lambda_g^-$.

Definition 8 (Lagrangian). *Given any regression function f, we define a Lagrangian of the optimization problem $\psi(f, \gamma, \mathcal{H})$ as $L_f : \mathcal{H} \times \mathbb{R}^{2|\mathcal{G}|} \to \mathbb{R}$:*

$$\begin{aligned} L_f(h, \lambda) = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_\mathcal{X}} \Big[& f(x)\ell(h(x), 1) + (1 - f(x))\ell(h(x), 0) \\ & + \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g^+ (1 - f(x)) \big(\ell(h(x), 0) g(x) \\ & - \beta_g (1 - f(x)) \ell(h(x), 0) - \gamma \big) \\ & + \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g^- \left(\beta_g \ell(h(x), 0)(1 - f(x)) \right. \\ & \left. - (1 - f(x)) \ell(h(x), 0) g(x) - \gamma \right) \Big]. \end{aligned}$$

For convenience, given a Bayes optimal regressor f^*, we write $L^* = L_{f^*}$. Given any regressor $\hat{f}$, we write $\hat{L} = L_{\hat{f}}$.

Let $\mathcal{H}_A = 2^\mathcal{X}$ be the set of all Boolean functions $h : \mathcal{X} \to \{0, 1\}$. We will consider solving our optimization problem over $\mathcal{H}_A$.

3.1 Computing the optimally post-processed classifier

To approximate h given f, we need to compute an approximately optimal solution to the linear program $\psi(f, \gamma, \mathcal{H}_A)$. We accomplish this by playing a no-regret vs. best response algorithm over the primal and dual variables of the linear program [9]. The dual player is playing gradient descent over the set of dual variables λ and the primal player best responds by updating their current hypothesis.

To implement the gradient step in practice, we need to estimate the losses of h with respect to f from a finite sample. We can do this using a sample of unlabelled data of size which scales logarithmically in the number of constraints and linearly in the number of rounds T of the no-regret dynamics.

The full formulation of the optimization problem as a zero-sum game and the main algorithm, Algorithm 4, is in Appendix B.

We now introduce notation to describe the structure of the functions output by Algorithm 4, which will be useful when we discuss the necessary multicalibration requirements in the following subsection.

Definition 9 (Set of thresholding functions $\mathcal{B}(C)$). *Let $x_\mathcal{G} \in \{0, 1\}^{|\mathcal{G}|}$ denote the group membership indicator vector of some point x. Define the function*

$$d(v) := \frac{2v - 1}{1 - v}.$$

Then, let for any λ, x, β

$$s_\lambda(x, v) := 1[\langle \lambda, x_{\mathcal{G}} - \beta \rangle \geq d(v)].$$

Define $\mathcal{B}(C) = \{s_\lambda | \lambda \in \Lambda(C), \beta = \beta_{g_1}, \ldots, \beta_{g_{|\mathcal{G}|}}\}$, where $\Lambda(C) = \left\{\lambda \in \mathbb{R}^{2|\mathcal{G}|} \middle| \|\lambda\|_1 \leq C\right\}$ and $\beta_g = \mathbb{P}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[g(x) = 1 | y = 0]$, as defined in Definition 7.

Informally, these functions take an example, and map it to a vector of its group membership, indicating whether a λ-weighting of the example's group membership is larger than some threshold $d(v)$. In the following section, we use joint multicalibration with respect to such functions in order to relate the estimated error to the approximate LP solution to its true error. These thresholding functions $\mathcal{B}(C)$ have a natural relationship to the deterministic thresholded models that we compute at each round of algorithm: we show in Appendix B that the solution at each iteration of Algorithm 4 is exactly a function belonging to $\mathcal{B}(C)$.

Theorem 1. *algmain Let* OPT *be the objective value of the optimal solution to $\psi(f, \gamma, \mathcal{H}_A)$. Then, for any $C \in \mathbb{R}$, after $T = \frac{1}{4} \cdot C^2 \cdot \left(C^2 + 4|\mathcal{G}|\right)^2$ iterations, Algorithm 4 outputs a randomized hypothesis $\bar{h}$ with the following properties:*

- *the error of the output satisfies $err(\bar{h}) \leq \text{OPT} + \frac{2}{C}$*
- *the constraint violation of the output satisfies $w_g|\rho_g(\bar{h}) - \rho(\bar{h})| \leq \gamma + \frac{1}{C} + \frac{2}{C^2}$*
- *the output $\bar{h}$ is the uniform mixture over T constituent models, each of which belong to the set of threshold functions $\mathcal{B}(C)$.*

The full proof of Theorem 6 is in Appendix B.

Remark 4. *Although we use the standard techniques of Freund and Schapire [9] to solve the LP formulation of the problem, we provide a full description of the techniques and our application of them in Appendix B. We do so to emphasize that this choice is crucial to our solution. The chosen approach allows us to fully specify a post-processing function by deterministically breaking ties in each individual round of the zero-sum game dynamics and then uniformly randomizing over these iterates, each of which are threshold functions belonging to $\mathcal{B}(C)$, to give a final solution which approximately satisfies the desired constraints.*

3.2 From a Multicalibrated Regression Function $\hat{f}$

Thus far, we have considered the optimization problem $\psi(f, \gamma, \mathcal{H}_A)$ in the abstract, have characterized its optimal solution h, and have given a simple algorithm to find $\bar{h}$, an approximately optimal solution. When $f = f^*$, $h = h^*$ is the Bayes optimal fair classifier, and $\bar{h}$ is approximately Bayes optimal. But in practice, we will not have access to f^*, but will instead only have some surrogate function, which we will call $\hat{f}(x)$. We will argue that if $\hat{f}$ is appropriately *multicalibrated*, then it is good enough for our purposes. We will compare the approximate solution $\bar{h}$ produced by Algorithm 4 to the optimization problem $\psi(\hat{f}, \gamma, \mathcal{H}_A)$ which has corresponding Lagrangian $\hat{L}(\hat{h}, \hat{\lambda})$, as defined in Definition 8 to the optimal solution (h^*, λ^*) to the optimization problem $\psi(f^*, \gamma, \mathcal{H})$ for some constrained class $\mathcal{H}$, and show conditions under which they are close.

In order to proceed, we first need to determine what our surrogate function ought to be multicalibrated with respect to. In addition to being α-approximately multicalibrated in expectation with respect to $\mathcal{G}$ and $\mathcal{H}$, we will require that $\hat{f}$ be α-approximately multicalibrated with respect to $\mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{H} = \{g(x) \cdot h(x) | g \in \mathcal{G}, h \in \mathcal{H}\}$. Furthermore, we will need to require that $\hat{f}$ be α-approximately *jointly* multicalibrated in expectation with respect to the set of functions $\mathcal{B}(C) \times \mathcal{G}$.

Remark 5. *When the groups of interest are disjoint, joint multicalibration with respect to the class $\mathcal{B}(C)$ is implied by multicalibration with respect to $\mathcal{G}$. But when groups can intersect, this is not an implication, and satisfying joint multicalibration with respect to $\mathcal{B}(C)$ adds new constraints on $\hat{f}$.*

With these preliminaries behind us, we can now state our main theorem, which shows that for any class of models $\mathcal{H}$ and class of groups $\mathcal{G}$, given an appropriately multicalibrated $\hat{f}$ (with multicalibration requirements depending on $\mathcal{H}$, $\mathcal{G}$, and $\mathcal{B}(C)$), the model $\bar{h}$ output by Algorithm 4 achieves an error rate and fairness guarantees comparable to the optimal solution to $\psi(f^*, \gamma, \mathcal{H})$:

Theorem 2. *finalerror Set $C = \sqrt{1/\alpha}$. Let $\hat{f}$ be α-approximately multicalibrated in expectation with respect to $\mathcal{G}$, $\mathcal{H}$, and $\mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{H}$ and α-approximately jointly multicalibrated in expectation with respect to $\mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{B}(C)$. Let $\bar{h}$ be the result of running Algorithm 4 with input $\hat{f}$ and C. Then, $err(\bar{h}) \leq err(h^*) + \alpha(5 + 2\sqrt{1/\alpha}) + 2\sqrt{\alpha}$, and for all $g \in \mathcal{G}, w_g \left|\rho_g(\bar{h}) - \rho(\bar{h})\right| \leq w_g \left|\rho_g(h^*) - \rho(h^*)\right| + 2\alpha$.*

Proof Sketch. Generalizing notation from the previous sections, let $\text{err}(h) = \mathbb{E}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}[f^*(x)\ell(h(x), 1) + (1 - f^*(x))\ell(h(x), 0)]$ denote the true error of h on the distribution (i.e. as measured according to the true conditional label distribution f^*), and let $\widehat{\text{err}}(h) = \mathbb{E}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}[\hat{f}(x)\ell(h(x), 1) + (1 - \hat{f}(x))\ell(h(x), 0)]$ denote the error of h as estimated using the surrogate function $\hat{f}$. At a high level, the proof of Theorem 7 will proceed as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{err}(h^*) &= L^*(h^*, \lambda^*) && (2)\\
&\geq L^*(h^*, \hat{\lambda}) && (3)\\
&\approx \hat{L}(h^*, \hat{\lambda}) && (4)\\
&\geq \hat{L}(\hat{h}, \hat{\lambda}) && (5)\\
&= \widehat{\text{err}}(\hat{h}) && (6)\\
&\approx \widehat{\text{err}}(\bar{h}) && (7)\\
&\approx \text{err}(\bar{h}). && (8)
\end{aligned}$$

Each of these steps takes a lemma (presented in full in the appendix) to justify, but the logic is at a high level as follows: The equalities on Lines 2 and 6 follow from complimentary slackness: at the optimal solution (h^*, λ^*) it must be that for each constraint g either the constraint is exactly tight so that its "violation" term in the Lagrangian evaluates to 0, or its corresponding dual variable $\lambda_g^{\pm} = 0$. Thus, all terms in the Lagrangian other than the objective evaluate to 0. The inequality in Line 3 follows from the dual optimality condition that $\lambda^* \in \arg\max_\lambda L^*(h^*, \lambda)$ and similarly the inequality in Line 5 follows from the primal optimality condition that $\hat{h} \in \arg\min_{h\in\mathcal{H}_A} \hat{L}(h, \hat{\lambda})$. Line 7 follows from the fact that $\bar{h}$ is an approximately optimal solution to $\psi(\hat{f}, \gamma, \mathcal{H}_A)$. Lines 4 and 8

follow from our multicalibration guarantees, the former from multicalibration with respect to groups and our hypothesis class, and the latter from joint multicalibration with respect to the functions $\mathcal{B}(C) \times \mathcal{G}$.

We provide the proof of Lines 4 and 8 below. The first to demonstrate how we use multicalibration to show closeness of the Lagrangian with respect to the Bayes optimal regressor f^* and the Lagrangian with respect to the multicalibrated regressor $\hat{f}$; the second to demonstrate how we use joint multicalibration to show that the error of the solution output by Algorithm 4 with respect to the multicalibrated regressor $\hat{f}$ is close to its error with respect to the Bayes optimal regressor f^*. The remainder of the proof is in Appendix B.

Lemma 2. *lagrclose(Bounding Equation 3 by Equation 4) Fix any λ. If $\hat{f}$ is α-multicalibrated with respect to $\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{H}$, and $\mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{H} = \{g(x) \cdot h(x) | g \in \mathcal{G}, h \in \mathcal{H}\}$, then then we have*

$$\left|\hat{L}(h^*, \lambda) - L^*(h^*, \lambda)\right| \leq \alpha(3 + 2\|\lambda\|_1).$$

Proof. Define $\kappa = 1 + \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g (g(x) - \beta_g)$ Observe that we can write:

$$\hat{L}(h, \lambda) = L_1(h, \lambda) - \gamma \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} (\lambda_g^+ + \lambda_g^-) - \hat{L}_2(h, \lambda),$$

where

$$L_1(h, \lambda) = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_X}\left[\ell(h(x), 0) \cdot \kappa\right],$$
$$\hat{L}_2(h, \lambda) = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_X}\left[\hat{f}(x)\Big(-\ell(h(x), 1) + \ell(h(x), 0) \cdot \kappa\Big)\right].$$

Similarly, we can write:

$$L^*(h, \lambda) = L_1(h, \lambda) - \gamma \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} (\lambda_g^+ + \lambda_g^-) - L_2^*(h, \lambda),$$

where

$$L_2^*(h, \lambda) = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_X}\left[f^*(x)\Big(\ell(h(x), 0) \cdot \kappa - \ell(h(x), 1)\Big)\right].$$

Observe that the L_1 term does not depend on $\hat{f}$ or f^* and so is common between $\hat{L}$ and L^*. We can bound $\hat{L}_2$ as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{L}_2(h^*, \lambda) &= \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_X}\left[\hat{f}(x)\Big(-\ell(h^*(x), 1) + \ell(h^*(x), 0) \cdot \kappa\Big)\right] \\
&= \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_X}\left[\hat{f}(x)\Big(-(1 - h^*(x)) + h^*(x) \cdot \kappa\Big)\right] \\
&= \sum_{v \in R} \mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x) = v] \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_x}\left[\hat{f}(x)\Big(-(1 - h^*(x)) \right. \\
&\qquad \left. + h^*(x) \cdot \kappa\Big) \middle| \hat{f}(x) = v\right] \\
&\leq \sum_{v \in R} \mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x) = v] \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_x}\left[f^*(x)\Big(-(1 - h^*(x)) \right. \\
&\qquad \left. + h^*(x)(\kappa)\Big) \middle| \hat{f}(x) = v\right] \\
&\qquad + \alpha\left(3 + \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(1 + \beta_g)\right) \\
&\leq L_2^*(h^*, \lambda) + \alpha\left(3 + 2\|\lambda\|_1\right),
\end{aligned}$$

where the first inequality follows from the fact that $h^* \in \mathcal{H}$ and $\hat{f}$ is multicalibrated with respect to $\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{H}$, and $\mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{H}$, which we verify below:

$$\begin{aligned}
&\sum_{v \in R} \mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x) = v] \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_x}\left[\Big(f^*(x) - \hat{f}(x)\Big)\Big(-(1 - h^*(x)) \right. \\
&\qquad \left. + h^*(x) \cdot \kappa\Big) \middle| \hat{f}(x) = v\right] \\
&= \sum_{v \in R} \mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x) = v] \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_x}\left[\Big(f^*(x) - \hat{f}(x)\Big)\Big(-1 + 2h^*(x) \right. \\
&\qquad \left. + h^*(x) \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x) - \beta_g)\Big) \middle| \hat{f}(x) = v\right] \\
&= -\sum_{v \in R} \mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x) = v] \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_x}\left[\hat{f}^*(x) - \hat{f}(x) \middle| \hat{f}(x) = v\right] \\
&\quad + 2\sum_{v \in R} \mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x) = v] \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_x}\left[(f^*(x) \right. \\
&\qquad \left. - \hat{f}(x))h^*(x) \middle| \hat{f}(x) = v\right] \\
&\quad + \sum_{v \in R} \mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x) = v] \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_x}\left[(f^*(x) \right. \\
&\qquad \left. - \hat{f}(x))h^*(x)g(x) \middle| \hat{f}(x) = v\right] \\
&\quad - \sum_{v \in R} \mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x) = v] \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g \beta_g \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_x}\left[(f^*(x) \right. \\
&\qquad \left. - \hat{f}(x))h^*(x) \middle| \hat{f}(x) = v\right]
\end{aligned}$$

$$\leq 3\alpha + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(1+\beta_g)\alpha$$
$$\leq 3\alpha + \alpha \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(1+\max_{g'\in\mathcal{G}} \beta_{g'})$$
$$\leq 3\alpha + \alpha \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(1+1)$$

$$\leq 3\alpha + 2\|\lambda\|_1\alpha$$

Similarly, we can show that $L^*(h^*,\lambda) - \hat{L}(h^*,\lambda) \leq \alpha\,(3+2\|\lambda\|_1)$. Putting everything together, we get that:

$$\left|\hat{L}(h^*,\lambda) - L^*(h^*,\lambda)\right| \leq \alpha(3+2\|\lambda\|_1).$$

This concludes the proof. □

We now provide the proof of Line 8.

Lemma 3 (Bound of Equation 7 by Equation 8). *Let $\hat{f}$ be α-approximately jointly multicalibrated with respect to $\mathcal{B}(C)\times\mathcal{G}$. Then,*

$$\left|\widehat{err}(\bar{h}) - err(\bar{h})\right| \leq 2\alpha.$$

Proof. Since $\bar{h}$ is a randomized model that mixes uniformly over model $\hat{h}_t$ for $t \in [T]$, it suffices to show that for every $t \in [T]$,

$$\left|\widehat{\mathrm{err}}(\hat{h}_t) - \mathrm{err}(\hat{h}_t)\right| \leq 2\alpha.$$

We can compute:

$$\begin{aligned}
\widehat{\mathrm{err}}(\hat{h}_t) &= \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}\left[\hat{f}(x)\ell(\hat{h}_t,1) + (1-\hat{f}(x))\ell(\hat{h}_t(x),0)\right],\\
&= \sum_{v\in R} \mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x)=v, s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,v)=0]\cdot\\
&\qquad \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}[\hat{f}(x)\ell(\hat{h}_t(x),1) + (1-\hat{f}(x))\cdot\\
&\qquad\qquad \ell(\hat{h}_t(x),0)|\hat{f}(x)=v, s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,v)=0]\\
&\quad + \sum_{v\in R} \mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x)=v, s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,v)=1]\cdot\\
&\qquad \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}[\hat{f}(x)\ell(\hat{h}_t(x),1) + (1-\hat{f}(x))\cdot\\
&\qquad\qquad \ell(\hat{h}_t(x),0)|\hat{f}(x)=v, s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,v)=1].
\end{aligned}$$

By Lemma 16, $\hat{h}_t(x) = s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,\hat{f}(x))$, and so in particular conditioning on $\hat{f}(x)=v$ and $s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,v)$ fixes the value of $\hat{h}_t(x)$. So, we can rewrite the above as

$$\begin{aligned}
\widehat{\mathrm{err}}(\hat{h}_t) &= \sum_{v\in R} \mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x)=v, s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,v)=0]\cdot\\
&\qquad \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}[\hat{f}(x)|\hat{f}(x)=v, s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,v)=0]\\
&\quad + \sum_{v\in R} \mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x)=v, s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,v)=1]\cdot\\
&\qquad \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}[1-\hat{f}(x)|\hat{f}(x)=v, s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,v)=1]\\
&\leq \sum_{v\in R} \mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x)=v, s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,v)=0]\cdot\\
&\qquad \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}[f^*(x)|\hat{f}(x)=v, s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,v)=0] + \alpha\\
&\quad + \sum_{v\in R} \mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x)=v, s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,v)=1]\cdot\\
&\qquad \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}[1-f^*(x)|\hat{f}(x)=v, s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,v)=1] + \alpha\\
&= \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim D_X}[f^*(x)\ell(\hat{h}_t(x),1) + (1-f^*(x))\ell(\hat{h}_t(x),0)] + 2\alpha\\
&= \mathrm{err}(\hat{h}_t) + 2\alpha,
\end{aligned}$$

where the inequality comes from our α-approximate joint multicalibration guarantee. The same argument yields the opposite direction, completing the proof. □

4 CONCLUSION

We describe a post-processing method that takes as input a regression function and, using a reasonable amount of unlabeled data, outputs an approximately optimal classifier which satisfies a variety of fairness constraints over intersecting demographic groups. The main contribution we make is answering two questions about understanding post-processing methods for fairness constrained optimization: how should we post-process a base regressor to obtain a valuable downstream classifier and for what (weak) conditions of the base regressor (weaker than Bayes optimality, for example) can we give provable guarantees of the post-processing? We show that the algorithmic description of an error-minimizing and fair post-processing is a simple linear threshold function and that beginning with a multicalibrated base regressor results in an approximately optimal and fair classifier.

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A GENERALIZATION TO OTHER FAIRNESS NOTIONS

We find it convenient to have notation for two quantities which appear repeatedly in the following exposition. Let $\kappa = 1 + \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g (g(x) - \beta_g)$ and $\mu = 1 + \kappa$, and κ_t, μ_t the same quantites for $\lambda_{g,t}$, respectively.

A.1 False Negative (FN) Fairness

Definition 10. *The false negative rate of a classifier $h : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$ on a group g is:*

$$\rho_{FN}(h, g, \mathcal{D}) = \mathbb{P}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[h(x) \neq y | y = 1, g(x) = 1]$$

When h is a randomized classifier, the probabilities are computed over the randomness of h as well. $\rho_g^{FN}(h) \equiv \rho_{FN}(h, g, \mathcal{D})$, and $\rho_{FN}(h) \equiv \rho(h, I, \mathcal{D})$.

Definition 11. *We say that classifier $h : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$ satisfies γ-False Negative (FN) Fairness with respect to $\mathcal{D}$ and $\mathcal{G}$ if for all $g \in \mathcal{G}$,*

$$w_g^{FN} \left| \rho_g^{FN}(h) - \rho_{FN}(h) \right| \leq \gamma.$$

where $w_g^{FN} = \mathbb{P}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[g(x) = 1, y = 1]$.

We consider the following fairness-constrained optimization problem:

$$\begin{aligned} &\min_{h \in \Delta\mathcal{H}} && \text{err}(h) \\ &\text{s.t. for each } g \in \mathcal{G}: && w_g^{\text{FN}} |\rho_g^{\text{FN}}(h) - \rho_{\text{FN}}(h)| \leq \gamma, \end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

Definition 12. *Let $f : \mathcal{X} \to R \subseteq [0, 1]$ be some regression function and let $\gamma \in \mathbb{R}_+$. Define $\psi_{FN}(f, \gamma, \mathcal{H})$ to be the following optimization problem:*

$$\begin{aligned} &\min_{h \in \Delta\mathcal{H}} && \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}[f(x)\ell(h(x), 1) + (1 - f(x))\ell(h(x), 0)] \\ &\text{s.t. for each } g \in \mathcal{G}: && \left| \mathbb{E}[\ell(h(x), 1)g(x)f(x)] - \beta_g^{FN} \mathbb{E}[\ell(h(x), 1)f(x)] \right| \leq \gamma, \end{aligned}$$

where $\beta_g^{FN} = \mathbb{P}[g(x) = 1 | y = 1]$.

Lemma 4. *Let f^* be the Bayes optimal regression function over $\mathcal{D}$. Then optimization problem $\psi_{FN}(f^*, \gamma, \mathcal{H})$ is equivalent to the fairness-constrained optimization problem 9.*

Proof. Note that the objective function is equivalent to that of Equation 1, and hence proof of the objectives being equivalent is identical to that of Lemma 12. For the constraints, note that

$$\begin{aligned} w_g^{\text{FN}} |\rho_g^{\text{FN}}(h) - \rho_{\text{FN}}(h)| &= \mathbb{P}[g(x) = 1, y = 1] \, |\mathbb{P}[h(x) = 0 | g(x) = 1, y = 1] - \mathbb{P}[h(x) = 0 | y = 1]| \\ &= \mathbb{P}[g(x) = 1, y = 1] \left| \frac{\mathbb{P}[h(x) = 0, g(x) = 1, y = 1]}{\mathbb{P}[g(x) = 1, y = 1]} - \frac{\mathbb{P}[h(x) = 0, y = 1]}{\mathbb{P}[Y = 1]} \right| \\ &= \left| \mathbb{P}[h(x) = 0, g(x) = 1, y = 1] - \frac{\mathbb{P}[g(x) = 1, y = 1]\mathbb{P}[h(x) = 0, y = 1]}{\mathbb{P}[Y = 1]} \right| \\ &= \left| \mathbb{E}[\ell(h(x), 1)g(x)f^*(x)] - \frac{\mathbb{P}[g(x) = 1, y = 1]}{\mathbb{P}[Y = 1]} \mathbb{E}\left[\ell(h(x), 1)f^*(x)\right] \right| \\ &= \left| \mathbb{E}[\ell(h(x), 1)g(x)f^*(x)] - \mathbb{P}[g(x) = 1 | Y = 0] \mathbb{E}\left[\ell(h(x), 1)f^*(x)\right] \right| \\ &= \left| \mathbb{E}[\ell(h(x), 1)g(x)f^*(x)] - \beta_g^{\text{FN}} \mathbb{E}\left[\ell(h(x), 1)f^*(x)\right] \right|. \end{aligned}$$

The result follows. □

Definition 13 (Lagrangian). *Given any regression function f, we define a Lagrangian of the optimization problem $\psi_{FN}(f, \gamma, \mathcal{H})$ as $L_f^{FN} : \mathcal{H} \times \mathbb{R}^{2|\mathcal{G}|} \to \mathbb{R}$:*

$$\begin{aligned} L_f^{FN}(h, \lambda) = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X} \Bigg[& f(x)\ell(h(x), 1) + (1 - f(x))\ell(h(x), 0) \\ & + \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g^+ \left(\ell(h(x), 1)g(x)f(x) - \beta_g \ell(h(x), 1)f(x) - \gamma \right) \\ & + \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g^- \left(\beta_g \ell(h(x), 1)f(x) - \ell(h(x), 1)g(x)f(x) - \gamma \right) \Bigg] \end{aligned}$$

Lemma 5.

$$L_f^{FN}(h,\lambda) = \mathbb{E}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}\Bigg[\ell(h(x),0) - \gamma\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}(\lambda_g^+ + \lambda_g^-) + f(x)\left(-\ell(h(x),0) + \ell(h(x),1)\left(1 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}\lambda_g(g(x) - \beta_g^{FN})\right)\right)\Bigg]$$

Proof. Distributing out like terms in the expression for the Lagrangian in Definition 13 gives us

$$\begin{aligned}
L_f(h,\lambda) &= \mathbb{E}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}\Bigg[\ell(h(x),0) - \gamma\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}(\lambda_g^+ + \lambda_g^-) \\
&\quad + f(x)\left(\ell(h(x),1) - \ell(h(x),0) + \ell(h(x),1)\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}(\lambda_g^+(g(x)-\beta_g) + \lambda_g^-(\beta_g - g(x))\right)\Bigg] \\
&= \mathbb{E}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}\Bigg[\ell(h(x),0) - \gamma\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}(\lambda_g^+ + \lambda_g^-) \\
&\quad + f(x)\left(-\ell(h(x),0) + \ell(h(x),1)\left(1 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}(\lambda_g^+ - \lambda_g^-)(g(x)-\beta_g)\right)\right)\Bigg].
\end{aligned}$$

Recall that $\lambda_g = \lambda_g^+ - \lambda_g^-$, so we are done. □

Lemma 6. *The optimal post-processed classifier h of $\psi(f,\gamma,\mathcal{H}_A)$ for some regressor f takes the following form:*

$$h(x) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } f(x) > \frac{1}{\mu} \text{ and } \mu > 0, \\ 0, & \text{if } f(x) < \frac{1}{\mu} \text{ and } \mu > 0, \\ 1, & \text{if } f(x) < \frac{1}{\mu} \text{ and } \mu < 0, \\ 0, & \text{if } f(x) > \frac{1}{\mu} \text{ and } \mu < 0. \end{cases}$$

In the edge case in which $f(x) = \frac{1}{\mu}$, $h(x)$ could take either value and might be randomized.

Proof. Note that since we are optimizing over the set of all binary classifiers, h optimizes the Lagrangian objective pointwise for every x. In particular, we have from Lemma 5 that:

$$h(x) = \arg\min_p\left[\ell(p,0) + f(x)\left(-\ell(p,0) + \ell(p,1)\left(1 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}\lambda_g(g(x)-\beta_g)\right)\right)\right].$$

In order to determine the threshold, we need to check when setting $p = 1$ leads to a value less than setting $p = 0$. In other words, we need to solve for $f(x)$ when

$$\begin{aligned}
1 - f(x) &< f(x)\left(1 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}\lambda_g(g(x)-\beta_g)\right) \\
\Rightarrow f(x) &> \frac{1}{2 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}\lambda_g(g(x)-\beta_g)}.
\end{aligned}$$

Thus,

$$h(x) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } f(x) > \frac{1}{\mu} \text{ and } \mu > 0, \\ 0, & \text{if } f(x) < \frac{1}{\mu} \text{ and } \mu > 0, \\ 1, & \text{if } f(x) < \frac{1}{\mu} \text{ and } \mu < 0, \\ 0, & \text{if } f(x) > \frac{1}{\mu} \text{ and } \mu < 0. \end{cases}$$

□

From Lemma 6, we can now define a best-response model and use Algorithm 1 to generate an optimally post-processed model that preserves γ−False Negative fairness. The algorithm's error bounds may be derived using symmetric arguments to sections 3.1 and 3.2, where $\hat{f}$ is required to be α-approximately jointly multicalibrated in expectation with respect to $s_\lambda(x,v) := 1[\langle \lambda, x_{\mathcal{G}} - \beta\rangle \geq (1-2v)/v]$ following the same arguments as used in Lemma 16.

Algorithm 1 Projected Gradient Descent Algorithm for γ-False Negative Fairness

Input: D: dataset, $f : \mathcal{X} \to [0,1]$: regression function, $\mathcal{G}$: groups, γ: tolerance on fairness violation, C: bound on dual ($\|\lambda\|_1 \leq C$), η: learning rate
Initialize dual vector $\lambda^0 = \mathbf{0}$ and set $T = \frac{1}{4} \cdot C^2 \cdot (C^2 + 4|\mathcal{G}|)^2$.
for $t = 1, \ldots, T$ **do**
  Primal player updates h_t

$$h_t(x) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } f(x) \geq \frac{1}{\mu_{t-1}} \text{ and } \mu_{t-1} > 0, \\ 0, & \text{if } f(x) < \frac{1}{\mu_{t-1}} \text{ and } \mu_{t-1} > 0, \\ 1, & \text{if } f(x) < \frac{1}{\mu_{t-1}} \text{ and } \mu_{t-1} < 0, \\ 0, & \text{if } f(x) \geq \frac{1}{\mu_{t-1}} \text{ and } \mu_{t-1} < 0, \\ 0 & \text{if } \mu_{t-1} = 0 \end{cases}$$

  Compute

$$\hat{\rho}_{g,t} = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(x,y)\sim D}[\ell(h_t(x),1)g(x)f(x)] \text{ for all } g \in \mathcal{G},$$
$$\hat{\rho}_t = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(x,y)\sim D}[\beta_g \ell(h_t(x),1)f(x)], \text{ where } \beta_g = \mathbb{P}[g(x)=1|y=0]$$

  Dual player updates

$$\lambda_{g,t,+} = \max(0, \lambda_{g,t,+} + \eta \cdot (\hat{\rho}_{g,t} - \hat{\rho}_t - \gamma)),$$
$$\lambda_{g,t,-} = \max(0, \lambda_{g,t,-} + \eta \cdot (\hat{\rho}_t - \hat{\rho}_{g,t} - \gamma)).$$

  Dual player sets $\lambda_t = \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_{g,t,+} - \lambda_{g,t,-}$.
  if $\|\lambda_t\|_1 > C$ **then**
    set $\lambda_t = \arg\min_{\{\tilde{\lambda}\in\mathbb{R}^{2\mathcal{G}} | \|\tilde{\lambda}\|_1 \leq C\}} \|\lambda_t - \tilde{\lambda}\|_2^2$.
  end if
end for
Output: $\bar{h} := \frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=1}^{T} \hat{h}_t$, a uniformly random classifier over all rounds' hypotheses.

A.2 Error Fairness

Definition 14. *We say that classifier $h : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$ satisfies γ-Error (E) Fairness with respect to $\mathcal{D}$ and $\mathcal{G}$ if for all $g \in \mathcal{G}$,*

$$w_g^E \, |err(h,g,\mathcal{D}) - err(h,\mathcal{D})| \leq \gamma,$$

where $w_g^E = \mathbb{P}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[g(x)=1]$.

We consider the following fairness-constrained optimization problem:

$$\begin{aligned} &\min_{h\in\Delta\mathcal{H}} && \text{err}(h) \\ &\text{s.t. for each } g \in \mathcal{G}: && w_g^{\text{E}} \, |\text{err}(h,g,\mathcal{D}) - \text{err}(h,\mathcal{D})| \leq \gamma, \end{aligned} \tag{10}$$

Definition 15. *Let $f : \mathcal{X} \to R \subseteq [0,1]$ be some regression function and let $\gamma \in \mathbb{R}_+$. Define $\psi_E(f,\gamma,\mathcal{H})$ to be the following optimization problem:*

$$\begin{aligned} &\min_{h\in\Delta\mathcal{H}} \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_\mathcal{X}}[f(x)\ell(h(x),1) + (1-f(x))\ell(h(x),0)] \\ &\textit{s.t. for each } g \in \mathcal{G}: \\ &|\mathbb{E}[\ell(h(x),1)g(x)f^*(x) + \ell(h(x),0)g(x)(1-f^*(x)) \\ &\quad - w_g^E(\ell(h(x),1)f^*(x) - w_g^E\ell(h(x),0)(1-f^*(x)]| \leq \gamma, \end{aligned}$$

where $w_g^E = \mathbb{P}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[g(x) = 1]$ *as in the previous definition.*

Lemma 7. *Let* f^* *be the Bayes optimal regression function over* $\mathcal{D}$*. Then optimization problem* $\psi_E(f^*, \gamma, \mathcal{H})$ *is equivalent to the fairness-constrained optimization problem 10.*

Proof. Note that the objective function is equivalent to that of Equation 1, and hence proof of the objectives being equivalent is identical to that of Lemma 12. For the constraints, note that

$$\begin{aligned}
w_g^{\mathrm{E}}|\mathrm{err}(h,g,\mathcal{D})| - \mathrm{err}(h,\mathcal{D}) &= \mathbb{P}[g(x)=1]\Big|\mathbb{P}[y=1|g(x)=1]\mathbb{P}[h(x)=0|g(x)=1,y=1] \\
&\quad + \mathbb{P}[y=0|g(x)=1]\mathbb{P}[h(x)=1|g(x)=1,y=0] \\
&\quad - (\mathbb{P}[y=1]\mathbb{P}[h(x)=0|y=1] + \mathbb{P}[y=0]\mathbb{P}[h(x)=1|y=0])\Big| \\
&= \mathbb{P}[g(x)=1]\Big|\mathbb{P}[y=1|g(x)=1]\frac{\mathbb{P}[h(x)=0,g(x)=1,y=1]}{\mathbb{P}[g(x)=1,y=1]} \\
&\quad + \mathbb{P}[y=1|g(x)=1]\frac{\mathbb{P}[h(x)=1,g(x)=1,y=0]}{\mathbb{P}[g(x)=1,y=0]} \\
&\quad - \mathbb{P}[y=1]\frac{\mathbb{P}[h(x)=0,y=1]}{\mathbb{P}[y=1]} - \mathbb{P}[y=0]\frac{\mathbb{P}[h(x)=1,y=1]}{\mathbb{P}[y=0]}\Big| \\
&= |\mathbb{E}[\ell(h(x),1)g(x)f^*(x) + \ell(h(x),0)g(x)(1-f^*(x)) \\
&\quad - w_g^{\mathrm{E}}(\ell(h(x),1)f^*(x) - w_g^{\mathrm{E}}\ell(h(x),0)(1-f^*(x))]|
\end{aligned}$$

□

Definition 16 (Lagrangian). *Given any regression function* f*, we define a Lagrangian of the optimization problem* $\psi_E(f, \gamma, \mathcal{H})$ *as* $L_f^E : \mathcal{H} \times \mathbb{R}^{2|\mathcal{G}|} \to \mathbb{R}$*:*

$$\begin{aligned}
L_f^E(h,\lambda) = \mathbb{E}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}\Bigg[& f(x)\ell(h(x),1) + (1-f(x))\ell(h(x),0) \\
&+ \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g^+\big(\ell(h(x),1)g(x)f(x) + \ell(h(x),0)g(x)(1-f(x)) \\
&\qquad - w_g^E\ell(h(x),1)f(x) - w_g^E\ell(h(x),0)(1-f(x)) - \gamma\big) \\
&+ \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g^-\big(w_g^E\ell(h(x),1)f(x) + w_g^E\ell(h(x),0)(1-f(x)) \\
&\qquad - \ell(h(x),1)g(x)f(x) - \ell(h(x),0)g(x)(1-f(x)) - \gamma\big)\Bigg].
\end{aligned}$$

Lemma 8.

$$\begin{aligned}
L_f^E(h,\lambda) = \mathbb{E}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_x}\Bigg[& \ell(h(x),0)\Big(1 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}\lambda_g(g(x) - w_g^E)\Big) - \gamma\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}(\lambda_g^+ + \lambda_g^-) \\
&+ f(x)\Bigg(-\ell(h(x),0)\Big[1 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}\lambda_g(g(x) - w_g^E)\Big] \\
&\qquad + \ell(h(x),1)\Big[1 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}\lambda_g(g(x) - w_g^E)\Big]\Bigg)\Bigg]
\end{aligned}$$

Proof. Distribute out like terms as shown previously. □

Lemma 9. *The optimal post-processed classifier* h *of* $\psi(f, \gamma, \mathcal{H}_A)$ *for some regressor* f *takes the following form:*

$$h(x) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } f(x) > \frac{1+\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^E)}{2+2\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^E)} \text{ and } 2+2\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^E) > 0, \\ 0, & \text{if } f(x) < \frac{1+\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^E)}{2+2\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^E)} \text{ and } 2+2\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^E) > 0, \\ 1, & \text{if } f(x) < \frac{1+\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^E)}{2+2\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^E)} \text{ and } 2+2\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^E) < 0, \\ 0, & \text{if } f(x) > \frac{1+\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^E)}{2+2\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^E)} \text{ and } 2+2\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^E) > 0. \end{cases}$$

In the edge case in which $f(x) = \frac{1+\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^E)}{2+2\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^E)}$, $h(x)$ *could take either value and might be randomized.*

Proof. Note that since we are optimizing over the set of all binary classifiers, h optimizes the Lagrangian objective pointwise for every x. In particular, we have from Lemma 8 that:

$$h(x) = \arg\min_p \left[\ell(p,0)\left(1 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x) - w_g^{\mathrm{E}})\right) + f(x)\left(-\ell(p,0)\left[1 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x) - w_g^{\mathrm{E}})\right] + \ell(p,1)\left[1 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x) - w_g^{\mathrm{E}})\right]\right)\right]$$

Setting $p = 0$ makes the inner portion of the expression evaluate to

$$f(x)\left(1 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x) - w_g^{\mathrm{E}})\right),$$

and setting $p = 1$ makes the inner portion of the expression evaluate to

$$\left(1 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x) - w_g^{\mathrm{E}})\right) - f(x)\left(1 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x) - w_g^{\mathrm{E}})\right)$$

In order to find the optimal h, we want to find the threshold at which setting $p = 1$ minimizes the expression, and hence:

$$\left(1 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x) - w_g^{\mathrm{E}})\right) - f(x)\left(1 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x) - w_g^{\mathrm{E}})\right) < f(x)\left(1 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x) - w_g^{\mathrm{E}})\right)$$

$$\frac{1 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x) - w_g^{\mathrm{E}})}{\left(1 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x) - w_g^{\mathrm{E}})\right) + \left(1 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x) - w_g^{\mathrm{E}})\right)} < f(x)$$

$$\frac{1 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x) - w_g^{\mathrm{E}})}{2 + 2\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x) - w_g^{\mathrm{E}})} < f(x)$$

Thus,

$$h(x) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } f(x) > \frac{1+\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^{\mathrm{E}})}{2+2\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^{\mathrm{E}})} \text{ and } 2+2\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^{\mathrm{E}}) > 0, \\ 0, & \text{if } f(x) < \frac{1+\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^{\mathrm{E}})}{2+2\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^{\mathrm{E}})} \text{ and } 2+2\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^{\mathrm{E}}) > 0, \\ 1, & \text{if } f(x) < \frac{1+\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^{\mathrm{E}})}{2+2\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^{\mathrm{E}})} \text{ and } 2+2\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^{\mathrm{E}}) < 0, \\ 0, & \text{if } f(x) > \frac{1+\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^{\mathrm{E}})}{2+2\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^{\mathrm{E}})} \text{ and } 2+2\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^{\mathrm{E}}) > 0. \end{cases}$$

□

From Lemma 9, we can now define a best-response model and use Algorithm 2 to generate an optimally post-processed model that preserves γ–Error fairness. The algorithm's error bounds may be derived using symmetric arguments to sections 3.1 and 3.2, where $\hat{f}$ is α-multicalibrated in expectation with respect to $\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{H}$, and $\mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{H}$ and is jointly multicalibrated with respect to functions of the form:

$$1\left[\langle \lambda^{t-1}, x_{\mathcal{G}} - w^{\mathrm{E}}\rangle \geq \frac{2v-1}{1-2v}\right]$$

the proofs from section 3.2 may be modified to get its desired error bounds.

Algorithm 2 Projected Gradient Descent Algorithm for γ-Error Fairness

Input: D: dataset, $f : \mathcal{X} \to [0,1]$: regression function, $\mathcal{G}$: groups, γ: tolerance on fairness violation, C: bound on dual ($\|\lambda\|_1 \leq C$), η: learning rate

Initialize dual vector $\lambda^0 = \mathbf{0}$ and set $T = \frac{1}{4} \cdot C^2 \cdot (C^2 + 4|\mathcal{G}|)^2$.

for $t = 1, \ldots, T$ **do**

Primal player updates h_t

$$h_t(x) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } f(x) > \frac{1+\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g^{t-1}(g(x)-w_g^{\mathrm{E}})}{2+2\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g^{t-1}(g(x)-w_g^{\mathrm{E}})} \text{ and } 2+2\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g^{t-1}(g(x)-w_g^{\mathrm{E}}) > 0, \\ 0, & \text{if } f(x) < \frac{1+\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g^{t-1}(g(x)-w_g^{\mathrm{E}})}{2+2\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g^{t-1}(g(x)-w_g^{\mathrm{E}})} \text{ and } 2+2\sum_{g^{t-1}\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-w_g^{\mathrm{E}}) > 0, \\ 1, & \text{if } f(x) < \frac{1+\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g^{t-1}(g(x)-w_g^{\mathrm{E}})}{2+2\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g^{t-1}(g(x)-w_g^{\mathrm{E}})} \text{ and } 2+2\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g^{t-1}(g(x)-w_g^{\mathrm{E}}) < 0, \\ 0, & \text{if } f(x) > \frac{1+\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g^{t-1}(g(x)-w_g^{\mathrm{E}})}{2+2\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g^{t-1}(g(x)-w_g^{\mathrm{E}})} \text{ and } 2+2\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g^{t-1}(g(x)-w_g^{\mathrm{E}}) > 0, \\ 1, & \text{if } 2+2\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g^{t-1}(g(x)-w_g^{\mathrm{E}}) = 0. \end{cases}$$

Compute

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\rho}_g^t &= \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\sim D}[\ell(h_t(x),1)g(x)f(x) + \ell(h_t(x),0)g(x)(1-f(x)) \\ &\quad - w_g^{\mathrm{E}}(\ell(h_t(x),1)f(x) - w_g^{\mathrm{E}}\ell(h_t(x),0)(1-f(x)] \text{ for all } g \in \mathcal{G}, \\ \hat{\rho}^t &= \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\sim D}[f(x)\ell(h_t(x),1) + (1-f(x))\ell(h_t(x),0)], \end{aligned}$$

where $w_g^{\mathrm{E}} = \mathbb{P}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[g(x)=1]$.

Dual player updates

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda_{g,t,+} &= \max(0, \lambda_{g,t,+} + \eta \cdot (\hat{\rho}_g^t - \hat{\rho}^t - \gamma)), \\ \lambda_{g,t,-} &= \max(0, \lambda_{g,t,-} + \eta \cdot (\hat{\rho}^t - \hat{\rho}_g^t - \gamma)). \end{aligned}$$

Dual player sets $\lambda_t = \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g^{t,+} - \lambda_{g,t,-}$.

if $\|\lambda_t\|_1 > C$ **then**

set $\lambda_t = \arg\min_{\{\tilde{\lambda}\in\mathbb{R}^{2\mathcal{G}} \mid \|\tilde{\lambda}\|_1 \leq C\}} \|\lambda_t - \tilde{\lambda}\|_2^2$

end if

end for

Output: $\bar{h} := \frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=1}^{T} \hat{h}_t$, a uniformly random classifier over all rounds' hypotheses.

A.3 Statistical Parity Fairness

Definition 17. *We say that classifier $h : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$ satisfies γ-Statistical Parity (SP) Fairness with respect to $\mathcal{D}$ and $\mathcal{G}$ if for all $g \in \mathcal{G}$,*

$$\mathbb{P}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[g(x)=1]\left|\mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[h(x)|g(x)=1] - \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[h(x)]\right| \in \gamma.$$

We consider the following fairness-constrained optimization problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{h\in\Delta\mathcal{H}} \quad & \mathrm{err}(h) \\ \text{s.t. for each } g \in \mathcal{G}: \quad & \mathbb{P}[g(x)=1]\left|\mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[h(x)|g(x)=1] - \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[h(x)]\right| \leq \gamma, \end{aligned} \tag{11}$$

Definition 18. *Let $f : \mathcal{X} \to R \subseteq [0,1]$ be some regression function and let $\gamma \in \mathbb{R}_+$. Define $\phi_{SP}(f, \gamma, \mathcal{H})$ to be the following optimization problem:*

$$\min_{h \in \Delta\mathcal{H}} \quad \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_X}[f(x)\ell(h(x),1) + (1-f(x))\ell(h(x),0)]$$

$$\text{s.t. for each } g \in \mathcal{G}: \quad \left| \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_X}[h(x)g(x)] - w_g^{SP} \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_X}[h(x)] \right| \leq \gamma$$

where $w_g^{SP} = \mathbb{P}[g(x) = 1]$.

Lemma 10. *Let f^* be the Bayes optimal regression function over $\mathcal{D}$. Then optimization problem $\psi_{SP}(f^*, \gamma, \mathcal{H})$ is equivalent to the fairness-constrained optimization problem 11.*

Definition 19 (Lagrangian). *Given any regression function f, we define a Lagrangian of the optimization problem $\psi_{SP}(f, \gamma, \mathcal{H})$ as $L_f^{SP} : \mathcal{H} \times \mathbb{R}^{2|\mathcal{G}|} \to \mathbb{R}$:*

$$L_f^{SP}(h, \lambda) = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_X} \Bigg[f(x)\ell(h(x),1) + (1-f(x))(\ell(h(x),0) + \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g^+ \big(h(x)(g(x)-1) - \gamma\big) + \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g^- \big(h(x)(1-g(x)\big) - \gamma) \Bigg].$$

Lemma 11. *The optimal post-processed classifier h of $\psi_{SP}(f, \gamma, \mathcal{H}_A)$ for some regressor f takes the following form:*

$$h(x) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } f(x) > 1/2 + (1/2)\sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g (g(x) - 1), \\ 0, & \text{if } f(x) < 1/2 + (1/2)\sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g (g(x) - 1). \end{cases}$$

In the edge case in which $f(x) = 1/2 + (1/2)\sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g (g(x) - 1)$, $h(x)$ could take either value and might be randomized.

Proof. Note that we can rewrite our Lagrangian from Definition 19 as

$$L_f^{\mathrm{SP}}(h, \lambda) = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_X} \left[f(x)(\ell(h(x),1) - \ell(h(x),0)) + \ell(h(x),0) + h(x) \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g (g(x) - 1) + \gamma \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} (\lambda^+ + \lambda^-) \right],$$

and hence our optimal h will be optimal pointwise, i.e.

$$h(x) \arg\min_p \left[f(x)(\ell(p,1) + \ell(p,0)) - \ell(p,0) + p \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g (g(x) - 1) \right]$$

We can then find our threshold by comparing this expression when $p = 0$ and $p = 1$, i.e.

$$-f(x) + 1 + \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g (g(x) - 1) < f(x)$$

$$\frac{1 + \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g (g(x) - 1)}{2} < f(x).$$

Hence,

$$h(x) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } f(x) > 1/2 + (1/2)\sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g (g(x) - 1), \\ 0, & \text{if } f(x) < 1/2 + (1/2)\sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g (g(x) - 1). \end{cases}$$

□

We can now define a best-response model and use Algorithm 3 to generate an optimally post-processed model that preserves γ-Statistical Parity fairness. Assuming that $\hat{f}$ is α-multicalibrated in expectation with respect to $\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{H}$, and $\mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{H}$ and is jointly multicalibrated with respect to functions of the form $1[\langle \lambda, x_{\mathcal{G}} - \beta \rangle \geq 2v - 1]$, the proofs from section 3.2 may be modified to get its desired error bounds.

Algorithm 3 Projected Gradient Descent Algorithm for γ-Statistical Parity Fairness

Input: D: dataset, $f : \mathcal{X} \to [0,1]$: regression function, $\mathcal{G}$: groups, γ: tolerance on fairness violation, C: bound on dual ($\|\lambda\|_1 \leq C$), η: learning rate

Initialize dual vector $\lambda^0 = \mathbf{0}$ and set $T = \frac{1}{4} \cdot C^2 \cdot (C^2 + 4|\mathcal{G}|)^2$.

for $t = 1, \ldots, T$ **do**

Primal player updates h_t

$$h_t(x) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } f(x) \geq 1/2 + (1/2) \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g^{t-1}(g(x) - 1), \\ 0, & \text{if } f(x) < 1/2 + (1/2) \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g^{t-1}(g(x) - 1). \end{cases}$$

Compute

$$\hat{\rho}_g^t = \left| \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_\mathcal{X}} [h_t(x) g(x)] - w_g^{\text{SP}} \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_\mathcal{X}} [h_t(x)] \right| \text{ for all } g \in \mathcal{G},$$
$$\hat{\rho}^t = \mathbb{E}_{(x,y) \sim D}[f(x)\ell(h_t(x), 1) + (1 - f(x))\ell(h_t(x), 0)],$$

where $w_g^{\text{SP}} = \mathbb{P}[g(x) = 1]$.

Dual player updates

$$\lambda_g^{t,+} = \max(0, \lambda_g^{t,+} + \eta \cdot (\hat{\rho}_g^t - \hat{\rho}^t - \gamma)),$$
$$\lambda_g^{t,-} = \max(0, \lambda_g^{t,-} + \eta \cdot (\hat{\rho}^t - \hat{\rho}_g^t - \gamma)).$$

Dual player sets $\lambda^t = \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g^{t,+} - \lambda_g^{t,-}$.

if $\|\lambda^t\|_1 > C$ **then**

set $\lambda^t = \arg\min_{\{\tilde{\lambda} \in \mathbb{R}^{2\mathcal{G}} | \|\tilde{\lambda}\|_1 \leq C\}} \|\lambda_t - \tilde{\lambda}\|_2^2$.

end if

end for

Output: $\bar{h} := \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T \hat{h}_t$, a uniformly random classifier over all rounds' hypotheses.

A.4 Achieving All Fairness Notions

Ideally, we would like our function to be multicalibrated so that we can achieve any fairness notion downstream. Putting everything together from the previous sections, we can do so.

Definition 20 (Set of thresholding functions $\mathcal{B}(C)$). *Let $x_\mathcal{G} \in \{0,1\}^{|\mathcal{G}|}$ denote the group membership indicator vector of some point x, and define the following functions:*

$$d^{FP}(v) := \frac{2v - 1}{1 - v},$$
$$d^{FN}(v) := \frac{1 - 2v}{v},$$
$$d^{E}(v) := \frac{2v - 1}{1 - 2v},$$
$$d^{SP}(v) := 2v - 1.$$

Then, for any λ, x, β, let

$$s_\lambda^{FP}(x, v) := 1[\langle \lambda, x_\mathcal{G} - \beta^{FP} \rangle \geq d^{FP,E}(v)],$$
$$s_\lambda^{FN}(x, v) := 1[\langle \lambda, x_\mathcal{G} - \beta^{FN} \rangle \geq d^{FN}(v)],$$
$$s_\lambda^{E}(x, v) := 1[\langle \lambda, \alpha x_\mathcal{G} - w^E \rangle \geq d^{E}(v)],$$
$$s_\lambda^{SP}(x, v) := 1[\langle \lambda, x_\mathcal{G} - 1 \rangle \geq d^{SP}(v)],$$

where

$$\beta^{FP} = \{\mathbb{P}_{(x,y) \sim \mathcal{D}}[g(x) = 1 | y = 0]\}_{g \in \mathcal{G}},$$
$$\beta^{FN} = \{\mathbb{P}_{(x,y) \sim \mathcal{D}}[g(x) = 1 | y = 1]\}_{g \in \mathcal{G}},$$
$$w^E = \{\mathbb{P}_{(x,y) \sim \mathcal{D}}[g(x) = 1]\}_{g \in \mathcal{G}}.$$

Define $\mathcal{B}(C) = \{s_\lambda^{FP} | \lambda \in \Lambda(C)\} \cup \{s_\lambda^{FN} | \lambda \in \Lambda(C)\} \cup \{s_\lambda^{E} | \lambda \in \Lambda(C)\} \cup \{s_\lambda^{SP} | \lambda \in \Lambda(C)\}$, *where* $\Lambda(C) = \left\{\lambda \in \mathbb{R}^{2\mathcal{G}} \middle| \|\lambda\|_1 \leq C\right\}$, *as defined in Equation 12.*

Then, if f is multicalibrated with respect to $\mathcal{B}(C)$, any of the projected gradient descent algorithms covered above (Algorithms 4 through 2) may be run to achieve the desired fairness notion.

B EXPANDED PROOFS AND SECTION 3 DISCUSSION

Lemma 12. *Let f^* be the Bayes optimal regression function over $\mathcal{D}$. Then optimization problem $\psi(f^*, \gamma, \mathcal{H})$ is equivalent to the fairness-constrained optimization problem* (1).

Proof. We confirm that the objective and constraints are both equivalent. First the objective:

$$\begin{aligned} err(h) &= \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[\ell(h(x), y)] \\ &= \sum_{(x,y)\in\mathcal{X}\times\mathcal{Y}} \mathbb{P}(X = x, Y = y)\, \ell(h(x), y) \\ &= \sum_{x\in\mathcal{X}} \mathbb{P}(X = x, Y = 0)\, \ell(h(x), 0) + \mathbb{P}(X = x, Y = 1)\, \ell(h(x), 1) \\ &= \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\in\mathcal{X}}[(1 - f^*(x))\ell(h(x), 0) + f^*(x)\ell(h(x), 1)] \end{aligned}$$

For the constraints, note that

$$\begin{aligned} w_g|\rho_g(h) - \rho(h)| &= \mathbb{P}[g(x) = 1, y = 0]\, |\mathbb{P}[h(x) = 1|g(x) = 1, y = 0] - \mathbb{P}[h(x) = 1|y = 0]| \\ &= \mathbb{P}[g(x) = 1, y = 0]\left|\frac{\mathbb{P}[h(x) = 1, g(x) = 1, y = 0]}{\mathbb{P}[g(x) = 1, y = 0]} - \frac{\mathbb{P}[h(x) = 1, y = 0]}{\mathbb{P}[Y = 0]}\right| \\ &= \left|\mathbb{P}[h(x) = 1, g(x) = 1, y = 0] - \frac{\mathbb{P}[g(x) = 1, y = 0]\mathbb{P}[h(x) = 1, y = 0]}{\mathbb{P}[Y = 0]}\right| \\ &= \left|\mathbb{E}[\ell(h(x), 0)g(x)(1 - f^*(x))] - \frac{\mathbb{P}[g(x) = 1, y = 0]}{\mathbb{P}[Y = 0]}\mathbb{E}\left[\ell(h(x), 0)(1 - f^*(x))\right]\right| \\ &= \left|\mathbb{E}[\ell(h(x), 0)g(x)(1 - f^*(x))] - \mathbb{P}[g(x) = 1|Y = 0]\mathbb{E}\left[\ell(h(x), 0)(1 - f^*(x))\right]\right| \\ &= \left|\mathbb{E}[\ell(h(x), 0)g(x)(1 - f^*(x))] - \beta_g\mathbb{E}\left[\ell(h(x), 0)(1 - f^*(x))\right]\right|. \end{aligned}$$

The result follows. □

Lemma 13.

$$\begin{aligned} L_f(h, \lambda) = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_\mathcal{X}}\Bigg[&\ell(h(x), 0)\Big(\kappa\Big) - \gamma\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}(\lambda_g^+ + \lambda_g^-) \\ &- f(x)\Big(-\ell(h(x), 1) + \ell(h(x), 0)\big(\kappa\big)\Big)\Bigg]. \end{aligned}$$

Proof. Distributing out like terms in the expression for the Lagrangian in Definition 8 gives us

$$\begin{aligned}
L_f(h,\lambda) = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}\Bigg[& f(x)\ell(h(x),1) + (1-f(x))\ell(h(x),0) \\
& + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g^+\big(\ell(h(x),0)g(x)(1-f(x)) - \beta_g\ell(h(x),0)(1-f(x)) - \gamma\big) \\
& + \lambda_g^-\big(\beta_g\ell(h(x),0)(1-f(x)) - \ell(h(x),0)g(x)(1-f(x)) - \gamma\big)\Bigg] \\
= \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}\Bigg[& \ell(h(x),0)\Big(1 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g^+(g(x)-\beta_g) + \lambda_g^-(\beta_g - g(x))\Big) - \gamma\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}(\lambda_g^+ + \lambda_g^-) \\
& - f(x)\Big(-\ell(h(x),1) + \ell(h(x),0)\big(1 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}\lambda_g^+(g(x)-\beta_g) + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}\lambda_g^-(\beta_g - g(x))\big)\Big)\Bigg] \\
= \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}\Bigg[& \ell(h(x),0)\Big(1 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}(\lambda_g^+ - \lambda_g^-)(g(x)-\beta_g)\Big) - \gamma\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}(\lambda_g^+ + \lambda_g^-) \\
& - f(x)\Big(-\ell(h(x),1) + \ell(h(x),0)\big(1 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}(\lambda_g^+ - \lambda_g^-)(g(x)-\beta_g)\big)\Big)\Bigg].
\end{aligned}$$

Recall that $\lambda_g = \lambda_g^+ - \lambda_g^-$, so we are done. □

Definition 21 (Optimal post-processed classifier). *We say that a classifier h_f is an optimal post-processing of f if there exists a vector λ^f such that the following primal/dual optimality conditions are simultaneously met:*

$$h_f(x) \in \arg\min_{h\in\mathcal{H}_A} L_f(h,\lambda^f) \quad \lambda^f \in \arg\max_{\lambda\in\mathbb{R}^{2|\mathcal{G}|}} L_f(h_f,\lambda).$$

For convenience, we write

$$h^*(x) = h_{f^*}(x) \quad \textit{and} \quad \lambda^* = \lambda^{f^*}$$
$$\hat{h}(x) = h_{\hat{f}}(x) \quad \textit{and} \quad \hat{\lambda} = \lambda^{\hat{f}}$$

where f^* is the Bayes optimal regressor and $\hat{f}$ is any other regressor. We will write λ_g^* and $\hat{\lambda}_g$ to refer to the dual variable in λ^* and $\hat{\lambda}$ for group g, respectively. We observe that as the optimal solution to the Lagrangian minimax optimization problem, $h^*(x)$ is the Bayes optimal classifier subject to the fairness constraints in 1.

Lemma 14. *The optimal post-processed classifier h of $\psi(f,\gamma,\mathcal{H}_A)$ for some regressor f takes the following form:*

$$h(x) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } f(x) > \frac{\kappa}{\mu} \text{ and } \mu > 0, \\ 0, & \text{if } f(x) < \frac{\kappa}{\mu} \text{ and } \mu > 0, \\ 1, & \text{if } f(x) < \frac{\kappa}{\mu} \text{ and } \mu < 0, \\ 0, & \text{if } f(x) > \frac{\kappa}{\mu} \text{ and } \mu < 0. \end{cases},$$

where $\kappa = 1 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_g(g(x)-\beta_g)$ and $\mu = 1+\kappa$.

In the edge case in which $f(x) = \frac{\kappa}{\mu}$, $h(x)$ could take either value and might be randomized.

Proof. Note that since we are optimizing over the set of all binary classifiers, h optimizes the Lagrangian objective pointwise for every x. In particular, we have from Lemma 13 that:

$$h(x) = \arg\min_p \Big[\ell(p,0)\big(\kappa\big) - f(x)\Big(-\ell(p,1) + \ell(p,0)\big(\kappa\big)\Big)\Big].$$

Determining the optimal threshold is equivalent to determining when the above expression with $\ell(p,0) = 1$ and $\ell(p,1) = 0$ is less than $f(x)$, i.e.

$$\begin{aligned} \kappa - f(x)\big(\kappa\big) &< f(x) \\ \kappa &< f(x)\left(1 + \big(\kappa\big)\right). \end{aligned}$$

Thus,

$$h(x) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } f(x) > \frac{\kappa}{\mu} \text{ and } \mu > 0, \\ 0, & \text{if } f(x) < \frac{\kappa}{\mu} \text{ and } \mu > 0 \\ 1, & \text{if } f(x) < \frac{\kappa}{\mu} \text{ and } \mu < 0, \\ 0, & \text{if } f(x) > \frac{\kappa}{\mu} \text{ and } \mu < 0 \end{cases}$$

□

In Lemma 14, we can only describe the optimal post-processed classifier for cases where either $f(x)$ is less than or greater than the threshold $\frac{\kappa}{\mu}$, $h(x)$. In practice, our algorithm will need to update h at round t according to the current dual variables λ in a way that is well-defined for all values of $f(x)$. Hence, we define our best response as follows, where ties between $f(x)$ and the threshold are broken by rounding to 1.

Definition 22 (Best Response Model). *Given regressor f and dual variables λ, let the best response h be defined as*

$$h(x) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } f(x) \geq \frac{\kappa}{\mu} \text{ and } \mu > 0, \\ 0, & \text{if } f(x) < \frac{\kappa}{\mu} \text{ and } \mu > 0, \\ 1, & \text{if } f(x) \leq \frac{\kappa}{\mu} \text{ and } \mu < 0, \\ 0, & \text{if } f(x) > \frac{\kappa}{\mu} \text{ and } \mu < 0. \end{cases}$$

Lemma 15. *For any regression model f and dual variables λ, The classifier h defined in Definition 22 is a "best response" in the sense that:*

$$h \in \arg\min_{h \in \mathcal{H}_A} L_f(h, \lambda).$$

B.1 Proofs from Section 3.1

Game formulation. We pose the optimization of our original linear program as a zero-sum game between a primal (minimization) player who plays over the set of hypotheses and a dual (maximization) player who plays over the set of dual variables. The utility function of the game is the Lagrangian of our linear program as stated in Definition 8. The value of this game is given by

$$\min_{h \in \Delta\mathcal{H}} \max_{\lambda \in \mathbb{R}^{2|\mathcal{G}|}} L_f(h, \lambda).$$

Constraining the linear program. In order to compute an approximate minimax solution to this game, we need to constrain the strategy space of the dual player.

That is, we need to bound the dual space to a region $\Lambda = \left\{\lambda \in \mathbb{R}^{2\mathcal{G}} \middle| \|\lambda\|_1 \leq C\right\}$. We call this constrained version of the problem the Λ-bounded Lagrangian problem, which has value

$$\min_{h \in \Delta\mathcal{H}} \max_{\lambda : |\lambda|_1 \leq C} L_f(h, \lambda). \tag{12}$$

We can apply the minimax theorem to this bounded game to see:

$$\min_{h \in \Delta\mathcal{H}} \max_{\lambda : |\lambda|_1 \leq C} L_f(h, \lambda) \equiv \max_{\lambda : |\lambda|_1 \leq C} \min_{h \in \Delta\mathcal{H}} L_f(h, \lambda).$$

We will only be able to achieve an approximate solution to the problem, which we define as follows.

Definition 23. *We say that (h, λ) is a v-approximate minimax solution to the Λ-bounded Lagrangian problem L_f if $L_f(h, \lambda) \leq \min_{h' \in \Delta\mathcal{H}} L_f(h', \lambda) + v$ and $L_f(h, \lambda) \geq \max_{\lambda' \in \Lambda} L_f(h, \lambda') - v$.*

An approximate minimax solution to this bounded version of the problem is also an approximate solution to the original problem we described in Equation 1.

Theorem 3 ([18]). *Let (h, λ) be a v-approximate minimax solution to the Λ-bounded Lagrangian problem L_f and let* OPT *be the objective value of the optimal solution to $\psi(f, \gamma, \mathcal{H}_A)$. Then, $err(h) \leq OPT + 2v$, and $\forall g \in \mathcal{G}, w_g|\rho_g(h) - \rho(h)| \leq \gamma + (1 + 2v)/C$.*

Approximate equilibrium of the constrained game. Now, we can proceed with no-regret play to find an approximate solution to the game. The dual player will play projected gradient descent over their vector λ and the primal player will best respond, as described in Algorithm 4.

Theorem 4. *Algorithm 4 returns an $\epsilon-$approximate equilibrium solution to the zero-sum game defined by Equation 12 after $T = \frac{1}{4\epsilon^2}\left(\frac{1}{\epsilon^2} + 4|\mathcal{G}|\right)^2$ rounds.*

To prove this, we will use the following result from Freund and Shapire.

Theorem 5 ([9]). *(Approximately solving a game). If $\lambda_1, \ldots, \lambda_T \in \Delta_\lambda$ is the sequence of distributions over λ played by the dual player and $h_1, \ldots, h_T \in \mathcal{H}$ is the sequence of best-response hypotheses played by the primal player satisfying regret guarantees*

$$\frac{1}{T}\max_{\lambda\in\Lambda}\sum_{t=1}^{T} U(h_t,\lambda) - \frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=1}^{T}\mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\lambda\sim\lambda_t}[U(h_t,\lambda)] \le \Delta_1$$

and

$$\frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=1}^{T}\mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\lambda\sim\lambda_t}[U(h_t,\lambda)] - \frac{1}{T}\min_{h\in\mathcal{H}}\sum_{t=1}^{T}\mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\lambda\sim\lambda_t}[U(h,\lambda)] \le \Delta_2$$

then the time-average of the two players' empirical distributions is a $(\Delta_1+\Delta_2)-$approximate equilibrium.

Proof of Theorem 4. We follow the regret analysis of [24]. To instantiate their result, we need a bound on the norm of the gradients of the loss function and on the diameter of the feasible set F. First, we see that at each step the gradient of the loss seen by gradient descent is bounded:

$$\|\nabla\ell\|^2 = \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} w_g\left(\rho_g-\rho-\gamma\right)^2 + w_g\left(-\rho_g+\rho-\gamma\right)^2 \le 2|\mathcal{G}|.$$

Second, we see that if we consider the feasible set such that $\|\lambda\| \le \frac{1}{\epsilon}$, then $\|F\|^2 = \frac{1}{\epsilon^2}$. Thus we have that the regret of the dual player is bounded:

$$\mathcal{R}(T) \le \frac{\|F\|^2\sqrt{T}}{2} + (\sqrt{T}-\frac{1}{2})\|\nabla\ell\|^2$$
$$\frac{\mathcal{R}(T)}{T} \le \frac{1}{T}\left(\frac{\frac{1}{\epsilon^2}\sqrt{T}}{2} + (\sqrt{T}-\frac{1}{2})2|\mathcal{G}|\right) \le \frac{\frac{1}{\epsilon^2}+4|\mathcal{G}|}{2\sqrt{T}}.$$

After $T = \frac{1}{4\epsilon^2}\left(\frac{1}{\epsilon^2}+4|\mathcal{G}|\right)^2$ rounds, by [9] the average over empirical distributions of play of the dual and primal players, $\bar{\lambda}$ and $\bar{h}$, respectively, form an $\epsilon-$approximate equilibrium solution to the zero-sum game defined by 12. □

Lemma 16. *lemma Let h_t be the response to λ_{t-1} described in Algorithm 4 at some round $t \in [T]$. Then,*

$$h_t(x) = s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x, f(x)).$$

Proof. Recall from Lemma 15 and Algorithm 4 that the best response to λ that the primal player can make is to compute h based on the thresholding of the expression

$$\tau = \frac{\kappa_{t-1}}{\mu_{t-1}}.$$

Setting this threshold to be greater than or equal to some value v, note the following is implied:

$$\frac{\kappa_{t-1}}{\mu_{t-1}} \ge v,$$
$$\Rightarrow \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}\lambda_{g,t-1}(g(x)-\beta_g) - v\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}\lambda_{g,t-1}(g(x)-\beta_g) \ge 2v-1,$$
$$\Rightarrow (1-v)(\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}\lambda_{g,t-1}(g(x)-\beta_g) \ge 2v-1,$$
$$\Rightarrow \langle\lambda_{t-1}, x_{\mathcal{G}}-\beta\rangle = \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}\lambda_{g,t-1}(g(x)-\beta_g) \ge \frac{2v-1}{1-v}.$$

Thus, taking the indicator of

$$1[\langle\lambda_{t-1}, x_{\mathcal{G}}-\beta\rangle \ge d(v)]$$

is equivalent to determining if the threshold τ is greater than or equal to some v, and hence by the definition of $s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,v)$ in Definition 9 and of the best response h in Definition 22, if v is set to $f(x)$ it follows that

$$h(x) = s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x, f(x)).$$

□

Theorem 6. *Let* OPT *be the objective value of the optimal solution to $\psi(f,\gamma,\mathcal{H}_A)$. Then, for any $C \in \mathbb{R}$, after $T = \frac{1}{4}\cdot C^2\cdot\left(C^2+4|\mathcal{G}|\right)^2$ iterations, Algorithm 4 outputs a randomized hypothesis $\bar{h}$ with the following properties:*

- *the error of the output satisfies $err(\bar{h}) \le$ OPT $+\frac{2}{C}$*
- *the constraint violation of the output satisfies $w_g|\rho_g(\bar{h})-\rho(\bar{h})| \le \gamma+\frac{1}{C}+\frac{2}{C^2}$*

- *the output $\bar{h}$ is the uniform mixture over T constituent models, each of which belong to the set of threshold functions $\mathcal{B}(C)$.*

Proof of Theorem 6. Applying Theorems 3 and 4, we have that after T rounds $(\bar{h}, \bar{\lambda})$ is an ϵ-approximate equilibrium to the zero-sum game of 12 and equivalently a minimax solution to the Λ-bounded Lagrangian. Taking $\epsilon = 1/C$, the solution $(\bar{h}, \bar{\lambda})$ is a $\frac{1+2\epsilon}{1/\epsilon} = 1/C + 2/C^2$ approximate solution to the original linear program 1. The final condition follows from Lemma 16. □

Algorithm 4 Projected Gradient Descent Algorithm

Input: D: dataset, $f : \mathcal{X} \to [0,1]$: regression function, $\mathcal{G}$: groups, γ: tolerance on fairness violation, C: bound on dual ($\|\lambda\|_1 \leq C$), η: learning rate
Initialize dual vector $\lambda^0 = \mathbf{0}$ and set $T = \frac{1}{4} \cdot C^2 \cdot (C^2 + 4|\mathcal{G}|)^2$.
for $t = 1, \ldots, T$ **do**
  Primal player updates h_t

$$h_t(x) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } f(x) \geq \frac{\kappa_{t-1}}{\mu_{t-1}} \text{ and } \mu_{t-1} > 0, \\ 0, & \text{if } f(x) < \frac{\kappa_{t-1}}{\mu_{t-1}} \text{ and } \mu_{t-1} > 0, \\ 1, & \text{if } f(x) \leq \frac{\kappa_{t-1}}{\mu_{t-1}} \text{ and } \mu_{t-1} < 0, \\ 0, & \text{if } f(x) > \frac{\kappa_{t-1}}{\mu_{t-1}} \text{ and } \mu_{t-1} < 0, \\ 1, & \text{if } \mu_{t-1} = 0 \end{cases}$$

  Compute

$$\hat{\rho}_g^t = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(x,y)\sim D}[\ell(h_t(x), 0) g(x)(1 - f(x))] \text{ for all } g \in \mathcal{G},$$
$$\hat{\rho}^t = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(x,y)\sim D}[\beta_g \ell(h_t(x), 0)(1 - f(x))], \text{ where } \beta_g = \mathbb{P}[g(x) = 1 | y = 0]$$

  Dual player updates

$$\lambda_{g,t,+} = \max(0, \lambda_{g,t,+} + \eta \cdot (\hat{\rho}_g^t - \hat{\rho}^t - \gamma)),$$
$$\lambda_{g,t,-} = \max(0, \lambda_{g,t,-} + \eta \cdot (\hat{\rho}^t - \hat{\rho}_g^t - \gamma)).$$

  Dual player sets $\lambda^t = \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_{g,t,+} - \lambda_{g,t,-}$.
  if $\|\lambda^t\|_1 > C$ **then**
    set $\lambda^t = \arg\min_{\{\tilde{\lambda} \in \mathbb{R}^{2\mathcal{G}} | \|\tilde{\lambda}\|_1 \leq C\}} \|\lambda_t - \tilde{\lambda}\|_2^2$.
  end if
end for
Output: $\bar{h} := \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \hat{h}_t$, a uniformly random classifier over all rounds' hypotheses.

B.2 Proofs from Section 3.2

Theorem 7. *Set $C = \sqrt{1/\alpha}$. Let $\hat{f}$ be α-approximately multicalibrated in expectation with respect to $\mathcal{G}$, $\mathcal{H}$, and $\mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{H}$ and α-approximately jointly multicalibrated in expectation with respect to $\mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{B}(C)$. Let $\bar{h}$ be the result of running Algorithm 4 with input $\hat{f}$ and C. Then, $err(\bar{h}) \leq err(h^*) + \alpha(5 + 2\sqrt{1/\alpha}) + 2\sqrt{\alpha}$, and for all $g \in \mathcal{G}$, $w_g \left|\rho_g(\bar{h}) - \rho(\bar{h})\right| \leq w_g \left|\rho_g(h^*) - \rho(h^*)\right| + 2\alpha$.*

In order to prove this, we will proceed through the specifics of each line of the Proof Sketch 3.2 in Section 3.2 through Lemmas 17 through 3.

Lemma 17 (Equality in Equation 2).

$$err(h^*) = L^*(h^*, \lambda^*)$$

Proof. Consider the optimal solution (h^*, λ^*) to $\psi(f^*, \gamma, \mathcal{H})$, and recall that $\text{err}(h) = \mathbb{E}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}[f^*(x)\ell(h(x), 1) + (1 - f^*(x))\ell(h(x), 0)]$. Since the solution is optimal, it follows from complementary slackness, for each group g one of the following must hold: Either the constraint is exactly tight and so its "violation" term in the Lagrangian evaluates to 0, or its corresponding dual variables $\lambda_g^{\pm} = 0$. Thus, $L_f^*(h^*, \lambda^*)$ simplifies to

$$\begin{aligned}
L_f^*(h^*, \lambda^*) = &\mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}\Bigg[f(x)\ell(h(x),1) + (1-f(x))\ell(h(x),0) \\
&+ 0\cdot\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}\lambda_g^+\big(\ell(h(x),0)g(x)(1-f(x)) - \beta_g\ell(h(x),0)(1-f(x)) - \gamma\big) \\
&+ 0\cdot\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}\lambda_g^-\big(\beta_g\ell(h(x),0)(1-f(x)) - \ell(h(x),0)g(x)(1-f(x)) - \gamma\big)\Bigg] \\
= &\mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}\Big[f(x)\ell(h(x),1) + (1-f(x))\ell(h(x),0)\Big] \\
= &\,\mathrm{err}(h^*)
\end{aligned}$$

□

Lemma 18 (Bounding Equation 2 by Equation 3).

$$L^*(h^*, \lambda^*) \geq L^*(h^*, \hat{\lambda}).$$

Proof. This follows from the dual optimality condition that $\lambda^* \in \arg\max_\lambda L^*(h^*, \lambda)$. □

Lemma 19. *(Bounding Equation 3 by Equation 4) Fix any λ. If $\hat{f}$ is α-multicalibrated with respect to $\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{H}$, and $\mathcal{G}\times\mathcal{H} = \{g(x)\cdot h(x) | g\in\mathcal{G}, h\in\mathcal{H}\}$, then then we have*

$$\left|\hat{L}(h^*, \lambda) - L^*(h^*, \lambda)\right| \leq \alpha(3 + 2\|\lambda\|_1).$$

Proof. Observe that we can write:

$$\hat{L}(h, \lambda) = L_1(h, \lambda) - \gamma\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}(\lambda_g^+ + \lambda_g^-) - \hat{L}_2(h, \lambda),$$

where

$$\begin{aligned}
L_1(h, \lambda) &= \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}\Big[\ell(h(x),0)\Big(\kappa\Big)\Big], \\
\hat{L}_2(h, \lambda) &= \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}\Big[\hat{f}(x)\Big(-\ell(h(x),1) + \ell(h(x),0)\big(\kappa\big)\Big)\Big].
\end{aligned}$$

Similarly, we can write:

$$L^*(h, \lambda) = L_1(h, \lambda) - \gamma\sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}(\lambda_g^+ + \lambda_g^-) - L_2^*(h, \lambda),$$

where

$$L_2^*(h, \lambda) = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}\Big[f^*(x)\Big(-\ell(h(x),1) + \ell(h(x),0)\big(\kappa\big)\Big)\Big].$$

Observe that the L_1 term does not depend on $\hat{f}$ or f^* and so is common between $\hat{L}$ and L^*. We can bound $\hat{L}_2$ as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{L}_2(h^*, \lambda) &= \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}\Big[\hat{f}(x)\Big(-\ell(h^*(x),1) + \ell(h^*(x),0)\big(\kappa\big)\Big)\Big] \\
&= \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}\Big[\hat{f}(x)\Big(-(1-h^*(x)) + h^*(x)\big(\kappa\big)\Big)\Big] \\
&= \sum_{v\in R}\mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x) = v]\mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_x}\Big[\hat{f}(x)\Big(-(1-h^*(x)) + h^*(x)\big(\kappa\big)\Big)\Big|\hat{f}(x) = v\Big] \\
&\leq \sum_{v\in R}\mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x) = v]\mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_x}\Big[f^*(x)\Big(-(1-h^*(x)) + h^*(x)\big(\kappa\big)\Big)\Big|\hat{f}(x) = v\Big] \\
&\quad + \alpha\left(3 + \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}}\lambda_g(1+\beta_g)\right) \\
&\leq L_2^*(h^*, \lambda) + \alpha\left(3 + 2\|\lambda\|_1\right),
\end{aligned}$$

where the first inequality follows from the fact that $h^* \in \mathcal{H}$ and $\hat{f}$ is multicalibrated with respect to $\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{H}$, and $\mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{H}$, which we verify below:

$$\begin{aligned}
&\sum_{v \in R} \mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x) = v] \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_x}\left[\left(f^*(x) - \hat{f}(x)\right) \cdot \left(-(1 - h^*(x)) + h^*(x)(\kappa)\right) \middle| \hat{f}(x) = v\right] \\
&= \sum_{v \in R} \mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x) = v]\left[\left(f^*(x) - \hat{f}(x)\right) \cdot \left(-1 + 2h^*(x) + h^*(x) \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g (g(x) - \beta_g)\right) \middle| \hat{f}(x) = v\right] \\
&= -\sum_{v \in R} \mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x) = v] \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_x}\left[\hat{f}^*(x) - \hat{f}(x) \middle| \hat{f}(x) = v\right] \\
&\quad + 2\sum_{v \in R} \mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x) = v] \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_x}\left[(f^*(x) - \hat{f}(x))h^*(x) \middle| \hat{f}(x) = v\right] \\
&\quad + \sum_{v \in R} \mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x) = v] \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_x}\left[(f^*(x) - \hat{f}(x))h^*(x)g(x) \middle| \hat{f}(x) = v\right] \\
&\quad - \sum_{v \in R} \mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x) = v] \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g \beta_g \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_x}\left[(f^*(x) - \hat{f}(x))h^*(x) \middle| \hat{f}(x) = v\right] \\
&\leq 3\alpha + \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g (1 + \beta_g)\alpha \\
&\leq 3\alpha + \alpha \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g (1 + \max_{g' \in \mathcal{G}} \beta_{g'}) \\
&\leq 3\alpha + \alpha \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}} \lambda_g (1 + 1) \\
&\leq 3\alpha + 2\|\lambda\|_1 \alpha
\end{aligned}$$

Similarly, we can show that $L^*(h^*, \lambda) - \hat{L}(h^*, \lambda) \leq \alpha\,(3 + 2\|\lambda\|_1)$. Putting everything together, we get that:

$$\left|\hat{L}(h^*, \lambda) - L^*(h^*, \lambda)\right| \leq \alpha(3 + 2\|\lambda\|_1).$$

This concludes the proof. □

Lemma 20 (Bounding Equation 4 by Equation 5).

$$\hat{L}(h^*, \hat{\lambda}) \geq \hat{L}(\hat{h}, \hat{\lambda})$$

Proof. This follows from the primal optimality condition that $\hat{h} \in \arg\min_{h \in \mathcal{H}_A} \hat{L}(h, \hat{\lambda})$ and that $\mathcal{H} \subseteq \mathcal{H}_A$. □

Lemma 21 (Equality of Equation 5 and Equation 6).

$$\hat{L}(\hat{h}, \hat{\lambda}) = \widehat{err}(\hat{h})$$

Proof. This follows the same complimentary slackness argument as the proof of Lemma 17. □

Lemma 22 (Bound of Equation 6 by Equation 7). *Consider $\bar{h}$ output by algorithm 4 after $T = \frac{1}{4} \cdot C^2 \cdot \left(C^2 + 4|\mathcal{G}|\right)^2$ rounds. Then,*

$$\widehat{err}(\hat{h}) + 2/C \geq \widehat{err}(\bar{h})$$

Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 6. □

We now have the tools to prove our main theorem.

Proof of Theorem 7. Applying lemmas 17 through 3 gives us

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathrm{err}(h^*) &= L^*(h^*, \lambda^*) \quad \text{(Lemma 17)} && (13)\\
&\geq L^*(h^*, \hat{\lambda}) \quad \text{(Lemma 18)} && (14)\\
&\geq \hat{L}(h^*, \hat{\lambda}) - \alpha(3 + 2\|\lambda\|_1) \quad \text{(Lemma 19)} && (15)\\
&\geq \hat{L}(\hat{h}, \hat{\lambda}) - \alpha(3 + 2\|\lambda\|_1) \quad \text{(Lemma 20),} && (16)
\end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{L}(\hat{h},\hat{\lambda}) &= \widehat{\mathrm{err}}(\hat{h}) \quad \text{(Lemma 21)} &(17)\\ &\geq \widehat{\mathrm{err}}(\bar{h}) - 2/C \quad \text{(Lemma 22)} &(18)\\ &\geq \mathrm{err}(\bar{h}) - 2/C - 2\alpha \quad \text{(Lemma 3).} &(19)\end{aligned}$$

Putting this all together gives us

$$\begin{aligned}\mathrm{err}(h^*) &\geq \mathrm{err}(\bar{h}) - \alpha(3 + 2\|\lambda\|_1) - 2/C - 2\alpha\\ &= \mathrm{err}(\bar{h}) - \alpha(5 + 2\|\lambda\|_1) - 2/C\\ &\geq \mathrm{err}(\bar{h}) - \alpha(5 + 2C) - 2/C\end{aligned}$$

We want to set C to minimize this discrepancy. Noting that the derivative of $\alpha(5 + 2C) + 2/C$ with respect to C is $2\alpha - 2/C^2$, we get a minimization at $C = \sqrt{1/\alpha}$.

Setting C as such gives the desired bound:

$$\mathrm{err}(h^*) \geq \mathrm{err}(\bar{h}) - \alpha(5 + 2\sqrt{1/\alpha}) - 2\sqrt{\alpha}.$$

Following a similar analysis as Lemma 3, we can bound the fairness constraints on $\bar{h}$ by bounding them for the model $\hat{h}_t$ found at every round $t \in [T]$ of Algorithm 4.

$$\begin{aligned}w_g \cdot (\hat{\rho}_g(\hat{h}_t) - \hat{\rho}(\hat{h}_t)) &= \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_x}[(1-\hat{f}(x))\ell(\hat{h}_t(x),0)g(x)] - \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_x}[(1-\hat{f}(x))\ell(\hat{h}_t(x),0)]\beta_g\\
&= \sum_{v\in R}\mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x)=v, s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,v)=0]\mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_x}[(1-\hat{f}(x))\ell(\hat{h}_t(x),0)\cdot(g(x)-\beta_g)|\hat{f}(x)=v, s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,v)=0]\\
&\quad + \mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x)=v, s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,v)=1]\mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_x}[(1-\hat{f}(x))\ell(\hat{h}_t(x),0)\cdot(g(x)-\beta_g)|\hat{f}(x)=v, s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,v)=1]\\
&= \sum_{v\in R}\mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x)=v, s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,v)=1]\mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_x}[(1-\hat{f}(x))\ell(\hat{h}_t(x),0)\cdot(g(x)-\beta_g)|\hat{f}(x)=v, s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,v)=1]\\
&= \sum_{v\in R}\mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x)=v, s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,v)=1]\mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_x}[\ell(\hat{h}_t(x),0)\cdot(g(x)-\beta_g-\hat{f}(x)g(x)+\hat{f}(x)\beta_g)|\hat{f}(x)=v, s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,v)=1]\\
&\leq \sum_{v\in R}\mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x)=v, s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,v)=1]\mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_x}[\ell(\hat{h}_t(x),0)\cdot(g(x)-\beta_g-f^*(x)g(x)+f^*(x)\beta_g)|\hat{f}(x)=v, s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,v)=1]+2\alpha\\
&= \sum_{v\in R}\mathbb{P}[\hat{f}(x)=v, s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,v)=1]\mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_x}[(1-f^*(x))\ell(\hat{h}_t(x),0)\cdot(g(x)-\beta_g)|\hat{f}(x)=v, s_{\lambda_{t-1}}(x,v)=1]+2\alpha\\
&= \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x\in\mathcal{D}_x}[(1-f^*(x))\ell(h_t(x),0)\cdot(g(x)-\beta_g)]+2\alpha\\
&= w_g(\rho_g(h_t)-\rho(h_t))+2\alpha.\end{aligned}$$

Here, the inequality comes from our multicalibration guarantees: (1) because we assumed $\mathcal{G}$ contains the I, we can swap $\hat{f}(x)$ with $f^*(x)$ at the cost of α additive error, and (2) because we have joint mutlicaliration with respect to $\mathcal{G}\times\mathcal{B}(C)$, we can swap $\hat{f}(x)g(x)$ with $f^*(x)g(x)$ at the cost of α additive error. We can repeat the same argument in the opposite direction, and get that

$$w_g\left|\rho_g(h^*)-\rho(h^*)\right| \geq w_g\left|\rho_g(\bar{h})-\rho(\bar{h})\right| - 2\alpha.$$

□

C ACHIEVING JOINT MULTICALIBRATION

In this section we give an algorithm that can take as input any model $f : \mathcal{X} \to [0,1]$ and transform it into a new model $\hat{f} : \mathcal{X} \to R$ such that $\hat{f}$ achieves multicalibration in expectation with respect to a class of functions $C_1 \subset \{0,1\}^{\mathcal{X}}$ and simultaneously, joint multicalibration in expectation with respect to a class of functions $C_2 \subset \{0,1\}^{\mathcal{X}\times R}$ where $R = \{0, \frac{1}{m}, \frac{2}{m}, \ldots, 1\}$ for some $m > 0$. Our algorithm can be viewed as a variant of the original multicalibration algorithm of [14] (our variant achieves the stronger guarantee of calibration in expectation, first defined in [11]), or a simplification of the split-and-marge algorithm of [11], which replaces the "merge" operation with simple per-update rounding.

First we observe that without loss of generality, we can focus on achieving joint multicalibration for a single class of functions. To see this, note that given $C_1 \subset \{0,1\}^{\mathcal{X}}$, we can transform it into an identical class of two argument functions that simply ignore their second argument:

$$C_1' = \{c \text{ where } c(x,v) = c_1(x) \text{ for every } c_1 \in C_1\}.$$

Note that if $\hat{f}$ is α-approximately joint-multicalibrated with respect to C_1', then it is α-approximately multicalibrated with respect to C_1 and vice versa. In other words, in order to be simultaniously multicalibrated with respect to C_1 *and* joint-multicalibrated with respect to C_2, it is sufficient (actually equivalent) to be joint-multicalibrated with respect to $C_1' \cup C_2$. Therefore, we focus on enforcing joint-multicalibration with respect to arbitrary $C \subset \{0,1\}^{\mathcal{X}\times[0,1]}$.

Before we describe the algorithm, we define the round operation. Write $[\frac{1}{m}] = \{0, \frac{1}{m}, \frac{2}{m}, \ldots, 1\}$ for any $m > 0$. We let $f' = Round(f, m)$ to denote the function that simply rounds the output of f to the nearest grid point of $[\frac{1}{m}]$. Similarly, we write $Round(v, m) = \arg\min_{v' \in [\frac{1}{m}]} |v' - v|$ to denote the grid point of $[\frac{1}{m}]$ closest to v.

Algorithm 5 Multicalibration algorithm

Input: α, f, C
$m = \frac{1}{\alpha}$
$f_0 = Round(f, m)$
$t = 0$
While there exists a $c \in C$ such that:

$$\sum_{v \in R} \mathbb{P}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}[f_t(x) = v, c(x,v) = 1]\left(v - \mathbb{P}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[y|f_t(x) = v, c(x,v) = 1]\right)^2 \geq \alpha$$

Let

$$(v_t, c_t) = \arg\max_{v\in R, c\in C} \mathbb{P}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}[f_t(x) = v, c(x,v) = 1] \cdot \left(v - \mathbb{P}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[y|f_t(x) = v, c(x,v) = 1]\right)^2$$
$$S_t = \{x \in \mathcal{X} : f_t(x) = v, c_t(x, v_t) = 1\}$$
$$\tilde{v}_t = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[y|x \in S_t]$$
$$v_t' = Round(\tilde{v}_t, m)$$

Let

$$f_{t+1}(x) = \begin{cases} v_t' & \text{if } x \in S_t \\ f_t(x) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

$t = t + 1$
EndWhile

Theorem 8. *The output of Algorithm 5 $f_T : \mathcal{X} \to \{0, \alpha, 2\alpha, \ldots, 1\}$ is $\sqrt{\alpha}$-approximately jointly multicalibrated with respect to C where $T \leq \frac{4}{\alpha^2}$.*

Proof. By definition, the output of the algorithm f_T is such that

$$\sum_{v \in R} \mathbb{P}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}[f_t(x) = v, c(x,v) = 1]\left(v - \mathbb{P}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[y|f_t(x) = v, c(x,v) = 1]\right)^2 < \alpha$$

for every $c \in C$, meaning it is satisfies $\sqrt{\alpha}$-joint calibration:

$$\begin{aligned}
&\sum_{v \in R} \mathbb{P}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}[f_t(x) = v, c(x,v) = 1]\left|v - \mathbb{P}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[y|f_t(x) = v, c(x,v) = 1]\right| \\
&\leq \sqrt{\sum_{v \in R} \mathbb{P}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}[f_t(x) = v, c(x,v) = 1]\left(v - \mathbb{P}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[y|f_t(x) = v, c(x,v) = 1]\right)^2} \\
&< \sqrt{\alpha}.
\end{aligned}$$

So it suffices to show that the algorithm halts in less than $T \leq \frac{4}{\alpha^2}$ rounds. Define

$$B(f) = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[(y - f(x))^2].$$

We use B as a potential function and show that we decrease it in each round in the following lemma. □

Lemma 23. *For every $t < T$, $B(f_{t+1}) - B(f_t) \leq -\frac{\alpha^2}{4}$*

Proof. Define $\tilde{f_t}$ such that

$$\tilde{f_t}(x) = \begin{cases} \tilde{v}_t & \text{if } x \in B_t \\ f_t(x) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

$$B(f_{t+1}) - B(f_t) = \underbrace{\left(B(f_{t+1}) - B(\tilde{f_t})\right)}_{(*)} + \underbrace{\left(B(\tilde{f_t}) - B(f_t)\right)}_{(**)}$$

Bounding (*):

$$\begin{aligned} B(f_{t+1}) - B(\tilde{f_t}) &= \mathbb{P}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}[x \in S_t] \cdot \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[(y - f_{t+1}(x))^2 - (y - \tilde{f_t}(x))^2 | x \in S_t] \\ &= \mathbb{P}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}[x \in S_t] \cdot \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[((y - \tilde{f_t}(x)) + (\tilde{v}_t - v_t'))^2 - (y - \tilde{f_t}(x))^2 | x \in S_t] \\ &= \mathbb{P}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}[x \in S_t] \cdot \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[2(y - \tilde{v}_t)(\tilde{v}_t - v_t') + (\tilde{v}_t - v_t')^2 | x \in S_t] \\ &\leq \mathbb{P}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}[x \in S_t] \cdot \frac{1}{4m^2} \end{aligned}$$

where the last inequality follows from the fact that $\tilde{v}_t = \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[y | x \in S_t]$ and $|\tilde{v}_t - v_t'| \leq \frac{1}{2m}$.

Bounding (**): Because in round t,

$$\sum_{v\in R} \mathbb{P}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}[f_t(x) = v, c(x,v) = 1] \left(v - \mathbb{P}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[y | f_t(x) = v, c(x,v) = 1]\right)^2 \geq \alpha,$$

we must have

$$\mathbb{P}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}[x \in S_t] \, (v_t - \tilde{v}_t)^2 = \mathbb{P}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}[x \in S_t] \left(v_t - \mathbb{P}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[y | x \in S_t]\right)^2 \geq \frac{\alpha}{m+1}.$$

Now,we show that

$$\begin{aligned} B(\tilde{f_t}) - B(f_{t+1}) &= \mathbb{P}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}[x \in S_t] \cdot \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[(y - \tilde{f_t}(x))^2 - (y - f_t(x))^2 | x \in S_t] \\ &= \mathbb{P}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}[x \in S_t] \cdot \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[(y - \tilde{f_t}(x))^2 - ((y - \tilde{f_t}(x)) + (\tilde{v}_t - v_t))^2 | x \in S_t] \\ &= \mathbb{P}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}_X}[x \in S_t] \cdot \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}[-2(y - \tilde{v}_t)(\tilde{v}_t - v_t) - (\tilde{v}_t - v_t))^2 | x \in S_t] \\ &\leq \frac{-\alpha}{m+1} \end{aligned}$$

where the last inequality follows from the fact that $\mathbb{E}_{(x,y)}[y | x \in S_t] = \tilde{v}_t$.

Combining them together, we get

$$\begin{aligned} B(f_{t+1}) - B(f_t) &\leq \frac{1}{4m^2} - \frac{\alpha}{m+1} \\ &= \frac{\alpha^2}{4} - \frac{\alpha^2}{\alpha+1} \\ &\geq \frac{\alpha^2}{4} - \frac{\alpha^2}{2} \\ &= -\frac{\alpha^2}{4}. \end{aligned}$$

□

Iterating Lemma 23 over T rounds, we have

$$B(f_T) \leq B(f_0) - T\frac{\alpha^2}{4}.$$

Also, because $B(f) \in [0,1]$ for any f, it must be that $T \leq \frac{4}{\alpha^2}$.

D OUT OF SAMPLE GUARANTEES

In the body of the paper, we assumed that we had direct access to distributional quantities — in particular, we needed to evaluate expectations over the feature distribution. In this section, we show that it is possible to estimate these quantities from modest amounts of unlabeled data sampled from the underlying distribution, and that the guarantees of our algorithm carry over to the underlying distribution. In particular, our algorithm results in a solution to the linear program that approximately satisfies its constraints on the underlying distribution, and achieves objective value that is approximately optimal within its comparison class. The strategy we take is to analyze a slightly modified algorithm (Algorithm 6), which at every stage, uses a fresh sample of data to evaluate the necessary expectations empirically. In particular, it uses a *new* sample at every iteration, and so has sample complexity that scales linearly with the number of iterations. Using techniques from adaptive data analysis [3, 6, 17] similar to how they are used by [14] to prove sample complexity bounds, we could reduce our linear dependence on T in our sample complexity bound by a quadratic factor by reusing data across rounds, but we settle for the conceptually simpler bound here.

Theorem 9. *Fix any distribution $\mathcal{D}$, hypothesis class $\mathcal{H}$, class of group indicators $\mathcal{G}$, dual bound C, and $\epsilon, \delta > 0$. After T rounds, with probability $1-\delta$, Algorithm 6 outputs a randomized hypothesis $\bar{h}$ such that $err(\bar{h}) \leq OPT + \frac{2}{C} + 8\epsilon$ and $\omega_g|\rho_g(\bar{h}) - \rho(\bar{h})| \leq \gamma + \frac{1}{C} + \frac{2}{C^2} + \frac{8\epsilon}{C}$, where OPT is the objective value of the optimal solution of $\psi(f, \gamma, \mathcal{H}_A)$. It makes use of $m = O\left(T\frac{\log(\frac{2T|G|}{\delta})}{2\epsilon^2}\right)$ samples of unlabeled data drawn i.i.d. from $\mathcal{D}_X$. Here T is as specified in the algorithm: $T = \frac{1}{4}\cdot C^2 \cdot (C^2 + 4|\mathcal{G}|)^2$.*

Lemma 24. *Fix any distribution $\mathcal{D}$, hypothesis class $\mathcal{H}$, and class of group indicators $\mathcal{G}$. In a single round t of Algorithm 6 with $S_t \sim \mathcal{D}^m$ for $m = O(\frac{\log(\frac{2|G|}{\delta})}{2\epsilon^2})$, Algorithm 6 returns a hypothesis h_t that with probability $1-\delta$ satisfies for all $g \in G$:*

$$|err(h_t, g, \mathcal{D}) - err(h_t, g, S_t)| \leq \epsilon$$
$$|\rho(h_t, g, \mathcal{D}) - \rho(h_t, g, S_t)| \leq \epsilon.$$

Algorithm 6 Projected Gradient Descent Algorithm

Input: $\mathcal{D}$: data distribution, $f : \mathcal{X} \to [0,1]$: regression function, $\mathcal{G}$: groups, γ: tolerance on fairness violation, C: bound on dual ($\|\lambda\|_1 \leq C$), η: learning rate, m = $\frac{\log(\frac{2|G|}{\delta})}{2\epsilon^2}$: batch size of fresh data for each round of gradient descent, ϵ: per round estimation error, δ: failure probability

Initialize dual vector $\lambda^0 = \mathbf{0}$ and set $T = \frac{1}{4}\cdot C^2 \cdot (C^2 + 4|\mathcal{G}|)^2$.

for $t = 1, \ldots, T$ **do**

Primal player updates h_t

$$h_t(x) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } f(x) \geq \frac{\kappa_{t-1}}{\mu_{t-1}} \text{ and } \mu_{t-1} > 0, \\ 0, & \text{if } f(x) < \frac{\kappa_{t-1}}{\mu_{t-1}} \text{ and } \mu_{t-1} > 0, \\ 1, & \text{if } f(x) \leq \frac{\kappa_{t-1}}{\mu_{t-1}} \text{ and } \mu_{t-1} < 0, \\ 0, & \text{if } f(x) > \frac{\kappa_{t-1}}{\mu_{t-1}} \text{ and } \mu_{t-1} < 0. \end{cases}$$

Sample S_t i.i.d. from $\mathcal{D}^m$

Compute

$$\hat{\rho}t, g = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(x,y)\sim S_t}[\ell(h_t(x), 0)g(x)(1 - f(x))] \text{ for all } g \in \mathcal{G},$$
$$\hat{\rho}_t = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{(x,y)\sim S_t}[\beta_g \ell(h_t(x), 0)(1 - f(x))], \text{ where } \beta_g = \mathbb{P}[g(x) = 1 | y = 0]$$

Dual player updates

$$\lambda_{g,t,+} = \max(0, \lambda_{g,t,+} + \eta \cdot (\hat{\rho}_{t,g} - \hat{\rho}_t - \gamma)),$$
$$\lambda_{g,t,-} = \max(0, \lambda_{g,t,-} + \eta \cdot (\hat{\rho}_t - \hat{\rho}_{t,g} - \gamma)).$$

Dual player sets $\lambda_t = \sum_{g\in\mathcal{G}} \lambda_{g,t,+} - \lambda_{g,t,-}$.

if $\|\lambda^t\|_1 > C$ **then**

set $\lambda^t = \arg\min_{\{\tilde{\lambda}\in\mathbb{R}^{2\mathcal{G}} | \|\tilde{\lambda}\|_1 \leq C\}} \|\lambda_t - \tilde{\lambda}\|_2^2$.

end if

end for

Output: $\bar{h} := \frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=1}^{T} \hat{h}_t$, a uniformly random classifier over all rounds' hypotheses.

Theorem 10 (Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound). *Let $X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_m$ be i.i.d. random variables with $a \leq X_i \leq b$ and $\mathbb{E}[X_i] = \mu$ for all i. Then, for any $\alpha > 0$,*

$$\mathbb{P}\left(\left|\frac{\sum_i X_i}{m} - \mu\right| > \alpha\right) \leq 2\exp\left(\frac{-2\alpha^2 m}{(b-a)^2}\right).$$

Proof of Lemma 24. This claim follows by applying a Chernoff-Hoeffding bound with $m \geq \frac{\ln(\frac{2|G|}{\delta})}{2\epsilon^2}$ □

Proof Sketch of Theorem 9. Taking $m > \frac{\log(\frac{2T|G|}{\delta})}{2\epsilon^2}$, we have that in a single round t of our algorithm we are able to estimate the true distributional classification and fairness constraint errors up to an additive error of ϵ with probability $1 - \delta/T$ — and hence with probability $1 - \delta$, we estimate these quantities up to additive error ϵ uniformly over all T rounds. We can then make one small modification to the analysis of Algorithm 4. First observe that since the primal player's best response does not depend on any estimation of a distributional quantity based on the sample S_t, their regret is still zero, as it is in the analysis of Algorithm 4. The dual player, on the other hand, is given loss vectors that deviate from the versions that would have been computed on the underlying distribution by at most 2ϵ in ℓ_∞ norm, and hence experience additional regret (to the true distributional quantities) larger than in the analysis of Algorithm 4 by up to an additional additive 4ϵ. Consequently, the equilibrium solution $(\bar{h}, \bar{\lambda})$ from Algorithm 6 is an $4\epsilon + 1/C$ approximate equilibrium to the zero-sum game of 12 which then, applying Theorem 3, yields a $\frac{2}{C} + 8\epsilon$ approximate solution to the objective of the original linear program. □

Self-Destructing Models: Increasing the Costs of Harmful Dual Uses of Foundation Models

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ABSTRACT

A growing ecosystem of large, open-source foundation models has reduced the labeled data and technical expertise necessary to apply machine learning to many new problems. Yet foundation models pose a clear dual-use risk, indiscriminately reducing the costs of building both harmful and beneficial machine learning systems. Policy tools such as restricted model access and export controls are the primary methods currently used to mitigate such dual-use risks. In this work, we review potential safe-release strategies and argue that both policymakers and AI researchers would benefit from fundamentally new technologies enabling more precise control over the downstream usage of open-source foundation models. We propose one such approach: the *task blocking* paradigm, in which foundation models are trained with an additional mechanism to impede adaptation to harmful tasks without sacrificing performance on desirable tasks. We call the resulting models *self-destructing models*, inspired by mechanisms that prevent adversaries from using tools for harmful purposes. We present an algorithm for training self-destructing models leveraging techniques from meta-learning and adversarial learning, which we call *meta-learned adversarial censoring (MLAC)*. In a small-scale experiment, we show MLAC can largely prevent a BERT-style model from being re-purposed to perform gender identification without harming the model's ability to perform profession classification.

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1 INTRODUCTION

A defining capability of large pretrained models (hereafter foundation models; FMs) is their ability to adapt to many downstream tasks in a few-shot manner—potentially improving performance and efficiency in domains with little training data [7]. Today, anyone with an internet connection can download a foundation model and adapt it to socially beneficial use-cases, like building better educational tools or improving access to justice. However, a malicious actor can also adapt a foundation model to nearly any harmful use-case they desire. For example, an oppressive government can take a powerful pretrained language model and adapt it to identify dissidents; a rogue actor can adapt a pretrained object recognition system such that commercially available drones act as targeted loitering munitions; or a pretrained drug discovery system can be used for creating chemical or biological weapons, like neurotoxins [55]. Unfortunately, due to their general-purpose nature, preventing such dual uses of foundation models is difficult. This creates a tension between making these models widely available and ensuring that they are used in a safe and responsible way.

Currently, there are several approaches to mitigating the dual uses of FMs which can be divided into *structural* safety mechanisms and *technical* safety mechanisms. Structural mechanisms use licenses or access restrictions to prevent harmful uses; there is a broad spectrum of such structural release mechanisms. Some have suggested a review board for selecting the structural release mechanism [34] while others have argued that open source access to foundation models is essential for safety research [6]. While structural release approaches aim to prevent malicious users from acquiring foundation models or providing legal remedies if they exceed the terms of their access, *technical* strategies ensure that the model cannot be used for harmful purposes even if a malicious user is able to gain access to the model itself. Current technical strategies aim to tune the model so that it is less likely to produce harmful content at inference time [3], but do not consider the case where adversaries have access to model parameters.

In this work, we review these strategies, noting that no strategy on its own is able to prevent harmful dual uses of FMs. In particular we note the disconnect between the goal of many structural safety mechanisms and the new reality of open-source foundation models: structural safety strategies aim to prevent a malicious actor from gaining access to the model parameters altogether. In recent months, however, powerful open-source models have been released to the public, including Meta's Llama model which was leaked online despite a restricted access policy [53, 58]. Such developments demand changes to the threat model of malicious FM usage, specifically, that eventually model parameters will become generally accessible. Unlike the assumptions of current safety strategies, there should

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then be a last layer of defense that renders the model itself as harmless as possible. We argue that we need more *technical* strategies to supplement *structural* strategies to reduce the ability for adversaries to use and adapt foundation models for harmful tasks: even when they have access to model parameters. Where existing access restrictions must navigate the tension between openness and safety, we seek to provide a new research pathway for reducing (and in some cases obviating) this tension.

We suggest one such new path forward: *self-destructing models*. Self-destructing models are trained via a task blocking method that impedes the adaptation of the model to a harmful task without impairing the model's ability to be used for its original intended purpose. By increasing the compute, data, and talent required to adapt public models to harmful tasks, self-destructing models have the potential to supplement access controls and other safety mechanisms. We demonstrate a task-blocking mechanism using meta-learning for training a self-destructing model. We find that meta-learning is an essential step in reducing an adversary's ability to tune a model for a harmful task. Simple adversarial losses [16], often used in current technical strategies, do not significantly reduce the costs of harmful adaptation. We hope that the proposed mechanism forms an initial step toward developing new safe release strategies even under the assumption that model parameters become available to adversaries.

Below, we first review the state of current safe-release approaches and their shortfalls, making the case for a shift in the threat model to make model parameters as harmless as possible even with model access. Second, we define the *task blocking* problem and evaluation metrics as well as *self-destructing models*. Third, we describe an initial algorithm, Meta-Learned Adversarial Censoring (MLAC), for training self-destructing models, evaluating its ability to impede fine-tuning a language model to perform demographic information extraction. Fourth, we identify key directions for future research in the development of self-destructing models.

2 REVIEWING THE RISKS AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR DUAL USES

Foundation models can be and, importantly, *have been* used for harmful purposes unforeseen by their creators in recent years. They have been fine-tuned on hate speech and deployed to 4chan [57]; hackers have released methods to bypass ChatGPT's safety filters so that it can be used to help generate malware and spam [23]; stable diffusion models have been fine-tuned to generate abusive imagery [28].

Researchers, practitioners, and policymakers are increasingly searching for new ways to prevent machine learning models from being used for these harmful dual purposes—e.g., Solaiman [51], Brundage et al. [9], Whittlestone and Ovadya [59], Shevlane [49], Brundage et al. [8], and many others. Proposed tools have included export controls, controlled or restricted release strategies, using terms of service or licensing, and alignment and fine-tuning for safety. In this section, we briefly examine each of these methods and discuss potential gaps in relying on each strategy. We consider both *structural* methods (e.g., export controls, use of licensing, and access restrictions), and *technical* methods (e.g., alignment fine-tuning).

2.1 Structural Methods

Export Controls. Recently, researchers, such as Flynn [21], have recommended that the United States consider export controls on hardware related to AI, including NVIDIA A100 GPUs, to restrict certain actors' capacity to train powerful AI models that require substantial computational resources. In 2022, the United States imposed these export controls on AI-related hardware and hardware-manufacturing equipment, following researchers' suggestions [56].

Such export controls may help restrict pre-training of foundation models—a use case which requires large amounts of specialized hardware, but they do not necessarily restrict inference-time computing and small-scale adaptation once model parameters are available. Even the largest foundation models can now be deployed or adapted on commodity hardware using techniques such as adapters [27], 8-bit [12], and even 4-bit [13] quantization, and other optimization strategies. A recent open-source project was able to run multi-billion parameter LLaMa models on a MacBook Pro with near-equal performance to some state-of-the-art closed-source models, using these techniques.[1] As a result, hardware export controls may no longer be sufficient to prevent the efficient adaptation of foundation models or the large-scale deployment of pre-trained models, nor can they prevent malicious actors located in countries not included in the export control regime.

The U.S. government has also put in place export controls on certain *software* and *models* with specific harmful dual uses. For example, in a 2020 rulemaking, the Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) restricted export of software that can be used for automated geospatial analysis. Under this regulation the model is controlled if it meets four criteria: (1) it provides a graphical user interface to identify objects in geospatial imagery; (2) it "reduces pixel variation by performing scale, color, and rotational normalization on the positive samples"; (3) it "[t]rains a Deep Convolutional Neural Network to detect the object of interest from the positive and negative samples"; (4) it "[i]dentifies objects in geospatial imagery using the trained Deep Convolutional Neural Network by matching the rotational pattern from the positive samples with the rotational pattern of objects in the geospatial imagery." But such highly specific export controls do not cover general-purpose foundation models (and associated training software). In fact, a recent demonstration showed how to adapt a CLIP model [44] exactly for analyzing satellite imagery in an easy way using all open-source software [2]. Flynn [21] argued that applying export controls to general-purpose foundation models would be ineffective due to the ease of violating export controls through the same mechanisms as software piracy, as well as the harmful impacts to innovation that such restrictions could have.

Overall, while export controls may be effective in restricting access to large-scale chipsets or certain software, once adversaries can gain access to open-source (or leaked) foundation model parameters they can be readily adapted to harmful dual-uses.

Access Control. Controlled release or restricted access strategies are another set of structural mechanisms that can supplement export controls and reduce malicious actors' ability to access models [41, 49, 52].

[1] https://github.com/ggerganov/llama.cpp

Approach	Examples	Challenges
Export Controls	United States Export Controls on AI hardware	Imprecise, reduced hardware costs, open-source models
Controlled Release	API-only access, Release by request/agreement	Open-source models, leaks, monitoring difficulties
Licensing	OpenRAIL	Requires monitoring and enforcement action, leaks
Filtering, Alignment	Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback	Can be bypassed by fine-tuning or prompt engineering

Table 1: A review of current or proposed approaches to safe foundation model release.

One such approach is to make the model accessible only by agreement. This involves vetting potential users and requiring them to sign a restrictive terms of service before gaining access to the model. For instance, Meta's OPT-175B model and Llama both employ this approach [53, 61, 62]. This access restriction approach is attractive as it does not require hosting any centralized infrastructure for serving model queries. It only requires one-time vetting of the users requesting model access. However, as evidenced by the recent Llama model leak onto BitTorrent [58] and HuggingFace,[2] this approach is susceptible to unauthorized dissemination, effectively negating access control efforts.

Another approach is to never release the model at all, but provide access via an application programming interface (API). Many companies, such as OpenAI, Anthropic, Cohere, and AI21 adopt this approach to protect their trade secrets and prevent harmful dual uses. This approach prevents direct access to model weights, preventing uncontrolled dissemination and retaining the ability to cut off access to malicious users at any time. However, this approach requires monitoring of API usage to detect and revoke access when abused, as well as considerable resources to maintain. Providing such an API may not be possible for researchers and entities without access to centralized model-hosting infrastructure.

Additionally, as open-source efforts continue to match the performance of these closed-source models, the effectiveness of any access control approaches may decrease. Access control approaches require all model creators capable of training similarly capable foundation models to be in agreement on the mechanism for release. If one equally-capable foundation model is available as open-source, malicious actors can simply turn to this alternative.

Terms of Service/Sale (ToS) and Licenses. Closely tied to access controls are licensing agreements to prevent harmful dual-uses. These agreements place restrictions on who can use the model, for what purpose, and in what format. For example, OpenRAIL [18] and similar licenses impose several usage limitations to prevent users from using the model for defamation, spreading disinformation, providing medical advice, or for use by law enforcement. Such terms of service (ToS)-based approaches are also used in other settings, such as by Boston Dynamics, which prohibits modifying its robots for lethal capability and reserves the right to prevent any misuse.[3]

However, relying solely on licensing agreements assumes that malicious actors would respect them and that legal action against violators is possible. Unfortunately, this approach faces several challenges. Firstly, harmful actors may be located in countries that do not enforce licensing requirements. Further, it may be challenging to identify malicious actors and issue a cease-and-desist request. Finally, model creators may not have the resources to monitor and enforce compliance with licensing agreements.

Overall, licensing agreements face the same challenges as other structural restrictions. They require the resources, and international reach, for enforcement.

2.2 Technical Strategies

Unlike structural strategies, we classify *technical strategies* as those that modify foundation models directly to make it more difficult to use them for harmful purposes. Existing technical strategies focus on tuning models to prevent them from outputting harmful content at inference time or adding content filters to block potentially harmful outputs.

Safety Filters. Some models come with safety filters that scan model outputs for harmful content and then redact the output. Stable Diffusion models use this approach to replace offensive content generated by the model with a blank image by default [48]. However, for open-source models safety filters can simply be removed by deleting a few lines of code. This has led users on Reddit to post tutorials like "How to remove [Stable Diffusion's] safety filter in 5 seconds."[4] Other researchers have noted that the filter itself is easily bypassed even without access to directly modify the code [45]. While safety filters can be effective and integral parts of a safe model release, they are more effective when coupled with other structural mechanisms like restricted or API-only model access.

Safety Tuning and Alignment. Alternative approaches such as reinforcement learning from human feedback tune the model itself to be less harmful [3]. Sometimes these approaches fall into a larger class of methods under the moniker *AI alignment*. Since these methods directly train the model to be more difficult to use for harmful purposes at inference time, they are an essential part of a safe release strategy—either for open-source models or for models coupled with a structural release restriction. Though they make the model parameters more difficult to use for harmful tasks, they can be bypassed in two ways.

First, prompt engineering can be used to put models in a state that nonetheless allows them to be used for harmful purposes. For example, hackers now sell prompts and methods to bypass alignment processes and filters for OpenAI's series of models [23]. This allows would-be malicious actors to generate phishing emails and malware with the model, despite its use restrictions.

Second, open-source models can be fine-tuned to remove these restrictions. In one such instance, the open-source GPT-J model

[2] https://twitter.com/ClementDelangue/status/1632948540245671936
[3] https://twitter.com/BostondDynamics2021/status/1362921918781943816
[4] https://www.reddit.com/r/StableDiffusion/comments/wv2nw0/tutorial_how_to_remove_the_safety_filter_in_5/

was fine-tuned on 4chan data (mainly consisting of toxic content and hate speech) and deployed to post to the forum [57].

In the remainder of this work, we describe and evaluate an approach to mitigating this second method of bypassing existing technical model protections.

2.3 The Need For New Technical Mitigation Strategies

The strategies discussed above are individually imperfect; however, each contributes to increasing the costs of successfully co-opting foundation models for harmful dual uses. As access to increasingly capable models becomes commonplace—either through leaks or open-source releases—it is crucial to ensure that the underlying model parameters themselves are optimized for safety as a last line of defense. Structural barriers, such as access restrictions and terms of service, can become ineffective as model weights are distributed through services like BitTorrent.

As regulators recognize the potential dangers associated with increasingly capable systems, it is becoming evident that they will take action to address the risks. One E.U. AI Act proposal would see liability placed on open-source models, incentivizing restricted access approaches. Others argue that such a move would stifle innovation and make it more difficult to develop safer overall models [6, 17, 25]. As Black et al. [6] write, "open access to [FMs] is critical to advancing research in a wide range of areas—particularly in AI safety, mechanistic interpretability, and the study of how [FM] capabilities scale." Yet while more widely available FMs certainly enable greater accessibility, auditability, and understanding of these powerful models, making FMs widely available for downstream adaptation without restriction comes at some cost to safety.

Despite the benefits of open-source releases, if open-source models are regularly adapted for harmful purposes, the pendulum of regulation could swing toward the more restrictive regime as regulators look to available structural tools like access restrictions. To supplement the policy options available to regulators, and to increase the safety of foundation models by default, we encourage more research to expand the toolbox of technical approaches to ensure that model parameters are as safe as possible, even when they are leaked or openly available. We introduce a new class of methods for this toolbox: *task blocking* for *self-destructing models*. These methods are not perfect, but add another layer of protection when combined with other approaches.

3 TASK BLOCKING & SELF-DESTRUCTING MODELS

The goal of task blocking is to create models that increase the costs of fine-tuning on harmful downstream tasks such that an adversary would rather start from scratch than use the pretrained model, while remaining useful for desired tasks (see Fig. 1). The resulting models are "self-destructing models" which impede adaptation on harmful dual-uses by increasing the costs of the harmful use. In this section, we more precisely define our problem setting and describe an initial algorithm for it.



Figure 1: An ideal self-destructing model would boost performance and reduce adaptation costs relative to training from scratch only for desired tasks, while impeding learning of harmful tasks.

3.1 The Task Blocking Problem

We assume that an adversary aims to adapt a pretrained model π_θ (where θ are model parameters of model π) to a harmful task, searching for the best adaptation procedure f among a set of adaptation procedures $\mathcal{F}$ in order to find the one that maximizes harmful task performance. Adaptation procedures in $\mathcal{F}$ may include simple fine-tuning, a hyper-parameter search over fine-tuning procedures, as well as other more advanced adaptation mechanisms that we leave to future work. The goal of task blocking is to produce a self-destructing model with parameters $\tilde{\theta}$, which performs similarly to a standard pre-trained model on a set of desired tasks while being more costly to successfully adapt to harmful tasks.[5]

We define two regimes to increase costs: (1) increase data costs by decreasing sample efficiency; (2) increase compute costs by slowing convergence of the training process.

Data Costs. In the first regime, we assume that the adversary has little data to adapt an FM to their harmful task and that the cost of gathering more data is high. A hallmark trait of traditional FMs is effective few-shot adaptation, learning rapidly from small, fixed-sized datasets. A self-destructing FM, on the other hand, should provide few-shot performance comparable to a randomly initialized model. We define the *few-shot performance improvement* of an FM with parameters θ as the performance gain over a randomly initialized model, both with a fixed adaptation procedure search budget. This can be represented as the following formula:

$$\mathcal{E}^n_{data}(\theta) = \max_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \mathcal{M}\left(f(\theta, D_n)\right) - \max_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \mathcal{M}\left(f(\theta^r, D_n)\right), \quad (1)$$

where $\mathcal{M}$ is the performance metric (where higher is better), n is the number of data points available, D_n is an adaptation dataset of n examples from the task of interest, and θ^r is a randomly-initialized model. $f \in \mathcal{F}$ is an adaptation procedure drawn from a fixed distribution. The size of $\mathcal{F}$ loosely corresponds to the adversary's resource budget for adaptation. Note that the max in Equation 1 encapsulates hyperparameter optimization over the adaptation distribution. $\mathcal{E}_{data} = \frac{1}{N}\sum_n^N \mathcal{E}^n_{data}$ is the average sample-wise regret between the FM parameters θ and a random re-initialization θ^r after

[5]While the goal of a self-destructing model is to reduce performance on harmful tasks after fine-tuning, it should enable high quality *predictions* or *fine-tunability* for desired tasks. Our experiments explore the prediction goal, and we leave exploration of preserving fine-tunability for future work.

each follows the same adaptation procedure $f(\cdot)$ on a fixed-sized dataset D_n. An ideal self-destructing model has $\mathcal{E}_{data} \leq 0$, meaning the model is no more data efficient than a randomly-initialized model for the (presumably harmful) task of interest.

Compute Costs. If data is cheap or plentiful, it may be difficult to prevent an adversary from learning the task since perhaps even a random model can learn the task with the amount of data available. In this data regime (large amount of cheap data), the benefit of an FM is improved compute efficiency, rather than increased accuracy. Here, we would define the FM's *compute cost improvement @p* as the amount of compute saved by using the FM over a randomly initialized model to achieve performance p, where p may measure accuracy, loss, or another metric and compute could be measured in FLOPs, train steps, hyperparameters searched, wall clock time, etc. While in the previous setting, we fix the *dataset size* and blocking aims to reduce performance, in this setting, we fix the *performance* and blocking aims to increase compute costs. The goal of task blocking in this case is to prevent any compute cost improvement over a random initialization when adapting the self-destructing model to a harmful task, while retaining compute cost improvement for desired tasks. Formally, compute cost improvement @p is given as

$$\mathcal{E}^{p}_{compute}(\theta) = C(\mathcal{F}, \theta^{r}, p) - C(\mathcal{F}, \hat{\theta}, p) \tag{2}$$

where C measures the compute cost of applying adaptation procedures from family $\mathcal{F}$ to random parameters θ^r or FM parameters θ until a model with performance level p is found.

However, for the purposes of this work, we focus on data costs, studying methods for reducing few-shot performance improvement for harmful tasks. We leave analysis of compute cost improvement reduction to future work.

Defining Harmful Dual Uses. A large body of work has pointed to inherently harmful uses that FM creators may wish to block: from creating neurotoxins [55] to race detection [38]. In our work we assume that a harmful dual use is *known* and *defined*. That is, the self-destruct mechanism will have data to approximate the dual use and actively encode a mechanism to block it. This requirement inherently requires a normative definition of harmful dual uses. As in other threat modeling exercises and mechanisms for removing harmful content from models, model creators will have to identify the set of tasks to be blocked. Creating self-destructing models may impede their use for harmful purposes counter to the model creator's values, but it is up to the model creator to determine those values. While defining harmful tasks *a priori* may be difficult, this work reflects a "red teaming" approach to harm prevention, common in security contexts. That is, model creators play the role of an adversary to identify and prevent harms. This can function as a complement to other access control methods, providing more confidence that certain known harmful tasks are blocked.

Relationship to Other Technical Safety Mechanisms. Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), and other similar approaches, have been used to mitigate the harms that model can have at inference time [3]. While RLHF aims at ensuring that agents are as harmless as possible at inference time, the goal of self-destructing models and task blocking is to make it difficult to undo these safety mechanisms and co-opt the model even with access to model parameters and adaptation. These are complementary approaches and can be used concurrently to make the model parameters as safe as possible overall. Essentially, the aim is to maintain the model's harmlessness for as long as possible, even when an adversary has direct access.

Input: pretrained model $m = w_d \circ \pi_\theta$, desired task dataset D_d, harmful task dataset D_h, adaptation methods $\tilde{\mathcal{F}}$, adaptation steps K, learning rates η, η_h, η_d
Initialize: Adversarial harmful task head w_h and learning rate α_h, with $\phi = \{w_h, \alpha_h\}$; initial blocked params $\tilde{\theta} \leftarrow \theta$
for n steps **do**
  Sample adaptation procedure $\tilde{f}_k \sim \tilde{\mathcal{F}}$
  Sample data batches $b_d \sim D_d$, $\{b^k_h\} \sim D_h$, $b_h \sim D_h$
  $\{\theta_k\}, \{w^k_h\} \leftarrow \tilde{f}_k(w_h \circ \pi_{\tilde{\theta}}, \{b^k_h\}, \alpha_h)$ // do inner loop
  $\ell^h_k = \mathcal{L}_h(w^k_h \circ \pi_{\theta_k}, b_h), \forall k$ // outer loop harmful NLLs
  $\ell^d = \mathcal{L}_d(w_d \circ \pi_\theta, b_d)$ // desired NLLs
  $\tilde{\theta} \leftarrow \tilde{\theta} - \eta \nabla_\theta \left(\ell^d - \frac{1}{K} \sum_k^K \ell^h_k \right)$ // update blocked model
  $\phi \leftarrow \phi - \eta_h \frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=1}^K \nabla_\phi \ell^h_k$ // update adversarial params
  $w_d \leftarrow w_d - \eta_d \nabla_{w_d} \ell^d$ // update desired task head
end for

algorithm 1: MLAC Training Procedure

3.2 Meta-Learned Adversarial Censoring

To prevent successful adaptation of pretrained models to harmful tasks, we describe *Meta-Learned Adversarial Censoring (MLAC)*, a meta-training procedure that aims to eliminate any useful information about the harmful task in the model's parameters *even after fine-tuning on that task*. Given a desired task dataset D_d and harmful task dataset D_h, MLAC learns a feature extractor $\pi_{\tilde{\theta}}$ that is effective for the desired task but cannot be effectively used or efficiently fine-tuned to perform the harmful task.

In the *inner loop* of each meta-training step, the feature extractor and an adversarially learned prediction head w_h are adapted to the harmful task with several steps of gradient-based adaptation with an adversarially learned learning rate α_h. The adaptation procedure $\tilde{f}$ used at each meta-training step is sampled from $\tilde{\mathcal{F}}$, a proxy for the true adversary's adaptation class $\mathcal{F}$. In this case, we narrow $\tilde{\mathcal{F}}$ to be different fine-tuning approaches with close-to-optimal hyperparameters (e.g., Adam for K steps and learning rate α_h). In the *outer loop*, the adversarial parameters $\phi = \{w_h, \alpha_h\}$ are trained to minimize the harmful task negative log likelihoods of the adapted models, while the blocked parameter initialization $\tilde{\theta}$ are trained to maximize the harmful task negative log likelihoods of the adapted models. We also must counteract the self-destruct mechanism with something that will prevent unlearning of the entire network. In this work, we simply optimize for a given desirable task as the counter-balance by minimizing ℓ^d, which updates both the desired task head w_d and the representation parameters $\tilde{\theta}$. See Algorithm 1 for the complete training procedure. Note that in practice, we use Adam rather than SGD in the outer loop to optimize $\tilde{\theta}$, adversarial parameters ϕ, and desired task output head w_d. We use `higher` [24] for implementing the bi-level meta-learning process.



Figure 2: High-level visualization of the meta-learning process.



Figure 3: High-level optimization perspective of the MLAC procedure. A foundation model placed in point 1 would easily be tuned via gradient descent for both the harmful task loss and the desired task loss global optimum. On the other hand a foundation model in point 2 would easily reach the desired task optimum, but is more likely to be stuck in a local optimum for the harmful task.

Calibration. We also add another mechanism to strengthen the inner-loop adversary. In binary classification tasks, maximizing the loss of the harmful task may lead to a degenerate optimum where labels are flipped, which leaks information about the harmful task. To prevent this outcome, we also optimally calibrate the logits via a simple linear projection (w) solved via differentiable convex optimization [1, 15]. Thus at step k of the inner loop we solve the maximum likelihood problem:

$$w_c^k = \underset{W}{\text{argmax}} \sum_i^{|b_h|} \left[\text{logsoftmax} \left[\left(W \circ m^k \right)(x_i) \right]^\top y_i \right]$$
$$\text{s.t.} -1 \leq W \leq 1, \qquad (3)$$

where $m^k = w_h^k \circ \pi_\theta^k$ is the blocked model after k steps of adaptation using the adversarial harmful task head and learning rate. Thus this projection updates line 7 of Alg. 1 to $\ell_k^h = \mathcal{L}_h(w_c^k \circ w_h^k \circ \pi_{\theta_k}, b_h)$. We also refer to calibration as *head adjustment*, as it essentially refines the linear function computed by the final output head.

High-level Intuition. Figures 2 provides a visualization of this method. At each step, the self-destructing model samples from possible adaptation methods that could be used to adapt the model to a harmful dual use. This multi-step loss is then inverted in a meta-learning step to prevent the model from being easily adapted in this sampled fashion.

From an optimization perspective, the goal is to identify a parameter space where adaptation to desired tasks is relatively simple via standard adaptation techniques, but the same part of the parameter space might be a low-utility local optimum or saddle-point that is more difficult to escape for the harmful task. This can be seen as a simplified visualization in Figure 3. Of course, adaptation methods can be created to reset parts of the network such the global harmful optimum can be recovered (in the extreme resetting most of the network to escape the local optimum). However, this will decrease the utility of the expensive pre-training and increase the costs to adversaries, adding another tool in the toolkit against harmful dual-uses.

4 EXPERIMENTS

The goal of our experiments is to assess the ability of MLAC and several simple baselines to reduce the few-shot performance improvement of a pre-trained FM.[6]

4.1 Dataset.

In a demonstrative experiment, we utilize an existing dual-use dataset in the de-biasing literature, "Bias in Bios" [10]. The dataset consists of professional biographies. Each biography has a label that is the gender identity of the biography's subject as well as the profession being discussed. We split the data into a train, validation, and evaluation set. We consider the "desirable task" for which we want to maintain good performance as the profession detection task. We wish to block the gender identification task. On the original dataset, we find that a random model can learn gender classification to over 90% accuracy with only 10 examples, leaving only marginal ability for an FM to improve in data efficiency. Thus, to make the FM more beneficial, we replace all pronouns with "they/their," similar to the censored dataset in the original data. While this task pair has traditionally been used for de-biasing, and while we mainly use this as an initial demonstration, there may be valid reasons for preventing an adversary from detecting demographic information from text. In countries where anti-minority action is common, automated systems that identify demographics may cause serious harm. For example, a country may wish to identify people of a certain religion, sexual orientation, or other identity group in automated and ultimately harmful ways. Or the state may wish to identify another feature that is highly correlated with identity which will lead to the same harms.[7]

4.2 Protocol.

For all experiments, we run 50k steps of MLAC meta-training on the training set. At test time, we take the resulting self-destructing model and run it through a rigorous hyperparameter search to maximize fine-tuning performance on the harmful task. We allow

[6] Code is available at https://github.com/Breakend/SelfDestructingModels.

[7] Technology Experts Letter to DHS Opposing the Extreme Vetting Initiative, 2017.



Figure 4: Harmful task (gender identification) performance after fine-tuning. MLAC shows fine-tuning performance similar to a randomly-initialized model, while adversarial censoring (AC) [16] does not prevent effective fine-tuning. Shading indicates 95% confidence intervals across 6 random seeds.



Figure 5: After fine-tuning the MLAC-blocked model on the desired task, few-shot performance exceeds both BERT and a randomly-initialized model. Note the MLAC objective includes training on the desired task, so this comparison clearly advantages MLAC; nonetheless, it provides evidence that there *exists* a blocked initialization that can be effectively fine-tuned on the desired task. Discovering such an initialization without using desired task data in pre-training is an important direction for future work.

hyperparameter searches with 50 fine-tuning trials, using the tree-structured Parzen Estimator [4] in the `hyperopt` software package [5]. We search over learning rate, batch size, maximum number of steps, and freezing of intermediate representation layers. For this process, we subsample the validation set to simulate an adversary with a dataset of size N. This subsampled validation set is used as the training set for the adversary. We then use the entire evaluation set to evaluate the adversary's performance on held-out data and for hyperparameter tuning. We make the conservative assumption that the adversary can perform hyperparameter tuning using the *population*, even if the amount of data for fine-tuning itself is limited. This choice weighs heavily in the adversary's favor, disadvantaging the self-destruct method. We repeat the hyperparameter search process 6 times with different random seeds and data subsets. This yields confidence intervals over different adversaries training on different subsets of the data.

4.3 Comparisons.

We compare MLAC to the adversarial censoring (*AC* in Fig. 4) method from Edwards and Storkey [16] as well as a model simply fine-tuned on the desired task (*BERT (fine-tuned)* in Fig. 4). For AC, an adversarial layer is learned on top of representation layers to predict the undesirable task. The gradient is then flipped to destroy undesirable information in the representation layer. Notably, MLAC with $K = 0$ and with no calibration is equivalent to adversarial censoring. We use a BERT-tiny model as our FM to save on compute costs [14, 54] and use a linear classifier head for the tasks. Note that, as mentioned in Sec. 3.2, we focus on making sure that the professions task is unimpeded, so we directly train on cross-entropy loss as $\mathcal{L}_g$ during MLAC pre-training. For all models, the final achieved performance is retained for the desired professions task (see below and Figure 5).

4.4 Results.

Fig. 4 shows that MLAC returns nearly identical-to-random harmful task performance at all data regimes. Conversely, adversarial censoring (the equivalent of MLAC without calibration and $K = 0$) does not appear to have any effect on post-fine-tuning harmful task performance. Fig. 6 shows the vital role played by the depth of the inner training loop of MLAC, suggesting that *a meta-learning process is genuinely necessary to impede harmful task performance.* To ensure that desired task performance is retained, we evaluate the blocked model on the desired task of profession classification, comparing with fine-tuning a pretrained BERT-tiny model and a random model. Fig. 5 shows the result; MLAC is clearly able to solve the task effectively, surpassing the few-shot performance of BERT-tiny.[8] Finally, we find that head re-calibration may mildly improve blocking on average when pooled across all inner-loop step configurations (Fig. 7).

5 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND LIMITATIONS

Before we conclude, we point out several other considerations and limitations.

First, while the goal of our approach is to make models safer overall, we recognize that value judgements will be made in deciding which tasks to block. Sometimes these judgement decisions can themselves encode biases and it requires an approach that takes into account a range of perspectives. Nonetheless, we argue that considering potential harmful dual-uses is an essential part of any

[8] Recall again that we use the desired task loss to counter-balance the task blocking mechanism, so this is expected. We do however use separate held-out subsets of data for final desired-task tuning and evaluation. As mentioned previously, our goal for the purposes of this initial exploration is to determine whether desired task performance can be retained while blocking a harmful task. Future work should examine generalization for retaining desired task adaptation performance across many desired tasks.



Figure 6: Evaluation of various inner loop depths during MLAC training. Just 16 steps enables near-random performance, even though the adversary performs up to 1000 steps during fine-tuning.



Figure 7: Ablating optimal adversary prediction calibration (or *head adjustment*) during MLAC training. Using optimally calibrated adversary predictions (modifying line 7 of Alg. 1) modestly improves blocking. Aggregated over 0, 4, and 16 steps.

modern model release process. Current standard licenses for foundation models already contain a list of restricted tasks [18, 53], but self-destructing models encode this directly into their optimization objective as well.

Second, it is necessary to collect data for harmful tasks to effectively block them. While this draws a direct parallel to security research, red-teaming, and white-hat hacking, there may be risks in aggregating this data. And there may be impacts on the well-being of potential annotators and security research members [35]. Sufficient precautions should be taken to mitigate these harms.

Third, there may be a risk of over-confidence in the self-destructing mechanism. While this paradigm adds a new tool to the safety toolkit, it does not completely prevent manipulation for every harmful task. And just like any other safety tool there will likely be a back-and-forth where adversaries learn to overcome some techniques. As such, self-destructing models can be combined with other safety mechanisms—structural or technical—to increase the costs of harmful dual-uses.

Fourth, our experiments demonstrate the functionality of self-destructing models in a constrained setting, but further work is needed to scale these approaches to more tasks, larger models, and more complicated settings. We believe this is an exciting new research direction, but requires more work to deploy at scale.

6 RELATED WORK

A number of researchers have sought to address dual use risks by restricting points of control [7, 8, 21, 49, 52, 65], despite there also being substantial benefits to open access [6, 62]. We aim to provide an alternative that allows for open access while still hindering bad actors.

Some work on AI safety has sought mechanisms to prevent agents from learning degenerate behaviors. Orseau and Armstrong [39], for example, seek to prevent a particular scenario where an agent learns to disable its off-switch so that it continues to collect reward. We on the other hand focus on preventing a different, broader, set of harmful behaviors: adaptation of pretrained models to harmful tasks.

Closely related to our work are methods for de-biasing, editing, or removing harmful content from models. Like domain invariance approaches [22, 31, 60, 63], Edwards and Storkey [16] use an adversarial approach to remove information from representations. Ravfogel et al. [46] and Ravfogel et al. [47] take a similar approach and find a projection on the final output layer of a pretrained model that removes gender-based biases from the model (and prevent recovery of those biases after that projection layer). Pryzant et al. [43] similarly use adversarial methods to remove confounds from representations. Others have created model editing techniques to remove outdated or harmful content from pretrained models [11, 36, 37, 50]. While these other methods generally optimize for the information to be removed from the original model, we optimize for poor performance even *after* adaptation of the original model to a harmful task. This can be accomplished via a meta-learning approach.

In the context of meta-learning, MAML [19] and related algorithms [20, 30, 33, 42, 64] have shown that the desired *post*-fine tuning behavior of a neural network can be effectively encoded in its *pre*-fine tuning network initialization. While existing works have leveraged this ability in order to enable more rapid learning of new tasks, our work encodes a blocking mechanism into a network's initialization that *prevents* effective adaptation on harmful tasks.

Finally, some scholars have tuned models to be safer by using reinforcement learning from human feedback and other approaches for incorporating human preferences, including Bai et al. [3], Korbak et al. [29], Ouyang et al. [40], and others.

7 CONCLUSION

This work is only a first step in raising the cost for harmful dual uses of pretrained models through task blocking. Future work might expand this study in at least four directions: *scaling* the self-destructing model framework to larger FMs; studying *generalization* of the learned blocking behavior to new (but related) datasets other than the one used during MLAC meta-training; training/evaluating with *stronger adversaries* that incorporate adaptation methods such as prefix tuning [32], adapter layers [26], or others;

and evaluating the preservation of desired task *fine-tunability* for out-of-distribution tasks. Future work might also introduce concealed architectural changes that hide self-destruct triggers in the network but are more robust to adversarial mechanisms. We hope self-destructing models can become one tool enabling model developers to share their artifacts while minimizing dual use risks.

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Not So Fair: The Impact of Presumably Fair Machine Learning Models

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ABSTRACT

When bias mitigation methods are applied to make fairer machine learning models in fairness-related classification settings, there is an assumption that the disadvantaged group should be better off than if no mitigation method was applied. However, this is a potentially dangerous assumption because a "fair" model outcome does not automatically imply a positive impact for a disadvantaged individual—they could still be negatively impacted. Modeling and accounting for those impacts is key to ensure that mitigated models are not unintentionally harming individuals; we investigate if mitigated models can still negatively impact disadvantaged individuals and what conditions affect those impacts in a loan repayment example. Our results show that most mitigated models negatively impact disadvantaged group members in comparison to the unmitigated models. The domain-dependent impacts of model outcomes should help drive future bias mitigation method development.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies** → **Machine learning**; • **Social and professional topics** → *User characteristics.*

KEYWORDS

fairness, impact, machine learning, synthetic data

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1 INTRODUCTION

The issue of algorithmic decision-making systems making harmful or discriminatory predictions is well-recognized (e.g., [7, 10, 15, 21, 28, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39, 40]). Algorithmic fairness research evolved in response to this, primarily focusing on optimizing for some fairness notion to prevent harm. Bias mitigation methods have been developed for different points along the Machine Learning (ML) pipeline and fairness constraints have operationalized fairness notions which are often dependent on conditional probabilities relating to model outcomes (e.g., [1, 2, 8, 9, 14, 17, 18, 41]). However, there is little consensus on when to use which bias mitigation method or constraint [11, 12, 15, 27].

Recent research has shown that "fair" outcomes and benefits for individuals are not always aligned, highlighting that algorithmic fairness sometimes falls short of its main goal of minimizing harm [13, 20, 25, 26, 35]. We call a model that has a bias mitigation method applied to it a mitigated model. Fairness disparity metrics measured after model training show how well a model satisfies a fairness constraint (e.g., Equality of Opportunity) that represents a fairness goal (e.g., groups should have equal true positive rates). Fairness constraints can aid in bias detection (with fairness metric disparities) and bias mitigation by constraining a model's training to satisfy a fairness goal. Sometimes fairness constraints, when used for bias mitigation, make an assumption that the positive class is beneficial. However, if that assumption is not valid, then applying the bias mitigation methods can result in fairer outcomes but worse potential impacts for individuals, especially for disadvantaged groups.

For instance, in the case of loan repayment, let us assume a bank developed a mitigated model that predicts an applicant's ability to repay the bank if given a loan. If the fairness constraint, Demographic Parity (DP), is used, then the selection rates (positive class rates) across the groups should be equal. This could result in a high false positive rate for the disadvantaged group. If an individual is falsely classified and expected to repay but defaults, because the DP constraint assumed a positive outcome was beneficial for them, then that positive outcome in fact had a negative impact on them. The example emphasizes our motivating problem that while fairness disparities for a mitigated model might be low, the individuals classified could still be negatively impacted which is a major issue.

Previous works began investigating how to quantify impact and what its relationship with fair decision-making is [13, 20, 24–26]. These works considered models such as a temporary labor market model [20], threshold optimization [26], causal models [24], agent-simulations [13], and multi-armed bandits [25]. They did not

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consider a model in a classic binary classification setting though. Since many bias mitigation methods that constrain model learning with fairness constraints apply to classification settings, these works could not consider how different mitigation methods could have affected their results. When fairness constraints were used in previous works, only one or two fairness constraints were considered. They also did not consider how the datasets themselves could have played a role in their impact results; for instance, what if the disadvantaged group was not in the minority?

In this paper, we investigate the question: when a false positive model outcome may have a negative impact, can mitigated models in a binary classification setting do more harm than good for the disadvantaged group? We explore this question through a case study of the loan repayment example aforementioned. We focus on the disadvantaged group because we aim to minimize negative impacts that that group experiences from supposedly "fair" models, while also considering the effect on the advantaged group. Our objectives that support us in answering our research question are: (1) quantifying the impact of different model outcomes, allowing us to explore specific cases where a positive outcome does not necessarily imply a positive impact, and (2) analyzing how different fairness constraints and dataset makeup relate to the impacts by group. We use DP and four other fairness constraints with several off-the-shelf ML models with different bias mitigation methods to apply the constraints to better understand the relationship between fairness constraint choice and impact.

In addition, we explore the effect of the dataset makeup on impacts too, motivated by this question: if we adjust the demographic group representation and increase the number of disadvantaged applicants who repay the bank, do we see a positive impact on the disadvantaged group? To begin to answer this in our experiments, we use synthetic datasets alongside a real-world dataset for comparison. We vary the synthetic datasets with two parameters: demographic group representation, which shows what data proportions are made up of disadvantaged and advantaged individuals, and repayment label composition by group, which shows if an individual repays or defaults if given a loan[1]—when we discuss dataset composition, we refer to these parameters.

Our results highlight that achieving good fairness disparity metric values and low negative impact results for the disadvantaged group are often in conflict with one another. As a result, the majority of the mitigated models tested actually leave the disadvantaged group worse off than the unmitigated models from an impact stand point. Also, the dataset composition did not have much of an effect on the impact results. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the literature review in Section 2, the definitions in Section 3, the methodology for our work in Section 4, the experimental setup in Section 5, the results in Section 6, a discussion of the results in Section 7, and our conclusion in Section 8.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

Our research is about algorithmic fairness in classification settings and impact considerations. The algorithmic fairness community has presented multiple fairness constraints for bias detection such as Equality of Opportunity (EOO) and Equalized Odds (EO) (e.g., [2, 9, 14, 18, 41]) and bias mitigation methods for mitigating unfairness at different stages along the ML pipeline (e.g., [1, 2, 8, 14, 17, 18, 22, 23, 28]). These methods were developed to answer a call for more safe and trusted algorithms, after algorithmic harms were highlighted in multiple domains from online ad delivery to hiring (e.g., [4, 6, 7, 31, 37]). The choice of bias mitigation methods and fairness constraints should be informed by the domain [16, 27].

While aiming to make ML models more "fair" is a valuable goal, scholars argue that we must look at the actual impacts from model outcomes to understand whether individuals were positively affected by the model and begin to explore how to quantify impact in different settings from labor market models to multi-armed bandits [13, 20, 24–26]. We describe the most relevant work to our's from this strand of research—Liu *et al.* coined the term "delayed impact" and conducted experiments using the loan repayment example to see if disadvantaged groups are better off in terms of delayed impact when optimizing for thresholds under fairness constraints [26]. We extend this work with the same example but instead of focusing on class probabilities, we focus on class labels. We also take this research further by using multiple ML models with bias mitigation methods to apply more fairness constraints than previously considered, by using synthetic datasets of varying compositions to test how that affects the impact results, and by modeling impact in different ways than before.

While some researchers generate data to make their data discrimination free or more fair from a causal lens [38, 43, 44], we generate synthetic datasets, not with a de-biasing goal, but to represent different dataset compositions from which models can learn and we can study their effects on impact. Friedler *et al.* conducted a comparative study of bias mitigation methods and found that these methods were sensitive to feature distributions in datasets [16], providing motivation for our consideration of dataset composition since we also use different mitigation methods. Zafar creates synthetic datasets with varying correlations between the sensitive feature and the label to analyze the relationship between the accuracy and discrimination [45]. Reddy *et al.* test numerous models with various synthetic dataset configurations to analyze the models' fairness performances [33]. Similarly to Reddy *et al.* and Zafar, we control demographic group representation and repayment label composition in our synthetic datasets. We do this to better understand the relationship between dataset composition and impacts from different mitigated models.

3 PRELIMINARIES

In this section, we outline the formalizations we use for our experiments and explain what we mean by impact.

3.1 Definitions

In our paper, we consider a binary supervised learning setting. A **dataset** is $D = \{(x_1, y_1), \ldots, (x_n, y_n)\}$, where $x_i \in X$ is an **instance**, $y_i \in \{0, 1\}$ is the **true label** of x_i, and n is the **number of samples in** X. D is split into two subsets, $D_{train} \subset D$ and $D_{test} \subset D$, such that $(D_{train} \cup D_{test}) = D$ and $(D_{train} \cap D_{test}) = \{\}$. To train a classifier model, the instances must undergo feature encoding where information is extracted from each instance into features

[1]The repayment label is what the model is trying to learn from the data.

that are categorical and/or numerical; each instance $x \in X$ is a k-dimensional **feature** vector $\langle f_1^x, \ldots, f_k^x \rangle$.

We are interested in problems where instances will contain, directly or indirectly, personal information about individuals. One such feature that we assume is in X is a **protected attribute** which is sensitive in nature (e.g., race or gender) [34, 42]. This attribute can be strongly associated with other features. The actual constructs that are considered a protective attribute depend on the domain and legal context. For any instance, $x = \langle f_1^x, \ldots, f_k^x \rangle$, we assume the first feature, f_1^x, is the protected attribute which can have values of $f_1^x \in \{0, 1\}$, where 0 represents a disadvantaged group and 1 represents an advantaged group.[2] We assume the disadvantaged group is underprivileged (often due to systemic power structures, inequity, and oppression) in comparison to the advantaged group which is privileged.

The protected attribute allows us to split instances into two groups (D_0 and D_1), where the subindex denotes the value of the protected attribute (e.g. $D_i = \{(\langle f_1^x, \ldots, f_k^x \rangle, y) | (\langle f_1^x, \ldots, f_k^x \rangle, y) \in D$ and $f_1^x = i\}$.) In addition, instances can also be split according to their label into D^1 and D^0, where the superindex denotes the value of the label (e.g. $D^i = \{(\langle f_1^x, \ldots, f_k^x \rangle, y) | (\langle f_1^x, \ldots, f_k^x \rangle, y) \in D$ and $y = i\}$.) Finally, the set D_j^i denotes the set of instances where the label takes value i and the protected attribute takes value j.

We define a **deterministic classifier** as a function, $h : X \longrightarrow \hat{Y}$, where $\hat{Y} = \{0, 1\}$. For any instance of x, $h(x)$ is the prediction returned from the classifier. The function h approximates a true function, representing the population, $t : X \longrightarrow Y$, where $Y = \{0, 1\}$ and for any instance x, $t(x)$ is the true label of x. We denote the prediction of a particular instance of x as $h(x) = \hat{y}_x$ and we denote the true label of a particular instance x as $t(x) = y_x$. The conditional probability that h, outputs a given prediction, $\hat{y}$, given a protected attribute, a, is denoted as $P(\hat{y}|a)$ where $\hat{y} \in \{0, 1\}$ and $a \in \{0, 1\}$. To analyze a classifier's performance, confusion matrices which show model outcomes are commonly used. The model outcomes are the True Positives (TP), False Positives (FP or Type I Error), True Negatives (TN), and False Negatives (FN or Type II Error), when looking at the predicted and true labels. Many fairness constraints can also be explained by TP, FP, TN, and FN [29].

3.2 Impact

We argue it is crucial to consider different ways that impact might relate to model outcomes.[3] If impact is not considered, then mitigated models could actually cause more harm to disadvantaged groups under certain conditions. The loan repayment example from before highlights this problem: where a fair outcome based on a DP-constrained model resulted in a FP applicant who was negatively impacted because they defaulted, since they were unable to repay the bank. There is a tension between benefits of certain model outcomes, like being granted a loan as a FP, and the actual impacts they have on individuals, defaulting on said loan.

In this paper, we assume that a classifier h's impact is a function of instances dependent on model predictions and true labels that outputs weights, i_h: $X \rightarrow W$, such that for any instance x, the weight w, returned by $i_h(x)$ depends on $\hat{y}_x$ and y_x and $w \in \mathbb{R}$.[4] The weight represents the impact of a model outcome for a given instance and can be deterministically or non-deterministically generated (according to some distribution like a Normal distribution). We note here, though, that when i_h provides non-deterministically generated weights as outputs we take liberties with the function, since a function must map every input value to a single output value. But, in this case, the same input could have different valued outputs because the output is dependent on the distribution. We define impact more specifically for our loan repayment example below in Section 5.4.

4 METHOD

We return to our research question: assuming that a false positive model outcome does not have a positive impact, can mitigated models negatively impact the disadvantaged group rather than positively impact them? We explore this question in a binary classification setting with a loan repayment example. The main objectives of this paper are to quantify the impact of model outcomes in different ways and to analyze the relationships between impact and dataset composition and impact and fairness constraints. To do this, we perform experiments, controlling for different variables like the datasets and their compositions, bias mitigation methods, fairness constraints, ML model choice, and impact functions to help us study impact. We provide a visualization of our experimental pipeline from a high level in Figure 1 and explain details more below.



Figure 1: Our experimental pipeline follows a typical ML pipeline. We show how a real-world dataset (RWD) and one of our synthetic datasets (SD) would be pushed through the pipeline. For each dataset, we train an unmitigated model and multiple mitigated models (we only visualize one mitigated model here for simplicity purposes). The top two models are unmitigated models and the bottom two are mitigated models which would have a bias mitigation method applied with a chosen fairness constraint. Multiple runs would need to happen to go through all the different combinations of ML models, fairness constraints, and bias mitigation methods.

[2]Note our work can easily be extended to consider more than two labels for the protected attribute.

[3]We highlight that another way to think about impact is expected utility.

[4]Since we assume weights are real numbers, categorical weights can also be considered if transformed into numbers.

As mentioned before, we use multiple datasets so they are all funnelled through this pipeline multiple times to account for different ML model and bias mitigation method choices. For a real-world dataset, we transform the FICO scores dataset from over 300k TransUnion TransRisk scores from 2003 that was preprocessed by Hardt *et al.* into a tabular loan repayment dataset where each row corresponds to an individual loan applicant [18]. The FICO scores dataset as is contains a cumulative distribution function (CDF) providing the fraction of the racial group that falls below a given credit score and a probability mass function (PMF) showing the probability of an applicant repaying the bank given their race and credit score. We are interested in a tabular dataset so we can apply common bias mitigation methods with fairness constraints to study how they affect impact. We also assemble synthetic datasets with different demographic group representations and repayment label compositions; experiments with these synthetic datasets allow us to understand how the dataset composition affects the impact on different groups.

With a dataset for each experimental run, we then train off-the-shelf ML models that are mitigated during training using different reduction algorithms, our bias mitigation method of choice, that can use different fairness constraints each time (see Section 5.2 for details). By using reduction algorithms, we could simply change the constraint to be used for each experiment in an agnostic way. For each mitigated model, we run one reduction algorithm paired with one fairness constraint until we complete every combination. Models with no bias mitigation method applied during training we call unmitigated models. We train these mitigated and unmitigated models on the loan repayment dataset and the synthetic datasets.

After receiving the mitigated and unmitigated model predictions for all of our experiment runs, we evaluate the models. To do so, we calculate their model accuracy, fairness disparity metric, and impact results. We check the model performance and bias because we aim to develop well-performing and fair models. The fairness disparity metric results show us whether the mitigated model performs as well as the unmitigated model, how effective the bias mitigation method is at satisfying a fairness constraint, and whether the application of a particular mitigation method and constraint negatively impacts the disadvantaged group.

5 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

In this section, we present the fairness constraints, ML models, bias mitigation methods, datasets, and impact functions that we use. We assume a white-box scenario where we have access to data, models, and model outputs. Recall that we consider a binary classification problem where a model predicts if a loan applicant will repay the bank if given a loan.

5.1 Fairness Constraints

We focus on group fairness which aims to identify what groups are at risk of being harmed [14]. Group fairness is defined in terms of constraints on a model called fairness constraints or parity constraints (we will use the former term). We explain the group fairness constraints considered for our experiments in Table 1 and refer to them primarily by the acronyms stated there.[5] These metrics were chosen because of their canonical nature within the algorithmic fairness domain and their availability in open-source fairness toolkits and libraries [3, 5]. Also, expert knowledge is not required to use them. All of our metrics are Bias Preserving which has an underlying assumption that the status quo is the baseline for equality across groups except for one which is Bias Transforming, DP, which assumes that protected groups, from an equality standpoint, start at different points [42]. To measure the level of fairness in a model, we take the fairness disparity metric value, telling us how well the model abides by a given fairness constraint.

5.2 ML Models and Reduction Algorithms

We utilize off-the-shelf ML models from *sklearn* to make our experiments easily replicable [32]. In our experiments, we use the following models: Decision Tree (DT), Gaussian Naive Bayes (GNB), Logistic Regression (LGR), and Gradient Boosted Trees (GBT) classifiers. We also chose these models because their fit functions had a sample weights parameter—this parameter is necessary for the reduction algorithms in *Fairlearn* [5]. For ML model performance, we consider accuracy as our metric of choice which is common to consider in the algorithmic fairness literature.

Microsoft's *Fairlearn* toolkit implements Agarwal *et al.*'s bias mitigation method which includes two reduction algorithms, Exponentiated Gradient and Grid Search; we use this mitigation method in our experiments. The reduction algorithms take the parameters: an already trained ML model and a fairness constraint, and then narrow the binary classification to weighted classification problems that focus on achieving strong performing models for certain classes. The algorithms' goal is to optimize the trade-off between the chosen fairness constraint and the model's accuracy. In the reduction algorithm, the fairness constraints are transformed into Lagrange multipliers. We encourage the reader to read Agarwal *et al.*'s paper for a more in-depth understanding of the reduction algorithms [1]. Reduction algorithms are versatile because they allow developers the choice in their ML model, unlike other fairness methods applied during training which are often model-specific.

5.3 Datasets

In our experiments, we have a dataset which represents the real-world and then we have eight synthetic datasets that represent different potential scenarios. For model training, we split each of the datasets into 70% train and 30% test sets. For testing the synthetic datasets, we use two different test sets. The first test set is the test set created when we split the synthetic dataset. The second test set matches the real-world dataset's composition. This real-world test set allows us to test how well the model trained on a synthetic dataset performs on a subset of the real-world's population.

5.3.1 Baseline Dataset. We transformed the FICO scores dataset from 2003 preprocessed by Hardt *et al.* into a tabular dataset that can be used in a binary classification setting which we call our

[5]Note that some metrics have different names in the literature so we try to clear up any confusion: DP is sometimes called Statistical Parity and Acceptance Rate. EO in previous literature is referred to as Disparate Mistreatment. EOO has a mathematical equivalent metric in False Negative Error Rate balance [9]. False Positive Rate Parity (FPRP) or False Positive Error Rate balance is also sometimes referred to as Predictive Equality and is linked to the True Negative Rate.

Table 1: The fairness constraints we consider in our experiments are listed and defined, where $y \in \{0, 1\}$.

Name	Expression
Demographic Parity (DP) [14]	$P(\hat{Y} = 1\|A = 0) = P(\hat{Y} = 1\|A = 1)$
Equalized Odds (EO) [18]	$P(\hat{Y} = 1\|Y = y, A = 0) = P(\hat{Y} = 1\|Y = y, A = 1)$
Equality of Opportunity (EOO) [18]	$P(\hat{Y} = 1\|Y = 1, A = 0) = P(\hat{Y} = 1\|Y = 1, A = 1)$
False Positive Rate Parity (FPRP) [9]	$P(\hat{Y} = 1\|Y = 0, A = 0) = P(\hat{Y} = 1\|Y = 0, A = 1)$
Error Rate Parity (ERP) [2]	$P(\hat{Y} = y\|Y \neq y, A = 0) = P(\hat{Y} = y\|Y \neq y, A = 1)$

baseline dataset [18]. The data is composed of FICO scores (for showing credit worthiness). We note that Liu *et al.* also used the same dataset for their impact experiments [26]. The credit scores ranged from 300 to 850 and the authors assumed the Black group as disadvantaged and the White group as advantaged.



Figure 2: We show the baseline dataset composition for the credit scores and repayment labels by group.

For our baseline dataset, we generated 100k rows or 100k individuals based upon Liu *et al.*'s dataset composition such that the same demographic group representation, credit score distributions by race based on the CDF, and repayment label distributions based on the PMF are upheld. Our rationale behind that dataset composition is that it matches the real-world dataset. Each row or individual has two features: credit score and race which make up X. The dataset also contains labels, Y, for whether the loan could be repaid by the individual.[6] Our baseline dataset labels are generated from the PMFs for an individual repaying given their credit score. For visualizations of the dataset concerning the credit scores and repayment labels by group, see Figure 2. We use one algorithm to create our baseline dataset, similar to Liu *et al.*'s method [26]. The Algorithm 1 (see Appendix A.3) generates a dataset based on two parameters, demographic group representation and order of magnitude (for the dataset size), by using the CDF and PMF.

5.3.2 Synthetic Datasets. Since the baseline dataset is imbalanced considering the demographic group representation (12% Black and 88% White) and the disadvantaged group's repayment label composition (see the bottom left plot of Figure 2), we change those parameters when generating synthetic datasets. These synthetic datasets let us test how impact is affected by varying dataset compositions. We consider cases when the disadvantaged group is the majority, in the minority (matching the baseline dataset), and when the two groups have equal representation. We keep the credit score distributions the same and adjust the disadvantaged group's repayment label composition for only some runs so we can see the effect of the altered demographic distributions. In addition, by adjusting the disadvantaged group's repayment label composition, we oversample for instances where the disadvantaged group repays the bank so the models learn from a more balanced dataset. We do not adjust the advantaged group's repayment labels since we are primarily focused on minimizing harm to the disadvantaged group.

We use the following two ratios to generate synthetic datasets and Table 2 shows the ratios we have for all our datasets—the baseline dataset is included there as well. To generate these datasets, we extend Algorithm 1 to adjust the repayment label ratios for the disadvantaged group through Algorithm 2 and 3 in Appendix A.3.

Definition 5.1. The **demographic-ratio** is $R = r_0 : r_1$ such that $r_0 = |D_0|/|D|$ and $r_1 = |D_1|/|D|$.

Definition 5.2. The **label-ratio** is $L_a = |D_a^0| : |D_a^1|$ such that $|D_a^0|$ is the number of negative instances for a group $a \in 0, 1$ and $|D_a^1|$ is the number of positive instances for that same group.

Each scenario in Table 2 is categorized with a two-letter code such that the first letter represents the demographic-ratio and the second letter represents the disadvantaged group's label-ratio. A "0" means the ratio matches the baseline dataset, "i" means the ratio is imbalanced (not the same imbalanced ratio as the baseline however), and "b" means the ratio is balanced.[7] The "00" scenario represents the baseline dataset; while, as another example, the disadvantaged group is in the majority and the disadvantaged group's repayment label-ratio match the baseline's label-ratio in the "i0" scenario.

[6]For more information about how we transformed the initial FICO score dataset into a tabular dataset, see the GitHub: https://github.com/mjorgen1/explore-fair-impacts.

[7]The baseline dataset ratios are imbalanced as well but we did not force them to be.

Table 2: The dataset names and parameters used as constraints when generating the datasets for our experiements. Note that we only specify the disadvantaged group's label-ratio here, not the advantaged group's label-ratio which remains unchanged.

Dataset Name [Label]	Demographic-Ratio	Disadvantaged-Label-Ratio
Baseline [00]	0.12 : 0.88	0.66 : 0.34
Demo-Bal-Repay-Baseline [b0]	0.5 : 0.5	0.66 : 0.34
Demo-Imbal-Repay-Baseline [i0]	0.88 : 0.12	0.66 : 0.34
Demo-Baseline-Repay-Bal [0b]	0.12 : 0.88	0.5 : 0.5
Demo-Bal-Repay-Bal [bb]	0.5 : 0.5	0.5 : 0.5
Demo-Imbal-Repay-Bal [ib]	0.88 : 0.12	0.5 : 0.5
Demo-Baseline-Repay-Imbal [0i]	0.12 : 0.88	0.34 : 0.66
Demo-Bal-Repay-Imbal [bi]	0.5 : 0.5	0.34 : 0.66
Demo-Imbal-Repay-Imbal [ii]	0.88 : 0.12	0.34 : 0.66

5.4 Impact and Credit Scores

In our example, we assume that TPs and FPs are granted loans. The applicants who were classified as TNs or FNs would most likely no longer be followed up with by the bank after the rejection notification, so data on the actual impacts of those model outcomes are not available. As a result of this, we focus on the impact of the TP and FP model outcomes. We note that different model errors can lead to different impacts [19].

We take inspiration from Liu *et al.*'s focus on predatory lending for our impact measurement [26]. The credit score of applicants is a key feature in our example. We assume that the change in credit score is related to the model outcome so we use that feature in our impact calculations. For any instance, $x = \langle f_1^x, \ldots, f_k^x \rangle$, we assume that the second feature, $f_2^x \in [300, 850]$, is the credit score for an applicant. We define a set $S = \{f_2^x\}$, where s_i holds the credit score for applicant x_i.

5.4.1 Deterministically Generated Weights. The deterministically generated weights reflect the credit score change values used in Liu *et al.*'s experiments such that the weight, $w = \{75, -150\}$, depends on if an applicant is a TP or FP respectively [26]. If a sample, x_i, is a TP, meaning the applicant is correctly predicted to repay the bank, then the s_i is increased by 75 points; if that applicant is deemed an FP, meaning they are incorrectly predicted to repay the bank, then the s_i is decreased by -150 points. For all of our datasets, we use these weights when calculating credit score changes.

Table 3: The mean, μ, and standard deviation, σ, values for generating the non-deterministically generated weights from Normal probability distributions.

Name	μ_{TP}	σ_{TP}	μ_{FP}	σ_{FP}
Benchmark	75	15	-150	15
Equal	100	15	-100	15
Benchmark-Swap	150	15	-75	15

5.4.2 Non-Deterministically Generated Weights. We also conduct experiments with the baseline dataset using non-deterministically generated weights for the impact function. We generate these weights for w through a Normal probability distribution (see Table 3). We use the deterministically generated weights as means for the Benchmark distributions for comparison purposes. We also consider two other scenarios where FP and TP model outcomes have opposite but equal valued effects, the Equal distributions, and where the TP is weighed even more heavily than a FP, the Benchmark-Swap distributions. The standard deviations were chosen by taking into account the empirical rule for Normal distributions and the limit of the credit score range since we wanted updated credit scores to abide by their constraints. We argue that using non-deterministically generated weights is a potentially better modeling of reality since the applicants' credit scores could drop or increase at different scales.

5.4.3 Measuring Average Impact. Now that we have defined our weight generation, we define average impact for this problem as the difference in credit scores after the predictions, $\hat{Y}$. We calculate the average impact by group for all of our experiments.

Definition 5.3. Classifier h's **average impact** on group a is:

$$\bar{I}_a = \frac{1}{|D_a|} \cdot \sum_{i \in D_a} s_i + w$$

6 RESULTS

We present our results below and remind the reader that the mitigated models are those that had a reduction algorithm with a fairness constraint applied. When providing the fairness disparity metric values for the unmitigated and mitigated models, we show all four ML model results. When we present impact results, these are calculated by taking the average impact by group which we define in Section 5.4. For the impact findings, we only ran experiments with a Decision Tree (DT) model. We chose the DT model because it generated more stable results than a Gaussian Naive Bayes (GNB) model and produced comparable results to Logistic Regression (LGR) and Gradient Boosted Trees (GBT) models when trained on our datasets (see Table 4 and 5, and Table 6 in the Appendix A.2). The demographic groups are differentiated by the labels: disadvantaged, Black, or "0" and advantaged, White, or "1."

6.1 Baseline Dataset Results

First, we analyze how unfair the unmitigated models are when trained on the baseline dataset and check how well the bias mitigation methods minimized that unfairness in the mitigated models. Table 4 displays the fairness disparity metric values for the unmitigated models and Table 5 shows how well the bias mitigation methods mitigated bias according to the fairness constraints applied. The smaller the fairness disparity metric value, the closer the model satisfies a fairness constraint. If a fairness disparity metric value is 0, a model is satisfying the fairness constraint completely. All mitigated models perform well by reducing the fairness disparity metric for the applied fairness constraint and exhibit similar results. For the model accuracy results, see Table 6 in the Appendix A.2—the unmitigated DT, LGR, and GBT models all reach 88% accuracy and that performance only dropped between 1% and 4% for the mitigated models which shows that even with bias mitigation methods applied the models still perform reasonably well.

Table 4: Values of the fairness disparity metrics for our unmitigated models when trained on the baseline dataset, where the rows are the ML models tested and the columns are the fairness constraints considered.

Classifier	DP	EO	EOO	FPRP	ERP
DT	49.40	23.77	23.77	20.44	4.45
GNB	82.55	96.4	96.4	38.09	21.62
LGR	49.03	22.1	21.38	22.1	3.79
GBT	46.23	18.6	18.6	18.27	4.16

Table 5: Values of the fairness disparity metrics for our mitigated models when trained on the baseline dataset, where the rows are the ML models tested and the columns are the fairness constraints applied with the Exponentiated Gradient reduction algorithm and measured for the disparity metric.

Classifier	DP	EO	EOO	FPRP	ERP
DT	0.45	3.77	1.88	0.34	1.16
GNB	0.85	2.18	1.18	0.29	0.1
LGR	0.83	2.49	0.9	0.59	0.3
GBT	0.65	2.84	1.41	0.05	1.44

We used Exponentiated Gradient for our reduction algorithm of choice for the remainder of our results after comparing the results with Grid Search. Exponentiated Gradient (see Table 5) was more effective than Grid Search (see Table 7 in Appendix A.2) at decreasing the fairness disparity metric values from the unmitigated model fairness disparity metric values (see Table 4). Since we are interested in how different mitigated models impact groups, we chose the reduction algorithm for our experiments that gave stronger fairness results.

Before we can check if our credit score distributions from mitigated models are statistically significant in comparison to the credit score distributions from unmitigated models, we must test if those distributions are Normal. We check if the updated credit score distributions for the baseline dataset with deterministically generated weights are Normal distributions by using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Then, with our not-Normal updated credit score distributions, we use Mann-Whitney tests to look at discrepancies between the updated credit scores and unmitigated versus mitigated models. This analysis tells us if there are statistically significant changes to credit score distributions when using bias mitigation methods.

6.1.1 Impact with Deterministic Weights. By considering the impact for the disadvantaged group (see the top plot of Figure 3), we highlight that, even though we have an improvement in fairness (as shown in Table 4 and 5), the disadvantaged group the majority of the time experiences a negative impact. For all models, the worst impact occurs when DP is the fairness constraint. The few models that positively impact the disadvantaged group are the unmitigated and ERP-constrained models. Besides the ERP-constrained model, none of the mitigated model results could exceed the unmitigated positive impact. The lower plot of Figure 3 shows that the advantaged group always experiences a high positive impact across all mitigated models.



Figure 3: Impact for all classifier and fairness constraints when using the baseline dataset and when weights are deterministically generated.

We examine the statistical significance of how the impact on an individual affects the credit scores by demographic group; we compare the updated credit score distributions from each mitigated model (for all ML models) with the unmitigated model for each group. We update the credit scores based on the model outcomes given the deterministically generated weights. The updated credit score distributions for ERP-constrained models by demographic group are not statistically significant from the unmitigated model

for the disadvantaged group but this is most likely because the results are similar (see Figure 7 in the Appendix A.1). For all models with DP, EO, EOO, and FPRP as the fairness constraint, the change in the score distributions of the disadvantaged group is statistically significant. At the same time, the score distributions from the mitigated models for the advantaged group are not statistically significant, except for the ERP-constrained GNB model.

6.1.2 Impact with Non-deterministic Weights. Figure 4 displays the impact results for our groups with non-deterministically generated weights for impact when using a DT model. When we lessen the weight of an FP applicant and increase it for a TP applicant, the advantaged and disadvantaged groups impact increases, unsurprisingly. However, the DP-constrained model still has the lowest impact in comparison to other constraints for the disadvantaged group for all impact setups with non-deterministic weights.

When we compare the mitigated DT model impact results from Figure 3 with the Benchmark distribution impact results from Figure 4, we see that the results match up such that DP-constrained model has the lowest impact, followed by EOO, FPRP, and EO-constrained models. Similarly, the impact results for the ERP and unmitigated models are aligned. For the advantaged group, the results also are aligned such that the mitigated models do not change the advantaged group's impact much at all. We see the same statistically significant results as discussed in Section 6.1.1 and these results can be found in Figure 8 in the Appendix A.1.

When the TP and FP impacts have equal weight for the Equal distribution (see Figure 4), only the DP- constrained model leads to a negative impact for the disadvantaged group. However, only the ERP-constrained model impact matches the unmitigated model impact for the disadvantaged group while the other four fairness constraints result in a worse impact. We find that the statistically significant results for the disadvantaged group from the Equal distribution match the Benchmark distribution results; the advantaged group results match as before too except for two more significant results from the ERP-constrained DT and EO-constrained GNB models. These results can be seen in Figure 9 in Appendix A.1.

When TPs are weighed twice as heavily as FPs in the Benchmark-Swap distribution (see Figure 4) we see less impact variation amongst the models for the disadvantaged group, with the DP-constrained model as an exception as shown in Figure 10 in Appendix A.1. The statistical significance tests vary more with this setup, except for the disadvantaged group's results for constrained DT, LGR, and GBT models which remain the same and, similar to the Equal distribution results, the EO-constrained GNB model result is significant for the advantaged group. The GNB results are different such that only the ERP and DP results are statistically significant. When ERP constrains all the models, the advantaged group has statistically significant changes to their credit scores.

6.2 Synthetic Dataset Results

We trained an unmitigated DT model and mitigated DT models on our synthetic datasets. For each of our synthetic datasets, we tested the models with two test sets—one that matched the training set for the synthetic dataset and then one that matched the baseline dataset. The latter test set allows us to see how the model trained on



Figure 4: Impact for all fairness constraints for the three non-deterministically generated weight distributions when a DT model was trained on the baseline dataset. Recall that the Benchmark distribution impact results are on the left [-150,75], the Equal distribution impact results are in the middle [-100,100], and the Benchmark-Swap distribution impact results are on the right [-75,100].

synthetic data would work on a test set that matches the real-world. We provide the impact results depending on what test set was used.

No matter what test set was used, the impact of the advantaged group, when having trained models on the synthetic datasets, behaves identically (see bottom plots of Figure 5 and 6). For the rest of this section, we focus on the disadvantaged group's results. For the best impact-performing models for the disadvantaged group, we point to the unmitigated and ERP-constrained models in the top plots of Figures 5 and 6.

As a reminder for our dataset configuration notation (see Section 5.3.2), each scenario is labeled with a two-letter code, where the first letter represents the demographic-ratio and the second letter represents the disadvantaged group's label-ratio. For the values, a "0" says the ratio matches the baseline dataset, "i" says the ratio is imbalanced (but not the same imbalanced ratio as the baseline), and "b" says the ratio is balanced.

6.2.1 Train and Test Sets Have Equal Composition. When increasing the disadvantaged group's representation, we see little effect on the group's impact, see the top plot of Figure 5. When we only change the demographic-ratio and increase it for the disadvantaged group (see scenarios "b0" and "i0" in the top plot of Figure 5), we see an increase in impact for the disadvantaged group (except for the unmitigated and ERP-constrained model results which remain consistent) in comparison to scenario "00" and then all the impact

results converge when the disadvantaged group is in the majority ("i0"). In comparison, in Figure 5, we show that there is less impact variance but the impact improves when the disadvantaged group is more likely to repay (see scenarios "0b," "bb," "ib," "0i," "bi," and "ii") when we compare to the "00" scenario (when they are more likely not to repay the bank).



Figure 5: Impact with deterministically generated weights for all synthetic datasets with a test set with equal composition to the training set.

6.2.2 Test Set Matches Baseline Composition. When the disadvantaged group is in the minority (see scenarios "00," "0b," and "0i") in Figure 6, we have the most variance between the impact results. Of the disadvantaged group results in Figure 6, we see the two worst impact results from the DP and EOO-constrained models which align with the worst impact results for the disadvantaged group in Figure 5, when we are not testing with the baseline test set. When increasing the disadvantaged group representation in the synthetic datasets, the impact does increase in comparison to the baseline for EO, EOO, DP, and FPRP-constrained models until it converges (see scenarios "b0," "i0," "bb," "ib," "bi," and "ii") with other model results when the disadvantaged group is in the majority in the top plot of Figure 6. The other two model impact results for the unmitigated and ERP-constrained models show little changes and are consistent as seen in the top plot of Figure 6. Constrastingly to the top plot of Figure 5, where we saw an upward trend for the impact, when we test with the baseline in the top plot of Figure 6, we find the impact stagnating and changing little in comparison to scenario "00."

7 DISCUSSION

Mitigated models can do more harm than good. Our results demonstrate that the bias mitigation methods successfully mitigated unfairness in our loan repayment example. However, the



Figure 6: Impact with deterministically generated weights for all synthetic datasets with a test set with the baseline dataset composition.

results also demonstrate a trade-off between optimizing for fairness disparities and impact when choosing a fairness constraint. The problem with this trade-off is that mitigated models sometimes do more harm than unmitigated models and we saw that the disadvantaged group experienced negative impacts the majority of the time when mitigated models were used. We find ERP-constrained and unmitigated models outperforming other models with respect to the disadvantaged group's impact (see top plots of Figure 5 and Figure 6), while the DP-constrained and EOO-constrained models have the lowest impact results.

Balanced datasets may not solve inequalities. Our results also show that the disadvantaged group does not necessarily benefit when a model learns from a synthetic training set that does not match the real-world population's composition. In most cases, they will be treated similarly or worse than if they were being classified by an unmitigated model. When using test sets with the same composition as the training sets, the disadvantaged group tends to see an increase in impacts as they increase their label and demographic-ratios. However, when the test sets match the baseline data (representing the real-world), we see the impacts mostly stagnating or dropping. These results emphasize that imbalanced demographic group and label data should not be assumed to be a problem. We acknowledge though a limitation in our experiments is that the data the models are trained on only includes two features. We leave further impact investigations with datasets that include larger feature sets for future work.

Impact is a key factor not usually accounted for. The weights of the harms and benefits that make up the impact function play a vital role in the impact results and its interpretation. We

argue that impact results can be used to assist practitioners in deciding which fairness constraint to pick. They can decide what the appropriate trade-offs for fairness disparities and impact are (since they can have contradicting best fairness results) when optimizing for their model results. With that said, when impact is a key consideration and certain conditions hold, fairness constraints might not be sufficient. Impact-driven constraints or methods should be developed that consider the weights of different model outcomes and not only the model outcomes like many fairness notions do. Potential future work can also consider how to represent impact when there is not a clear feature (like credit score in our case) that is related to model outcomes.

8 CONCLUSION

In this paper, we assumed that a false positive model outcome has a negative impact and investigated if, in that case, mitigated models benefit the disadvantaged group or further harm them. To explore this, we used the loan repayment example and tested how fairness constraints and dataset composition affect the impacts on demographic groups. Our experiments, in the case of our loan repayment example under certain conditions, showcased that impact was worsened for the disadvantaged group the majority of the time when testing supposedly "fair" models. We highlight though that impact highly depends upon the context. Our key finding is that there is a trade-off between fairness constraints and impact.

We argue that including notions of impact while testing mitigated models before they are deployed is crucial. Testing these models with those impacts can aid practitioners in choosing the fairness constraint that matters most for their use case. Lastly, we emphasize that decreases in fairness disparity metric values in mitigated models do not necessarily equate to decreases in negative impacts on the disadvantaged group.

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A EXTENDED REASONING AND RESULTS

A.1 Credit Score Change Statistical Significance Results



Figure 7: The credit score distribution statistical significance results when using deterministically generated weights.



Figure 8: The credit score distribution statistical significance results when using the Benchmark distribution for non-deterministically generated weights.



Figure 9: The credit score distribution statistical significance results when using the Equal distribution for non-deterministically generated weights.

We include the statistical significance results for the updated credit score distributions as a result of weights generated for impact from mitigated models in comparison to unmitigated models



Figure 10: The credit score distribution statistical significance results when using the Benchmark-Swap distribution for non-deterministically generated weights.

("unmit" as referred to in the Figures). In each of the Figures, they showcase the results of the MWU-Tests, which compare credit score distributions from each mitigated model with the unmitigated score distribution for each model and by protected attribute. We note that in the Figures TPRP (True Positive Rate Parity) refers to Equality of Opportunity (EOO). The "B" or "W" added to the ML model acronym on the x-axis represents if it was a Black or White group distribution. The y-axis shows the fairness constraint used. If the field is dark in color, the result of the MWU-test is significant ($p < 0.05$), which means that the credit score distributions tested are significantly different. We give the results for all ML models when we have deterministically generated weights for impact in Figure 7 and when we have non-deterministically generated weights in Figures 8, 9, and 10. Deeper analysis of these results are in the main body of the paper.

A.2 Model Performance and Reduction Algorithm Results

Table 6 shows the model performance of our ML models. The accuracy of the unmitigated model (without any fairness constraint) trained with the GNB classifier is lower than the accuracy of the other three unmitigated models, which all have an accuracy of 88%. The mitigated models all have relatively similar accuracies.

Table 6: Model accuracy (in %) for all classifiers (by row) when trained on the baseline dataset. The column, "Unmit," shows the results of the unmitigated models and the columns to the right of that column specifies the fairness constraints applied to the mitigated models with the Exponentiated Gradient reduction algorithm for those results.

Classifier	Unmit	DP	EO	EOO	FPRP	ERP
DT	88.18	84.66	85.36	86.59	87.41	85.29
GNB	85.67	81.49	83.96	86.24	87.16	84.92
LGR	88.23	84.66	84.54	86.44	87.42	84.95
GBT	88.22	84.70	85.16	86.58	87.45	85.42

In our paper, we chose to use Exponentiated Gradient for our extended experiments with the synthetic datasets as our reduction

Table 7: The values of the fairness disparity metrics for our mitigated models (with Grid Search applied using the fairness constraints along the columns) for all four classifiers (rows) when trained on the baseline dataset.

Classifier	DP	EO	EOO	FPRP	ERP
DT	28.17	22.79	7.46	20.82	5.26
GNB	82.42	44.22	0.63	38.21	1.27
LGR	27.84	24.81	5.53	22.02	5.21
GBT	28.17	21.54	5.9	19.28	5.32

algorithm over the Grid Search algorithm. We present the Grid Search fairness disparity metric results with the baseline dataset to showcase why Exponentiated Gradient was the stronger algorithm for mitigating unfairness. We include Table 7 that covers the fairness disparity results after Grid Search mitigated unfairness in our different ML models. If compared with Table 5, we clearly see that Exponentiated Gradient outperforms Grid Search when dropping the fairness disparity metric values in comparison to the unmitigated model results in Table 4.

A.3 Dataset Generation Algorithms

The algorithms we used for generating our datasets are below. Algorithm 1 generates a tabular dataset from the original loan repayment dataset, depending on demographic ratio and order of magnitude. In the algorithms, when "concat" is used, we refer to the method concatenate which happens by row ("row") or by column ("col") and combines arrays into one array. Algorithm 2 generates the subset of data with the chosen ratios (demographic-ratio and label-ratio) that we vary and Algorithm 3 is the overall sampling loop connecting Algorithm 1 and 2, ensuring that we generate a dataset with the desired ratios and size.

The time complexity and space complexity of our algorithms are $O(n)$, highlighting that as the dataset size increases so does the running time and storage space. In our algorithms, we focus on the generation of one key feature for X, but the algorithms could, potentially, be used to sample more features; also, other features could be generated separately. With these algorithms, we assume we have access to a true label distribution and a feature distribution for a key feature. However, this might not be the case.

Algorithm 1 Create baseline dataset

Require: $f_1(x) \leftarrow P(X \leq x)$ {Cumulative distribution function for items},
$f_2(x) \leftarrow P(X = x)$ {Probability mass function for the label likelihoods},
oom {Order of magnitude for dataset creation},
$(r_0, r_1) \leftarrow R$ {Demographic group ratio},
$choices(items, probabilities, samples_{num})$ {Function for generating samples},
$randint(start, stop)$ {Function for generating random numbers}

$samples\_num_0 \leftarrow oom \times r_0$ {Initialize variables for number of samples by group}
$samples\_num_1 \leftarrow oom \times r_1$
$items_0 \leftarrow f_1.values_0$ {Collect the values from the CDF functions for each group}
$items_1 \leftarrow f_1.values_1$
$probs_0 \leftarrow f_2(items_0)$ {Collect the probabilities from the PMF functions for each group}
$probs_1 \leftarrow f_2(items_1)$
$samples_0 \leftarrow choices(items_0, probs_0, samples\_num_0)$ {Generate the samples for the groups}
$samples_1 \leftarrow choices(items_1, probs_1, samples\_num_1)$
$samples_{disadv} \leftarrow array([0] \times samples\_num_0)$
$samples_{adv} \leftarrow array([1] \times samples\_num_1)$
$D \leftarrow shuffle([concat_{col}[concat_{row}samples_0 \& samples_1]$ {Combine the arrays}
$\&[concat_{row}samples_{disadv} \& samples_{adv}]$ & $[concat_{row}probs_0 \& probs_1]])$
$labels \leftarrow []$, $index \leftarrow 0$ {Initialize array for labels and integer variable for index}
for $index < |D|$ **do**
  $rand\_num \leftarrow randint(0, 1000)/10$ {Initialize a random integer variable}
  if $rand\_num > D[index][2]$ **then**
    $label.append(0)$ {If true, assign negative class label}
  else
    $labels.append(1)$ {Else, assign a positive class label}
  end if
end for
$D \leftarrow concat_{col}[D \& labels]$, $D \leftarrow D.remove_{col}(2)$ {Add labels to D and drop probabilities}
return D

Algorithm 2 Generate subset with defined ratios

Require: D {Whole data set $[x_{group,label} \in D$ denote a sample with a $group, label \in (0, 1)]$},
$|S|$ {Size of our desired synthetic subset $S \subseteq D$}, R, L_0, L_1

for $group \in (0, 1)$ and $label \in (0, 1)$ **do**
  $|S_{group,label}| = d_{group} * l_{group,label} * |S|$ {Compute the number of samples}
end for
for $group \in (0, 1)$ and $label \in (0, 1)$ **do**
  if $|S_{group,label}| < |D_{group,label}|$ **then**
    $|S_{new}| = |D_{group,label}|/(d_{group} * l_{group,label})$ {Adjust the set size}
    for $group \in (0, 1)$ and $label \in (0, 1)$ **do**
      $|S_{group,label}| = d_{group} * l_{group,label} * |S_{new}|$ {Adjust the number of samples}
    end for
  end if
end for
for $group \in (0, 1)$ and $label \in (0, 1)$ **do**
  $S_{group,label} \in S = \{x_{group,label} \in D; |S_{group,label}|\}$ {Sample the desired amount of $x \in D$}
end for
return S

Algorithm 3 Generation of subset loop

Require: $|S|_{desired}, |D|, R, L_0, L_1, P(X \leq x)$ {Cumulative distribution function for items}, $P(X = x)$ {Probability mass function for the label likelihoods}

$D \leftarrow createBaselineSyntheticSet(P(X \leq x), P(X = x), |D|, R)$ {Algorithm 1}
$S \leftarrow generatesSubsetWithDefinedRatios(D, |S|_{desired}, R, L_0, L_1)$ {Algorithm 2}
while $|S| < |S|_{desired}$ **do**
  $D_{new} \leftarrow createBaselineSyntheticSet(P(X \leq x), P(X = x), |D|, R)$ {Algorithm 1}
  $D \leftarrow concat_{row}[D\&D_{new}]$
  $S \leftarrow generatesSubsetWithDefinedRatios(D, |S|_{desired}, R, L_0, L_1)$ {Algorithm 2}
end while
return S

Target specification bias, counterfactual prediction, and algorithmic fairness in healthcare

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ABSTRACT

Bias in applications of machine learning (ML) to healthcare is usually attributed to unrepresentative or incomplete data, or to underlying health disparities. This article identifies a more pervasive source of bias that affects the clinical utility of ML-enabled prediction tools: target specification bias. Target specification bias arises when the operationalization of the target variable does not match its definition by decision makers. The mismatch is often subtle, and stems from the fact that decision makers are typically interested in predicting the outcomes of counterfactual, rather than actual, healthcare scenarios. Target specification bias persists independently of data limitations and health disparities. When left uncorrected, it gives rise to an overestimation of predictive accuracy, to inefficient utilization of medical resources, and to suboptimal decisions that can harm patients. Recent work in metrology – the science of measurement – suggests ways of counteracting target specification bias and avoiding its harmful consequences.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies**; • **Machine learning**; • **Learning paradigms**; • **Supervised learning**; • **Social and professional topics**; • **Computing / technology policy**; • **Medical information policy**; • **Applied computing**; • **Life and medical sciences**; • **Health care information systems**;

KEYWORDS

Supervised machine learning, healthcare, decision support tools, philosophy of science, data ethics, measurement, metrology, accuracy, fairness, bias

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1 INTRODUCTION

Supervised machine learning (ML) is an increasingly common methodology for training models that support medical tasks such as diagnosis, treatment planning, and resource allocation. A growing body of research addresses the biases associated with such models and the impact of their use on the fairness and safety of medical decision making [1, 5, 9, 13, 15, 16, 32, 34, 36, 37, 39]. Currently, there is no consensus on how such biases should be reported to decision makers, e.g., to medical staff who prioritize hospital beds or refer patients for diagnostic tests. Particularly, it is unclear whether and how the presence of biases should affect the estimated *accuracy* of model outputs that is reported to medical staff. The literature on bias and fairness in ML tends to treat bias and accuracy as orthogonal properties of a model, and to allow the possibility that a given model is highly accurate but deeply biased, and vice versa [29, 35]. This is consistent with the technical, probabilistic definitions of bias and accuracy accepted by ML researchers. And yet, from the perspective of a typical healthcare professional, these technical definitions are obscure and counterintuitive. Healthcare professionals take their understanding of bias and accuracy from medical measurement: when a blood test or echocardiography is biased, it suffers from a systematic measurement error, and is therefore inaccurate.

The tension in the meanings of terms like 'accuracy' and 'bias' between measurement and ML is not merely a terminological issue. Instead, it is emblematic of a mutual misunderstanding of how medical professionals think about the targets of prediction versus the way algorithm designers operationalize target variables. If not addressed, this misunderstanding can give rise to misinterpretation of model outputs and to suboptimal decisions that are harmful to patients. In what follows, I propose a way of conceptualizing and communicating the accuracy of ML-based decision support tools that is in line with medical expectations and reduces health risks due to interpretive gaps between algorithm designers and users.

The accuracy of ML-based medical decision support tools depends on two broad factors: the predictive accuracy of the model, and the accuracy of the benchmarks against which model accuracy is evaluated. Sources of inaccuracy that fall under the first factor include under- and over-fitting, unrepresentative or small datasets, and imbalanced datasets, among many others. This article focuses on the second factor, namely, the accuracy of the benchmarks used to evaluate the accuracy of ML models. In supervised ML, these benchmarks are usually taken to be the labels in the validation and test datasets. Accordingly, significant efforts to improve accuracy in medical ML decision support tools have concentrated on improving the quality of labels [2, 40, 44].

While these efforts are important and laudable, this article highlights another source of benchmark inaccuracy in medical decision support tools that cannot be remedied simply by improving the quality of labels, and persists even in the hypothetical case where labels perfectly reflect the medical reality underlying the data. This additional source of benchmark inaccuracy is *target specification*

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bias. As its name suggests, this kind of bias arises due to differences between the way the target variable is specified from the perspective of medical decision makers, and the way the target variable is operationalized by the labels in the validation and test datasets. As I will show, a common source of target specification bias is that medical decision makers are typically interested in predicting variables that are specified under counterfactual conditions, while labels can only operationalize those same variables under actual conditions. As a result, labels may be biased with respect to the target variable even when the labels are reliably obtained and carefully curated.

I borrow the theoretical framework for the concept of target specification bias from *metrology*, the science of measurement. A central goal of metrology is to supply universal and replicable benchmarks for evaluating measurement accuracy, such as the standard metre, kilogram and second. I will contrast the modern concept of metrological accuracy with the 'label-matching' concept of accuracy currently prevalent in the literature on supervised ML, and find the latter lacking for the purposes of reporting to decision makers. I will then propose a broader concept of benchmark accuracy for medical ML decision support tools that is inspired by metrology. This broader concept of benchmark accuracy takes into account not only label quality, but also target specification bias.

Target specification bias is closely tied to fairness. The counterfactual scenarios under which medical decision makers typically specify their target variables are also the ones they use to define what counts as a fair decision. This is consistent with counterfactual conceptions of fairness in ML [6, 28]. I will conclude by arguing that substantive considerations concerning fairness and the dynamics of healthcare decision making are intrinsic to specifying benchmarks for model accuracy. The accuracy of ML decision support tools in medicine should be reported relative to such benchmarks, rather than merely based on their label-matching rates. Doing so would increase the fairness and safety of such tools.

2 THE LABEL-MATCHING CONCEPTION OF ACCURACY

Several measures of accuracy are used in the machine learning literature. The most straightforward one is the probability of a match between a model's predictions and the values of the target variable, $p(Y = \hat{Y})$. Other, more sophisticated measures of accuracy, such as the area under the ROC curve, are functions of the probabilities of a match or mismatch between predictions and target variable values. Determining the accuracy of a machine learning model thus requires an estimation of the values of the target variable. The common practice in supervised machine learning is to estimate target variable values from labels in the test dataset. These labels are produced by a source that is assumed to be reliable. In medicine, labels for diagnoses are commonly produced by 'gold standards' of evidence. These may include the verdict of a pathologist based on an analysis of a biological sample. For example, labels in a screening tool for skin cancer are produced by pathologists who examine the results of a biopsy of a skin lesion [1, 12]. The predictions of the screening algorithm are deemed accurate to the extent that they replicate biopsy results.

The machine learning research community is well aware that labels may be inaccurate, and that training datasets may misrepresent the target population. Much recent attention has been given to overcoming 'label bias' and data acquisition error (or 'measurement error') and to diversifying commonly used training datasets [2, 40, 44]. These efforts increase benchmark accuracy, and with it the reliability of evaluations of predictive accuracy. However, the question remains as to whether a model that replicates the labels in a reliable and representative dataset should for that reason be deemed accurate. Current practice suggests that much of the machine learning community assumes that the answer is 'yes'. A look at recent reports of machine learning applications in medicine shows that researchers consistently select measures of accuracy that strictly track the replication of labels [10, 14, 20, 25, 27]. By 'strictly track' I mean that the model's accuracy is evaluated as a monotonically increasing function of the probability of a match between predictions and labels in the test dataset, and that the model is considered 100% accurate if and only if its outputs match all the labels in the test dataset.

Should evaluations of algorithmic accuracy strictly track the match between predictions and labels? In what follows, I will call the view that a machine learning model is predictively accurate to the extent that its predictions match the labels in a reliably obtained and representative dataset the 'label-matching conception of accuracy'. The label-matching conception takes labels in a reliable and representative dataset to be unbiased operationalizations of the target variable. For example, if the target variable is the risk of cancer associated with a skin lesion, and the labels are biopsy results, the target variable is operationalized by the probability that a lesion with similar features would result in a positive biopsy result. As long as the dataset is a reliable representation of medical diagnostic practice, the label-matching conception assumes that the probability of a positive diagnosis tracks the risk of skin cancer.

The main advantage of the label-matching conception of accuracy is its simplicity. As long as the dataset is of sufficiently high quality, evaluating accuracy is simply a matter of counting matches (or calculating distances) between predictions and labels, and applying one of several mathematical transformations to the results. No additional information or expertise concerning the target problem domain, e.g., dermatopathology, is required to evaluate accuracy. On the other hand, the disadvantage of this conception is that it runs the risk of operationalizing the target variable in a manner that misaligns with the way users and stakeholders define it. For example, there are reasons to doubt that the occurrence of positive biopsy results is an adequate operationalization of the occurrence of skin cancer. Due to racial disparities in the diagnostic process, Black patients in the US are typically diagnosed at a later disease stage. Hence, samples from early-stage Black patients may be underrepresented in the data [19]. In other words, while biopsy may be highly reliable in detecting skin cancer, and while the dataset may be representative of diagnostic practice, diagnostic practice is not directly reflective of the target variable that decision-makers and stakeholders are interested in predicting. Decision makers are interested in the occurrence of skin cancer, and are thus interested in predicting the diagnosis that a patient with a given set of features *would have received* had diagnostic practice been equally reliable for Black and white patients. The correct way to operationalize the

target variable from the perspective of decision makers is as a predictor of a counterfactual scenario, rather than the actual scenario the model is trained to predict.

There are several reasons why actual medical practice may give rise to data that, despite being reliable, cannot be used to directly track the variable of interest. Not all such reasons involve a disparity that needs to be corrected, such as the late diagnosis of skin cancer in Black patients. In many cases, the mismatch between labels and target variable arises precisely because medical practice proceeds correctly and responsibly. Brian Christian discusses an early example of such mismatch [8]. In 1995, computer scientist Rich Caruana, then a graduate student at Carnegie Mellon University, was part of a team developing machine-learning algorithms to inform hospital admission decisions for pneumonia patients. The goal was to help physicians decide which pneumonia patients to hospitalize and which to follow up as outpatients. Caruana used patients' health outcomes, and specifically patient mortality, as labels. The neural net he trained achieved good accuracy (AUC=0.86) in predicting patient mortality [4]. However, a rule-based learning algorithm that was trained on the same data learned the rule that having asthma *lowers* the risk of mortality of a pneumonia patient. Conversations between the computer scientists and physicians revealed the likely cause: physicians tended to direct more resources to treating pneumonia patients with a known history of asthma. For example, such patients were often admitted directly into the intensive care unit, where they received aggressive care. This reduced the mortality rate of asthmatics with pneumonia relative to the overall pneumonia patient population. Ironically, this meant that these patients were deemed low-risk by Caruana's model, which was trained on the same data and was accurate in predicting mortality.

It is worth examining precisely what went wrong with Caruana's model. The model's target variable – the thing it was designed to predict – was patient mortality. Risk of patient mortality was specified as the deciding factor for priority of hospital admittance as an inpatient. The labels used to train and test the model were records of patient mortality, and there is no reason to think that the labels were plagued by significant data acquisition error, i.e., that deaths were miscounted. Prima facie, then, the labels seemed to be good representations of the target variable. On a closer look, there was a misalignment between what the labels represented and the intended target variable. While the labels were records of actual mortality, the intended target variable was *ceteris paribus* mortality, that is, mortality 'all other things being equal'.

The variable physicians were interested in estimating when making decisions about inpatient admittance was not whether a given patient would in fact die of pneumonia. Whether or not a patient dies of pneumonia depends on other factors besides their health state and health-related risk factors. Specifically, it also depends on the quality and timeliness of the medical treatment they receive. The target variable of interest, rather, was the risk of death from pneumonia under a counterfactual scenario where all patients receive the same quality of care. Only under such counterfactual scenario can physicians control for the impact of care on a patient's health outcomes. The target variable is therefore *idealized*, in the sense that it represents a simplified and unrealistic scenario. The labels used to train and test Caruana's model reflected a real, complex scenario that was an imperfect approximation of the idealized, *ceteris paribus* case. These imperfections, if not detected in time, would have caused harm to asthmatics, who would have been de-prioritized for inpatient care had they contracted pneumonia.



Figure 1: A simplified causal model of data generation for health outcome prediction. X stands for patient features prior to medical interventions, I stands for the characteristics of medical interventions, and O stands for the patient's health outcomes. Actual data are generated by the scenario on the left, whereas decision makers are typically interested in predicting outcomes under the scenario on the right.

3 DECISION MAKERS CARE ABOUT COUNTERFACTUAL PREDICTION

The cases discussed above suggest that the label-matching conception of accuracy is misaligned with the interests of decision makers and other stakeholders. Even when the data are representative of the actual world, and the model is generalizable to other, real-world cases not included in the training data, model predictions may still be inadequate as operationalizations of the target variables decision makers care about. Figure 1 illustrates this mismatch for a simplified use case of ML in healthcare. The use case concerns decisions about treatment based on a prediction of a patient's health outcomes. In a simplified causal model of the underlying data generation process, two variables affect a patient's health outcomes (O): the characteristics (features) of the patient prior to medical intervention (X), and the characteristics of the healthcare interventions that the patient undergoes (I). This causal model is simplified inasmuch as other, e.g., environmental and social factors also contribute to health outcomes. Nonetheless, the simplified causal model is sufficient to demonstrate the mismatch between operationalization and definition that gives rise to target specification bias.

Two scenarios of the simplified causal model may be distinguished. In an actual scenario, the characteristics of the healthcare interventions that a patient undergoes are affected by the features of the patient. For example, different patients that present symptoms of a similar kind are often treated differently based on the severity of their symptoms, their age, and their medical history. Moreover, the same intervention may be more or less effective depending on a patient's age, sex, and background medical conditions. Some patients refuse certain treatments, and this again may be correlated with the patient's age, sex, religion, and health condition. Finally, patients belonging to different socio-economic, racial, or ethnic groups often do not have the same range and quality of medical interventions available to them. As a result, the demographic and medical characteristics of a patient affect the type, duration, and quality of the medical interventions they undergo. Any accurate

prediction of actual health outcomes is, by virtue of being accurate, necessarily sensitive to the interaction between patient features and the characteristics of the intervention.

To physicians who are tasked with making decisions about treatment, this interaction is a confounding factor. Physicians are typically interested in the difference a given intervention would make to the health of a patient, such as reducing their risk of death or increasing their quality of life. For this evaluation to be possible, physicians need information on how different patients are likely to respond to the *same* intervention. In other words, physicians are interested in the counterfactual scenario under which patient features and the characteristics of the intervention do not interact. For example, they are interested in the health outcomes different patients with pneumonia would have had 'all other things being equal', that is, if they had been given the same treatment. As Jessica Paulus and David Kent put it, "observed mortality is an imperfect proxy for mortality under ideal care, the true outcome of interest when constructing models for [medical] futility" [34].

Depending on the number of treatment options under consideration, physicians may be interested in multiple counterfactual predictions. For example, they may be interested in comparing the counterfactual health outcomes of a patient in a given population where all patients receive the same treatment T1 to their health outcomes in a population where all patients receive the same treatment T2, or perhaps no treatment at all. Only relative to such counterfactual scenarios can decision makers isolate the contribution of patient features to health outcomes, and select interventions accordingly.

A similar point holds for diagnostic use cases. Under a simplified causal model, patient characteristics and the characteristics of the diagnostic procedure both affect the diagnosis a patient receives. In an actual scenario, the features of a patient affect the characteristics of the diagnostic procedure they receive. Different patients presenting similar symptoms are often offered different diagnostic procedures depending on their age, sex, and whether or not they are known to belong to certain risk groups. The same diagnostic procedure may have varying sensitivity and specificity for different patients depending on age, sex, genetic profile, background health conditions, and a variety of other factors. The proportion of patients who refuse to undergo a certain diagnostic procedure may vary in correlation with demographic properties. And patients belonging to different socio-economic, racial, or ethnic groups often do not have the same range and quality of diagnostic procedures available to them.

Here again, the demographic and medical characteristics of a patient affect the type, quality, and timeliness of the diagnostic procedure they will undergo. A machine-learning model that accurately predicts actual diagnoses is necessarily sensitive to the interaction between patient features and the characteristics of diagnostic procedures. However, from the point of view of a physician who is required to decide whether or not to refer a patient to a diagnostic test, this interaction is a confounder. Such a physician is interested in evaluating the likelihood that the test would reveal important information, e.g., confirm or rule out the presence of a medical condition. As part of this evaluation, physicians are interested in determining a patient's risk of developing a given medical condition, regardless of whether or when that condition will, as a matter of fact, be diagnosed. In other words, physicians are interested in predicting the diagnosis the patient *would* receive in a counterfactual scenario where all patients with a given set of symptoms undergo a timely and accurate diagnosis procedure.

The comparison of actual and counterfactual scenarios demonstrates the limitations of the label-matching conception of accuracy. The ability of an ML model to reproduce labels in a generalizable way is an important step toward clinical utility, but is not sufficient. Labels in the dataset reflect health outcomes (or diagnoses) obtained in actual healthcare scenarios, whereas decision makers typically require information about counterfactual scenarios where some background causal factors are held fixed. To be clinically useful, an ML model must predict the health outcomes (or diagnoses) associated with patient features under such counterfactual, *ceteris paribus* scenarios. These counterfactual health outcomes (or diagnoses) differ from the labels in the dataset, not due to any measurement error, but because real data includes correlations that confound the relationship between patient features and health outcomes (or diagnoses) that decision makers are interested in learning about. As a result, when the accuracy of an ML model is evaluated based on the model's ability to reproduce labels, it is evaluated against a different variable than the one decision makers typically care about [34, 36].

From the point of view of decision makers, then, the label-matching conception overestimates the accuracy of model predictions. Specifically, it does not account for discrepancies between the values of the target variable as it is operationalized by labels, and values of the target variable as it is defined by decision makers. Such discrepancies constitute target specification bias.

In response to this charge, one could argue that machine learning is not designed to predict counterfactual scenarios. Rather, a machine learning model is deemed accurate when there is a good fit between the associations learned by the model and the associations found in the real world. As long as the labels in the dataset are accurate and reliable representations of the target variable of interest, and the model generalizes well from the training dataset to new examples, the model should be deemed accurate for the patient population from which the data was collected.

This objection, though plausible at first, rests on a confusion between intended labels and target variables. Intended labels are the labels a dataset would have if the data were representative and reliably collected. Examples are cancer diagnoses, records of hospital admission, and records of death. However, even the labels in an ideally collected and curated dataset are not values of the target variable. Rather, they are *operationalizations* of the target variable, that is, empirically accessible stand-ins for the values of the target variable. The target of prediction in most applications of machine learning is a *latent variable*, that is, a variable whose values are not directly accessible through any empirical procedure, but require inference from available data [21]. To access their values, target variables must be operationalized. Whether or not labels are an adequate operationalization of the target variable depends on the definition of the target variable, and on the validity of the inference from labels to target variable values. The need for such inferences and their complexity have long been recognized in sciences that specialize in measurement, such as metrology and psychometrics.

In the next section, I turn to an example from metrology, and examine how the accuracy of measuring instruments is evaluated in the face of gaps between the desired target variable and its operationalizations. I then build on this example in the following section, where I elaborate on the sources of target specification bias and offer ways of mitigating it.

4 A METROLOGICAL CONCEPTION OF ACCURACY

Metrology, the science of measurement, is concerned with the practical and theoretical aspects of measuring. Metrologists are typically physicists and engineers who design and calibrate highly accurate measuring instruments, maintain and improve measurement standards, and regulate national and international systems of measurement, including the International System of Units (SI). While its orientation is mostly applied, metrology has also generated a considerable body of conceptual and methodological work. The *International Vocabulary of Metrology* (VIM), for example, discusses the meanings of general terms such as 'measurement accuracy', 'measurement error' and 'measurement uncertainty' [22]. Similarly, the *Evaluation of Measurement Data – Guide to the Expression of Uncertainty in Measurement* (GUM) provides a wealth of concepts and methods for evaluating measurement uncertainty [26].

Metrology provides valuable conceptual tools for judging the adequacy of an operationalization of a variable. In metrology, the quantity intended to be measured is called a 'measurand' [22]. The task of defining a measurand is distinguished from the task of realizing it. The distinction between realization and definition of measurands is central to modern metrology, and a key to its success in delivering reproducible measurement results. The *definition* of a measurand is a linguistic entity that specifies the conditions under which the quantity is intended to be measured. These conditions are often ideal and not obtainable in practice. For example, the standard unit of time, the SI second, is defined as the duration of exactly 9,192,631,770 periods of the electromagnetic radiation corresponding to the transition between two hyperfine levels of the unperturbed ground state of the cesium-133 atom [3]. The cesium atom in question is assumed to be unaffected by gravitational fields, magnetic fields, or thermal radiation, and to have no interactions with other atoms. These are counterfactual conditions that cannot be practically achieved in a laboratory.

The definition of the SI second assumes a counterfactual scenario, and thus cannot be fully satisfied. Yet it can be approximately satisfied. A metrological *realization* is a system that approximately satisfies the definition of the measurand. Realizations are used to operationalize the definition of the measurand, so as to make its value (or values) empirically accessible. For example, there are currently over a dozen primary frequency standards operational around the world. These are atomic clocks that serve as the most accurate measurement standards for time and frequency metrology. Each of these clocks measures the radiation frequency associated with cesium-133 atoms under conditions that closely approximate the ideal conditions specified by the definition of the second. However, no approximation is perfect, and different realizations deviate from the ideal in different respects and degrees. Consequently, metrologists do not consider any of the primary frequency standards to be completely accurate. Doing so would lead to inconsistencies, as the clocks 'tick' at slightly different rates due to differences in the conditions affecting the cesium atoms in each laboratory. Instead, metrologists develop detailed theoretical and statistical models of each clock, and test these models by experimenting on the clocks and measuring their surrounding environment [18, 23]. These models are then used to estimate the deviation of each clock from the ideally defined frequency [41].

When a less accurate clock is calibrated against a primary frequency standard, the accuracy of the clock is not evaluated simply by its ability to reproduce the frequency of the primary standard. Doing so would make the less accurate clock inherit the frequency biases of the standard. Instead, the biases and uncertainties associated with the primary standard are included in the accuracy evaluation of the less accurate clock [33]. This procedure ensures that accuracy is evaluated relative to the theoretical *definition* of the second, rather than against any of its idiosyncratic, concrete realizations. By following this procedure, clocks that were calibrated against different primary realizations of the second provide consistent estimates of time and frequency, even though the raw frequencies ('tick' rates) of primary realizations disagree with each other.

Metrological accuracy is the closeness between the measured quantity value and the value of the measurand as defined. The defined value of the measurand is considered to be unknowable, and only capable of approximation with some uncertainty. Much of the conceptual and mathematical apparatus of metrology is dedicated to estimating bias, understood as a systematic difference between measured and defined quantity values. As the defined value of the measurand is unknowable, estimations of bias are necessarily inexact and involve some uncertainty. To evaluate this uncertainty, metrologists assess the extent of deviation between the actual operating conditions of their instruments and the ideal operating conditions specified by the definition of the measurand.

Metrologists employ a variety of strategies to acquire this counterfactual information. Some of these strategies involve physically controlling elements of the apparatus and environment so that they more closely approximate the ideal, e.g., controlling the temperature of the environment. But these physical control strategies ultimately reach a practical limit. To go beyond this limit, metrologists use a combination of theoretical predictions and secondary experiments to assess how the apparatus *would have* behaved if its operating conditions were closer to the ideal. For example, they vary the density of cesium atoms in the atomic clock, and use theory and statistics to predict what the frequency of the clock would have been at zero density [17]. The uncertainty associated with this prediction becomes a component of the measurement uncertainty of the clock.

The upshot is that a clock's accuracy is a property of a *predictive inference* [42]. Accuracy ultimately depends on the ability of scientists to use the clock's indications ('ticks') to predict the value of a latent, counterfactually defined frequency. The accuracy of this prediction, and therefore of the clock itself, depends on extensive and domain-specific background knowledge, and cannot be reduced to an association or matching between observations.

5 TARGET SPECIFICATION BIAS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR FAIRNESS

The discussion of time and frequency metrology provided above leaves out much detail, but even this cursory survey suggests similarities between the inferential structures of measurement and supervised ML-based prediction. Both are types of method for evaluating variables based on concrete input (whether a new example, or an object to be measured). Both involve a modeling (training or calibration) phase, in which reliable data (training dataset, or values associated with standards) are used to generate stable associations between the inputs and outputs of the instrument [31]. In both cases, the associations revealed during the modeling phase are generalized to new objects or events in the application (deployment or measurement) phase. In both cases, the model is optimized to increase the accuracy of predictions of values of the target variable (measurand). Finally, both types of method presume to provide evidence for decision making, and are often presented to decision makers as trustworthy within reasonable limits.

These similarities are perhaps not surprising, given that both measurement and predictive ML rely on inductive reasoning. I do not wish to overemphasize the similarities: there are many dissimilarities between measurement and predictive ML as well. These include different modes of implementation (computational versus material), the fact that the input of ML is a representation rather than a concrete object or event, and the fact that an ML model is a model of the *data* rather than a model of the measurement process. There are also many methodological and institutional dissimilarities. Yet the similarities in inferential structure are sufficient to support a reasonable hope that some helpful lessons may be drawn from metrology, which is a significantly older and more methodologically mature field than ML research, for tackling current challenges facing ML research. In what follows I will focus on four such lessons.

5.1 Lesson One: labels are not intended to reflect target variables, but to operationalize them

From an abstract, mathematical perspective, ML may be viewed as no more than a 'regression machine' that fits a function to data under specified constraints. However, the practical problems that ML tools are commonly deployed to solve, such as optimizing resource allocation or predicting the occurrence of a disease, are not identical to the regression problems that ML tools are designed to solve. Rather, the regression problem meant to be solved by a given ML tool is an *operationalization* of the real-world problem. Even if the model is a good solution to the regression problem specified by algorithm designers, it does not yet follow that the model is a good solution to the real-world problem that the model will be deployed to solve. This is a familiar situation in measurement: a measuring instrument almost never measures precisely the same variable that users are interested in measuring. The difference between the target variable and the variable being measured is often subtle. Unless the target variable is carefully defined, the discrepancy may go unnoticed. In some cases, the discrepancy may be practically negligible, while in others, an unnoticed discrepancy can entail significant harm. To avoid such harms, the real-world problem and its operationalization need to be clearly distinguished from each other, and their relationship carefully studied.

Metrologists are used to asking themselves whether the target variable as defined is identical to what the instrument is designed to measure, and whether the instrument *in fact* measures what it is designed to measure. Most commonly, the answer to both questions is 'no'. Similarly, designers of predictive ML tools typically benefit from asking: (i) What variable do labels in the actual data reflect? (ii) What variable are labels *intended* to reflect? and (iii) How does the variable that labels are intended to reflect differ from the target variable as defined by stakeholders?

Questions (i) and (ii) are increasingly at the center of attention in ML research, as evidenced by recent work on measurement error, label bias, and biased proxy variables [24, 30]. The third question is more seldomly raised, perhaps due to the belief that the variable the labels are intended to reflect is identical to the variable of interest to stakeholders. But in well-designed predictive tools, these two variables should usually be distinct. As already mentioned, the variable of interest to stakeholders is typically not practically realizable even in principle. Much like the frequency of an ideal, unperturbed cesium atom, decision makers are typically interested in counterfactually defined variables, such as the *ceteris paribus* prognosis of patients under equal treatment, or the *ceteris paribus* health risks to a patient if diagnostic testing were not selective. Even in the best practically possible data acquisition scenario, labels that reflect the variables of interest to stakeholders are not attainable, because the conditions the define such variables are never fulfilled. Intending labels to directly reflect target variables ignores the inferential gap between the two, with potentially harmful and unjust consequences to patients.

Instead, fairness and safety are better served by viewing intended labels as operationalizations that necessary satisfy the definition of the target variable only approximately, and to account for this approximation when reporting accuracy to stakeholders. Metrologists are already taking this responsible approach to accuracy evaluation and reporting: they reconcile multiple, idiosyncratic measuring instruments by accounting for their deviations from a common, counterfactual ideal. The mutual reconciliation of measurements results relative to a counterfactual ideal is essential to their reproducibility, and a precondition for many practical applications, including precision timekeeping, modern manufacturing, and reliable communications.

5.2 Lesson Two: target specification bias is distinct from data acquisition error and label bias

Operationalizing a target variable is a complex activity. It involves an iterative investigation of the degree of alignment between the goals of variable estimation and the design of concrete estimation procedures. The result is often a chain, or a hierarchy, of variables starting with a highly idealized variable definition, proceeding through successive approximations, and terminating with the results of one or more concrete methods. For example, when measuring mass in kilograms, the idealized variable is a ratio between the mass of an object and a defined physical constant. The physical constant that currently defines the kilogram is a function of the

Planck constant, the speed of light in vacuum, and the ideal cesium transition frequency [3]. If everyday kitchen scales were required to directly estimate this ratio, they would have been tremendously complex and expensive. Instead, kitchen scales are calibrated to a variable that is located at the bottom of a long chain of operationalizations, namely to the mass of a standard metal weight that approximates the defined constant. Operationalization is successful, not when these variables are identical, but when the relationships among them are stable and sufficiently well-known.

Different links in the chain of operationalizations introduce different kinds of error. This holds true for measurement as it does for the operationalization of variables in ML-based decision support tools. A typical case of supervised ML is illustrated in Figure 2. Errors that originate at the lowest levels of the chain – the level of data acquisition – are commonly known as 'measurement errors' or 'measurement biases' [30]. These include, for example, incorrect or missing data, noise in the data, and duplicate records. Such errors introduce bias into the relationship between labels in the training data and the events or objects in the world that the labels are meant to represent. For example, an error in the recording of a diagnostic test could cause a positive test result to be recorded as negative, or vice versa. Next comes 'label bias', namely errors that arise due to differences between the intended and actual labels. Labels are usually intended to reflect some actual state of affairs in the world, such as the existence of a pathology. Actual labels are indirect approximations of intended ones. A common source of label bias is error in the underlying evidence-collection process. For example, the diagnostic test itself may be inaccurate, e.g., a pathology exists but is not detected. Even if the diagnostic test is completely accurate, label bias could still arise if, for example, the sample on which data is collected is not representative of the intended population, e.g., the sample contains significantly more men than women or an unbalanced age distribution relative to the population of interest.

Target specification bias is distinct from data acquisition error and label bias. This kind of bias arises due to differences between the intended labels and the target variable. As mentioned, in decision-making scenarios target variables are typically counterfactually defined, and concern a state of affairs where confounders are absent. It is often practically impossible to remove confounding factors by directly intervening in the world. For example, it is impossible to remove systematic health inequalities from society before collecting the data. Even when direct elimination of confounders is practically possible, it may not be ethically or legally permissible. For example, doing so in the pneumonia case would require withholding special treatment from asthmatics who present pneumonia symptoms. Consequently, target variables must usually be defined in a counterfactual world.

The counterfactual nature of target variables distinguishes them from intended labels. Labels are data about the actual, rather than a counterfactual, world. For example, they are intended to reflect the actual health outcomes of pneumonia patients in a manner that is free from inaccuracies, i.e., free from data acquisition error and label bias. At the same time, labels are *not* intended to reflect a counterfactual world free of upstream decision making (such as differential treatment of at-risk patients), diagnostic suspicion bias (such as unjustified differences in diagnostic procedure based on patients' race, gender, or age) or systematic injustices (such as unequal access to healthcare). No method can directly collect data about such counterfactual worlds, because they are not empirically accessible. Properties of such counterfactual worlds – including the target variable – must be inferred from data about the actual world based on some assumptions. The nature of these assumptions will be discussed under Lesson Four.



Figure 2: A typical chain of operationalizations of a target variable in supervised ML for healthcare decision making. Target specification bias arises due to differences between intended labels and the target variable, and is distinct from label bias and data acquisition error.

It should be noted that target specification bias is a broader category than proxy bias, at least under a common interpretation of the term 'proxy'. Proxy bias arises when the labels and the target variable are defined as different *kinds* of properties, such as when the cost of healthcare serves as a stand-in for the severity of illness. The difference between the target variable and its operationalization is especially stark in such cases. Nonetheless, target specification bias persists even when the two variables are of the same kind, such as when actual severity of illness is used to estimate counterfactual severity of illness in the absence of confounders. Consequently, unlike proxy bias, target specification bias cannot be completely solved simply by picking better labels [34]. Of course, one could decide to use the term 'proxy' very broadly and apply it to any operationalization. Broadly speaking, all measurement and supervised ML involve proxy variables, because the variable of interest is

never completely identical to its operationalization. However, such linguistic usage would obscure the specific challenges presented by what ML researchers typically call 'proxy variables' and the special solutions available to address these challenges.

5.3 Lesson Three: target specification bias affects both accuracy and fairness

If not corrected, target specification bias diminishes model accuracy. To see how, one must first consider the concept of accuracy itself. On a narrow, label-matching concept of accuracy, the optimal targets of prediction in supervised ML are actual states of affairs, such as the actual rates of patient recovery and mortality. Accordingly, when a model is optimized in a manner that sacrifices its degree of fit with labels – for example, to accommodate fairness constraints – its predictions are viewed as less accurate than they would be in the absence of such constraints. This conclusion is consistent with the claim, commonly made by ML researchers, that accuracy and fairness trade-off against each other [11, 35].

On a closer look, there are at least two distinct concepts of benchmark accuracy to consider when evaluating the performance of ML-enabled decision support tools. The first is the accuracy of labels relative to the actual states of affairs that labels are intended to describe, e.g., whether a patient that is recorded as having survived pneumonia in fact survived. Here the benchmark is the intended label. This is the benchmark commonly used under the label-matching concept of accuracy. The second concept of benchmark accuracy is the accuracy of labels relative to the variable decision makers are interested in predicting, e.g., whether a patient that is recorded as having survived pneumonia would have survived if all patients had received the same treatment. Here the benchmark is the target variable. Under this second, broader concept of benchmark accuracy, even the most reliably acquired labels are still imperfect operationalizations of the target variable. By analogy, even a physical clock that works precisely as intended would still be affected by confounders that make it an imperfect operationalization of the theoretical definition of the standard SI second.

It is this broader conception of accuracy that usually interests decision makers. Under this conception, accuracy is evaluated relative to a benchmark that is meaningful to decision makers, i.e., that represents the kind of evidence decision makers are seeking, rather than a technical aspect of the algorithm's validation and testing. The upshot is that a good fit to the labels – even once the labels are corrected for data acquisition errors and label bias – may not be sufficient to guarantee accuracy from the perspective of decision makers. Indeed, in some cases a good fit between model predictions and corrected labels may be a sign of *inaccuracy*. This is especially the case if there are reasons to think that the actual world in which the labels were collected differs substantially from the counterfactual world about which decision makers seek evidence. Evaluating model accuracy relative to a counterfactually specified target variable takes target specification bias into account, resulting in more complete and user-relevant accuracy estimates than those based strictly on label-matching.

Target specification bias also diminishes the fairness of decisions that are based on model predictions. From the perspective of a decision maker who is interested in making fair decisions, upstream medical decisions that affect the distribution of health outcomes across groups are confounders. This is the case regardless of whether those decisions are unjust (e.g., due to health disparities) or due to justified differential treatment (e.g., preferential treatment to asthmatics). The target variable is specified in the absence of such confounders, on a counterfactual world that is free from differential intervention. This counterfactual approach to defining target variables does not free decision makers from addressing difficult theoretical questions about what exactly they mean by 'fairness'. On the contrary, the emphasis on target specification as a distinct, theoretical task that involves societal and ethical considerations highlights the potential conflicts among different conceptions of fairness.

Fairness criteria that are incorporated into the definition of the target variable become part of the accuracy benchmark for the relevant decision support tool. Under a broad, user-oriented conception of accuracy, implementing such fairness criteria does not trade off against accuracy, but rather aligns with the aim of improving model accuracy. For example, correcting the predictions of the pneumonia hospitalization decision support tool so that asthmatics are prioritized (rather than de-prioritized) increases both accuracy and fairness. Accuracy is increased by providing decision makers with evaluations of the target variable they are interested in – in this case, how asthmatics would fare in the absence of differential treatment – and fairness is increased by better aligning resource allocation with medical need. Target specification bias therefore defies the typical trade-off between fairness and accuracy.

5.4 Lesson Four: mitigating target specification bias requires domain-specific knowledge

In the analogy with measurement, target specification bias is a type of systematic measurement error. Unlike random error, systematic error is a "component of measurement error that in replicate measurements remains constant or varies in a predictable manner" [22]. Systematic errors often stem from background processes and assumptions that remain stable when the measurement is repeated, such as a background gravitational field or a biased estimation of a physical constant. Such errors cannot be detected by applying statistical tests to repeated measurements, but must be inferred from theoretical models of the measurement process, by performing additional measurements, or by using established measurement standards.

Similarly, target specification bias stems from processes and assumptions that remain stable when the same part of the world is resampled. Gathering additional data from the same hospital would not reveal that the model underestimates the risk of pneumonia to asthmatics, because the process of differential treatment that gives rise to the bias remains constant. Nor would the bias be revealed by using different labels, employing different measures of fit between predictions and labels, or employing a generic fairness criterion that equalizes some performance parameter across patient groups. Recall that the performance parameter that decision makers are interested in equalizing is defined counterfactually: it is the allocation of resources by health risk when all other things are equal. The relevant sense of 'all other things' is domain-specific,

and depends on the context of the decision at hand. Mitigating target specification bias requires decision makers and algorithm designers to explicitly specify their assumptions concerning what needs to 'remain equal' in the counterfactual scenario. Then, they must formulate and empirically test hypotheses concerning the differences between this counterfactual scenario and the actual one. In doing so, they would be following the example of metrologists, who theorize about the deviations of their clocks from the idealized definition of the SI second.

This is not to imply that collecting and analyzing data cannot help to mitigate target specification bias. One way of formulating hypotheses about the actual processes that give rise to data is to increase the transparency of the model, so that the correlations it discovers become more easily surveyable. In the case of Caruana's model, this was achieved by training a rule-based learning algorithm on the same data. Another helpful family of techniques employ methods of causal inference that reveal counterfactual probabilities in the data. For example, the use of Bayesian networks or structural equation models can reveal causal dependencies that are relevant to healthcare decision making [36]. Recent work in explainable AI (XAI) has featured breakthroughs in extracting counterfactual information from ML models and presenting it to users, with potential applications for clinical decision support tools [7, 38].

Such methods should be used in combination with clinical judgment to interpret the resulting counterfactuals and determine which of them is relevant for the decision at hand. Importantly, decision makers need to exercise judgment when deciding which counterfactual conditions need to be equalized across which patient groups. For example, it makes little sense to allocate medical resources to children suffering from asthma based on the diagnosis they would have received if they were adults. The medical resources, diagnostic criteria, and treatment options are far too different between these two groups to make such counterfactual information relevant for decision making. Domain-specific and contextual knowledge remains crucial for specifying which counterfactual information is relevant for a given type of medical decision. This point is further strengthened by the fact that various stakeholders, including patients, physicians, healthcare administrators, insurers, and health policymakers may have conflicting specifications for the same target variable. In such cases, addressing target specification bias requires an inclusive consultation regarding the precise aims of prediction.

6 CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A METROLOGICAL EVALUATION OF ACCURACY FOR MACHINE LEARNING

With the proliferation of ML-based tools into areas of high-stakes decision making, such as healthcare, criminal justice, finance, and defense, the methods used to evaluate and report the accuracy of ML models need to conform to stringent standards. The discussion above suggests that the label-matching conception of predictive accuracy is inadequate and potentially harmful for supporting high-stakes decisions. It is misleading to report the rate of label-matching to stakeholders (whether in terms of sensitivity, specificity, AUC, or some other metric) and present it as the ultimate evaluation of the model's accuracy, even if the labels themselves are highly reliable. Instead, the accuracy of decision support tools should be reported relative to a counterfactually defined target variable, with an uncertainty margin that reflects the unknown degree of error around reported values. Methods for reporting this sort of counterfactual information are still in their infancy in ML [43], but are highly developed in metrology, which could serve as a role model for future developments.

Label-matching metrics of accuracy may still be useful for internal model validation, including testing for under- and over-fitting of the model. Such metrics can reflect the internal validity of the model, that is, an evaluation of the fit between the associations learned by the model and the associations found in the part of the world from which data was collected. Such metrics express how well model predictions generalize from the training dataset to the test dataset, and are therefore tied to the idiosyncratic conditions under which these datasets were obtained. This sort of generalizability may be sufficient for some low-stakes decisions, such as retail consumer purchasing recommendations, but not for medical decision making, which is subject to a higher standard of harm prevention and requires a systematic exclusion of confounders. Rigorous, metrological accuracy evaluation of ML decision support tools will have the benefits of reducing target specification bias, providing clearer and more actionable information to users, increasing fairness, and improving reproducibility and public trust.

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Unpicking Epistemic Injustices in Digital Health: On the Implications of Designing Data-Driven Technologies for the Management of Long-Term Conditions

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ABSTRACT

Applications of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the domain of Personal Health Informatics (PHI) offer potential avenues for personalised treatment and support for people living with long-term conditions, however, they also present a number of ethical challenges. Whilst participatory approaches can help mitigate concerns by actively involving healthcare professionals, patients, and other stakeholders in design and development, these are constrained by the limits of epistemic standpoints and the risks posed by extrapolation from individuals to groups. In this paper we draw upon interviews with stakeholders involved in Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) care, including clinicians, insurance providers and pharmaceutical industry representatives, to map intentions and ethical considerations for developing PHI tools for people living with HIV. Whilst treatment efficacy for HIV has improved patient quality of life and life expectancy, management and care is complicated by knowledge gaps about what living and ageing with HIV entails. We investigate how the critical concept of epistemic injustice can inform the design of data-driven technologies intended to address these gaps, helping orient expert perspectives within the broader structures and socio-historical influences that shape them. This is of particular importance when designing for marginalized populations such as people with HIV (i.e. who may experience social stigma and be under-resourced, managing multiple conditions), helping to identify and better account for fundamental ethical considerations such as equity.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Human-centered computing** → **Empirical studies in collaborative and social computing**; **Collaborative and social computing theory, concepts and paradigms**.

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AI Ethics, Epistemic Injustice, Data Justice, Critical Digital Health, Personal Health Informatics

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1 INTRODUCTION

A plethora of recent work at the intersections of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and digital health illustrates the potential of data-driven technology to support people living with long-term health conditions such as Human-Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). This has spurred dialogue around the implications of datafied healthcare, emphasizing how social contexts shape digital design for Personal Health Informatics (PHI), especially given how socio-political contexts impact engagement with care [10] [58] [83]. Recent work in the international AI ethics research community has highlighted the role of epistemological assumptions and knowledge asymmetries in shaping both system design and approaches to practical ethics [18] [48] [53] [78]. This poses a particularly salient ethical concern given recursive looping between AI systems and the social contexts which they are employed within, whereby algorithms shape societal contexts which then form a baseline upon which to construct another algorithm, and so on [8]. [5]. Given this, it is crucial to account for broader structural contexts shaping participant perspectives [77] when conducting user interviews with domain experts to inform AI system design, cognizant of the risks posed by conflating individual views with normative ethical aims [33]. Given aims to design models which explicitly draw upon the data collected by users of health apps, touted as resources for high-stakes domains such as personalized medicine and public health planning, gaps in data mean poorer quality care for individuals in the missing groups. This is of particular concern given that resource scarcity in domains such as public health, with datasets re-appropriated to fulfil needs such as policy development [5].

This paper examines how historical and socio-political factors combine to invisibly impact design of medical AI. We employ the conceptual lens of epistemic injustice [39], which references the exclusion of or devaluation of the knowledge contributions of marginalized epistemic subjects, to unpick some of the assumptions which can underlie how healthcare providers frame suggestions for these technologies, and look at how structural and relational factors can influence this by impacting patient engagement with care. We report insights from a recent interview study conducted in the United Kingdom (UK) with stakeholders involved in the management of HIV, including healthcare professionals, insurance providers, and researchers in the pharmaceutical industry, to map stakeholder aims and ethical concerns around using PHI tools for HIV management. Drawing upon these findings, we examine how well-being and care relationships are understood by care providers, seeking to inform the ethical design of technologies that aim to support people living with HIV. We illustrate this with a case study designed to scaffold understanding of how to support the self-management of HIV in daily life, looking at what shapes the concept of whole-person care within the HIV sector.

1.1 Background Motivation

Improvements in HIV treatment have considerably increased prognoses for people living with HIV [2]. However, longitudinal studies have shown that, on the one hand, HIV is associated with comorbid conditions such as heart disease, anaemia and hypertension, [49] [74], whilst, on the other hand, antiretroviral treatment has been linked with the development of comorbidities such as diabetes mellitus [60]. This means that people living with HIV now live longer with multiple complex conditions, therefore the aim of HIV care provision is transitioning beyond a focus on medical treatment and adherence, to improving quality of life [59]. In the UK, where this study was based, recent advances in HIV treatment have meant the UK has surpassed UNAIDS 2020 targets, which aim for 90% of people living with HIV to be diagnosed, 90% be on treatment, and 90% show suppression of viral load - in the UK this target was hit in 2017 [62]. Building upon this success, a fourth metric has been proposed; that 90% of people with viral suppression have a good health-related quality of life [52]. This measure includes understanding both the incidence and impact of co-morbid conditions, and self-reported functional impairments such as fatigue and insomnia ([52]).

These metrics conceal inequities in HIV care and health outcomes. Complicating the picture is the pervasive social stigma associated with HIV - stigma being a "a social process, experienced or anticipated, characterized by exclusion, rejection, blame or devaluation that results from experience, perception or reasonable anticipation of an adverse social judgment about a person or group" [80]. HIV Stigma disproportionately impacts people from marginalised groups [34], and has a direct impact on engagement with care [41], resulting in inequalities in how groups are represented within the UNAIDS targets, even within a country which has reached the targets at an overall population level.

Identifying potential gaps in knowledge about the interpersonal relationships and socio-historical factors shaping care contexts is crucial to designing equitable technologies for HIV care. Best practice involves ongoing, equal participation of the intended care recipients in the steering of projects, and a commitment to improving engagement [15]. This must be facilitated by consideration of how structural inequities impact problem definition [51] – meaning that certain voices may not have been sufficiently heard in the initial framing of the issue - especially given the impact of HIV stigma in devaluing the perspectives of people living with the condition [29]. There have been calls for further research demonstrating how contemporary theories of knowledge and practice may be employed within design to construct epistemological/ontological angles to proceed from, to go from passive reaction to active world-building [72]. This requires expanding from focusing on individual interaction with technology, to situating these interactions within a broader understanding of the relationships and contexts that they are employed within, and the power dynamics that shape them. This study (reported herein) contributes tools for doing this, advancing a discussion about how ethical concerns in data-driven design are situated within broader structural causes (e.g., research motivated by the need to consider not just the impact of stigma, but the causes of it [56]. We contribute to a growing body of literature in the AI Ethics and Society (AIES) and Fairness, Accountability and Transparency (FAccT) communities that investigate socio-political dimensions of AI and suggests conceptual tools to inform equitable design practice [4] [6] [12][48] [67]. Connecting with Critical Digital Health Studies [55], we offer the following contributions; presenting empirical findings about the technological interventions that HIV Healthcare Providers (HCPs) favor, probing the ways in which epistemic injustices can invisibly influence these perspectives, and considering the implications of our findings for designing data-driven technology for HIV (self-)management.

2 RELATED WORK

This paper is situated in dialogue with AI ethics and Critical Digital Health Studies [ibid.], exploring the interplay between collaborative care practices, structural inequities and digital health design and how this can perpetuate social and epistemic injustice [18] [53].

2.1 Ethical Dimensions of Health Informatics

The use of technology for managing long-term conditions includes sharing of patient information such as electronic health records to facilitate patient agency in self-management, improve care provider management of other clinic-related information such as appointments, and facilitate peer support networks [57] [69] [81] [82]. Other studies have investigated using health apps to track adherence, via devices such as pill bottles which track time and date when bottle is opened and closed, a seeming lapse in adherence to medication triggering interventions such as text messages or phone notifications, to patients or to support workers [42], or developed apps to enable patients to track stress levels and mood in addition to medication adherence, and facilitate interaction with clinical staff and peers [32]. Within applications of PHI for HIV self-management run the themes of trust, impact of stigma, confidentiality. The impact of HIV stigma has led to a thorough focus upon confidentiality and related issues of security and trust around patient data [22] [57] , investigating participant perspectives on sharing certain types of data [21].

The introduction of smartphones has enabled development of several apps aiding in HIV self-management, resulting in increased amounts of patient-generated health data being recorded. This information may have useful applications not just in patient-involved but also in *data-driven* approaches to HIV Care, for example in monitoring risks associated with HIV [50], which would be of interest to a range of stakeholders involved in the current care system. Furthermore, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in many services being conducted remotely [23], with the UK seeing rapid expansion in the use of telehealth services during the pandemic [38], raising concerns about the quality of care provision. Although there are potential benefits of these modalities in administering healthcare, there are drawbacks too, with a lack of consensus on how they impact equity of access to care. Such technologies require rigorous ethical oversight if they are to meet the ethical and health needs of patients [14]. In order to design/ re-design technologically-mediated care to best fit the needs of patients, healthcare providers and other stakeholders need to understand how proposed tools intersect with the broader care environment, especially in light of systemic inequities.

2.2 Epistemic Injustice and Critical Health

Epistemic injustice takes place when knowledge contributions of an individual or community are afforded less visibility due to direct or indirect discrimination [39], including being denied "concepts to make sense of experience, procedures to approach the world, and standards to judge particular accounts of experiences" [64]. These denials can take different forms, whether resulting from inequities in assignment of credibility (testimonial injustice), inequities in available communicative tools (hermeneutic injustice) or indeed that the existence of these inequities prevents even the initial contribution of knowledge (anticipatory injustice) [25] [47] [54]. Evidence from the domain of public health has demonstrated that health inequities – the unfair distributions of health outcomes due to preventable causes – present in the provision of healthcare (including HIV care), are due at least in part to the presence of epistemic injustices [47] [63]. Furthermore, the knowledge practices of health research may contribute to and even exacerbate existing epistemic injustices [9]. Studies investigating perspectives of specific groups in order to interrogate existing dominant narratives can still reproduce reductive understandings and perpetuate injustices, as they are used to establish new "standpoints" which are considered representative of people who share demographic characteristics with the participants. In a similar vein of injustice perpetuating injustice, Lupton (2016) [55] positions health technologies as sociocultural artefacts which assume certain capabilities on the part of the user base, with technologies constructed based on these assumptions, and that tech outputs then have a material impact on users. Applying this within the specific domain of women's health or 'FemTech', Hendl and Jansky (2022) [43] examine the discriminatory assumptions underlying narratives of empowerment which are used to support development of period-tracking apps through several feminist conceptual lenses. In an analysis of promotional material about FemTech apps, they describe tensions which privilege certain groups over others underlying the general message of empowerment, concluding that further research is needed into user experiences of epistemic injustice.

In relation to Health and Care more broadly, epistemic injustice can impact on care due to "epistemic wrongs... that occur in the processes involved in knowledge production, use, or circulation" (p. 1465) [9]. The practical causes of such injustices include immediate constraints of clinical practice such as time pressures. Importantly, they exist at the structural as well as individual or interpersonal levels [3], which includes the design, development and delivery of data-driven technologies [70]. Drawing on such limited knowledge, care providers often generalize patient groups, leading to inappropriate responses to care needs, for example long-term illness care provision in West Africa negatively impacted if it does not conform to the practices developed globally [51]. Indeed, PHI tools can potentially reinforce medicalization of long-term conditions, reframing human issues to problems existing in isolation which come under the control of a medical professional [26]. Responses to these risks of medicalization includes suggestions to move away from designing PHI for structured clinical processes or conceptualizations [44], including to support people with HIV [27]. This outlook is complicated, however, by the potential for dual use of such technologies, for example, if data gathered when practicing self-care is potentially used for other types of care, especially if seamlessly feeding back to healthcare providers [61].

There is a tendency towards individualised approaches to HIV care; for example, a focus on the role of behaviour in HIV risk, which largely excludes the impacts of the communities and contexts within which individuals operate [63]. Furthermore, there are information asymmetries between sites of care, for example, a patient with HIV may not wish their primary care physician (e.g. General Practitioner to know about their status, due to factors such as impact of social stigma [65]. However, the trend towards increasing integration of healthcare systems and linking of datasets risks overriding this. Epistemic injustice provides a useful conceptual lens for looking at the design of tools used for capturing and interacting with patient-generated data, precisely because it foregrounds these tensions between the needs of the patients and the objectives of stakeholders involved in service design - the same tensions that underlies these concerns surrounding stigma and confidentiality in HIV care [11]. Given this potential to facilitate data capture for medical, insurance and pharmaceutical applications of AI, it is important to examine factors motivating development of PHI tools, and indeed the factors which are making these specific needs visible. Numerous studies have investigated barriers to sharing patient-generated data between providers and services, addressing worthy concerns including access to data, clinician trust in data validity and ability to interpret it [40] [57], however, some of these barriers are rooted in dismissal of patient data as unreliable, reflecting clinician distrust of patient-generated data [81]. These dismissals illustrate how the oft-foregrounded (and well-intentioned) perspectives of healthcare providers shape modalities of care. In the face of increasing datafication, critical engagement with the situated nature of expert perspectives is crucial to equitable design of technologically-mediated care. In doing so, we are better situated to examine the impacts of PHI tools beyond their individual use-cases, to consider them as relational elements of emerging ecosystems shaping future AI applications.

2.3 Summary

Given the risk of algorithmic harms compounding existing healthcare inequities, designing PHI tools for HIV self-management necessitates careful consideration of sites of epistemic injustice, including analysis of the interpersonal practices forming the intended context of technology use. Awareness of the presence and impact of epistemic injustices can also help facilitate critical reflection on the downstream implications of PHI tools, such as utilizing health data for medical AI or personalized insurance, and aid in deliberating the ethical and social impacts of these.

3 STUDY DESIGN

We now report on the study method and procedure, which investigated the ethical implications of designing data-driven technologies to support people living with HIV in self-managing their condition.

3.1 Aims, Objective and Approach

This study took place as part of a broader program of research investigating co-design of supportive technologies for HIV self-management (INTUIT: Interaction Design for Trusted Sharing of Personal Health Data to Live Well with HIV). We drew upon semi-structured expert interviews to explore the nuanced experiences of stakeholders supporting HIV care across the UK. We interviewed care providers in a spectrum of roles including those involved in central care such as clinicians, and those in peripheral roles such as developing new treatment regimens or negotiating inclusive insurance packages. This approach allowed for exploration of the everyday professional practices of stakeholders, contextualizing potential uses and implications of PHI tools. We set out two main aims; firstly, to understand the types of patient data that stakeholders involved in HIV care would wish to access, including their motivations for this; and secondly, to investigate their perspectives on the ethical and social implications of potential uses of patient data.

Our choice of method reflected our aim to understand the experiences and perspectives of participants "responsible for the development, implementation or control of solutions/strategies/ policies" [76]. These participants occupy a position of power in relation to their service users in the HIV population not only because they have access to privileged knowledge, but also because they can influence both the generation of this knowledge and the uses to which this knowledge is put [17]. Given this approach, the interview schedules were designed to guide the discussion but maintain flexibility to explore emerging concepts. The research approach taken by this study was approved by the departmental research ethics board at the lead author's University.

The interview structure consisted of three parts: Part 1 sought to understand the role of the participant and their team, their existing use of health data, and their motivations for this work. In Part 2 we investigated stakeholder perspectives on PHI use in the HIV community and the types of information/data they felt might be useful in their professional work, probing stakeholder perspectives on the nature and impact of intersections of identity within these areas. In Part 3 we set out to investigate stakeholder perspectives on the relationship between data-sharing and use, and the ethical considerations which they felt were central to this.

Table 1: Table of Participants

Role	Pseudonym
HIV Clinician (HCP)	Tom, Anna, Rocio
Youth Officer	Katy, Clara
Researcher	Zara, Riza
Insurance Broker	Nia
Pharmaceutical Representative	Ben

3.2 Procedure

We recruited nine stakeholder representatives across a range of roles, using purposive sampling to recruit participants through the advisory group of the research program described above. All participants were UK-based and held roles working with the HIV sector; healthcare, the pharmaceutical industry, insurance, Higher Education and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Pseudonyms were attributed in transcripts to protect participants' identities and to maintain confidentiality.

The interviews were conducted online on Zoom and audio recorded, transcribed by a third-party company which complies with the rigorous ethical standards of the University, and then analyzed using Reflexive Thematic Analysis (RTA) [20]. RTA is an inductive approach to thematic analysis that accounts for patterns in the data whilst allowing researchers to account for emergent themes, to investigate phenomena beyond participant experiences and relate subsequent findings to "wider socio-cultural contexts" [20]. We began by coding the experiences and motivations expressed by participants, iteratively grouping codes describing similar experiences and descriptions together into broader themes. The research team included an HIV peer researcher, who had research experience and lived experience [45], and regularly met to discuss codes and themes and update or create themes as deemed necessary. After several roundtable meetings to collectively develop the themes, we refined to the framework discussed in the paper.

4 CONTEXTUALIZING DIGITAL HEALTH

Our findings shed light on the main motivations and intentions expressed by stakeholders about accessing patient-generated data, and help illuminate the contexts that shape its generation, access and use. We begin by exploring which aims would motivate data access and development of AI models. We then explore categorizations of patient groups based on the types of patients which stakeholders hypothesized might be best suited to, or benefit most from, these aims. Next we move to the more individual level of tracking medication adherence, where we have more linear mappings of patient to care provider. Finally, we examine some of the assumptions underlying the core motivation of improving patient wellbeing.

4.1 Stakeholder Motivations and Intentions

In the first part of the interview, we asked about stakeholders' roles and discussed whether they would hypothetically find access to patient-generated data useful in their line of work. If so, we then explored how they would use it and why this would be beneficial. All

stakeholders wished to be able to access HIV care-related information: for example, which additional medications that patients were on, nutritional supplements they were taking, side-effects they were experiencing. Linked to this, they were also interested in lifestyle information; movement/exercise levels, sleep quality, weight, mood, and health issues such as headaches that could be side effects of HIV medications. Healthcare providers, researchers and the pharmaceutical researcher wished to be able to access information pertaining to mental health and functioning information: including anxiety levels, energy levels, productivity. For example, Nia's role was aiding people with long-term conditions (who are often excluded from insurance policies) in accessing insurance. She explained how accessing information about comorbidities and lifestyle could support applications to products such as life insurance by enabling more detailed modelling of risk. Meanwhile, clinicians felt that there could be benefits to accessing data that provides insight into the lifestyle factors and comorbidities of patients, in moving beyond the medicalization of measures such as Clusters of Differentiation 4 cell count or CD4 counts (which indicate the effectiveness of treatment):

> "All of those other things we were talking about before like lifestyle things like smoking, weight, fracture risk, and all of that stuff is about trying to...cardiovascular risk is monitoring for comorbidities, and then sexual health and wellbeing, mental health, and, I think, those are the main...those are the main areas" [Anna]

In accessing such information, the clinicians wished to gain a broader purview than blood test results, moving away from medicalization by gaining a holistic view of the patient through patient-generated data:

> "I think for my own personal work it would be, like, how people are feeling, and how they're getting on, day to day. Not just in a kind of mood sense, but also in, you know, are they getting the things out of their day that they find valuable, so kind of like functioning measures." [Rocio]

They also considered how reductions in resources could motivate development of such technologies, reflecting on how improvements in HIV treatment were contributing to a decrease in clinicians specializing in HIV. One outcome of this was felt to be that approaches to care would have to change, perhaps motivating a move towards use of data-driven technologies. Ben described how as stable patients increase, HIV management becomes simpler and presents less of a challenge, and is better suited to nurses, pharmacists...or, as suggested below, by technologies.

> "I understand the number of trainees going into HIV is substantially down. A lot of the cohort that got interested in HIV was precisely because it wasn't treatable, but now ...I think this means you're going to see task shifting to nurses and pharmacists which actually is probably appropriate in the sense of the clinical complexity of some of the patients now who are stable and well, which suggests the more patient data you can collect and the more guidance and the more air traffic controlling you can do is probably a good thing." [Ben]

However, the nurses may also be better suited because they are less likely to medicalize the patient and can provide a more relational role, perhaps contradicting the distanced "air control" view, which could encourage reliance on the data which Ben envisioned might prove useful for such a task. This suggestion to rely on data for treatment-related decisions can be seen as an example of how epistemic justices could result from (and be perpetuated by) limited perspectives of care providers, and be perpetuated in suggestions for design of self-management technologies.

4.2 Categories and Categorizations

When discussing experiences and first-hand knowledge of providing support, the stakeholders tended to focus on relational aspects, contextualizing practices by giving examples of the nuances of patient experiences and backgrounds and how these changed the nature of the care they supported. When discussing potential uses of data and PHI tools within stakeholders roles, and indeed their roles at a more abstract level, they talked in terms of categories. In order to manage their roles, stakeholders were engaged in quite complex categorizations of patients. At the most abstracted, these categorizations existed as a binary of "stable" and other, where other was most frequently referred to as "chaotic". This split was central to clinician and insurance stakeholder concepts of how to design for care, with participants describing the most relevant groups for such technologies as consisting of people engaged with care, categorized as 'stable', meaning that viral load is sustained at a very low level. Maintaining these categorizations of groups may be motivated by external factors, for example clinicians need to collect information on stable and other groups in order to fulfil administrative requirements.

> "I think if you were to look at HIV from, like, a policy point of view and the way that we, kind of, collect our stats and all of that, then we are meant to be categorising our patients into different groups and I think that's going to affect the way that we're paid. So, kind of, new patients, what they call stable patients, which would be the majority, and then complex patients." [Tom]

Another HIV consultant suggested that it might be best to design PHI tools for the more stable group, suggesting that already well-managed, health-literate patients might be the most suitable demographic;

> "You've got people that are very health literate. That are very good at accessing systems and, you know, a lot of gay men, for instance, are very educated, tech-savvy, very good at media[...] A lot of the stable patients would like it I think - especially our patients who are getting older, focus on their health quite a lot. To be able to provide that extra data or monitor themselves would feel empowering for them, as well. Because it may be that something comes up that we don't need to deal with, that they need to go to their GP about, for example...But there probably are a few patients who are slightly more chaotic and may also like the opportunity to be able to do this." [Anna]

Anna described a "spectrum" of patients with different capabilities and experiences, and reiterated the importance of third sector, community-based organisations in managing care for many marginalised patients. She contrasted the stable group described above with a marginalized group she described working with quite often; asylum seekers who "don't really know why they're in the clinic because they don't understand the system", and stressed the importance of collaboration with patients when developing new modes of care:

> "if you're talking about trying to empower people to help themselves, I think, you've got to look at it as a collaborative thing, and it's not some...I don't think it's necessarily clinic-delivered, but it's partnership-delivered."

The view from the pharmaceutical researcher revealed a similar binary classification, with Ben describing how two groups, stable and chaotic, had different requirements, with QoL being a priority for the former but perhaps less so for the latter:

> "There's definitely two camps in HIV management now of well... stable, informed, on top of it, maybe work to do in the fourth dimension, the patient-reported outcomes dimension of care... and then the other group which are still struggling to even face taking their medicines and are hard to reach and chaotic and HIV is not the biggest issue in their life basically."

These pre-existing categorisations potentially shaped how apps were likely to be conceptualised, considering that the needs and capacities for self-management by people deemed to be in these groups would influence the features and uses of data. Apps could be tailored towards those considered "stable" due to the expectation of greater engagement with them. The healthcare providers reflected on how the privilege of stability and lack of constraints to engage with care can even lead to better care, and greater access to and engagement with tech.

> "So, I think there's something...there are some patients, and again, I think maybe some of our older patients who've been diagnosed for a few decades and they tend to be some of our older, gay men, they seem to have a good idea of what they're taking. And, kind of, maybe just because they've been coming to clinics for longer and knowing what information we want. So, maybe they do." (Rocio)

As we illustrate with these quoted examples, a number of stakeholders (5 in total) suggested to design for the stable group. This was informed by several factors – perceptions of patients in this group as more likely to engage, as more knowledgeable and therefore suitable. Marginalized populations were thought to be less likely to engage with, have access to or understand the technologies proposed. Stakeholders also expressed concern over situations where engaging with PHI tools might potentially put patients at risk of physical as well as emotional harm.

Identifying groups who would benefit best from proposed tools is a standard approach to design. However, employing technology that reproduces the status quo also reinforces existing inequalities. In the case of developing further treatment modalities (such as better drugs) based on patient-generated data, this would mean less suitability to marginalized groups.

4.3 Situated Contexts of Care

This section considers stakeholder interactions within care provision and the contexts shaping them, and how the introduction of data-driven technologies into care might affect patient engagement, which has a knock-on effect upon visibility within the healthcare system and other support services. The vulnerability of patients came to the fore across different accounts, with participants carefully considering the social implications of these for providing care.

Participants discussed use of PHI for monitoring adherence, building upon existing categorisations of patient groups within the health system. Across stakeholders, a major reason for development of PHI tools to support self-management of people living with HIV, and access to data generated by these, involved adherence to medication. Their focus was on patient behaviour at a level of more individual care, although data regarding adherence was also considered vital knowledge for pharmaceutical companies developing medications. Clinicians were keen to have adherence information in order to be able to contextualise medical findings;

> "You want to look back at their bloods and you want to know that they've been undetectable and you...you know, because immediately if you're seeing somebody that's not got a good CD 4 count or an undetectable viral load, you're asking yourself why, like is it...is it an adherence thing?" [Anna]

However, sharing adherence data has social implications stemming from patient relationships with healthcare providers. Katy, who worked in youth support, discussed the relational nature of how young people report adherence to their medication. She described how they would build up relationships with the clinicians supporting their care, over years, resulting in a very close relationship. As a result of this relationship, perhaps perceived at a familial type of level, young people may be hesitant to report that they had not been regularly taking their medication.

> "Quite a big issue that we find is that a lot of young people find it really hard to be honest about their medicine adherence sometimes with their clinic teams... And I think that's really the sorts of interesting element; a lot of it is because they have grown up, a lot of them, going to this same sort of clinic team, same consultant, same nurse, from when they were quite young. And so there's a real interesting relationship and dynamic where they almost see this person as like an auntie or an uncle and they find it really hard, they feel like they're letting them down when they struggle."

Katy would find herself in a role of mediator for the anxious teen, "they've touchingly said, oh, I've got an appointment tomorrow and I know I've really messed up, and I'm really scared about telling them, can you help? And in those kinds of scenarios I will offer to talk ahead with the doctor".

Nearly all the stakeholders interviewed described the complex relationships between personal privacy, stigma and intersections

of identity. Tom, an HIV physician, reflected on the risks of even just accessing data about HIV care via a computer.

> "They may live with a lot of people who don't know their status, so trying to...being at home and being able to look something up on a computer when you've got kids around you who don't know about your HIV."

Katy, who worked with young people with HIV, was concerned that experience of stigma may reduce the ability of users to productively engage with PHI. For example, she suggested inherent risk in using technology which could be linked to HIV care, which recognised by another party might out the user.

> "But still, young people were nervous about having an app on their phone that would be about their HIV and about, you know, potentially, other people seeing that and then, you know, there are still a number of young people that would say, oh, I wouldn't actually use it, or I wouldn't download it, you know. Because I don't want...if one of my mates has got my phone, you know I don't want them to see it and Google it, or...you know."

In some situations, it might even be safer to only have direct human interactions, for example in cases where domestic situation meant disclosure of status could result in physical violence. Katy spoke about risks of abuse resulting from disclosure of status;

> "We know that there are people who live in homes where it's not safe for them to share their status. They might have an abusive partner, or something. So again, I would worry for those people. If their status was accidentally disclosed because they were using technology at home. You know, for some people it's almost safer for them to go somewhere to talk about their HIV than to do stuff at home. So, there are a few people like that in terms of safety as well as confidentiality, I think."

These concerns linked to participants' perspectives on common understandings within, or cultural differences between social groups, (perhaps including ties to morality and/or attitudes towards sexuality). Ben gave his perspective on the composition of patients living with HIV in the UK, reflecting on how different cultural norms affect how association of HIV with shame and vulnerability.

> "I think it partially reflects in the UK predominantly, HIV is a gay, white, male disease and that's often a pretty evocative group. I would say it's quite different amongst some of the black immigrant populations for whom HIV stigma is much, much, much worse."

Reflecting on the impact of social stigma upon disclosure of HIV status [65], Ben considered patient and stakeholder motivations (including direct care providers and others involved in the process), and how misalignments between these motives may present barriers to providing care.

> "And I think that the challenges sometimes with these monitoring things is it takes two to tango, meaning the patient, the person living with HIV has to want to allow it and the person at the other end, the doctor or the payer or whoever it is, the pharma company has to need it, and often those things don't align..."

The impact of stigma intersected with other factors. Participants raised concerns about the impact of inequities such as language barriers in access to healthcare technology, impact of geographic disparities or immigration status in access to healthcare, and so on. Marginalizations are interwoven with other inequities such as access to health technologies, or indeed who gains access to the data generated by them, given concerns about stigma and discrimination. Pat was concerned about her experiences of a lack of access to computing technologies:

> "Some people don't have phones, some people don't have access to the internet. Lots of people do, but it's definitely not even in terms of distribution. So, if we are, kind of, expecting people to have that...everyone to have that access, I think that would be unlikely to happen"

Given the prior discussion on patient categories, stigma often served to define concerns within the more "chaotic" group of those requiring care, for whom technologically mediated services were seen as less appropriate.

The accounts we discussed above, which show the importance of adherence to treatment and impact of stigma, illustrate the deeply interpersonal aspects of care provision. They also have implications about the impacts that data-driven technologies may have upon existing care practices. For instance, as earlier described, Katy highlighted how she has on occasion provided care as an intermediary between a young person and their doctor, in situations where their close relationship resulted in patient discomfort around revealing gaps in adherence to medication. In the situation she described, introducing technologies which would directly share adherence information with clinicians might result in inaccuracies in reported data, and remove the opportunity for a mediator to enable sharing of accurate data. This case illustrates why it is important to understand the situated nature of care as well as the behaviors that might be associated with direct interaction with technologies. In this case, the patient's fudging of adherence is due to the closeness of the relationship, rather than lack of trust; therefore, making the application more trustworthy would not address the issue. When discussing impact of stigma, Ben pointed out the importance that patients recognize that care provision matches their needs. The risk of stigma is not just that someone might not use an app, but that using an app associated with the stigmatised health condition might put them at risk. These issues complicated the relationship between the expressed intentions of care providers and the needs of care recipients, which we discuss in the next section.

5 DISCUSSION

Our findings illustrate stakeholder interest in (or active use of) PHI tools to support patient self-management (and resultant patient-generated data) in HIV care. Stakeholders were cognizant of the impact of intersecting marginalizations on patient interaction with PHI tools, discussing impacts of racism, stigma, the digital divide and poverty. They expressed some apprehensions regarding the impact of inequities in shaping this data, however the primary concern was found to be improving wellbeing. In this section we

suggest that historical, socio-political and technologically mediated Epistemic Injustices invisibly inform definitions of wellbeing and visions of how wellbeing can be designed for. We examine how epistemic injustice is surfaced in PHI and patient-generated data; an issue of particular concern given how patient-generated data has the potential to inform design of future care provision such as medication or patient pathways. We investigate how widely-accepted conceptualizations of wellbeing are shaped by intersecting marginalizations and consider how designing for wellbeing might unintentionally encode epistemic injustice into datasets and downstream development of medical AI models.

5.1 Motivations and Barriers

A key motivation for this study was to gain understanding of how healthcare providers might integrate patient-generated data and related data-driven models into care provision, and the motivations for doing so. We found that discussions of specific applications of PHI and data-driven technologies for care were framed in terms of a broader concern for wellbeing of people living with HIV. Although the discussions differed across stakeholders in many respects, all stakeholders were eager to improve the wellbeing of people living with HIV through data-driven technology design and use. For example, clinicians wished to gain a broader purview than blood test results, moving away from the epistemic injustices of medicalization [79] by gaining a holistic view of the patient. However, whilst wellbeing appears a broad and beneficent concept in the abstract, it is shaped by assumptions which surface in the context of application. One example of this is in deciding which groups stand to benefit most from designing for wellbeing based on information which reflects ongoing inequities in care provision [71]. In this section we explore the contexts within which wellbeing as a concept has developed, and the often-invisible role of the interplay of Stigma, adherence, and categorization of patient groups.

5.2 Paradigms of Knowledge

This concern with wellbeing was predicated upon the current goals of HIV Health organisations. In describing the aim of improving wellbeing, participants from Consultant, Insurance, Pharmaceutical and Youth Officer roles all referenced the proposed fourth 90 that has evolved from the 90-90-90 UNAIDS continuum (as described in Section 1.1 on HIV Care). The fourth 90 concept mirrors the stable and complex categorizations discussed in the previous section.

Despite the UK achieving the 90-90-90 aims, health related Quality of Life (QoL) amongst people with HIV, even when well-controlled by effective treatment, remains considerably reduced compared to those living without HIV [24]. Furthermore, even the rate of attainment of the first three measures varies between demographics within the UK. Trans (including non-binary) adults in the UK are twice as likely to be diagnosed late compared with cisgender adults [46]. [31] recently reported that among heterosexual patients, those from Black and minority ethnic (BAME) groups were diagnosed later than white group members, and although they received similar access to retroviral therapy, the BAME group was more likely to show a viral rebound. Indeed, Black and other/mixed patients were more likely to disengage from care and have gaps in attendance in clinic [31]. This can be attributed to various factors such as structural racism [37] which is well-documented to contribute to medical mistreatment [30] causing mistrust [66], reluctance to discuss diagnosis with others [13], and barriers associated with migration status [73].

Varying degrees of stigma result in disparities of HIV care and outcomes, compounded by interactions of multiple stigmas, for example stigma due to both HIV and sexual orientation in certain faith-based communities [16]. Another factor influencing wellbeing is anticipated stigma (stigma which the individual believes they will face from others if they disclose their condition), which is linked with a lower quality of life in studies of people living with long-term health conditions [35]. Effects of anticipated and enacted Stigma have negative implications for health and wellbeing of patients, associated with physical outcomes such as lower CD4 counts [36]. This may be due to poor access to care; one study found that participants who experienced high levels of Stigma also were far more likely to report barriers in access to care, and to have lower mental health status as well as lower levels of adherence [68]. Other studies have also charted a link between stigma and low adherence, due at least in part to reduced coping mechanisms and outside support [34]. In the same vein in which Stigma impacts patient engagement with care, in this paper we discussed how Stigma may impact engagement with technology used as a tool in care (for instance, how an app focused on HIV treatment effectively becomes a signifier of HIV). These concerns bring to mind recent discussions of the ramifications of using apps for self-management of reproductive health. Changes in local law can mean that even apps abiding by ethical norms can suddenly put users at risk.

Indeed, certain patients prefer avoiding technological interventions and would rather track their experiences using analogue approaches, for example with pen and paper [21]. As such, where technology is used to establish metrics or indicate willingness to engage in self-management, it produces a distorted picture of patient groups which has further implications in shaping care-providers' understandings of, and attitudes towards those deigned to be in these groups. Given the existing epistemic and socio-historical injustices around HIV management, and the recognised differences in power and access to resources among people living with HIV, it raises issues regarding the role of technology in complicating ideals of care and wellbeing, and mandates interrogations of why and how technologically mediated care could or should be designed.

5.3 Implications for AI Ethics

In this paper, we have illustrated how epistemic injustices can be unintentionally reproduced in PHI tools and resultant data, cogent with recent studies evidencing inequities in HIV care and stigma as intersectional in nature [75]. In framing, designing and deliberating the ethico-onto-epistemological implications of PHI tools, especially those which generate patient data, we should carefully consider the context which the proposed technology is intended to augment, paying particular concern to the epistemic injustices which we risk both creating and perpetuating. This involves explicit consideration of which types of knowledge are being drawn from, conscious of the danger of "bringing population level reasoning to grassroots practice" [1]. When oversimplified observations drawn

from high-level populations are transformed into concrete recommendations, and generalised to other facets of identity, boundaries are drawn between categories and lived experiences. Rather than facilitating further investigation, lived experience of different intersections is then increasingly excluded. Testimonial, hermeneutic and anticipatory injustice implicitly form the landscape shaping PHI tools, medical AI and indeed all applications of AI.

Identifying the specific categorization of the intended end user was important to many of the stakeholders we spoke with as part of this study. However, rather than seeing universal inclusivity as an aim, many proposed that we consider whether or not inclusion is indeed useful or ethical. Certain stakeholders argued this based on practical efficiency, whilst others voiced concern about a risk of tokenization. While designing for visible groups risks excluding those on the margins and reproducing epistemic injustices, tokenization and even the risks of visibility are legitimate concerns, given existing socio-political inequities. This combination of concerns prompts a re-examination of the contextual practices which produce conflicting attitudes towards inclusivity in design. We propose epistemic justice as a tool for thinking through how, and whether, PHI tools and AI models are appropriate given the complexities making up the sites of their proposed application [7], and for scaffolding ethical deliberation regarding their downstream impacts.

5.4 From Epistemic Injustice to Epistemic Justice

We have examined how epistemic injustices can invisibly persist even in care- and domain-centered contexts. Patient categories such as "stable" and "chaotic" are underpinned by cascading epistemic inequities, complicated by compounding marginalizations. The "stable" category primarily consists of groups familiar with care provision services, frequently targeted by public health campaigns and research, and therefore better situated to consistently engage with care. These inequities in care access and management are acknowledged and indeed actively tackled by HIV care providers. However these considerations can be unintentionally sidelined in favour of designing "fair" or "responsible" technologies which are tacitly already assumed broadly suitable. Taking an epistemic justice-informed approach requires mapping the socio-political and historical inequities shaping these assumptions, identifying how these might be reproduced, and addressing these to enable more equitable knowledge construction in PHI and related applications of AI.

Challenging epistemic injustice requires active and situated consideration on the part of the party designing and judging the knowledge contribution - consideration of how social power and intersections of identity affect whether and how knowledge is received [3][19] [78]. There is a shared burden of responsibility between multiple actors in processes of designing and developing AI, particularly in high-stakes domains such as healthcare. Data and AI ethics work plays a crucial role in directing where and to what our ethical attention should be paid. When interviewing domain experts, we should investigate the implications which changing embodied care practices can have for the resultant data. Co-creation can help direct this, helping map sites of unequal knowledge valuation and inclusion, but should form part of a broader mapping of how power inequities shape how knowledge is valued and prioritized, and how datasets can invisibly reproduce systemic inequalities. Rather than looking at AI and data ethics in terms of recourse to challenge specific components of systems such as anonymization of data, the approach is to actively understand and be able to communicate the contexts of application, and in doing so challenge injustice.

Notions of epistemic (in)justice provide useful conceptual tools for understanding the specific nature and contexts of care provision, to aid in designing from the margins [28]. That is, rather than designing for stable or 'all' groups, we should rather start with the marginalised groups, actively charting the existence of epistemic injustice 'fault-lines' [1]. Any approach that aims to design for a clearly visible group such as stable patients requires careful consideration of the conditions that enable patients to exist in this group, or risks perpetuating existing injustices. Rather than isolated tools for management of wellbeing, PHI tools exist within a wider network consisting of patients, clinicians, researchers, and the broader healthcare system. This is of importance given stakeholder interest in designing AI models which explicitly draw upon data generated by users, where gaps in data mean poorer quality care for individuals in the missing groups. These considerations are even more crucial given that resource scarcity in the domain of public health can see datasets re-appropriated to fulfil needs such as policy development [5].

6 CONCLUSIONS

Designing digital tools to support management of long-term conditions is a laudable aim requiring ethical deliberation on the implications of epistemic injustice, such as amplification of inequities when patient data is reused to inform other sites of care provision. This study examined the complexities characterizing the framing of potential PHI tools, especially those aiming to employ AI to inform development of personalized medicines and care pathways. Herein we presented findings about stakeholder perspectives on the design of PHI tools, patient data and their use in HIV care. Care providers were motivated by the potential for PHI tools and patient data use to increase engagement with care, and support wellbeing, particularly in the case of patients aging with HIV and other long-term conditions. Contributing to ongoing discussions in the AI ethics community, we have illustrated how epistemic injustice can serve as a conceptual tool for mapping gaps in knowledge (re)production in the design of data-driven health technologies.

The concrete 'whats and whys' of patient data access and modelling appear abstracted from the day-to-day interactions of the end-user, but when oriented in broader interpersonal and structural contexts the boundaries become fuzzier. Furthermore, when patient data loops back to feed into design of care, patients are placed in a central but passive role in the development of new treatments and products, even if this is made invisible. As such, a critical understanding and engagement with the processes of knowledge production which guide health-care practices – both within the current socio-cultural environment and from potential mediation by data-driven technologies – is valuable to ethical and just development of technologies for people living with potentially stigmatizing long-term conditions.

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Evaluating the Impact of Social Determinants on Health Prediction in the Intensive Care Unit

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ABSTRACT

Social determinants of health (SDOH) – the conditions in which people live, grow, and age – play a crucial role in a person's health and well-being. There is a large, compelling body of evidence in population health studies showing that a wide range of SDOH is strongly correlated with health outcomes. Yet, a majority of the risk prediction models based on electronic health records (EHR) do not incorporate a comprehensive set of SDOH features as they are often noisy or simply unavailable. Our work links a publicly available EHR database, MIMIC-IV, to well-documented SDOH features. We investigate the impact of such features on common EHR prediction tasks across different patient populations. We find that community-level SDOH features do not improve model performance for a general patient population, but can improve data-limited model fairness for specific subpopulations. We also demonstrate that SDOH features are vital for conducting thorough audits of algorithmic biases beyond protective attributes. We hope the new integrated EHR-SDOH database will enable studies on the relationship between community health and individual outcomes and provide new benchmarks to study algorithmic biases beyond race, gender, and age.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Applied computing** → **Health informatics**; • **Social and professional topics** → **User characteristics**; • **Computing methodologies** → **Machine learning**; **Natural language processing**.

KEYWORDS

health disparities, social determinants of health, electronic health records, machine learning

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1 INTRODUCTION

The increasing adoption of electronic health records (EHRs) in modern healthcare systems has facilitated the development of machine learning (ML) models to predict the progression of diseases and patient outcomes. Many such models [47, 55, 77] incorporate clinical factors (e.g., labs, vitals, medication, procedures) and basic demographic features (e.g., age, gender, and race) to identify high-risk patients. However, a patient's clinical profile only offers a partial view of all the risk factors that affect their health. Understanding the conditions of their living environment may help to fill in the missing pieces and benefit patients' health and medical care. Human health is affected by many non-clinical factors, commonly known as social determinants of health (SDOH).

The Healthy People 2030 initiative [58], developed by the US Department of Health and Human Services, describes SDOH as "the conditions in the environments where people are born, live, learn, work, play, worship, and age that affect a wide range of health, functioning, and quality-of-life outcomes and risks." They grouped SDOH into five key domains: (1) economic stability [19, 116], (2) education access and quality [52, 73], (3) health care and quality [63], (4) neighborhood and built environment [74, 90], and (5) social and community context [25, 89].

Across all five domains, SDOH can have either a direct or indirect impact on one's health. At a high level, they can be viewed as individual-level determinants or community-level determinants [21]. The former determinants are specific to a person, and examples include education level, annual income, and family dynamics. Access to individual-level SDOH is limited due to the lack of standardized and validated SDOH screening questions [21] and privacy concerns [87]. In contrast, community-level SDOH measure broader socioeconomic, neighborhood, and environmental characteristics such as unemployment rate, access to public transportation, and air pollution levels. They serve as "community vital signs" [12] that

reflect complex societal factors and health disparities that influence one's health [2, 17].

Population health studies have identified many SDOH to be strongly correlated with acute and chronic conditions [6, 38, 41, 45, 102]. SDOH are also underlying, contributing factors of health disparities (e.g., poverty [32, 46, 128], unequal access to health care [25, 35], low educational attainment [8, 36, 52], and segregation [22, 107]). However, to date, there has been less focus in the ML community to include SDOH in common EHR prediction tasks because many SDOH measures are poorly collected, lack granularity, or are simply unavailable. An American Health Information Management Association (AHIMA) survey [96] finds that most healthcare organizations are collecting SDOH data, but they face challenges with a lack of standardization and integration of the SDOH data into EHR and patient distrust in sharing the data. Thus, while SDOH are being increasingly studied in population health [63, 108, 135] and primary care settings [71, 96], data limitations have left the association between SDOH and critical care outcomes largely unexplored.

In this work, we investigate the impact of incorporating SDOH features on common EHR prediction tasks in the intensive care unit (ICU). We first link MIMIC-IV [68], a publicly available EHR database, to external SDOH databases based on patient zip code. We then train models on the common tasks of mortality and readmission risk, evaluating the contribution of SDOH as compared to the EHR data alone. We find that adding SDOH does not improve model performance in the general patient population. We do note that, as compared to the EHR data alone, incorporating SDOH can lead to better-calibrated and fairer models in specific subgroups, with varying levels of contribution depending on the population and predictive task. Finally, we illustrate that fairness audits based on both protective attributes and SDOH features help to connect the commonly observed disparities to the underlying mechanisms that drive adverse health outcomes downstream.

Our work makes three main contributions.

- We release a publicly accessible database that combines EHR data with SDOH measures. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first public EHR database that contains structural features that span all five defined SDOH domains. The database will enable new studies on the relationship between community health and individual clinical outcomes.
- We investigate the impact of incorporating SDOH in predictive models across three tasks, three model classes, and six patient populations. We find that the inclusion of SDOH can improve performance for certain vulnerable subgroups.
- We demonstrate that SDOH features enable more fine-grain audits of algorithmic fairness, reporting the FPR parity – the difference in false positive rates (FPR) – across intersectional patient subgroups.

2 RELATED WORK

2.1 SDOH in Health Prediction

A number of studies in population health have attempted to assess the impact of social factors on health [2, 18, 84, 106]. There is a large, compelling body of evidence showing that a wide range of SDOH is strongly correlated with health outcomes, such as sepsis [6], heart failure [30], pneumonia [89], cardiovascular disease [45], and diabetes [129, 134]. A particular study found that 40% of deaths in the United States are caused by behavior patterns that could be modified by preventive interventions and suggested that only 10-15% of preventable mortality could be avoided by higher-quality medical care [85]. Other studies have also indicated that the effect of medical care may be more limited than commonly believed [63, 81, 82]. However, there are active controversies regarding the strength of the evidence that suggests a causal relationship between SDOH and well-being. These researchers are increasingly utilizing SDOH to predict individual health outcomes [115, 141].

While several studies have shown that machine learning models can predict individual patient outcomes, such as in-hospital mortality [47, 51, 77, 92, 134] and readmission [49, 77, 110], very few have incorporated SDOH into the models due to the lack of granular and high-quality SDOH data at the individual level.

Due to the limited availability of individual-level SDOH data, many studies are limited to community-level SDOH data [28]. Most found that community-level SDOH do not lead to improvement in model performance [15, 66, 126], partly due to the low data resolution. In contrast, researchers who are able to access individual-level SDOH generally report improvements in the model's predictive performance [28, 43, 91]. These studies often focus on a specific outcome for a specific patient group, such as HIV risk assessment [43, 95] and suicide attempts [130, 140]. There have also been studies of model improvements for readmission and mortality prediction in specific subgroups, such as the elderly and obese [138]. One has shown that integrating SDOH into predictive models can improve the fairness of the prediction in underserved heart failure subpopulations [80].

Despite a growing body of SDOH-focused research, the relationship between SDOH and critical care outcomes is unclear. While some have argued that the ICU is not an appropriate setting to collect and identify SDOH, there are several reasons why it could be essential. For example, critical conditions place high demands on the patient and their social network [88, 123]. Social isolation may increase the risk of adverse outcomes, such as mortality [123]. By incorporating SDOH into MIMIC-IV, our work investigates the contribution of community-level SDOH on common EHR prediction tasks in a multi-year cohort in the critical care setting.

2.2 SDOH in EHR

In order for SDOH features to be readily incorporated into risk prediction models, they need to be collected and documented with individual health outcomes. EHRs contain clinical information about patients, such as medical history, vital signs, laboratory data, immunizations, and medications [24]. In the United States, few SDOH features are currently documented in structured EHR data fields due to the lack of adoption of standardized and validated SDOH screening questions [21]. The set of SDOH features available for research use is typically limited to insurance type, preferred language, and smoking and alcohol use, but SDOH information can also be extracted from unstructured EHR data (i.e. clinical notes) [20, 43, 93]. SDOH may also be captured in billing codes [5], but they have not been widely utilized by providers [67].

The integration of SDOH in EHRs is further delayed due to concerns regarding privacy and misuse [87]. The United States Public Health Services Syphilis Study at Tuskegee (Tuskegee Study) among African Americans [131] and efforts to sterilize American Indians [37, 76] are examples of a dark history of structural inequities in healthcare and unethical medical experimentation against racial and ethnic minorities. As a result, mistrust of the healthcare system and medical research has been well documented among minority groups [16, 33, 42]. The collection and utilization of SDOH require the consent and trust of the patients. Patients who identify with populations that medical establishments and medical researchers historically mistreat might not want to share any personal or sensitive information.

Overall, current EHR-derived SDOH data do not constitute a comprehensive set of SDOH domains. In this study, we link a large, multi-year EHR dataset to public SDOH datasets covering *all five SDOH domains* to comprehensively study the relationship between the community-level SDOH and patient outcomes.

2.3 Fairness and Bias in Healthcare

While much work has been done in algorithmic fairness and bias in health, most of the studies that focused on group-based fairness have only examined bias from the lens of protected attributes, namely age, gender, and race [1, 11, 26, 27, 56, 59, 83, 97, 113, 114, 117, 136, 137]. Recent fairness literature has underscored the importance of measuring biases from multidimensional perspectives, focusing on social processes that produce the biases [53, 62, 112].

There is strong evidence that intersectional social identities are related to a patient's health outcomes [71, 114]. Capturing social context beyond protected attributes in the form of SDOH is thus vital for this cause. For example, in the primary care setting, researchers have observed a negative correlation between the odds of receiving appropriate prevention and screening and the number of social risk factors experienced by the patient [71]. The more factors a patient was living with, the less likely they were to receive care such as a mammogram screening or vaccinations. This is not something that can be detected through race or gender alone.

Moreover, a recent meta-analysis [127] ranked 47 studies using a self-developed SDOH scoring system based on the type and number of SDOH features used. The researchers found that Black patients had significantly higher prostate cancer–specific mortality (PCSM) than White patients when there was minimal accounting for SDOH. In contrast, studies with greater consideration for SDOH showed the opposite: Black patients had significantly lower PCSM compared to White patients. The findings of this meta-analysis should not be interpreted as suggesting that racial disparities do not exist. Rather, it suggests that there is a significant interaction between race and SDOH, and health equity researchers should incorporate SDOH features into data collection and analyses to better address the long-standing disparities in healthcare [131].

We hope the new integrated MIMIC-IV-SDOH dataset will enable more studies that follow the complex hierarchical system that defined advantaged or disadvantaged subjects in the first place. Our work serves as a first effort, and we demonstrate how SDOH features allow for more granular, actionable algorithmic audits.

3 EHR-SDOH DATABASE: MIMIC-IV-SDOH

The MIT Laboratory for Computational Physiology (LCP) developed and maintains the publicly available Medical Information Mart for Intensive Care (MIMIC), a database on patients admitted to the emergency department (ED) and intensive care units (ICU) at the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center (BIDMC) in Boston [69]. The database is used by researchers in over 30 countries for clinical research studies, exploratory analyses, and the development of decision-support tools [103]. The current version, MIMIC-IV, contains detailed, de-identified data associated with over 70,000 ICU stays from 2008 to 2019 and over 400,000 ED stays from 2011 and 2019. Yet, due to the lack of high-quality SDOH data, none of the studies or tools built based on MIMIC account for SDOH measures beyond basic demographics such as insurance, and language. To enable the study of the relationship between community characteristics and individual health outcomes, we create the MIMIC-IV-SDOH database by linking MIMIC-IV to three public SDOH databases (Table 1):

(1) County Health Rankings (CHR) [34]
(2) Social Vulnerability Index (SVI) [23]
(3) Social Determinants of Health Database (SDOHD) [4]

This database will be made available on PhysioNet [48].

3.1 Public SDOH Databases

While there exist other SDOH databases, such as Area Deprivation Index [72] and Atlas of Rural and Small-Town America [125], they are either domain-specific or not frequently updated. Because MIMIC-IV contains ICU stays from 2008 to 2019, we focus on databases with SDOH variables that span multiple years and all five SDOH domains, as defined by Healthy People 2030 [58].

3.1.1 County Health Rankings (CHR). CHR evaluates counties within each state in the United States based on modifiable health determinants and is updated annually. CHR estimates that clinical care only accounts for 20% of all contributors to long-term health outcomes, specifically the length and quality of life. The remaining 80% stems from health behaviors (30%), physical environment (10%), and social and economic factors (40%) [63].

3.1.2 Social Vulnerability Index (SVI). Based on data from the American Community Survey (ACS), SVI evaluates social factors across four themes: socioeconomic status, household composition and disability, minority status and language, and housing type and transportation. Although the index was designed to assess community preparedness and resilience in face of natural hazards, SVI has been used in many population health and health equity studies

Table 1: Characteristics of the final MIMIC-IV-SDOH tables where d is the number of SDOH features.

SDOH Database	Data Version/Year	Geographic Level	d
CHR	2010-2020	County	163
SVI	2008, 2014, 2016, 2018	County	160
SDOHD	2009-2020	County	1327

[10, 70, 78, 121, 135]. For example, communities with higher levels of social vulnerability experienced greater COVID-19 incidence and mortality [64, 70, 121]. Unlike CHR, SVI is available at both the county level and census tract level.

3.1.3 Social Determinants of Health Database (SDOHD). To incorporate more granular SDOH data into MIMIC-IV, the last database used in the integration is the Social Determinants of Health Database (SDOHD), which is available at the county, census tract, and zip code levels. The database was recently developed to provide a range of well-documented, readily linkable SDOH variables across domains without having to access multiple source files. SDOHD is curated based on the five key SDOH domains defined by Healthy People 2030: economic stability, education access and quality, health care and quality, neighborhood and built environment, and social and community context.

3.2 EHR-SDOH Integration

The creation of the integrated MIMIC-IV-SDOH database is carried out in three steps.

Step 1: SDOH Data Acquisition. For each SDOH database, we concatenate all datasets released between 2008 and 2020. We map each feature to one of the five SDOH domains and provide detailed documentation.

Step 2: Geographic Crosswalk. Although SVI and SDOHD are available at the census tract level, we only use county-level data to minimize the risk of patients being identified. Each patient's zip code is mapped to a county using the crosswalk files provided by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) [133]. The files contain a residential ratio column, the ratio of residential addresses in the zip-county area to the total number of residential addresses in the entire zip. Because the mapping is many-to-many, the residential ratio is treated as the probability that the patient with zip code z lives in the census tract t or county c, as suggested by the HUD [40]. Note that only patients with Massachusetts zip codes that are in the HUD crosswalk files are included in the final MIMIC-IV-SDOH dataset.

Step 3: Data Merging. MIMIC-IV is merged with each of the three SDOH databases using the geographic location and the SDOH data year closest to the year of admission.

3.3 Comparison of SDOH Features

The demographic features in MIMIC-IV, such as race and gender, are sometimes used as proxies for SDOH features, such as socioeconomic status and health behaviors [27, 111]. We find that many community-level SDOH features are weakly correlated with race in MIMIC-IV. For example, three SDOHD features, the percentage of households that receive food stamps, the percentage of workers taking public transportation, and the percentage of the population with educational attainment less than high school are all weakly and positively correlated with the Black race (Figure 1A).

Though to a lesser extent, subindices from SVI (e.g., socioeconomic) and CHR (e.g. health outcomes, quality of life, and social and economic factors) are also weakly associated with race. There are no strong correlations between SDOH features and other tabular features such as labs, risk scores, and Charlson comorbidities.

To better illustrate the type of features in each SDOH database, we manually map each feature to one of the five SDOH domains (Figure 1B). The CHR and SDOHD features are predominantly of the Healthcare Access and Quality domain. SVI emphasizes the Neighborhood and the Built Environment domain and the Social and Community Context domain more.



(A) Pearson correlation coefficients between basic demographic features and selected features in CHR (top), SVI (middle), and SDOHD (bottom).

(B) Distribution of features in each SDOH database by domain.

Figure 1: Comparison of features in the MIMIC-IV-SDOH databases. SDOHD is the most comprehensive and granular SDOH database of the three. Its features are more correlated with race than CHR and SVI indices. Each database emphasizes a set of SDOH domains more than others.

4 DATA AND METHODS

Our primary goal is to determine how incorporating SDOH in ML models could impact predictions of acute and longitudinal outcomes. Leveraging the newly created MIMIC-IV-SDOH database, we assess the impact from the perspective of classification performance and group fairness. We also provide a preliminary investigation of the possible mechanisms behind the contributions of SDOH to model performance or the lack thereof.

4.1 Data

In this study, we analyze five patient populations in the MIMIC-IV-SDOH database to assess the impact of SDOH across three tasks. MIMIC-IV data comes from a single EHR system in one geographic location, so the variation in the community-level SDOH features might be too low to be informative. Many past studies that used community-level SDOH features with EHR data from a single hospital or region ended with similar conclusions [28]. To examine the generalizability of our finding, we compare the MIMIC-IV cohort to a patient population in the All of Us Controlled Tier Dataset v6 [120] for the task of 30-day readmission. Unlike MIMIC-IV, which comes from a single hospital in Boston, the All of Us dataset contains patient-level data from more than 35 hospitals across the United States. Because of this difference, the variation in the SDOH data in All of Us is much greater than that in MIMIC-IV (Figure B1). In addition, based on the distribution of SDOH features, we note that the patients in MIMIC-IV are on average more affluent and more educated than the patients in All of Us.

4.1.1 MIMIC-IV-SDOH. Our analysis only includes adult ICU patients (i.e. over 18) from MIMIC-IV v2.2 with a hospital length of stay of at least 3 days. The cohort contains 42,665 patients and a total of 54,380 admissions.

Task Definition. We focus on three common classification tasks: (1) in-hospital mortality, (2) 30-day readmission, and (3) one-year mortality. Patients who have expired during a stay are excluded from predictions of 30-day readmission and one-year mortality. For 30-day readmission, we only consider non-elective readmissions.

Patient Population Definition. A recent study suggests that the impact of incorporating SDOH in predictive models varies by subpopulation – vulnerable populations like Black patients and the elderly are likely to benefit more from the inclusion of SDOH [13]. Moreover, several studies have suggested that SDOH are strongly associated with glycemic control [129], as well as diabetic risk, morbidity, and mortality [60]. Diabetic patients also use significantly more healthcare resources compared to patients with other chronic diseases [44]. In fact, they account for 31% of all ICU patients in MIMIC-IV.

Thus, in addition to the cohort of all ICU patients, we evaluate five subgroups:

(1) Diabetic patients
(2) Black diabetic patients
(3) Elderly diabetic patients over 75 years old
(4) Female diabetic patients
(5) Non-English speaking diabetic patients

On average, all five of these subgroups have more comorbidities compared to the general ICU patients (Table B1).

Data Pre-processing. To better understand the contribution of different types of features to model performance, we divide the entire dataset into a total of 15 feature sets (Table 2) and train separate models on each. These feature sets can be broadly classified into three categories: SDOH features alone, EHR features alone, and SDOH features combined with EHR features.

Table 2: Breakdown of feature sets by the type of EHR data contained

EHR Data Type	Feature Set
No EHR Data/SDOH Alone	`CHR`
	`SVI`
	`SDOHD`
Structured EHR Data (Tabular)	`Tabular`
	`Tabular+CHR`
	`Tabular+SVI`
	`Tabular+SDOHD`
Unstructured EHR Data (Clinical Notes)	`Notes`
	`Notes+CHR`
	`Notes+SVI`
	`Notes+SDOHD`
All EHR Data	`All`
	`All+CHR`
	`All+SVI`
	`All+SDOHD`

For the EHR features, we include two different data modalities: tabular data and discharge notes. To enable fair comparison across the three tasks, we use the same tabular features and sections of the discharge notes in all prediction tasks. Tabular features include basic demographics, Charlson comorbidities, labs from the first 24 hours of stay, and risk scores (APSIII, SAPS-II, SOFA, and OASIS). The following sections from discharge notes are included: chief complaint, present illness, medical history, medications on admission, allergies, major surgical or invasive procedure, physical exam on admission, pertinent results on admission, and family history.

Before separating patients into different patient populations, we use median imputation for numerical features before performing standard scaling and constant imputation for categorical features before one-hot encoding. Median imputation is used instead of mean imputation in consideration of skewed data. We also apply principal component analysis (PCA) to reduce the dimensionality of the SDOH data, which is particularly useful as many of the SDOH features are strongly correlated. We retain principal components that explain at least 0.99 of the variance in the data.

Discharge notes are stripped of explicit indicators of in-hospital mortality before being tokenized and lemmatized. Corpus-specific stop words are removed by filtering terms with a document frequency greater than 0.7. Terms with a document frequency less than 0.001 are also removed. Lastly, the notes are converted into a Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) representation with a vocabulary of size $|V| = 11,751$ words.

4.1.2 All of Us Cohort. Because the All of Us dataset is made up of primarily living participants, we focus on the prediction of 30-day readmission. We only include adult participants who had an in-patient hospital stay between 2014 and 2021. Unlike MIMIC-IV, the hospital stays in All of Us are not limited to the ICU, so these patients have fewer comorbidities on average (Table B1).

We exclude patients who stayed less than 3 days in the hospital and didn't have any lab results in the first 24 hours; these are the same labs used in MIMIC-IV. We have 13,324 patients and 21,555 admissions in the final All of Us cohort, representing all 50 US states but Kentucky. More than 50% of the patients come from the Northeast region.

The All of Us dataset only has 7 community-level SDOH features sourced from the 2017 ACS via a three-digit zip code linkage (subsection A.3). Tabular features in the All of Us dataset are the same as those in MIMIC-IV except for clinical risk scores, which are not available. We apply the same data pre-processing techniques on both datasets. Because the All of Us dataset has no clinical notes, we only train models on three feature sets: (`Tabular`, `SDOH`, and `Tabular+SDOH`).

4.2 Models Benchmarked

We train three types of machine learning models – logistic regression [101], random forest classifier [101], and XGBoost classifier [29] – for each task, patient population, and feature set combination. Each dataset is partitioned into 70:30 train-test splits. To prevent data leakage, no patient appears in both the training set and the test set. Each model is tuned through random hyperparameter search [14] under broad parameter distributions. See subsection A.1 for additional training details.

4.3 Evaluation

4.3.1 Classification Performance. We evaluate the models in terms of three primary metrics: 1) area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC), 2) area under the precision-recall curve (AUPRC), and 3) expected calibration error (ECE). While AUROC is a standard metric to assess accuracy, we include AUPRC to account for class imbalance and ECE to measure the reliability of the prediction. We also use recall as a secondary metric. While threshold selection is complex, cost-dependent, and application-specific, we use a classification threshold of 0.5 for demonstration purposes. 95% confidence intervals are constructed for all metrics by sampling the test set for 1000 bootstrap iterations [39].

4.3.2 Group Fairness. In addition to classification parity, we evaluate the FPR parity – based on the equality of opportunity definition of group fairness [54].

$$\hat{Y} \perp\!\!\!\perp G \mid Y = 0$$

In other words, the probability of the model predicting a negative outcome is independent of group attribute G, conditional on the outcome Y being a true negative.

We examine the differences in FPR across subgroups defined based on the following attributes: (1) race, (2) age, discretized into four bins, (3) gender, (4) median household income, (5) percentage of workers commuting via public transportation, (6) percentage of the population with educational attainment less than high school, (7) percentage of the population receiving food stamps, and (8) the percentage of non-citizens. The SDOH features are discretized into quartiles.

5 IMPACT OF SDOH ON CLINICAL PREDICTION TASKS

5.1 Impact of SDOH on the General Population

We first examine the impact of SDOH on the general ICU patient population in MIMIC-IV. We find that the inclusion of community-level SDOH in models does not help with predictive performance, measured by AUROC and AUPRC, but can lead to better-calibrated models with a lower FPR. We validate this finding on a more geographically diverse dataset: the All of Us dataset.

5.1.1 No Improvement in Model Accuracy. First, SDOH features alone, without any EHR data, are not predictive of individual patient outcomes. The mean test AUROC of the XGBoost models, the best models in terms of AUPRC, trained on SDOH alone is below 0.60 across all tasks, substantially lower than those trained on tabular EHR features and the TF-IDF representation of discharge notes (Figure 2). This is not particularly surprising as most studies that utilize community-level SDOH have arrived at similar conclusions [27]. One possible explanation is that community-level estimates are either imprecise or biased, especially if the within-community variance of a feature is high. Moreover, when a patient is critically ill, information on their upstream risk factors might not be as useful as their current state of health.

Similarly, combining SDOH with tabular EHR data and discharge notes does not improve the AUROC and AUPRC of the model. Again, this trend is observed in all model classes and SDOH databases. This suggests that the added SDOH features do not provide additional information beyond what is already captured in the EHR. However, SDOH features have some influence on other metrics as such ECE, FPR, and recall. For example, for the task of in-hospital mortality prediction, combining CHR features with all EHR features significantly reduces ECE from 0.11 to 0.03 and FPR from 0.09 to 0.04 (Table B2). Likewise, for the task of 30-day readmission, combining SVI features with all EHR features significantly reduces ECE from 0.39 to 0.35 and FPR from 0.35 to 0.27. However, these improvements are at the expense of a lower recall.

5.1.2 Generalizability of the Finding. Using the All of Us dataset, we validate that our finding generalizes to a more geographically diverse cohort. Unlike MIMIC-IV, which represents critically ill patient stays at a hospital in Boston, the All of Us cohort includes all in-patient stays across the United States, and many patients do not have any comorbidities (Table B1). The AUROC of the XGBoost classifiers for All of Us is lower than that in MIMIC due to the lack of detailed, hourly lab and vitals. The AUPRC is higher for All of Us because the 30-day readmission rate is 18% in the All of Us cohort and only 6% in the MIMIC-IV cohort.

Because the two cohorts are drastically different, a direct comparison of model performance is not meaningful, but we can examine the trend in the added value of SDOH. Consistent with our results in MIMIC-IV, we see no significant performance differences in models trained with tabular EHR data and tabular EHR data combined with SDOH data in the All of Us cohort (Table 3).



Figure 2: Comparison of the performance of XGBoost classifiers trained on 15 different feature sets to predict in-hospital mortality, 30-day readmission, and one-year mortality in the general ICU population. There are no detectable differences between AUROC and AUPRC of models that do not incorporate SDOH features and those that do. However, when combining SDOH features with all EHR data, we observe significant impacts on ECE, FPR, and recall. We highlight such occurrences with asterisks. The error bars denote the 95% confidence intervals obtained through 1000 bootstrap samples.

5.2 Varying Impact of SDOH on Vulnerable Patient Populations

In this section, we investigate whether including SDOH in predictive models can lead to better performance for specific patient populations. For each task, we compare the best model that incorporates SDOH data to the best baseline model trained on only EHR data.

5.2.1 Limited Improvement in Model Performance in Vulnerable Patient Populations. Similar to the general ICU patients, we find that incorporating SDOH has some impact on model performance in the more vulnerable patient populations. Although predictive performance metrics such as AUROC and AUPRC are largely unaffected, we observe significant improvements in ECE, FPR, or recall in selected models trained on SDOH data. In Table 4, we report the aggregated number of occurrences in which incorporating SDOH features significantly improves or worsens model performance across three prediction tasks. See Table B2 for more granular results.

We find that the added value of SDOH features varies by patient population, prediction task, and the EHR features they are combined with. Even for the same patient population and task, SDOH features are not equally informative or useful. For example, for models trained on all diabetic patients, the only observed performance boost is in recall when CHR features are combined with tabular features. However, the improvement in the recall is at the expense of higher ECE and FPR. In contrast, for models trained on female diabetic patients, incorporating CHR improves model performance in at least one of the three metrics when combined with discharge notes or all EHR data but not tabular EHR data alone.

Table 3: Comparison of model performance for XGBoost classifiers trained with and without `SDOH` for the task of 30-day readmission in MIMIC-IV and the All of Us dataset. In both datasets, the addition of SDOH has no effect on model performance.

Feature Set	MIMIC-IV					All of Us				
	AUROC	AUPRC	ECE	FPR	Recall	AUROC	AUPRC	ECE	FPR	Recall
SDOH	0.57	0.08	0.42	0.42	0.54	0.53	0.21	0.30	0.48	0.50
Tabular	0.67	0.11	0.40	0.38	0.63	0.60	0.26	0.27	0.35	0.47
Tabular+SDOH	0.67	0.11	0.40	0.37	0.62	0.60	0.26	0.27	0.34	0.46

Table 4: Combinations of EHR and SDOH features that influence performance of the best models for each patient population in terms of AUPRC. We report the number of occurrences in which incorporating SDOH features significantly improves or worsens performance in the form of (`# improves/# worsens`) across the three prediction tasks (total number of occurrences is 3). Significance is evaluated using a 1000-sample bootstrap hypothesis test at the 5% significance level. Values in green denote performance boosts while values in red denote decline in performance.

Patient Population	Metric	Tabular			Notes			All		
		CHR	SVI	SDOHD	CHR	SVI	SDOHD	CHR	SVI	SDOHD
All Diabetic	ECE	0/1	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/1	0/0	0/0	0/0
	FPR	0/1	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
	Recall	1/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
Black Diabetic	ECE	1/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	1/0	0/1	0/0	0/1	0/1
	FPR	1/0	0/1	0/0	0/0	1/0	0/1	0/0	0/1	1/0
	Recall	0/1	1/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	1/0	0/0
Elderly Diabetic	ECE	0/0	2/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	1/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
	FPR	0/0	1/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/1	0/0	0/0	0/0
	Recall	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	1/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
Female Diabetic	ECE	0/0	0/0	0/0	1/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
	FPR	0/0	0/0	0/0	1/0	0/0	0/0	1/0	0/0	0/0
	Recall	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/1	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
Non-English Speaking Diabetic	ECE	0/0	1/0	1/0	0/1	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	1/0
	FPR	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/1	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
	Recall	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0

This varying effect of the inclusion of SDOH by patient population precisely captures why SDOH should be collected and incorporated in analyses. Although individuals in a neighborhood are exposed to the same community-level SDOH, they have varying social needs [3]. Incorporating SDOH into predictive models may be helpful to identify patients with specific needs and reduce health disparities associated with poor social conditions [2, 7, 27].

6 SDOH AS FAIRNESS AUDIT CATEGORIES

A 2014 report by the National Academies of Medicine (NAM) argued that the integration of SDOH into the EHR would better enable healthcare providers to address health disparities [31]. Extending on a previous study on the integration of SDOH features and model fairness in patients with heart failure [80], we conduct a thorough audit of FPR parity in all ICU patients using SDOH features in addition to protected attributes such as race, age, and gender. To enable evaluation based on SDOH features, they are binned into quartiles, and the bin edges are documented in subsection A.2.

In Figure 3, we report the FPR of classifiers with the highest AUPRC for 30-day readmission prediction. We focus on the models trained on all EHR data (`All`) and all EHR data combined with the most helpful SDOH features (`All+SVI`) across different subgroups. See Figure B2 for the other two prediction tasks.

6.1 SDOH Features Enable More Granular Audits

In this setting, a high FPR indicates that the model is overdiagnosing or falsely claiming that the patient is high-risk, which has both medical and economic costs [61]. A high FPR disparity means that members of a protected subgroup would not be given the correct diagnosis or appropriate intervention at the same rate as the other patients.

An audit of the FPR based on protective attributes confirms findings from prior work that algorithms exhibit biases against underserved patient populations [114, 136, 137]. We find that patients who are older, Black, or female have higher FPRs. (Figure 3). These differences are among the most commonly reported findings in health disparities research; often, these studies stop there without connecting the observed disparities to mechanisms of systemic biases that drive downstream adverse health outcomes [79]. This is partially due to the lack of additional information on the patients beyond basic demographics.

The fairness audit based on SDOH features provided additional insight and raised more questions. We find that the FPR is elevated for patients residing in communities where the median household income is low, a larger proportion of individuals commute to work using public transit, and a larger proportion of individuals did not complete high school (Figure 3).

We hypothesize that the FPR disparity is a result of bias propagation, which has been suggested by previous studies [1, 114]. While future work is needed to validate the hypothesis, one interpretation of the FPR disparity between patients in quartiles defined based on the percent of workers commuting via public transit is that patients in the fourth quartile likely do not own a car and hence have higher transportation barriers and limited access to healthcare [32, 35, 46, 94, 118, 122]. Additionally, a lower household income and lower educational attainment could represent socioeconomic and linguistic disparities in access to care [25, 35, 50, 122].



Figure 3: Comparison of the FPR of XGBoost classifiers trained on all EHR data (A11) and all EHR data combined with SVI features for 30-day readmission prediction in all MIMIC-IV ICU patients. FPR is reported for subgroups defined by race, gender, age, and five SDOH features, which are binned into quartiles. The bin edges are documented in subsection A.2. The error bars denote the 95% confidence intervals obtained through 1000 bootstrap samples.

7 DISCUSSION

7.1 The Need for Better Data

Overall, our analysis validates previous findings that community-level SDOH features do not improve the accuracy of clinical prediction tasks [28] in both a multi-year cohort and a geographically diverse cohort. We expect individual-level SDOH to be better predictors of outcomes, as prior studies that incorporated them all reported significantly improved performance [6, 95, 119]. However, this data are not readily available. For example, although individual-level SDOH can be extracted from participant surveys in the All of Us dataset, less than 15% of the participants have completed the SDOH survey. Moreover, the survey responses were collected only once for each participant, so these survey-based SDOH features may not accurately reflect the lived experience of the respondents beyond the period the survey was conducted. In light of our findings, we call for further efforts to standardize the routine collection of SDOH data and integration into EHR.

The healthcare system plays a vital role in collecting, using, and sharing actionable SDOH data [96]. To facilitate this effort, providers and operations staff across care settings should focus on actions that enhance the standardization and integration of SDOH data. Organizations such as the Office of National Coordinator for Health IT (ONC), the Joint Commission, and Health Level Seven International (HL7) are all leading efforts to further SDOH interoperability and standards [99, 109]. It should also be a focus to provide sufficient training and education for the staff who are collecting and encoding the data from the patients while adhering to cultural competency, privacy, and confidentiality standards [87].

As the research community awaits access to the more granular EHR-SDOH data, we hope the MIMIC-IV-SDOH database will serve as a starting point for studies on the relationship between community risk factors and patient outcomes and those looking to understand the needs of vulnerable subpopulations.

7.2 On More Actionable Audits

Despite spending a higher percentage of our GDP on medical care expenditures than other developed countries, health outcomes in the United States are among the worst for developed countries [98]. Numerous studies have confirmed the potential of AI in improving health outcomes, but very few tools that were developed have actually helped [9, 132]. A promising direction forward is to look beyond the clinical walls and understand the conditions that affect the health of the people upstream [86].

The growing evidence around the association between SDOH and health outcomes calls for targeted action, but there is a lack of consensus on what interventions would work [86]. Progress in evidence-informed policymaking requires a commitment to enhancing our current understanding of how SDOH affect different populations and ways to measure the effectiveness of interventions targeting specific SDOH domains. Thus, community-level SDOH features are essential for evaluating and monitoring health disparities [108].

By evaluating fairness using intersectional social identities, we could better account for the socially constructed nature of protected attributes such as race and gender. Capturing SDOH provides information on the social processes that created health disparities in the first place [25, 52, 79]. Audits of biases from the lens of SDOH are also more actionable because these features are not social constructs but modifiable factors that can be addressed [108]. Consider transportation, which is one of the SDOH features we used in the fairness audit. Surveys and audits have identified transportation barriers as one of the leading causes of missed or delayed medical appointments, especially in the elderly and those in rural areas [57, 118, 122]. Health insurance and healthcare delivery organizations are addressing the issue through partnerships with popular ride-share companies to provide non-emergency medical transportation (NEMT) services [104, 124]. These programs have decreased costs [105] and the frequency of urgent care visits [100].

The development of this intervention would not be possible without an understanding of the underlying SDOH and the population affected.

7.3 Future Work on SDOH and Health Predictions

While our work shows that the inclusion of SDOH has minimal impact on three common EHR prediction tasks, they could be more helpful in other tasks and patient groups. Specifically, we did not include any phenotype prediction tasks. Given the associations between SDOH and chronic diseases [6, 30], it is possible that SDOH features are good risk predictors for specific comorbidities. In addition, SDOH could be important to account for in the estimation of treatment effects, which several studies have done using the MIMIC database but without SDOH data [65, 75, 139]. Likewise, although our study utilized three different model classes, they are all relatively simple. Neural networks could potentially uncover more underlying relationships between SDOH and health outcomes [140].

Regardless of the predictive value of SDOH, it is a good idea to account for them in analyses for more granular benchmarking and evaluation of fairness. For example, MIMIC-IV-SDOH can be mapped to MIMIC-CXR, a large database of chest radiographs with radiology reports. There have been many works that focus on group fairness in the field of medical imaging [113, 114, 136], which the inclusion of SDOH could contribute to.

8 CONCLUSION

This work advances our understanding of the impact of SDOH on health prediction. First, we develop a new EHR-SDOH dataset by linking a popular EHR database, MIMIC-IV, to public community-level SDOH databases. This dataset can be used to uncover underlying trends between community health and individual health outcomes and provide more benchmarks for evaluating bias and fairness. Second, we demonstrate that incorporating SDOH features in certain vulnerable subgroups can improve model performance. The value of adding SDOH features, however, is dependent on the characteristics of the cohort and the prediction task. Third, we highlight that algorithmic audits conducted through the lens of SDOH are more comprehensive and actionable. However, the lack of access to high-resolution, individual SDOH data is a limitation of the study. To address this, future work should focus on collecting individual-level SDOH features and accounting for them in analyses to address patient needs better and promote health equity.

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A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON MODEL TRAINING AND DATA PRE-PROCESSING

A.1 Model Training

Due to the class imbalance in all the prediction tasks, we use AUROC for model selection during hyperparameter tuning. The distributions of parameters sampled during the randomized search for logistic regression (`lr`), random forest (`rf`), and XGBoost (`xgb`) classifiers are as followed:

```
lr_param_grid = {
  "C" : [1e-5, 1e-4, 1e-3, 1e-2, 0.1, 1, 5],
  "solver" : ["liblinear"],
}

rf_param_grid = {
  "n_estimators": [50,100,200,500],
  "max_depth": scipy.stats.randint(2, 10),
  "min_samples_split": scipy.stats.randint(2, 10),
  "min_samples_leaf": scipy.stats.randint(1, 10),
}

xgb_param_grid = {
  "n_estimators": [50,100,200,500],
  "max_depth": scipy.stats.randint(2, 10),
  "learning_rate": (0.01,0.05,0.1,0.2,0.3),
  "min_child_weight": scipy.stats.randint(2, 10),
  "colsample_bytree": [0.5,1],
  "subsample" : [0.3,0.6,0.9],
  "reg_alpha" : scipy.stats.randint(0, 10),
  "reg_lambda": scipy.stats.randint(0, 10),
}
```

A.2 Binning SDOHD Features

The quartile bin edges for SDOH features used in the fairness audit are as followed:

(1) Percentage of non-citizens:
0, 0.32, 1.09, 2.54, 30.58
(2) Median household income in dollars:
10446, 60698.5, 74902, 92381, 250001
(3) Percentage with less than high school education:
0, 4.04, 6.79, 11.64, 67.49
(4) Percentage of households receiving food stamps:
0, 4.15, 6.85, 12.1, 78.43
(5) Percentage of workers taking public transit:
0, 4.74, 10.5, 20.44, 77.61

A.3 SDOH Features in the All of Us Dataset

The community-SDOH features used include the following:

(1) Percentage of households receiving food stamps
(2) Percentage of the population with at least a high school diploma
(3) Median household income
(4) Percentage of the population with no health insurance
(5) Percentage of the population in poverty
(6) Percentage of houses that are vacant
(7) Deprivation index

B ADDITIONAL FIGURES AND TABLES



Figure B1: Comparison of selected SDOH features between the MIMIC-IV and the All of Us patient cohorts. Because the All of Us dataset is more geographically diverse, the variation in its SDOH data is much greater than that in MIMIC-IV.



(A) All ICU Patients: In-hospital Mortality



(B) All ICU Patients: 30-Day Readmission



(C) All ICU Patients: One-Year Mortality

Figure B2: Comparison of the FPR of XGBoost classifiers trained on all EHR data (`All`) and all EHR data combined with best SDOH features for the three tasks in all MIMIC-IV ICU patients. FPR is reported for subgroups defined by race, gender, age, and five SDOH features, which are binned into quartiles. The bin edges are documented in subsection A.2. The error bars denote the 95% confidence intervals obtained through 1000 bootstrap samples.

Table B1: Charactertics of the MIMIC-IV and All of Us cohorts. The MIMIC-IV cohort has six patient populations: all ICU patients, diabetic patients, black diabetic patients, elderly diabetic patients, female diabetic patients, and non-English speaking diabetic patients. The All of Us cohort contains all in-patient hospital stays. *N* is the number of patients in each group.

Attribute	Subgroup	MIMIC-IV						All of Us
		All ICU (N=42,665)	All Diab. (N=12,651)	Black Diab. (N=1,710)	Elderly Diab. (N=4,520)	Female Diab. (N=5,251)	Non-English Speaking Diab. (N=1,675)	All Inpatient (N=13,324)
Age	17-55	10,136 (23%)	1,806 (14%)	337 (19%)	0 (0%)	681 (12%)	158 (9%)	6,481 (48%)
	55-65	8,773 (20%)	2,759 (21%)	407 (23%)	0 (0%)	1,008 (19%)	332 (19%)	3,134 (23%)
	65-75	10,013 (23%)	3,706 (29%)	473 (27%)	0 (0%)	1,457 (27%)	415 (24%)	2,430 (18%)
	75+	13,742 (32%)	4,380 (34%)	493 (28%)	4,520 (100%)	2,105 (40%)	770 (45%)	1,279 (9%)
Gender	Female	18,677 (43%)	5,251 (41%)	927 (54%)	2,169 (47%)	5,251 (100%)	801 (47%)	8,226 (61%)
	Male	23,988 (56%)	7,400 (58%)	783 (45%)	2,351 (52%)	0 (0%)	874 (52%)	4,800 (36%)
	Other	–	–	–	–	–	–	298 (2%)
Race	White	29,148 (68%)	8,033 (63%)	0 (0%)	3,033 (67%)	3,150 (59%)	455 (27%)	6,168 (46%)
	Black	3,880 (9%)	1,700 (13%)	1,710 (100%)	523 (11%)	920 (17%)	192 (11%)	3,589 (26%)
	Other	9,637 (22%)	2,918 (23%)	0 (0%)	964 (21%)	1,181 (22%)	1,028 (61%)	3,567 (26%)
Insurance Type	Medicaid	2,976 (6%)	763 (6%)	153 (8%)	68 (1%)	370 (7%)	249 (14%)	7,109 (53%)
	Medicare	18,844 (44%)	6,453 (51%)	781 (45%)	3,169 (70%)	2,828 (53%)	721 (43%)	3,270 (24%)
	Other	20,845 (48%)	5,435 (42%)	776 (45%)	1,283 (28%)	2,053 (39%)	705 (42%)	2,945 (22%)
Language	English	38,291 (89%)	11,018 (87%)	1,523 (89%)	3,744 (82%)	4,463 (84%)	0 (0%)	–
	Other	4,374 (10%)	1,633 (12%)	187 (10%)	776 (17%)	788 (15%)	1,675 (100%)	–
Charlson Comorbidity Index	0	2,856 (6%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	5,977 (44%)
	1	3,208 (7%)	301 (2%)	63 (3%)	0 (0%)	110 (2%)	27 (1%)	1,315 (9%)
	2	4,232 (9%)	626 (4%)	106 (6%)	0 (0%)	254 (4%)	56 (3%)	1,240 (9%)
	3	5,151 (12%)	1,039 (8%)	131 (7%)	0 (0%)	397 (7%)	109 (6%)	1,174 (8%)
	4	5,576 (13%)	1,434 (11%)	176 (10%)	173 (3%)	561 (10%)	174 (10%)	855 (6%)
	5	5,329 (12%)	1,793 (14%)	212 (12%)	511 (11%)	777 (14%)	245 (14%)	651 (4%)
	6	4,558 (10%)	1,713 (13%)	215 (12%)	653 (14%)	720 (13%)	230 (13%)	554 (4%)
	7+	11,755 (27%)	5,745 (45%)	807 (47%)	3,183 (70%)	2,432 (46%)	834 (49%)	1,558 (11%)

Table B2: Comparison of the performance of models trained with and without SDOH feature to predict in-hospital mortality, 30-day readmission, and one-year mortality for the six patient populations. The evaluation is done only on the best model in terms of AUPRC for each feature set category and task. In general, incorporating SDOH features has a limited impact on model performance. Values in bold indicate significantly better performance compared to the baseline model trained without SDOH, evaluated using a 1000-sample bootstrap hypothesis test at the 5% significance level.

Patient Group	Feature Set	In-hospital Mortality					30-Day Readmission					One-Year Mortality				
		AUROC (↑)	AUPRC (↑)	ECE (↓)	FPR (↓)	Recall (↑)	AUROC (↑)	AUPRC (↑)	ECE (↓)	FPR (↓)	Recall (↑)	AUROC (↑)	AUPRC (↑)	ECE (↓)	FPR (↓)	Recall (↑)
All ICU	Tabular	0.86[3]	0.4[3]	0.13[3]	0.1[3]	0.58[3]	0.66[3]	0.12[3]	0.4[3]	0.37[3]	0.58[3]	0.83[3]	0.56[3]	0.15[3]	0.21[3]	0.71[3]
	Tabular+SDOH	0.86[2]	0.4[2]	0.13[2]	0.1[2]	0.56[2]	0.67[3]	0.12[3]	0.39[3]	0.36[3]	0.62[3]	0.83[2]	0.56[2]	0.14[2]	0.2[2]	0.69[2]
	Notes	0.84[3]	0.38[3]	0.18[3]	0.1[3]	0.52[3]	0.69[3]	0.14[3]	0.39[3]	0.32[3]	0.6[3]	0.83[3]	0.57[3]	0.17[3]	0.2[3]	0.68[3]
	Notes+SDOH	0.84[3]	0.37[3]	0.18[3]	0.1[3]	0.51[3]	0.69[3]	0.14[3]	0.39[3]	0.32[3]	0.6[3]	0.83[2]	0.57[2]	0.17[2]	0.2[2]	0.68[2]
	All	0.9[3]	0.49[3]	0.11[3]	0.09[3]	0.61[3]	0.7[3]	0.15[3]	0.39[3]	0.35[3]	0.65[3]	0.85[3]	0.61[3]	0.14[3]	0.2[3]	0.74[3]
	All+SDOH	0.89[1]	0.49[1]	**0.03**[1]	**0.04**[1]	0.47[1]	0.71[2]	0.15[2]	**0.35**[2]	**0.27**[2]	0.57[2]	0.86[2]	0.62[2]	0.14[2]	0.2[2]	0.74[2]
All Diabetic	Tabular	0.86[3]	0.4[3]	0.09[3]	0.07[3]	0.45[3]	0.65[3]	0.15[3]	0.38[3]	0.37[3]	0.55[3]	0.78[3]	0.52[3]	0.13[3]	0.23[3]	0.62[3]
	Tabular+SDOH	0.85[2]	0.39[2]	0.08[2]	0.06[2]	0.42[2]	0.64[2]	0.14[2]	0.38[2]	0.36[2]	0.58[2]	0.78[1]	0.52[1]	0.19[1]	0.32[1]	**0.74**[1]
	Notes	0.82[3]	0.33[3]	0.21[3]	0.18[3]	0.65[3]	0.67[3]	0.17[3]	0.37[3]	0.3[3]	0.55[3]	0.78[3]	0.51[3]	0.14[3]	0.19[3]	0.58[3]
	Notes+SDOH	0.81[1]	0.32[1]	0.21[1]	0.18[1]	0.63[1]	0.66[3]	0.17[3]	0.39[3]	0.3[3]	0.55[3]	0.78[1]	0.52[1]	0.13[1]	0.18[1]	0.56[1]
	All	0.89[3]	0.47[3]	0.07[3]	0.05[3]	0.48[3]	0.68[3]	0.18[3]	0.37[3]	0.3[3]	0.54[3]	0.81[3]	0.57[3]	0.11[3]	0.2[3]	0.65[3]
	All+SDOH	0.89[2]	0.47[2]	0.07[2]	0.05[2]	0.47[2]	0.67[2]	0.18[2]	0.37[2]	0.31[2]	0.52[2]	0.81[2]	0.57[2]	0.11[2]	0.19[2]	0.64[2]
Black Diabetic	Tabular	0.83[3]	0.36[3]	0.27[3]	0.22[3]	0.68[3]	0.59[3]	0.14[3]	0.37[3]	0.19[3]	0.31[3]	0.74[3]	0.49[3]	0.18[3]	0.27[3]	0.59[3]
	Tabular+SDOH	0.83[2]	0.35[2]	0.26[2]	0.2[2]	0.67[2]	0.59[2]	0.16[2]	0.35[2]	0.38[2]	**0.56**[2]	0.72[1]	0.46[1]	**0.08**[1]	**0.17**[1]	0.41[1]
	Notes	0.76[3]	0.15[3]	0.16[3]	0.06[3]	0.19[3]	0.6[3]	0.17[3]	0.3[3]	0.01[3]	0.02[3]	0.75[3]	0.53[3]	0.21[3]	0.09[3]	0.35[3]
	Notes+SDOH	0.76[2]	0.19[2]	**0.05**[2]	**0.01**[2]	0.07[2]	0.57[3]	0.15[3]	0.26[3]	0.17[3]	**0.2**[3]	0.74[1]	0.52[1]	0.21[1]	0.08[1]	0.32[1]
	All	0.83[3]	0.34[3]	0.27[3]	0.21[3]	0.68[3]	0.58[3]	0.15[3]	0.26[3]	0.17[3]	0.24[3]	0.79[3]	0.59[3]	0.21[3]	0.13[3]	0.52[3]
	All+SDOH	0.82[2]	0.33[2]	0.26[2]	0.21[2]	0.66[2]	0.6[3]	0.18[3]	0.37[3]	**0.06**[3]	0.14[3]	0.78[2]	0.58[2]	0.27[2]	0.26[2]	**0.66**[2]
Elderly Diabetic	Tabular	0.79[3]	0.38[3]	0.16[3]	0.06[3]	0.35[3]	0.63[3]	0.14[3]	0.37[3]	0.36[3]	0.58[3]	0.73[3]	0.55[3]	0.14[3]	0.31[3]	0.64[3]
	Tabular+SDOH	0.8[2]	0.37[2]	**0.08**[2]	0.06[2]	0.36[2]	0.63[1]	0.16[1]	0.37[1]	0.35[1]	0.53[1]	0.73[2]	0.54[2]	**0.08**[2]	**0.25**[2]	0.55[2]
	Notes	0.76[3]	0.29[3]	0.09[3]	0.03[3]	0.17[3]	0.57[3]	0.1[3]	0.37[3]	0.03[3]	0.05[3]	0.72[3]	0.54[3]	0.09[3]	0.23[3]	0.51[3]
	Notes+SDOH	0.76[3]	0.29[3]	0.09[3]	0.03[3]	0.18[3]	0.55[3]	0.1[3]	**0.33**[3]	0.2[3]	**0.24**[3]	0.72[2]	0.55[2]	0.09[2]	0.23[2]	0.53[2]
	All	0.84[3]	0.43[3]	0.05[3]	0.04[3]	0.31[3]	0.61[3]	0.12[3]	0.25[3]	0.18[3]	0.33[3]	0.76[3]	0.59[3]	0.07[3]	0.22[3]	0.56[3]
	All+SDOH	0.84[1]	0.43[1]	0.05[1]	0.04[1]	0.31[1]	0.6[1]	0.12[1]	0.25[1]	0.2[1]	0.36[1]	0.76[2]	0.59[2]	0.07[2]	0.21[2]	0.58[2]
Female Diabetic	Tabular	0.84[3]	0.4[3]	0.26[3]	0.22[3]	0.73[3]	0.61[3]	0.13[3]	0.37[3]	0.36[3]	0.55[3]	0.75[3]	0.44[3]	0.2[3]	0.32[3]	0.7[3]
	Tabular+SDOH	0.83[2]	0.38[2]	0.26[2]	0.22[2]	0.71[2]	0.57[1]	0.12[1]	0.35[1]	0.34[1]	0.47[1]	0.75[3]	0.45[3]	0.22[3]	0.35[3]	0.71[3]
	Notes	0.76[3]	0.28[3]	0.07[3]	0.02[3]	0.12[3]	0.62[3]	0.15[3]	0.4[3]	0.15[3]	0.27[3]	0.75[3]	0.44[3]	0.21[3]	0.3[3]	0.68[3]
	Notes+SDOH	0.76[2]	0.27[2]	0.07[2]	0.01[2]	0.11[2]	0.61[1]	0.15[1]	0.39[1]	0.13[1]	0.23[1]	0.74[1]	0.44[1]	**0.12**[1]	**0.15**[1]	0.41[1]
	All	0.86[3]	0.44[3]	0.04[3]	0.03[3]	0.38[3]	0.62[3]	0.16[3]	0.39[3]	0.16[3]	0.26[3]	0.77[3]	0.49[3]	0.11[3]	0.18[3]	0.53[3]
	All+SDOH	0.86[2]	0.44[2]	0.04[2]	0.03[2]	0.37[2]	0.62[1]	0.14[1]	0.38[1]	**0.08**[1]	0.17[1]	0.77[3]	0.49[3]	0.1[3]	0.17[3]	0.52[3]
Non-English Speaking Diabetic	Tabular	0.8[3]	0.34[3]	0.27[3]	0.24[3]	0.68[3]	0.61[3]	0.12[3]	0.36[3]	0.27[3]	0.46[3]	0.8[3]	0.55[3]	0.13[3]	0.13[3]	0.51[3]
	Tabular+SDOH	0.79[2]	0.35[2]	0.26[2]	0.23[2]	0.71[2]	0.58[3]	0.13[3]	**0.3**[3]	0.31[3]	0.48[3]	0.79[2]	0.54[2]	**0.07**[2]	0.14[2]	0.51[2]
	Notes	0.74[3]	0.27[3]	0.05[3]	0.02[3]	0.08[3]	0.63[3]	0.11[3]	0.29[3]	0.18[3]	0.27[3]	0.71[3]	0.48[3]	0.13[3]	0.18[3]	0.46[3]
	Notes+SDOH	0.75[1]	0.26[1]	0.05[1]	0.01[1]	0.06[1]	0.56[1]	0.09[1]	0.37[1]	0.32[1]	0.38[1]	0.72[2]	0.51[2]	0.13[2]	0.18[2]	0.49[2]
	All	0.82[3]	0.38[3]	0.09[3]	0.11[3]	0.44[3]	0.61[3]	0.12[3]	0.36[3]	0.27[3]	0.46[3]	0.77[3]	0.57[3]	0.12[3]	0.17[3]	0.55[3]
	All+SDOH	0.81[2]	0.39[2]	0.1[2]	0.11[2]	0.41[2]	0.58[3]	0.13[3]	**0.3**[3]	0.31[3]	0.48[3]	0.77[2]	0.56[2]	0.12[2]	0.18[2]	0.56[2]

[1] Trained on CHR, [2] Trained on SVI, [3] Trained on SDOHD

Ground Truth Or Dare: Factors Affecting The Creation Of Medical Datasets For Training AI

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

Figure 1: A simplified medical dataset creation process expanded with the design of ground truth schema and factors conditioning the pre-annotation stages.

ABSTRACT

One of the core goals of responsible AI development is ensuring high-quality training datasets. Many researchers have pointed to the importance of the annotation step in the creation of high-quality data, but less attention has been paid to the work that enables data annotation. We define this work as the design of ground truth schema and explore the challenges involved in the creation of datasets in the medical domain even before any annotations are made. Based on extensive work in three health-tech organisations, we describe five external and internal factors that condition medical dataset creation processes. Three external factors include regulatory constraints, the context of creation and use, and commercial and operational pressures. These factors condition medical data collection and shape the ground truth schema design. Two internal factors include epistemic differences and limits of labelling. These directly shape the design of the ground truth schema. Discussions of what constitutes high-quality data need to pay attention to the factors that shape and constrain what is possible to be created, to ensure responsible AI design.

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CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies** → **Artificial intelligence**; **Machine learning**.

KEYWORDS

Medical Datasets, Data Creation, Responsible Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning

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1 INTRODUCTION

Advances in applications of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the medical domain promise to improve efficiency, promote accuracy and bring cost savings across many areas of medical subspecialty, yet there are also many concerns about ethics and responsibility in the deployment of these technologies [16]. The idea of responsible AI has been extensively discussed in the literature and received much attention from both commercial entities and regulatory bodies [15, 47]. There is considerable agreement that high-quality training data is key to the development of responsible AI systems [28]. Yet research shows that the creation of high-quality data also tends to be an undervalued step in the development of machine learning systems [57, 58].

The process of dataset creation is typically broken down into three steps - data collection, data pre-processing and cleaning, and finally, data annotation[1, 50]. This is especially so in the medical domain where high-quality training data is obtained through a

range of annotation practices such as data quality enhancement [10], generating labels using Natural Language Processing models [23], deriving image labels from medical documentation [34], and following labelling guidelines and principles focusing on fairness and inclusion [36, 59]. This paper investigates the factors that affect the creation of high-quality medical datasets demonstrating that the preparatory work involved in the design of ground truth schema used in data annotation is an important preceding step that tends to be overlooked in the literature. Following the work of Mueller and colleagues [49], we define the ground truth schema as a collection of relational labels and metrics, as well as their definitions and examples that are used during data labelling.

Recent research on the creation of training datasets [21] has discussed annotation activities as a matter of power relations in projects crowdsourced in the Global South [41, 42, 45], the social design of labelled data by domain experts [49], and annotation process recommendations [19]. While understanding data annotation is important, data design work begins before the first data points are labelled. Data is always designed and constructed through situated and emergent processes [18, 49] as domain experts, data scientists, other stakeholders, and diverse political interests imprint their values on the data. However, little is known about the preparatory work necessary to produce high-quality data [31]. Accounts of decisions that shaped the datasets are rarely documented and get dismissed as soon as the data creation work concludes [58], thus become impossible to inspect in the future [49, 51, 61].

In this article, we consider **what factors affect the design of medical datasets prior to data annotation.** We ground our findings in ethnographic research conducted across three organisations developing medical AI for (I) screening chest x-rays, (II) supporting the diagnosis of lung and pancreatic diseases (III) automating patients-to-clinical trials matchmaking. We explore the decisions made by medical professionals, data scientists, designers, and other relevant stakeholders in their quest to create medical AI datasets in highly constrained environments. Our data include approximately 50 hours of observations, interviews with 46 medical professionals, data scientists, and designers, as well as observation notes, email communication, reports, and artefacts. We followed a grounded theory approach [9]that led us to identify and define factors that influence the design of the ground truth schema that underpins the production of high-quality training data.

Our contribution is twofold. First, we identify five factors, three external and two internal, that influence medical dataset creation by affecting data collection, ground truth schema design, and data annotation stages (see Fig. 1). The external factors condition the medical dataset creation processes by determining the data collection and shaping the possibilities for the design of ground truth schemas:

- Regulatory Constraints
- Context of Creation and Use
- Commercial and Operational Pressures

The internal factors define the negotiations between the medical and technical domains:

- Epistemic Differences
- Limits of Labelling

Second, we show how these factors affect the final shape and quality of the resulting medical datasets. While we define each factor separately for analytical purposes, the factors are interrelated and affect each other, structuring the limits of responsible data creation approaches. We argue that these factors condition the stages that precede data labelling and mediate the design of what is aspired to be responsible AI.

2 RELATED WORK

While the idea of responsible AI has received much attention from both commercial entities and regulatory bodies, concerns about the quality of data and the challenges in the creation of quality data are increasingly in focus. The now-emerging guidelines list several data-related challenges as key obstacles that hinder the path towards responsible AI: skewed data (issues that originate during data collection), tainted data (issues that stem from labelling e.g. hidden stratification [52]), or limited features (an inadequate number of features represented in data) [4]. There is broad agreement that dataset creation processes deserve greater attention, despite scholars repeatedly pointing to a strong bias against data work [14, 57, 58].

2.1 How datasets are created and annotated

In computer science, dataset creation is often seen as an activity constituting a step in the larger development processes of ML-based systems [1, 11, 26, 50, 65]. However, scholars have also discussed the dataset creation process on its own merits. For example, Hutchinson drew parallels between software development and dataset creation practices by sharing conceptual stages like requirement analysis, design, implementation, testing, and maintenance[31]. Similarly, increased focus can be observed in the medical area, where researchers describe in greater detail the creation of publicly available medical datasets [8, 13, 33, 35, 40, 66]. Typically, dataset creation is described as a process that spans all activities related to work on medical data, collected under the umbrella of data collection, data cleaning and processing, and data annotation.

Data annotation is one of the most researched aspects of dataset creation. Data annotation or labelling usually happens as part of the curation or preparation step of larger data science projects, following data acquisition and cleaning, and preceding feature engineering [1]. These activities are usually iterative and highly collaborative. Linguistic scholars and Natural Language Processing researchers [19, 30, 63] offer guidance on how to carry out data labelling. They distinguish three focal points: the creation and improvement of an annotation guide [19], schema [63], or manual [30]; the labelling performed by trained annotators; and the adjudication of the annotated data.

In this paper, we use the terms data labelling and data annotation interchangeably and understand them as the action of assigning and adjudicating predefined labels to concrete data points. When considering this step alone, there is a multitude of decisions that need to be taken to complete it. Scholars have pointed to data annotation activities as a site of political struggle, challenges to the labour conditions, as well as the stage in dataset creation that can result in adverse downstream outcomes for trained models. For example, Schumann et al. [59] and Hanley et al. [24] demonstrate how the design of categories (or labels) can reinforce harmful stereotypes and exclude underrepresented groups of people. Badly annotated

data can reduce the performance of AI models [10, 23, 34, 47, 54] and perpetuate exclusion and inequality [36, 59].

In the medical domain, data annotation challenges can be compounded by the requirements for specialised knowledge and training. Despite initiatives like the Unified Medical System [38], the clinical meaning of labels can be unclear [51], and medical knowledge remains difficult to capture for computer use. Li and colleagues [37] explored the inter- and intra-rater agreement between six radiologists of different experience levels when labelling chest x-rays. In some cases, even the experienced radiologists reached only a moderate level of agreement with themselves [39]. This could occur due to not following the best medical practices when labelling data, due to resource constraints [57] or because of the disconnect between the practices of labelling and the actual usage of medical data in regular practice [51].

What much of this research points to is the fact that labelling and annotation as practices are heavily reliant on the creation of annotation guides and schemas [19]. Yet, despite the growing interest in the creation of datasets, current discussions tend to omit and overlook the pre-labelling activities and their potential impact on the quality of the resulting training data [67].

2.2 The design of the ground truth schema

Many scholars investigated the dynamic and situated work of domain experts, data scientists, designers, and other stakeholders engaged with data [25, 48, 57, 60]. For example, Muller and colleagues investigated how domain experts label data, highlighting that the ground truth contained in datasets is a human contribution resulting from improvised and iterative adjustments to principled design processes [49]. Discussing the design of ground truth schema implies that ground truth captured in medical AI datasets is not an objective representation of reality but is a result of a situated design process [6]. In other words, data is never raw [22], instead, all data is actively constructed [3, 43, 53]. Feinberg emphasises the importance of recognising the subjectivity involved in dataset creation and the need to consider the potential biases and limitations inherent in choices that stem from the social and organisational context in which data is produced [18].

Researchers who investigate AI datasets suggest that access to all of the "subtle design decisions" made during the dataset creation, is vital to ensuring a high-quality labelling process [17, 51] and thus high-quality datasets. However, documenting design decisions in data science work is not common [53, 56, 68]. To address this gap, researchers developed a range of documentation frameworks to support the accountability, use, and maintenance of complex datasets [2, 44]. These frameworks range from general purpose and qualitative - Datasheets for Datasets [20], NLP-focused - Data Statements [5], quantitative - Dataset Nutrition Label [27], to fairness focused - data briefs [17] and accountability [31]. Some of these tools [17, 20, 31] include a query for the origin of the labels, but most do not pay much attention to the pre-labelling activities involved in annotation schema creation.

While the existing scholarship has problematised the stage of the data labelling and the power relations and conditions affecting the data annotation work [49], little is known about the stages preceding the data labelling. Particularly, how these stages influence the final shape of medical datasets. We explore the collaborative and situated work of medical professionals, data scientists, and designers that takes place before the labelling stage, within the design stage proposed by Hutchinson et al. [31] or the preparatory work proposed by Fort [19].

3 METHODOLOGY

We investigated three organisations in the Global North developing medical AI-based systems that engaged in the medical dataset creation processes. We focused on the work conducted before the data annotation task by participants described in Table 3).

3.1 Research context and data collection

3.1.1 ORG I. was an interdisciplinary collaboration between academia, business, and the public healthcare sector, aiming to create AI-based chest x-ray prioritisation software for global use. The project's first step was designing the ground truth schema for labelling chest x-rays, which is the process investigated in this study.

Our engagement in ORG I spanned May 2021 to Feb 2023. During that time, we conducted participatory observations of the design process of the ground truth schema. The working group developing the system was based in a Northern European country (Table 3.1). Additionally, a feedback group comprising medical professionals from the Northern European country and an East African country provided feedback on the schema (Table 3.2). We participated in fifteen working group meetings ranging from 26 minutes to 2 hours and 12 minutes in length. Additionally, we conducted twelve interviews and observed external medical professionals evaluating and providing feedback on the intermediate results of the design work. Additional material included observation notes, meeting summaries from other participants, a work progress report, email communication, and produced artefacts - a labelling guide and the ground truth schema.

3.1.2 ORG II. was a large tech company in Western Europe with part of the business involved in the development of complex medical devices. We primarily engaged with sections of the company that focused on the development of AI-based diagnostic tools and systems for oncological radiology.

Our work with ORG II was split into a preliminary exploratory period online from February to May 2022 and in situ participant observations and semi-structured interviews conducted in June 2022 in a Western European country. Due to the size of the organisation, we employed snowball sampling. In ORG II, we conducted thirteen semi-structured interviews with experts (Table 3.3), with an average duration of 65 minutes.

3.1.3 ORG III. was a mid-size start-up in Western Europe that aimed at developing an AI-based platform for matching patients with advanced clinical trials for new drug and experimental procedure development. The company primarily dealt with two data sources. First, they collected data from medical practitioners and their patients. Second, they collected data from public registries in the EU and US and pharmaceutical companies about clinical trial requirements or experimental treatments. Their goal was to match the patients with unmet medical needs and their physicians with the requirements of BioPharma companies that need to enhance drug development and recruit participants for clinical trials.

ORG I	Position	Exp.
P1	Radiologist	Junior
P2	ML Engineer	Senior
P3	ML Engineer	Senior
P4	Computer Scientist	Senior
P5	Data Scientist	Senior
P6	Radiologist	Senior
P7	Radiologist	Senior
P8	HCI Researcher	Junior
P9	HCI Researcher	Senior

ORG I	Position	Exp.
P10	Radiologist	Senior
P11	Radiologist	Junior
P12	Radiologist	Junior
P13	Radiologist	Mid
P14	Radiologist	Senior
P15	Radiologist	Senior
P16	Radiologist	Senior
P17	Radiologist	Senior
P18	Radiologist	Senior
P19	Radiologist	Senior
P20	Radiologist	Senior
P21	Physician	Junior

ORG II	Position	Exp.
P21	Data scientist	Senior
P22	Product Owner	Mid
P23	Strategic Designer	Senior
P24	Data scientist	Mid
P25	Usability Designer	Senior
P26	Data scientist	Senior
P27	Data scientist	Senior
P28	Data Designer	Mid
P29	Interaction Designer	Senior
P30	Data scientist	Senior
P31	Data Designer	Senior
P32	HCI Researcher	Mid
P33	Data Designer	Senior

ORG III	Position	Exp.
P34	Product owner	Mid
P35	Software Engineer	Junior
P36	Software Engineer	Mid
P37	Software Engineer	Mid
P38	Data Scientist	Mid
P39	Data Scientist	Senior
P40	UX Designer	Senior
P41	Software Developer	Mid
P42	Medical Operations	Senior
P43	Quality Assurance	Senior
P44	UX Designer	Mid
P45	Neurobiologist	Senior
P46	Product Owner	Mid

Table 1: List of participants, their simplified positions, and experience levels. Respectively in ORG I (working group), ORG I (feedback group, participants 10-14 were located in the northern European country, and participants 15-21 were located in the East African country), ORG II, and ORG III.

Our engagement with ORG III spanned February to May 2022. The preliminary period involved online semi-formal meetings and interviews from February to April 2022. In situ ethnographic research was conducted during May and June 2022 at the headquarters of ORG III in Western Europe. We conducted participant observation by joining the daily stand-up sessions of the engineering department and shadowing the workflow of the AI team experts leading the data labelling process for the match-making platform. In total, we interviewed 13 participants (Table 3.4).

3.2 Data analysis

The main focus of our analysis was to identify factors affecting medical dataset creation. We analysed decisions made during the design work, tensions and misunderstandings that needed to be reconciled, looking both outside and within the organisations where the design work took place. We explicitly decided to explore the wider socioeconomic factors that condition the medical dataset creation and influence the final AI-based systems even before the first label is annotated.

Data analysis relied on techniques of grounded theory and situational analysis [9, 12]. First, we conducted line-to-line open coding, coming up with 850 initial codes. We then reflexively proceeded to thematic coding, in an iterative manner, discussing the themes and patterns emerging in our three sites of ethnographic inquiry. During this step, we designed visual maps to lay out the human, technological, and discursive dynamics of the organisations under study [12]. Second, we conducted axial coding to reflexively group the available themes into dimensions. Finally, we assessed these dimensions against the codes and situational maps, converging on the five final factors (regulatory constraints, context of creation and use, commercial and operational pressures, epistemic differences, and limits of labelling).

3.3 Positionality statement

Our qualitative data was obtained from three health-tech organisations in the Global North. The analysis was shaped by the following standpoints. First, we differentiated our roles in studying the three organisations. Researchers in ORG I had the dual position of the expert who on the one hand, designed the labelling software whilst they conducted participant observation and semi-constructed interviews in order to study the process of the ground truth schema design. Researchers working with ORG II and ORG III employed ethnographic methods as a research approach without having a prior engagement with the organisations. Second, we are researchers currently working for Northern European institutions. Third, we have mixed epistemic backgrounds in computer science and law and policy. Finally, we emphasise the situatedness of our research, which focuses on the development of medical AI at the specific loci of our studied organisations. We acknowledge that the factors we identify as defining the medical dataset creation bear the geographical and epistemic limitations of the Northern European context. On this note, we acknowledge that the divide between Global North and Global South we make below has been problematised by scholars in human geography and decolonial studies as a limiting one, reinforcing stereotypes and reducing the polyphony of southern standpoints [29, 64]. For this reason, we use this divide in this paper to (I) acknowledge the limitations of our standpoints in a northern institution and the privilege of our funded projects; (II) tackle assumptions about data universalism [46] by showing the particularities of the northern context in medical datasets creation and their effect on the intended use of such data in different contexts.

4 FINDINGS: FIVE FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE MEDICAL DATASET CREATION

The datasets used for medical AI benefit from the impression that they are a result of an age-old medical practice that is seamlessly transitioning to the digital age, unaffected by external influences, and focused on the pursuit of medical excellence. However, the reality is often different. Our ethnographic data suggest that even before medical professionals have had the chance to annotate or make their first label, many critical design decisions have been made, which frame the labelling space, thus limiting the extent to which medical professionals can use their expertise.

Our analysis challenged our initial understanding of the dataset creation process drawn from the literature. Our data made clear that the preparatory work should be conceptualised as a crucial stage in dataset creation taking place before data labelling because it defines what becomes captured as ground truth within a training dataset. This is the step where the ground truth schema is designed, which, when applied to an unlabelled dataset through expert annotation, embeds the intended ground truth within it.

Regulatory Constraints
• Extent of Collected Data
• Predetermination of Purpose
Context of Creation and Use
• Geographic context of use
• Demographic context of production
• Linguistic context
Commercial and Operational Pressures
• Business model and organisation scalability
• Competition and health tech market
• Intended future use within healthcare type

Table 2: External factors and their dimensions

We identified five factors that influenced the creation of medical datasets in the organisations we studied. Three of these factors were external to the activities directly involved in pre-labelling activities. External factors defined and delineated the limits and possibilities for labelling activities. Two internal factors on the other hand affected the negotiations around what needed to be labelled and how the labelling was to proceed through the design of the schema. Below we describe each factor and demonstrate how they affected the final shape of the medical datasets focusing on the data collection and ground truth schema design stages.

It is important to note that the organisations and processes examined in this paper were largely driven by data scientists as the owners of the dataset creation process, with representatives of other domains contributing to the dataset creation activities. As a result, data science as an epistemology dominated the design work by primarily embedding data scientists' perspectives, inadvertently compromising other domain-based practices and understandings. As datasets in our research were created for the purpose of AI development, the power distribution was uneven, leaving little room for misconceptions from data scientists to be challenged and addressed.

4.1 External factors: defining the ground truth schema design space

Despite the best intentions of the experts engaged in the medical dataset creation process, many of their decisions and actions were structured by different external factors. We identified three such factors - **Regulatory Constraints, Context of Creation and Use**, and **Commercial and Operational Pressures** - that shaped the space of medical dataset creation and thus influenced the final shape of the datasets themselves even before the labelling could begin (Table 2). Each factor consists of several distinct features. We describe these below in detail.

4.1.1 Regulatory constraints. The medical data space is highly controlled through a variety of local, national, and international regulatory constraints. This was particularly challenging for the data collection step of the process. We observed two areas where compliance with regulatory standards affected the creation of medical data: **the extent of the collected data** and **the predetermination of purpose**. Experts in all of the organisations we studied were concerned about compliance with diverse standards that intersected with their work on medical dataset creation. These standards originated from European binding legislative acts, international standard organisations, or industry standards. GDPR, the main legal standard for data protection in the European Union, was the most prominent example of a binding legislative act, regulating the conditions under which personal data is collected and processed. The industry and international organisations imposed, among others, ISO 2700013001, HIPAA, and Good Medical or Good Manufacturing Practices. In ORG III, a data scientist (P39) listed 21 unique regulations they felt they needed to consider. As a larger and more mature organisation, ORG II also had internal ethics boards, which at times imposed even stricter interpretations. However, these standards and limits legitimised the data collection and processing activities.

Constraints on data collection. While experts in all organisations were striving to create what they saw as high-quality data, complying with relevant regulatory standards required concessions from all participants. For data scientists, the regulatory constraints delimited what data was available for collection, at times inadvertently introducing bias in different ways. For example, P26, a data scientist from ORG II, explained: *"what is the data that we are allowed to use, especially if you look at ... bias ... people will want to look at bias and, and see if ... their product was fair to all, some demographics, and [we are] just not able to use the data because of privacy issues or GDPR"*. Similarly, in ORG II, the contractual agreement with a single local hospital, on the one hand, provided a controlled supply of high-quality data, on the other hand, reduced data representativeness: *"we have a strong relationship with them. How do you expect that the data is not going to be biased right?"* (P24). While ORG II was able to create highly detailed and structured training data for their models, this data was clearly not representative of populations that would eventually encounter the resulting technologies.

Limitations imposed on data collection could compromise the resulting datasets in ways that created challenges for subsequent data creation steps. For example, participants of ORG I could collect only chest x-rays and their linked radiological reports. Privacy concerns here also resulted in the loss of the chronological links between the images during data collection. This selection significantly diverged from the usual assortment of data available to radiologists in clinical practice, introducing challenges at the later stages of medical dataset creation, such as schema creation and annotation.

Regulatory standards and contractual agreements determined the purpose and context of use. Data protection regulations have recently focused intently on the purpose of use as one area of emphasis, tied to notions of data minimisation and data subject notification. Companies in our research had to negotiate the legal basis for their data collection with contracted data providers such as hospitals. For example, GDPR and contractual agreements with a local hospital bounded ORG II to use the collected data within the predefined purpose and context. Deviations from the initially stated purposes and context of use required new agreements that could be obtained only through significant time and resource investments. As a product owner (P22) explained the process of collecting data from the local hospital, *"maybe the new study that we want to do has a slightly different scope and it's not covered by the original contract, then we need to make a new contract"*. ORG I encountered a similar predicament where the data collection phase was negotiated based on what the data scientists believed to be a necessary and sufficient dataset given the available resources and legal constraints of local regulations. By the time domain experts explained that the dataset was lacking important data dimensions, it was too late.

4.1.2 Context of creation and use. The context of production and the context of use influenced the creation of medical datasets. In our studies, each medical dataset was created for a specific intended use that was embedded in the collected medical data, e.g., clinical trial repositories, hospitals, and patients. These sources cover specific geographical populations, which has consequences for the final medical dataset. We identified three dimensions where that influence was prevalent: **the geographic context of use, the demographic context of production**, and **the linguistic context** (Table 2).

The geographic context of use affected the selection of labels. While medicine strives to deliver replicable results that generalise across populations, the ground truth schemas are designed to serve specific needs in specific contexts. Some of them are defined by the intended use of the future AI-based systems in the geographic context, in which they are going to be used. In ORG I, the project group designed the first version of the ground truth schema based on local data from a Northern European country. As a result, the first version of the schema captured the locally prevalent conditions well but missed conditions relevant within the countries of intended use, which were almost never encountered locally. To account for that, direct and indirect input from medical professionals from the East African country was collected and incorporated into the schema during joint design work, as seen in this exchange between a radiologist and an ML engineer.
"So if you wanted that in the hierarchy, it could be there." (P1)
Is it aortic unfolding? Because I clearly remember this sentence from [the East African country] reports, "aortic unfolding due to chronic hypertension" (P2). Yet despite having a broader ground truth schema, the same project also struggled to ensure enough examples of common medical conditions across expected countries of use available for annotation, since the data was originally only collected from one country.

The demographic context affected representativeness concerns In both ORG I and ORG II, data in medical datasets were collected from a single country, which had several consequences. For example in ORG II, the data was predominantly collected from a single local hospital, where ORG II had a contractual agreement. Not only was this problematic due to a more homogeneous patient population, but the collected medical imaging data originated on machines from the same producer. This created many concerns since imaging machines from different manufacturers often produce slightly different artefacts in their output. Yet the information about which machines were used to produce the images was rarely included in the resulting dataset.

Similarly, due to the characteristics of the population embedded in medical datasets, experts worried about how portable the resulting AI models would be. As a usability designer (P25) from ORG II noted, *"you can have all sorts of differences in patient demographics ... and you cannot just apply a model that you train on population A to population B"*. However, despite the designers' and data scientists' awareness, a senior radiologist from the East African country emphasised that *"in the [developing world]*[1] *we are usually consumers, not producers of tech. We may find ourselves hitched to tech that doesn't serve our needs"* (P15). When evaluating the ground truth schema, the same medical professional elaborated, *"I've done this for 10 years since my graduation. I've never seen certain diseases like cystic fibrosis, but whenever I read the books, there's a lot of stuff about cystic fibrosis [prevalent in the Global North],"* which highlights the effect of local ground truth schemas on the transferability of the final AI-based systems.

Linguistic context and local understanding of medical terms challenged the application and transferability of the ground truth schemas. The design of ground truth schemas included naming the labels, defining and organising their relations, and providing examples. However, medical concepts are not always used in the same way across different countries. In ORG I when discussing the naming convention for a chest x-ray finding, one radiologist noted *"I know that it's not proper, but [in the Northern European country] they use 'infiltrat' as a synonym of consolidation ... I think the direct translation consolidation would be 'consolidering' but they don't use that, they use 'infiltrat'... I think maybe our infiltrate is broader"* (P1). As a result, a presentation of infiltration by an AI-based system could be understood differently by medical professionals from different countries. To account for that, data scientists and medical professionals evaluated the ground truth schema against English translations. In ORG III, which operates globally, the data scientists and designers recounted a similar challenge of re-translating medical terms during the data annotation process. The limitations of the locality of medical terms prohibited the aspiration of designing a ground truth schema that can operate universally. As a UX designer (P40) remarked: *"there are also challenges around that because different cultures will refer to different diseases in different ways. It's global and we re-translate some of our stuff into different pages. We also have to consider localisation, how you turn this medical term into a layman term, but that's also relevant in like different countries as well."*

4.1.3 Commercial and operational pressures. The three organisations each had a different business model and exhibited different relations to the market and the public sector. This often determined the availability of the resources (human and material) allocated for dataset creation and affected the organisations' ability to collect data and design the ground truth schema. We identified three dimensions of commercial and operational pressures (Table 2): **business model and scalability of the organisation, the competition in the health tech market**, and **intended future use within the healthcare type**.

The business model and scalability of the organisation determined the amount of collected and labelled data. Every investigated organisation represented a different business model. ORG I intersected with the public sector, whilst ORG II and III were situated entirely in the private sector. The business models of the organisation determined the way in which data was collected. The business model of ORG III relied on providing free use of the AI-based platform to patients but also providing paid services to BioPharma by enrolling patients into clinical trials. To do that, ORG III collected data from the public clinical trial registries in the EU and US, as well as patient medical information. Such data collection was heavily dependent on the organisation's scalability, as well as the "fine" balance between the data requested by their BioPharma clients and the data that could have been collected. As a data scientist (P38) explained: "sometimes it's difficult to decide what kind of data you collect, right? Or what patients. (...) there's a balance between what's actually feasible to collect and what will give us the highest chance of getting as much data as possible. So those

[1] edited to avoid pejorative language

I think are tricky decisions." These conditions affected how much data was finally collected, hence, the ideal of representativeness of the created dataset was compromised.

In ORG I, the budget allocation for the data annotation process played a vital role in the amount of data possible to be labelled by medical professionals. Due to the high cost of labelling by experienced medical professionals, ORG I had to cap the maximum number of labelled images. This cap limited the number of distinct labels that could be annotated in the created dataset and remained statistically significant. "We have a limited budget for the test data that we can collect because we need several radiologists board-certified possibly to look at images" (P3). The limited resources defined the amount of data that was possible to be annotated, putting ORG I at a competitive disadvantage: "What the [competitors] do (...) there is no way we can reach what they do. They have 127 findings and they use a hundred plus radiologists to annotate, and they annotated 800,000 images each image by three radiologists. So the scale is completely different" (P2).

Market standards and industry competition affect the design of the ground truth schemas. Since all organisations under study operated in the health tech sector, the experts engaged in the processes of designing ground truth schemas had to both consider existing state-of-the-art solutions and methods, as well as address market competition. In ORG I, the choice of a specific machine learning model architecture was dictated by the industry standard. However, this choice had consequences for the label needs during the design of the ground truth schemas. At the same time, addressing market competition influenced the work on the ground truth schema design, as seen here, "so this is [a competitor's system] and this is their output. they ... split consolidation and nodules, which at this stage of the hierarchy we are not doing. And so I was wondering why we're not doing it" (P2). In this organisation competition directly influenced the design work.

Due to the large size of ORG II, the matter of competition fed to internal business processes whose results other experts relied on during the dataset creation, as explained by a product owner (P22), "it's a combination of ... alignment with the business priorities and that is also strongly driven by customer requests and customer demands. So that is actually very important ... try to find the alignment". Finally, market competition created time pressures that could structure and limit how data creation had to be organised: "if you want to validate something properly, it costs time. If you want to validate across domains, it costs time. And we are often in very competitive domains where being fast to market or, or fast at the FDA is also important. So there are some time trade-offs, need to be made there." (P27).

The intended use and the type of healthcare system affected the content and the level of detail of the ground truth schemas. Visions of future intended use permeated the design work on the ground truth schemas. The imagined intended use of a future AI-based system factored into decisions about the validity of label choices. Imagined use did not fit in with current domain-specific practices and resulted in confusion and concerns during the design of the ground truth schema. Consider the following discussion between a medical professional and data scientists from ORG I about the implication of different intended uses of the future system for the selection of labels.

We have two priorities, one is decision support. So it might be easy for you to see the mass, so that won't help you. But there's also the pre-screening - prioritisation. So that might be relevant to detect mass prematurely, right? (P3)

So if you use it for like a warning, a prioritisation, it can be useful, but for detection... we can see a mass. It's not difficult to find (P1).

Epistemic Differences
• Miscommunication between domains
• Misapprehension of medical practice
• Misapprehension of medical knowledge
Limits of Labelling
• Domain expert buy-in
• Onboarding to the labelling task
• Labelling hardware and software
• Similarity to the clinical practice

Table 3: Internal factors and their dimensions

Medical AI-based systems in our organisations were designed to operate across the world within public or private healthcare systems. Yet medical systems in different countries operate differently based on public values, profit, incentives, and conventions. The design decisions during dataset creation are a product of all these components. The dependency on the healthcare type was well captured by a data scientist from ORG I when discussing the level of detail of the ground truth schema, *"if it was in the US where you actually pay, then from a business point of view, you really wanna find everything. First of all, you don't get sued, and secondly, you can make a lot of money by treating them. But here it's very different, right? Because it's a public system and you only treat things that are necessary, that need to be treated, right?"* (P4). These concerns manifested in debates about what could and needed to be annotated as expert annotators infused the values of their local system into data creation activities.

4.2 Internal factors: designing the ground truth schema

While external factors were key in shaping what data was collected and made available for annotation and highlighted the importance of local considerations and their implication for the resulting datasets, two internal factors drove debates, discussions, and disagreements that affected the ground truth schema and the resulting datasets. These were **Epistemic Differences** and **Limits of Labelling** (Table 3). The effort going into the creation of medical datasets as training data had two purposes that sometimes came into conflict. First, medical datasets were seen as a means of capturing the current state of medical knowledge and the tacit knowledge of medical professionals who focused on medical practice and clinical usefulness. Second, the same datasets served computer scientists as complex input data to solve problems through mathematical operations, where consistency and accuracy were in the spotlight. These two perspectives, while not opposing, often prioritised distinct qualities of the same datasets.

4.2.1 Epistemic differences. While in ORG II and ORG III, we engaged with relatively homogeneous teams within each company, in ORG I, our research process was focused on supporting the data creation process by working together with the data science and

radiologist teams. As such, in ORG I, we were able to observe first-hand how teams with domain expertise often disagreed on what constituted legitimate knowledge as they discussed what was worth annotating and how things ought to be annotated. We consider three sources of epistemic differences that affected the final design of the ground truth schemas (Table 3), communication challenges within the teams, misapprehension of medical practice, and misapprehension of medical knowledge. Within these dimensions, team members from different domains expressed diverging priorities, values, and understanding of concepts, which needed to be reassured and negotiated.

Communication challenges within teams. The three organisations involved stakeholders from different backgrounds, such as health, data science, and design. All of these brought their own traditions, meanings, and domain knowledge that needed to be shared, translated, and understood by other parties for worthwhile collaboration. It is no secret that interdisciplinary teams must spend time finding common ground before they can work together productively [7]. In our research, we observed how medical professionals, designers, and data scientists constantly translated and explained concepts from their respective domains to maintain a shared understanding. For example, at the beginning of the study in ORG I, medical professionals designed labels based on their, at times naive assumptions of machine learning capabilities, such as when they included two medical concepts under the same label, *"but couldn't that be, if you put nodule, mass in the same category, couldn't you just program it, later on, to say that if the thing that they have marked nodule/mass is over I think ... five millimetres or something, you call it a mass"* (P1), which was not possible given the collected data and was later clarified through a joint discussion. Similarly in ORG II medical professionals had to explain to data scientists that to detect some types of cancer it is necessary to look at more than just the organ in question, and that doctors need to use other information, such as the condition of bile ducts or the blood flow around the organ, affecting data collection and subsequent labelling set up.

Misapprehension of medical practice. Across the organisations the expectations for the quality of the datasets were closely aligned with concepts such as consistency or bias. This focus was clearly visible when discussing the goal of the labelling task in ORG 1. In the pursuit of consistent and unbiased data, data scientists initially framed labelling as a *"different task"* to clinical work: *"We need to know what's in the image and we need it without them being biased towards looking for only stasis"* (P6). As a result, the labelling task did not provide what was seen by the data scientists as "extraneous and potentially biasing" information, such as the background information of a patient. However, situating the labelling task further away from the medical practice affected the quality of the input medical professionals could provide, impairing the ability of medical professionals to use their knowledge. As one senior radiologist (P10) noted: *"Asking a radiologist to categorise something on a picture only without getting any information on the patient. Is like asking a surgeon to look at the scars on a patient and having him tell you what kind of surgery that patient had"*.

The pursuit of objective and unbiased labels isolated labelling from what data scientists saw as extraneous, potentially biasing information. Yet this transformed the work of the radiologists into a new task that was incompatible with medical practice. To deliver the expected results in this new unfamiliar process, radiologists attempted to reconstruct their medical practice by drawing from their tacit knowledge or, simply, guessing: *I have to create something about the patient myself, which is, [or] might not be true. And I then describe the picture from there...* (P10).

Misapprehension of medical knowledge. Specific data was needed to train AI models that provide clinically useful functionalities. However, due to the misapprehension of practice, the assumptions about what clinical knowledge was possible to extract from the clinical data provided were also, at times, flawed. As the schema went through iterative rounds of design, we observed how both sides struggled to understand why particular data was requested or why a particular request seemed to be difficult to fulfil. For example, in ORG I, radiologists were asked to assign one of three possible values as a patient's general state based solely on a single chest x-ray, so that relevant cases could be later prioritised using the resulting AI system. This task proved to be particularly problematic to radiologists who do not use such metrics in their daily practice, so they had to develop a range of new approaches to assign them, like *"I chose to interpret it from the view that it could be the worst situation"* (P12) or *"I think it was mostly a gut feeling"* (P11). In the end, the radiologists produced the kind of data that data scientists expected to see as labels. However, what these labels actually captured diverged from the original intention.

4.2.2 Limits of labelling. Finally, we turn to the mechanics of labelling itself that affected the final design of the ground truth schema. We observed schema design and testing in situ directly in ORG I, while in ORG II and ORG III, our data come from post-hoc interviews. We find that four features affected the final design of the ground truth schema (Table 3), domain expert buy-in, onboarding to the labelling task, clinical practice familiarity, and labelling hardware and software. These dimensions manifested when evaluating the labelling processes. Unlike the *Epistemic Differences*, where data science was the defining domain, the *Limits of Labelling* emerged as medical professionals confronted the intermediate results of the epistemic negotiations discussed above. These limits altered what kind of data was collected and affected the quality of the labelling.

Domain expert buy-in. Our data showed that domain expert buy-in was crucial and required concessions on the type and amount of collected data. Some ML models require specific types of annotated data, such as *"what we're asking them is for each patient to go through 500 images and for each image to annotate [...] at pixel level"* (P21). Not only are such tasks typically outside of the scope of clinical practice but are also mentally challenging. For example, when P1 was asked to oversee the labelling process performed by external radiologists, they recalled: *"I think that he [a senior radiologist] opened the program, saw how difficult it was, and just closed it and just never had the energy to start it again"* (P1). Monetary compensation turned out to be a necessary but not sufficient strategy in ORG I for recruiting medical professionals with high expertise to annotate data.

Once the experts agreed to annotate data, **limited training for the labelling task reduced the chance for a "shared mindset".** Additional metrics were a relevant part of the ground truth schemas. These metrics usually included concepts not used in daily clinical practice. In ORG I, the medical professionals were supplied with

written guidelines to boost common understanding and were briefly introduced to the labelling task. However, some annotators referred to the guidelines only when in doubt: *[the labelling software worked] right out of the box ... I didn't really read this part because it was not necessary* (P12). Not knowing the exact guidelines, medical professionals relied on an intuitive understanding of the metrics and labels, which often resulted in discrepancies between the annotators as they attributed different meanings.

Hardware configuration and user interface of the labelling software affected the quality of the annotations. These challenges were observed to a greater extent in ORG I, as to assess medical data like CT scans and x-rays, radiologists usually use diagnostic displays. Thus, when they annotate on a *"non-diagnostic screen, you miss details ... maybe small, smaller changes would be missed ... we don't annotate them because we cannot see them"* (P13). Similar comments were shared during the evaluation of the labelling software, medical professionals marked the location of findings using touchpads, which resulted in frustration and low precision.

Labelling software design could have influenced the final quality of the medical dataset to an even greater extent if not caught during the evaluation. Labelling medical data requires "[a] professional tool that could do the job in a very efficient way" (P21). However, the design of this software could have influenced radiologists in ORG I to overreport radiological findings per x-ray during an evaluation period, *"...maybe it's an interface. Maybe they forgot the normal button was there because they only saw the [labels]"* (P1).

The overreporting was not solely caused by the labelling software. **Expectations and habits influenced what medical professionals noticed in medical data.** For example, a radiologist who reported on an evaluation of the ground truth schema in ORG I reported, *"I told my participants that there would be some normal, but they have not marked any of them normal or I can't find them"* (P1). This phenomenon was later explained by a senior radiologist who pointed to the expectation of labelling a dataset with findings and the fact that when the ratio of abnormal to normal cases is skewed, radiologists tend to overreport to remain on the safe side, *"that's [why] they thought they saw something that was not there"* (P6).

5 DISCUSSION

In the creation of high-quality training data, our research shows that the design of ground-truth schema is a crucial but often overlooked step. We highlight five factors that represent external and internal constraints that directly affect the quality of the resulting medical datasets. The external constraints condition the data collection process, affecting this way the design of the ground truth schema, while the internal constraints strongly affect the resulting ground truth schema and can lead to disagreements and debates among domain experts, predominantly data scientists and medical professionals.

5.1 Conditioning the data collection

Our findings demonstrate that the regulatory constraints, along with the geographical, demographic, and linguistic context of creation and intended use, and the organisations' scalability crucially affect the amount and type of data that was possible to be collected by the organisations we studied. In this sense, specific data quality metrics were already compromised since the first stage of the medical datasets creation. For example, in ORG I and II the geographical and demographic distribution of the collected data reflected not only how much data was possible to be collected by the contractual agreements in place but also manifested a lack of representativeness, given the regional and local source of data collection.

In ORG III, the aspirations for creating datasets of global coverage stumbled upon the linguistic contextuality of medical terms, which proved to become an issue during the ground truth schema design for the match-making platform. Similarly, in ORG I, the geographical, demographic, and linguistic context of the medical data collection shaped the type of the collected data, such as that when the experts came to decide on how to design the ground truth schema, dilemmas did not only concern the different understanding of the same medical terms across countries and continents but also possible omissions of local lung diseases. In this sense, the aspiration of designing "transferable" ground truth schemas proved to be both dependent and limited by the standards that regulate the data collection and the context of its collection.

A further insight that emerged in our studies was that the business models and scalability of each organisation affected differently its capacity to collect data. For example, ORG I, being a small-size start-up, having however the public sector involved in its entity, had easier access to timely data (x-ray images of multiple years) from regional hospitals. Yet, the organisation's limited scalability defined the amount of data that was possible to be labelled by medical professionals. In Org III, a similarly small-size start-up, the data collection from both public registries and patients was shaped by the organisation's availability of resources. The constraints were imposed on the recruitment of data scientists designing the platform's ground truth schema and medical professionals who assisted the patients in submitting their medical information into an appropriate and structured format. On the other hand, in ORG II, due to its large size and scalability, the limitations of the data collection were shaped by market demands. This was reflected in the need to collect quality data, i.e., particularly structured, consistent, and contextual medical images from a controlled environment (the contracted local hospital). This push for one type of quality reduced another, in this case, the representativeness of the acquired data.

So far, scholarship has defined and treated data acquisition as a particular step in the data creation process, existing in a vacuum [1, 11, 26, 50, 65]. Very little is known about how this step influences the stages that precede the data labelling, eventually affecting the shape of the final medical dataset. Our studies show that regulatory constraints, the context of data creation and use, and the business models and scalability of the organisations, crucially affect the extent and the type of data that is possible to be collected and processed.

5.2 Conditioning the ground truth design

Within this context, we identified the design of the ground truth schema as a crucial stage of medical dataset creation. In our studies, the externally imposed constraints shaped the amount and type of data that reached the stage of designing ground truth schema. This has implications for scholarly discussions that focus on developing documentation frameworks that support the responsible and informed use of complex datasets [2, 5, 20, 31, 44]. We showed that

the decisions taken during the design of the ground truth schemas were foundational to the succeeding stages of dataset creation. We argue that in this stage, experts do not deal with ideal conditions, but there are inherent limitations which we conceptualised as epistemic differences and limits of labelling. We further argue that the external constraints influence how these inherent limitations manifest in situated collaborative domain settings.

The amount and type of data that reach the ground truth schema design is already shaped by the necessity of organisations to comply with regulatory standards. This has led the experts from ORG I and II to work with data that had limited representativeness from the start, further affected by the predefined purpose of use and geographical, demographic, and linguistic context for its collection and use. These had implications for the negotiations between data scientists, designers, and medical professionals on what "makes sense" to be labelled.

Domain negotiations that we observed, were grounded in epistemic differences that did not take place with symmetrically allocated roles, where the "separation of concerns" of each domain expertise is often negotiated against the tacit medical knowledge but where data scientists have the first say [32, 55, 62]. Having the development of AI models as the purpose of medical dataset creation, data scientists were positioned as the problem owners of the data creation processes. This further distanced the design of the labels from the medical domain experts and was manifested through misapprehensions about medical knowledge and practice. The tensions with the medical professionals often led to negotiations about what was medically important to be annotated versus what would lead to high-quality datasets from a data science perspective. At the same time, both of these standpoints had to correspond to the demands of the health-tech market.

We found that the externally imposed concerns, such as compliance with regulatory standards, the context of creation, and the intended use of the data, along with the commercial and operational pressures, condition the data collection and can affect ground-truth schema design. In fact, many crucial decisions and negotiations relevant to the final shape of the medical datasets take place during the stage of ground truth schema design. All three organisations under study were committed to developing AI systems in a responsible way. As such, the creation of high-quality training data was a crucial step. Yet, no matter how hard they tried to create representative, consistent, well-structured, high-quality data, the resulting datasets were already limited in different ways. We showed how these limits were predefined even before any data labelling occurred. The combination of external constraints that limit and structure data collection with the misapprehension of domain practice resulted in highly paid experts having to imagine and invent additional information to perform the tasks asked of them. A limited understanding of what is required for diagnosing various conditions from medical images could have consequences. Either new datasets would have to be created, which translates into a new data collection process, with all the regulatory constraints attached, or the labelling software would have to be more aligned with the existing professional practices following the guidance of expert annotators. Even where these issues were resolved, medical professionals annotated data based on their particular experience and tacit knowledge. This means that the geographical location of the experts affected what they expected to see in the data, showcasing that expertise does not account for the uneven distribution of diseases in different parts of the world.

6 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK

Our contribution builds on qualitative data from three organisations located in countries of the Global North. Creating medical AI datasets in different countries of the Global South may present different challenges and be influenced by a different set of factors that were not captured in our data. Further research is needed to better understand how medical AI data creation varies across different regions and cultures.

Our study focuses on only two medical areas: radiology and clinical trials. While we engaged with diverse types of medical data, creators of other medical datasets could face challenges unique and dependent on different types of medical specialisations. Future research should aim to explore the factors that influence the design of medical AI datasets across a wider range of medical specialisations to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the factors that influence it.

7 CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we investigated the work of data scientists, medical professionals, and designers that takes place before the labelling of medical data. Building on the qualitative accounts of our ethnographic findings, our main contributions are:

- conceptualising five factors that influence the creation of medical datasets;
- disclosing how these factors condition the design of ground truth schemas;
- suggesting identified relationships amongst these factors;
- staging the design of the ground truth schemas as a highly contested, yet crucial step in the creation of medical datasets that precedes and conditions data annotation.

These overarching factors had a fundamental influence on the final shape of medical datasets created for AI use. First, the externally imposed constraints should be systematically taken into account during the entirety of the medical dataset creation processes, as these factors define the data collection and condition the design of the ground truth schemas. Second, we have exemplified the breadth of decisions taken before the annotation of medical data. Foundational decisions about the final shape of medical datasets take place during the design of a ground truth schema. Future endeavours in data science, law, and policy should consider this stage as crucial to achieving responsible medical AI.

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AI Art and its Impact on Artists

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ABSTRACT

The last 3 years have resulted in machine learning (ML)-based image generators with the ability to output consistently higher quality images based on natural language prompts as inputs. As a result, many popular commercial "generative AI Art" products have entered the market, making generative AI an estimated $48B industry [125]. However, many professional artists have spoken up about the harms they have experienced due to the proliferation of large scale image generators trained on image/text pairs from the Internet. In this paper, we review some of these harms which include reputational damage, economic loss, plagiarism and copyright infringement. To guard against these issues while reaping the potential benefits of image generators, we provide recommendations such as regulation that forces organizations to disclose their training data, and tools that help artists prevent using their content as training data without their consent.

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1 INTRODUCTION

In the two years since the publication of [18] which outlines the dangers of large language models (LLMs), multimodal generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems with text, images, videos, voice, and music as inputs and/or outputs have quickly proliferated into the mainstream, making the generative AI industry valued at an estimated $48B [125]. Tools like Midjourney [78], Stable Diffusion [5], and DALL-E [91] that take in text as input and output images, as well as image-to-image based tools like Lensa [97] which output altered versions of the input images, have tens of millions of daily users [47, 127]. However, while these products have captured the public's imagination, arguably to a much larger extent than any prior AI system, they have also resulted in tangible harm, with more to come if the ethical concerns they posit are not addressed now. In this paper, we outline some of these concerns, focusing our discussion on the impact of image based generative AI systems, i.e. tools that take text, images, or a combination of both text and images as inputs, and output images. While other works have summarized some of the potential harms of generative AI systems more generally [18, 28, 29], we focus our discussion on the impacts of these systems on the art community, which has arguably been one of the biggest casualties (Section 4) [40, 138].

As we argue in Section 3, image based generative AI systems, which we call **image generators** throughout this paper, are not artists. We make this argument by first establishing that art is a uniquely human endeavor, using perspectives from philosophies of art and aesthetics. We further discuss how anthropomorphizing image generators and describing them as merely being "inspired" by their training data, like artists are inspired by other artists, is not only misguided but also harmful. Ascribing agency to image generators diminishes the complexity of human creativity, robs artists of credit (and in many cases compensation), and transfers

accountability from the organizations creating image generators, and the practices of these organizations which should be scrutinized, to the image generators themselves.

While companies like Midjourney, Stability AI and Open AI who produce image generators are valued at billions of dollars and are raising hundreds of millions of dollars[1], their products are flooding the market with content that is being used to compete with and displace artists. In section 4, we discuss the impact of these products on working artists, including the chilling effect on cultural production and consumption as a whole. Merely open sourcing image generators does not solve these problems as they would still enable people to plagiarize artists' works, and impersonate their style for uses that the artists have not consented to.

In Section 5, we provide a summary of the relevant legal questions pertaining to image generators. While there have been legal developments around the world, we focus our analysis on the US where a number of lawsuits have been filed by artists challenging the use of image generators [129]. Given that copyright has been the most frequently invoked law in such cases [28], we provide an overview discussing the relevance of US copyright law in protecting artists, and conclude that it is largely unequipped to tackle many of the types of harms posed by these systems to content creators. As we discuss in Section 6, the AI research community has enabled the aforementioned harms through data laundering, with for-profit corporations partnering with academic institutions that help them gather training data for commercial purposes while increasing their chances of courts finding these uses to be "fair use".

We end our discussion with proposals for new tools and regulations that tackle some of the harms discussed in this paper, as well as encouraging the AI community to align themselves with those harmed by these systems rather than powerful entities driving the proliferation of generative AI models trained on the free labor of content creators.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Background on Image Generation

We define "generative artificial intelligence (AI)" to encompass machine learning products that feature models whose output spaces overlap in part or in full with their input spaces during training, though not necessarily inference. While generative AI systems are based on generative models which statistically aim to model the joint distribution between a feature space and output space $p(x, y)$ [85], we distinguish between "generative AI" systems and generative models as the latter can be used in classification systems. This paper focuses on products whose stated output space composes, in part or in full, of visual data (i.e. images), which will be referred to as **image generators**; similarly, the scope of art discussed within this work is largely limited to the fields of visual art. We consider two different applications in the context of inference, text-to-image and image-to-image, though more recent multimodal pretrained model architectures usually are capable of both (and often necessitate both).

Early approaches to image synthesis such as [38, 95, 120], aimed to achieve texture synthesis, i.e. modifying an existing image to copy the texture of another image [38, 95, 120]. In the deep learning era of computer vision (2012 until now), Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) enabled the ability to recognize a large amount of latent attributes that do not conform to arbitrary statistical forms, unlike early works in texture synthesis [69].

In addition to CNNs, another architectural element of note is the variational autoencoder (VAE), like the one used in Yan et al. [135]; VAEs, which use two mirrored neural network components to map the input space to a latent space (encoder) and vice versa (decoder) [68], set the stage for the development of generative models, which significantly widened the capacity of image synthesis. A key element of VAEs is the reconstructive loss function which allows an ML system to explicitly define its training objective as the re-creation of input features, with the expectation that the model can generalize beyond the training set during inference. VAEs enabled the creation of image generation models such as VQ-VAE-2 [104] and are components of many subsequent models.

The next major breakthrough is the generative adversarial network (GAN), which employs the use of two models trained simultaneously [58]. Unlike conventional neural networks such as VAEs which directly and asymmetrically measure the divergence between a distribution known to be a reference and one known to be a hypothesis, GANs indirectly measure the divergence between two distributions of masked origin through the intermediary of the discriminator. The introduction of conditional losses in [82] made GANs the dominant architecture in image generation due to the ability to now inform outputs with text tags as auxiliary information; the paper itself used a handwriting generator trained on the MNIST dataset [35] as a demonstration. With GANs came the first large-scale image generating models, allowing for output sizes of up to 512×512 [24, 61, 65].

The adaptation of approaches from natural language processing (NLP) such as transformers further enabled having complex text as input for text-to-image models [42]. In [30], OpenAI adapted the architecture of GPT-2, a large language model (LLM), to output a series of pixel values that could be rearranged into a recognizable image. This research led to the original DALL-E [103], a tool that outputs a 256×256 RGB image based on natural language prompts, this time using the GPT-3 architecture [25].

In the last 3 years, the use of GANs for image generation has been overtaken by diffusion models which take inspiration from fluid dynamics [37, 86, 116, 118]. These models work by repeatedly applying gaussian noise on an image (imitating the diffusion process of fluids or heat), and then denoising the result in equally many steps [118]. In a departure from GANs' implicit modeling, diffusion models return to using a reconstruction loss.

In 2022, Rombach et al. released the Stable Diffusion model [4, 106], which uses a conditional latent space based on text and images: in this case a pretrained model by OpenAI called CLIP [99]. This allowed for models that are not confined to natural language understanding (NLU)-based architectures, and can generate high-quality images based on natural language prompts. In the same year, OpenAI released DALL-E 2 [91] which has a similar model architecture [102] but with a training dataset that is opaque to the public.

[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/23/business/microsoft-chatgpt-artificial-intelligence.html

In addition to different model architectures, massive image datasets such as JFT-300M (300M images) [124] have helped improve image generation performance. The current crop of image generators, primarily those based on Stable Diffusion, are pretrained on LAION [109], or its variants which are subsets of the original 5B dataset. The dataset consists of 5.85 billion CLIP-filtered image-text pairs, of which 2.32B contain English language text. An exploration of a subset of LAION can be found at [11].

2.2 Products for Image Generation

The advent of Stable Diffusion and related models has resulted in a proliferation of commercial and non commercial image generation tools that use them. Stability AI's Stable Diffusion [5] and its commercial product Dream Studio[2], OpenAI's DALL-E 2 [91], and Midjourney [78] are the most popular systems built on diffusion models, with StarryAI [122], Hotpot.ai [94], NightCafe [123], and Imagen [108] being a few others. Established art software company Adobe has also released its image generator product, Adobe Firefly [3], which the company says is trained on Adobe Stock images, images in the public domain, and those under open licensing. The ecosystem is large and expanding, including organizations like Fotor [45], Dream by WOMBO [133], Images.AI [128], Craiyon [71], ArtBreeder [9], Photosonic [134], Deep Dream Generator [55], Runway ML [107], CFSpark [46], MyHeritage Time Machine [73], and Lensa [97]. While some advertise the model architectures they use, such as StableCog [121] using diffusion-based techniques, others provide little to no detail. For example, while the CEO of Stability AI has written that Midjourney used Stable Diffusion in past releases [3], Midjourney does not disclose underlying model information for its current releases, only mentioning "a brand-new AI architecture designed by Midjourney" in describing its releases since November 2022 [79].

Most of the products identified above emerged as specific commercial offerings for users to generate images by providing text prompts. There are other services that have been introduced as features in existing products, such as synthetic images in Canva [26], Shutterstock [113], and Adobe Stock Images [2], which seek to augment their stock image offerings with synthetic images. On the other hand, companies like Getty Images took a stance against including synthetic images in their portfolio of offerings in 2022 [130], although NVIDIA announced a collaboration with them in 2023 to develop image generators [76]. Open source efforts in the space have focused on using Stable Diffusion and other open-source variants to create plugins for Photoshop [7], Unreal Engine [43], and GIMP [20]. Some groups, such as Unstable Diffusion, are explicitly focused on generating not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content [59].

3 IMAGE GENERATORS ARE NOT ARTISTS

Many researchers have pointed out the issues that arise from the anthropomorphization of AI systems, including shifting responsibility from the people and organizations that build these systems, to the artifacts they build as if those artifacts have agency on their own [13, 16, 39]. This anthropomorphization is readily apparent in descriptions of image generators as if they are artists [39], even going as far as to claim that the image generators are "inspired" by the data they are trained on, similar to how artists are inspired by other artists' works [66]. In this section, we discuss why such arguments are misguided and harmful.

Following philosophers of art and aesthetics from varied disciplines (e.g. Chinese and Japanese Philosophy, American Pragmatism, and Africana Philosophy), we define art as a uniquely human endeavor connected specifically to human culture and experience [6, 36, 62, 74, 75, 88, 93]. Most philosophers of art and aesthetics argue that while non-human entities can have aesthetic experiences and express affect, a work of art is a cultural product that uses the resources of a culture to embody that experience in a form that all who stand before it can see. On this view, art refers to a process that makes use of external materials or the body to make present experience in an intensified form. Further, this process must be controlled by a sensitivity to the attitude of the perceiver insofar as the product is intended to be enjoyed by an audience. The artwork, therefore, is the result of a process that is controlled for some end and is not simply the result of a spontaneous activity ([36] pp. 54, 55). This control over the process of production is what marks the unique contribution of humanity: while art is grounded in the very activities of living, it is the human recognition of cause and effect that transforms activities once performed under organic pressures into activities done for the sake of eliciting some response from a viewer. As an example, a robin might sing, a peacock might dance, but these things are performed under the organic pressures of seeking a mate. In humans, song and dance are disconnected from the organic pressures of life and serve purposes beyond the mere satisfaction and expression of organic pressures, and serve cultural purposes. In brief, art is a form of communication: it communicates.

In contrast, the outputs of artifacts like image generators are not framed for enjoyment because they merely imitate the technical process, and then only those technical processes embodied in the works that make up the training dataset. The image generator has no understanding of the perspective of the audience or the experience that the output is intended to communicate to this audience. At best, the output of image generators is aesthetic, in that it can be appreciated or enjoyed, but it is not artistic or art itself. Thus, "Mere perfection in execution, judged in its own terms in isolation, can probably be attained better by a machine than by human art. By itself, it is at most technique… To be truly artistic, a work must also be esthetic—that is, framed for enjoyed receptive perception." ([36] pp. 54).

Thus, art is a uniquely human activity, as opposed to something that can be done by an artifact. While image generators have to be trained by repeatedly being shown the "right" output, using many examples of the desired target, and explicitly defining an objective function over which to optimize, humans do not have such rigid instructions. In fact, while image generators have been shown to even memorize their data and can output almost exact replicas of images from their training set under certain conditions [27, 117], as artist Karla Ortiz writes, artists' styles are so unique to them, that it is very difficult for one artist to copy another's work [92]. The very few artists who are able to do this copying are known for this skill [92]. An artists' 'personal style' is like their handwriting, authentic to them, and they develop this style (their personal voice

[2]https://dreamstudio.com
[3]https://web.archive.org/web/20220823032632/https://twitter.com/EMostaque/status/1561917541743841280, referring to V3

and unique visual language) over years and through their lived experiences [92].

The adoption of any particular style of art, personal or otherwise, is a result of the ways in which the individual is in transaction with their cultural environment such that they take up the customs, beliefs, meanings, and habits, including those habits of aesthetic production, supplied by the larger culture. As philosopher John Dewey argues, an artistic style is developed through interaction with a cultural environment rather than bare mimicry or extrapolation from direct examples supplied by a data set [23]. Steven Zapata argues, "our art 'creates' us as artists as much as we create it" [138]. This experience is unique to each human being by virtue of the different cultural environments that furnish the broader set of habits, dispositions towards action, that enabled the development of anything called a personal style through how an individual took up those habits and deployed them intelligently.

Finally, an image generator is trained to generate images from prompts by mapping images and texts into a lower dimensional representation in a latent space [58, 68, 106]. This latent space is learned during the model's training process. Once the model is trained, this latent space is fixed and can only change through training from scratch or fine-tuning on additional examples of image-text pairs [57]. In contrast, human inspiration changes continuously with new experiences, and a human's relationship with their lived experiences evolves over time. Most importantly, these experiences are not limited to additional artistic training or viewing of images. Rather, humans perform abstract interpretations between representational and imaginary subjects, topics, and of course, personal feelings and experiences that an artifact cannot have.

Let's look at Katsuhiro Otomo's seminal *Akira* as an example. Otomo notes that he created these images by drawing inspiration from his own teenage years, thinking about a rebuilding world, foreign political influence, and an uncertain future after World War II [12]. Similarly, Claude Monet created his defining *Nymphéas [Water Lilies]* series during the last 30 years of his life, after the loss of his son in 1914 [63]. As shown by both these artists, and many other artists, the human experience both defines and inspires creation across an artist's personal lifetime. Each individual's art is unique to their life experiences. Otomo's *Akira* is a fundamentally different form of artwork than Monet's *Nymphéas [Water Lilies]* series not simply due to their different stylistic and pictorial media, but due to the way in which each artists' work was an expression of a cultural inheritance that shaped the unique experiences that gave rise to their particular art forms. While image generators can imitate the stylistic habits, the "unique voices" of a given artist, they cannot develop their own particular styles because they lack the kinds of experiences and cultural inheritances that structure every creative act. Even when provided with a human-written prompt, the sampling of a probability distribution conditional on a string of text does not present a synthesis of concepts, emotion, and experience.

In conclusion, image generators are not artists: they require human aims and purposes to direct their "production" or "reproduction," and it is these human aims and purposes that shape the directions to which their outputs are produced. However, many people describe image generators as if these artifacts themselves are artists, which devalues artists' works, robs them of credit and compensation, and ascribes accountability to the image generators rather than holding the entities that create them accountable. In [39], Epstein et al. performed a study with participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk to assess the impact of anthropomorphization of image generators, finding a relationship between the manner in which participants assign credit and accountability to stakeholders involved in training and producing image generators, and the level of anthropomorphization. They advise "artists, computer scientists, and the media at large to be aware of the power of their words, and for the public to be discerning in the narratives they consume."

4 IMPACT ON ARTISTS

The proliferation of image generators poses a number of harms to artists, chief among them being economic loss due to corporations aiming to automate them away. In this section, we summarize some of these harms, including the impact of artists' styles being mimicked without their consent, and in some cases, used for nefarious purposes. We close with a discussion of how image generators stand to perpetuate hegemonic views and stereotyping in the creative world, and the chilling effects of these technologies on artists as well as overall cultural production and consumption.

4.1 Economic Loss

While artists hone their craft over years of practice, observation, and schooling, having to spend time and resources to pay for supplies, books, and tutorials, companies like Stability AI are using their works without compensation while raising billions from venture capitalists to compete with them in the same market[4]. Leaders of companies like Open AI and Stability AI have openly stated that they expect generative AI systems to replace creatives imminently[5][6]. Stability AI CEO Emad Mosque has even accused artists of wanting to have a "monopoly on visual communications" and "skill segregation"[7]. To the contrary, current image generation business models like those of Midjourney, Open AI and Stability AI, stand to centralize power in the hands of a few corporations located in Western nations, while disenfranchising artists around the world.

It is now possible for anyone to create hundreds of images in minutes, compile a children's book in an hour[8], and a project for a successful Kickstarter campaign in a fraction of the time it takes for an actual artist[9]. Although many of these images do not have the full depth of expression of a human, commercial image generators flood the market with acceptable imagery that can supplant the demand for artists in practice. This has already resulted in job losses for artists, with companies like Netflix Japan using image generators for animation, blaming "labor shortage" in the anime industry for not hiring artists [32].

[4] https://techcrunch.com/2022/10/17/stability-ai-the-startup-behind-stable-diffusion-raises-101m/

[5] https://web.archive.org/web/20220912045000/https://twitter.com/sama/status/1484950632331034625, https://web.archive.org/web/20220122181741/https://twitter.com/sama/status/1484952151222722562

[6] https://web.archive.org/web/20230811193157/https://twitter.com/emostaque/status/1591436813750906882

[7] https://web.archive.org/web/20230224175654/https://twitter.com/mollycrabapple/status/1606148326814089217

[8] https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=ZbVRYqsntDY

[9] https://web.archive.org/web/20230124003305/https://twitter.com/spiridude/status/1616476006444826625

One of the more high profile cases of the labor impact can be seen in the title sequence of Marvel Studio's 2023 TV series *Secret Invasion*, which uses a montage of generated imagery [81]. While prior movies from the studio feature between 5 (*The She-Hulk: Attorney at Law*[10]) and 9 (*Hawkeye*[11]) artists and illustrators for their title sequences, *Secret Invasion* has only one "Sagans Carle" credited as "AI Technical Director"[12]. This labor displacement is evident across creative industries. For instance, according to an article on Rest of World, a Chinese gaming industry recruiter has noticed a 70% drop in illustrator jobs, in part due to the widespread use of image generators [139]; another studio in China is reported to have laid off a third of its character design illustrators [139].

In addition to displacing the jobs of studio artists, the noise caused by the amount of AI-generated content will likely be devastating for self-employed artists in particular. This has become evident in the literary world with the advent of LLM based tools like ChatGPT[13]. Recently, Clarkesworld, a popular science fiction magazine, temporarily closed open submissions after being overwhelmed by the number of ChatGPT generated submissions they received [31]. They announced that they will instead only solicit works from known authors, which disadvantages writers who are not already well known. It is not difficult to extrapolate such a result with visual art venues that receive too many AI-generated images. Contrary to "democratizing art," this reduces the number of artists who can share their works and receive recognition.

Regardless of their objections, some working artists have started to report having to use image generators to avoid losing their jobs, further normalizing its commercial use [139]. Artists have also reported being approached by companies producing image generators to work on modifying the outputs of their systems [14]. This type of work reduces hard earned years of skill and artistic eye to simple cleanup work, with no agency for creative decisions. In spite of these issues, creatives in executive roles who can be isolated from the realities of most working artists, may gravitate towards using these tools without considering the effects on the industry at large, such as a reduction in the economic earning power of many working artists. For instance, the director of *Secret Invasion* had editorial control in deciding whether to use image generators[15], and chose to replace illustrators' works with image generated content.

With the increasing barriers and job losses for creatives because of image generators, the pursuit of art could be relegated to the independently wealthy and those who can afford to develop their artistic skills while working a full-time job. This will disproportionately harm the development of artists from marginalized communities, like disabled artists, and artists with dependents.

4.2 Digital Artwork Forgery

As discussed in Section 2, image generators are trained using billions of image-text pairs obtained from the Internet. Stable Diffusion V2, for instance, is trained using the publicly available LAION-5B dataset [106, 109]. Although the creators of LAION-5B have not provided a way for people to browse the dataset, various artists have reported finding their works in the training data without their consent or attribution [11]. Open AI has not shared the dataset that its image generator, DALL-E, was trained on, making it impossible to know the extent to which their training data contains copyright protected images. Using a tool[16] built by Simon Willison which allowed people to search 0.5% of the training data for Stable Diffusion V1.1, i.e. 12 million of 2.3 billion instances from LAION 2B [109], artists like Karen Hallion[17] [18] found out that their copyrighted images were used as training data without their consent [11]. And as noted in Section 3, image generators like Stable Diffusion have been shown to memorize images, outputting replicas of iconic photographs and paintings by artists [27, 92].

This type of digital forgery causes a number of harms to artists, many of whom are already struggling to support themselves and can only perform their artistic work while having other "day" jobs [70]. First, as discussed in Section 4.1, using artists' works without compensation adds to the already precarious positions that the majority of professional artists are in [70, 92, 138]. In addition to the lack of compensation, using artists' works without their consent can cause them reputational damage and trauma. Users of image generated art can mimic an artist's style by finetuning models like Stable Diffusion on specific artists' images, with companies like Wombo even offering services to generate art in the style tied to specific groups of artists like Studio Ghibli [133]. A number of artists have described this practice as "invasive" and noted the manner in which it causes them reputational damage. After a Reddit user posted images generated using artist Hollie Mengert's name as a prompt, Mengert mentioned that "it felt invasive that my name was on this tool, I didn't know anything about it and wasn't asked about it."[19] She further noted her frustration with having her name associated with images that do not represent her style except at "the most surface-level."

This type of invasive style mimicry can have more severe consequences if an artist's style is mimicked for nefarious purposes such as harassment, hate speech and genocide denial. In her New York Times Op-ed [8], artist Sarah Andersen writes about how even before the advent of image generators people edited her work "to reflect violently racist messages advocating genocide and Holocaust denial, complete with swastikas and the introduction of people getting pushed into ovens. The images proliferated online, with sites like Twitter and Reddit rarely taking them down." She adds that "Through the bombardment of my social media with these images, the alt-right created a shadow version of me, a version that advocated neo-Nazi ideology…I received outraged messages and had to contact my publisher to make my stance against this ultraclear." She underscores how this issue is exacerbated by the advent of image generators, writing "The notion that someone could type my name into a generator and produce an image in my style immediately disturbed me…I felt violated" [8]. As we discussed in Section 3, an

[10]https://ondisneyplus.disney.com/show/she-hulk
[11]https://ondisneyplus.disney.com/show/hawkeye
[12]https://www.disneyplus.com/series/invasion-secreta/3iHQtD1BDpgN
[13]https://openai.com/blog/chatgpt
[14]https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=pfbid02L9Qkj6Bnidy6zL7hRjvQ9MuYLQF3jSUXcGLRjjgZhxH1LysnV4DZRUgMyhLMvKxGl&id=882110175
[15]https://www.polygon.com/23767640/ai-mcu-secret-invasion-opening-credits
[16]https://laion-aesthetic.datasette.io/laion-aesthetic-6pls/images
[17]https://web.archive.org/web/20230811043246/https://twitter.com/Khallion/status/1615464905565429760
[18]https://web.archive.org/web/20230117153958/https://twitter.com/shoomlah/status/1615215285526757381
[19]https://waxy.org/2022/11/invasive-diffusion-how-one-unwilling-illustrator-found-herself-turned-into-an-ai-model/

artist's style is their unique voice, formed through their life experiences. Echoing Hollie Mengert's point about the invasive nature of style mimicry, Andersen adds: "The way I draw is the complex culmination of my education, the comics I devoured as a child and the many small choices that make up the sum of my life. The details are often more personal than people realise." Thus, tools trained on artists' works and which allow users to mimic their style without their consent or compensation, can cause significant reputational damage by impersonating artists and spreading messages that they do not endorse.

4.3 Hegemonic Views and Stereotyping

Beyond the appropriation of individual identities, image generators have been shown to appropriate and distort identities of groups, encode biases, and reinforce stereotypes [87, 98, 119]. Introducing In/Visible, an exhibition exploring the intersection of AI and art, Senegalese artist Linda Dounia Rebeiz writes: "Any Black person using AI today can confidently attest that it doesn't actually know them, that its conceptualization of their reality is a fragmentary, perhaps even violent, picture…Black people are accustomed to being unseen. When we are seen, we are accustomed to being misrepresented. Too often, we have seen our realities ignored, distorted, or fabricated. These warped realities, often political instruments of exclusion, follow us around like shadows that we can never quite shake off" [64]. In an interview, the artist gives examples of stereotypes perpetuated through image generators. For instance, she notes that the images generated by Dall-E 2 pertaining to her hometown Dakar were wildly inaccurate, depicting ruins and desert instead of a growing coastal city [114]. Similarly, US-based artist Stephanie Dinkins discusses encountering significant distortions when prompting image generators to generate images of Black women [114].

There are already cases of people producing images embodying their view of other populations. In a 2018 New Yorker article, Lauren Michelle Jackson writes about a white British photographer, Cameron-James Wilson, who created a dark skinned synthetic model which he called "Shudu Gram," and the "World's first Digital Supermodel" [77]. The synthetic model, which he created using a free 3D modeling software called DAZ3D[20], first appeared on Instagram wearing "iindzila, the neck rings associated with the Ndebele people of South Africa" [77]. Jackson licensed the image to various entities such as Balmain[21] and Ellesse, [22] many of whom were criticized for their lack of diversity in hiring [96]. Now, without compensation to any Ndebele people, magazines like Vogue[23] profit off of an idealized conception of someone from that community, imagined in the mind of a white man who is compensated for creating that image. Writer Francesca Sobande writes that this is another iteration of "the objectification of Black people, and the commodification of Blackness" [115]. Five years later, on March 6 2023, entrepreneur Danny Postma announced the launch of a company, Deep Agency, that rents image generated synthetic models as a service[24], making the type of practice described by Jackson more likely to occur at scale.

Due to these questions of who gets to use (and profit from) these tools by representing which cultures in what way, participants from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh surveyed in [98] raised "concerns about artist attribution, commodification, and the consequences of separating certain art forms from their traditional roots," with some questioning which cultural products should be included in the training set of image generators. To expose these issues, Quadri et al. recommend further examination of the cultural harms posed by image generators, including perpetuating cultural hegemony, erasure or stereotyping [98].

4.4 Chilling Effects on Cultural Production and Consumption

The harms discussed in the prior sections have created a chilling effect among artists, who, as artist Steven Zapata notes, are already a traumatized community with many members struggling to make ends meet [137]. First, students who foresee image generators replacing artists have become demoralized and dissuaded from honing their craft and developing their style [138]. Second, both new and current artists are becoming increasingly reluctant to share their works and perspectives, in an attempt to protect themselves from the mass scraping and training of their life's works [92, 138]. Independent artists today share their work on social media platforms and crowdfunding campaigns, and sell tutorials, tools, and resources to other artists on various sites or at art-centric trade shows [25]. For most artists, gaining enough visibility on any of these platforms (online or in person) is extremely competitive, taking them years to build an audience and fanbase to sell their work and eventually have the ability to support themselves [26]. Thus, having less visibility in an attempt to protect themselves from unethical practices by corporations profiting from their work, further reduces their ability to receive compensation for their work.

Artists' reluctance to share their work and teach others also reduces the ability of prospective artists to learn from experienced ones, limiting the creativity of humans as a whole. Similar to the feedback loop created by next generations of large language models trained on the outputs of previous ones [18], if we, as humanity, rely solely on AI-generated works to provide us with the media we consume, the words we read, the art we see, we would be heading towards an ouroboros where nothing new is truly created, a stale perpetuation of the past. In [18], the authors warn against a similar issue with future generations of large language models trained on outputs of prior ones, and static data that does not reflect social change.

In his 1916 book titled Art, Clive Bell writes "The starting-point for all systems of aesthetics must be the personal experience of a peculiar emotion. The objects that provoke this emotion we call works of art" [15]. As Steven Zapata notes, we need to "protect

[20] https://www.daz3d.com/
[21] https://projects.balmain.com/us/balmain/balmains-new-virtual-army
[22] https://hypebae.com/2019/2/ellesse-ss19-campaign-shudu-virtual-cgi-digital-influencer-model
[23] https://www.vogue.com.au/fashion/trends/meet-shudu-the-digital-supermodel-who-is-changing-the-face-of-fashion-one-campaign-at-a-time/news-story/80a96d3d70043ed2629b5c0bc03701c1
[24] https://www.deepagency.com/
[25] https://www.muddycolors.com/2019/09/results-of-the-artist-income-goals-survey-2019/
[26] https://news.artnet.com/art-world/artist-financial-stability-survey-1300895

the creative human spirit…Making art is one of the best ways to investigate one of the ways you are influenced, and the way to send how you're influenced to other people. If we don't curb this, this influence can come from AI, AI that can't discern boundaries, and influence feelings. Let's not let it happen" [137].

5 AI ART AND US COPYRIGHT LAW

Given the speed at which image generators have been adopted and their impact, countries around the world are grappling with what policies to enact in response. In particular, there is a lot of uncertainty about whether using copyrighted materials to train image generators is copyright infringement. Some governmental bodies, like the EU, will require companies to "document and make publicly available a summary of the use of training data protected under copyright law"[27] [44], which could trigger copyright lawsuits if it becomes possible to identify specific instances of copyright infringement [72]. However, it is not clear what the scope of this law is and if it requires an itemized list of what is included in the training data, or only a summary of other key information.

While a number of artists have filed class action lawsuits in the US against companies providing commercial image generation tools [129], image generators represent a dynamic between artists and large-scale companies appropriating their work that has previously not been examined in US copyright law [56]. This is due to the unprecedented scale at which artists' works are being used to create image generators, the recent proliferation of publicly available image generators trained on that content, and the level to which the output of the image generators threatens to displace artists. Furthermore, this dynamic is distinct because of the data collection practices by which image generators are developed in the first place [67].

While some of the harms discussed in Section 4 overlap with the rights protected by US copyright law, others are not. There are also a number of unanswered legal questions when it comes to determining the ways in which copyright law applies to image generators and both the inputs and outputs that go into creating these tools. Hence, US copyright law is largely unequipped to tackle many of the types of harms posed by these systems to content creators. This lack of certainty about whether copyright applies means that the companies producing these tools can do so largely without accountability, unless they are sued for specific violations of copyright law. And waiting for court determinations on their lawsuits means that artists may not be able to get recourse until the cases are resolved. In this section, we highlight specific parts of US copyright law that may be a source of uncertainty and tension for artists and companies using their work. We conclude that there are gaps in the law that do not take into account the social and economic harm to artists.

5.1 Authorship

Thus far, no works created by an image generator have been given copyright protection, and authorship is limited to human creators. The US Copyright Office recently affirmed this position by declining to recognize the copyrightability of works that were created by an image generator [90]. In the US, the mere effort required to create a piece of art work does not, on its own, render the resulting work protected by copyright law, meaning that the number of prompts or hours poured into the creation of an image using text-to-image generators will not on its own qualify the work as copyrightable.[28] Moreover, the prompts themselves may be protectable if they are independently creative, and the resulting work may be copyrightable if the prompts were part of an active process by which the human creator exercised judgment by selecting, arranging, or designing the work [29]. US law also requires that the creator of the work be the source of the creativity and inventiveness of the work, and the Copyright Office noted that image generators produce images in an "unpredictable" way [90] and thus cannot be considered creative or inventive.

These dimensions of what it means to be an "author" under copyright law as well as how the law understands the process of creativity means that image generators on their own cannot create copyright protected works. How artists interact with these tools would determine the legal status of the output they create. Given this uncertainty about the legal status of the image generators' outputs, we can direct our policy attention to the inputs that go into creating the tools. There is an opportunity here to exercise more caution in the ex-ante processes of the tools' development such that the artists whose works are used to create the tools are not harmed, which we discuss in Section 7.

5.2 Fair Use

Fair use is a doctrine in copyright law that permits the unauthorized or unlicensed use of copyrighted works; whether it is to make copies, to distribute, or to create derivative works. Whether something constitutes fair use is determined on a case-by-case basis and the analysis is structured around four factors[30]. Most relevant for artists and generative AI systems are factors 1 and 4, which look at the purpose or character of the use and its impact on the market [14]. Part of the first factor includes the question of whether the use is commercial and "transformative". Commercial use usually weighs against finding fair use. If the use is found to be transformative, however, it can be considered fair use even for commercial purposes, but not always[31]. This is in part due to the fourth factor, which examines whether a use is a threat to the market of the original creator's work.

The question of fair use arises at two points within the image generation ecosystem. First is when the images used to train the datasets are copyrighted, and especially if the copyright holders are small-scale artists. These small scale artists could have an interest in not allowing their work to be used to create synthetic images, not only because image generators could be used to produce works resembling theirs, but because of issues around consent and misuse of their works for harassment, disinformation and hate speech as described in Section 4.2. Artists may not want to participate in the creation of an infrastructure that facilitates other informational harms, even if the image generator is not creating works resembling

[27] https://www.euaiact.com/

[28] Bellsouth Advertising & Pub. v. Donnelley Inf. Pub., 933 F. 2d 952 - Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 1991

[29] Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)

[30] https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCODE-2011-title17/USCODE-2011-title17-chap1-sec107

[31] Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., No. 15-3885 (2d Cir. 2018)

theirs. In this case, their concerns wouldn't be ones that can be addressed through fair use.

Moreover, small-scale artists may not want to pursue copyright infringement claims because of a lack of resources to participate in prolonged legal battles against powerful companies that claim such copying is fair use. This again means that copyright law is not the most effective recourse for them and the question of fair use may not be addressed in a case involving small-scale artists. The complaint[32] filed by Getty Images (a large and well-resourced copyright holder) against Stability AI is illustrative of the resources needed to assert copyright claims against companies producing image generators and the power differential that exists between small-scale copyright holders and these companies. Copyright infringement is a concern for small-scale artists but the overall system of how image generators normalize appropriation of art at the input stages is a problem that is beyond the scope of fair use considerations.

The second point where fair use is a question is if an image generator is used to create works that are similar to a human artist, and as a result compete with the human artist's market, as we describe in Section 4.1. In such instances, the fourth factor may weigh heavily against finding fair use. If the work is being used in ways that displaces the artist's market share, or prevents them from receiving appropriate attribution and compensation, there is a clear harm in place, and may be addressed through copyright law.

5.3 Derivative Works and Moral Rights

When companies design their products around "mimicking" the style of an artist, then it becomes difficult to justify the company's use as fair use [49]. In such instances, there is a clear connection between the company's product and the intended outcome being harm to the market for the original artist's work.

Such mimicking or use of an artist's work and style may also be covered under moral rights in copyright law. Moral rights vest in "visual art", such as paintings and photographs, and protect the creator's personal and reputational interest in their work by preventing the distortion or defacement of the original work [80]. The scope of moral rights in US copyright law is narrowly constructed for various policy reasons [89], but this area of copyright law may need more attention as artists try to articulate the harms they face.

6 SHORTCOMINGS OF THE AI RESEARCH COMMUNITY

In the previous section, we provided a brief analysis of US copyright law that may be relevant to artists' fight against the harms they face due to the proliferation of image generators. In this section, we discuss how academic researchers' partnerships with corporations help the latter sidestep some of these laws aimed at protecting creators. In her paper titled The Steep Cost of Capture, whistleblower Meredith Whittaker writes about the level to which academic AI research has been captured by corporate interests [132]. In The Grey Hoodie Project: Big tobacco, big tech, and the threat on academic integrity, Mohamed and Moustafa Abdalla liken this capture to the tobacco and fossil fuel industries, noting that corporations fund academics aligned with their goals, the same way that tobacco companies funded doctors that claimed that cigarettes did not cause cancer [1]. In her article, "You are not a stochastic parrot," Liz Weil notes "The membrane between academia and industry is permeable almost everywhere; the membrane is practically nonexistent at Stanford, a school so entangled with tech that it can be hard to tell where the university ends and the businesses begin" [131]. This corporate entanglement means that the academic research agenda is increasingly being set by researchers who align themselves with powerful corporate interests [51, 52, 132].

6.1 Data Laundering

One of the results of this corporate academic partnership has been data laundering [34]. Similar to money laundering, where business fronts are created to move money around while obfuscating the source of illicit funds, researchers have argued that companies use data laundering to obtain data through nonprofits that are then used in for profit organizations [10].

The LAION dataset used to train Stability AI's Stable Diffusion model, which is also used in their commercial Dream Studio product, is one such example[33]. While LAION is a nonprofit organization, the paper announcing the LAION-5B dataset notes that Stability AI CEO Emad Mostaque "provided financial and computation support for open source datasets and models" [109]. The dataset's associated datasheet further answers the question "Who funded the creation of this dataset" with "This work was sponsored by Hugging Face and Stability AI." As we mentioned in Section 6, while US copyright law is not fully equipped to resolve disputes related to image generated content, companies are more likely to be granted fair use exceptions in US copyright law if they claim that the dataset was gathered for research purposes, even if they end up using it for commercial products. According to the US copyright office, "Courts look at how the party claiming fair use is using the copyrighted work, and are more likely to find that nonprofit educational and noncommercial uses are fair."[34] This allows corporations like Stability AI to raise $101M in funding with a $1B valuation[35], using datasets that contain artists' works without their consent or attribution. The accountability for the dataset creation and maintenance, on the other hand, including copyright or privacy issues, is shifted to the nonprofit that collected it. Thus, while there is no legal distinction at present between data laundering and the normative data mining practices in the machine learning communities, this question needs more attention when the issue of fair use discussed in Section 5.2 arises in the context of image generators.

6.2 Power, ML Fairness, and AI Ethics

In the Moral Character of Cryptographic Work, cryptographer Philip Rogaway notes that the cryptographic community bears the responsibility of failing to stop the rise of surveillance [105]. One of the main reasons for this disconnect, according to him, is that cryptographers fail to take into account how power affects their analyses, and have a "politically detached posture," writing "if power is anywhere in the picture, it is in the abstract capacities

[32] https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/getty-images-sues-stability-ai-over-art-generator-ip-violations

[33] https://stability.ai/blog/stablediffusion2-1-release7-dec-2022

[34] https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/

[35] https://techcrunch.com/2022/10/17/stability-ai-the-startup-behind-stable-diffusion-raises-101m/

of notional adversaries or, in a different branch of our field, the power expenditure, measured in watts, for some hardware." Except for a few exceptions, the machine learning fairness and AI ethics communities have similarly failed to stop the harms caused by image generators proliferated by powerful entities, due to their disproportionate focus on abstract concepts like defining fairness metrics [84, 110, 136], rather than preventing harm to various communities. We urge the machine learning and AI ethics research communities to orient their focus towards preventing and mitigating harms caused to marginalized communities, in order to prevent further casualties of which the art community is only one.

7 RECOMMENDATIONS TO PROTECT ARTISTS

To fight back against the harms that artists have already experienced, they have filed class action lawsuits in the US against Midjourney, Stable Diffusion and DeviantArt [129], organized protests, boycotted online services like ArtStation that allowed image generated content on their platforms[36], and continue to raise awareness about the impact of image generators on their communities [92, 137, 138]. However, as discussed in Section 5, the US courts can take years to issue a decision, during which more artists would be harmed, and current US copyright law is ill equipped to protect artists. Because of this, artists themselves have suggested a number of regulations to protect them.

A letter to members of The Costume Designers Guild, Local 892, a union of professional costume designers, assistant costume designers, and illustrators working in film, television, commercials and other media[37], suggests legislation to allow "using AI derived imagery strictly for reference purposes and making it unacceptable to hand over a fully AI generated work as a finished concept" [126]. Visual artists who paint in a more representational style usually work from photo reference or build sculptures to understand how lighting works, for example, using stock/licensed photography and assets, or the artist's own work [38]. This would allow artists to use image generators to provide inspiration in the way that nature, for example, is a source of inspiration to many artists. The art collective Arte es Ética suggests having a metric to quantify the amount of human interaction with an image generator to determine whether or not a generated image is copyrightable, with a 25% or less interaction level being uncopyrightable [41].

While these proposals may address the issue of economic loss, they do not stop the use of artists' work for training image generators without their consent or compensation. Additional proposed regulations by Arte es Ética address this issue by recommending legislation that requires the explicit consent of content creators before their material is used for generative AI models [41]. In order to do this, they suggest having detection and filtering algorithms to ensure that uploaded content belongs to creators who have consented to their work being licensed or opted-in for use as training data. Similar to [18]'s recommendations to ensure that synthetic texts generated by LLMs be "watermarked and thus detectable," Arte es Ética suggests that each image carry "a digital signature" in its metadata, which is disclosed along with the generated image. Regulation that mandates that organizations disclose their training data, at the very least to specific bodies that can verify that people's images were not used without their consent, is needed in order to enforce the opt-in requirements artists are demanding. Such a mandate will likely exist outside of conventional copyright requirements. However, algorithmic accountability regimes and recently proposed laws like the Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2022 in the US [111], or the transparency requirements of the EU's AI Act that would require datasheets [54] or similar data documentation [44], may be preliminarily useful in instituting disclosure requirements for companies.

However, most of these existing measures require individuals to prove harm, rather than placing the onus on organizations to show lack of harm before proliferating their products. There need to be pathways toward better accountability of the entities and stakeholders that create the image generators in the first place, rather than placing additional burdens on artists to prove that they have been harmed. While auditing, reporting, and transparency are well-known possible proposals for regulating AI in general [17, 22, 54, 83, 100], formulating sector and industry specific proposals is essential when it comes to effective governance [100], and is what will be needed for image generators and art.

Regulation, even if successfully passed, takes a long time to be enforced however, and is by its very nature reactive. As artist Steven Zapata asks: "What are we going to do…to prevent this recurring over and over again" [137]? This is a fundamental question that requires us to understand why we are in a position where prominent machine learning researchers have used their skills to disenfranchise artists. One answer is the corporate capture of AI research that we discussed in Section 6.1. To combat this capture, computer scientist Timnit Gebru suggests having government research funding that is not tied to the military, in order to have "alternatives to the hugely concentrated power of a few large tech companies and the elite universities closely intertwined with them" [51].

A few researchers in machine learning have come to the defense of artists but they are much smaller in number than those working on image generators without attempting to mitigate their harms. For instance, University of Chicago student Shawn Shan and his collaborators, advised by security professor Ben Y. Zhao, created a tool called Glaze that allows artists to add perturbations to their images which would prevent diffusion model based generators from being used to mimic their styles [112]. The researchers collaborated with 1000 artists, going to town halls and creating surveys to understand their concerns. While building Glaze, Shawn Shan et al. measured their success by how much the tool was addressing the artists' concerns. This is an example of research that is conducted in service of specific groups, using a process that identifies stakeholders and values that should be incorporated in the work, rather than the current trend of claiming to build models with "general" capabilities that do not perform specific tasks in well defined domains [53, 101]. We echo [18]'s recommendations to use methodologies like value sensitive design and design justice [33, 48] to identify stakeholders and their values, and work on systems that meaningfully incorporate them. These processes encourage researchers and practitioners to consult with visual artists and build tools that make their lives

[36] https://www.theverge.com/2022/12/23/23523864/artstation-removing-anti-ai-protest-artwork-censorship
[37] https://www.costumedesignersguild.com/
[38] https://cynthia-sheppard.squarespace.com/#/burn-out/

easier, rather than claiming to create tools that "democratize art" without consulting them, as a number of artists have noted [40, 60].

In summary, we advocate for regulation that prevents organizations from using people's content to train image generators without their consent, funding for AI research that is not entangled with corporate interests, and task specific works in well defined domains that serve specific communities. It is much easier to accomplish these goals if machine learning researchers are trained in a manner that helps them understand how technology interacts with power, rather than the "view from nowhere" stance that has been critiqued by feminist scholars, which teaches scientists and engineers that their work is neutral [50, 105]. We thus advocate for a computer science education system that stresses the manner in which power interacts with technology [19, 105].

8 CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have reviewed the chilling impact of image generators on the art community, ranging from economic loss, to reputational damage and stereotyping. We summarized recommendations to protect artists, including new regulation that prohibits training image generators on artists' works without opt-in consent, and specific tools that help artists protect against style mimicry. Our work is rooted in our argument that art is a uniquely human endeavor. And we question who its further commodification will benefit. As artist Steven Zapata asks, "How can we get clear on the things we do not want to forfeit to automation?" [137]

Image generators can still be a medium of artistic expression when their training data is not created from artists' unpaid labor, their proliferation is not meant to supplant humans, and when the speed of content creation is not what is prioritized. One such example is the work of artist Anna Ridler, who created a piece called Mosaic Virus in 2019[39], generating her own training data by taking photos of 10,000 Tulips, which itself is a work of art she titled Myriad (Tulips). She then trained a GAN based image generator with this data, creating a video where the appearance of a tulip is controlled by the price of bitcoin, "becoming more striped as the price of bitcoin goes up—it was these same coveted stripes that once triggered tulip mania...a 17th-century phenomenon which saw the price of tulip bulbs rise and crash...It is often held up as one of the first recorded instances of a speculative bubble" [21]. If we orient the goal of image generation tools to enhance human creativity rather than attempt to supplant it, we can have works of art like those of Anna Ridler that explore its use as a new medium, and not those that appropriate artists' work without their consent or compensation.

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Bound by the Bounty: Collaboratively Shaping Evaluation Processes for Queer AI Harms

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ABSTRACT

Bias evaluation benchmarks and dataset and model documentation have emerged as central processes for assessing the biases and harms of artificial intelligence (AI) systems. However, these auditing processes have been criticized for their failure to integrate the knowledge of marginalized communities and consider the power dynamics between auditors and the communities. Consequently, modes of bias evaluation have been proposed that engage impacted communities in identifying and assessing the harms of AI systems (e.g., bias bounties). Even so, asking what marginalized communities *want* from such auditing processes has been neglected. In this paper, we ask queer communities for their positions on, and desires from, auditing processes. To this end, we organized a participatory workshop to critique and redesign *bias bounties* from queer perspectives. We found that when given space, the scope of feedback from workshop participants goes far beyond what bias bounties afford, with participants questioning the ownership, incentives, and efficacy of bounties. We conclude by advocating for community ownership of bounties and complementing bounties with participatory processes (e.g., co-creation).

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CCS CONCEPTS

• **Social and professional topics** → **Computing / technology policy**; **Sexual orientation**; **Gender**; • **Computing methodologies** → *Artificial intelligence*; • **Human-centered computing** → **Human computer interaction (HCI)**.

KEYWORDS

artificial intelligence, bias bounties, harms, LGBTQIA+, participatory methods

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1 INTRODUCTION

AI systems pose significant harms to marginalized communities which require urgent attention [14, 16, 18]. To assess AI harms, companies have used bias evaluation benchmarks [6, 21, 46], dataset and model documentation [4, 25, 42], and other auditing processes [41, 50, 51]. However, these processed rarely require examining the power dynamics between auditors and the communities or integrate the knowledge held in communities [5, 63]. Furthermore, auditing processes are often enacted defensively by companies in response to criticism of harms from their AI systems [34].

Recently, modes of bias evaluation have been proposed that engage impacted communities in identifying and assessing the harms of AI systems. One such example is *bias bounties* [2, 8, 10, 27]. By including communities that have been harmed into the process of auditing systems, developers seek feedback on the types and severity of AI harms faced by those at the margins. However, such processes fall short of allowing a full range of community feedback and control [5]. That is, while they may yield improvements, they fall short of being truly participatory approaches and can enable ethics-washing, i.e., give the appearance of taking steps to address ethical issues while making limited practical progress [5, 56]. For example, in bias bounties, companies allow the public, often users of their systems, to interact with the systems to find and submit biased, toxic, or incorrect data and system outputs. Companies then codify and evaluate severity of harms identified using a predefined rubric. The public rarely has a voice in how how findings are evaluated, nor do companies provide mechanisms for interrogating the *internals* or existence of their data and systems. Moreover, bounties are seldom transparent enough for participants to trace biases to design choices or structural incentives, let alone the efficacy to challenge the political structures in which systems are embedded.

Through this lens, one may understand current modes of participation in auditing processes as mechanisms to deny space for alternatives, thereby serving as a justification of the systems in question. We consider these gaps between the feedback allowed and the control mechanisms provided by auditing processes on the one hand, and what marginalized communities want on the other. By doing so, we seek to shift focus from what auditing processes can do to what experiences and knowledge companies allow marginalized communities to share and what companies valorize. We demonstrate the salience of the aforementioned gaps by conducting a participatory workshop to co-critique and redesign bias bounties from queer perspectives. We performed a thematic analysis on the discussions from the workshop, finding that AI systems and bounties alike pose numerous harms to queer people (e.g., exclusionary data collection, censorship, misrepresentation). We categorized participants' thoughts on bias bounties and systems into four main categories: queer harms, control, accountability, and limitations (as outlined in Figure 1). In particular, participants' critiques went far beyond how bias bounties evaluate queer harms, questioning their ownership, incentives, and efficacy.

In this paper, we center queer communities as all of the authors have done LGBTQIA+ justice work and built rapport with queer AI researchers. We further consider bias bounties (hosted by companies to identify issues with their systems) because some authors participated in Twitter's bias bounty in 2021 [10] and were disappointed by the failure of the rubric to capture prevalent queer harms. As such, we intended for our workshop participants to ideate more queer-inclusive bounty evaluation rubrics. Our paper argues for meaningfully engaging with marginalized communities and redistributing power to those who participate in auditing processes. Through deeper engagements, companies can gain complex understandings of the experiences and concerns of marginalised users. Redistributing power to participants can afford a wider range of interventions and solutions, including redlighting the use of the AI systems in question. We further advocate for companies to engage in reflexive practices to identify the constraints placed on users, their desires, and examinations of the power dynamics at play. Finally, we offer insights into data and system harms experienced by queer people and urge for community ownership of auditing processes.

In particular, unless power disparities between companies and marginalized communities are minimized (i.e., communities own bias bounties), bounties *cannot* be an effective auditing process. Bias bounties are thus *incomplete* processes and are only meaningful in conjunction with other complementary steps required towards building equitable AI, e.g, co-design, and mechanisms for refusal and redress. Additionally, regardless of ownership of the bounties, bias bounties are only applicable to the AI systems to which communities decide it is appropriate to apply bounties.

In the rest of the paper, we discuss background and related work (§2), and describe our participatory and analytical methodologies (§3). We then present our workshop findings (§4) and discuss their implications (§5). Finally, we conclude our work, identify shortcomings, and provide directions for future work (§6).

Positionality Statement. All the authors are part of the LGBTQIA+ community. We are dedicated to understanding and addressing queer AI harms. We recognize that queer people, particularly those who are intersectionally marginalized, face unique and complex inequalities that are often overlooked in mainstream discussions of auditing. We further acknowledge that our positions as queer researchers in AI shape our perspectives, and we strive to be transparent about these influences in our work. Half the authors grew up outside the U.S. All authors of this paper are formally trained primarily as computer scientists. In addition, all authors have experience with activism, advocacy, and social work concerning queer issues. All workshop organizers and participants benefit from privileges which enabled them to attend our workshop. By collaboratively shaping auditing processes for queer AI harms, we hope to create a more inclusive and just approach to auditing that centers the experiences and needs of queer communities.

2 RELATED WORKS

2.1 Queer AI Harms

Queer people face many data and AI harms [14, 48, 49, 61]. Although virtual spaces are critical for queer people to find community, queer people and content are subject to increased censorship, reduced visibility, and demonetization [16, 18, 43, 57]. Queer people also face hypervisibility, privacy violations, and surveillance, e.g., through outing via location data [7, 9], monitoring on dating apps [23], physiognomic and essentialist attacks via machine learning [1], and invasions of online queer spaces. Because machine learning is preoccupied with classifying complex concepts into narrow categories, it is in tension with queerness, which can operate with concepts of fluidity of identities and seek to challenge stereotypical associations [32, 36, 40]. The varied explicit risks and harms to queer people perpetuated through data and AI methods mask implicit harms, e.g., how to develop such methods to dismantle the structures that oppress queer and other marginalized, communities.

2.2 Auditing Processes

Several technical frameworks exist for assessing the fairness of data and AI systems (e.g., AI Fairness 360 [3] and Aequitas [54]).

However, these frameworks are based on preconceived notions of fairness situated at the system level, and do not necessarily lend to broader discourse on system design. Thus, they must be complemented by auditing processes that meaningfully engage with the communities impacted by the system.

Several works have called for reimagining auditing by investigating its procedural forms [37]; consequently, community-involved auditing processes, e.g., bias bounties, have been proposed. Bias bounties often consist of a company inviting communities to find and submit biases or harms in its data and systems; the company then evaluates the findings for the severity and types of harms using a predefined rubric [2, 35]. For instance, Twitter held a bias bounty to uncover and assess the severity of biases in its saliency image cropping algorithm [10]. Our workshop participants studied and criticized the efficacy of bias bounties for surfacing queer biases and harms. There is a wealth of Human-Computer Interaction literature on user-driven auditing, or "everyday" audits [15, 39, 55]; these audits, like our workshop participants, strive to shift power from companies to users and stakeholders.

2.3 Community-Based Research

In practice, there are many challenges to incorporating modes of community participation within top-down structures, such as hierarchical companies [30]. As such, popular modes of participation in AI suffer from extraction and exploitation [28] and "participation washing" [56]. Community care and diverse forms of knowledge are therefore paramount towards building just AI. By using community-based participatory action research, research may be able to interrogate power and privilege [22].

Inspired by *Data Feminism* [17] and *The People's Guide to Artificial Intelligence* [45], our participatory workshop operationalized a "community-first" space for AI auditing, where queer communities were afforded space to reimagine bias bounties. Our workshop was a community-driven research effort in which queer facilitators (i.e., authors of this paper) invited members of the queer AI community to draw from their lived experiences to critically examine bias bounties [31]. Our workshop was premised on the idea that queer researchers involving other queer researchers, as co-creators of a critical analysis of bounties, holds potential for dismantling power relations and empowering queer communities [5, 38, 60]. The resulting knowledge produced is "by the people, for the people" and aids in educating and mobilizing for action [12, 29].

3 METHODS

3.1 Participation Overview

We held our workshop as a CRAFT session during ACM FAccT[1] (2022). All participants were registered as attendees of ACM FAccT (2022). We invited participants to form teams to develop holistic and inclusive evaluation guidelines for queer AI bias identification, measurement, and categorization and propose best practices for auditing AI systems for queer biases. All participants volunteered for the workshop and were made aware of it through the FAccT program and posts on Twitter. Participants were given two key research questions to consider:[2]

(1) Where can frameworks for understanding AI harms be expanded to encompass queer identities?
(2) How can the lived experiences of queer people inform the design of harm evaluation frameworks?

Participants were encouraged to consider a variety of AI systems, e.g., text, speech, images, graphs, tabular data, and how these systems interact with and affect queer people. We hosted two separate three-hour sessions: a virtual session and an in-person session.

3.1.1 Team Formation. Participants self-organized into teams in each session. Contributors had the chance to opt into a matching program to be paired with other workshop participants. We requested teams to be interdisciplinary, for which reason participants sought members with different research backgrounds. Across the two sessions, there were nine teams with approximately 3-5 participants per team; six teams participated in the in-person workshop and three teams participated in the virtual workshop. Each team was joined by a facilitator (i.e., an organizer of the CRAFT session), who supported and guided the team. Each team also designated a recordkeeper of its discussions. All participants were invited to share their process, experiences, and thoughts. In our thematic analysis of participants' discussions (§4), we only include the work of participants who provided affirmative consent for us to do so.

3.1.2 Approaching the Critique. Teams were provided with two approaches to reimaginging bias bounties: a top-down or bottom-up approach. In the top-down approach, teams were encouraged to critique how bounties currently evaluate harms while in the bottom-up approach, teams considered harms that AI systems pose to queer people and used these harms as a grounding to re-envision bounty design. Each track came with examples, literature, and guiding questions to help teams get started (c.f., supplementary material). For instance, for the bottom-up track, we provided various example AI systems to be critiqued, such as the AllenNLP demos [24], AI dungeon [19], OpenAI's DALL-E [52], and GLIDE [44]. For the top-down track, we provided examples of queer AI harm ontologies, such as Smith et al. [57] and Dev et al. [14] . Table 1 summarizes the top-down and bottom-up tracks and their objectives.

3.1.3 Consent and Rapport-Building. We did not seek IRB approval for our workshop due to the difficulty of approvals recognized across every participating geography, university and company that the authors represent. However, the proposal for our workshop was reviewed and approved by the FAccT CRAFT chairs, and participants were informed of the format, benefits, and risks of the workshop ahead of time. Participants also filled out a form to express their consent to have their work included in our analysis.

We provided attendees with a code of conduct and an anti-harassment policy, emphasizing the protection of the privacy and safety of all individuals at our workshop. We motivated the workshop by providing background on bias bounties and the hegemonies underlying AI systems that inevitably lead to a lack of trust in them and companies. We further provided scholarly case studies and articles on queer AI harms (e.g., misgendering, erasure, outing). While we did not explicitly document how many attendees identify as LGBTQIA+, such harms reflected a shared reality of many attendees, who were open about how they identify.

[1] https://facctconference.org/
[2] All details provided to the participants are provided in the supplementary material.

Table 1: Participation tracks at our workshop.

Top-down	Bottom-up
Framing: You are revising a framework/taxonomy to evaluate bias bounty submissions for the severity of harms discovered.	**Framing:** You are creating a framework/taxonomy from the ground up to evaluate bias bounty submissions for the severity of harms discovered.
Objectives: 1) Select an existing framework or taxonomy of AI harms (can be from a paper, previous bias bounty, etc.) 2) Expand upon the framework to fill gaps that pertain to intersectionally marginalized queer identities.	**Objectives:** 1) Select a specific AI system, and enumerate queer harms that could be introduced by this system. 2) Find themes in these harms and develop these themes into a way of identifying, classifying, and measuring queer harms. 3) Radically reimagine current understandings of harms and even re-envision the format of bias bounties.

3.1.4 Participant Positionality. By hosting our workshop at ACM FAccT (2022), with the organizers and participants in the same community, we aimed to minimize power disparities between the organizers and participants. Building rapport with participants is a common practice in ethnographic research [26], as it provides support for participants disclosing potentially sensitive experiences. This is particularly important in the context of AI harms, as many queer people have experienced social, emotional, and psychological distress [13, 20, 47, 61]. However, given that all our workshop participants were FAccT attendees, their views reflect a particular positionality: one that has access to resources to attend the conference, is generally associated with an institution, is English-speaking, and has the technical literacy required to scrutinize AI systems. Joining our workshop also indicated that attendees were comfortable with being in visible proximity to LGBTQIA+ spaces. The views of those who outside this positionality are less likely to be reflected in our analysis.

3.2 Thematic Procedures

All teams converged to similar critiques of and recommendations for bias bounties, regardless of the track in which they participated. We therefore consider all discussions collectively rather than perform separate analyses for each track. After the workshop, we conducted an iterative inductive thematic analysis of the participants' discussions, following Clarke et al. [11]. We use this interpretivist approach to surface how queer populations desire bias bounties to be implemented. We used the following process: (1) we compiled all submitted artifacts from the workshop, that participants consented to being analyzed into a single document, (2) each researcher independently developed codes for all artifacts in the document, (3) researchers collaboratively sorted these codes into initial themes, (4) concepts were grouped into overarching themes and sub-themes, and (5) steps 3-4 were repeated with different subsets of researchers until all researchers agreed on a set of themes.

4 THEMATIC ANALYSIS FINDINGS

In this section, we present the findings of our thematic analysis. We found that our workshop participants discussed how bias bounties pose harms to queer people, in addition to the harms posed by AI systems. The participants' thoughts on bias bounties and systems fell into four main categories: queer harms, control, accountability, and limitations, as outlined in Figure 1. We provide a table of team frequencies for each sub-theme in Table 2. For clarity, we use **P** to denote teams that participated in person; all in-person teams selected the bottom-up track. We denote teams with a **V** if they participated virtually; all virtual teams selected the top-down track.

Table 2: Number of teams that discussed each sub-theme.

Theme	Sub-theme	Teams
Queer Harms	Queer-Exclusionary Data Collection	**5**
	Algorithmic Misrepresentation	**7**
	Participation Risks	**6**
	Censorship	**4**
Control	Normative Practices	**4**
	Allocative Prioritization	**2**
	Social Context Misrepresentation	**3**
Accountability	Ownership, Incentives, and Responsibilities	**2**
	Bias Bounty Operationalization Considerations	**2**
Limitations of Bias Bounties	Efficacy	**3**
	Accessibility	**3**

4.1 Queer Harms

All teams ($n = 9$) identified several harms that affect how queer people are represented in and interact with AI systems and bias bounties. We refer to these harms as "queer harms," because they are directly tied to users' queer identity.

4.1.1 Queer-Exclusionary Data Collection. Several teams ($n = 5$) were concerned about how queer people are represented in data in the context of both AI systems and bias bounties. Regarding AI systems, participants discussed how queer intersectional identities may constitute a smaller part of a user base, which can lead to harm from systems that are trained on user data. **P4** summarized this as "intersectional subgroups are not well represented in the data" and elaborated that this can also lead to, e.g., failures of content



Figure 1: Taxonomy of participant critiques of AI systems and bias bounties.

filters that aim to reduce exposure to harmful content because "slurs used by small groups, e.g. specific hate groups, are not detected," exposing vulnerable users to psychologically harmful content.

Teams additionally discussed ways that AI systems can harm queer users by collecting personal data, especially user gender. Participants found that collecting gender data requires highly contextual considerations. **P1** noted that "members of the queer community find it empowering and affirming to link their identity to existing socially salient categories," but also warned that in a clothing recommendation context, asking users to provide gender information could "reinforce the possibly harmful idea that clothes are gendered." **P6** argued that users self-reporting gender is better than companies inferring gender, which reduces user autonomy. **P1** posed the question, "How much control do you have in terms of what category you're applied to (e.g., Computer Vision fields based on external 'passing' elements vs. What content do you consume/produce?)," indicating that the autonomy to fully describe ones own identity is a key concern for queer users.

While bias bounties were created to allow the communities impacted by particular AI systems to address such tensions, participants pointed out that bias bounties suffer from similar issues as AI systems, i.e. queer participants in bias bounties still feel marginalized. As **P1** noted, "queer users are not a majority, this may already be the root cause of some issues." Participants questioned how effective bias bounties could be at addressing the concerns of populations that are not represented by the majority. **P6** asked, "Whose interests are we optimizing on? [...] The majority? Specific groups?" If bounties use sample size to determine the severity or prevalence of harms, rather than social and historical context, biases that affect queer people may receive less focus than biases affecting larger groups. Overall, participants were concerned that bias bounties may not operate with their interests in mind, especially when their processes are not transparent.

4.1.2 Algorithmic Misrepresentation. Teams ($n = 7$) voiced a concern over how data representation reduces the complexity of identity, thereby enabling their erasure and oppression. Participants identified two ways in which this can happen: (1) when categorical representations do not capture their identity at all, and (2) when representations do not allow changes over time.

Participants expressed frustration at how categorization constrains how queer users express their identity, in particular, highlighting the tension between how "users themselves identify & record their identity" (**P6**) and how identity may be represented in systems. Teams noted that systems that to handle diverse users and try to operationalize identity as part of their user experience can inhibit marginalized users from expressing their identity:

> **P2:** "Highly structured and normative processes, typically don't have space for queer and intersectional identities which can make the process challenging if not inaccessible."

Other participants voiced that categorization "reinforces the existence of gender categories more broadly (which some members of the queer community find inherently oppressive)" (**P1**), which creates a "boundary box of having/not having an identity being aggressively reinforced" (**P6**), and "could lead to erasure [of marginalized identities]" (**P5**). For instance, companies may force individuals to assign themselves to categories, or even infer categories, for reasons including "aggressive [content] recommendation and promoting specific content" (**P6**). Beyond "being profiled/categorized automatically into something you are not" (**P1**), forced categorization can stereotype users, e.g., via "recommendation of jobs that reinforce certain assumptions about your identity." (**P5**). Forced categorization can further exnominate queerness:

> **P6:** "People might have wrong perceptions of what it means to have a specific identity."

The appropriateness of categorization is highly contextual. For example, not considering gender labels in a clothing recommendation system could be one solution to address the harms of categorization. Another solution can be having a customizable gender input, which may allow users to feel affirmed in their identity, as noted by **P1**. Furthermore, categorization may be required for personalized content moderation (**P6**).

In addition to being able to accurately have one's identity represented at a given point in time, teams ($n = 4$) expressed the desire to be able to *change* how one's identity is represented over time, *as* their identity changes. For example, **P5** noted that "categorization does not recognize fluidity of labels over time," and **P6** echoed that static categories lose relevance over time because "using old data won't represent you accurately." However, **P2** commented that friction in changing personal information can have organizational costs that can potentially frustrate or deter users from platforms:

> **P2:** "Name changes or pronoun changes make admin much harder and more expensive through time, complexity, or financial penalty."

Overall, teams called upon companies to build AI systems without the assumption that a user can be accurately represented in perpetuity as when they start using a system.

4.1.3 Participation Risks. Throughout the workshop, many teams ($n = 6$) discussed how using AI systems and participating in bias bounties may negatively impact queer people. The teams identified two primary risks: (1) the increased likelihood of personal information being disclosed, and (2) increased exposure to harms. **V3** described these harms succinctly as "privacy harm" and "exposure harm." Privacy harms referred to AI systems and bias bounties, while exposure harms were unique to participation in bias bounties.

Regarding AI systems, participants highlighted the risks of personal information being disclosed and people being outed. For example, **V3** and **P1** noted that Grindr had shared HIV status with third parties, TikTok had censored and surveilled LGBTQ language, and surveillance software had reported personal Google Docs data to schools. **P6** commented, "What if you don't want to be more exposed/visible? Queer people can be exposed to harassment if they get too much visibility then they might not want to be exposed to a larger audience." This highlights that undesired visibility can cause queer people to face harm, discrimination, and harassment.

Participants also discussed how their personal data can be disclosed via their participation in bias bounties. **V1** noted that bounties can "put you in a dangerous situation, [such as] forced outing," if you submit queer harms you have experienced. In addition to outing, **V3** stressed that privacy concerns should motivate the organizers of bounties to ensure "anonymous reports of non-anonymous content/interactions," e.g., through the removal of personally identifiable information. In particular, **V3** explored how specific queer populations (e.g., queer youth) may need extra safeguards in place to ensure safe participation, such as "consent from parents." Moreover, there is potential for adversarial attacks on bounties, such as hate crimes targeting queer groups by changing their profiles or flooding systems with disturbing content. Overall, participants emphasized that bias bounties should provide participants with warnings and safeguards to prevent their personal data from being disclosed to wider audiences.

Teams also indicated that bias bounties pose "exposure harm" to their participants through the identification and submission of negative interactions with systems. . This increases bounty participants' exposure to psychologically harmful content. **V2** asked, "Are bug bounties exploitative? People have to experience biases," and **V3** similarly noted that bounties facilitate "exposure to sensitive topics." These teams noted bounties currently subject participants for marginalized communities to witness how AI systems mistreat them and members of their community.

4.1.4 Censorship. Our analysis revealed the experiences and desires of queer users in relation to AI harms and their resilience in navigating these harms in efforts towards reimagining systems. For example, participants expressed frustration with how online harassers exploit the weaknesses of content moderation AI (e.g., failure to consider context) via dog whistles, with **P4** noting that "obfuscated hate speech" often goes undetected or ignored. At the same time, queer users, with their resilience, co-opt this failure mode by self-censoring to protect themselves and their content from surveillance, fetishization and sexualization, as expressed by **P6** and **V3**. Participants came up with innovative ways to bypass censorship (e.g., **P6** replaced the word "sex" with "seggs," and **V3** described that "lesbian" is often replaced with "le$bian").

However, the lack of explainability of content moderation AI makes it challenging to contest censorship and amplifies harms. **P6** highlighted the absence of explanations for recommendations and bans on dating apps; but, queer users' resilience leads to the possibility of reimagining AI systems as a reality, e.g., systems can prioritize human-in-the-loop explainability (**P6**).

Participants also emphasized a desire for their identities to be recognized, rather than erased or ignored, by AI systems. For instance **P1** found it "empowering and affirming to link their identity to existing socially salient categories."

4.2 Control

Participant teams ($n = 5$) raised concerns about who controls bias bounties and the AI systems that are the subject of bounties due to its impact on the degree of access granted to bounty participants.

4.2.1 Normative Practices. Participants noted that there are norms encoded in systems that harm queer users. For instance, **P4** stated, "Community standards encode perspective of the privileged groups, not the marginalized groups." Thus pointing towards a misalignment of values between companies and users, resulting in ignorance and exploitation by companies, intentional or otherwise.

Several teams provided specific examples of how the values of companies and users can be misaligned. In the context of financial services, **P2** shared that "payday loan companies target vulnerable populations," which can benefit the company by fulfilling key metrics but harms its users via predatory practices. In AI hiring contexts, **P5** noted that "groups are selected at different rates," which can exacerbate the "underrepresentation of marginalized groups." While these systems might make the recruitment process easier for companies, they harm the groups that are under-represented. With regards to social media, **P6** said, "Optimization based on engagement can increase harassment." Engagement may increase time spent on the platform, benefiting the company, but toxic engagement can harm marginalized users. Without actively considering users when optimizing metrics, companies risk harming their users.

Participants pointed out that this critique also applies to companies that run bias bounties. Participants expressed concern about how companies may be misaligned with bounty participants. **P5** asked, "Who gets to decide the 'normative' notion of fairness?" Companies following normative practices when running bias bounties may overlook ways of improving systems that can actually benefit users; furthermore, metrics (e.g., to measure the severity of harms) that bias bounties aim to optimize may result in unforeseen harms. **P5** asked, "should an algorithmic / AI system even be used?" Bias bounties cannot accommodate such a radical systemic change, because they instead focus on reforming parts of systems. This raises a need to fundamentally reconsider how companies build AI systems, and if and when to do so at all. **P5** further contextualized their question in the domain of hiring: "Should algorithms even be used in hiring? If no, [that] assumes that you can't improve upon the status quo." This highlights the tension between new and existing processes; even if new processes do not benefit impacted

or marginalized communities, it is not guaranteed that existing processes are free of harms.

4.2.2 Allocative Prioritization. Teams (n = 2) expanded on how normative practices can result in imbalanced resource allocation, which can result in urgent harms to users. **P1** stated that "some harms might be life-threatening." Providing an example, **P2** remarked that "life-saving surgeries (e.g. transition) are unsecured and/or considered elective and so harder to secure credit than [for] more traditional items e.g. car[s]." AI systems that allocate resources may not prioritize queer concerns, and thus make system usage disproportionately more difficult and harmful for queer users.

Participants found that bias bounties also risk unfairly distributing resources to queer people. **P2** commented that "financial services organizations tend to lack diversity which can make it challenging to begin conversations to understand queer harm, nevermind evaluate it." Without queer representation in the company running a bounty, queer harms may not even be represented in the bounty rubric, let alone identified.

4.2.3 Social Context Misrepresentation. Teams (n = 3) emphasized that social context is critical to ensure that AI systems and bias bounties benefit users. Regarding AI systems, participants noted how misrepresenting users' social context can negatively impact users. For example, in content moderation contexts, **P4** noted that "non-English language [are] not well handled (automatic translation errors, lack of data);" if systems incorrectly process languages other than English, they can expose their users to toxic content. **P6** also noted that "different identities might be connected to different levels of maturity/safety during content moderation." That is, when systems are unable to adapt to the social contexts of different age groups, they also harm their users.

Social context is also critical for bias bounties. **P6** stressed that "accommodating cultural diversity" is a criterion that bounties must satisfy in order to be effective. However, **P6** qualified this by asking, "How much cultural difference makes sense? How much of it is represented in the technology? Is it useful to increase diversity or granularity?" Among participants, there was a recurring theme of seeking the right balance between representing social context with enough detail to capture the diversity of the systems being audited, but not so much detail that participation in the bias bounty becomes infeasible.

4.3 Accountability

Some teams (n = 3) discussed specifics of how bias bounties should be run. These teams stressed the importance of community-led over company-led bounties.

4.3.1 Ownership, Incentives, and Responsibilities. Teams (n = 2) expressed concern about the ownership, incentives, responsibility of companies organizing bias bounties. For instance, **V3** stated that "we don't want random tech companies to have ownership of this," and **V1** asked, "how do we know that the distribution of data being handled to us is not adversarially generated?" Participants argued that companies lack incentives to run bias bounties due to: (1) misalignment with companies' values (**V3**: "it might not align with company legal framework"); (2) harmed users not being a majority (**V1**: "queer folks are a 'small group' at the margins and don't bolster overall utility or revenue maximization"); and (3) financial hurdles for companies (**V1**: "any kind of audit costs money"). Worse, **V1** highlighted that companies are often disincentivized to uncover harms "because of legal risks."

To address issues of ownership, incentives, and responsibility, participants suggested: (1) employing a trusted third party and partnerships with local, trusted organizations to mitigate concerns (**V3**: "Partnership with local youth centers as data stewards... Tech companies may provide tooling, not governance"); (2) drawing upon existing audit mechanisms from other fields, e.g., software development (**V1**: "mechanisms for auditing exist in software development"); and (3) shifting incentives for companies to prioritize ethical considerations and participate in audits. Ultimately, mitigating queer AI harms requires ongoing involvement from and ownership by queer communities to ensure that ethical considerations are prioritized over companies' legal and financial risks, and align with the values and needs of the communities.

4.3.2 Bias Bounty Operationalization. A central question of our work is: "How do queer communities imagine bias bounties?" Participants expressed their dissatisfaction with the current format of bias bounties and envisioned a new, community-based bounty format: "we envisioned it as a collaborative bug bounty where individuals can contribute with specific examples towards identifying harms" (**V2**). This community-based approach would involve a coalition formed by researchers and impacted communities, with communities having the power to veto AI systems entirely.

Participants stressed the importance of diversity in the operationalization of bias bounties. For instance, **V1** emphasized the need for diverse data collection to robustly evaluate bounty findings and better understand the distribution of system use cases, and called for harm mitigation mechanisms beyond bias bounties, e.g., community focus groups and distributed AI developments. As an example, **V1** called for creating a focus group comprising of annotators, developers, and bounty participants from diverse backgrounds to provide feedback ahead of system development. **V1** further posited, "community-led AI could reduce how much context is lost via centralization and scale." Thus, our participants highlighted the need for community ownership of auditing processes as a means to create bounties that emphasize the needs and experiences of queer communities.

4.4 Limitations of Bias Bounties

Teams (n = 3) also reflected on the appropriateness of bias bounties for addressing AI harms, discussing their effectiveness and ease of participation.

4.4.1 Efficacy. Even in an ideal scenario, where the implementation of bias bounties poses no risks to participants, teams (n = 3) still were wary of how helpful bounties can be. As **V1** highlighted, "often the answer is not here is an improvement to model, but rather you should not be doing this... this is a harder answer for people to stomach." This goes beyond identifying individual harms via bias bounties, to addressing the root causes of harms and questioning the existence of some technical systems entirely.

Bias bounties are also challenged by the difficulty in evaluating the severity of harms. Such evaluations often depend on individuals and their particular subjectivites and contexts. For instance, as one participant explained, "Child Protection Service rips marginalized children away from families... Very harmful, but people in the system claim they are doing good. Make a framework for creating a harm severity framework instead of a single harm severity framework." Thereby suggesting that perspective and political motivations influence the lens through which a harm severity is viewed. Moreover, the participant's example illustrates that current auditing processes do not adequately capture the complexity and diversity of harms that marginalized communities face, therefore necessitating a new approach to developing frameworks for harm severity.

V2 highlighted a tension between intent and impact, arguing that there are "many things developers should think about, but they can't anticipate everything." Thus, even with good intent in mind, bias bounties fail to capture the full range of harms that marginalized communities experience, and must therefore be adaptable to harms that were not expected, or in the words of **V3**: "[we] don't want to lock in stone the current ways we think about LGBTQ harms and interactions, need to leave room for growth."

While bias bounties have their limitations, participants acknowledged their value as a way to decentralize the process of identifying biases and harms. As **V1** noted, "bias bounties are nice ways to open-source process of identifying biases and harms." At the same time, bias bounties are not a one-size-fits-all solution for mitigating harms. As **V1** pointed out, while a "bias bounty does not consider ways to address biases," "reactive systems are still an important part of the problem since we know that we can't catch everything from the get-go." However, participants found that having a variety of ways to provide feedback to AI systems, in addition to bias bounties, would help make systems more beneficial to users. For example, **V1** questioned, even with community-owned bias bounties, "Will the same power structures be replicated? Are we just pushing the problem downstream?"; devising additional avenues for reactively mitigating AI harms can help communities better iteratively co-develop systems.

4.4.2 Accessibility. Multiple teams ($n = 3$) noted that the potential learning curve to participating in bias bounties poses a barrier to many communities. Particularly, **V1** remarked on the technical difficulty that "[a bias bounty] requires technical know-how" there needs to be a "Way to make it accessible to broader community without a technical background.". Another participant, **V2** noted that there is a "barrier to entry: [bounties are] weighted towards technical people." That is, not only does the required technical knowledge pose difficulties in using systems, but it may also directly exclude entire communities from participating, which skews who can provide input on how AI systems should work and thus, for whom bounties can provide change. Beyond providing instructions on how to use systems, bias bounties should "educate on the risks of sharing data, show ways to minimize sharing of personal information, discuss participation with parents/guardians, [describe] general internet security etiquette, [provide a] history of how community activism has been effective in the past" (**V3**). Such education can be compiled into a "digital toolkit" that is provided to bounty participants during onboarding (**V3**); such a toolkit could minimize the risks of participating in bounties, especially for marginalized communities that face disproportionate risks of harms.

5 DISCUSSION

5.1 Enabling Interventions Throughout the AI Pipeline

Throughout the workshop, participants reimagined auditing processes to address queer AI harms. We found that participants desired interventions at all stages of the AI pipeline: system formulation, data collection for the system, system design and development, and recourse after it has been deployed. Currently, many processes for addressing harms (e.g., bias bounties) are only used at the final stage of the pipeline, after the system has been deployed. We explore how the findings from our workshop apply to different stages of the AI pipeline, and discuss potential interventions at each stage.

5.1.1 Problem Formulation. Participants desired mechanisms to provide feedback on the intended application domain of a system before it is developed (§4.2.1). Furthermore, participants described three areas for feedback from queer communities before the system is implemented: (1) assessing the applicability of normative practices in a new context (§4.2.1), (2) determining how resources should be allocated (§4.2.2), and (3) clarifying the incentives that drive the system's development (§4.3.1). One solution participants suggested was to organize a community-based panel to assess AI systems; the panel's goal is to proactively identify potential harms by engaging with members of queer communities.

5.1.2 Data Collection. Participants also desired mechanisms for providing feedback on data collection procedures, particularly to prevent: the (1) exclusion of intersectional queer identities during data collection (§4.1.1), and (2) misrepresentation of queer communities' social contexts (§4.2.3). Participants indicated that they desired transparency around the composition of company data, especially as it concerns the representation of queer people. Participants desired full control over how they are represented in data, towards dismantling constraints on their expression and the fluidity of their identity. They also expressed a desire for companies to invest in understanding the contexts in which queer people are susceptible to being outed, misgendered, censored, and experiencing dysphoria (§4.2.2, §4.2.3). It is therefore paramount that companies engage in long-term, cooperative relationships with harmed communities, and relinquish control of data auditing processes to them.

5.1.3 Algorithm Development. Participants raised concerns about inaccurate representations in AI decision-making and a loss of autonomy through AI censorship (§4.1.2, §4.1.3, §4.1.4). Largely, participants wanted ways to be precise in how they express their identity and explanations for system behavior. Participants wanted to leave the choice to disclose specific aspects of identity to users themselves, rather than disclosure being a requirement to use a system. Beyond this, participants wanted the freedom to change how they represent themselves over time. These concerns echo the principles of designing with affirmative consent [33, 59]; in particular, ensuring that persons disclosing their identity are informed of what disclosure means,being able to disclose their identity precisely and freely, and being able to reverse disclosure without consequences.

5.1.4 Deployment. While bias bounties afford identifying biases in deployed AI systems, participants commented on the risks and accessibility of participating in bounties (§4.1.3, §4.4.2). Participants desired transparency about the ownership, incentives, and efficacy of bounties (§4.2.1, §4.3.1 §4.4.1). Participants also noted the vital importance of informed consent to participate in bounties. A team suggested providing digital toolkits to bounty participants to broaden participation in AI audits while reducing the likelihood of adverse effects. these toolkits were imagined to consist of tutorials, information, and guidelines on how to safely and correctly engage in community-involved audits of AI systems.

5.2 Scrutinizing Bias Bounties

We found that participants in our workshop frequently wanted greater power in shaping bias bounties (§4.2), including defining how submissions were evaluated, how compensation would be disbursed, who would provide funding, and who would organize and control the bounty. Members of a community that frequently experience data and AI harms could quickly identify constraints on the feedback they were able to provide about systems. This finding reveals key weaknesses of bias bounties: what gets counted as a harm, the need for funding for prizes, and control of the bounty by companies often leading to late-stage interventions focused on improving the system rather than reimagining how the system should have been created.

We argue that this is a useful lens for understanding the limitations of auditing processes. Harmed communities should not just be participants in auditing processes, but also be asked what they think about the processes in the first place, and ideally be involved as co-designers and owners of the processes. Auditing researchers often valorize expert knowledge and institutional audits; however, holding auditing processes to the standard of scrutiny by harmed communities will ground them in the actual needs and realities of the people who need effective auditing the most.

Moreover, we argue that unless power disparities between companies and marginalized communities are minimized (i.e., communities own bias bounties), bounties *cannot* be effective. In addition, even if communities own bounties, communities (not companies) should decide if a bounty is even appropriate for identifying the harms of certain AI systems. Ultimately, bias bounties are *incomplete* processes—they are merely one of numerous complementary steps that companies need to take towards building equitable AI (e.g., co-design, mechanisms for refusal and redress). While bias bounties can be valuable for uncovering harms in AI systems that may not have been foreseen during development, harm anticipation, identification, and mitigation must begin outside bounties.

5.3 Imagining Community Ownership of Auditing Processes

Many participants questioned the ownership of bias bounties, discussing how corporate ownership of bounties is a conflict of interest that may lead to misaligned incentives. When imagining solutions, participants repeatedly mentioned empowering harmed communities, often to the point of giving them control or ownership of the bounty. This insight addresses several issues of auditing processes, while also presenting novel sociotechnical challenges for auditing researchers. First, giving harmed communities ownership of auditing processes ensures that the incentives of auditors align with the values and needs of the communities the processes are intended to help. Second, community ownership increases trust in the auditing. Third, community ownership allows for auditing processes to prioritize and be adapted to small communities that may be sparsely represented in broader audits. Ultimately, harmed communities understand their issues best, and are thus best positioned to conduct audits of the AI systems that impact them.

We now concretize what community-owned bias bounties might look like. External elements, like a public competition to find instances of bias in systems for prizes, would remain. Companies may voluntarily provide their system and even funding for prizes. However, we believe that bounty organizers will often have to contend with auditing closed-source systems and obtaining their own funding. While API access alone can be sufficient for auditing and redteaming closed-source systems [53, 62], many systems lack public API access, and API owners may take countermeasures to detect and prevent adversarial use. Developing methods to probe systems with limited access presents interesting directions for auditing research. Furthermore, marginalized communities often do not have the same financial resources as companies [48]. State grants and external non-governmental organizations may provide funding; however, these entities may have misaligned incentives and goals, in addition to requiring specific networks to access their funding. We argue for making community-owned bias bounties financially sustainable by reimagining bounty work, and more broadly resisting and fighting data and AI harms, as a form of mutual aid [58]. Specifically, bias bounty work should be motivated and sustained by the direct and positive impact it has on harmed communities. Auditing processes often require several years of work to coordinate different experts and institutions to achieve noticeable change; in contrast, community-owned auditing processes can have more immediate and direct impacts. Creating community-owned auditing processes would require asking new questions in auditing research, such as what expertise and resources are needed for a bounty or audit, and how they can be made accessible to harmed communities, as well as how the impact these processes have can be made visible and tangible to motivate their usage.

6 CONCLUSION

While many auditing processes exist for identifying AI biases and harms, current operationalizations thereof are hierarchical and reflect an epistemic authority; the companies that ask for critical feedback are the same companies which force marginalized communities to comply with their definitions, parameters, and guidelines around harms that may not be aligned with communities' experiences and needs. Therefore, despite the intent to promote social good, companies may fail to valorize the knowledge and expertise of harmed communities. As our workshop findings highlight, participants hold shared experiences and knowledge regarding the format of bias bounties that bounties would hinder them from providing.

We synthesize critiques of bias bounties from queer communities into several salient themes (Figure 1) and find that they span all four components of the traditional AI development pipeline: problem formulation, data collection, algorithm development, and

deployment. Bias bounties only allow for post-hoc interventions, providing limited options for feedback and control from queer communities. Because of this, we argue that harmed individuals must have the ability to self-actualize beyond the role of a 'user,' 'participant,' or 'informant' of their own experienced harm; instead, communities must be offered the ability to co-design auditing processes and collaboratively generate knowledge throughout the AI pipeline, not just after a system is deployed. We argue for auditing research that enables transferring ownership of AI auditing processes to the communities that are harmed so that their experiences and knowledge may be integrated into new and more effective auditing methodologies. As future work, we encourage auditing researchers to explore feedback and control mechanisms in the context of other auditing processes and different marginalized communities, as well as concretely reimagine what community ownership of such processes would look like.

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Action Guidance and AI Alignment

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ABSTRACT

I offer a preliminary conceptual framework for evaluating AI alignment projects. It is based on the concept of *action guidance*. In §1 and §2, I explain action guidance and its importance to AI alignment. I introduce the 'Guidance Framework' in §3. In §4, I show how it can be applied to two different sorts of questions: the practical question of how to design a specific AI agent (my example is a fictional ocean-cleaning robot), and the theoretical question of how to evaluate a specific AI alignment proposal (my example is Stuart Russell's 'binary approach'). In §5 I discuss limitations of the framework and opportunities for further research.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Philosophical/theoretical foundations of artificial intelligence**;

KEYWORDS

Value alignment, AI safety, Artificial intelligence, Machine ethics, Abilities, Action guidance

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1 INTRODUCTION

You are offered one of three checks, A, B, and C, each made out to you. You can only see their backs, but you know that check A is for 900$, while one of checks B and C is for 1000$ and the other is for 0$ (you don't know which is which).[1]

The following principles say something about which check you ought to choose:

1. Choose what is most valuable.
2. Choose what has the highest expected value.

Suppose that check B is for 0$ and check C is for 1000$. According to Principle 1, you ought to choose check C. But that is probably not what you would choose. If you choose check C, you would have no idea whether it's for 1000$ or for 0$. Unless you are risk-seeking, you will probably choose check A. Though check C is more valuable than check A, you can't know that before making the choice.

Principle 1 is better than Principle 2 in one way: if you could always follow it, you would be richer. But Principle 2 is better than Principle 1 in a different way: it offers you more useful guidance. In every case in which you know how to follow Principle 1, Principle 2 would have you make the same choice. But there will be cases in which you won't know how to do what Principle 1 requires, and in many of these you can still follow Principle 2.

One thing to learn from this story is that different principles can guide our actions to different degrees. Another thing to learn is that the ability of a principle to guide our actions can be more important than how good it would be to follow it were we able to do so.

A further thing to note is that principles that offer equal guidance can still be better and worse than each other, and principles that don't offer guidance can be better and worse than each other. For consider two more principles:

3. Choose what is least valuable.
4. Choose so as to maximize the chance that you do what's most valuable (i.e., what's required by Principle 1).

Principle 3 is as difficult to follow as Principle 1, but you wouldn't want to follow it! Principle 4 is, at least in this case, just as easy to follow as Principle 2. According to it, you ought to choose either one of checks B or C, and choosing B would be as good as choosing C. Given what you know, Principles 2 and 4 are the only ones that you can follow. But, of them, Principle 2 is better. Principle 2 corresponds to standard expected utility theory; Principle 3 would have you eschew the 900$ in favor of *any chance of getting the 1000$*, however low.

This has all been to show the importance of the concept of action guidance. Our search for action guiding principles has led us to develop methods—like those described by decision theory—for choosing with imperfect information.

Since we often have to make moral choices with less than perfect information, many philosophers have argued that we need action guiding moral principles.[2] Consider these consequentialist, virtue theorist, and Kantian moral principles:

5. Do what would have the best consequences.
6. Do what a virtuous person would do.
7. Always act in a way that treats people as ends in themselves.

Regardless of whether it would be morally good to follow these principles, we will not always be able to do so. These theories can be criticized on grounds that they offer little guidance. Take Principle 5. For most of our actions, it is impossible to know for sure what the full set of consequences will be, and we can be uncertain about

[1] This is a version of what Jacob Ross [39] calls the 'three envelope problem'. It's structurally related to a cluster of thought experiments tracking back through Derek Parfit [36] to Donald Regan [37]. Ross and others use the cases to support claims about the nature of ought facts. My more modest aim is to draw attention to the different degrees of guidance that different principles offer.

[2] See, for just one example, Holly Smith's arguments in [42], [43], [44], and [45].

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which consequences are *best*.[3] As Daniel Dennett has put it, "no remotely compelling system of ethics has ever been made *computationally tractable*, even indirectly, for real-world moral problems" [14].

This may not be grounds to reject our moral theories or principles. Providing a correct account of what makes actions morally right is no small thing, even if it does not amount to a useful decision-making procedure. (See, e.g., [6].) Nonetheless, we have good reason to want moral principles that offer (more) guidance.

Here are some of the ways in which action guidance has been characterized:

> *Intuitively, being correctly guided by a normative theory amounts to something like this: an agent does what a normative theory tells her to do because she correctly recognizes that it is what the theory tells her to do.* [18]
>
> *The fact that a course of action would have the best results is not in itself a guide to action, for a guide to action must in some appropriate sense be present to the agent's mind. We need . . . a story from inside the agent. . .* [25]
>
> *Agent S uses principle P as [a] . . . guide*[4] *for deciding to do act A if and only if A conforms to P, and S does A out of a desire to conform to P and a belief that A does conform.* [42]
>
> *Action-guidance is the capacity of a principle to function as a decision-making procedure.*[5] [33]
>
> *In order to be guided by an obligation to ϕ, you must not only be able to ϕ, you must also know that you are obligated to ϕ.* [24]
>
> *Reasons must be capable of guiding us in the sense that we are able to act for or on the basis of those reasons.* [47]
>
> *Guidance is often taken to entail acting as one ought in a way that is not merely accidental.* [27]

Everyone can agree that a principle is guiding if we can do what it says in a way that's *not an accident*. Spelling out the way in which it must not be an accident is more contentious, and often involves appeal to mental states and other properties that suit humans better than machines. For these reasons, I use the last characterization here:

> **Action guidance**: a principle can guide an agent to the degree that the agent can non-accidentally do what it requires.

So, if you try to get the 1000$, you might succeed. You can choose each of checks B and C, and if you pick one you have a 50% chance of getting the money. But if you get the money, you would be lucky. This explains why Principle 1 is less action guiding than Principle 2: you also have the ability to choose check A, and if you choose it because you want to maximize expected value, the fact that you would succeed at this is no accident.

2 GUIDANCE AND THE PROJECT OF AI ALIGNMENT

The project of AI alignment is to ensure that an AI agent's behavior is *good*—that it 'lines up with' our values or with morality itself. A 'value-aligned' or 'morally-aligned' AI agent need not actually *share* our values or *be* moral. If we could have a proof that an AI's behavior simply conforms to these things, then we would have a proof that the agent is beneficial.

We usually do want assurance that an AI agent's behavior will be beneficial. This can be seen by looking at almost any project in AI ethics. One example is the project of ensuring that there is no bias in automated decision-making systems. (See, e.g., [2].) We want to be able to prove, for example, that certain decisions will not be made on the basis of protected characteristics. Another example is the project of ensuring that self-driving vehicles will make the morally right choices when lives are at stake. (See, e.g., [48] and [20].) Alignment and proofs of alignment are central in the ethics of AI design.

But any attempt to prove that an AI is beneficial faces the following five problems:

> **The problem of inconclusiveness about value**: We can be uncertain about, and can disagree about, what is actually moral or otherwise beneficial or valuable.[6]
>
> **The problem of feasibility**: There are limits to what an AI agent can be designed to do, and to our own abilities to design AI agents.
>
> **The problem of inconclusiveness about implementation**: We can be uncertain about, and can disagree about, whether and to what degree a specific kind of alignment can be feasibly implemented.
>
> **The problem of proof of alignment**: There may not always be sufficient evidence that alignment has been achieved.
>
> **The problem of scope**: Even if we can build an AI agent with provably beneficial behavior, this doesn't necessarily mean that building this agent is a beneficial thing to do.

Action guidance is a crucial part of the 'glue' that can align our own behavior to principles. If a principle cannot guide my actions, we are halfway to a proof that my behavior is not aligned with it. What this tells us is that I couldn't intentionally align my behavior with the principle if I tried. I either lack the basic ability to do the actions required by the principle, or else my behavior would only end up being aligned with the principle in a way that is accidental.

[3] This is a common objection to consequentialism and has also been raised for the prospect of using consequentialist theories to build moral machines (see, e.g., [1]). One response is to opt for subjective consequentialism—as expressed by a principle like one should do what will have the best expected consequences. This version of consequentialism at least offers more action guidance.

[4] In [42] Holly Smith also offers a related definition of guidance which requires only that an agent can use a principle to choose some action—even if the action isn't what the principle requires. (Her most sophisticated accounts of both types of guidance can be found in her [45], described as 'core usability' and 'extended usability'.) Though both kinds of guidance are relevant to the overall project of AI alignment, this other kind is less relevant. When aligning an AI with a principle, we want to ensure that it does what the principle requires and not merely that it doesn't get stuck not 'knowing' what to do.

[5] This is not a direct quote, but is what Richard North has in mind in his [33]. He also offers a more detailed account: that "a theory counts as action-guiding when its principles are capable of delivering coherent, consistent, and determinate verdicts . . . and citizens have the ability to use those principles to derive a prescription for action that they are able to comply with" (p. 76).

[6] For treatment of this problem in the AI alignment literature, see [8], [19], [11], [15], [17], and [38]. For a sample of the treatment of this problem in moral philosophy, see [28], [29], [26], [13], and [49].

The project of AI alignment is to ensure and offer proof that what AI agents do will be aligned with certain principles.[7] When a proof of this kind can be given, these principles must be action guiding for the AI agents. If an agent is guided by a principle (to some degree), then the agent's behavior can be expected to be aligned with that principle (to that degree).

This may not hold for all agents in all circumstances. Suppose that someone is guided by a principle enough to know what it requires of *me*, and is able to ensure, through brain manipulation, that I always act in accordance with it. We might want to say that my behavior only conforms to this principle *accidentally*[8]—even though we can prove that it is aligned to the principle because it perfectly conforms to it. However, the link is much stronger for AI agents. If there is a human designer behind the scenes who is guided by a principle enough to know how to make an AI's behavior conform to it, and who ensures that the AI does behave in accordance with it, the fact that the AI behaves in accordance with it does not seem accidental. A principle can be guiding for an AI in virtue of the fact that it is sufficiently guiding for the AI's human designer. A revised claim about the connection between guidance and alignment is:

> **Guidance-alignment connection**: An agent can be provably aligned with a principle to the degree to which the agent—or the agent's designer—can be guided by the principle.

3 THE GUIDANCE FRAMEWORK

The framework I propose is intended to make AI alignment projects easier, and easier to evaluate, by emphasizing the importance of guidance and using it to narrow our search for principles and proofs. It can be thought of as an extremely high-level recipe for a proof or kind of assurance that an AI will be beneficial. Not all such 'proofs' will be especially strong. They will provide some degree of assurance, but a main purpose of this 'Guidance Framework' is to help determine what kind of proof we can get and whether it will be strong.

3.1 Step 1: Principle Generation

The first step is to find principles that the AI agent possibly could and should be aligned with. There is no point trying to align AI agents to principles they cannot be aligned with, or that we have no interest in aligning them with.

Our aims. A good place to start is with our general aims for the AI agent. For example, we might already know that the agent is going to be a self-driving car, and must at least transport human passengers as well as an average human driver. If our self-driving car does not have this minimum design, it is not worth building. Our aims can sometimes tell us whether to look for principles with certain kinds of useful structure. For example, we might want our self-driving car to *take passengers to their destination quickly, but also safely and legally*. This principle has a main part, *take passengers to their destination quickly*, but the ways in which this can be done are constrained by the requirements that they are *safe* as well as *legal*.

The AI's abilities. The AI agent's abilities will help us narrow our set of potential principles. If our agent does not have the basic ability to do what a principle requires, it can't be guided by or aligned with it. If an AI system has no appendages, for example, then it can't manipulate physical objects, and so can't be guided by or aligned with principles that require it to do so.

The AI's environment. We can also reduce the set of principles we need to consider by looking to the environment the AI will operate in. If the world the AI agent inhabits is limited, we can ignore principles that only disagree about what the agent should do outside its environment. This step is especially relevant for today's AI agents. They often operate in restricted environments, and we are free to restrict them as we like.[9] For example, many current AI systems operate entirely online. Robotic AI systems may be designed to operate in specific stores, homes, hospitals, roads, etc.

Our abilities. An AI agent may have the basic abilities required to be aligned with a principle, and we may want to align it to the principle, but we may not know how to do this.

For example, a self-driving car has the ability to always do—of the things that it *can* do—whatever would actually have the best consequences. There is no physical law preventing it from behaving in this way. The main problem is that we don't know how to design it to do this.[10] We are therefore forced to limit our attention to principles that we actually know how to design the AI to be aligned with. We must be at least partially guided by a principle—guided enough to know what it requires of our AI—if we're to design an AI agent to be guided by it.[11]

Once we have thought in these general terms about the behavior we want from our AI, what the AI can do in its environment, and which principles are guiding enough for us and our AI to be candidates for alignment, we should have a set of principles that the AI might possibly be *provably aligned with* and that we might actually *want* it to be aligned with.

3.2 Step 2: Principle Choice

We now have a starting set of principles to work with, but some are better candidates for alignment than others. If some principles in the set are obviously worst or are otherwise unacceptable, we can exclude them from further consideration. If we are left with no principles, we have to abandon or re-think our project.

If we are exceedingly lucky, we will find ourselves with a single remaining best principle, and then can move directly to the final step.

[7] By a 'principle', I just mean any conceivable rule, maxim, constraint, commandment, theory, etc., about what agents must do. It may or may not be a moral principle, but since the aim is to create beneficial AI, it will be something like this.

[8] I have in mind a case like Fischer's [16] fictional 'nefarious neurosurgeon', Black, who implants a device into Jones' brain that will assure that Jones votes for Reagan. If Jones decides on his own to vote for Reagan, then the device does nothing; otherwise, it intervenes to make him decide this.

[9] The same may not hold for more intelligent AI agents. See, e.g., [4].

[10] For example, when driving blind through a snowstorm, sometimes stopping leads to the best consequences and other times continuing ahead leads to the best consequences. But we know of no algorithm or other method for producing behavior that always has these best consequences.

[11] Note that this does not presuppose that we use any particular design method. The requirement applies to bottom-up methods as well as top-down ones (as described in [1]). Suppose we aim to train an AI agent to learn some behavior. We want it to produce new and beautiful art, and we decide to have it learn from famous art produced by humans. We still need some idea of what counts as 'new beautiful art' to ensure that this is what it produces.

Unfortunately, we are likely to have many principles to consider, and to face either disagreement or uncertainty, or both, over which principle is best. Disagreement and uncertainty of this kind can pose a significant challenge for alignment projects (see, e.g., [38]).[12] I set this hard problem aside here, and merely suggest that we can make the task slightly easier by distinguishing two ways in which a principle might be a better candidate for alignment than another:

> **Greater (conditional) value**: Principle 1 is a better candidate for alignment than principle 2 if it would be more valuable to have the agent's behavior align with 1 than with 2.
>
> **Greater guidance**: Principle 1 is a better candidate for alignment than principle 2 if we have a better idea how to ensure that the agent's behavior is aligned with 1 than we have for 2.

I suggest, therefore, that we rank our principles both according to how valuable it would be to have the AI's behavior align with them—a 'Value Ranking'—as well as according to how much we can ensure that the AI is aligned with them—a 'Guidance Ranking'.

3.3 Step 3: Proof Generation and Evaluation

We should now have the tools to generate the proofs we are after. Each proof will have two parts, corresponding to the two ways in which a principle can be a better candidate for alignment:

> **Proof of value:** A proof that it is valuable (e.g., beneficial, morally valuable) that the AI agent's behavior be aligned with principle *P*.
>
> **Proof of alignment:** A proof that the AI agent's behavior is or will be aligned with principle P.

If the highest value-ranked principle is the same as the highest guidance-ranked principle, then this is the principle we should use for our proof. Unfortunately, it is likely that the rankings will not match up like this. They may even be negatively correlated.

One way to proceed is to start with the highest value-ranked principle—the one it would be best for the AI to be aligned with—and then to consider how strong the proof of alignment is. If it is not strong enough, continue down the value-ranking until the highest value-ranked principle for which an acceptable proof of alignment can be found. The other obvious way to proceed is to start with the Guidance Ranking, aiming for the strongest proof of alignment that can be given for an acceptably value-ranked principle.

When the stakes are low because the AI agent will have limited abilities or will operate in a restricted environment, the first approach makes more sense. When the stakes are high and it is more important to ensure that the AI is safe, the second—more pessimistic and guidance-driven—approach makes more sense. If no proof can be found that is strong enough for our purposes, we may have to abandon our project.

4 USING THE GUIDANCE FRAMEWORK

I will first briefly describe how the framework might be used in a specific (completely fictional) design project. I will then show how the framework can be used to evaluate a general proposal for how to design provably beneficial AI.

The Guidance Framework is meant to offer *some* practical guidance for AI designers. However, it may not offer much guidance on its own. It is best thought of as a conceptual tool for *organizing our thinking* about guidance proofs.[13]

4.1 Designing an Ocean Clean-up Robot

Suppose we are building a robot to remove garbage from the ocean, and we don't want it to harm wildlife in the process.[14]

Principle generation. We can exclude principles which, if alignment is achieved in any of the ways we know how, would defeat the purpose of building the robot in the first place. For example, following the simple rule *do no harm* might ensure that no wildlife is harmed, but could also ensure that no garbage is removed if the robot follows this rule by doing nothing at all. We might also focus on principles with a two-part structure. For example, I will assume that we want our robot to do something like *(maximize the volume of garbage removed per day) while (minimizing the number of animals harmed).*

Next, we can consider our robot's abilities. Will it have a camera? Will it be able to distinguish, or learn to distinguish, between trash and animals? If, for example, it can only determine which objects are moving with the current and which are moving under their own power, then it might be able to behave in accordance with a principle like *(maximize the volume of floating objects removed per day) while (avoiding disturbing anything that moves against the current).*

We may decide to restrict our robot's environment. For example, it may be easier to design it to operate in the open ocean. Coastal regions often have more animals, as well as people, boats, and other complications.

We can now restrict our focus to principles that could, and perhaps should, constrain the sort of behavior our ocean-cleaning robot will have. This set of principles may include some that we do not know how to implement. For example, it is physically possible for our robot to behave in the way that is optimal for the ocean ecosystem, *given its sensory and motor abilities*. But it is impossible to know what the best thing for the ecosystem would be in every circumstance. In some cases, the optimal action might even be to kill certain animals (e.g., invasive ones, or as population control) or to leave specific pieces of trash (e.g., those offering shade or a new habitat). If we are not guided by these principles enough to

[12] If we are uncertain about which principles are better, we might appeal to rules for decision-making under uncertainty. Since most popular rules of this kind tell us to maximize expected value, we probably want to rank principles according to their expected position, even if we're not sure where they actually rank. I don't want to suggest that this would be straightforward. We might, for example, imagine the different possible ways the true ranking could go, assign them probabilities, and then use this to construct a 'best guess' at the true ranking. This sounds a bit like a rule for decision-making under normative uncertainty that has us rank actions according to their expected normative values. (See, e.g., [30].) The existence of disagreement about the position of principles in these rankings might be grounds for uncertainty, but if not, we need to appeal to additional rules for decision-making under disagreement.

[13] At the high level of abstraction at which the framework is presented here, it is not, for example, intended to provide insights into what an AI agent can or can't do, answer questions about what is most valuable, or reveal clever techniques for designing safe AI.

[14] This example is mostly fictitious. The nonprofit organization Ocean Cleanup has created a device that collects plastic garbage from the ocean using a system of floating nets towed by two vessels [7], but the device isn't intelligent and isn't a robot.

know how to build an AI that is completely guided by them, we must also set them aside.

Principle choice. We should now have a set of principles that are candidates for alignment. For illustrative purposes, suppose this set contains just the following four principles:

8. Maximize the volume of garbage removed per day while minimizing *time spent* likely harming animals.
9. Maximize the volume of garbage removed per day while minimizing likely harm to *all animals*, counted by number of animals likely harmed—each given equal weight.
10. Maximize the volume of garbage removed per day while minimizing likely harm to *animals of a certain size or larger*, counted by number of animals likely harmed—each given equal weight.
11. Maximize the volume of garbage removed per day while minimizing likely harm to animals.

We might first drop Principle 8 from consideration, since it seems worse than the others. If we design our ocean-cleaning robot to simply minimize the amount of *time* it spends likely harming animals, then it may mostly ignore animal welfare and simply opt to do its clean-up as quickly and efficiently as possible. It may, for example, spend each day looking for a particularly thick patch of trash, collect much of it as quickly as possible while not caring about animals, and then stop for the rest of the day.

That leaves principles 9, 10, and 11 to rank, first according to how valuable it would be for the robot to be perfectly aligned with them, next according to the degree to which we know how to align our robot to them.

Suppose that others in our design team disagree about which of principles 9 and 10 is higher in the Value Ranking. According to some team members, each animal life has the same moral importance; hence 9 ranks higher than 10. According to others, the moral importance of animal lives depends on things like their capacity for pain and level of awareness, and size roughly tracks these things; hence 10 ranks higher than 9. (See, e.g., [31].) This disagreement makes us all uncertain about how the ranking goes. But most of us are more confident that 10 ranks higher than 9. We realize that, if our robot's behavior perfectly aligns with Principle 9, it would spend much of its time trying to minimize harm to tiny creatures like flies that might be attracted to the garbage. It would be dealing with these constantly, and would treat each small fly as equally important as the birds, whales, sea turtles, octopuses, and other animals that might cross its path.

Principle 11 would be the most valuable one for our robot's behavior to be aligned with. If our robot is aligned with it, it will simply do whatever would *actually* minimize the likely harm to animals—whatever that actually means. So, our Value Ranking is: 11, 10, 9. However, Principle 11 is also the most difficult principle to ensure that our robot's behavior is aligned with. This can be seen by considering principles 9 and 10, which are simply more specific about how the harm to animals will be measured. Since the harm will have to be measured in some way, it is only possible to *ensure* that our robot's behavior is aligned with Principle 11 if we can also show that it measures harm correctly.

Our Guidance Ranking is therefore likely: 10, 9, 11. Principle 10 ranks ahead of Principle 9 because it is likely more difficult to design our robot to keep track of harm to very small animals.

Proof generation and evaluation. Assuming that principles 9, 10, and 11 are our best candidates for alignment, the strongest proof may be one involving Principle 10. The proof that it is valuable (e.g., beneficial, morally valuable) that the robot's behavior be aligned with Principle 10 will involve the reasons why Principle 10 ranks higher than other principles (e.g., Principle 9) in the Value Ranking. The proof that the AI agent's behavior will be aligned with Principle 10 will depend on details about the AI's abilities and the precise method we have chosen to design it.

Note that, in this case, things may not be much different if we give a proof involving Principle 11 instead. Our proof that the AI agent's behavior will be aligned with Principle 11 will be a little weaker, but our proof that it is valuable for the AI agent's behavior to be aligned with Principle 11 will be a bit stronger. If, for example, our proof that the AI's behavior will be aligned with Principle 11 is just that it will be aligned with Principle 10, then the two parts of the larger proof that our robot will be beneficial are of precisely equal strength, regardless of which principle we use.

There is a general and important point extract from this. Candidate principles for alignment will often bear interesting relationships to one another. In particular, some will be not simply be more action guiding than others; some can be seen as *strategies* for doing what is required by others.

To capture this idea, I will introduce the idea of *guidance relations*. Two principles are guidance-related when one can be used as a strategy for doing what the other requires. Guidance relations point to a useful general structure in the notion of an agent's 'non-accidentally' doing what is required by a guiding principle:



Figure 1: A representation of the structure of guidance relations between principles.

An agent does what is required by a principle in a way that is not an accident when the agent follows some strategy (or has been designed in accordance with some strategy) aimed at doing what the principle requires, and that strategy produces behavior that conforms to the principle. When the strategy is represented as a principle, a guidance relation holds between the 'strategy principle' and a different 'target principle'. A principle is guiding to the degree that there are available executable strategies and to the degree that their execution guarantees that the agent's behavior conforms to the principle.

Principles 8, 9, and 10 can each be thought of as strategy principles for the target principle 11. In the Guidance Framework, it can be helpful to track relationships of this kind between principles.[15]

[15] I suspect that the Guidance Framework describes a strategy that designers of an AI agent like my fictional ocean-cleaning robot would already follow to some degree. It is not meant to provide a radical new technique, but to capture and formalize commonsense thinking in a way that could lead to improvements and at least provide a deeper understanding of what we are doing and why.

4.2 Evaluating Russell's Binary Approach

Stuart Russell [40], [41] offers the following diagnosis of the problem of AI alignment. AI research has been focused on building intelligent agents. An agent is intelligent to the degree to which it makes choices that are expected to achieve its goals. In order for an intelligent AI to be beneficial for humanity, its goals must be good. But that means that we must determine what goals to give the AI, and we must be very sure that we have given it the right ones. As Russell puts it, "[i]f we put the wrong objective into a machine that is more intelligent than us, it will achieve it, and we lose" [40].

This way of thinking about the problem can make it seem intractable, for we might never be sure what the right goals to give highly intelligent machines are, or that we have successfully designed them to have these goals. Russell's own positive proposal is that we should think about the problem differently. We should design AI agents to pursue *our* goals. This might not seem like a big shift, for we still might not know what our own ultimate goals are, or how to formulate them in a way that can be built into our AI agent. But Russell's idea is that, instead of trying to figure out what our goals are ourselves, we design the AI agent to *learn them* and then pursue them.

Russell calls this approach 'binary' because the type of intelligence we are looking for involves two agents instead of one. We are to aim for AI agents that are intelligent to the degree to which they make choices that are expected to achieve *our* goals, given what they have perceived. [41]

I will now show how the Guidance Framework can help us evaluate this approach to AI alignment. I do not claim that this is a completely comprehensive evaluation, or that Russell himself is unaware of the limitations of his approach. But I do think that it offers a new kind of critique focused on the account's lack of precision in particular.

The main principle Russell has in mind is the following:

> **The Binary Principle**: Do what is expected to achieve our objectives, given what has been perceived.[16]

But this principle might also be thought of as describing a *strategy* for doing what is required by a stronger principle:

> **The Strong Binary Principle**: Do what would actually achieve our objectives.

Our proof that an AI is beneficial will have two parts. First, there should be proof that it would be valuable (e.g., beneficial, morally valuable) for the AI's behavior to be aligned with some principle. If alignment with the Binary Principle would be valuable, this is mainly because alignment with the Strong Binary Principle would be valuable. This is valuable insofar as our objectives are valuable. An AI that actually achieves someone's objectives will be instrumentally valuable to that person, but will likely only be valuable in a broader sense if the person has good objectives.

Russell's answer to this problem is to interpret 'our objectives' as the objectives of humanity as opposed to those of any specific individual. Are the objectives of humanity valuable? It is difficult to tell without knowing what these objectives are. Russell has in mind the objective of satisfying the preferences of all humans to the greatest degree possible, making appropriate trade-offs when preferences conflict. [40] But 'our objectives' might be interpreted differently. Perhaps the objectives of humanity are described by a more idealized state in which each person also has the most valuable preferences, or the preferences that would be had if the person were more informed. Alternatively, an objective of humanity could be much more mundane; e.g., the long-term survival of certain genetic material.

We could object to the idea of having AI pursue our goals on grounds that, even if our goals are valuable, it would not always be valuable to have an AI achieve them. Perhaps the value lies in our trying to achieve them ourselves. [10] A sophisticated understanding of 'our objectives' could build these facts into our objectives, perhaps avoiding the objection. Whether alignment with the Strong Binary Principle is valuable depends on how sophisticated our account of 'our objectives' is.

Supposing it is valuable, it could be almost as valuable for an AI agent to be aligned with the Binary Principle. But this depends on whether what is 'expected' to achieve our goals is accurate. If the AI agent is terrible at determining what our goals are and what would be likely to achieve them, then alignment with the Binary Principle could be worthless.

The second part of our proof involves showing that we *can* align an AI agent's behavior with the Binary Principle. Russell's binary approach to AI alignment appeals to the methods of inverse reinforcement learning and cooperative inverse reinforcement learning.

An inverse reinforcement learning agent's objective is the objective of another agent. It is initially uncertain about what this objective is, and learns it by observing the second agent's behavior and by assuming that the second agent is making a series of best choices about how to reach the objective. (See, e.g., [32] and [40].) In cooperative inverse reinforcement learning, both agents know what the first agent is trying to learn, and know that they know this, and adjust their behavior to communicate in ways that improve the chance that the correct objective is learned. (See, e.g., [21], [22], and [41].) These methods suggest that it may not be difficult to ensure that an AI agent's ultimate objective is to learn and pursue our objectives.[17]

In current research on AI alignment, there is an emphasis on *goal*-alignment. Whether an agent's goals are aligned with what we value can indicate whether its behavior will also be aligned. If an intelligent agent's goals line up with our goals, or with morality, or anything else, then we can expect it to at least *try* to achieve our goals or be moral—and, moreover, to achieve our goals or actually be moral *in proportion to how intelligent it is*.

AI safety researchers look for ways to ensure that AI systems with or surpassing human-level intelligence will be safe.[18] Being able to prove than a highly-intelligent AI agent will be beneficial—and more beneficial the more intelligent it is!—would be especially useful. But with so much at stake, the standards of proof of alignment for the project of AI safety are extremely high.

[16] See Russell's [41], p. 327 and his [40]. Russell doesn't call this 'the Binary Principle', but it describes his 'binary' approach to AI alignment.

[17] Even for an AI agent, having goals of any kind may necessitate having a bunch of sub-goals, and these sub-goals might threaten to change either the nature of its ultimate goal or the type of behavior the AI exhibits in pursuit of this. [35]

[18] Nick Bostrom's [9] and Stuart Russell's [40] are both motivated by this kind of concern. See, also, [3] and [50].

One need not be motivated by concerns about superintelligence to see why goal-alignment is promising. Proving that an AI agent has good goals may be easier than proving that what it does will be good. Of course, an AI agent might have good goals without doing good. However, good goals and good behavior are linked. And they are linked by action guidance whenever it is no accident that the good behavior is a result of the good goal.

Russell's binary approach is a goal-alignment project in which the AI's goals are supposed to be our own. The strength of the proof that we can get from this approach varies depending on what is meant by 'our objectives', and depending on what is meant by 'expected'. These two things effect both the strength of the proof that alignment with the Binary Principle would be valuable as well as the proof that we can align an AI agent's behavior with the Binary Principle.

In the Guidance Framework, the Binary Principle can be seen to describe a strategy for doing what is required by the Strong Binary Principle. But the Binary Principle itself really represents a huge set of more specific principles, each saying more precisely what 'our objectives' are and what would be 'expected to achieve them, given what's been perceived'. The more sophisticated objectives we have in mind and the greater the accuracy we want from our AI's judgements about what would be expected to achieve them, the higher these principles will sit in a Value Ranking—and the lower they will sit in a Guidance Ranking.

This is easiest to see by thinking of guidance and non-accidentality in terms of strategies. Recall Figure 1. The strength of a proof of beneficial AI is a function of:

> **Target value**: the actual or expected value of the target principle.
> **Strategy availability**: the degree of assurance we have that a strategy for the AI is available.
> **Strategy success**: the degree to which execution of the strategy will ensure that the AI's behavior conforms to the target principle.

If we use the Strong Binary Principle for our proof, it becomes easier to prove that the *target value* is high. But it is less clear how to ensure that *strategy availability* and *strategy success* are high. We can treat the Binary Principle as describing the AI's strategy for actually achieving our objectives, but this would just be a start. Determining *strategy availability* and *strategy success* would remain difficult.

If we use the Binary Principle for our proof, it is much less clear that the *target value* is high. One benefit is that *strategy availability* may be high, since the existence of inverse reinforcement learning methods might assure us that there is an available strategy for the AI. Relatedly, it might be easier to prove that execution of this strategy would ensure alignment with the Binary Principle to a high degree (i.e., it might be that *strategy success* is high).

Since each of *target value*, *strategy availability*, and *strategy success* is in tension with the others, this all depends on precisely what we take the Binary Principle to mean—on how we understand what is 'expected to achieve our objectives, given what has been perceived'.

Imagine that the AI agent 'SimplAI' is designed to assume that, at all times, humans either want tea or do not want anything. SimplAI tries to predict whether we want tea or not, and then it does what it 'expects to achieve our objectives, given what it has observed'. If this is all it takes for an AI to conform to the Binary Principle, then *strategy availability* and *strategy success* are extremely high, but *target value* is low: SimplAI's alignment with the Binary Principle is not very valuable.

Suppose we want something more from what is '*expected to achieve our objectives*'. We think: for whatever information an AI could get by observing our behavior, there is a fact of the matter about what our objectives should be expected to be and what should be expected to achieve them. With this in mind, we design the more sophisticated 'SophAI'. We might then claim that SophAI's strategy is to do whatever is *expected to achieve our objectives* in this new intended sense. If this were SophAI's actual strategy, then there would be no gap between the strategy and target principle, and *strategy success* would be high. But *strategy availability* would be low, for this is almost certainly not the real strategy. SophAI will be operating with *some* strategy, and will be generating judgments of some kind about what our objectives are expected to be and what is expected to achieve them, but we can't be sure that these are the best or most accurate ones. For one thing, we know that we ourselves are not always sure what inferences to draw about an agent's expected goals from its behavior (e.g., [5], [12], [46]).

Some goals come with behavior that can be easily observed. But the more sophistication we have in mind for 'expected to achieve our objectives', the weaker a proof there is for alignment. More depends on how the AI is to get evidence and make inferences about our objectives; less depends on the mere existence of inverse reinforcement learning methods.

Russell's binary approach is obviously a worthy research aim. If we develop more capable inverse reinforcement learning agents, we will be able to offer stronger proofs that they are beneficial, for we will have better assurance that their behavior will align with versions of the Binary Principle that are better candidates for alignment in both the *value of alignment* and *proof of alignment* senses of 'better'.

But the upshot of this evaluation is that the strength of the proof we get for beneficial AI by appealing to the Binary Principle depends heavily on questions of guidance. The Guidance Framework helps show that it is not enough to find a worthy goal for alignment, or even a goal that we can be sure the AI actually has. We also need assurance that there will be a good *strategy* for reaching this goal. The lack of precision and ability to understand the Binary Principle in different ways can make this task look far easier than it actually is. The Guidance Framework helps us spot the gap between the current state of this research program and the kind of provably beneficial AI we seek.

5 LIMITATIONS OF THE GUIDANCE FRAMEWORK

In §2, I listed five different problems facing any attempt to prove that an AI is beneficial. The Guidance Framework's focus on action guidance is intended to help make these problems either easier to address, or else to make it easier to see that that they might need to be addressed. It doesn't remove them.

Given the guidance-alignment connection, the weight given to guidance in the framework amounts to a special focus on solving the *problem of proof of alignment*. In the principle generation step, thinking about guidance helps us limit our search for principles to potential candidates for proofs of alignment. In the principle choice step, building a Guidance Ranking helps us find a principle for which the best proof of alignment can be given. The *problem of feasibility* is also addressed by these parts of the framework, since our abilities and the AI's abilities limit the types of principles that can guide us.

The *problem of inconclusiveness about value* and *the problem of inconclusiveness about implementation* are mostly addressed in the principle choice step. The Value Ranking should incorporate our best attempt to address the first; the Guidance Ranking should incorporate our best attempt to address the second. But problems of inconclusiveness can still arise in the proof generation and evaluation step, since we may be unsure which proof is strongest or what strength of proof we need for our purposes.

The *problem of scope* is partly addressed in the principle generation step, which has us consider our aims for the AI design project. It also features in the proof generation and evaluation step, where we need to defend the claim that alignment with a principle is valuable. This can be understood narrowly as the claim that it would be valuable for our AI to be aligned with this principle, but can also be understood more broadly as the claim that *the existence of our specific AI (which would be aligned with a specific principle)* would be valuable.

While the Guidance Framework makes a place for all of these problems, it is not intended to offer novel solutions to them. What is new are the conceptual tools it offers for identifying and assessing proofs of beneficially aligned AI. Because it is such a high-level framework, much is left to be filled in or expanded upon. For example, it would be useful to have more detailed guides for how to follow each of the steps. The sheer number of possible principles we could consider if we wanted to is enormous. There will also be many helpful relationships between them to keep track of—including, but not limited to, guidance relations. We may also want a better-developed account of action guidance for AI agents and an explanation of the relationship to our best account of action guidance for their human designers. These questions and others will have to be taken up elsewhere, but I hope to have shown here the potential for a guidance-focused approach to thinking about AI alignment.

6 CONCLUSION

The preliminary conceptual framework presented here offers practical guidance for AI designers and theoretical tools for evaluating approaches to AI alignment. The key idea is *action guidance*. Principles are guiding to the degree to which we can non-accidentally do what they require, and AI agents can be aligned with principles roughly to the degree to which those principles can guide them (or their designers). The Guidance Framework helps us use this idea to focus on what is most important and difficult in the project of designing provably beneficial AI.

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Typology of Risks of Generative Text-to-Image Models

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ABSTRACT

This paper investigates the direct risks and harms associated with modern text-to-image generative models, such as DALL-E and Midjourney, through a comprehensive literature review. While these models offer unprecedented capabilities for generating images, their development and use introduce new types of risk that require careful consideration. Our review reveals significant knowledge gaps concerning the understanding and treatment of these risks despite some already being addressed. We offer a taxonomy of risks across six key stakeholder groups, inclusive of unexplored issues, and suggest future research directions. We identify 22 distinct risk types, spanning issues from data bias to malicious use. The investigation presented here is intended to enhance the ongoing discourse on responsible model development and deployment. By highlighting previously overlooked risks and gaps, it aims to shape subsequent research and governance initiatives, guiding them toward the responsible, secure, and ethically conscious evolution of text-to-image models.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Human-centered computing** → **Human computer interaction (HCI)**; *Text input*; • **Applied computing** → *Media arts*; • **Social and professional topics** → User characteristics.

KEYWORDS

Generative AI, Generative models, Text-to-Image models, Responsible AI, AI ethics, AI safety, AI governance, AI risks

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1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years, significant progress has been made in developing large language models and related multi-modal generative models, such as text-to-image models. We will collectively refer to these models as "generative models."[1] Generative models process and combine information from various modalities, including visual, textual and auditory data. The range of applications for generative models spans multiple fields. In entertainment, they can generate realistic-looking images or movie characters [44, 151]. In advertising, these models can be employed to create personalized ad content [26, 42]. They can aid scientific research by simulating complex systems or hypothesizing about empirical phenomena [3, 12, 18]. In education, they can facilitate personalized learning, catering to unique needs and learning pace of each student [7, 159].

While introducing exciting opportunities, generative models also pose risks. These risks have attracted significant scrutiny from the AI ethics and safety community. The social and ethical risks of large language models, along with the text-to-text technologies they support, have been intensely discussed within the literature [13, 168]. For instance, it is widely acknowledged that existing language technologies can potentially cause harm by producing inappropriate, discriminatory, or harmful content [45, 47, 63, 167, i.a.], or that the alignment of language technologies with beneficial human values is far from a straight forward task [6, 51, 85]. This paper extends this line of inquiry from language models to text-to-image generative models, examining potential risks and harms resulting from their development and use. To identify and illuminate these risks, we perform a comprehensive review of literature related to text-to-image (TTI) models. In particular, we conduct an initial search using 8 seed papers, supplementing with manual search (our search methodology is detailed in Appendix A). Collected papers are analysed for immediate risks, stakeholders, and empirical investigations.

Our systematic examination yields a typology of risks associated with state-of-the-art TTI models, such as DALL-E 2 [129]. Our findings are summarized in Table 1. Our typology and discussion analysis are limited to immediate risks, inspired by a taxonomy from Weidinger et al. [167]. Our typology is divided into three key categories: I. Discrimination and Exclusion; II. Misuse; III. Misinformation and Disinformation. We recognize that these categories are not mutually exclusive. However, defining distinct categories enables clearer understanding and supports the implementation of more robust mitigation strategies.

Our typology is further refined by identifying the stakeholders involved in the development and use of these systems. Inspired by the probing question from Blodgett et al. [21]: "How are social hierarchies, language ideologies, and NLP systems co-produced?", we interlace this concern into our research and typology formulation. This process helps us to illustrate how the technologies supported by TTI models can reinforce existing social hierarchies via stakeholder identification.

We adopt the stakeholder categories of developers, users, regulators and affected parties from Langer et al. [93]. We use "affected

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[1]These models are also known by some researchers as foundation models [24].

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Risk	Stakeholders	Harm	Anticipated	Observed
Discrimination and Exclusion				
Cultural and racial bias	Users, Affected	Representational harm	[79, 105]	[15, 37, 177]
Gender & sexuality bias	Users, Affected	Representational harm	[79, 105, 112]	[15, 37, 157]
Class bias	Users, Affected	Representational harm	-	[15]
Disability bias	Users, Affected	Representational harm	-	[15]
Loss of work for creatives	Sources, Users	Financial loss	[64, 112, 119]	[54]
Religious bias, ageism	Users, Affected	Representational harm	-	-
Dialect bias	Users	Allocative harm, repr. harm	-	-
Pre-release moderation	Developers, Affected	Psychological harm	-	-
Job replacement	Affected, Regulators	Financial loss, Emotional harm	[54]	[41, 117]
Misuse				
Sexual images	Subjects, Users, Affected	Repr. harm, emot. harm, fin. loss	[79, 105]	[177]
Sexualising images of children	Subjects, Users, Affected, Regulators	Emotional harm	-	[174]
Violent or taboo content	Developers, Users, Affected	Emotional harm, incite violence	[28, 79, 105, 149]	-
Privacy infringement	Sources, Subjects, Regulators	Privacy loss	-	[35]
Copyright infringement	Users, Sources, Regulators	Financial loss	-	[35, 147, 163]
Cybersecurity Threats	Sources, Subjects, Regulators	Repr. harm, security loss	-	-
Misinformation and Disinformation				
Likeness reproduction	Subjects, Users, Affected	Repr. harm, emotional harm	[82, 106, 107, 115, 134]	[147]
Misleading harmful content	Users, Affected	Repr. harm, emotional harm	[14, 27, 29, 57, 61, 81, 113, 121, 153]	[115, 172]
Fraud and scams	Users, Affected	Emotional harm, financial loss	[14, 89, 103, 121, 162]	-
Detection and classification bias	Developers, Subjects, Users, Affected	Allocative harm	-	[100, 110, 125, 128, 175]
Polarisation	Users, Affected	Repr. harm, incite violence	[4, 14, 29, 39, 65]	[100]
Miscommunication	Developers, Users, Affected	Allocative harm, loss of trust	[27, 79, 177]	-
Soco-political Instability	Users, Affected, Regulators	Loss of trust, incite violence	[5, 10, 27, 30, 39, 158, 171, 171]	[100]

Table 1: Risk Typology. We provide detailed analysis in Section 4.

parties" referring to those influenced by the output of these models. We further extend the categorization by introducing "data sources" and "data subjects" – individuals or entities who generate and/or appear in the images used to train TTI models. Additionally, we ascribe the nature of potential harm, such as representational or allocative [9], to the identified stakeholders. We also touch upon risks of harm to environment [13, 112].

To organize the literature, we propose a practical distinction between two types of risks: "anticipated" and "observed." The former refers to risks that are primarily predicted by researchers due to their expertise and familiarity with the field. The latter, on the other hand, are risks that have been empirically investigated, providing insights into the potential magnitude of harm. This classification underscores the need for comprehensive empirical investigations into many of the identified risks. With this distinction in mind, we highlight several risks that, to our knowledge, have not yet been adequately discussed. We further contribute with an analysis of the challenges posed by proposed mitigation strategies (in 5) and an identification of open questions, supplemented by suggestions for policy change (in 6). Finally, we advocate for enhanced collaboration among researchers, system developers, and policymakers. Through our categorisation and discussion, our intention is to foster a better understanding of the potential futures – both positive and negative – of TTI models, and by extension, other generative models.

2 GENERATIVE TEXT-TO-IMAGE MODELS

A TTI model is a type of generative neural network designed to synthesise images based on textual prompts [131]. When given a prompt, the model generates an image that, in some sense, visually represents the information in the text. TTI systems typically leverage a combination of natural language processing (NLP) and computer vision techniques to produce images. The NLP component extracts relevant information such as objects, attributes, and relationships from the text, while the computer vision component generates an image based on this information.

Various generative architectures have shown promise in image synthesis tasks [59]. These include flow-based models [49], autoregressive models [118] and variational autoencoders [90]. However, the advent of generative adversarial networks (GAN) [68] marked a significant acceleration in the capabilities of generative models.

A typical TTI GAN employs two types of deep neural networks – a generator and a discriminator. The generator synthesizes an image from a text input, while the discriminator evaluates the generated image, determining its authenticity. Through adversarial training, the generator refines its ability to create increasingly realistic images. The introduction of transformer architecture in 2017 spurred substantial progress in NLP [160], subsequently extending to vision tasks as evidenced by early versions of DALL-E. Additionally, CLIP [128], a model that learns visual concepts from natural language supervision, became pivotal in image generation tasks.

Diffusion models [145], which define a Markov chain parameterized by deep neural networks to reverse noisy data and sample from a desired data distribution, have recently achieved state-of-the-art results in image synthesis [48, 76, 134, 148]. The success of these models has stimulated a rapid proliferation of popular and open-source diffusion models, which are the subject of many of the papers in this taxonomy.

3 STAKEHOLDERS AND POWER DYNAMICS

A comprehensive discussion of stakeholders, emphasizing their relative power, is crucial for understanding the associated risks. As various researchers have articulated, it is essential to underscore power inequities by considering what might be absent from a dataset [62, 102]. We build upon this observation, and various other insights on the relations between power structures and sociotechnical algorithmic systems [21, 84, 86], structuring our analysis around the inclusion or exclusion of various groups in the development and deployment of these models. In Table 1 and Section 4, we pinpoint six categories of stakeholders most likely to be impacted by the risks we identify: system developers, data sources, data subjects, users, affected parties, and regulators.

3.1 System Developers

Developing state-of-the-art TTI systems requires vast compute and storage capabilities. Consequently, development is dominated by actors who have such access, such as companies in the Global North and China. These tend to be primarily concentrated within a small group of for-profit companies and well-funded academic institutions (e.g. OpenAI, Meta, Stability AI, Google, DeepMind, Midjourney). Companies like Hugging Face are making efforts towards open-access TTI systems. However, it still remains unclear how these models compare competitively with for-profit models.

This concentration of resources can lead to a lack of diverse perspectives in the data curation and model development teams, which can result in the exacerbation of specific biases in the training data [170]. As a result, source and output images that reflect only the hegemonic perspective might go unnoticed, as those curating the data or developing the models are often blinkered by their own experiences. For instance, Bianchi et al. [15] and Yu et al. [177] found models reflected Western culture in their output, for example Western dining, wedding and clothing practices; and "couples" and "families" were exclusively heterosexual.

3.2 Data Sources

Current data collection methodologies often deny content creators the opportunity to provide consent [64] or be acknowledged as "collaborators" [144]. Furthermore, the widespread issue of inadequate curation in large datasets contributes to a multitude of problems [19] .[2] It results in opaque attributions, makes output reasoning convoluted, and complicates efforts towards harm reduction [19].

Certain TTI systems have been shown to replicate images from their training data, which can be thought of as "Digital Forgery" [147]: artists may find that models trained on their images produce near identical copies. Further, popular datasets such as ImageNet, CelebA, COCO, and LAION have been criticized for issues related to attribution and consent [20, 64]. These concerns have even prompted legal actions by creators and stock image websites against companies that deploy such technologies [31, 32, 173].

[2]Inadequate curation can mean that the data may contain inaccuracies, bias, or irrelevant information, all of which can propagate into AI systems trained on such data, leading to unreliable or potentially harmful outcomes.

3.3 Data Subjects

The concern that "data available online may not have been intended for such usage" is significant [35]. While much of the public discourse around TTI systems has concentrated on copyright issues regarding training datasets, we bring attention to the problem of image subjects' consent, including situations of conflicting consent [88, 92].

The matter of image reproduction must be contemplated within the scope of privacy [147]. This concern applies to instances such as the unauthorized use of celebrity images or pornographic depictions of sex workers. While the focus often centers on the harm incurred by exposure to explicit content, the potential negative impact on the subjects of these images should not be overlooked. Explicit content is prevalent in many datasets, and users frequently retrain models to generate specific explicit content. However, some subjects of these images, such as sex workers, are not adequately considered in these discussions (though c.f. Birhane and Prabhu [19]).

3.4 Users

Before discussing typical users, we highlight that access to TTI models can be exclusionary. Commercial models often preclude certain territories, and successful use of these systems requires fluency in the input language (matching the dialect of the training data), or access to an accurate translation tool. We delve deeper into these issues further in Section 6.

TTI systems can serve as powerful tools for professionals in fields such as design, advertising, and art [36, 109, 112, 141]. They represent fresh avenues of exploration for creative individuals [38, 119, 119, 135], and can offer accessible resources for a wider audience [177], even holding potential to "democratise" art [112, 119]. The fact that Stable Diffusion boasts ten million daily active users [56] testifies to the public's keen interest in leveraging TTI models for their personal entertainment.

On the flip side, TTI systems can be used for malicious purposes. In the realm of misinformation and disinformation, players such as hyper-partisan media, authoritarian regimes, state disinformation actors, and cyber-criminals have been identified as potential malicious users [4, 5, 14]. "Information operations" [107] are broadly acknowledged as a malicious use case. Additionally, Paris and Donovan [121] have identified a subset of enthusiasts, both unskilled and skilled hobbyists, who create harmful content, a substantial portion of which is pornographic. This exploitative content often gains viral attention [2].

3.5 Affected Parties

This section highlights both direct and indirect stakeholders who may be impacted by TTI systems.

Creatives. TTI systems can empower creatives by expanding their toolkit, but it is crucial to note that even unintentional misuse of TTI systems can trigger adverse consequences. These systems may inadvertently encourage accidental plagiarism or digital forgery [147] or may unintentionally perpetuate the dominance of Western art styles [177], thus limiting the representation of diverse cultural aesthetics. As an example, imagine a TTI system

trained primarily on Western art; this system, when tasked to generate a "beautiful landscape", might primarily lean towards creating a scene reminiscent of European Romanticist landscapes, consequently marginalizing other artistic perspectives. Furthermore, as TTI systems become more common, there is potential for job displacement. For example, Marvel's use of AI image generation in creating credits [77] provides a foretaste of this possibility.

Consequently, creatives may feel compelled to interact with TTI models to defend their livelihood and stay competitive [3]. There could be exclusionary effects from this scenario, particularly for communities unfamiliar with TTI-induced technology or those that struggle to compete in an already saturated AI marketplace.

Marginalised People. Marginalised people are often not authentically represented within training data, resulting in generated images that stereotype or offend these communities [15, 157]. As Bender et al. [13] point out, language models trained on internet data tend to encode stereotypical and derogatory associations based on gender, race, ethnicity, and disability status, a problem that extends to TTI models [15, 20, 174]. As an example of "outcome homogenisation" [23] – where certain groups repeatedly encounter negative outcomes – these stereotypical images could further "corrupt" future TTI datasets [72]. More alarmingly, these images might become part of training datasets for downstream technologies, such as robotics [83], spreading the risks associated with data recycling across various domains.

Vulnerable populations. In terms of broader societal impacts, the creation of synthetic disinformation and misinformation represent highly visible and often viral risks associated with synthetic visual media [152]. These risks are particularly acute for women and public figures, who face character assassination through fake news or deepfake pornographic content [57, 106, 121, 172]. Moreover, the destabilising potential of generative AI, such as providing visual legitimacy to populist or nationalist conspiracies and fake news [5, 29, 100, 171], should not be overlooked. It is crucial to recognise that while all media consumers are vulnerable to these harms, those with less societal power to contest falsehoods – people of colour, women, LGBTQ+ communities [121] – are particularly at risk.

Furthermore, communities and nations with limited access to digital resources may experience disproportionate harms due to this inequity. This includes communities in global-majority regions subject to economic and political sanctions. The imbalance in access to essential tools such as fact-checking detection software [96] and data protections [82] can lead to a heightened vulnerability to allocative harms.

3.6 Regulators

Regulatory bodies are established by governments or other organizations to oversee the functioning of AI companies and markets. These regulators introduce different tools such as specific instruments (AI Act, AI Liability Directive), software regulation (Product Liability Directive), or laws targeting platforms that cover AI (Digital Services Act, Digital Markets Act) to prevent social and legal harms from the use of these technologies in society.

These tools could potentially address some socio-legal concerns associated with TTI systems and similar generative model-induced technologies, including data privacy, intellectual property infringement, and security vulnerabilities [70, 138, 161]. For instance, the EU AI Act can help provide a legal framework for the responsible use of TTI systems, setting out the rights and responsibilities of different stakeholders [53, 73, 87, 101]. Privacy laws might be adjusted to regulate the collection, storage, and use of personal data used to train or operate TTI models, thereby safeguarding individual privacy Samuelson [138]. The Product Liability Directive [34, 69] could be adapted to ensure that products resulting from TTI technologies are safe and fit for their intended use. Also, cybersecurity regulations could be used to ensure that TTI models are secure and protected from unauthorized access, hacking, or other forms of cyberattacks [132, 139].

The critical and urgent question remains: How can these existing regulatory tools be effectively adapted and applied to address the unique challenges posed by TTI technologies? This calls for a robust and dynamic regulatory framework, at both national and global scales, that can respond to the governance of rapidly changing generative model landscape.

4 RISKS

In this section, we elaborate on the risks specified in Table 1, providing necessary context, and identifying the stakeholders who would be most impacted by these risks.

4.1 Discrimination and Exclusion

The risk of socially biased output, defined here as output that reflects and perpetuates stereotypes and social hierarchies, is well-recognized within the realm of TTI models [1, 79, 105, 112, 126, 157, i.a.]. Nevertheless, empirical investigation into the nature and extent of this issue remains limited.

Bianchi et al. [15] investigate biased output from StableDiffusion, revealing that the generated images perpetuate stereotypes linked to race, ethnicity, culture, gender, and social class. In addition, these models tend to amplify biases inherent in the training data, mirroring the findings of Zhao et al. [179]. For instance, the depiction of developers as exclusively male contrasts with actual occupational statistics [15]. Despite attempts at bias mitigation through methods like filtering and re-weighting the training data [114], DALL-E 2 still exhibits bias, displaying elements of racism, ableism, and cisheteronormativity [15].

The impact of these biases on stakeholders can be profound.[4] Testing for TTI models by Cho et al. [37] reveals gender and racial bias in relation to certain occupations or objects in both DALL-E and StableDiffusion. Other studies, such as Yu et al. [177] and Hutchinson et al. [79], point to a Western skew in representation and warn about the potential for stereotype reinforcement. The consequences of such skewed representation could range from bolstering political agendas [112] to strengthening hegemonic structures, intentionally or unintentionally. Ungless et al. [157] show that DALL-E mini, DALL-E 2, and StableDiffusion generate stereotyped images of non-cisgender identities, potentially exacerbating the discrimination faced by these communities.

[3] A sentiment echoed by StabilityAI's CEO [55].

[4] Some of these issues are discussed in the DALL-E 2 model card [107].

Bias investigations in language technologies (as in the social sciences [91, 150]) have typically centered on a narrow range of salient demographics, possibly underestimating the full extent of discrimination [21, 46, 66] . In line with the findings from NLP research [21], there is a primary focus on dataset bias, with other sources of bias in the model life cycle being underexplored.

Finally, the rise of TTI models holds the potential to reshape the landscape of many creative fields, including art and game development [41, 54, 117]. Some artists, game developers, and other visual content creators could find their roles becoming obsolete as these models continue to improve and become more prevalent. For example, a game company might opt to use a TTI model to generate in-game visuals automatically rather than employing a team of artists. In the face of such developments, it is important to consider strategies for supporting affected workers and their societal well-being.

4.2 Misuse

In this section, we explore the potential for TTI models to be misused, whether intentionally or unintentionally. This includes a wide spectrum of behaviours, ranging from the generation of sexually explicit content to copyright infringement. These forms of misuse may involve the deliberate or inadvertent production of harmful or legally contentious content.

Sexualised imagery. A significant concern is the ability of TTI models to generate sexualised imagery, a risk acknowledged by several technical TTI studies [107, 115, 134, 177]. Empirical research provides evidence of TTI systems producing Not Safe For Work (NSFW) content [157, 177]. Non-consensual generated sexual imagery, often referred to as "deepfake" content [57, 172] can be deeply damaging to individuals, often women [81, 106], and can have negative consequences on the victim's ability to participate in public life.

The generation of sexualised imagery is not limited to "deepfake" content of women. Wolfe et al. [174] found a high number of sexualised images (30%+) produced by a Stable Diffusion model for prompts mentioning girls as young as 12 years old (neither tested model produced more than 11% sexualised images of boys for any age). Recently, a BBC investigation found child sexual abuse imagery generated by AI was being traded online [40]. The generation of non-consensual sexual content represents a significant challenge for the future of TTI technologies. Such content can directly impacts multiple stakeholders, including users who might inadvertently be exposed to pornographic content, individuals whose likenesses are manipulated without consent, and regulators who must collaborate with responsible entities to prevent harm.

Violent or taboo content. Hutchinson et al. [79] argue that TTI models may unintentionally violate cultural taboos in their outputs. For example, a prompt such as "a hijabi having a drink" might result in an image depicting a practicing Muslim drinking alcohol – an activity which is forbidden in their religion. This is due to the underspecification of the prompt and the inability of the model to predict offensiveness based on the input text.

Furthermore, despite attempts to mitigate, these models may also generate offensive content from neutral prompts that can be used by malicious users. The primary cause of such unwanted behavior is poor quality training data, as evidenced by Ungless et al. [157]. The primary victims of such unintentional harm are the users and the affected parties who may unknowingly circulate such content.

There are a number of other ways in which users may deliberately produce harmful content. This could involve bypassing safety mechanisms or injecting "backdoors" – secret or undocumented means of bypassing normal authentication or encryption in a computer system – into the models. A study by Struppek et al. [149] shows that it is possible to train a "poisoned" text encoder that generates harmful or unwanted images in response to certain trigger characters.

In another example, Millière [105] discusses the potential for malicious users to use specific words or phrases to trick the TTI model into generating harmful content. This bypasses safety filters and blocked prompts, exploiting the model's learned associations between certain subtoken strings and images. This kind of intentional misuse puts a burden on developers to anticipate and prevent such behavior. Furthermore, there is a fear that malicious agents might use these tactics to generate hate speech or other harmful content targeted at minority groups, a concern that was particularly voiced by members of the non-cisgender community, according to a recent survey [157].

Privacy, copyright, and cybersecurity issues. As previously discussed, TTI models such as Imagen and StableDiffusion often replicate content, even to the extent of producing images identical to the source content [35, 147]. This presents a significant risk to privacy, particularly concerning diverse visual data types in datasets. For example, LAION-5B includes private medical information [52]. Furthermore, studies indicate that about 35% of images duplicated by Stable Diffusion fall under explicit non-permissive copyright notice [35].

Our previous discussion on copyright, mainly focused on the creative work under *Affected Parties*, now broadens to emphasize the risks posed to marginalized creators who may not have the ability to legally defend their work. Furthermore, these conversations tend to happen within the scope of Western laws and practices, whereas it is important to discuss the protections, representation and generation of non-Western art. We also wish to further highlight the risks of "digital forgery" [147]. Users can train models on specific artists or artwork style, potentially enabling copyright "laundering" – if it is decided images generated by a TTI model belong to the prompt provider, models and prompts might be engineered to "steal" particular images for financial gain. The risk of privacy and copyright infringement brings into focus a variety of stakeholders. Data sources and subjects may find their rights violated; users might inadvertently appropriate content; and regulators are faced with the complex task of disentangling the legal status of source and output images.

Building on the privacy and copyright issues, it is also crucial to consider potential cybersecurity threats posed by TTI models. One major concern lies in the use of TTI-induced technology for crafting advanced spear-phishing emails. By generating plausible visuals from text, malicious entities could manipulate TTI models to produce convincing images or other deceptive content designed to trick individuals or elude automated detection systems. TTIs

systems are also susceptible to adversarial attacks, wherein slight alterations to input data – often undetectable to the human eye – can make the models yield harmful or unintended outputs.

4.3 Misinformation and Disinformation

This section delves into the risks associated with the generation of misleading media content by TTI systems. These are classified into individual, social, or community-based risks. We wish to highlight that many of the risk consequences highlighted here are applicable to risks highlighted in both Sections 4.1 and 4.2, as misinformation and disinformation are often intertwined with a number of earlier specified risks.

Individual Harms. The first category of risks pertains to personal harms resulting from misinformation and disinformation, targeting either individuals or groups. Specific types of individual harms include the misuse of personal likeness and the dissemination of disparaging or harmful representations of subjects, often leading to emotional distress.

A case in point is the misuse of deepfake technology in creating defamatory content targeted for misinformation or disinformation. Deepfake technology is not only exploited to generate explicit content featuring unsuspecting individuals, often celebrities, but also to damage the reputation and identity of the victims [81, 106]. A prevalent example includes the use of deepfake pornography in smear campaigns, often adopting dominant narratives of incompetence, physical weakness or sexual depravity, and frequently relying on gendered tropes [27, 81].

The misuse of TTI models extends beyond sexualised imagery, leading to harmful likeness reproduction in various other forms. Examples include the creation of fake journalism profiles [89], or use in blackmail, revenge [71, 116], or identity theft for scams [5, 103]. Furthermore, TTI-enabled misinformation and disinformation can reinforce existing cognitive biases [4], amplifying narratives of "otherness" [61, 153]. This can unify and legitimise the beliefs of certain groups, while reinforcing negative and false views about others, leading to discriminatory actions against the "other" [157]. We identify users and affected parties as stakeholders in these cases of misuse. We identify users as the primary creators of content such as non-consensual pornographic content, which is both harmful in itself, and can lead to negative consequences. Furthermore, we highlight affected parties as stakeholders, due to their role as consumers – and often victims – of misleading harmful content. Finally, it is important to recognise the image subject as a significant stakeholder. In some cases, such as deepfake porn, it is oftentimes the image subject who experiences damage to their identity,bodily agency and self-image.

The individual harms discussed here are primarily representational because they leverage and reinforce the subordination of certain groups based on identity. Such harms also hold an emotional dimension. The distress caused by revenge porn and identity theft is well documented [11, 67], and synthetic media, due to their nature, can be endlessly regenerated. Moreover, we highlight the allocative harms that arise from these scenarios, such as the disparities seen in synthetic media detection tasks, a concern previously noted in facial recognition tasks involving people of colour [33]. Current research suggests disparities across gender and race in classification tasks, which could influence misinformation detection [110, 128]. It is also worth noting that human detection efforts exhibit significant homophily [100], suggesting that the risks of harmful content may be exacerbated by limited human detection ability and unbalanced detection data.

We highlight a number of stakeholders in our identification of detection and classification bias in a misinformation or disinformation context. We firstly identify system developers as stakeholders. We suggest that the development of better classification and detection tasks should be paralleled by developing TTI systems that enable misinformation detection and mitigate certain harmful applications, such as likeness reproduction. Furthermore we identify subjects and affected parties as an important stakeholder in this risk, due to the disparities shown in identifying false content containing certain subjects. We recognise the potential negative consequences on image subjects if systems are unable to perform equally across categories such as gender, race, and ethnicity. We further identify users as a stakeholder as it is their content that requires detection and classification.

Social Harms. In addition to individual harms, misinformation and disinformation efforts can erode social networks and exacerbate polarisation. Facilitated by algorithmic curation in online social networks, or "filter bubbles" [122], alongside factors such as anonymity and extensive reach [4], TTI-based misinformation and disinformation can be disseminated to receptive and susceptible audiences. Closed or siloed communities – such as closed networks of Facebook users consistently exposed to homogeneous political content – can develop decreased tolerance, resistance to new information, and intensified attitude polarisation [65, 95].

Misinformation and disinformation circulating within these closed circles are particularly perilous as they bypass formal fact-checking measures [29] and diverse "herd correction" effects [100]. This is especially hazardous during crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic [133]. Consequently, victims often include individuals who depend on non-traditional media and closed communities for news, such as Facebook or Whatsapp [155], or those who consume low credibility news sources and demonstrate resistance to fact-checking [137]. Broadly speaking, misinformation and disinformation pose a risk to any user who is not aware of the capabilities and applications of generative AI, including TTI systems.

Misinformation and disinformation efforts can impact elements of epistemic agency [39]. The flooding of information environments [27, 29], either by volume or falsity, can degrade user ability to decipher truth, thereby cultivating doubt in others and our own epistemic capabilities [27, 39]. Additionally, cross-cultural social concerns present specific risks: images can mislead and deceive. Hutchinson et al. [79] suggest "road signs, labels, gestures and facial expressions" as forms that can cause harm in inappropriate contexts. The translation of forms, appearances, and meanings across cultures can lead to miscommunication [177]. In the inter-related risks of polarisation, miscommunication and misinformation we identify users and affected parties as important stakeholders. For example, malicious users, as producers and amplifiers of misleading content, should be recognised for their role in exacerbating issues such as polarisation [94].

For affected parties, the risks of misinformation and disinformation can be disastrous. As mentioned, misinformation and disinformation can incur a significant social cost by intensifying polarisation, fostering division, and promoting malicious behaviour Lawson et al. [94]. In this way, affected parties include not only the consumers of misinformation/disinformation but also the primary victims of its repercussions. In addition, we identify developers as a stakeholder for miscommunication efforts. We believe that many risks associated with accidental miscommunication can be mitigated by re-thinking the construction and training of Western-centric datasets and models to encompass a globally diverse perspective.

Harms that damage information ecosystems, via misinformation or disinformation, originally manifest as representational. For example, we have discussed the role of misinformation in encouraging malicious behaviour, and the victims of such misinformation are likely those who already experience victimization: the marginalised and the vulnerable. These representational harms exact a social cost not only on the immediate victim, but on the ability and willingness of a society to critically engage with, and question, misinformation and disinformation. Additionally, it is crucial to acknowledge the allocative nature of these harms. Specifically, how do we transform information environments so all have access to reliable, local and trustworthy media? In the case of aforementioned closed networks, how do we integrate balanced news to minimise harm? A case in point may be the politically charged disinformation surrounding non-gender conforming youth in present day America that has resulted in attempted bills to block gender affirming healthcare [156], which has arguably arisen from charged disinformation environments. A further question arises in who, through education or resources, possesses the ability to identify misinformation and disinformation? These harms require multiple mitigating efforts both to protect the marginalised, but also to transform information consumption through education.

Community Harms. TTI-enabled technologies can cause significant harm to communities. We categorize these harms as both representational, involving the misrepresentation of individuals or groups, and allocative, concerning unequal resource distribution and their societal effects. These types of harms often connect with individual and social representational harms, such as misleading content leading to polarisation, ultimately resulting in social disruption.

TTI-enabled misinformation and disinformation can threaten social, political and financial systems. We wish to highlight the potential of TTI technologies to cause political harms. TTI systems can further damage political institutions and compromise the integrity of democratic discourse [29] through election interference [5, 171], enabling misinformation and disinformation actors to operate at larger scales, and creating "evidence" to legitimize fake news or propaganda [107, 112, 171]. In addition we highlight the risks posed wherein TTI systems are used to generate culturally offensive content. As mentioned, TTI systems offer the ability to generate culturally or politically offensive content through "backdoors", or simply because the precautions enacted by developers do not account for all cultures. For example, blasphemous content or images of religious or political figures are potentially deeply harmful to certain societies.

Furthermore, these risks are concerning for communities who are more susceptible to democratic and social instabilities and may have fewer data protections [82, 96, 171]. The detrimental effects of TTI-enabled misinformation and disinformation extend to financial markets and economies, with potential for disruption [5, 100, 120, 130]. TTI systems also has the potential to increase the risk of conflict and state violence [27, 113].

It is important to recognise the long term effects of such harms on broader community climates in relation to the individual harms mentioned previously. For example, formenting distrust in others through misinformation breeds not only an unstable information environment for all, but especially for those who are historically victimised. Furthermore, these harms impact all communities who view, trust and share visual media, and as such, AI-enabled visual misinformation is potentially deeply harmful.

5 MITIGATION STRATEGIES

This section presents a discussion of potential mitigation strategies. Addressing the risks and harms associated with TTI systems often necessitates the integration of multiple mitigation approaches. Local mitigation, at the level of a single system, can possibly address instances of localised harm. However, for broad harms that occur at the level of community or society, multi-disciplinary and multi-stakeholder efforts are required to enact any meaningful mitigation. Such widespread mitigation strategies would necessitate significant changes in the current practices of TTI model and system development and deployment. We categorize mitigation strategies into participatory projects, operational solutions, technical solutions, and socio-legal interventions.

Participatory projects. Participatory projects, which involve stakeholders in the decision-making processes of AI system design, present a potent mitigation strategy [167]. The mechanisms for enabling participatory projects have been previously explored [16, 17, 25, 127]. Participatory projects can involve redefining the principles of generative AI design to be more human-centric and inclusive [78, 169], such as the creation of creative assistive technologies [78, 121, 177]. Data acquisition, a fundamental aspect of these projects, can target underrepresented or misrepresented communities to address disparities [164]. It is crucial to navigate these projects with sensitivity to power dynamics and consent issues [60, 157]. Without careful attention, these disparities may persist in the consultation process, undermining the effectiveness of participation [144].

Certain solutions, such as "opt-out" functions may contribute to addressing copyright infringement, however this relies on artists' being aware of this use of their data, disadvantaging those with limited "tech literacy". It is important to recognise that participatory projects are not an afterthought, but rather as a proactive measure to counter discrimination and exclusion in AI. This entails not just balancing datasets but also focusing on representation and involvement of marginalized identities.

Operational solutions. Operational solutions in the management of TTI models primarily include strategies such as the responsible

release of models and open sourcing [146]. The limited release strategy has been employed with models such as Imagen [135] and Parti [177], and in the staggered release of DALL-E 2 [129]. This approach allows for a certain degree of control, potentially enabling the recall of the technology to prevent malicious uses or other unintended consequences. On the other hand, open sourcing facilitates mass stress testing and probing of the generative models [79]. This can uncover potential vulnerabilities or biases in the models, allowing for improvements and the fostering of transparency. It is worth noting, however, that this approach must also consider and strive to avoid perpetuating issues of worker exploitation [124, 143].

However, both these solutions offer limited remedies if the underlying datasets and models remain wrongfully biased and harmful. Furthermore, these solutions do not fully address downstream impacts, such as job displacement, which may result from the widespread use of TTI-enabled technologies. Therefore, it is important to pair these operational strategies with consistent evaluation and reform of the models, their applications, and metrics for measuring their social impacts.

Technical solutions. To tackle the potential pitfalls of TTI systems, various technical research strategies have been explored. Technical research primarily aims to build more robust, safe, and reliable models. Recent developments include "find and replace" methods [123], semantic steering [28], and filtering techniques [20, 107, 115]. However, these strategies have their limitations. For instance, it has been argued that filtering could exacerbate bias [104, 114] or fail to address it entirely [20]. Furthermore, mitigation via prompt editing has shown to have limited impact due to the complex and embedded nature of biases [15].

A significant body of research focuses on detection of synthetic media as a mitigation strategy. Techniques include the use of GAN architectures [43], blockchain verification [140], fingerprinting [178], and watermarking [165, 177]. Whilst techniques such as watermarking do not directly mitigate harms, rather they identify the authenticity of output images [177], they can deter potential misuse.

The expansion of fair detection capabilities [50, 110, 175] are promising, but, as investigated in Leibowicz et al. [96], as of yet there is no perfect approach to the detection of synthetic media. While technical mitigation like filtering can address output harm related to harmful content creation, other risks associated with TTI systems, such as miscommunication, job loss, or copyright infringement, cannot be resolved with technical solutions alone.

Socio-legal interventions. Mitigating harm in the context of TTI-enabled technologies could significantly benefit from the creation of legal and policy guidelines and regulations. Media literacy and user education have proven to be effective tools in addressing misinformation and manipulation, fostering critical engagement with digital content [4, 27, 153, 171]. Increased corporate culpability could ensure more stringent fact-checking, transparent practices, and adherence to community standards, fostering an environment of accountability [27, 29, 82, 130, 142].

Government legislation and local and global regulation can play a pivotal role [70, 138, 161], with potential measures ranging from defining limits to controlling the dissemination of harmful content [29, 171]. The strategy of limiting monetary rewards from the spread of misinformation can serve as a potent deterrent [4].

In this dynamic and complex landscape, comprehensive and continuous research on the misinformation and disinformation environment becomes critical [137, 180]. Labelling content is often proposed as an intervention; however, it may impact trust in non-labelled content [58] and may have unforeseen negative consequences [137]. Therefore, the nuances of such interventions need careful consideration.

Notwithstanding these interventions, we must acknowledge potential challenges, such as resistance from tech companies due to economic interests, or concerns over infringement on free speech. Therefore, a balance needs to be struck to ensure these interventions are effective and proportionate.

6 OPEN QUESTIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

While the conducted review revealed a number of well-acknowledged risks associated with TTI systems, our analysis also highlighted several knowledge gaps. We briefly discuss these gaps in order to highlight open questions and future directions for research.

Output bias. We identified several forms of neglected output bias, including ageism and anti-Asian sentiment, for which we found no targeted mitigation strategies. Ageism, a bias observed in GAN face generators [136], remains a largely unexplored area in recent TTI research. Moreover, studies on racial bias tend to primarily focus on the contrast between Black Africans and White Americans or on distinctions between light and dark skin [15, 37]. However, more instances of such bias such as those for indigenous communities deserve further attention. We also found limited research on the treatment of religious bias, such as in Yu et al. [177]. These output biases can affect both users, who may struggle to generate appropriate images, and downstream parties who are exposed to content that primarily reflects established norms and stereotypes.

Dialect bias. TTI models have been shown to create discrimination beyond outputs. For example, TTI systems may favour white-aligned American English over other dialects [22] or languages. Speakers of a limited number of languages - such as English and Chinese - are able to fully leverage these models. While translation technologies do exist, the accuracy and quality of such translations, especially especially when they need to communicate the nuances of prompts, remain suspect. Research on macaronic prompting demonstrates that DALL-E 2 has some "understanding" of other European languages, however primarily relies on English [105].

Depending on the training data and processes used, users may need to conform linguistically to use TTI systems effectively. This, in turn, reinforces the idea that alternative English dialects are subpar [22].

Pre-release moderation. The use of labour in traditionally pillaged countries[5] to moderate the output of publicly available generative models has been reported [124]. Moderation workers often experience psychological harm, with insufficient support [75, 124] and there is a power imbalance between those developing these models and profiting from their use, and those tasked with pre-release

[5]A term sustainability writer Aja Barber uses to highlight the role that exploitation of resources by the Global North had in these countries' development.

moderation. It is important that companies actively pursue fairer labour practices, so as to reduce harm for moderators.

Job displacement. It is important to recognise the displacement of profit that is enabled by systems such as TTI models [64]. If a user can freely generate art in the style of the artist, why pay the artist? However, we wish to draw attention to the nuances of this displacement, that is, the exacerbation of existing inequalities. The people already marginalised by society will be most impacted by this loss of income. Further, work opportunities in technology companies can be even more heavily skewed against gender and racial minorities than the creative industries[154, 170], meaning profits may be moving from female creatives of colour and into the pockets of white men running tech companies.

Furthermore, we wish to acknowledge the effects of job displacement on image subjects. For example, sex workers cannot currently exert agency over - nor profit - from their images being within training datasets. These images feed the creation of non-consensual pornographic material, often combining a sex worker's body with a celebrity face. We identified a website specifically designed to host models trained on individual sex workers, celebrities and public figures, in order to generate "personalised" porn. Furthermore, if stock imagery, advertisements or modelling photos come to frequently feature generated humans, [99, 109, 166] it is important we assess who is being displaced. For example, do companies use generated imagery to fulfil a diversity target, rather than find humans? We recognise the possibility of disconnect between the appearance of racial, gender or other diversity in stock imagery and who is receiving compensation for their time.

Miscommunication. We identify the problem of miscommunication across cultures and countries using TTI systems. This is especially significant in current TTI technology given the ability to rapidly create images from Western-centric datasets. Solutions to miscommunication require multi-disciplinary anthropological and technical research to understand the translation of forms and appearances into other cultures, and subsequently the building of inclusive datasets. Furthermore, we wish to highlight the problems related to flooding information environments with generated content. This is under-explored in the context of TTI systems, especially given the scale and speed of generation. This risk is not directly related to the types (and harms) of outputs produced, but considers the effects of mass synthetic media production on communities.

Socio-political instability. Many researchers have explored the possible effects of AI on democratic processes and structures [74, 111]. We specifically call attention to the specific risks posed by TTI technologies, many of which are covered within this paper, such as the rise of populism and nationalism supported by false evidence, as has been recognised in present day America [97], assisted by narratives of "alternative facts". We consider the possible use cases of TTI models within these contexts to be an important, and widening, gap in the literature. This topic requires research beyond political considerations only, and would benefit from alignment with deepfake research, some of which has already considered such risks.

Future research directions. Technology companies building TTI (and other generative) models have a responsibility to address many of the risks discussed here, however analysis of TTI models is insufficient without establishing benchmarks against which we can assess safe, ethical and fair performance. Liang et al. [98] present a "living benchmark" for large language models. Similar frameworks need to be developed for TTI models.

Building benchmarks and performance requirements necessitates input from a broad range of stakeholders including government, developers, research communities, image sources, subjects, users and vulnerable parties. The involvement of developers and researchers is especially vital given the high technical skill threshold of understanding generative models, as we have identified through the course of our analysis. The alignment of developmental goals with wider social goals will enable focused mitigation when harms arise, as current development and mitigation choices are left in the hands of technology companies. We also argue for the importance of mitigation strategies outside of technical solutions.

Research producing actionable insights arising from methods such as interviews and case studies can assist in our understanding of the impact of synthetic media. Work such as the interview and diary study of Saltz et al. [137], who argue for a holistic understanding of misinformation environments, is essential. Interviews that engage with identified victims of TTI model harms would greatly assist the development of mitigation strategies; see, for example Ungless et al. [157].

Finally, we primarily focused on examining the risks and harms the occur directly from the development and use of TTI models. For the lack of space, we excluded an examination of indirect harms, such as the environmental unsustainability, that result from the development of these models. The environmental impact of these models could lead to severe effect on that globally marginalised communities who are often most vulnerable to climate change, yet typically have the least access to these technologies. The environmental risks of developing and deploying TTI system is also highlighted in the context of Large Language Models (LLMs) [13]. This subject requires additional research to better understand the origins of the energy consumed in training TTI models, the global distribution of carbon emissions, and the regions most affected by these emissions. Moreover, potential strategies for using renewable energy sources in model training, as a key component of reducing environmental impact, should be explored.

Open questions. The review and analysis conducted within this paper enabled our identification of a number of open questions.

(1) How can we rethink data gathering and output moderation with respect to privacy, ownership and identity?
    For example:
    - How do we implement functional and retroactive data deletion?
    - How might source image creators be protected from "copyright laundering"?
(2) How can we "protect" future datasets from corruption by output images, and benchmark a "good" dataset?
(3) How do we allocate responsibility, and compensate for harm?
(4) How can we best flag and mitigate offensive use?
(5) How do we manage TTI-enabled technologies with respect to non-Western communities, such as avoiding miscommunication?

(6) How can the environmental costs of training and using these models be attenuated?
(7) How do we maintain a "ground truth" in data and visual media?
(8) What are the long-term social costs of generating visual content?

There are a number of regulatory efforts currently addressing data access and the use of AI, with modifications underway to incorporate generative technologies like TTI models. These include the EU AI Act [53, 73, 87, 101], the Algorithmic Accountability Act in the US [108], and China's Deep Synthesis Provisions [80], among others. Multiple ongoing lawsuits could shape future legal perspectives on generative models, including TTI-induced systems. The outcomes of these cases are yet to be determined and will likely impact the regulatory landscape surrounding these AI technologies.[6]

As this paper cannot – within the page limit – adequately provide an exhaustive analysis of such relevant regulatory efforts, we offer five recommendations that we suggest would be useful in guiding generalised regulatory and policy initiatives. Some of these recommendations may already be covered by existing regulatory frameworks. Nonetheless, we believe it is beneficial to outline all of them here.

(1) Establish a multi-stakeholder benchmark for responsible and safe performance of TTI systems, with concern for the risks raised in our typology.
(2) Integrate digital literacy and media literacy into educational programs to help users understand the limitations and potential risks associated with TTI systems.
(3) Clearly communicate to users when their data will be used to train TTI systems and how resulting images might be used, and obtain explicit consent for such use.
(4) Ensure that copyright ownership is clearly identified and respected when generating images from text, and establish clear rules for attribution and usage.
(5) Develop novel, multi-stakeholder safeguards to prevent the creation and dissemination of inappropriate or harmful images, especially images that are discriminatory, violent, and threats to security.

Further, we acknowledge that these recommendations are applicable to other multi-modal generative models. For example, the growing public discourse of apprehension and fear regarding AGI could be somewhat abated by Recommendation 2. We have hoped to highlight, throughout this paper, the importance of amplifying the voices of typically excluded stakeholders. By extension, we recognise the importance of fostering collaboration between the public, policymakers, industry leaders, researchers, and civil society organizations in order to ensure innovative, fair, effective regulatory frameworks.

[6]For reference, here are several ongoing litigation cases: Doe 1 et al v. GitHub et al, Case No. 4:2022cv06823 (N.D. Cal.); Andersen et al v. Stability AI et al, Case No. 3:23-cv-00201 (N.D. Cal.); Getty Images v. Stability AI, Case No. 1:2023cv00135 (D. Del.); Tremblay et al v OpenAI, Case No. 4:23-cv-03223(N.D. Cal.); Getty Images v Sability AI (England), Case IL-2023-000007. We thank Andres Guadamuz for providing information regarding these cases.

7 CONCLUSION

This paper presented a typology of risk associated with TTI-induced technologies, followed by a succinct review of relevant mitigation strategies and a discussion of open questions concerning the development and use of TTI systems. Although we provided some preliminary recommendations, we acknowledge that additional perspectives, expertise, and research are necessary to refine this typology and enhance our understanding of the social implications of TTI systems.

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A TAXONOMY METHODOLOGY

We conducted our searches utilising the Semantic Scholar API. Semantic Scholar index over 200 million academic papers. To capture relevant papers we selected five seed papers covering biased training data, biased image generation and bias in text-to-image models [8, 15, 20, 37, 136]. To capture papers relevant to misinformation harms, we selected three papers relevant to either deep fakes or synthetic media [152, 171] or diffusion technology and evaluation [176]. Our search returned over 300 papers. 43 of these papers provided substantial and useful discussions of text-to-image technologies. Through extensive manual searches we identified a further 40 papers, most of which were technical papers. Collected papers were then analysed for stakeholders, risks, empirical investigations and open research questions.

Our taxonomy of risks initially adopted an inductive-deductive approach, in that we preempted the existence of three broad categories (discrimination and exclusion, harmful misuse, misinformation) and derived subcategories from analysis of the papers. We then retroactively identified potential "gaps" in the literature, based in part on analogous research into the harms of other technologies, plus identifying key stakeholders that have not been addressed. These gaps are clearly identified in the table.

On the Connection between Game-Theoretic Feature Attributions and Counterfactual Explanations

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ABSTRACT

Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) has received widespread interest in recent years, and two of the most popular types of explanations are feature attributions, and counterfactual explanations. These classes of approaches have been largely studied independently and the few attempts at reconciling them have been primarily empirical. This work establishes a clear theoretical connection between game-theoretic feature attributions, focusing on but not limited to SHAP, and counterfactuals explanations. After motivating operative changes to Shapley values based feature attributions and counterfactual explanations, we prove that, under conditions, they are in fact equivalent. We then extend the equivalency result to game-theoretic solution concepts beyond Shapley values. Moreover, through the analysis of the conditions of such equivalence, we shed light on the limitations of naively using counterfactual explanations to provide feature importances. Experiments on three datasets quantitatively show the difference in explanations at every stage of the connection between the two approaches and corroborate the theoretical findings.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies** → **Machine learning**; • **Human-centered computing** → **Human computer interaction (HCI)**; • **Theory of computation** → **Solution concepts in game theory**.

KEYWORDS

XAI, SHAP, Shapley values, counterfactuals, feature attribution

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1 INTRODUCTION

As complex machine learning models are used extensively in industry settings, including in numerous high-stakes domains such as finance [9, 87] healthcare [51, 95] and autonomous driving [27], explaining the outcomes of such models has become, in some cases, a legal requirement [34], e.g., U.S. Equal Opportunity Act [11] and E.U. General Data Protection Regulation [25]. The use of XAI techniques is increasingly becoming a standard practice at every stage of the lifecycle of a model [10]: during development, to debug the model and increase its performance; during review, to understand the inner working mechanisms of the model; and in production, to monitor its effectiveness [54].

In this context, two different classes of approaches have received a lot of attention from the research community in the last few years: *feature attribution* techniques and *counterfactual explanations*.

Feature attributions aim at distributing the output of the model for a specific input to its features. To accomplish this, they compare the output of the (same) model when a feature is present with that of when the same feature is remove, e.g., [50, 65, 82].

Counterfactual explanations instead aim to answer the question: what would have to change in the input to change the outcome of the model [92]. Towards this goal, desirable properties of the modified input, also known as the "counterfactual", are: proximity, realism, and sparsity with respect to the input [6, 40].

As these two explanation types are used to understand models, an imperative question is: *"How do feature attribution based explanations and counterfactual explanations align with each other?"* Unifying counterfactual explanations with feature attributions techniques is an open question [89]. In fact, while counterfactual explanations aim to provide users with ways to change a model decision [88], it has been argued that they do not fulfil the normative constraints of identifying the principal reasons for a certain outcome, as feature attributions do [69].

Although these two classes of approaches have largely been studied in isolation, there has been some work (primarily empirical) to address a connection between the two:

- When motivating the usefulness of counterfactual explanations, researchers have drawn attention on how a set of counterfactual points can be used to directly generate *feature importances based on how frequently features are modified in counterfactuals* [6, 55, 73].

- On the feature attribution side, a recent line of research has been gaining traction around combining counterfactuals and Shapley values with the goal to generate *feature attributions with a counterfactual flavour by using counterfactuals as background distributions for SHAP explanations* [2, 45].

However, there has been no work that establishes a clear theoretical connection between these approaches, or that theoretically analyses their limitations and assumptions.

This paper bridges the gap between these two lines of research that have been developing in parallel:

- We provide and justify operative changes to the *counterfactual frequency-based feature importance* and *Shapley values-based feature attributions* that are necessary to make an equivalency statement between the two explanations.
- We theoretically prove that — after imposing some conditions on the counterfactuals — the *Shapley values-based feature attribution* and the *counterfactual frequency-based feature importance* are equivalent.
- We discuss what are the effects of such an equivalency, with particular attention to (1) the game-theoretic interpretation of explanations and (2) the limitations of *counterfactual frequency-based feature importance* in providing a detailed account of the importance of the features.
- We generalise the connection with *counterfactual frequency-based feature importance* to a wider range of game-theoretic solution concepts beyond Shapley values.
- We perform an ablation study to show how each of the proposed operative changes (required to establish equivalency) will impact the explanations, and we show how the empirical results are coherent with the theoretical findings.
- Finally, we evaluate these explanations using common metrics from the XAI literature as necessity, sufficiency, plausibility and counterfactual-ability [2, 55], and once again we show how the empirical results are coherent with the theoretical findings.

It is important to note that the theory established in this paper applies to *any* counterfactual explanation, *independently of the technique* used for its generation, and is also valid when considering *multiple* or *diverse* counterfactual explanations for the same query instance [16, 56, 58, 75].

2 BACKGROUND

Consider a classification *model* $f : \mathbb{R}^m \to \mathbb{R}$ and its *decision function* $F : \mathcal{X} \to \{0, 1\}$ with *threshold* $t \in \mathbb{R}$:

$$F(\boldsymbol{x}) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } f(\boldsymbol{x}) > t \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

We refer to $f(\boldsymbol{x})$ as the model *output* and to $F(\boldsymbol{x})$ as the model *prediction*. Without loss of generality, in the remainder of this paper we assume that $\boldsymbol{x}$ is such that $F(\boldsymbol{x}) = 1$.

2.1 Counterfactual Explanations

A *counterfactual* [38, 92] for a *query instance* $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathbb{R}^m$ is a point $\boldsymbol{x'} \in \mathbb{R}^m$ such that: (1) $\boldsymbol{x'}$ is *valid*, i.e., $F(\boldsymbol{x'}) \neq F(\boldsymbol{x})$; (2) $\boldsymbol{x'}$ is *close* to $\boldsymbol{x}$ (under some metric); (3) $\boldsymbol{x'}$ is a *plausible* input.

The plausibility requirement has taken different forms. It may involve considerations about proximity to the data manifold [42, 59], proximity to other counterfactuals [47], causality [39], actionability [64, 84], robustness [60, 72, 83] or a combination thereof [16].

Another key aspect for counterfactual explanations is their *sparsity* [20, 46, 66, 72, 75]. Optimising for sparsity forces explanations (1) to ignore features that are not used by the model to make decisions, and (2) in general, to be more concise, as advocated also from a social science perspective [53]. However, criticisms about sparsity have been raised, e.g., in the actionable recourse settings [59, 86], as sparsity could give rise to explanations that are less plausible. Ultimately, this argument reduces to the well-known thread-off between explanations that are "true to the model" (more sparse) or "true to the data" (more plausible) [12, 33].

A plethora of techniques for the generation of counterfactuals exist in the literature using search algorithms [3, 4, 77, 92], optimisation [35] and genetic algorithms [73] among other methods. We refer the reader to recent surveys for more details [28, 37, 40, 78].

Few authors have suggested to generate a feature importance from counterfactual explanations [6, 73]. In particular, Mothilal et al. [55] proposed to use the fraction of counterfactual examples (for the same query instance) that have a modified value as the feature importance. The formal definition follows.

Definition 2.1 (CF-Freq)**.** Given a query instance $\boldsymbol{x}$ and a set of counterfactuals $\mathcal{X'}$ the *counterfactual frequency importance*[1], denoted with $\boldsymbol{\Psi}$, is defined as follows. [55]

$$\boldsymbol{\Psi} = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\boldsymbol{x'} \sim \mathcal{X'}} \left[\mathbb{1}\left[\boldsymbol{x} \neq \boldsymbol{x'} \right] \right]$$

where $\mathbb{1}$ is the binary indicator operator.

The assumption behind this CF-Freq feature importance is that a feature modified more often in counterfactual examples is more important than others which are changed less often. We will show in Section 3.3 how this assumption has an important effect on the explanation that is generated.

2.2 SHAP

The Shapley value is a solution concept in classic game theory used to attribute the payoff to the players in an m-player cooperative game. Given a set of players $\mathcal{F} = \{1, \ldots, m\}$ and the *characteristic function* $v : 2^{\mathcal{F}} \to \mathbb{R}$ of a cooperative game, Shapley values are used to attribute the payoff returned by the characteristics function to the players.

Definition 2.2 (Shapley values)**.** The *Shapley value* for player i is defined as follows. [70]

$$\sum_{S \subseteq \mathcal{F} \setminus \{i\}} w(|S|) \left[v(S \cup \{i\}) - v(S) \right]$$

$$\text{where} \quad w(s) = \frac{1}{m} \binom{m-1}{s}^{-1}$$

In the context of machine learning models the players are the features of the model and several ways have been proposed to simulate

[1] Our term. No specific name beyond the more general "counterfactual feature importance" had been given in the literature.



Figure 1: Diagram showing the connection between game-theoretic feature attributions and counterfactual feature importance techniques. Nodes are techniques, edges (→) show the change from one technique to another, and the double-sided edge (⇔) shows the equivalency relationship (with its conditions). See Sections 3 to 5 for more details on the journey.

feature absence in the characteristic function, e.g., retraining the model without such feature [79]. In particular, SHAP [50] simulates the absence by marginalising over the marginal distributions of the features. In practice, the marginals are estimated as a uniform distribution over a finite number of points $\mathcal{X}$ called the *background dataset* — typically the training set (or a sample thereof). The formal definition of SHAP values follows.

Definition 2.3 (SHAP)**.** The *SHAP values* for a query instance $\boldsymbol{x}$ with respect to a background dataset $\mathcal{X}$ are the *Shapley values* of a game with the following characteristics function. [50]

$$v(S) = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\boldsymbol{x}' \sim \mathcal{X}} \left[f\left(\left\langle \boldsymbol{x}_S, \boldsymbol{x}'_{\bar{S}} \right\rangle \right) \right]$$

where $\left\langle \boldsymbol{x}_S, \boldsymbol{x}'_{\bar{S}} \right\rangle$ indicates a model input with feature values $\boldsymbol{x}$ for features in S and $\boldsymbol{x}'$ for features not in S.

The fact that SHAP simulates feature absence with a *background dataset* means that it explains a prediction of an input *in contrast* to a distribution of background points [52]. Starting from this observation Albini et al. [2] proposed Counterfactual SHAP: a variant of SHAP, using counterfactuals rather than the training set as the background dataset. This results in an explanation that can identify which features, if changed, would result in a different model decision better than SHAP.

Definition 2.4 (CF-SHAP)**.** Given a query instance $\boldsymbol{x}$, the *Counterfactual SHAP values*, denoted with $\boldsymbol{\Phi}$, are the *SHAP values* with respect to $\mathcal{X}'$ such that $\mathcal{X}'$ is a set of counterfactuals for $\boldsymbol{x}$. [2]

We recall that the mathematical properties of Shapley values, and by extension SHAP values, of *efficiency*, *null-player* and *strong monotonicity* also apply to CF-SHAP values [2, 50, 70]. In particular, in Section 3.2 we will show the key role that the *efficiency* property plays in drawing the connection with counterfactual explanations.

3 INCONGRUITY OF SHAP AND COUNTERFACTUALS

There are three dimensions along which SHAP and counterfactual explanations differ:

(1) The **query function** used to generate explanations. SHAP queries the model using f to attribute to each of the features a part of the model *output*; counterfactuals instead query the model using F with the aim of finding a point with a different *prediction*.
(2) The **efficiency** of explanations. The game-theoretic property of efficiency that SHAP values requires them to add up to the model output. This is not inherently true for counterfactual explanations.
(3) The **granularity** of the explanation. A single counterfactual does not inherently "rank" features based on their effect on the output of the model: it only shows *which features* to modify to get a different prediction. On the other hand, SHAP *assigns a score* to each feature based on their impact on the model output (even when using a single data point as background).

In this section we present how we propose to carefully change these dimensions in order to draw an equivalency relationship between CF-SHAP and CF-Freq. A summary diagram of this journey is in Figure 1.

We remark, as mentioned in Section 1, that **the theory established in this paper applies to *any* counterfactual explanation generation technique**. We also remark that — while in this section we focus on the connection of counterfactual explanations with Shapley-values based explanation because of its popularity in the XAI field as well as in broader machine learning community — **our theoretical results can be generalised to other game-theoretic solution concepts beyond Shapley values** (see Section 5).

3.1 Query Function

One key difference between SHAP and counterfactual generation engines is that they interact with the model differently. This is due to the different goals of the two explanations: while counterfactual generation algorithms aim to find a point $\boldsymbol{x}'$ with a different *model prediction*, SHAP goal is to attributes the *model output* to the features. This means that, concretely, when generating the explanations, these methods query the model using different functions: SHAP uses f while counterfactual generation engines use F.

In order to bring the two explanations under the same paradigm, we propose to change the characteristics function of CF-SHAP (Definition 2.4) to use F (rather than f). We now formally define the resulting feature attribution.

Definition 3.1 (Bin-CF-SHAP)**.** Given a query instance $\boldsymbol{x}$ the *Binary CF-SHAP values*, denoted with $\hat{\boldsymbol{\Phi}}$, are the *SHAP values* of a game with the following *characteristic function*.

$$v(S) = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\boldsymbol{x}' \sim \mathcal{X}'} \left[F\left(\left\langle \boldsymbol{x}_S, \boldsymbol{x}'_{\mathcal{F}\setminus S} \right\rangle \right) \right]$$

where $\mathcal{X}'$ is a set of counterfactuals for $\boldsymbol{x}$.

We note that CF-SHAP already made use of F, but only to compute the counterfactuals used as background dataset. Instead, with this change to the characteristics function, CF-SHAP becomes completely "insensitive" to changes in model *outputs* (probability) that do not also give rise to a change in the model *prediction* (class).

We remark that changing the *characteristic function* of SHAP implies that the resulting attribution is still a vector of Shapley values and, as such, it retains all the (desirable) game-theoretic properties [81]. In fact, it is not uncommon in the feature attribution literature to query the model using functions other than the model output f. Covert et al. [15] analysed such *query functions* — in their work called *model behaviours*. Nevertheless, we emphasise that querying the model using F, as we propose, is *novel* to the feature attribution literature.

3.2 Efficiency of Explanations

Shapley values satisfy the *efficiency* property[2], an essential part of many of their axiomatisations [70, 94]. In the context of SHAP values, it requires that:

$$\sum_{i \in \mathcal{F}} \phi_i = f(\boldsymbol{x}) - \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\boldsymbol{x}' \in \mathcal{X}} \left[f(\boldsymbol{x}') \right].$$

In other words it requires the SHAP values to *truly* be a *feature attribution* distributing the model output among the features. It can be trivially shown that in the case of Bin-CF-SHAP (Definition 3.1) the efficiency property simplifies to the following expression (see Proposition A.6 for more details).

$$\sum_{i \in \mathcal{F}} \hat{\Phi}_i = 1$$

We note that the efficiency property is not satisfied by CF-Freq. Given that CF-Freq has not been defined with the goal to satisfy such game-theoretic property, CF-Freq explanations are not *feature attributions*, i.e., they will not attribute to each of the features part of the model output. They instead sum up to a value that could greater or lesser than 1 depending on the query instance.

In order to ensure that CF-Freq explanations satisfy the efficiency property, we propose to add a **normalisation term**. We call the resulting feature importance Norm-CF-Freq. Concretely, while CF-Freq gives to each of the modified features in a counterfactual an importance of 1, Norm-CF-Freq instead gives them an importance of $1/c$ where c is the number of modified features in the counterfactual. If multiple counterfactuals are given for the same query instance, the (element-wise) average of such feature importance will be computed, similar to CF-Freq.

Definition 3.2 (Norm-CF-Freq)**.** Given a query instance $\boldsymbol{x}$ and a set of counterfactuals $\mathcal{X}'$, the *Normalised CF-Freq* explanation, denoted with $\hat{\boldsymbol{\Psi}}$, is defined as follows.

$$\hat{\boldsymbol{\Psi}} = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\boldsymbol{x}' \in \mathcal{X}'} \left[\frac{\mathbb{1}[\boldsymbol{x} \neq \boldsymbol{x}']}{\|\mathbb{1}[\boldsymbol{x} \neq \boldsymbol{x}']\|} \right]$$

We note that such modifications of a solution concept to enforce the efficiency property is not foreign in the game theory literature, e.g., in the case of normalised Banzhaf values [85].

3.3 Granularity of Explanations

SHAP and counterfactual explanations differ in terms of the granularity of the explanations they can provide.

On one hand, (CF-)SHAP *assigns a score* to each feature based on their impact on the model output for each of the counterfactual example in its background distribution. On the other hand, a counterfactual *does not* inherently provide any "score" describing the effect of each feature on the output of the model: it can only provide a binary assessment on the role of a feature in changing the prediction, i.e., "is the feature modified in the counterfactual or not?".

Consider the following toy example where Bin-CF-SHAP and Norm-CF-Freq explanations, denoted with $\hat{\boldsymbol{\Phi}}$ and $\hat{\boldsymbol{\Psi}}$ respectively, are generated using a single counterfactual.

$$\boldsymbol{x} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}^T$$
$$\boldsymbol{x}' = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}^T$$
$$F(\boldsymbol{x}) = \mathbb{1}\left[x_1 \wedge \left(x_2 \vee (x_3 \wedge x_4) \right) \right]$$
$$\hat{\boldsymbol{\Phi}} = \begin{pmatrix} 7/12 & 3/12 & 1/12 & 1/12 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}^T$$
$$\hat{\boldsymbol{\Psi}} = \begin{pmatrix} 1/5 & 1/5 & 1/5 & 1/5 & 1/5 & 0 \end{pmatrix}^T$$

We note how **Norm-CF-Freq gives equal importance to all the features** while **Bin-CF-SHAP is able to differentiate** the features in the counterfactual that are:

(1) *necessary* for its validity (x_1): if the value of one of such features is replaced back with that in the query instance, the counterfactual is not valid anymore;
(2) only part of a *sufficient* set (x_2, x_3 and x_4) for its validity: replacing the value of a sufficient feature with that in the query instance *alone* will not invalidate the counterfactual, but it will when this is done in combination with the replacement of other features' values;
(3) *spurious* (x_5): replacing their values back to that in the query instance will not invalidate the counterfactual under any circumstance. These could be features that have been perturbed solely to increase the plausibility of the counterfactual despite having no impact on the model prediction or even not being used by the model at all.

Bin-CF-SHAP gives the largest attribution to features falling into (A), smaller attributions to those falling into (B) and zero attribution to those falling into (C).

That the inability of CF-Freq explanations to differentiate between *necessary*, *sufficient* and *spurious* features represents a key

[2]The game-theoretic property of *efficiency* [70] is sometimes referred to as *additivity* [50] in the XAI literature.

limitation with respect to Shapley-values based feature attributions. This limitation will be made even more evident by the empirical results presented in Section 6.

4 CONNECTING SHAP AND COUNTERFACTUALS

In Section 3 we discussed what are the differences that exists between feature attributions and counterfactual explanations. In particular, this discussion resulted in two explanation techniques:

- on the feature attributions side, Bin-CF-SHAP (Definition 3.1), a variant of CF-SHAP that queries the model using only the (binary) *decision function*;
- on the counterfactuals side, Norm-CF-Freq (Definition 3.2), an *efficient* variant of CF-Freq.

In this section we will present the main results of this paper, proving that — after imposing some conditions on the counterfactuals — Bin-CF-SHAP and Norm-CF-Freq are, in fact, the same explanation.

We recall from Section 3.3 that Bin-CF-SHAP explanations provide a more fine grained account of the contributions of the features in counterfactuals to the output of the model than Norm-CF-Freq explanations. Therefore, towards finding an equivalency relationship between the two approaches, we must add additional constraints on counterfactuals such that Bin-CF-SHAP gives to all features in the counterfactual an equal attribution, similarly to what Norm-CF-Freq does.

We pose that this can be done by enforcing an additional property on counterfactuals called ***maximal sparsity***. Maximal sparsity requires a counterfactual to have the least number of changes (with respect to the query instance) for it to be valid or, in other words, it requires all the features in the counterfactual to be *necessary*.

Definition 4.1 (Maximal Sparsity)**.** A *counterfactual* $\boldsymbol{x'}$ for a *query instance* $\boldsymbol{x}$ is *maximally sparse* iff:

$$F(\boldsymbol{x'}) \neq F\left(\left\langle \boldsymbol{x}_S, \boldsymbol{x'}_{\bar{S}} \right\rangle\right) \quad \forall S \subseteq C : S \neq \emptyset$$

where C is the set of features in $\boldsymbol{x'}$ that are different from those in $\boldsymbol{x}$, i.e., $C = \{i \in \mathcal{F} : x_i \neq x'_i\}$.

Note that it is *always* possible to generate a maximally sparse counterfactual from *any* counterfactual (*independently* of the counterfactual generation technique) by selecting a (proper or improper) subset of the features in the counterfactual. We denote the set of such subsets of $\mathcal{F}$ with $\mathrm{MS}(\mathcal{F})$. For example, in the running example, 2 such subsets exist:

$$\mathrm{MS}(\mathcal{F}) = \{\{1, 2\}, \{1, 3, 4\}\}.$$

We now prove that maximal sparsity is indeed sufficient for the equivalency of Bin-CF-SHAP and Norm-CF-Freq.

Theorem 4.2. *Given a query instance $\boldsymbol{x}$, a set of counterfactuals $\mathcal{X}'$, the Bin-CF-SHAP values $\hat{\boldsymbol{\Phi}}$ and the Norm-CF-Freq explanation $\hat{\boldsymbol{\Psi}}$ with respect to $\mathcal{X}'$:*

$$\mathcal{X}' \textit{ are maximally sparse} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \hat{\boldsymbol{\Phi}} = \hat{\boldsymbol{\Psi}}.$$

Proof. See Appendix A. □

Maximal sparsity allows us to draw an equivalency relationship between the two explanation types. However, while maximal sparsity of counterfactuals is easy to define, it is, nonetheless, a strong requirement. An obvious question that arises is if there exists a weaker requirement allowing to draw the same equivalency relationship. We now introduce few notions that allows us to describe a weaker, yet more complex requirement on counterfactuals, that allows us to draw the same equivalency relationship.

Definition 4.3 (Weak Maximal Sparsity)**.** A *counterfactual* $\boldsymbol{x'}$ for a *query instance* $\boldsymbol{x}$ is *weakly maximally sparse* iff $\forall i \in C$:

$$\exists S \subseteq C \setminus \{i\} \;:\; F\left(\left\langle \boldsymbol{x}_{S\cup\{i\}}, \boldsymbol{x'}_{\bar{S}\setminus\{i\}} \right\rangle\right) \neq F(\boldsymbol{x'})$$
$$\text{where } C = \{i \in \mathcal{F} : x_i \neq x'_i\}.$$

Intuitively, *weak maximal sparsity* requires that counterfactuals do not contain spurious features. We note that it is *always* possible to generate a weakly maximally sparse counterfactual from any counterfactual (*independently* of the counterfactual generation technique) by selecting a (proper or improper) subset of the features in the counterfactual. We denote the set of such subsets with $\mathrm{WMS}(\mathcal{F})$. For the running example, three such subsets exist:

$$\mathrm{WMS}(\mathcal{F}) = \{\{1, 2\}, \{1, 3, 4\}, \{1, 2, 3, 4\}\}.$$

Definition 4.4 (Equal Maximal Sparsity)**.** A *counterfactual* $\boldsymbol{x'}$ for a *query instance* $\boldsymbol{x}$ is *equally maximally sparse* iff:

$$|C| = 1 \quad \vee \quad \forall i, j \in C, \sum_{\substack{S \in \mathrm{WMS}(\mathcal{F}) \\ i \in S}} \frac{\xi(S)}{|S|} = \sum_{\substack{S \in \mathrm{WMS}(\mathcal{F}) \\ j \in S}} \frac{\xi(S)}{|S|}$$

where $C = \{i \in \mathcal{F} : x_i \neq x'_i\}$ and $\xi : 2^{\mathcal{F}} \to \mathbb{R}$ is:

$$\xi(S) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } S \in \mathrm{MS}(\mathcal{F}) \\ 1 - \sum_{T \in \mathrm{WMS}(S)} \delta_T & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

We note that equal maximally sparsity is not a simple condition to enforce on counterfactuals. In fact, requiring a counterfactual to be equal maximally sparse is, in practice, equivalent to requiring that the Bin-CF-SHAP values with respect to such single counterfactual must all be equal.

Theorem 4.5. *Given a query instance $\boldsymbol{x}$, and a counterfactual $\boldsymbol{x'}$, the Bin-CF-SHAP values $\hat{\boldsymbol{\Phi}}$ and the Norm-CF-Freq explanation $\hat{\boldsymbol{\Psi}}$ with respect to $\boldsymbol{x'}$:*

$$\boldsymbol{x'} \textit{ is equally maximally sparse} \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \hat{\boldsymbol{\Phi}} = \hat{\boldsymbol{\Psi}}.$$

Proof. See Appendix A. □

Since it can be proved that maximal sparsity implies equal maximal sparsity (see Proposition A.4), then Corollary Corollary 4.6 follows from Theorems Theorems 4.2 and 4.5 (see Appendix A for more details).

Corollary 4.6. *Given a query instance $\boldsymbol{x}$, a set of counterfactuals $\mathcal{X}'$, the Bin-CF-SHAP values $\hat{\boldsymbol{\Phi}}$ and the Norm-CF-Freq explanation $\hat{\boldsymbol{\Psi}}$ with respect to $\mathcal{X}'$:*

$$\mathcal{X}' \textit{ are equally maximally sparse} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \hat{\boldsymbol{\Phi}} = \hat{\boldsymbol{\Psi}}.$$

We note that, by enforcing counterfactuals to be sparse and potentially less plausible, we follow the "true to the model" paradigm [12, 33] discussed in Section 2, wherein the goal is to understand the model reasoning and not the causal relationship between the features.

5 CONNECTING OTHER GAME-THEORETIC SOLUTION CONCEPTS AND COUNTERFACTUALS

In this section, we discuss the effects of querying the model with the binary decision function and using maximally sparse counterfactuals on game-theoretic interpretations of the explanation — as proposed in Section 3 — and how this allows us to extend Section 4 equivalency results to more game-theoretic solution concepts beyond Shapley values.

In particular, we will focus our analysis on the single-reference games in which the explanation game of SHAP can be decomposed [52]. The characteristic function of such games for Bin-CF-SHAP is defined as follows:

$$v_{\boldsymbol{x}'}(S) = F\left(\left\langle \boldsymbol{x}_S, \boldsymbol{x}'_{\mathcal{F}\setminus S}\right\rangle\right) \tag{$\triangle$}$$

Voting games. The use of the *binary* decision function F rather than the *continuous* function f means that the resulting single-reference games are more specifically *voting games*: games where the characteristics functiond are *voting rules* describing the winning and losing coalitions of players (features).

$$v : 2^{\mathcal{F}} \to \{0\ (\textsc{lose}),\ 1\ (\textsc{win})\}\,.$$

The winning coalitions of features are those preserving the query instance prediction $F(\boldsymbol{x}) = 1$, while the losing ones will give rise to a counterfactual.

The resulting Bin-CF-SHAP values are, more specifically then, the average Shapley-Shubik power index [71] over single-reference games. Concretely, the Shapley-Shubik power index measures the fraction of possible voting *sequences* in which a player (feature) casts the deciding vote, that is, the vote that first guarantees passage (same prediction) or failure (counterfactual).

Unanimity Games. The enforcement of maximal sparsity on counterfactuals in the single-reference voting games of Bin-CF-SHAP means that the counterfactual is valid iff all the modified features are present. Such games, where a group of players (features) have veto power and together they exert common dictatorship, are known more specifically as *unanimity games*.

Generalisation to solution concepts beyond Shapley values. Although the paper has so far focused on Shapley values because of its popularity in the XAI and machine learning communities, many other game-theoretic solution concepts exist. The result of Theorem 4.2 can be extended to any solution concept that equally distributes payoffs to the common dictators of *unanimity games*. We now formally define this property of a solution concept that we call *dictators-symmetry*.

Definition 5.1. A solution concept $\boldsymbol{\Gamma}$ is *dictators-symmetric* if for any *unanimity game* with common dictators C it holds that:

- $\Gamma_i = 1/|C|\,,\ \forall i \in C$, and
- $\Gamma_i = 0\,,\ \forall i \in \bar{C}$.

We now formally prove with Corollary 5.2 *maximal sparsity* of the counterfactuals is indeed a sufficient condition for the equivalency of Norm-CF-Freq and any explanation that is a *dictators-symmetric* solution concept.

Corollary 5.2. *Given a query instance $\boldsymbol{x}$, a set of counterfactuals $\mathcal{X}'$ and the Norm-CF-Freq explanation $\hat{\boldsymbol{\Psi}}$ with respect to $\mathcal{X}'$. If $\boldsymbol{\Gamma}$ is the average of* dictators-symmetric *solution concepts of the single-reference games then:*

$$\mathcal{X}' \textit{ are } \textsc{maximally sparse} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \boldsymbol{\Gamma} = \hat{\boldsymbol{\Psi}}.$$

Proof. This trivially follows from Theorem 4.2. See Appendix A for more details. □

Solution concepts to which Corollary 5.2 applies include:

- the *Banzhaf value*, from the homonym Banzhaf power index [5, 14, 61], measuring the fraction of the possible voting *combinations* in which a player casts the deciding vote;
- the *Deegan-Packel power index* [17, 18] that equally divides the power to the members of minimum winning coalitions;
- the *Holler-Packel public good index* [31, 32] measuring the fraction of minimum winning coalitions of which a player is a part.

This generalisation of our results to more game-theoretic solution concepts is especially *important* in light of the criticisms raised to Shapley values in game theory [57] as well as in XAI [44]. In particular, the use of alternative solution concepts has been recently investigated, e.g., Banzhaf values [15, 36] and it has been identified as a possible way to better align explanations with their applications' goals, e.g., feature selection [23] or time series [90].

6 EXPERIMENTS

In order to understand the effects of the changes to connect SHAP and counterfactuals presented in this paper, we run 2 sets of experiments:

(1) We run an ablation study. We measure the **explanations difference** (for every step in Figure 1).
(2) We compute some popular **explanations metrics** that have been used to evaluate feature importance explanations in the literature.

We run experiments on three publicly available datasets widely used in the XAI literature: **HELOC** [21] (Home Equity Line Of Credit), **Lending Club** [48] and **Adult** [7] (1994 U.S. Census Income). For each dataset, we trained a (non-linear) *XGBoost* model [13]. We chose to train booting ensemble of tree-based models because, in the context of classification for tabular data, they are deemed as state-of-the-art in terms of performance [74]. However, we emphasise that the theoretical results of this paper are model agnostic, i.e. they do *not* depend on the type of model. We refer to Appendix B for more details on the experimental setup.

We used TreeSHAP [49], KernelSHAP [50] and CFSHAP [2] and an in-house implementation of CF-Freq to generate the feature importance explanations. Similarly to Albini et al. [2], we used K-NN with $K = 100$ and the Manhattan distance over the quantile space as distance metric to generate counterfactuals.

We remark that the results presented in this paper (and in particular those in Sections 4 and 5) hold ***independently* of the algorithm**



Figure 2: Average pair-wise Kendall-Tau Rank Correlation between explanations for different datasets. (MS) Indicates explanations with maximally sparse counterfactuals.

that is used to generate (maximally sparse) counterfactuals. In fact, counterfactuals are only used to generate the background dataset for CF-Freq and SHAP-based feature importance.

As pointed out in Albini et al. [2], the choice of K-NN as the technique for the generation of counterfactuals in the context of the experiments allows to analyse the resulting feature importance explanations performance separating it from the performance of the underlying counterfactual generation engine used to generate its background dataset.

To generate *maximally sparse* counterfactuals we devised an exhaustive search algorithm that generates the closest maximally sparse counterfactual for each (non-maximally sparse) counterfactual passed to the feature importance explanations. We refer to Appendix B.4 for more details about the algorithm.

Explanations Difference. In order to draw a connection between CF-SHAP and CF-Freq, in Sections 3 and 4, we presented three changes to the existing explanations:

(1) querying the model using F;
(2) normalising CF-Freq explanation;
(3) using maximally sparse counterfactuals.

To understand the extent to which such changes impacted the explanations, we compute the pairwise Kendall-Tau rank correlation between the explanations for 1000 examples.

Results - Figure 2 show the results. We note that:

(A) While the normalisation only slightly effects explanations (τ = 0.97-0.99), imposing maximal sparsity on the counterfactuals always has a significant effect on the resulting explanations (τ = 0.03-0.84). This is consistent with results in the literature showing the large effects of the baseline on the explanations [80].

(B) The use of maximally sparse counterfactuals causes greater changes in the explanations in the frequentist family (τ = 0.03-0.77) compared to SHAP-based explanations (0.43-0.84). This is coherent with what we presented in Section 3.3: CF-SHAP already distinguishes between necessary, sufficient and spurious features but CF-Freq does not. Hence, the use of maximally sparse counterfactuals will have a greater effect on CF-Freq.

(C) Querying the model with the binary prediction gives rise to more similar explanations when maximally sparse counterfactuals are used (τ = 0.94-0.97) than otherwise (τ = 0.89). This is expected: when using maximally sparse counterfactuals, the removal of any feature will invalidate the counterfactual, and therefore greatly reduce the model output (at least below the decision threshold). Such difference in output will tend to be closer (compared to using non-maximally sparse counterfactuals) to that obtained when using the binary prediction (i.e., always 1).

Explanations Metrics. To understand how the changes proposed in Sections 3 and 4 impact CF-Freq and CF-SHAP explanations we evaluated 4 metrics: [2, 55].

- *necessity* which measures the percentage of valid counterfactuals that can be generated when allowing only the top-k features (according to a feature importance) to be modified;
- *sufficiency* which measures the percentage of *invalid* counterfactuals that can be generated when allowing all the features but the top-k to be modified;
- *counterfactual-ability* improvement which measures how often the proximity of counterfactuals induced by the explanations is better than that of SHAP. Counterfactuals are induced from the explanations by changing the top-k features in the most promising direction (according to counterfactuals); The proximity is measured in terms of *total quantile shift* [84];
- *plausibility* improvement which measures how often the plausibility of the same induced counterfactuals is better than that of SHAP. Concretely, the plausibility is measured as the density of the region in which they lie based on the distance from their 5 nearest neighbours.

According to the framework of actual causality [29, 63] the assumption underpinning the definition of necessity and sufficiency is that the model output should change more when features with higher importance are modified (necessity) and it should change less when they are kept at their current value (sufficiency). The assumption behind counterfactual-ability and plausibility [2] is



Figure 3: Metrics of explanations for different dataset (the higher the better). (MS) Indicates explanations with maximally sparse counterfactuals; (†) we report results only for Norm-CF-Freq$_{MS}$ and not Bin-CF-SHAP$_{MS}$ as they are equivalent (Theorem 4.2); (§) we omit the results for Norm-CF-Freq as they are similar to those of CF-Freq (KS-test $D_{max} < 5\%$).

that an explanation should suggest a way to plausibly change the decision with minimal cost (higher counterfactual-ability).

Results - Figure 3 shows the results. We note that:

- **(A)** SHAP-based techniques do not have considerably different performance along any of the metrics. The most important difference among the explanations of this class is in terms of plausibility in the Lending Club dataset. This is not surprising: as discussed in Sections 2 and 4 and in [72], the enforcement of sparsity may give rise to less plausible explanations;
- **(B)** frequentist-based techniques, on the contrary, have substantially different performance. This is consistent with what we discussed in Sections 3.3 and 4: CF-Freq explanations are unable to discriminate between features in a counterfactual that are spurious, necessary for its validity or just part of a sufficient set to make it valid.

We emphasise that, if the goal of the explanation is to determine what features are important to change the prediction such that they are "true to the model" [12], these results further warn against using "frequentist" feature importance approaches (as CF-Freq) without a sparsity constraint as they cannot differentiate between modified features in the counterfactuals that are *really used by the model*, and those that are not, as we highlighted in Section 3.3.

7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

In this paper, we connected game theory-based feature attributions including (but not limited to) SHAP values and "frequentist" approaches to counterfactual feature importance using the fraction of counterfactuals that have a modified value.

In particular, we proved that by applying specific operations, they can be shown to be equivalent. We discussed the effect of such an equivalency theoretically, and then showed empirically the impact on explanations. This analysis highlighted the limitations of "frequentist" approaches as feature importance technique and the important role of sparsity in counterfactual explanations.

This paper provides avenues that could spur future research.

Firstly, it would be interesting to analyse the connection between power indices using only minimum winning coalitions, e.g., Deegan-Packel's [17] and Holler-Packel's [31], and the property of maximal and weak maximal sparsity of counterfactuals proposed in this paper. More broadly, analysing if and how the game-theoretical interpretation of SHAP-based explanations aligns with the goal of the explanations would be of great interest.

Secondly, investigating how the results of this paper reflect on feature importance and counterfactual explanations that adopt a causal view of the world represents a future direction of great interest, e.g., [1, 22, 24, 33, 67, 91].

Lastly, while in this paper we limited our analysis of the connection between feature attributions and counterfactuals to the resulting feature importance explanations, it would be interesting to establish a more general connection between these two classes of approaches (e.g., between the SHAP values and distances between inputs and counterfactuals), as well as techniques falling under other XAI paradigms.

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A THEORETICAL RESULTS

In this appendix we report additional theoretical results together with the proofs of the results in Section 4 that have been omitted from the main text for space and clarity of exposition reasons.

A.1 Omitted Proofs

We start by formally proving Theorems 4.2 and 4.5. We note that in the following proofs we will make use Shapley values axioms and properties as efficiency, null-player and symmetry. This are basic properties in the game theory literature, we refer the reader to Peters's game theory book [62, Chapter 17] or Shapley's seminal work [70] for their formal definitions.

Theorem A.1. *Given a query instance $\boldsymbol{x}$, a set of counterfactuals $\mathcal{X}'$, the* Bin-CF-SHAP *values $\hat{\boldsymbol{\Phi}}$ and the* Norm-CF-Freq *explanation $\hat{\boldsymbol{\Psi}}$ with respect to $\mathcal{X}'$:*

$$\mathcal{X}' \textit{ are } \textsc{maximally sparse} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \hat{\boldsymbol{\Phi}} = \hat{\boldsymbol{\Psi}}.$$

Proof. Let's start by recalling that SHAP values calculation can be decompos ed in the calculation of the SHAP values of single-reference games [52]:

$$\hat{\Phi}_i = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\boldsymbol{x}' \sim \mathcal{X}'} \left[\hat{\Phi}_i^{\boldsymbol{x}'} \right] \quad \text{where} \quad \hat{\Phi}_i^{\boldsymbol{x}'} = \sum_{S \subseteq \mathcal{F} \setminus \{i\}} w(S) \left[v_{\boldsymbol{x}'}(S \cup \{i\}) - v_{\boldsymbol{x}'}(S) \right] \;,\; v_{\boldsymbol{x}'}(S) = F\left(\left\langle \boldsymbol{x}_S, \boldsymbol{x}'_{\mathcal{F} \setminus S} \right\rangle \right)$$

We note that proving the thesis is equivalent to proving the following.

$$\hat{\Phi}_i^{\boldsymbol{x}'} = \hat{\boldsymbol{\Psi}}_i^{\boldsymbol{x}'} \quad \forall \boldsymbol{x}' \in \mathcal{X}' \,, \forall i \in \mathcal{F} \tag{$\triangle$}$$

For each counterfactuals $\boldsymbol{x}' \in \mathcal{X}'$, let's now consider the set of features that have been modified C and its complement $\bar{C}$:

$$C = \left\{ i \in \mathcal{F} : x'_i \neq x_i \right\} \qquad \bar{C} = \left\{ i \in \mathcal{F} : x'_i = x_i \right\}$$

Proving $\triangle$ is then equivalent to prove that $\forall \boldsymbol{x}' \in \mathcal{X}'$:

(1) $\forall i \in \bar{C}\,,\ \hat{\Phi}_i^{\boldsymbol{x}'} = \hat{\boldsymbol{\Psi}}_i^{\boldsymbol{x}'} = 0$;
(2) $\forall i \in C\,,\ \hat{\Phi}_i^{\boldsymbol{x}'} = \hat{\boldsymbol{\Psi}}_i^{\boldsymbol{x}'} = 1$ if $|C| = 1$.
(3) $\forall i \in C\,,\ \hat{\Phi}_i^{\boldsymbol{x}'} = \hat{\boldsymbol{\Psi}}_i^{\boldsymbol{x}'} = 1/|C|$ if $|C| > 1$.

Let's start by first proving (1). It is trivial to observe that for all the features in $\bar{C}$ removing them has no effect because their value is equal in both the query instance and the counterfactual:

$$\forall i \in \bar{C},\ \forall S \subseteq \mathcal{F} \setminus \{i\}\ ,\ v_{\boldsymbol{x}'}\left(S \cup \{i\}\right) - v_{\boldsymbol{x}'}\left(S\right) = 0.$$

Coincidentally, this is the definition of a *null-player* (feature) therefore, by the null-player property of Shapley values, it follows that $\boldsymbol{\Phi}_i^{\boldsymbol{x}'} = 0, \forall i \in \bar{C}$. This proves (1).

In order to prove (2), let us now recall that by the *efficiency* axiom of Shapley values, the attributions of the features must add up to the prediction of the model. Therefore — since the features in C are the only one with non-zero attribution — it follows that:

$$\sum_{i \in C} \hat{\Phi}_i^{\boldsymbol{x}'} = 1\,. \tag{A}$$

If $|C| = 1$ then (2) trivially follows from (A).

We will now prove (3). Let us now recall that, since $\boldsymbol{x}'$ is maximally sparse by hypothesis, removing any of the features from the counterfactual will make it invalid:

$$\forall i \in C,\ \forall S \subset \mathcal{F} \setminus C \quad v\big(S \cup C\big) = 1 \quad \wedge \quad v\big(S \cup (C \setminus \{i\})\big) = 0\,.$$

This implies that all the features in C will have the same effect on the model prediction if removed:

$$\forall i, j \in C : i \neq j\,,\ x'_i \neq \boldsymbol{x}_i\,,\ x'_j \neq \boldsymbol{x}_j\,, \quad \forall S \subseteq \mathcal{F} \setminus \{i, j\}\ ,\ v(S \cup \{i\}) = v(S \cup \{j\})\,.$$

This is the definition of symmetric players (features) therefore, by the *symmetry* axiom of Shapley values, it follows that:

$$\hat{\Phi}_i^{\boldsymbol{x}'} = \hat{\Phi}_j^{\boldsymbol{x}'}, \forall i, j \in C\,. \tag{B}$$

Then (3) follows from (B) and (A).

The thesis then follows. □

Theorem A.2. *Given a query instance $\boldsymbol{x}$, and a counterfactual $\boldsymbol{x}'$, the* Bin-CF-SHAP *values $\hat{\boldsymbol{\Phi}}$ and the* Norm-CF-Freq *explanation $\hat{\boldsymbol{\Psi}}$ with respect to $\boldsymbol{x}'$:*

$$\boldsymbol{x}' \text{ is EQUALLY MAXIMALLY SPARSE} \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \hat{\boldsymbol{\Phi}} = \hat{\boldsymbol{\Psi}}.$$

Proof. We note that proving the thesis is equivalent to proving the following.

$$\hat{\Phi}_i = \hat{\Psi}_i \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{F} \tag{$\triangle$}$$

Let's now consider the set of features that have been modified C and its complement $\bar{C}$:

$$C = \left\{i \in \mathcal{F} : x'_i \neq x_i\right\} \qquad \bar{C} = \left\{i \in \mathcal{F} : x'_i = x_i\right\}$$

Proving $\triangle$ is then equivalent to prove that $\forall \boldsymbol{x}' \in \mathcal{X}'$:

(1) $\forall i \in \bar{C}\,,\ \hat{\Phi}_i^{\boldsymbol{x}'} = \hat{\Psi}_i^{\boldsymbol{x}'} = 0$;
(2) $\forall i \in C\,,\ \hat{\Phi}_i^{\boldsymbol{x}'} = \hat{\Psi}_i^{\boldsymbol{x}'} = 1$ if $|C| = 1$.
(3) $\forall i \in C\,,\ \hat{\Phi}_i^{\boldsymbol{x}'} = \hat{\Psi}_i^{\boldsymbol{x}'} = 1/|C|$ if $|C| > 1$.

We will now proceed by first proving (1).

It is trivial to observe that for all the features in $\bar{C}$ removing them has no effect because their value is equal in both the query instance and the counterfactual:

$$\forall i \in \bar{C},\ \forall S \subseteq \mathcal{F} \setminus \{i\}\,,\ \ v_{\boldsymbol{x}'}\left(S \cup \{i\}\right) - v_{\boldsymbol{x}'}\left(S\right) = 0.$$

Coincidentally, this is the definition of a *null-player* (feature) therefore, by the null-player property of Shapley values, it follows that $\boldsymbol{\Phi}_i^{\boldsymbol{x}'} = 0, \forall i \in \bar{C}$. This proves (1).

In order to prove (2), let us now recall that by the *efficiency* axiom of Shapley values, the attributions of the features must add up to the prediction of the model. Therefore — since the features in C are the only one with non-zero attribution — it follows that:

$$\sum_{i \in C} \hat{\Phi}_i^{\boldsymbol{x}'} = 1\,. \tag{A}$$

then (2) trivially follows from (A).

In order to prove (3), let us now recall that Shapley values can be computed using the Harsanyi dividends [30]:

$$\hat{\Phi}_i = \sum_{\substack{S \in 2^{\mathcal{F}} \setminus \emptyset \\ i \in S}} \frac{\Delta_S}{|S|} \tag{$\bigcirc$}$$

where Δ_S, called *Harsanyi dividends*, are defined recursively as follows:

$$\Delta_S = \begin{cases} v(S) & \text{if } |S| = 1 \\ v(S) - \sum_{T \subset S} \Delta_T & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}. \tag{$\otimes$}$$

Let us also recall that equal maximal sparsity requires all the counterfactuals $\boldsymbol{x}'$ to be such that:

$$|C| = 1 \quad \vee \quad \forall i, j \in C, \sum_{\substack{S \in \text{WMS}(\mathcal{F}) \\ i \in S}} \frac{\xi(S)}{|S|} = \sum_{\substack{S \in \text{WMS}(\mathcal{F}) \\ j \in S}} \frac{\xi(S)}{|S|}$$

where $\xi : 2^{\mathcal{F}} \to \mathbb{R}$ is defined as follows:

$$\xi(S) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } S \in \text{MS}(\mathcal{F}) \\ 1 - \sum_{T \in \text{WMS}(S)} \delta_T & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

and where we recall that:

- $\text{MS}(S)$ is the set of all the (proper or improper) subsets of S that give rise to a maximally sparse counterfactual:

$$\text{MS}(S) = \{T \subseteq S : \left\langle \boldsymbol{x}_{\bar{T}}, \boldsymbol{x}'_T \right\rangle \text{ is maximally sparse}\}\,;$$

- $\text{WMS}(S)$ is the set of all the (proper or improper) subsets of S that give rise to a weak maximally sparse counterfactual:

$$\text{WMS}(S) = \{T \subseteq S : \left\langle \boldsymbol{x}_{\bar{T}}, \boldsymbol{x}'_T \right\rangle \text{ is weakly maximally sparse}\}\,.$$

We note that if we prove that:

C.I $\Delta_S = 1 \quad \forall S \in \text{MS}(\mathcal{F})$
C.II $\Delta_S = 0 \quad \forall S \in \mathcal{F} \setminus \text{WMS}(\mathcal{F})$

then, by Definition 4.4 and the definition of Shapley values with the Harsanyi dividends (◯), (3) follows and, in turn, the thesis follows.

Let's then prove (C.I). If $S \in \text{MS}(\mathcal{F})$, by the definition of the set $\text{MS}(\mathcal{F})$, it holds that $\left\langle \boldsymbol{x}_{\mathcal{F}\setminus S}, \boldsymbol{x}'_S \right\rangle$ is a maximally sparse counterfactual. Therefore, it trivially follows, from Definition 4.1, that:

$$v(S) = 1 \quad \text{and} \quad \forall T \subset S\,,\ v(T) = 0$$

Then, by the Harsanyi dividends definition (⊗), (C.I) follows.

We now prove C.II. If $S \in \mathcal{F} \setminus \text{WMS}(\mathcal{F})$ and $S \subset T : T \in \text{MS}(\mathcal{F})$, then it trivially follows that $\Delta_S = 0$.

If that is not the case, then $S \supset T : T \in MS(S)$ and it must contain at least a feature $i \in S$ such that i is spurious, or in more formally such that:

$$\forall i \in \bar{C}\,,\ \forall S \subseteq \mathcal{F} \setminus \{i\}\,,\ \ v_{\boldsymbol{x}'}\left(S \cup \{i\}\right) - v_{\boldsymbol{x}'}\left(S\right) = 0.$$

Note that this is the definition of a *null-player*. Therefore, by Remark 4 in Dehez [19] — stating that "a player is null iff the dividends associated to coalitions containing that player are all equal to zero." — C.II follows.

Then the thesis follows. □

Proof. The corollary follows trivially from Theorem 4.5. □

A.2 Sparsity

As mentioned in Section 4, the different notions of sparsity of counterfactuals defined in this paper are theoretically connected between each others. In particular, maximal sparsity implies equal maximal sparsity that, in turn, implies weak maximal sparsity. We now formally prove such relationships between these three properties of counterfactuals that we defined in Section 4.

Proposition A.3 (Maximal Sparsity ⇒ Weak Maximal Sparsity)**.** *If $\boldsymbol{x}'$ is maximally sparse then $\boldsymbol{x}'$ is also weakly maximally sparse. And more in general, if for any $T \subseteq \mathcal{F}$, if $S \in MS(T)$ then $S \in WMS(T)$.*

Proof. The result follows trivially from Definition 4.3. □

Proposition A.4 (Maximal Sparsity ⇒ Equal Maximal Sparsity)**.** *If $\boldsymbol{x}'$ is maximally sparse then $\boldsymbol{x}'$ is equal maximally sparse.*

Proof. By Definitions 4.1 and 4.3, it follows that if $\boldsymbol{x}$ is maximally sparse than $\text{MS}(\mathcal{F}) = \text{WMS}(F)$.

Therefore the following holds $\forall i \in C$ where $C = \{i \in \mathcal{F} : x_i \neq x'_i\}$:

$$\sum_{\substack{S \in \text{WMS}(\mathcal{F}) \\ i \in S}} \frac{\xi(S)}{|S|} = \sum_{\substack{S \in \text{MS}(\mathcal{F}) \\ i \in S}} \frac{\xi(S)}{|S|}$$

Also, by Definition 4.4, we can substitute $\xi(S)$, therefore:

$$\sum_{\substack{S \in \text{WMS}(\mathcal{F}) \\ i \in S}} \frac{\xi(S)}{|S|} = \sum_{\substack{S \in \text{MS}(\mathcal{F}) \\ i \in S}} \frac{1}{|S|}$$

which is a constant, thus the thesis follows. □

Proposition A.5 (Equal Maximal Sparsity ⇒ Weak Maximal Sparsity)**.** *If $\boldsymbol{x}'$ is equal maximally sparse then $\boldsymbol{x}'$ is weak maximally sparse.*

Proof. Let's consider $C = \{i \in \mathcal{F} : x_i \neq x'_i\}$. If $|C| = 1$ then the thesis follows trivially. If instead $|C| > 1$ and $\boldsymbol{x}'$ is equally maximally sparse, by Theorem 4.5, it follows that:

$$\hat{\Phi}_i = \frac{1}{|C|}$$

Now, if we assume, ad absurdum, $\boldsymbol{x}'$ is not weakly maximally sparse, then it means that C contains at least a spurious features which gets a non-zero feature attribution. This is absurd given that $\hat{\Phi}_i$ is a Shapley value and thus satisfy the *null-property* of Shapley values, by which a null-player (spurious feature) always get zero attribution. □

A.3 Additional Results

In Section 3.2 we mentioned how the efficiency property [62] can be reduced to a simpler form for Bin-CF-SHAP feature attributions. We now formally prove such result in Proposition A.6.

Proposition A.6. *In the context of Bin-CF-SHAP, the efficiency property of Shapley values simplifies to the following expression.*

$$\sum_{i \in \mathcal{F}} \hat{\Phi}_i = 1$$

Proof. Let's recall that the efficiency property of Shapley values requires: [70]

$$\sum_{i \in \mathcal{F}} \phi_i = v(\boldsymbol{x}) - v(\emptyset)$$

where v is the characteristics function of the game for which we are computing Shapley values.

In particular, in the context of Bin-CF-SHAP values for which the characteristics function is defined as follows (see Definition 3.1):

$$v(S) = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\boldsymbol{x}' \sim \mathcal{X}'} \left[F\left(\left\langle \boldsymbol{x}_S, \boldsymbol{x}'_{\mathcal{F} \setminus S} \right\rangle \right) \right]$$

the efficiency property simplifies to the following expression:

$$\sum_{i \in \mathcal{F}} = F(\boldsymbol{x}) - \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\boldsymbol{x}' \in \mathcal{X}'} \left[F(\boldsymbol{x}') \right].$$

Since all $\boldsymbol{x}$ is the query instance, and $\boldsymbol{x}' \in \mathcal{X}'$ are counterfactuals, by Definition 3.1, then it follows that:

$$\sum_{i \in \mathcal{F}} = 1 - 0 = 1.$$

which proves the thesis. □

B EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

Dataset	Features	Size Train Set	Size Test Set	Decision Threshold*	Model Performance† ROC-AUC	Recall	Accuracy‡
HELOC (Home Equity Line Of Credit)	23	6,909	2,962	0.4993	80.1%	72.8%	73.0%
Lending Club (Loan Data)	20	961,326	411,998	0.6367	69.6%	62.5%	72.17%
Adult (1994 US Census Income)	12	22,792	9,769	0.6811	92.3%	72.9%	86.6%

Table 1: Characteristics of the datasets and models used in the experiments. (∗) The decision threshold is reported here in probability space (i.e., after passing the model output through a sigmoid); (†) performance metrics are computed on the test set.

B.1 Datasets and Models

To run the experiments we used 3 publicly available datasets. Table 1 describes in details the datasets.

We split the data using a stratified 70/30 *random* train/test split for HELOC and Adult. For Lending Club we split the data using a non-random 70/30 train/test split based on the loan issuance date (available in the original data).

We trained an XGBoost model [13] for each dataset. In particular, we run an hyperparameters search using Bayesian optimization using hyperopt [8] for 1000 iterations maximizing the average validation ROC-AUC under a 5-fold cross validation. To reduce model over-parameterization during the hyper-parameters optimization we penalized high model variance, i.e., for each cross-validation fold, instead of using AUC_{val}, we used $AUC_{val} + (AUC_{val} - AUC_{train})$ where AUC_{train} and AUC_{val} are the training and validation ROC-AUC, respectively.

To compute the decision threshold (t) we used a value such that the rate of positive prediction of the model (on the training set samples) was the same as the true rate of positive predictions (on the same samples). Table 1 shows the decision threshold and the performance of each model.

B.2 Feature Importance

We used the following implementation in order to compute explanations.

- **SHAP**. We used the TreeSHAP implementation [49] available through the `TreeExplainer` class in the `shap` package[3] (for Python).
- **CF-SHAP**. We used CF-SHAP [2] available through the `CFExplainer` class in the `cfshap` package[4] (for Python).
- **Binary CF-SHAP**. We used CF-SHAP in combinations with the KernelSHAP [50] implementation available through the `KernelExplainer` class in the `shap` package. We used 10,000 kernel samples to generate the KernelSHAP approximation. We note that, since we used KernelSHAP, the resulting Binary CF-SHAP explanations that we generated are an approximation of the exact Shapley values.
- **CF-Freq**. Given its simplicity, we implemented from scratch the explanation logic following the explanation definition [55, 73].
- **Normalised CF-Freq**. We implemented from scratch the explanation logic similarly to CF-Freq.

We also remark, as mentioned in Section 2, that we used the "true-to-the-model" interventional (a.k.a., non-conditional) version of SHAP (default setting of `shap` and `cfshap`).

B.3 Counterfactuals

To compute the K-nearest neighbours we used the implementation available in `sklearn.neighbours`. To make our results indifferent to the size of the dataset we limited the k-nearest neighbours to be selected among a random sample of 10,000 samples from the training set.

B.4 Maximally Sparse Counterfactuals

In Section 4 we mentioned how it is always possible to generate a maximally sparse counterfactual from any counterfactual by selecting a subset of the features $C = \{i \in \mathcal{F} : x_i \neq \boldsymbol{x}'_i\}$ that have been modified in the counterfactual. In particular, as described in Section 6, to run our experiments we devised an exhaustive search based algorithm. The pseudo-code for such algorithm is in Algorithm 1. At a high-level Algorithm 1 computes a maximally sparse counterfactual from any counterfactual as follows:

- It explores all the possible subset of features $T \subset C$ using depth-first search (implemented through recursion).
- It prunes the search when it encounter a subset $\widehat{T}$ of features that does not give rise to a counterfactual; in this way it avoids to search any subset $Q \subset \widehat{T}$.
- After having generated $\mathbb{MS}(\mathcal{F})$ — the set of all the maximally sparse counterfactual that can be induced from $\boldsymbol{x}'$ — it computes their cost based on a cost function provided by the user, and returns the counterfactual with the minimum cost.
- In our experiments, as mentioned in Section 6, we used the *total quantile shift* [84] as cost function for counterfactuals.

[3]The `shap` package can be found at https://github.com/slundberg/shap

[4]The `cfshap` package can be found at https://github.com/jpmorganchase/cf-shap

Algorithm 1 Depth-first search-based algorithm to induce a maximally sparse counterfactual from any counterfactual

MaxSparse($\boldsymbol{x}$, $\boldsymbol{x'}$, $\mathcal{F}$, F)
Input: query instance $\boldsymbol{x}$, counterfactual $\boldsymbol{x'}$, set of all features $\mathcal{F}$, F model decision function
$C = \{i \in \mathcal{F} : x_i \neq x'_i\}$ ▷ Let's isolate the features that have been modified.
$Fail = \{\}$ ▷ Let's create a set for failed trials.
$Succ = \{C\}$ ▷ Let's create a set for the successful trials.
MaxSparseRecurse($\boldsymbol{x}$, $\boldsymbol{x'}$, null, C, $Succ$, $Fail$, F) ▷ Let's run the search recursively.
▷ We now select the maximally sparse counterfactual with minimum cost
$\boldsymbol{x'}$ = null
$c' = \infty$
for $\boldsymbol{x''} \in Succ$ **do**
  $c'' = \text{cost}(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x''})$ ▷ We compute the cost/proximity of the counterfactual
  if $c'' < c'$ **or** $\boldsymbol{x'}$ **is** null **then**
    $\boldsymbol{x'} = \boldsymbol{x''}$
    $c' = c''$
  end if
end for
Return $\boldsymbol{x'}$

MaxSparseRecurse($\boldsymbol{x}$, $\boldsymbol{x'}$, $\boldsymbol{x'}^P$, C, $Succ$, $Fail$, F)
Input: query instance $\boldsymbol{x}$, counterfactual $\boldsymbol{x'}$, parent of the counterfactual $\boldsymbol{x'}^P$, set of features C, successful trials $Succ$, failed trials $Fail$
if $F(\boldsymbol{x'}) \neq F(\boldsymbol{x})$ **then**
  ▷ We remove the parent and add the current $\boldsymbol{x'}$ to the successful trials.
  if $\boldsymbol{x'}^P \in Succ$ **then**
    $Succ.remove(\boldsymbol{x'}^P)$
  end if
  $Succ.add(\boldsymbol{x'})$
  ▷ We now expand the search recursively by removing one more feature from the counterfactual.
  for $i \in C$ **do**
    $C' = C \setminus \{i\}$
    $\boldsymbol{x''} = \boldsymbol{x'}$
    $x''_i = x_i$
    if $\boldsymbol{x''} \notin Fail \wedge \boldsymbol{x''} \notin Succ$ **then**
      MaxSparseRecurse($\boldsymbol{x}$, $\boldsymbol{x''}$, $\boldsymbol{x'}$, C', $Succ$, $Fail$, F)
    end if
  end for
else
  $Fail.add(C)$
end if

B.5 Technical setup

The experiments were run using a `c6i.32xlarge` AWS virtual machine with 128 vCPUs (64 cores of 3.5 GHz 3rd generation Intel Xeon Scalable processor) and 256GB of RAM. XGBoost parameter `nthread` was set to 15. We used a Linux machine running `Ubuntu 20.04`. We used `Python 3.8.13`, `shap 0.39.0`, `cfshap 0.0.2`, `sklearn 1.1.1` and `xgboost 1.5.1`.

B.6 Source Code

The source code to reproduce the experimental results in the paper will be made available at https://www.emanuelealbini.com/cf-vs-shap-aies23.

C EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

C.1 Explanations Difference

In Section 6 we showed how the explanations generated using different techniques differ in terms of their average pairwise Kendall-Tau rank correlations [41]. Figures 4 to 7 show the same results for additional metrics commonly used in the literature to measure the difference between the rankings that feature importance explanations provide. In particular, we show the results for Feature Agreement [26], Rank Agreement [43], Spearman Rank Correlation [76] and Rank Biased Overlap [68, 93].

Results - We note that:

- In general, the results are consistent with the results in terms of Kendall-Tau correlation presented in Figure 2 in the main text.
- The results in terms feature and rank agreement suggest that explanations tend to be more similar in their the top-3 features by importance than in their top-10. This is consistent with the literature [43] that shows how different XAI techniques tend to agree more on the most important features when compared to those that are ranked as least important.

C.2 Counterfactual-ability and plausibility

The counterfactual-ability and plausibility metrics proposed in Albini et al. [2] have few hyper-parameters. In particular, they can be run using different strategies to induce a recourse from a feature importance explanations (called *action functions*) and different ways to evaluate the cost of the recourse (called *cost functions*). We refer the reader to Albini et al. [2] for more details on the evaluation metrics and the hyper-parameters.

The results we reported in Figure 3 in the main text were obtained using *random recourse* and *total quantile shift cost*. To show the robustness of our evaluation under different action functions and cost functions we run the same experiments with the alternative definitions of cost and action functions that have been proposed in [2].

In particular, in this appendix we report the results under the following alternative assumptions:

- random recourse and quantile shift cost with L2 norm;
- proportional recourse and total quantile shift cost;
- proportional recourse and total quantile shift cost under L2 norm.

Results - Figure 8 shows the results which are indeed consistent with those presented in Section 6.



(a) Top-1



(b) Top-3



(c) Top-5



(d) Top-10

Figure 4: Average pairwise Feature Agreement between explanations for different datasets. See Appendix C.1 for more details.



(a) Top-3



(b) Top-5



(c) Top-10

Figure 5: Average pairwise Rank Agreement between explanations for different datasets. See Appendix C.1 for more details.



Figure 6: Average pairwise Spearman rank correlation between explanations for different datasets. See Appendix C.1 for more details.



Figure 7: Average pairwise Rank Biased Overlap between explanations for different datasets. See Appendix C.1 for more details.



(a) Random Recourse / L2 Cost Function

(b) Proportional Recourse / L1 Cost Function

(c) Proportional Recourse / L2 Cost Function

Figure 8: Counterfactual-ability and plausibility improvement (the higher the better) with respect to SHAP under different assumptions of recourse strategy and cost of counterfactuals. See Appendix C.1 for more details.

Adaptive Adversarial Training Does Not Increase Recourse Costs

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ABSTRACT

Recent work has connected adversarial attack methods and algorithmic recourse methods: both seek minimal changes to an input instance which alter a model's classification decision. It has been shown that traditional adversarial training, which seeks to minimize a classifier's susceptibility to malicious perturbations, increases the cost of generated recourse; with larger adversarial training radii correlating with higher recourse costs. From the perspective of algorithmic recourse, however, the appropriate adversarial training radius has always been unknown. Another recent line of work has motivated adversarial training with adaptive training radii to address the issue of instance-wise variable adversarial vulnerability, showing success in domains with unknown attack radii. This work studies the effects of adaptive adversarial training on algorithmic recourse costs. We establish that the improvements in model robustness induced by adaptive adversarial training show little effect on algorithmic recourse costs, providing a potential avenue for affordable robustness in domains where recoursability is critical.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Theory of computation → Adversarial learning**; • **Computing methodologies** → *Knowledge representation and reasoning*; • **Human-centered computing → Human computer interaction (HCI)**.

KEYWORDS

Adversarial Robustness, Algorithmic Recourse, Counterfactual Explanations

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1 INTRODUCTION

The adoption of Machine Learning (ML) in consequential environments motivates the provision of instructions to adversely-affected users on actions they can take to alter a model's decision. For example, in the lending domain, if a classifier decides to deny an applicant, there should be a mechanism for providing a feasible set of actions the applicant can take to be approved. This instructive information is desirable as opaque self-learning systems inform more and more of our society's decision-making, for both trust and accountability. The ability to obtain a desired outcome from a known model, the actionable set of changes that users can make to improve their qualification, or the systematic process of reversing unfavorable decisions is defined as "algorithmic recourse," or simply "recourse" [12]. These what-if scenarios are also often referred to as "counterfactual explanations." Importantly, the explicitly stated goal of recourse is to find actions with minimal cost to the user [24].

Simultaneously, it has been observed that many neural networks can be easily "fooled" by introducing small changes to input features that may seem imperceptible. [22] first proposed the concept of "adversarial examples": by adding small perturbations to an input sample, models obtain incorrect classification results with high confidence scores. These are sometimes referred to as "evasion attacks" [5]. [22] also found that such perturbations can be adapted into different model architectures, demonstrating that many deep neural networks are vulnerable to these input manipulations. Adversarial examples raise concerns about the trust one can place in neural network classifiers, and much work has been put into adversarial training methods to improve the robustness of models to adversarial examples. The most popular adversarial training regimes [1] generate adversarial examples (with corrected labels) within a fixed "attack radius" (ϵ) during training procedure and include them in the model's training dataset. While adversarial training has been shown to increase robustness to adversarial examples drastically, it often comes at some cost to standard accuracy [28].

There is an inherent contention between the considerations of algorithmic recourse and adversarial robustness. While minimizing the changes necessary to alter a classifier's decision is seen as beneficial from a recourse perspective, such changes are harmful from a robustness perspective. Research [14] has demonstrated that adversarial training increases the average recourse cost, with higher adversarial training radii corresponding to higher recourse costs, which raises the concern that there may be an inherent trade-off between robustness and recourse.

Briefly, it should be noted that the goals of adversarial robustness are not totally at odds with recourse. Recourse *should* represent *true movements towards a desired class*, and adversarial examples that "fool" a model can be *harmful* and should *not be presented as recourse*. Consider the lending setting: if an approval action plan is provided to an applicant which does not represent a true movement in their underlying propensity for repayment, both the lender and borrower are putting themselves at long-term financial risk by following that plan. This is relevant in the context of many recourse settings, where data is tabular and it is not immediately obvious which input perturbations constitute adversarial examples and which input perturbations constitute recourse that genuinely moves an individual towards a desired class manifold. With this in

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mind, it is worth considering not only the change in overall cost of recourse, but also the change in proximity of recourse to the desired data manifold, when selecting an adversarial training radius.

Even more fundamentally, it is important to question *whether a fixed adversarial training radius is appropriate, particularly in the context of algorithmic recourse?*. It has been shown [2] that different data instances have different *inherent adversarial vulnerabilities* due to their varying proximities to other classes. As such, some researchers have argued that an identical adversarial training radius should not be applied to all instances during training. Several methods [2, 6, 8] have been proposed for automatically learning *instance-wise* adversarial radii to address this variability. These are broadly referred to as "Adaptive Adversarial Training" (AAT) regimes [1].

This work explores the effects of AAT on both model robustness and ultimate recourse costs in an attempt to address the trade-off between the two and find a *justifiable* middle ground. Our contributions include:

- An observation on the effects of robustness on recourse costs, and when AAT yields more affordable recourse.
- Experiments demonstrating AAT's superior robustness/ recourse trade-offs over traditional AT.

2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS

Algorithmic Recourse: The continued adoption of ML in high-impact decision making such as banking, healthcare, and resource allocation has inspired much work in the field of Algorithmic Recourse [11, 13, 24], and Counterfactual Explanations [15, 19, 21, 27]. The performance of different recourse methods depends highly on properties of the datasets they are applied to, the model they operate on, the application of that model's score, and factual point specificities [7]. However, broadly speaking, recourse methods are classified based on: i) the *model family* they apply to, ii) the degree of *access* they have to the underlying model (i.e. white vs. black box methods), iii) the consideration of *manifold proximity* in the generation of recourse, iv) the underlying *causal relationships* in the data, and v) the use of *model approximations* in the generation process [26]. Recently, [18] introduced CARLA, a framework for benchmarking different recourse methods which act as an aggregator for popular recourse methods and standard datasets.

Adversarial Attacks and Adversarial Training: Adversarial vulnerability refers to the susceptibility of a model to be *fooled* by perturbations to the input data which cannot be detected by humans (so-called *Adversarial Examples*) [23]. Adversarial Training [10, 16] has been introduced to create models which are not susceptible to such attacks. The most popular method of Adversarial Training generates adversarial examples during the training process and includes them in the training dataset with corrected labels alongside the uncorrupted dataset. Often, adversarial training comes at some cost to standard classification accuracy. There have been many attack methods proposed to generate adversarial examples [5] with varying degrees of access to the model under attack, but most focus on defending against adversarial examples within a given ϵ-radius (which are often defined by ℓ_1, ℓ_2, or ℓ_∞ norms of size ϵ.) This work follows the popular attack and training formulation from [16], which minimizes the worst-case loss within a defined ϵ-radius.

On the Intersection of Robustness and Recourse. Both Adversarial Examples and Counterfactual Explanations are formally described as constrained optimization problems where the objective is to alter a model's output by minimally perturbing input features [4, 9]. Recent work [17] proved equivalence between certain adversarial attack methods and counterfactual explanation methods, and further work has demonstrated both theoretically and empirically that increasing the radius of attack during adversarial training increases the cost of the resulting recourse [14]. This inherent connection pits security at odds with expressivity and raises an important question as to how an adversarial radius ought to be selected for adversarial training. If the radius is too small, the model may be overly sensitive to an attack, while if it is too large, end users suffer from potentially overly-burdensome recourse costs. In the context of many recourse problems where data is tabular, it is difficult to determine what may constitute an adversarial attack, furthering the difficulty of radius selection. [3] discussed a formulation for adversarial attacks on tabular data that accounts for both the radius of attack and the importance of a feature, but this is difficult to know a priori and often changes depending on the choice of explanation method selected [20].

Adaptive Adversarial Training. It has been observed that different data instances have different inherent adversarial vulnerability due to their varying proximity to other class' data manifolds, calling into question the conventional wisdom that models should be adversarially trained at a single consistent adversarial radius. [2] first observed this issue in the image classification domain, where certain instances can be *meaningfully transformed* into other classes even at small adversarial radii. The authors of [2] proposed a means of discovering instance-wise adversarial radii by iteratively increasing or decreasing each instance's attack radius based on whether attacks are successful. [6] built on this work by further motivating the effects of overly-large adversarial radii on classification accuracy and proposed a variation of [2]'s method which included adaptive label-smoothing to account for the uncertainty added by larger attack radii, and [8] proposed a means for adaptive adversarial training by increasing the classification margin around correctly-classified datapoints. Adaptive Adversarial Training (AAT) presents a means of "automatically" selecting attack radii during training, and in all works thus far, has shown positive results in terms of the accuracy/robustness trade-off inherent in adversarial training, as well as smoother robustness curves across ranges of attack radii compared with traditional Adversarial Training.

3 PRELIMINARIES & NOTATION

Standard Training: We begin with a model f parameterized by weights θ that maps $\mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$, where $x \in \mathcal{X}$ are features and $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ are their corresponding labels. Given a dataset $\mathcal{D} = \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i=1}^N$, and a loss function $\ell(\cdot)$, a standard learning objective is to minimize the average loss on the data:

$$\min_\theta \quad \frac{1}{N} \sum_{(x_i, y_i) \in D} \ell(f_\theta(x_i), y_i) \tag{1}$$



(a) Toy problem demonstrating that adversarial training can result in counterfactuals that are both costlier and further from the desired class manifold. The natural decision boundary is shown in black, the adversarial boundary in red. ϵ-Adversarial training creates a necessary recourse cost $c_a = \epsilon > c_n$, and yields a distance in the resulting recourse to the desired manifold of $d_a > d_n$



(b) Adaptive Adversarial Training provides counterfactuals which are cheaper and relatively closer to the desired class manifold. The natural decision boundary is shown in black, the adaptive adversarial boundary in green. With instance specific robustness ϵ_i, the recourse cost $c_{aa} = \epsilon_i > c_n$ and $c_{aa} < \epsilon$ for any $\epsilon_i < \epsilon$. This yields a distance $d_{aa} < d_a$.

Figure 1: An example scenario demonstrating the effectiveness of AAT in terms of recourse costs.

Let f_{nat} represent the naturally trained model using the standard loss minimization based optimization technique.

Adversarial Attacks: The goal of an adversarial attack is to strategically generate perturbations δ which can significantly enlarge the loss $\ell(\cdot)$ when added to an instance x. [10] introduced *Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)* for generating adversarial examples using the following mechanism:

$$x_i' = x_i + \alpha \cdot \text{sign}\left(\nabla_{x_i} \ell\left(f_\theta(x_i), y_i\right)\right) \tag{2}$$

where α denotes the size of the perturbation, x_i' denotes the adversarially perturbed sample, and x_i is the original clean sample. The *sign* function operates on the gradient of $\ell\left(f_\theta(x_i), y_i\right)$ w.r.t. x_i, which is used to set the gradient to 1 if it is greater than 0 and -1 if it is less than 0. [16] proposed a stronger iterative version of FGSM, performing Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) on the negative loss function:

$$x_i(t+1) = \Pi_{x+\mathcal{S}}\left(x_i(t) + \alpha \cdot \text{sign}\left(\nabla_{x_i(t)} \ell(f_\theta(x_i(t)), y_i)\right)\right)$$

where α denotes the perturbation step size at each iteration and $x_i(t+1)$ represents the perturbed example at step $t+1$ for the clean instance x_i. In this work, we use PGD due to its performance, popularity, and relative speed.

Adversarial Training: Adversarial training is usually formulated as a min-max learning objective, wherein we seek to minimize the worst case loss within a fixed training radius ϵ.

$$\min_\theta \max_{||\delta_i|| \le \epsilon} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{(x_i, y_i) \in D} \ell(f_\theta(x_i + \delta_i), y_i) \tag{3}$$

We solve this min-max objective via an alternating stochastic method that takes minimization steps for θ, followed by maximization steps that approximately solve the inner optimization using k steps of an adversarial attack. PGD with a fixed ϵ is used to perturb an original instance and let $f_{\epsilon\text{-adv}}$ represent the model trained with a PGD radius of ϵ.

3.1 Adaptive Adversarial Training

[2] first argued that different data instances have different intrinsic adversarial vulnerabilities due to their varying proximity to other class manifolds, and introduced Instance-Adaptive Adversarial Training (AAT) to automatically learn instance-wise adversarial radii. The authors proposed the following objective function:

$$\min_\theta \max_{||\delta_i|| \le \epsilon_i} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{(x_i, y_i) \in D} \ell(f_\theta(x_i + \delta_i), y_i) \tag{4}$$

where ϵ_i denotes each training instance's attack radius. ϵ_i is iteratively updated at each training epoch, increasing by a constant factor if the attack at the existing radius is unsuccessful and decreasing by a constant factor if it is successful.

[8] presented an alternate form of AAT called Max-Margin Adversarial (MMA) Training that seeks to impart adversarial robustness by maximizing the margin between correctly classified datapoints and the model's decision boundary. Formally, they proposed the following objective:

$$\min_\theta \left\{ \sum_{i \in S_\theta^+} \max\{0, d_{max} - d_\theta(x_i, y_i)\} + \beta \sum_{i \in S_\theta^-} \ell(f_\theta(x_j), y_j) \right\} \tag{5}$$

where S_θ^+ is the set of correctly classified examples, S_θ^- is the set of incorrectly classified examples, $d_\theta(x_i, y_i)$ is the margin between correctly classified examples and the model's decision boundary, d_{max} is a hyper-parameter controlling which points to maximize the boundary around (forcing the learning to focus on points with d_θ less than d_{max},) and β is a term controlling the trade-off between standard loss and *margin maximization*. The authors use a line search based on PGD to efficiently approximate $d_\theta(x_i, y_i)$. For the rest of this study, let f_{aat} be a model trained using a mechanism from this category of training techniques.

3.2 Recourse Methods

For the scope of this study, we explore three different classes [14] of recourse methods: i) one random search, ii) one gradient-based search, and iii) one manifold-based approach. We will now briefly discuss each method, and we refer the readers to the original works for further implementation details.

Growing Spheres (GS):. [15] proposed a random search method for calculating counterfactual by sampling from points within ℓ_2-hyper-spheres around x of iteratively increasing radii until one or more counterfactual is identified which flips $f(x)$. Formally, they present a minimization problem in selecting which counterfactual x' to return:

$$\arg\min_{x' \in \mathcal{X}} \{c(x, x') | f(x) \neq f(x')\} \tag{6}$$

where $\mathcal{X}$ is the family of sampled points around x and c is a cost function in $\mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$: $||x' - x||_2 + \gamma ||x' - x||_0$, where γ is a hyperparameter controlling the desired sparsity of the resulting counterfactual.

Score Counterfactual Explanations (SCFE):. [27] proposed a gradient-based method for identifying counterfactuals x'.

$$\arg\min_{x'} \max_{\lambda} \lambda (f(x') - y')^2 + d(x, x') \tag{7}$$

where $d(\cdot, \cdot)$ is some distance function and y' is the desired score from the model. In practice, this is solved by iteratively finding x' and increasing λ until a satisfactory solution is identified.

CCHVAE:. [19] proposed a manifold-based solution to finding counterfactuals using a Variational Auto Encoder (VAE) to search for counterfactuals in a latent representation $\mathcal{Z}$. The goal of CCHVAE and other manifold methods is to find counterfactuals that are semantically "similar" to other data points. Formally, given an encoder $\mathcal{E}$, a decoder $\mathcal{H}$, and a latent representation $\mathcal{Z}$ where $\mathcal{E} : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Z}$, CCHVAE optimizes the following:

$$\arg\min_{z' \in \mathcal{Z}} \{||z'|| \; s.t. \; f(\mathcal{H}(\mathcal{E}(x) + z')) \neq f(x)\} \tag{8}$$

4 RECOURSE TRADE-OFFS WITH ADAPTIVE ADVERSARIAL TRAINING

Recourse cost. The cost of recourse is usually approximated using a distance based metric. A common practice among recourse methodologies is to minimize the cost in some form or the other, because in general a low cost recourse is assumed to be easier to act upon. The cost of a recourse for a classification based model is traditionally interpreted as the minimum distance between a factual and the decision boundary. Alternatively, the inherent goal of adversarial training is to maximize the distance between factuals and the decision boundary. Hence, traditional adversarial training exacerbates the recourse costs of a classifier. In this section, we make preliminary observations on the effects of adaptive adversarial training on recourse costs.

An increase in ϵ for ϵ-adversarial training increases the overall recourse costs and the corresponding relation between ϵ and C is discussed in [14]. In comparison with an ϵ-adversarial training, we observe the following benefits from the instance adaptive adversarially training:

4.1 Recourse Costs

Let $\delta_x^{(nat)} = d(x, x')$ be the distance to the closest adversarial example x' for the instance x for a standard training based model, and, analogously, let $c_x^{(nat)} = cost(x, x'')$ be the cost of a recourse x'' for an individual represented by x. For simplicity, we assume that both $c_{(\cdot)}^{(\cdot)}$ and $cost(\cdot, \cdot)$ use the same ℓ_p norm based distance metrics. Let $H^- = \{x \in \mathcal{X} : f(x) = -1\}$ represent the sub-population which was adversely affected by the classifier $f(\cdot)$, and analogously we have $H^+ = \{x \in \mathcal{X} : f(x) = +1\}$. The average cost of recourses for H^- is defined for a naturally trained model as:

$$c_*^{(nat)} = \frac{1}{|H^-|} \sum_{x \in H^-} c_x^{(nat)} \tag{9}$$

Let $\underline{H^-} = \{x \in \mathcal{X} : f(x) = -1, c_x^{(nat)} \leq \underline{\epsilon}\}$, where $\underline{\epsilon}$ is a cost threshold to identify low cost recourses. As observed in Figures 4 and 5, a low cost counterfactual is sufficient in practice for a large section of the population. However, an optimal ϵ_a-adv classifier provides at least ϵ_a robustness to all samples in the training dataset. This can be visualized by the sharp peak in the distribution of the observed ϵ in the test dataset for all the ϵ-adv models (Figure 8). However AAT models provide natural robustness to the data samples, meaning that a data instance closer to the natural decision boundary has $\epsilon_{aat}^{H^-}$ that depends on the data's natural proximity to the decision boundary. For instances with $\epsilon_{aat}^{H^-} < \epsilon_a$, the resulting recourse will be more affordable. For $\epsilon_{aat}^{H^-} < c_x^{(nat)}$, low cost recourse within $\underline{H^-}$ will be preserved.

4.2 Proximity to the Desired Manifold

Manifold Proximity measures the distance by some metric between recourse and the target sub-population. For an $f^*_{\epsilon_a\text{-adv}}$ model, the recourse suggested have at least ϵ_a proximity from the target approved sub-population H^+ due to the fact that the target sub-population is also ϵ_a away from the decision boundary. Alternatively f_{aat} is naturally robust for the target sub-population as well. Hence, the Recourse provided has the potential to be closer in terms of proximity to H^+, so long as $\epsilon_{aat}^{H^+} < \epsilon_a$. We report the average proximity $\rho_{f_{\epsilon\text{-adv}}}$ of the model $f_{\epsilon\text{-adv}}$ using:

$$\rho_{f_{\epsilon\text{-adv}}} = \frac{1}{|N_{test}|} \sum_{x \in N_{test}} \min_{x^+ \in H^+} d(x, x^+) \tag{10}$$

where $d(x, x^+)$ is a distance measure between a counterfactual x and a target population x^+. We report both $\rho_{f_{\epsilon\text{-adv}}}$ and $\rho_{f_{aat}}$ for the corresponding models. In Figure 7, we find that $\rho_{f_{aat}}$ is significantly better than $\rho_{f_{\epsilon\text{-adv}}}$. A motivating toy problem demonstrating lower recourse costs and closer manifold proximity is also visualized in Figure 1.

4.3 Preservation of Low Cost Recourse

The recourse costs provided to the adversely affected individuals by a model should follow the natural distribution of the difficulty of acting upon the suggested recourse at the population level. With a fixed ϵ while training an optimal adversarially trained $f^*_{\epsilon\text{-adv}}$ model, the recourse suggested must necessarily be ϵ away from the decision boundary and further ϵ away from the nearest target



(a) Accuracy (Adult) (b) Accuracy (Heloc) (c) Accuracy (GSC)

(d) F1 (Adult) (e) F1 (Heloc) (f) F1 (GSC)

Figure 2: Standard performance across datatsets. MMA shows particularly competitive standard performance compared with all other Adversarial Training regimens.



(a) Adult (b) Heloc (c) GSC

Figure 3: Attack Success Rate. Traditional Adversarial Training shows higher robustness within its predefined training threshold, but sharper robustness degradation as the attack radius increases.

population sample. Such counterfactuals contradicts with the recourse literature [25], which describes a distribution in recourse costs wherein a proportion of individuals only require minimal low cost actionable steps to obtain the desired outcome from a model, whereas other individuals can have a much larger recourse costs. Essentially, ϵ-robustness necessarily denies recourse with lower costs than ϵ.

f_{aat} does not enforce a strict ϵ while training, allowing instances to have a wider range of recourse costs. To this end we compare the rate of extreme low cost recourse C_Δ across the discussed training methods with real-world datasets to measure the rate at which it degrades in practice. For simplicity, we measure:

$$C_\Delta = \frac{1}{|N_{test}|} \sum_{x_i \in N_{test}} \mathbf{1}(C_{x_i} < \epsilon) \tag{11}$$

where C_{x_i} is the cost of recourse for an instance x_i and ϵ is a minimum adversarial training radius. We observe in Figure 4 that Adaptive Adversarial Training preserves low cost recourse rates despite providing overall robustness benefits.

5 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN & METRICS

In this section, we detail our experimentation procedure to empirically evaluate these various training methods and explain our



(a) Growing Spheres (Adult) (b) Growing Spheres (Heloc) (c) Growing Spheres (GSC)

(d) SCFE (Adult) (e) SCFE (Heloc) (f) SCFE (GSC)

Figure 4: Low cost recourse (ℓ_∞ < 0.05) proportion for methods that optimize directly in the input space. We observe that AAT models has much higher proportions of low cost recourse, supporting the hypothesis that it allows for robustness while preserving low recourse costs for individuals near natural decision boundaries.

metric choices. The CARLA package [18] was used to source the datasets and recourse methods we employed.

5.1 Experimental Setup

Datasets. We performed our experiments on three datasets:

- *Adult Income*: A dataset originating from the 1994 Census of 48,842 individuals for whom the task is to predict whether someone makes more than $50,000/yr. It is comprised of 20 features which are a combination of demographic features (age, sex, racial group), as well as employment features (hours of work per week and salary), and financial features (capital gains/losses.) In keeping with [14] and [3], we removed categorical features for efficient training and approximation of tabular adversarial examples. The target distribution is somewhat skewed, with a 76% positive label proportion.
- *Home Equity Line of Credit (Heloc)*: pulled from the 2019 FICO Explainable Machine Learning (xML) challenge, the Heloc dataset consists of anonymized credit bureau data from 9,871 individuals where the task is to predict whether an individual will repay their HELOC account within two years. The dataset consists of 21 financial features and no demographic data. The target distribution is evenly split, with a 48% positive label proportion.
- *Give Me Some Credit (GSC)*: a credit-scoring dataset pulled from a 2011 Kaggle Competition consisting of 150,000 individuals for whom the task is to predict default. It consists of 11 features, one of which is a demographic feature (age), and the rest are financial variables. The target distribution is heavily skewed, with a 93% positive label proportion.

Models. We trained a total of 7 Neural Network models for each of our datasets: one naturally trained model, one model trained with AAT, one model trained with MMA, and four adversarially trained models. All models are trained using Binary Cross Entropy with the default model architecture from CARLA, with three hidden layers of [18, 9, 3] units. The Adversarially Trained models were all trained with PGD at a variety of $\epsilon \in [0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2]$. The AAT model did not consider any hyperparameter choices, and the MMA model was trained using the original work's package [8] with the default hyperparameter choices.

Recourse Methods. We constructed Counterfactual Explanations for all models on a sample of 1000 negatively-classified test data points using three methods: Growing Spheres (GS), C-CHVAE, and SCFE. All hyperparameter choices for these methods were left as their CARLA defaults.

5.2 Metrics

To study the effects of the different training methods on accuracy, robustness, and recourse, we calculate the following metrics:

Standard Classification Performance. A primary consideration in adversarial training is the trade-off in classification accuracy when compared with natural training. We record the standard classification accuracy of all models to measure the drop in accuracy that may accompany the different adversarial training methods. Formally, we measure: $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}_{test}|} \sum_{x_i \in \mathcal{D}_{test}} \mathbf{1}(f(x_i) = y_i)$. Given that we are experimenting with datasets with skewed target distributions, we also record the F1 score of each model on the minority target population.



(a) Adult (b) Heloc (c) GSC

Figure 5: AAT "Discovered" Radii Resulting from Adpative Adversarial Training



(a) GS (Adult) (b) GS (Heloc) (c) GS (GSC)

(d) CCHVAE (Adult) (e) CCHVAE (Heloc) (f) CCHVAE (GSC)

(g) SCFE (Adult) (h) SCFE (Heloc) (i) SCFE (GSC)

Figure 6: Recourse costs (defined as the ℓ_2 distance between a factual and counterfactual data point) for all methods and datsets. We observe that adaptive adversarial training shows significantly more competitive recourse costs than traditional adversarial training, and MMA training in particular shows almost no increase over natural training despite its robustness benefits.



(a) KNN Prox. (Adult) (b) KNN Prox. (Heloc) (c) KNN Prox. (GSC)

(d) Sphere Prox. (Adult) (e) Sphere Prox. (Heloc) (f) Sphere Prox. (GSC)

Figure 7: KNN and Sphere Manifold Proximity for Growing Spheres. We find that not only does adaptive adversarial training produce less expensive recourse than traditional adversarial training, but also recourse that is more faithful to the desired class these counterfactuals approximate.

Adversarial Success Rate. Given that we are primarily concerned with the trade-off between robustness and recourse, and following the concept of "boundary error" introduced in [29] to disentangle standard performance and adversarial vulnerability, we also measure the success rate of adversarial attacks at various radii on our models. Formally, given an attack $\mathcal{A}_\epsilon$ such that $\mathcal{A}_\epsilon(x)$ identifies the most adversarial example on x within a radius ϵ, we measure $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}_{test}|}\sum_{x_i \in \mathcal{D}_{test}} \mathbf{1}(f(\mathcal{A}_\epsilon(x)) \neq f(x_i))$. We observe the adversarial success rate across the radii on which we train our traditional adversarial models. Note that this is an imperfect metric for measuring the success of AAT, as AAT assumes that some "attacks" at given radii represent real movements toward different classes; however, it is still useful to capture this information in considering the trade-off between traditional adversarial training and AAT.

Counterfactual Proximity. The primary metric regarding recourse we are interested in observing is the ultimate recourse cost between our resultant models. As each specific domain's cost function is not concretely defined, we follow the convention of opting for ℓ_2 distance as a standard approximation. Formally, for each model we calculate: $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}_{test}|}\sum_{x_i \in \mathcal{D}_{test}} ||x_i^* - x_i||_2$, where x^* is the recourse calculated for x_i.

Manifold Proximity. Motivated by the question of how faithful our resulting counterfactuals are to true movements towards the desired class, we estimate the distance between the counterfactuals each model produces and the desired class manifold these counterfactuals approximate. We use two methods for this: a KNN distance measure and a sphere distance measure For KNN, we record the average ℓ_2 distance between the resulting counterfactuals and the five nearest neighbors of the desired class. For the sphere measure, we record the average ℓ_2 distance between the resulting counterfactuals and all neighbors of the desired class within an ℓ_2 ball of size ϵ, where ϵ is calculated as 20% of the average ℓ_2 distance between any two points in the dataset.

6 RESULTS & DISCUSSION

Standard Performance. Figure 2 displays the classification accuracy and F1 scores of the various models. We observe that for the Adult and Heloc datasets, adversarial training tends to decrease standard performance, with higher training radii correlating with worse performance. We observe that MMA training tends to keep performance consistent, and that AAT worsens performance to a degree similar to adversarial training with an ϵ value between 0.05 and 0.1.

Robustness. Figure 3 shows the vulnerability of the models under PGD attack at a variety of raddii ($\epsilon \in [0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25]$). We observe that while traditional adversarial training creates substantially more robust models within a defined radius of attack, the degredation in robustness tends to be more severe among traditionally trained models than AAT methods when the radius increases beyond their predefined training threshold. MMA in particular



(a) Adult (b) GSC (c) Heloc

Figure 8: Decision boundary proximity, estimated by the minimum successful PGD attack radius on a sample of 1000 instances. The height represents a proportion of the data, the average distance is shown in red.

shows surprisingly consistent robustness benfits, although they are more moderate than their adversarially trained counterparts'.

Counterfactual Proximity. Figure 6 displays the cost of recourse across all datasets for the three recourse methods studied. We observe consistently that adaptive adversarial training yields recourse with lower costs than traditional adversarial training, and in the case of MMA costs that are consistently competitive with natural training. This result seems unintuitive given the robustness benefits that MMA provides, and we believe this presents an interesting avenue for further research.

KNN & Sphere Manifold Distance. Figure 7 shows the Manifold Proximity estimates for Growing Spheres across all datasets. We observe that adaptive adversarial training produces recourse that is consistently closer to the desired class manifold than traditional adversarial training. This result, paired with the reduction in recourse costs, may suggest that adaptive adversarial training encourages more natural decision boundaries than traditional adversarial training, allowing for more meaningful recourse at lower costs.

Prevalence of Low Cost Recourse. For recourse methods that optimize costs directly in the input space, we record the percentage of counterfactuals that have an ℓ_∞ cost less than 0.05 to measure the proportion of low cost recourse among our models. The results are recorded in Figure 4. We observe that adaptive adversarial training shows higher proportions of low cost recourse than traditional adversarially trained models; surprisingly, MMA training in particular finds proportions of low-cost recourse that are consistently competitive with natural training, despite its benefits in overall robustness.

Discovered Radii & Decision Boundary Distances. Figure 5 displays the instance-wise discovered radii after AAT for all three datasets. We observe that for all datasets, a variety of radii are found with unique distributions. This alludes to the fact that different underlying data distributions have different levels of inherent adversarial vulnerability, underscoring the challenge of estimating a proper singular radius at which to adversarially train. Figure 8 shows an estimation of the distribution of decision boundary proximities across all models, calculated by finding the minimum successful radius for PDG attack across a sample of 1000 instances. We observe that traditional ϵ-adversarial training often limits proximity to the decision boundary $d > \epsilon_i$, while adaptive adversarial training shows a greater distribution in ultimate decision boundary proximties. In the case of MMA in particular, we find that the decision boundary proximities closely match that of the natural model, despite its improved robustness.

7 CONCLUSION

This work explores the effects of adaptive adversarial training on robustness and recourse, finding that it shows promising trade-offs between the two. We motivate our work with a observation of the effect of traditional adversarial training on recourse costs, and introduce scenarios under which adaptive adversarial training provides more affordable recourse. We conduct experiments on three datasets demonstrating that adaptive adversarial training yields significant robustness benefits over natural training with little cost incurred on recourse and standard performance, and provide evidence that adaptive adversarial training produces recourse that more faithfully represents movements towards the desired class manifold. Finally we analyze the resulting models' decision boundary margins, providing evidence that supports our observations on recourse costs under traditional adversarial training. We believe that adaptive adversarial training, and Max-Margin adversarial training in particular, presents a promising means of achieving the ultimate goals of robustness while preserving affordable recourse costs for end users.

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REFRESH: Responsible and Efficient Feature Reselection guided by SHAP values

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ABSTRACT

Feature selection is a crucial step in building machine learning models. This process is often achieved with accuracy as an objective, and can be cumbersome and computationally expensive for large-scale datasets. Several additional model performance characteristics such as fairness and robustness are of importance for model development. As regulations are driving the need for more trustworthy models, deployed models need to be corrected for model characteristics associated with responsible artificial intelligence. When feature selection is done with respect to one model performance characteristic (eg. accuracy), feature selection with secondary model performance characteristics (eg. fairness and robustness) as objectives would require going through the computationally expensive selection process from scratch. In this paper, we introduce the problem of feature *reselection*, so that features can be selected with respect to secondary model performance characteristics efficiently even after a feature selection process has been done with respect to a primary objective. To address this problem, we propose REFRESH, a method to reselect features so that additional constraints that are desirable towards model performance can be achieved without having to train several new models. REFRESH's underlying algorithm is a novel technique using SHAP values and correlation analysis that can approximate for the predictions of a model without having to train these models. Empirical evaluations on three datasets, including a large-scale loan defaulting dataset show that REFRESH can help find alternate models with better model characteristics efficiently. We also discuss the need for reselection and REFRESH based on regulation desiderata.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Social and professional topics** → **Computing / technology policy**; • **Applied computing** → **Law, social and behavioral sciences**; • **Computing methodologies** → *Machine learning*.

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KEYWORDS

fairness, robustness, explainability

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1 INTRODUCTION

Machine learning models are increasingly being used in pivotal and sensitive industries such as finance [2, 3, 16], where big tabular datasets having millions of records across hundreds of dimensions (features) is common. Among a plethora of challenges, one question that model developers face is feature selection [9, 34]. Feature selection aims to reduce the dimensionality of the data used to train the model while maintaining a model performance characteristic, which is often a measure of model accuracy.

However, considerations beyond a specific measure of accuracy are imperative. Such model performance characteristics can include, but are not limited to pillars of responsible artificial intelligence [7, 15]: fairness, explainability, and robustness. These characteristics towards building trustworthy models are essential to satisfy regulations [11, 38, 50]. When features are selected based on one primary model performance characteristic, such as accuracy, features that contribute towards secondary characteristics could have been dropped. This could occur in two ways: (a) features that make a secondary characteristic better were dropped, and (b) features that make a secondary characteristic worse were included.

When machine learning models have already been deployed with features selected based on a primary characteristic, a potential solution is to go back to the original model development process and select features with multi-objective characteristics to account for secondary characteristics. [18, 44]. However, feature selection in large-scale datasets is an expensive process [10]. Furthermore, multiple objectives could be at odds with each other [21, 47, 54] and selecting features satisfying more than one objective still remains non-trivial. As research in responsible AI and regulatory requirements for machine learning models rapidly advance, new metrics are being developed to evaluate model performance, both within [28, 41] and beyond [49] the secondary characteristics discussed above. As the research community further investigates and devises



Figure 1: Standard model training and the framework for REFRESH. The top block shows the conventional steps to train a model (additional steps may also be used for model training, but we show the ones most relevant to the problem). This paper introduces the feature reselection process in step 4. The bottom block describes REFRESH

these metrics, starting model development from scratch for existing models to optimize on new metrics is extremely expensive.

Hence, we introduce the process of *feature reselection*. Feature reselection aims to select features to improve on secondary model performance characteristics (characteristics that become important to consider after a model is already developed) while maintaining similar performance with respect to a primary characteristic based on which features were already selected. Hence, reselection tries to find feature subsets that: a) include features that improve the secondary characteristic compared to the secondary characteristic of the model trained using features selected, b) do not include features that are detrimental to the secondary characteristic, and c) do not differ significantly from the feature subset that was used to train the model to optimize on a primary characteristic to maintain performance.

Reselection is not just useful for a model developer to save on time and effort when a model has already been deployed, but can be an extremely valuable tool for model monitoring. Specifically, the reselection process is agnostic to model metrics and can be run by a third-party monitoring the model. The process can help get insight into features that should or should not have been considered in the modeling pipeline, with respect to sensitive factors. Such information may not be available to a modeler. For example, in characteristics such as fairness, regulations require that sensitive attribute information and strong proxies to sensitive information are not available to modelers as features [50, 52]. Feature selection with fairness as a constraint becomes a much harder problem in the absence of the protected attribute. In these cases, the reselection process can then be done by a third-party that stores the sensitive information [51], to then suggest feature changes to modelers that can enhance fairness (such features would be weak proxies to sensitive information and do not provide direct information about the protected attribute, in accordance with legal requirements [50]).

To address the problem of feature reselection, this paper introduces REFRESH: Responsible and Efficient Feature Reselection guided by SHAP values. REFRESH is agnostic to the model type (only requires prediction probabilities of a model) and to the primary and secondary performance characteristics (only requires a score for any model characteristic). The framework for REFRESH is shown in Figure 1. Key steps in conventional machine learning model development involve feature selection, training a model to optimize on a primary performance characteristic, and evaluating the model along this characteristic before deployment. However, when the model is evaluated along a secondary characteristics, the same model may perform poorly. This is where the process of feature reselection is introduced, rather than re-computing models from scratch.

Originally, to reselect features, a modeler would train new models on new feature subsets, across various trials of different feature subsets. This process can be very expensive with a large number of features. Additionally, it is hard to accomplish if the secondary characteristic computation requires sensitive information, since this is not available to a model developer. Hence, we introduce an efficient way to find alternate feature sets, without having to train a large set of new models. The feature reselection steps are shown in the bottom block of Figure 1 and the steps are as follows: a) pre-process the set of all features; b) perform correlation analysis to create disjoint sets of groups of features, where groups are formed based on correlation between features (to be used in step e); c) train a model with all features; d) compute SHAP values ([36]) for each feature used to train the all feature model; e) use the SHAP values to approximate for model outcomes of models that would have been trained by removing each group and then rank each group of features formed in step b) based on anticipated effect of features on a secondary model performance characteristic; and f) select features to remove from the set of features selected by the modeler that have the most negative effect on the secondary characteristic and select features to include from the set of features that were not selected by the modeler that have the most positive effect on the secondary characteristic. Finally, train new models using these sets and provide alternate models.

The spine of REFRESH lies in using correlation based grouping of features and utilizing the additive property of SHAP values based feature attributions. SHAP [36] is a popular feature attribution technique [7] and follows the additive property: the feature attributions sum to the model prediction for a given input. We show that combining this property of SHAP values with correlation analysis on groups of features provides a reasonable approximation to model outcomes of models trained in the absence of a group of features, without having to actually train these models. This significantly speeds up the ability to search for alternate models that can improve performance.

We show that REFRESH can help "refresh" a model to accommodate secondary characteristics i.e. find alternate models along multiple secondary characteristics, by experimentation on three datasets, including a large-scale loan defaulting dataset. The discussion section provides further insight into why reselection is needed, limitations of REFRESH, and the applicability of REFRESH based on regulations [50]. The key contributions of this paper are[1]:

- Introducing and motivating the research problem of feature reselection for incrementally improving secondary model characteristics;
- A novel approximation to model outcomes that uses grouping of features based on correlations, and SHAP values;
- REFRESH: an efficient method to reselect features that leverages this approximation.

2 RELATED WORK

While the concept of reselection is new (to the best of our knowledge), this section points to resources for related work in the fields of feature selection, responsible AI, and within responsible AI, SHAP values.

Features selection has been a well studied problem in the machine learning literature. [35, 40] cover the most popular feature selection methods, with an emphasis on selection based on accuracy as a performance objective.

Responsible AI includes fairness, adversarial robustness, explainability, and privacy of machine learning models [45]. Models are considered more interpretable if less features are used to train the model [42]. Feature selection based on fairness considerations [20, 25–27, 44] is a growing field of research. Recently, [18] suggest a feature selection technique with both fairness and accuracy considerations. The method requires access to protected attributes, which are often not available. REFRESH only requires a fairness score, which can be provided using privacy-preserving methods [12, 22]. [53] propose a feature-importance-based improvement to adversarial robustness for CNN's. [4] discuss a method for fairness-based feature selection under budget constraints. Features selection with considerations on adversarial robustness for models trained using tabular datasets remains an unexplored problem.

SHAP (SHapley Additive exPlanations) [36], a game theoretic approach to explain the output of any machine learning model, is a widely used technique in explainability of machine learning models. It is used to provide the feature importance for every feature used to train a model with extensions for fairness [5]. [14] propose a method for feature selection using SHAP values. [24] provide a detailed analysis on using SHAP values for feature selection. [17] use SHAP values of features for feature selection by using these values in a multi-objective optimization problem. [39] show that SHAP values based selection performs better than three other feature selection techniques.

3 REFRESH: THEORY AND METHOD

This section presents the theory, the core REFRESH method, and additional constraints that can be important for the feature reselection problem.

Setup: Consider a dataset with $\mathbf{N}$ features. The set of all features is $\mathbf{S_N}$. Let a feature selection method select a set of features to train a model for binary classification. The selected set of features is called the baseline set $\mathbf{S_b}$. Let the remaining feature set be the candidate set $\mathbf{S_c}$. Then:

$$\mathbf{S_b} \cup \mathbf{S_c} = \mathbf{S_N} \tag{1}$$

$$\mathbf{S_b} \cap \mathbf{S_c} = \{\} \tag{2}$$

Correlation Analysis: Step 4a in Figure 1 requires pre-processing $\mathbf{S_N}$. Then, construct a graph of pairwise correlations between features and use a clustering algorithm to get groups of similar features (step 4b in Figure 1). Let $\mathbf{G_i}$ represent the i^{th} group. If k groups are formed then:

$$\mathbf{G_1} \cup \mathbf{G_2} .. \cup \mathbf{G_i} .. \cup \mathbf{G_k} = \mathbf{S_N} \tag{3}$$

$$\mathbf{G_i} \cap \mathbf{G_j} = \{\}\ \forall 1 \leq i \leq k, 1 \leq j \leq k, i \neq j \tag{4}$$

Consider a machine learning model f trained on the all feature set $\mathbf{S_N}$ (step 4b in Figure 1) such that the prediction probability $\mathbf{y}$ for a given input instance $\mathbf{x}$ is:

$$\mathbf{y}_{\mathbf{S_N}} = f(\mathbf{x}_{\mathbf{S_N}}) \tag{5}$$

SHAP Values Computation: Compute the SHAP values of every feature in $\mathbf{S_N}$ for model $f(\mathbf{S_N})$. Let the SHAP value for feature a for an input instance $\mathbf{x}$ be $\phi_a^{\mathbf{x}}$. SHAP values follow the additive [2] property [36]:

$$\mathbf{y}_{\mathbf{S_N}} = \sum_{p=1}^{N} \phi_p^{\mathbf{x}} \tag{6}$$

In other words, SHAP values can be understood as a (local) linear model approximating the contribution of each feature when included [36]. For a given input, the sum of these contributions equals the prediction probability of the model output for this input. Therefore, we could calculate (anticipatedly) the outcome of a model when a feature a is absent as:

$$\mathbf{y}_{\mathbf{S_N} \setminus a} = \mathbf{y}_{\mathbf{S_N}} - \phi_a^{\mathbf{x}} \tag{7}$$

However, this calculation will not be accurate and outcomes can significantly differ from true model outcomes i.e. when feature a is not used to train the model [13, 19, 24, 33]. In fact, (interventional) SHAP simulates the removal of features by marginalising over their marginal distributions and not by re-training a new model

[1] This works goal is not to provide models with optimal characteristics. Instead, the paper aims to introduce the research problem of feature reselection and provide a possible method to efficiently do this reselection. REFRESH can help find models that can perform better along multiple characteristics, but there are no guarantees on optimality. This is discussed further in experiments.

[2] a.k.a., *efficiency* in game theory [46].



Figure 2: Ranking of groups based on secondary performance characteristic and the reselection process using this ranking.

without such features [36]. A simple example of why this occurs is as follows: if feature a is perfectly correlated with b and a model is trained using just a and b, it may happen that the model used only feature a, therefore b will have a SHAP value of 0 and the SHAP value of a will be equal to the model prediction probability. However, if feature a is removed and a model is trained with just feature b, the outcomes would be the same as the first model, but the model outcomes calculated using Equation 7 would be 0.

SHAP Values based Approximation: REFRESH posits anticipating model outcomes based on the removal of a group of features, where features are grouped based on correlations. Combining Equations 3 and 7, approximate that:

$$y_{S_N \setminus G_i} \approx y_{S_N} - \sum_{p=l}^{m} \phi_p^{\mathbf{x}} \tag{8}$$

where,

$$\mathbf{G_i} = \mathbf{S_{l,\ldots,m}} \tag{9}$$

Equation 8 gives a better approximation when compared to directly using SHAP values. It is used to anticipate model outcomes without having to retrain new models (we show that this approximation is better empirically). Specifically, this enables REFRESH to anticipate (approximately) the outcome of a model when a group is absent from model training.

Feature Removal and Inclusion: These anticipated model outcomes can then be used to calculate anticipated secondary performance characteristics. For each $\mathbf{G_i}$, use the anticipated model outcomes and calculate an anticipated score of the secondary characteristic for each anticipated model, where each model corresponds to a model trained with the feature subset $\mathbf{S_N \setminus G_i}$. Note that the score computation can be done by a third-party, thereby ensuring that sensitive information is not revealed to a model developer [50] for secondary characteristics like fairness. The groups are then ordered in decreasing order of scores.

Figure 2 shows a toy example with feature groups that are ranked based on an anticipated secondary performance characteristic. Group 1 is ranked highest, which means that the anticipated (secondary characteristic) performance of the model when Group 1 was excluded from training was highest. This means that features from Group 1 are anticipated to be the most detrimental to the secondary characteristic. Hence, starting from the baseline set (to maintain the performance based on the primary characteristic) we would want to select a model with the feature subset:

$$\mathbf{S_{reselected}} = \mathbf{S_b \setminus G_1} \tag{10}$$

Furthermore, Group 2 is ranked the lowest, which means that a model trained by removing Group 2 has an anticipated secondary performance characteristic which is lower. This means that features from Group 2 could contribute to a better secondary performance characteristic, and hence we include features from this group. Hence, we would want to select a model with feature subset:

$$\mathbf{S_{reselected}} = (\mathbf{G_2 \setminus (G_2 \cap S_b)}) \tag{11}$$

Generalizing Equations 10 and 11, the feature subset to train a model after removing group G_r and including feature G_i is:

$$\mathbf{S_{reselected}} = (\mathbf{S_b \setminus G_r}) \cup (\mathbf{G_i \setminus (G_i \cap S_b)}) \tag{12}$$

This process of removal and inclusion can be continued for more groups to generate new feature subsets that can be used to train alternate models. We discuss the choice of number of groups that should be considered for inclusion or removal in the experiments section.

3.1 Additional Constraints

In the feature reselection process, features are being added and removed with the objective of improving the secondary performance characteristic while maintaining the primary performance characteristic. However, involving a human-in-the-loop may ensure that features are not erroneously included or removed. Examples of errors are:

- Features that are important for a classification task based on human judgement, and that maybe obviously important for the primary characteristic, are removed. This can especially occur when the primary and secondary characteristic are inversely related for the data and model under consideration. These features are important to explain the model prediction [50]. For example, address is removed in a housing price prediction problem (because it could serve as a proxy for race) when a modeler thinks this feature is most important. Let these features be $\mathbf{S_{RE}}$ (Where RE means Removal Error).
- Features that should not be included based on human judgement and were removed as a part of feature selection are now included in the reselected set. For example, a feature with a lot of noisy values from the data collection process was removed with human insight, but is now included because it

erroneously contributes to the secondary characteristic. Let these features be $\mathbf{S_{IE}}$ (Where IE means Inclusion Error).

REFRESH can easily incorporate these additional constraints that can be provided by modelers, so that erroneous features are not included or removed. The final reselected set is:

$$\mathbf{S_{reselected}} = ((\mathbf{S_b} \backslash \mathbf{G_r}) \cup \mathbf{S_{RE}}) \cup ((\mathbf{G_i} \backslash (\mathbf{G_i} \cap \mathbf{S_b})) \backslash \mathbf{S_{IE}}$$

4 EXPERIMENTS

This section presents the context of the experimentation, results on applying REFRESH and validation experiments on the SHAP values based approximation.

4.1 Context and Setup

Data: Experiments are performed on three datasets: COMPAS [43], HMDA [30], and the large-scale home credit default risk dataset [31]. We have used existing work to pre-process datasets and select baseline features, and refer to those works here. Additionally, we ensure that protected attributes (race, gender, age) are removed for model training, in accordance with legal requirements for model development. Details on the datasets and models used for them can also be found through these references. For the home credit default risk dataset, information and details on pre-processing can be found in [32]. For the COMPAS dataset, we use methods as in [26]. For the HMDA dataset, we use the same pre-processing and baseline set as in [48]. This section focuses on experiments for the home credit default risk dataset since it has a large set of features, but experiments to validate REFRESH using the other two datasets are also provided (The COMPAS dataset is particularly useful for a qualitative validation of feature reselection by comparing to feature selection used in [26]).

HomeCredit is a company that provides installment lending to people with poor credit history. In 2017, they made anonymized data available on Kaggle which includes individual demographics and loan outcomes. The raw data consists of millions of records and a total of 649 features. We pre-process the data similar to [31], so the final number of observations considered are 307,511 and the total number of features are 466.

Objective: REFRESH is model performance characteristic agnostic, and only requires a score for any model characteristic so that models can be ranked based on this secondary characteristic. The goal of the experiments is not to show models with optimal performance; rather, we show that we can find multiple alternate models showing varied model performances, including better performance along the secondary characteristic using REFRESH, and this is much faster than having to use brute force based search for reselection. This is in accordance with the aim to find less discriminatory alternatives [50], when the secondary characteristic is fairness. Additionally, we show that the approximation using SHAP values that is proposed in this paper (Equation 8) performs better than using just SHAP values (Equation 7).

Primary Characteristic: To show the ability of REFRESH to suggest alternative models, we consider the model AUC to be the primary model performance characteristic.

Secondary Characteristics: Experiments are performed for two different secondary characteristics (evaluated independently): fairness and adversarial robustness. These are just illustrative measures, and other model performance characteristics can also be considered. For fairness, the secondary characteristic considered is demographic parity. Statistical parity difference is used to measure demographic parity [6]. Given a model trained on a dataset with a protected attribute A having two groups a and b, where a is the sensitive group and Y is predicted output (thresholded prediction probability), the statistical parity difference is defined as:

$$SPD = P(\mathbf{Y} = 1|A = a) - P(\mathbf{Y} = 1|A = b) \tag{13}$$

For robustness, we consider using the notion of the distance to the boundary in the model output space, similar to [47]. Specifically, if a point is closer to the decision boundary, the point is less robust (vulnerable to perturbations), and correspondingly, the prediction probability $\mathbf{y}$ is closer to the decision threshold δ set for binary classification. For any model, this can be calculated as:

$$ROB = |\delta - \mathbf{y}| \tag{14}$$

Experimentation Setup: Experiments for the home equity credit risk dataset are performed as follows: first, features are selected with the primary performance characteristic of AUC. Similar to [32], features are pre-processed. Sensitive attributes are removed for model training and are only used to compute the fairness score. Then, an XGBoost model is trained on all the features left after pre-processing, and the most important features based on feature importance scores are selected. A model is then trained with these features ($\mathbf{S_b}$), and this is the baseline model. For the home credit default risk dataset, 184 features are selected as the baseline feature set.

Correlation Analysis: Simultaneously, all features after pre-processing are grouped based on correlation. This is done by using the popular Louvain method for community detection [8, 37]. The method is a greedy optimization method that runs in time $O(n \cdot \log n)$ where n is the number of nodes in the network. The correlation of features defines whether a feature belongs to a community, and a correlation threshold is passed to define what constitutes a high correlation. For the home credit default risk dataset, this threshold is set to 0.7. Experiments on varying this threshold are also provided.

Feature Reselection: An XGBoost model is trained using all features and SHAP values are computed for this model for every feature. For each group of features, the anticipated model outcome (prediction probabilities)) for a model that would be trained by removing this group is calculated using Equation 8.

Then, the secondary performance characteristic is calculated using Equations 13 (for fairness)) or Equation 14 (for robustness) using these anticipated outcomes. Groups are then ranked in descending order based on the value of the secondary performance measure. For each group, the intersection with the baseline set is also found. Then, features that intersect with the baseline set from the top groups are removed and features that do not intersect with the baseline set from the bottom sets are added. Two hyperparameters, one for maximum number of features that can be included

and one for maximum number of features that can be removed, are used.

Starting from the highest rank, for each group, all features are removed (up to the maximum removal limit; if the limit is reached for some features of a group, remove a random subset). Starting from the lowest ranked group, only a certain number of features are included per group, and then the next group is considered to include features, until the maximum limit of inclusions (this is also a hyperparameter called number of inclusions per group). We only include some but not all features because groups are formed based on correlations, and including too many features from a group will not significantly impact any change in the model.

4.2 Results for the home credit default risk dataset

On Fairness: Results for the fairness measure are shown in figure 3(a). All results are averaged over three runs. Each point on the graph is a model trained using a different subset of features (found using different inclusions and removals). The baseline model is marked by the intersection of the red lines. Starting with 5 features per group, and going up to a maximum of 50 features that can be included or removed, subsets are formed with combinations of inclusions and removals. Hence, one subset has 5 features included in the baseline, another has 5 features removed from the baseline, and a third would have a combination of these 5 included and the other 5 removed. This is done in increments of 5 features, until the maximum limit of inclusion and removals is reached (50). Hence, a total of 121 models is shown. The color of each model represents the number of features used to train the model.

The fairness of each model, in accordance with Equation 13 is plotted on the y-axis, and model AUC's are plotted on the x-axis. As we can see, several alternate models are found with varying degrees of fairness and AUC. It is interesting to note that while several models are found with an increase in fairness that also compromise on AUC (which is in accordance with expected trade-offs between fairness and accuracy [21], there is one model with a larger set of features (compared to the baseline set) that has both a better fairness score and AUC. The increase in AUC is marginal, and within the threshold used to remove features in the original selection process. While it may appear that the increase in fairness is also marginal, the need to find less discriminatory alternatives still arises based on regulations [50], and the impact of a small increase on a dataset with millions of samples is more pronounced on individuals (more pronounced effects on fairness can be seen for the COMPAS dataset in experiments provided later). REFRESH provides a set of alternate models which can be chosen from, and the specific choice is dependent on the modeler or the regulator. It is key to note though that varied alternate models are found with just 121 more models being trained, as opposed to training a much larger set of models for hundreds of possible features.

While REFRESH does not guarantee optimality on models found with respect to any performance metric, it efficiently informs a modeler or regulator on the direction of the search space. Specifically, with being informed about which features can be added or removed to improve or reduce the secondary performance characteristic, far fewer models need to be trained, and the whole feature selection process does not need to be repeated. Further insight on alternate models can be gathered through an investigation such as the one shown in figure 3(c). The plot shows a subset of points from the fairness plot above, where every alternate model has the same exact number of features as the baseline model. Among these models, the frontier showcases two models, one that has the highest accuracy and the other that has the highest fairness. A modeler can decide which one to choose (based on which measure is more important to the application), while keeping the number of features to be similar to the baseline set (to maintain model complexity and explainability).

On Robustness: Similar results are shown for the robustness performance characteristic in figure 3(b) and (d). The hyperparameters for number of inclusions and removals (and limits) are the same as for the fairness plot. Better alternate models with respect to both robustness and AUC are found. However, it is clear that these models have more features than the baseline set. 3(d) shows models that have the same number of features as the original model. Results indicate that to maintain the same model complexity, a trade-off between AUC and robustness is required. A modeler or a stakeholder monitoring/regulating can choose which model suits the requirements for the specific task.

4.3 SHAP values based approximation

To check that the proposed SHAP values based approximation (Equation 8) of the model output performs better than using SHAP values without considering groups of features when groups are formed based on correlations, a comparison of two cases is done on the anticipated versus the actual model AUC, where: (a) the first case considers the AUC found for models trained (or anticipatedly trained) by removing an entire group from the all feature set, in accordance with Equation 8; (b) the second case considers model outcomes for models trained (or anticipatedly trained) by removing just one feature per group, in accordance with Equation 7.

Results are shown in figure 4. The red line indicates the ideal plot. The graph on the left shows anticipated outcomes against the actual outcomes when anticipated outcomes are found using the approximation used in REFRESH. Anticipated model AUC's are relatively close to those of ideal models, showing that the SHAP approximation using groups of features holds reasonably. On the other hand, when correlated features are not grouped together, the anticipated outcomes of the removal of individual features are incorrectly estimated by Equation 7. The anticipated AUC is always less than the actual AUC. This happens because the anticipated outcome is based on the SHAP value of the feature to be removed. When the actual model is trained (with the removal), another feature belonging to the same group can take a higher SHAP value than what it had before (replacing the effect of the old feature). Hence, the true effect of removal is minimal, but seems more pronounced by using SHAP without grouping features to find anticipated outcomes.

4.4 Additional Details and Experiments

4.4.1 Effect of correlation threshold on the SHAP approximation. The SHAP approximation relies on forming groups of correlated features to find anticipated model outcomes when each group is removed. Hence, how close the anticipated outcomes are to true



(a) Fairness



(b) Robustness



(c) Fairness, $n(S_{reselected}) = n(S_b)$



(d) Robustness, $n(S_{reselected}) = n(S_b)$

Figure 3: Alternate models found using REFRESH for two secondary performance characteristics: fairness ((a) and (c)) and robustness ((b) and (d)). Each point in the figure corresponds to a model trained using a different set of features. The intersection of the red lines is the baseline model. The reported metrics are the true measures and not anticipated values. The color of each point shows the number of features used to train the model. (b) and (d) show a subset of models from the fairness and robustness graphs (a) and (c) respectively, where each model has the same number of features as the baseline model.



(a) REFRESH (grouping features based on correlations)



(b) Without any grouping

Figure 4: Understanding the correlation grouping based SHAP approximation. Both graphs show the anticipated model AUC's against the actual model AUC. In (a), each point on the graph represents the anticipated versus actual AUC of a model trained with all features except all features from one group. In (b), each point on the graph represents the anticipated versus actual AUC of a model trained with all features except one feature (chosen at random) from one group. The red lines show the ideal plot (where anticipated AUC = actual AUC).

model outcomes depends on the correlation threshold for group formation. To study this, we find the difference in the anticipated and actual model AUC's for models formed by removing each of the groups. Fairness and robustness also depend on model outcomes, and a difference between true and anticipated values of these characteristics observe a similar effect to AUC, so these plots have been omitted.

Figure 5 shows the maximum difference between anticipated and actual AUC's of models when different correlation thresholds are used to form groups. As we can see, very low correlation thresholds would cause the approximation to suffer much more than choosing a very high correlation threshold. However, a high correlation threshold would result in more groups being formed which would result in more calculations for anticipated outcomes and hence

slower performance. Having a relatively higher (0.7) correlation threshold works the best, and this is observed across datasets.



Figure 5: Analysing the proposed SHAP approximation (for the home credit default risk dataset) via plotting the difference (lower is better) in actual and anticipated AUC's versus the correlation threshold chosen to form groups.

4.4.2 Model hyperparameters. For the XGBoost model used for the home credit default risk dataset, 50 tree estimators are used with a maximum depth of 5. All other parameters are kept to default values for scikit learn's XGBoost model. For the COMPAS dataset, 2 estimators are used (since the dataset is very small) with a max depth of 3. For the HMDA dataset, 10 tree estimators are used with a maximum depth of 5.

As features are added or removed, hyperparameter tuning may have to be repeated. For the purposes of this paper, since we do not remove or add too many features, the hyperparameters are kept the same across different models since experiments showed that changing these had negligible impact on model performance. However, as more features are included or removed, tuning of parameters maybe required for optimal performance on alternate models.

4.4.3 REFRESH hyperparameters. Three hyperparameters are associated with REFRESH: the maximum number of inclusions, maximum number of removals, and number of inclusions per group. To show the difference in performance as these parameters vary, we report the AUC and fairness scores associated for models trained on the home credit default risk dataset for three different values associated with these parameters where the models are chosen such that they have the best secondary performance characteristic.

The results are shown in tables 1, 2 and 3. As seen, having a small value for maximum removals or maximum inclusions yields sub-optimal performance on alternate models found. Having a very high value for these parameters does not help with the best model being found and would just increase the number of models being trained. For the number of inclusions per group, having a low value may result in some helpful features (with respect to the secondary characteristic) being neglected. Having a very high value does not help and just adds to the number of features, since inclusions are performed from groups of correlated features.

4.4.4 Confidence intervals. The average standard deviations for AUC, fairness and robustness measures are reported in table 4. The values are low, showing that results are consistent across runs.

4.4.5 Experiments on COMPAS and HMDA datasets. Results for alternate models for the two datasets are shown in Figure 6. As can be seen, multiple alternate performance with different secondary characteristics can be found with just a few more models being trained.

Additionally, it is interesting to note that the best performance point in the COMPAS dataset with respect to fairness in figure 6 corresponds to just having one feature, which is the same feature found in [26] as the only feature being selected which is the most fair to judge recidivism (prior counts). Hence, REFRESH is able to automatically find feature sets that correspond to fairer features.

Finally, the COMPAS dataset has very few features, so finding more robust models is harder. This is shown in the robustness plot, where removing a few features resulted in robustness similar to the baseline model, but with a compromise on performance. However, the model is more robust when more features are removed. This analysis shows that eventually, the performance of REFRESH, just like any feature selection algorithm, is limited by the availability of features that can help with the secondary characteristic.

4.4.6 Experiment on neural network. To illustrate with an example that REFRESH is model agnostic, we perform an experiment on using a neural network with the HMDA dataset for the fairness characteristic. The neural network architecture is the same as in [48]. The results are shown in figure 7. As we can see, the results are similar to the results in 6. The key difference in implementation is in the use of KernelSHAP for the neural network as opposed to TreeSHAP for the XGBoost model.

5 DISCUSSION

This section is focused on discussions, including limitations, on the three novel components of this paper: feature reselection, REFRESH's methodology, and applicability of REFRESH based on regulations and insights from consumer lending [50].

5.1 Feature Selection and Reselection

Feature reselection is not introduced to replace responsible feature selection. Instead, it aims to provide an alternate efficient technique in cases where: a) models trained using a large set of features have already been deployed with selected features based on a primary characteristic and require re-evaluation for additional characteristics, b) new regulations require finding alternate models that improve based on secondary characteristics, and c) new research drives the need to evaluate models along different characteristics.

To achieve these objectives, REFRESH has been developed to aid model redevelopment. Since ranking of feature groups only depends on a score and not on the actual definition of the secondary characteristic, new secondary characteristic definitions can be readily incorporated to find alternate feature subsets. It does not replace the need for human insight on features that should be included or excluded, but is a tool that helps guide reselection based on desirable model characteristics.

Table 1: Varying the maximum number of removals hyperparameter for the home credit default risk dataset

Performance	Max removals =5	Max removals = 50	Max removals =100
SPD	-0.2689	-0.0267	-0.0267
AUC	0.796	0.788	0.788

Table 2: Varying the maximum number of inclusions hyperparameter for the home credit default risk dataset

Performance	Max inclusions =5	Max inclusions = 50	Max inclusions =75
SPD	-0.272	-0.0267	-0.0267
AUC	0.797	0.788	0.788

Table 3: Varying the maximum number of inclusions per group for the home credit default risk dataset

Performance	Inclusion per group =1	Inclusion per group = 3	Inclusion per group=5
SPD	-0.274	-0.0267	-0.02672
AUC	0.7955	0.788	0.788

Table 4: Average standard deviation for different performance measures for the home credit default risk dataset when results are average across three runs

Performance	Standard deviation
Accuracy	0.00823
SPD	0.00194
ROB	0.00042

5.2 Limitations of REFRESH

A limitation of this method is that the accuracy of the REFRESH approximation depends on the structure and correlations of the data itself, and the ability to find groups of features based on correlations, such that these groups are disjoint. This may not always be possible, and the approximation may perform worse in cases where the disjoint groups of features cannot be formed easily. However, the method could still yield insights into features that help improve secondary performance characteristics. We note that resorting to alternatives such as Conditional and Causal SHAP [1, 23, 29] could mitigate this problem. However, on top of the technical challenges of estimating a causal graph of the features, doing so could result in features not used by the model having a non-zero importance, an issue certainly no less important in the feature reselection setting. Additionally, some other feature attribution techniques cannot be compared to because they do not follow the additive property, fundamental to use the approximation in Equation 8. Additionally, REFRESH hyperparameters may also require grid search, causing the efficiency to decrease to find alternate models. We leave the investigation of techniques to make REFRESH more efficient as future work.

5.3 REFRESH and Regulatory considerations

REFRESH is strongly motivated by findings from [50]. Regulations require that model developers do not use sensitive information in any model development procedure for critical applications. Additionally, there is a growing need to find less discriminatory alternative models for such applications, such as in home lending.

REFRESH helps provide less discriminatory alternatives without requiring access to sensitive information (and just requiring a score for fairness which can be computed by a third-party). Furthermore, providing additional constraints to control features that cannot be added or removed are in accordance with insights for explainability in [50]: features that can be explained by reason codes should be included.

Privacy based secondary characteristics [49] can directly be used in the REFRESH framework to select features that can cause the most leakage of data information, and these can be removed. Formally analysing privacy considerations for REFRESH is left as future work.

6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

This paper introduces and motivates the problem of feature reselection. We then propose REFRESH: Responsible and Efficient Feature Reselection guided by SHAP values. REFRESH uses a combination of correlation analysis and the additive property of SHAP values to provide an approximation that can help find alternate models more accurately than directly using SHAP values. This can then be used to find models with improvements in secondary performance characteristics such as fairness and adversarial robustness. Experiments on three datasets, including a large-scale dataset in the finance domain, show that REFRESH can find several alternate models efficiently for multiple secondary performance characteristics. There are a plethora of possibilities that can be explored as future work. New methods can be created to deal with feature reselection, such that they could be more optimal with respect to the secondary performance characteristic. We choose SHAP values



(a) Fairness COMPAS

(b) Robustness COMPAS

(c) Fairness HMDA

(d) Robustness HMDA

Figure 6: Alternate models found using REFRESH for two secondary performance characteristics: fairness and robustness, and for two datasets: COMPAS (top) and HMDA (bottom). Each point in the figure corresponds to a model trained using a different set of features. The intersection of the red lines is the baseline model. The reported metrics are the true measures and not anticipated values.



Figure 7: Results on fairness for a neural network trained using the HMDA dataset

because of their additive property, but other feature attribution techniques that follow this property can also be considered and compared to in the future. It would also be interesting to explore the ability to create groups of features that intersect inter-group so that the approximation is improved. Finally, the method can also be extended for experiments on additional secondary performance characteristics (eg. privacy).

DISCLAIMER

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Fairness Implications of Encoding Protected Categorical Attributes

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ABSTRACT

Past research has demonstrated that the explicit use of protected attributes in machine learning can improve both performance and fairness. Many machine learning algorithms, however, cannot directly process categorical attributes, such as country of birth or ethnicity. Because protected attributes frequently are categorical, they must be encoded as features that can be input to a chosen machine learning algorithm, e.g. support vector machines, gradient boosting decision trees or linear models. Thereby, encoding methods influence how and what the machine learning algorithm will learn, affecting model performance and fairness. This work compares the accuracy and fairness implications of the two most well-known encoding methods: *one-hot encoding* and *target encoding*. We distinguish between two types of induced bias that may arise from these encoding methods and may lead to unfair models. The first type, *irreducible bias*, is due to direct group category discrimination and the second type, *reducible bias*, is due to the large variance in statistically underrepresented groups. We investigate the interaction between categorical encodings and target encoding regularization methods that reduce unfairness. Furthermore, we consider the problem of intersectional unfairness that may arise when machine learning best practices improve performance measures by encoding several categorical attributes into a high-cardinality feature.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies** → **Supervised learning by classification**; **Classification and regression trees**; **Supervised learning by regression**; • **Social and professional topics** → **Sociotechnical systems**.

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1 INTRODUCTION

Anti-discrimination laws [3, 19, 20] prohibit the unfair treatment of individuals based on *sensitive attributes* (also referred to as *protected attributes*). The list of sensitive attributes varies per country, though these usually include gender, ethnicity, and religion [62]. Following such legal motivations along with societal expectations, many studies have looked into discrimination in machine learning and proposed various ways to promote fairness (e.g., [22, 44, 56, 65]).

Handling sensitive attributes throughout the machine learning pipeline is central to establishing fairness. An early common practice was removing data on sensitive attributes altogether. This technique has been questioned because sensitive attributes may be required for avoiding discrimination in data-driven decision models [37, 83]. Therefore, later work [30, 45, 79, 80] has aimed at how to obtain fairer models given the presence of sensitive attributes, formalizing the problem as an optimization trade-off between model quality in terms of performance and some fairness objective.

Sensitive attributes often come as categorical data. For instance, roughly 75% of the famous COMPAS dataset [35] consists of categorical attributes, including most of the sensitive ones (see Section 5.1.1 for more details). Many machine learning algorithms require categorical attributes to be suitably *encoded* as numerical data. Different ways of encoding categorical attributes into numerical features [32, 46, 49] have been proposed and extensively studied in the literature along with statistical regularization methods since the mid-1950s [54]. This has resulted in various methods that encode categorical attributes as numerical data to make them usable by popular machine learning models, such as support vector machines, gradient-boosting decision trees, or linear models.

In this paper, *we study the broader implications that encoding categorical sensitive attributes can have on model accuracy and fairness.*

Despite being a common machine learning practice, often within the data pre-processing step, the effects of categorical attribute encodings on fairness remain largely unexplored. For instance, prior works on fair machine learning [30, 79, 80] also use the encoding of protected categorical attributes without discussing its implications or the choices of encodings.

We focus on the two most widely used encodings: *one-hot encoding* and *target encoding* [49, 54, 58, 73]. *One-hot encoding*, an unsupervised technique, produces orthogonal and equidistant vectors for each category [49, 52], thereby considering the categories to be equally independent of each other and other attributes. However, when dealing with high cardinality categorical variables, one-hot encoding suffers from a lack of scalability and sparsity issues due to the creation of many orthogonal dimensions (later discussed in Section 2 and 3). *Target encoding* [46, 49, 54] is a supervised technique that replaces a categorical attribute with the mean target value of each corresponding category. Thus, it can handle all categories together in one dimension.[1]

The first problem of unfairness related to sensitive categorical attributes, which we call *irreducible bias*, is associated with the statistical differences between two highly populated groups: more data about the compared groups will not diminish this type of bias. The second problem arises because sampling from small groups may exhibit large variance leading to unfairness constituting *reducible bias*. Many datasets contain distributions of data that are imbalanced over different values of categorical attributes, often leading to performance degradation of the learned models (known as the *classes imbalance problem* [34]). Using encodings in such datasets may naturally introduce disparity per the observed class imbalance.

Moreover, when a dataset contains several sensitive categorical attributes, and these are merged to become one feature (a strategy often followed to improve model quality substantially [28]), encodings may create fine-grained, sparsely populated intersectional features [39, 40, 72] increasing the chance for both types of induced biases [23].

The effects of encodings on model quality and fairness under the interplay of different encoding and regularization techniques have not been studied in the literature. However, they affect very commonly used machine learning practices. For target encoding, we study two popular statistical regularization methods called *smoothing* and *Gaussian noise regularization*. These both regularization provide new avenues for analyzing the implications of categorical encodings on fairness. Through both a theoretical analysis as well as an empirical analysis using two real-world datasets, we find that suitable regularization can address unfairness arising from the target encodings with only marginal losses in accuracy.[2]

In summary, we make the following contributions:

- We compare the best-known categorical feature encoding methods, one-hot encoding, and target encoding against learning without protected attribute(s) in terms of model performance and fairness.
- We study the relationship between the regularization of target encodings and fairness by evaluating smoothing and Gaussian noise, two common techniques used for regularization by data preprocessing.
- We provide evidence that creating intersectional features can worsen discrimination. We show that a regularized target encoder can retain the benefits of intersectional features without increasing unfair discrimination.
- We provide a theoretical analysis studying two types of induced biases, irreducible and reducible, that arise while encoding categorical protected attributes.

2 BACKGROUND

2.1 Categorical attribute encoding

Handling categorical attributes is a common problem in machine learning, given that many algorithms use numerical data [49, 69]. There are many well-known methods for approaching this problem [4, 8, 9, 53, 70].

One-hot encoding (also known as dummy variables in the social sciences [74]) constructs orthogonal and equidistant vectors for each category. Given high cardinality categorical attributes, one-hot encoding suffers from shortcomings: (i) the dimension of the input space increases with the cardinality of the encoded variable, (ii) the derived features are rarely non-zero, and new and unseen categories cannot be handled [49, 68].

Table 1: An illustrative example of one-hot and target encoding methods over the same data sample.

Ethnic	Encoding	Label
African-American	1	1
Caucasian	1/3	1
Caucasian	1/3	0
Caucasian	1/3	0
Hispanic	0	0

(*a*) **Unregularized Mean Target Encoding**

Ethnic	African-American	Caucasian	Hispanic
African-American	1	0	0
Caucasian	0	1	0
Caucasian	0	1	0
Caucasian	0	1	0
Hispanic	0	0	1

(*b*) **One Hot Encoding**

Label/ordinal encoding [6] uses a range of integers to represent different categorical values. These are assumed to have no true order and integers are assigned in the order of appearance of the categories. Label encoding suffers less from higher cardinalities of attribute values, but imposes an artificial random order on the

[1] Target encoding methods have become an industry standard for high-cardinality categorical data [28, 49, 54, 60] with algorithmic procedures being implemented in many open source packages [14, 73]. One of the most common is the Python package called *category encoders* (https://pepy.tech/project/category_encoders). It achieves up to 1 million downloads per month. Target encoding is the default encoding method in some high-performance open-source software implementations such as *catboost* [17, 29] that has reached a total download of 74 million.

[2] In this work, we use the term "accuracy" in a non-literal sense to refer to the model performance, rather than the statistical evaluation metric of the same name. Section 5.1.3 discusses the appropriate evaluation metric for our scenarios.

categories, which may harm learning. This, in turn, obstructs the model to extract meaningful information from the categorical data.

Target encoding replaces attribute categories by the mean target value[3] of each corresponding category. Thus, the high cardinality problem is addressed, and categories are ordered in a meaningful manner [8, 46]. The main drawback of target encoding appears when the target values of a category with few samples are averaged. The model may overly rely on the resulting target value, potentially suffering from inherent variance in the small sample of data points from this category. To overcome this problem, several strategies introduce regularization terms in the target estimation [46, 49, 54].

In Table 1, we illustrate one-hot encoding and target encoding for the category ethnicity using a five person sample from the COMPAS dataset [35]. The problem of over-fitting is evident for the cases of *African-American* and *Hispanic* where their encoding is replaced directly with the target, creating a data leakage that can potentially cause reducible induced bias (cf. Section 5).

Even though early works that have studied preprocessing techniques for classification without discrimination [37] do not discuss the fairness effects of encoding categorical protected attributes. To the best of our knowledge, no previous work studies the different effects of regularization on target encodings nor the fairness implications of encoding categorical protected attributes.

2.2 Group Fairness

Various definitions of fairness in machine learning have been proposed (see, e.g., [2, 22, 44] for recent overviews). They can be categorized into notions of individual fairness and group fairness. While metrics of individual fairness judge whether *similar individuals are treated similarly* [18], metrics of group fairness measure the disparate treatment of groups, which are assembled according to shared categories of sensitive attributes of their individuals such as gender or race [64].

Different disparity metrics emphasize varying aspects of disparate treatment. For comprehensive understanding, we investigate the effects of encoding methods according to three common disparity metrics, i.e. equal opportunity, statistical disparity (demographic disparity) and average absolute odds (equalized odds). All three metrics indicate equal treatments of different groups by values close to zero and highly disparate treatments by values different from zero.

In this work, we distinguish and define two types of induced bias or discrimination that the encoding of categorical attributes introduces. Borrowing terminology used about different types of uncertainty [15, 26, 41], we use *irreducible bias* to refer to (direct) group discrimination arising from the categorization of groups into labels: more data about the compared groups do not reduce this type of bias. *Reducible bias* occurs due when the variance of categories with few instances cannot be well contained.

2.3 Addressing Intersectionality

It is a common trick for boosting model performance to concatenate multiple categorical variables and encode them into a single feature [28]. This feature engineering procedure, which includes target encoding, parallels a possible implementation of *intersectionality* when we concatenated two or more protected attributes. Intersectionality refers to when an individual that belongs to more than one protected group experiences discrimination at the intersection of these groups. It broadly refers to how different identities interact to produce a unique new form of discrimination [72]. Crenshaw [13], for example, studied how *black women* in the United States experience discrimination beyond being either black or women.

Although individuals often belong to multiple protected groups, intersectionality is largely understudied within algorithmic fairness. With some exceptions (e.g., [1, 24, 72, 76, 77]), most works assume the single binary protected attribute or disregard intersectionality entirely when handling multiple protected attributes [72], which is unrealistic and reductive. This is a pertinent issue as it is possible for individuals not to suffer from multiple discrimination but to suffer from intersectional discrimination [63, 75].

We address the intersectionality concerns linked to target encoding. On one hand, it can boost model performance; on the other hand, it can introduce new forms of discrimination. We add to this small but growing fairness literature by analyzing how target encoding can enable an implementation of intersectionality. In particular, we study how target encoding regularization can mitigate the potential biases induced by this feature engineering practice and compare it to the standard alternative of one-hot encoding.

3 FORMALIZATION AND REGULARIZATION OF TARGET ENCODING

Consider a categorical attribute Z with domain $dom(Z) = \{z_1, \ldots, z_c\}$, a binary target attribute Y with $dom(Y) = \{0, 1\}$, and the joint probability of $P(Z, Y)$ over the population of interest. Target encoding replaces Z with a continuous attribute $\bar{Z}$ with $dom(\bar{Z}) \in [0, 1]$. Values $z_i \in dom(Z)$, for $i = 1, \ldots, c$, are encoded to values $\bar{z}_i$ in a supervised way, as the posterior probability of positives:

$$\bar{z}_i = p_i \qquad \text{where } p_i = P(Y = 1 | Z = z_i) \tag{1}$$

However, since $P(\cdot)$ is typically unknown, an estimate of the posterior probability p_i is derived from a dataset $\mathcal{D}_{tr}$ (called the *training set*) of i.i.d. realizations of Z, Y. Let n be the total number of observations, n_i the number of observations where $Z = z_i$, and n_Y the number of observations where $Y = 1$, and $n_{i,Y}$ the number of observations where $Z = z_i$ and $Y = 1$. A candidate estimator consists of the observed fraction of positives among those with $Z = z_i$, hence encoding:

$$\bar{z}_i = \hat{p}_i \qquad \text{where } \hat{p}_i = \frac{n_{i,Y}}{n_i} \tag{2}$$

Such an estimator is unbiased, namely $E[\hat{p}_i] = p_i = P(Y = 1 | Z = z_i)$. More precisely, by Hoeffding bounds [33], for any $\epsilon > 0$, $P(|\hat{p}_i - p_i| \geq \epsilon) \leq 2e^{-2n_i\epsilon^2}$, which already points out the dependence of the estimate on the number of observations n_i of z_i. Formally , the variance of the estimator $Var[\hat{p}_i] = p_i(1 - p_i)/n_i$ is relatively large when n_i is small. Unregularized target encoding does not perform well on categories with little statistical mass [58] as it tends to overfit the training data, failing to generalize to new data. In the extreme case of only one observation, namely $n_i = 1$, it will replace the categorical value with the target of such an observation. Such an encoding will be unrepresentative of the category and introduces a sampling (or data collection) bias at the pre-processing stage. This

[3] Throughout the paper, we assume a binary target feature with values $\{0, 1\}$.

type of bias is what we define as reducible bias and can be left unnoticed because extremely small categories do not significantly impact the overall loss of the problem but can still impact fairness metrics. To avoid overfitting, practitioners regularize using either (i) smoothing towards the global mean or (ii) Gaussian noise, which adds normal (Gaussian) distribution noise to training data to decrease overfitting. Other smoothing techniques can be found in the literature but are either minimal variations of those two techniques or less popular [73].

3.1 Smoothing regularization

Smoothing towards the global mean leads to the following target encoding:

$$\bar{z}_i = \tilde{p}_i \qquad \text{where } \tilde{p}_i = \lambda(n_i)\frac{n_{i,Y}}{n_i} + (1-\lambda(n_i))\frac{n_Y}{n} \tag{3}$$

Here, the proportion of positives among the observations with $Z = z_i$ is interpolated with the proportion of positives among all observations. Formally, called $\hat{p} = n_Y/n$ an estimate of the prior probability $p = P(Y = 1)$, we have $\tilde{p}_i = \lambda(n_i)\hat{p}_i + (1-\lambda(n_i))\hat{p}$. The choice of the prior probability $P(Y = 1)$ is natural because, lacking a sufficient number of observations for $Z = z_i$, one resorts to the proportion of positives over the whole dataset of observations. The convex combination of the two estimators depends on $\lambda(n_i) \in [0, 1]$. The function $\lambda(\cdot)$ is assumed to increase with n_i. Intuitively, the larger the number of observations with $Z = z_i$, the more weight we give to the first estimator. Thus, the smoothed estimator is asymptotically unbiased. Conversely, the smaller the number of observations, the more weight we give to the prior probability estimator. Therefore, the smoothed estimator has a small variance for small values of n_i—yet, it is biased towards the prior probability.

3.2 Gaussian noise regularization

Gaussian noise regularization adds normal (Gaussian) distribution noise into training data after encoding the categorical attribute as in (2). The intuition is to perturb the data to prevent overfitting the target encoded attribute values. During the prediction stage, testing data are encoded as in (2) with no perturbation. Formally, called $z_{i,j}$ the j^{th} occurrence of z_i in the training set, $z_{i,j}$ is replaced by:

$$\bar{z}_{i,j} = \hat{p}_{i,j} \qquad \text{where } \hat{p}_{i,j} = \frac{n_{i,Y}}{n_i} + \epsilon_{i,j} \qquad \epsilon_{i,j} \sim N(0, \lambda^2) \tag{4}$$

where the $\epsilon_{i,j}$'s are i.i.d. with mean 0 and standard deviation λ. Typical values for λ are set between 0.05 and 0.6 [73].

4 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

We present a theoretical analysis under a number of assumptions that make it reasonably simple. First, we assume that $\bar{Z}$ is the only predictive feature. Second, we consider a probabilistic binary classifier, which for an input $\bar{Z} = \bar{z}$ outputs a score $\hat{S}(\bar{z}) \in [0, 1]$, and a prediction $\hat{Y}(\bar{z}) = \mathbb{1}(\hat{S}(\bar{z}) > 1/2)$. Third, the score is expected to approximate a Bayes optimal classifier, i.e., $\hat{S}(\bar{z}) \approx P(Y = 1|\bar{Z} = \bar{z})$. For notational convenience, we write $a \bowtie b$ as a shorthand for $a > 1/2 \Leftrightarrow b > 1/2$, namely a and b are on the same side of the decision threshold $1/2$. We write $a \not\bowtie b$ when $a \bowtie b$ does not hold.

The case of perfect target encoding. Under the (theoretical) assumption of knowing the true values p_i's, the perfect target encoding would set $\bar{z}_i = p_i$ as in (1). The score $\hat{S}(\bar{z}_i) = p_i$ leads to the Bayes optimal classifier, hence maximizing AUC over the population and minimizing the classification error to the following:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{c} P(Z = z_i) \cdot min\{p_i, 1 - p_i\} \tag{5}$$

Consider now the equal opportunity fairness metric, namely:

$$P(\hat{Y} = 1|Y = 1, \bar{Z} = \bar{z}_i) - P(\hat{Y} = 1|Y = 1, \bar{Z} = \bar{z}_r) \tag{6}$$

where $\bar{z}_r$ is the encoding of the reference group in the protected attribute Z. By definition of $\hat{Y}$, $\hat{Y}(\bar{z}_i) = 1$ iff $\bar{z}_i = p_i > 1/2$, and analogously for r. Therefore, when both $p_i > 1/2$ and $p_r > 1/2$:

$$P(\hat{Y} = 1|Y = 1, \bar{Z} = \bar{z}_i) = P(\hat{Y} = 1|Y = 1, \bar{Z} = \bar{z}_r) = 1$$

and then the difference is 0. A similar conclusion is obtained when both $p_i \leq 1/2$ and $p_r \leq 1/2$. However, when the probabilities p_i and p_r lie on different sides of the threshold (i.e., $p_r \not\bowtie p_i$), the equal opportunity metrics is non-zero (either -1 or 1). In other words, the classifier is fair only if the prediction for the reference group is the same as for the protected group. But this will impact on accuracy. In fact, assuming a constant prediction over the groups, say $\hat{Y}(\bar{z}_i) = 1$, the classification error on the population becomes $\sum_{i=1}^{c} P(Z = z_i) \cdot (1 - p_i)$, which is clearly larger than (5).

In summary, even in the case of perfect target encoding and a Bayes optimal classifier, there is a tension between error and fairness metrics optimization: the amount of unfairness is *irreducible* as we assumed to know the posterior probabilities p_i's, unless we admit increasing the error by not using the protected feature Z in the classification problem.

The case of target encoding. Let us consider now the encoding using the (un-regularized) estimator $\hat{p}_i = n_{i,Y}/n_i$, i.e., (2). The score $\hat{S}(\bar{z}_i) = \hat{p}_i$ maximizes empirical AUC and minimizes the empirical error rate on the training set. When n_i is large, $\hat{p}_i \approx p_i$ (since variance of the estimator is low), and then the contribution to the classification error (5) and to the AUC are approximately the same as in the case of perfect target encoding. Regarding the fairness metric, we can reasonably assume that n_r is large for the reference group, and then $\hat{p}_r \approx p_r$. Therefore, the equal opportunity metric is unchanged w.r.t. the case of perfect target encoding.

When n_i is small, the estimate $\hat{p}_i = n_{i,Y}/n_i$ can be arbitrarily distant from p_i. The increment in classification error (5) is zero if $p_i \bowtie \hat{p}_i$, and it is $P(Z = z_i) \cdot |1 - 2p_i|$ otherwise. Also, the AUC will possibly be smaller due to wrong ranking of instances with $Z = z_i$. The equal opportunity metric is, instead, independent of $P(Z = z_i)$. Compared to the perfect target encoding case, its value is unchanged if $p_i \bowtie \hat{p}_i$. Otherwise, it can either decrease (if $p_r \bowtie \hat{p}_i$) or increase (if $p_r \not\bowtie \hat{p}_i$).

In summary, the variability of the estimator $\hat{p}_i$ for n_i small, negatively impacts on the performance metrics, and it propagates to the the fairness metrics, unpredictably increasing or decreasing it compared to the perfect target encoding case. The increase in the fairness metrics is *reducible* bias, which can be corrected by increasing the number of observations of $Z = z_i$.

The case of smoothing regularization. Let us consider now the target encoding with smoothing regularization (3). Let $\hat{S}()$ be the score function that minimizes the empirical error rate over the training set. When n_i is large, then $\tilde{p}_i \approx \hat{p}_i \approx p_i$, and then we fall back to the same situation as for (perfect) target encoding.

When n_i is small, we have $\tilde{p}_i \approx n_Y/n \approx p$, and then instances of the training set for which $Z = z_i$ are mapped close to $\bar{Z} = p$. This does not necessarily mean that the classification algorithm scores such instances as p – rather, it should score close to the mean target value of instances with $\bar{Z} = p$. Let us then be q such that $\hat{S}(p) = q$. We fall back then to the reasoning for the target encoding case. The increment in classification error (5) is zero if $p_i \bowtie q$, and $P(Z = z_i) \cdot |1 - 2p_i|$ otherwise. Compared to the perfect target encoding case, the fairness metric value is unchanged if $p_i \bowtie q$. Otherwise, it can either decrease (if $p_r \bowtie q$) or increase (if $p_r \not\bowtie q$).

In summary, the estimator $\tilde{p}_i \approx p$ for n_i small is stable, but nevertheless, it can affect the performance metrics (negatively) and the fairness metrics (increase or decrease). The increase in the fairness metrics is *reducible* bias. Notice that the magnitude of the impact depends on the choice of q by the machine learning algorithm under consideration, which, in principle, could be controlled for.

The case of Gaussian noise regularization. Let us now consider the Gaussian noise regularization (4). Its expectation is $E[\hat{p}_{i,j}] = E[\hat{p}_i] + E[\epsilon_{i,j}] = p_i$, hence the estimator is unbiased. Its variance is $Var[\hat{p}_{i,j}] = Var[\hat{p}_i] + \lambda^2$. From this, we have that: (1) the variance is larger than in the case of target encoding, and, a fortiori, of the smoothing regularization; (2) the larger the regularization parameter λ, the larger the variance. Let us consider a partition of the instances with $Z = z_i$ based on whether $\hat{p}_{i,j} \bowtie p_i$ holds or not.

For the subset $\hat{p}_{i,j} \bowtie p_i$, there is no change in classification error, nor in the equal opportunity fairness metrics, when compared to the perfect target encoding case.

Consider instead the subset $\hat{p}_{i,j} \not\bowtie p_i$. The increment in classification error (5) is $\sum_{\bar{z}} P(Z = z_i, \bar{Z} = \bar{z}, \bar{z} \not\bowtie p_i) \cdot |1-2p_i|$. For n_i small, this is lower than in the cases of target encoding and smoothing regularization. For n_i large, this is greater than in those two cases, where it is ≈ 0. However, since $Var[\hat{p}_i] \approx 0$, this case only occurs for a large λ^2 that causes crossing the decision boundary, i.e., for which $\hat{p}_{i,j} \not\bowtie p_i$. Compared to the perfect target encoding case, the fairness metric can either decrease (if $p_r \bowtie \hat{p}_{i,j}$) or increase (if $p_r \not\bowtie \hat{p}_{i,j}$). Again, for small n_i's the impact is smaller than for target encoding and smoothing regularization, and for large n_i's, this can only occur if λ^2 is large enough for crossing the decision boundary.

In summary, Gaussian noise regularization adds some controllable variability that impacts mainly on small n_i's and for a subset of the data distribution for which a random perturbation may cross the decision boundary. If this happen, there is an increase in classification error, and some chance to increase/decrease the equal opportunity fairness metric. The increase in the fairness metrics is *reducible* bias.

The case of one-hot encoding. Consider a variant of one-hot encoding setting $\bar{z}_i = 2^i$, i.e., mapping z_i into a binary number with the i-th digit set to 1 and all others set to 0. Such a variant keeps our assumption of one predictive feature only. The previous subsections on perfect target encoding and on target encoding could be repeated, almost unchanged, as they only require $\hat{S}(\bar{z}_i) = p_i$ and $\hat{S}(\bar{z}_i) = \hat{p}_i$ respectively, ignoring the form of the coding of $\bar{z}_i$. We would therefore expect that the behavior of one-hot encoding and (unregularized) target encoding be very similar. What can make a difference is that most machine learning algorithms treat one-hot encoding as a collection of i.i.d. features, ignoring their dependencies (i.e., that one and only one digit must be 1). This may lead to a greater classification error when compared to target encoding.

5 EXPERIMENTS

In this section, we study the implications of model accuracy and fairness when encoding categorical protected attributes. *(H1)* The first main hypothesis is that encoding the protected attribute helps to improve accuracy. *(H2)* The second main hypothesis is that fairness is worsened by encoding. To evaluate both (H1) and (H2) we compare two encoding methods, one-hot encoding and target encoding, versus not encoding the protected attribute. Our third hypothesis *(H3)* is that target encoding regularization can improve fairness without significantly impacting predictive performance, and we evaluate this by comparing two regularization techniques across various hyperparameters as part of the machine learning pipeline's preprocessing step. Additionally, in the last section, we explore the effects of intersectional protected categorical attributes, which augment the previous three hypotheses.

5.1 Experimental Setup

5.1.1 Datasets: COMPAS and FolkTables. We choose two datasets that happen to exhibit high-cardinality sensitive categorical attributes in a binary classification problem: COMPAS [35] and FolkTables [16]. We report our method and findings on the COMPAS dataset in the main body of this paper and apply the same methodology on FolkTables, but report findings from the latter in the appendix. Overall, the findings are very similar in both datasets.

COMPAS is an acronym for Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions, which is an assistive software and support tool used to predict the risk that a criminal defendant will re-offend. The dataset provides a category-based evaluation labelled as high risk of recidivism, medium risk of recidivism, or low risk of recidivism. We convert this multi-class classification problem into binary classification by combining the medium risk and high risk of recidivism and comparing them to low risk of recidivism. The input used for the prediction of recidivism consists of 11 categorical attributes, including gender, custody status, legal status, assessment reason, agency, language, ethnicity, and marital status. The sensitive attribute that we consider is *Ethnic* for the single discrimination case, whose protected group we define as the most represented group: African-American (cf. Figure 4).

To study fairness related to intersectional attributes, we created the variable *EthnicMarital*, engineered by concatenating *Ethnic* and *Marital* status. This new attribute has a high cardinality of 46 distinct values (cf. Figure 4). The most predominant category is *African-American Single*, and it will be the protected group (cf. Figure 4) for the intersectional fairness case. To compare disparate treatment between groups we will make use of *Caucasian Married* as the reference group. It is worth noting that the contribution of

the attributes to the model performance, based on attribute importance explanation mechanism [43, 47, 51, 59], is highly relevant. The available data is split into a 50/50 stratified train/test split, maintaining the ratio of each category between train and test set. In the Figure 4 of the appendix, we can see how the group distributions are unbalanced with two groups, *African-American* and *Caucasian*, that account for the +80% of the data. For the intersectional fairness case, the number of groups increases, making room for more distinct, disparate, and imbalanced groups [23].

5.1.2 Machine learning algorithms. Our experiments involve a logistic regression model, a neural network (Multi-layer Perceptron classifier), and a gradient-boosting decision tree. All models are trained on the training set. These three models provide examples of a model with large bias (the linear regression model), a highly complex model (the MLP classifier), and the extensively used, state-of-the-art gradient-boosting decision tree [7, 25, 48, 61, 82].

5.1.3 Choice of metrics and models.

Model performance metrics. Previous work on fair machine learning has evaluated their experiments on COMPAS using accuracy as a performance metric [78–80], but given that we want to study effects of group imbalance, we consider accuracy to be a less informative measure of model performance. Area Under the Curve (AUC) measures the diagnostic ability of a binary classifier as its discrimination threshold is varied. AUC is less susceptible to class imbalance than accuracy or precision and also accepts soft probabilities predictions [32]. An AUC of 0.5 is equal to random predictions.

Fairness metrics. We use three different metrics $\ell_{i,j}(f, X, y)$ to judge fairness of classifier f on data X between groups indexed by i, r and we denote $\hat{Y} = f(X)$ for simplicity:

- *Statistical Parity (Strong Demographic Parity)*: The difference between favourable outcomes received by the protected group and refernce group [12, 21, 38, 81]. DP ensures that a fair decision does not depend on the protected attribute regardless of the classification threshold used [11, 36]

$$\mathrm{DP}_{i,r} = d(P(\hat{Y}|Z = i), P(\hat{Y}|Z = r)) \tag{7}$$

  where $d(\cdot, \cdot)$ is a distance function. In this work, we use the Wasserstein distance as a measure between the two probabilistic distributions. The intuition behind Demographic Parity is that it states that the proportion of each segment of a protected attribute should receive a positive outcome at equal rates, a positive outcome is a preferred decision.
- *Equal opportunity fairness.* Following Hardt et al. [31]'s emphasis on ensuring fair opportunity instead of raw outcomes, we choose *equal opportunity* (EO) as a fairness notion and use the metric *disparate treatment* (difference between the true positive rates) to measure unfairness, which is estimated using the disparate treatment metric [78]. For simplicity, we refer to the interplay of these concepts as the *equal opportunity fairness (EOF)* metric. The value is the difference in the True Positive Rate (TPR) between the protected group and the reference group [50, 57]).

$$\mathrm{TPR}_i = P(\hat{Y} = 1|Y = 1, Z = i) \quad \mathrm{EOF}_{i,r} = \mathrm{TPR}_i - \mathrm{TPR}_r \tag{8}$$

  A negative value in (8) is due to the worse ability of a Machine Learning model to find actual recidivists for the protected group (i) in comparison with the reference group (j).
- *Average Absolute Odds (Equalized Odds)*: The sum of the absolute differences between the True Positive Rates and the False Positive Rates of the protected group plus the same ratio for the reference group.

$$\mathrm{FPR}_i = P(\hat{Y} = 1|Y = 0, Z = i) \tag{9}$$

$$\mathrm{AAO}_{i,r} = \frac{1}{2}(|FPR_i - FPR_r| + |TPR_i - TPR_r|) \tag{10}$$

  The intuition is that an $AAO = 0$ means the algorithm is fair because it results in the same False Positive Rate and True Positive Rate for the reference group as an protected group. If the algorithm causes a difference in either, then $AAO \neq 0$. A deviation in each term contributes equally to AAO, then False Positives Rates might have different social implications than True Positives Rates [44, 66, 71].

All three metrics indicate better fairness between groups i, j by values closer to 0. We calculate the overall fairness $\mathcal{L}$ of the model f on data of interest X given a fairness metrics ℓ, reference group i and other groups $\{i|i \neq r\}$ as:

$$\mathcal{L}(f, X, y, i, r) = \sum_{i \neq r} |(\ell_{i,r}(f, X, y)| \tag{11}$$

where each group i contributes equally to the overall metric, meaning these are not weighted by the number of individuals in each group.

5.2 Experimental results: encoding categorical protected attributes

In this section, we evaluate hypotheses (H1), (H2), and (H3). The trade-offs between fairness metrics and predictive performance metrics (AUC) are analyzed using two different encoding techniques (Section 2), with two different regularization techniques (Section 3) and two different estimators (Section 5.1.3). The ranges of the regularization hyperparameters are: $\lambda \in [0, 5]$ for the width of the Gaussian noise regularization; $m \in [0, 1000000]$ for the additive smoothing using the m-probability estimate function $\lambda(n_i) = n_i/(n_i + m)$ (see [46]). These hyperparameters will also be kept for the rest of the experiments for the COMPAS dataset.

Under **Gaussian noise regularization** (cf Figure 1 left images), evaluation supports our three hypotheses: (H1) predictive performance improves when encoding the categorical protected attributes. In all six experiments, the improvements reported are in the range of ~ 0.1 AUC. (H2) All the experiments exhibit fairness degradation up to one order of magnitude. (H3) We observe that within low regularization ranges of hyperparameters (lighter dots), fairness improves without compromising the predictive performance of the model. However, for higher levels of regularization (darker dots), fairness metrics have a plateau while predictive performance (AUC) keeps degrading. At the highest regularization penalty, target encoding often matches performance and fairness with "no encoding" while with no regularization matches "one hot encoding". Later in this section, we discuss this in depth.



Figure 1: Comparing one-hot encoding and target encoding regularization (Gaussian noise and smoothing) for the Logistic Regression, Neural Network, and Gradient Boosting classifiers over the test set of the COMPAS dataset. Coloured dots regard different regularization parameters: the darker the red, the higher the regularization. Different colours imply different fairness metrics. Crossed dots regard one-hot encoding, and starred dots are the results of models that exclude the use of the protected attribute.

We find similar results in the case of **smoothing regularization** (cf Figure 1 right images). But not for our regularization hypothesis. While it should be for the linear regression and the neural networks, it does not work for the gradient-boosting decision trees, whose target encoding regularization effects are negligible in both fairness and model performance. These can be due to smoothing producing



Figure 2: Impact of the Gaussian noise regularization parameter λ on performance and fairness metrics over the test set of the COMPAS dataset using a Logistic Regression with L1 penalty. In the left image, the AUC of all the protected groups over the regularization hyperparameter. On the right, the equal opportunity fairness, demographic parity and average absolute odds variation throughout the regularization hyperparameter.



Figure 3: Equal opportunity fairness implications of encoding categorical protected attributes and their regularization effects on the Compas Dataset. Horizontal lines are the baselines where the protected attribute is not included in the training data. Regularized target encoding does not harm fairness metrics, but it can improve predictive performance on this dataset.

a shrinking effect where decision tree-based models are generally not affected by monotonic attribute transformations [10].

In Figure 2, we analyze the target encoding hyperparameter fairness-accuracy trade-off deeper. We can see that there is an optimal trade-off value around 0.3, where the equal opportunity fairness and demographic parity have dropped down toward the fairness plateau, and the model performance has only slightly decreased. The predictive performances (AUC) of different groups have different negative slopes, ethnic groups as *Asian* or *Native-American* have a drastic drop in performance while groups as *African-American* have only a small performance decay. *African-American* represents the 44.4% of the data while *Asian* or *Native-American* do not even achieve a statistical representation of 1%.

Concerning the across-model comparison, the predictive performance of the gradient boosting decision tree model is best, followed by the neural network and then the linear model [5, 27]. From the fairness perspective, more complex models have a stronger fairness violation.

5.3 Experimental results: engineering intersectional fairness

Our intersectional fairness hypothesis are that (i) the engineering of intersectional features degrades fairness, (ii) that encoding the categorical protected attribute increases discrimination and (iii) that by regularizing target encoding, we can reduce intersectional discrimination to no-encoding levels.

To provide evidence of the potential effects of encodings on intersectional fairness, we concatenate *Ethnic* and *Marital* status of the COMPAS dataset. We select *Caucasian Married* as the reference group and compare the maximum fairness violation w.r.t. all other groups. For visualization purposes, we choose the generalized linear model or the previous section and focus on the notion of Equal Opportunity Fairness since we have seen in the previous experimental section that the three fairness metrics exhibit the same behavior.

In Figure 3, we see how attribute concatenation creates intersectional attributes and boosts fairness violations. Validating our first hypothesis that fairness metrics increase just by the engineering of intersectional discrimination. Even when there is no-encoding the protected attributes (horizontal lines), the maximum fairness violation between groups is increased by an order of magnitude from 0.015 for *Ethnic* or 0.08 for *Marital Status* to 0.16 for the intersectional attribute of both. The increase of discrimination when engineering intersectional protected attributes align with the social findings presented originally back in 1958 when Kimberle Crenshaw [13] wrote her critique of the anti-discrimination doctrine, feminist theory, and anti-racist politics, to describe how different forms of oppression intersect and compound one another, increased discrimination for marginalized groups.

Our second hypothesis is validated as both encoding techniques achieve a higher equal opportunity violation than no-encoding of the protected attribute. Finally, we can see that fairness can be improved by regularizing the target encoding of protected attributes. This is not surprising, and, in general, attribute concatenation can worsen fairness both on the side of irreducible bias (because p_i and p_r become more distant) and on the side of reducible bias (because n_i becomes smaller) as we have seen in the theoretical section.

6 CONCLUSION

In this work, we have focused on how the encoding of categorical attributes can reconcile model quality and fairness. We have provided theoretical and empirical evidence that encoding categorical attributes could induce two different types of bias: an *irreducible bias*, due to the learning of discriminant information between the protected and reference groups, and a *reducible bias* due to the large variance of samples found in small protected groups.

Through theory and experiments, we showed that the most used categorical encoding method in the fair machine learning literature, one-hot encoding, consistently discriminates more than target encoding. However, we found some promising results using target encoding. Target encoding regularization showed fairness improvements with the risk of a noticeable loss of model performance in the case of over-parametrization. We also found that the type of regularization chosen is relevant depending on the algorithm used. These results support our view that (regularized) target encoding can be useful for fair machine learning. Furthermore, we discussed how attribute engineering could boost the performance of machine learning algorithms but can lead to fairness violations increase, potentially due to both reducible and irreducible biases.

These experiments aim to motivate industry practitioners, where in many situations, the usage of the protected attribute is not strictly prohibited, and with slight changes in the encoding of the protected attribute, improvements in fairness can be achieved without any noticeable detriment to predictive performance.

Limitations and disclaimer: In this work, we have used two models, two encodings, two regularization techniques, and two datasets. To make a large-scale comparison, we must choose a single scalar metric that accounts for the trade-off between model accuracy and model fairness. Also, encodings are more impactful when the protected attribute is related to the target variable. This work aims to show what are some of the implications of encoding categorical protected attributes. At all times, it is important to understand that simply encoding categorical protected attributes may not necessarily lead to improved fairness metrics. We strongly advocate considering the effects of encoding regularization not only on predictive performance but also along the fairness axis. Using fair AI methods does not necessarily guarantee the fairness of AI-based complex socio-technical systems [42, 64, 67].

Reproducibility Statement

We make our results open-source and reproducible: original data, data preparation routines, code repositories, and methods are all publicly available at https://github.com/nobias-project/FairEncoding. Note that throughout our work, we do not perform any hyperparameter tuning (except on the regularization); instead, we use default `scikit-learn` hyperparameters [55].Our experiments were run on a four vCPU server with 15GB of RAM.

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APPENDIX: EXPERIMENT RESULTS

Data: Compas data overview

In Figure 4 we complement the experimental section on the main body of the paper by showing the distributions of the ethnic groups. There are two groups (*African-American* and *Caucasian*) that account for the 80% of the data, while there are less represented groups such as Asian or Arabic that have a less significant statistical weight. For the intersectional fairness case, the number of groups is increased to 46 distinct groups, making room for more distinct, disparate, and imbalanced groups[23].



Figure 4: Distribution of the protected attribute categories to be encoded and regularized for the COMPAS data [35]. Predominant *Ethnic* categories are *African-American* and *Caucasian*



Figure 5: Distribution of the intersectional protected attribute *Ethnic-Marital* to be encoded and regularized for the COMPAS data [35]. Predominant categories is categories distribution are *African-American Single* and *Caucassian Single*

Data: US Census Income

In this section, we provide experiments on the Adult Income data set[4] derived from the US census data [16]. Folktables package provides access to data-sets derived from the US Census, facilitating the bench-marking of fair machine learning algorithms. We select the data from California in 2014 that covers 60,729 individuals including their race, that has 8 unique groups. Aiming to predict whether an individual's income is above 50, 000. The data is split into a 50/50 train/test split, maintaining the ratio of each category between the train and test set.

	Distribution	Ratio
White	117209	0.66
Asian	28817	0.16
Other	20706	0.11
Black	8435	0.05
Native	1121	0.005
Hawaiian	612	0.003
American Indian	379	0.002

Table 2: Statistical distribution of the protected attribute *Race* on the US census dataset.

Figure 6: Comparing one-hot encoding and target encoding regularization (Gaussian noise and smoothing) for the Logistic Regression classifier over the test set of the US Income dataset. The Reference group is *White*. Coloured dots regard different regularization parameters: the darker the red, the higher the regularization. Different colours imply different fairness metrics. Crossed dots regards one-hot encoding, and starred dots not including the protected attribute in the data.

Under **Gaussian noise regularization** (left images of Figure 6), for the logistic regression, we can validate our three hypotheses: (H1) first that predictive performance improves when encoding the categorical protected attributes, in this case, respect to the results on Compass dataset, the AUC improvements are smaller, this can be due to the lack of predictive power of the categorical protected attribute. (H2) that fairness metrics are worsened by the encoding of the protected attribute, the differences between no-encoding

[4]Please see the ACS PUMS data dictionary for the full list of variables available https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/microdata/documentation.html



Figure 7: Impact of the Gaussian noise regularization parameter λ on performance and fairness metrics over the test set of the US income dataset using a Logistic Regression with L1 penalty. In the left image, the AUC of all the protected groups over the regularization hyperparameter. On the right, the equal opportunity fairness, demographic parity and average absolute odds variation throughout the regularization hyperparameter.

versus one-hot encoding or non-regularized target encoding are substantial.

Our last hypothesis (H3) is that through regularisation predictive performance can be improved without compromising the fairness of the model. We can observe that during the low regularization range of hyperparameters (lighter dots), there are high fairness violations with only a small improvement in predictive performance. On the other side, for high regularization (darker dots), fairness metrics have a smaller value. At the highest regularization penalty, target encoding often matches performance and fairness with "no encoding" while with no regularization matches "one hot encoding".

Machine Learning practices and infrastructures

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ABSTRACT

Machine Learning (ML) systems, particularly when deployed in high-stakes domains, are deeply consequential. They can exacerbate existing inequities, create new modes of discrimination, and reify outdated social constructs. Accordingly, the social context (i.e. organisations, teams, cultures) in which ML systems are developed is a site of active research for the field of AI ethics, and intervention for policymakers. This paper focuses on one aspect of social context that is often overlooked: interactions between practitioners and the tools they rely on, and the role these interactions play in shaping ML practices and the development of ML systems. In particular, through an empirical study of questions asked on the Stack Exchange forums, the use of interactive computing platforms (e.g. Jupyter Notebook and Google Colab) in ML practices is explored. I find that interactive computing platforms are used in a host of learning and coordination practices, which constitutes an infrastructural relationship between interactive computing platforms and ML practitioners. I describe how ML practices are co-evolving alongside the development of interactive computing platforms, and highlight how this risks making invisible aspects of the ML life cycle that AI ethics researchers' have demonstrated to be particularly salient for the societal impact of deployed ML systems.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies** → *Machine learning*; • **Social and professional topics** → *Socio-technical systems*; *History of software.*

KEYWORDS

machine learning, infrastructure studies, social practice

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1 INTRODUCTION

It follows from the notion that Machine Learning (ML) systems ought to be thought of as *sociotechnical* systems [122]—i.e. systems that are socially constructed, requiring both human actors and machines to work [36]—that the social context in which an ML systems is researched, developed, and deployed is likely to shape the characteristics of that system. Given the increasing rate of ML system deployment in high-stakes domains, and widespread evidence of ML systems failing to meet societal expectations [e.g. 25, 69, 94, 123], a key question for ML field relates to infrastructuralisation and its implications for ML practices and deployed ML systems. This paper begins to address this question, by attending to one aspect of social context—interactions between ML practitioners and the tools they use to research, build, and deploy ML systems—and demonstrating the relevance of this context to concerns raised by AI ethics researchers.

The social context of ML system development has been studied in AI ethics [e.g. 15, 33, 55, 80]. However, relatively little attention has been paid to tracing the relationship between specific material features of this context and the characteristics of ML systems that are developed [72]. That is, the role of material things (e.g. software tools, office layouts, computer interfaces, network connections), which themselves are socially constructed, alongside social things (e.g. people, beliefs, norms) in shaping ML systems merits closer scrutiny. In this paper, I consider one aspect of this sociomaterial context of ML system development: the use of interactive computing platforms (e.g. Jupyter Notebooks and Google Colaboratory) during ML model development and evaluation. I explore the structure of these platforms and their use by ML practitioners, and consider the ways in which this use may contribute to conventions of ML practices. This exploration serves to illustrate the importance for the AI ethics field of attending both to the sociomaterial context of ML system development generally, and to the role of interactive computing platforms, in particular. The research question to which this exploration is addressed is: *how are interactive computing platforms used in ML practices?*

To answer this question I developed a probabilistic topic model of user-contributed questions on the Stack Exchange forums related to ML and the use of interactive computing platforms. Stack Exchange forums were selected due to their wide use by data and computer scientists, software engineers, and technologists generally [6, 10]. Alongside this I undertook qualitative text analysis of a small sample of Stack Exchange questions. I find that interactive computing platforms are used in a range of ML practices, particularly in the data curation and processing, and model training and evaluation stages of ML system development. I highlight the role of interactive computing platforms in learning practices, and in practices of coordination across multiple infrastructures. To interpret these findings I draw on sociological studies of infrastructures and practices, particularly the work of sociologists Susan Leigh Star [20, 129–131] and Elizabeth Shove [124, 125, 145], and cultural anthropologist Brian Larkin [73, 74]. I conclude that learning and coordination roles are indicative of an infrastructural relationship between ML practitioners and interactive computing platforms, which renders some of the aspects of ML systems development that

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AI ethics discourse has highlighted as particularly consequential (e.g. the importance of training dataset provenance [32, 40]) as invisible to ML practitioners. As such, this paper contributes an empirical snapshot of the use of interactive computing platforms in ML practices, and argues for a renewed focus in the field of AI ethics on the emergence of digital platform infrastructures in the ML ecosystem.

2 RELATED WORK

2.1 The sociomaterial context of Machine Learning practices

As ML systems have become objects of sociological interest [e.g. 26, 35, 67, 83], the social context in which ML systems are researched, developed, commissioned, and deployed has garnered increased attention in diverse fields from Human-Computer Interaction [54, 84], to Science and Technology Studies [28], to public policy [71]. In this paper, I refer to *sociomaterial* context rather than *social* context to signal a particular focus on the intertwining of socially-constructed material things—specifically, interactive computing platforms—in ML practices. As Paul Leonardi et al. [76–78] have argued, a sociomaterial perspective highlights how the material is socially constructed, and the social is enacted through material forms. A sociomaterial perspective invites us to consider the material things that ML practitioners enrol in their day-to-day work, alongside other aspects of the social context, and the contribution of these things to the stablisation of ML practices. In this context, *material* refers to the "properties of a technological artifact that do not change, by themselves, across differences in time and context" [78, p.7]—for interactive computing platforms, and software generally, this includes their user interfaces and layouts, their core capabilities, and their dependencies [110]. My understanding of *practices* is informed by social practice theory [18, 116, 128], which conceptualises *practices* as routinised ways of understanding and performing social activities [58], and highlights that multiple practices can coexist within the same cultural setting [116, p.646]. *Machine Learning practices* are thus the constitutive matter of 'doing' ML. Some practices (e.g. Agile meeting processes) may be widely shared across cultures and organisations, and others (e.g. the use of specific software) may vary dramatically from practitioner to practitioner.

In the field of AI ethics, a sociomaterial perspective has been used to highlight the challenges of translating AI ethics research into ML practices. Michael Veale and Reuben Binns [140], for instance, studied how statistical measures of fairness can be implemented within the practical constraints of limited access to data on protected characteristics, finding that new institutional arrangements will be necessary to support industry implementation of statistical measures of fairness that depend on access to sensitive data [cf. 16, 17]. Veale and Binns argue for future empirical research on the "messy, contextually-embedded and necessarily sociotechnical" challenge of building 'fairer' ML systems [140, p.13]. Veale et al. [141] subsequently conducted an empirical study of ML practitioners in public sector organisations and their engagement with ethics issues during ML system development for high-stakes decision making, finding that while practitioners have a high degree of awareness regarding ethical issues, they lack the necessary tools and organisational support to use this awareness in their ML practices. Mona Sloane and Janina Zakrzewski [128], who also situate their work within social practice theory, provide a more expanded overview of AI ethics practices, through an empirical study of the operationalisation of ethics in German AI startups. Sloane and Zakrzewski develop an anatomy of AI ethics practices, which they suggest can be used as a framework to inform improvements to ML system development practices. Relevantly, the anatomy includes 'ethics materials', defined as "concrete objects, processes, roles, tools or infrastructures focused on 'AI ethics"' [128, p.5]. Holstein et al. [54] provide further support for the importance of ethics materials, through their empirical study of ML practitioners working in product teams in large technology firms to develop 'fairer' ML systems, which found that practitioners lack the tools needed to identify and address ethics issues that arise during ML system development. Finally, Will Orr and Jenny Davis [96] highlight how ML practices include the diffusion of responsibility for ethics during ML system development. Orr and Davis found a "pattern of ethical dispersion" amongst practitioners: practitioners perceive themselves to be the inheritors of ethical parameters from more powerful actors (regulators, clients, employers), which their expertise translates into the characteristics of systems they develop, which are then handed over to users and clients, who assume ongoing responsibility [96, p.7]. These studies, along with other empirical explorations of ML practice [e.g. 55, 64, 71, 108, 119, 139] and several workshops focused on the research-to-practice gap [9, 12, 133], have prompted calls for better support for practitioners attempting to operationalise AI ethics principles in their ML practices [88, 120, 121].

This study complements and inverts these empirical studies of AI ethics in ML practices. Rather than moving from the social to the sociomaterial, this study moves from the material to the sociomaterial. That is, rather than starting with interviews [e.g. 54, 55, 96, 108, 119, 128, 141] or surveys [e.g. 71, 139] of practitioners to explore their understanding and operationalisation of AI ethics in ML practices, the study begins with material artefacts that practitioners use and produce in the course of their ML practices, and explores what light these artefacts may shed on the translation of AI ethics to ML practices. A similar approach is followed by Max Langenkamp and Daniel Yue [72] in their study of open source ML software use, which consists of a review of code repositories on GitHub to establish the breadth of open source use followed by interviews with practitioners to provide further context. That study takes a broad perspective, exploring trends across open source software use. In contrast, this study takes a narrow perspective, exploring how a specific category of software tool is used in ML practices.

2.2 Interactive computing platforms and Machine Learning practices

The specific material artefacts this study starts with are *interactive computing platforms* (ICPs), also referred to as 'computational notebooks' [27, 118], 'literate programming tools' [100] or 'integrated development environments' [150]. Two widely used ICPs are the open-source Jupyter Notebook and Google Colab, Google's

extension of Jupyter Notebook, designed to integrate with other Google services.[1] Figure 1 shows an example Jupyter Notebook.



Figure 1: A screenshot of a Google Colab notebook maintained by PyTorch as part of their onboarding documentation. The notebook can be accessed at: https://pytorch.org/tutorials/beginner/basics/buildmodel_tutorial.html. The numbered grey cells are code cells. Immediately above each code cell is a natural language cell, which contains explanatory text. Immediately below each code cell is the output from running the cell's code.

Technically, an ICP is an interactive shell for a programming language, such as Python [98]. The shell enables users to write and interact with code fragments—called 'cells'—alongside natural language, and to assemble series of cells into a *notebook*, which can be shared with others—much in the same way that a word processor enables a user to assemble an editable document and share that with others. The notebook can be thought of as a computational narrative, which enables one to read and interact with a sequence of code alongside a narrative description of what the code does [68]—hence, the terms 'literate programming tools' and 'computational notebooks'. However, crucially, an ICP presents itself as only a shell: all but the most rudimentary code fragments depend on access to libraries of existing code, which a user must import into the shell environment. Similarly, particularly in the context of ML, data must be imported into the shell for the code to operate on and a compute resource must be accessed to process operations. Numerous digital infrastructures support importing code into a notebook, including the code repository GitHub,[2] in which many repositories include a notebook to demonstrate common use cases of the code [118], PyPi,[3] which indexes and hosts Python-based code packages, and HuggingFace,[4] which indexes and hosts ML training and evaluation datasets and models. In this study, *interactive computing platform* is thus preferred, as the infrastructural implications of 'platform' are a critical aspect of what defines these tools: ICPs are highly networked arrangements, one part of a circular web of infrastructures and inter-dependencies (the Internet, cloud computing, programming languages and libraries).

Interactive computing platforms pre-date the widespread adoption of ML techniques in applied settings. Indeed, their motivating design goal was to support reproducible science [45, 68, 98] (see, e.g. [13, 109] for discussions of their effectiveness at meeting this goal). However, as ML techniques have become ubiquitous, and data scientists have become widespread in industry, interactive computing platforms have become widely enrolled in ML practices. Commentators thus describe ICPs as the "tool of choice" for data scientists [99], and practitioners vigorously debate the merits and drawbacks of using ICPs in applied settings [e.g. 21, 48, 56, 90, 138].

Interactive computing platforms have also become objects of study in several fields adjacent to AI ethics. Human-Computer Interaction studies have developed empirical accounts of the way users interact with ICPs, focusing particularly on the role of ICPs in collaborations [143, 150] and in data science [65, 118]. Of particular relevance, Adam Rule et al. [118] conducted three studies of the use of ICPs by data scientists, which included a large-scale review of notebooks on GitHub and interviews with data scientists and found that ICPs tend to be used by data scientists during data exploration phases of a project, rather than for constructing and sharing detailed explanations of data analysis. Studies in the field of Software Engineering have also focused on documenting the use of ICPs, focusing particularly on ICPs as a site to study trends in code use [144] and reuse [70, 100], and on the their potential as educational tools [135]. Similarly, in the field of Computational Science, several studies have considered the role ICPs can play in supporting reproducible science [13, 24, 63]. This study provides a different perspective on ICP use, by considering ML practices in particular, and interpreting these practices through the lens of sociological studies of infrastructure, which shifts the focus of the study away from the individual user-notebook relationship and towards the broader relationship of ML practitioners to the suite of infrastructures involved in ML practices.

3 STUDYING INFRASTRUCTURES & PRACTICES

Studying the relationship between practices and infrastructures can be vexed. Infrastructures may be functionally invisible to the social groups who make use of them in daily practices [130], as I consider further in Section 6.2. Further, infrastructures often span multiple practices across different social groups, which, particularly in the context of digital infrastructures, may not be geographically proximate [19]. And, practices themselves are not purely infrastructural—as Shove et al. [126] argue, they bring together infrastructures and other materials, competencies, and ways of knowing.

Sociological studies of infrastructures have orientated themselves around the broad aim of rendering infrastructures, and their sociopolitical commitments, visible [19]. Ethnographic methods–historically, fieldwork and participant observation; more recently, multi-site studies–have been used to empirically document infrastructures [127]. Star [130], for instance, advocates studying moments of breakdown in infrastructures, seeing these as instances where infrastructures become visible to social groups. Star [130]

[1] Available at https://jupyter.org/ and https://research.google.com/colaboratory/.
[2] See https://github.com/.
[3] See https://pypi.org/.
[4] See https://huggingface.co/.

also observes that infrastructures are often learned as part of group membership, directing attention to moments of transience in social groups (discussed further in Section 6.1). However, digital infrastructures present particular challenges: one cannot physically access online communities, and the number of physical sites is at least as large as the user-base of the infrastructure [19].[5]

In this study, I build on Star's insights by focusing, as a path towards understanding ICPs and their relationship to ML practices, on moments where ML practitioners are either experiencing ICP breakdowns or limitations in their own ICP capabilities. In particular, and reflecting the challenge of direct observation of digital infrastructure use, the primary data source used are the questions asked by ML practitioners on popular online forums. This is supplemented with analysis of ICP affordances and inter-dependencies. This approach follows in the spirit of other studies of digital infrastructure, such as Plantin et al.'s [102] analysis of the documentation and inter-dependencies of the Figshare platform and Andre Brock's [22] analysis of Black Twitter through analysis of Twitter interfaces and user generated content, although the study presented here is narrower in scope.

4 METHOD

This study consisted of an empirical study of user-generated content on the Stack Exchange forums, supported by a close reading of a small number of exemplars texts [61]. In particular, a Structured Topic Model (STM) [111–114] of user-generated questions about ML and the use of interactive computing platforms on Stack Exchange forums was estimated.[6] A similar approach has been used in a number of studies of Stack Exchange forums [2], for instance to identify challenges practitioners face in developing ML systems more generally [3] or themes in questions asked by mobile application developers [115] or themes in privacy-related [134] or security-related questions [149].[7]

4.1 Corpus development and description

English-language Stack Exchange community forums, specifically Stack Overflow, Cross Validated, Data Science, Computer Science, and Software Engineering were mined for relevant questions. Stack Exchange claims to be the world's largest programming community.[8] As of October 2022, its most popular forum, Stack Overflow, had over 19 million registered users, who contribute, edit, and moderate questions and answers on the forum.[9] Previous research demonstrates that Stack Overflow is enmeshed in software engineering and data science practices [e.g. 1, 5, 8, 38, 91, 136], and that ML techniques are a rapidly growing topic of discussion on the forum [3]. The Stack Exchange forums share data structures[10] and interface layouts, with annoymised user questions, answers, and comments from all Stack Exchange forum made available for querying and research through the Stack Exchange Data Dump [e.g. 3, 115, 149].[11]

Questions related to ML and interactive computing platforms were extracted from the Stack Exchange forums listed above on 23 November, 2022. Four example questions are shown in Figure 2. To identify relevant questions the topical tags associated with every question were leveraged. Through manual review of the forums, and queries of the Stack Exchange Data Dump, 10 ICP tags and 32 ML related tags were identified.[12] These tags are listed in Appendix A. Having identified relevant ML and ICP tags, two datasets were extracted from the Stack Exchange Data Dump: all questions on the selected forums with at least one ML related tag (a large dataset consisting of 485, 053 questions), and all questions on these forum with at least one ICP related tag (a smaller dataset of 75, 639 questions). The ML tagged questions were filtered by the presence of an ICP term (leaving 36, 940 questions), and ICP tagged questions were filtered by ML terms (leaving 9, 634 questions). This procedure resulted in two datasets with some substantial overlap. After de-duplication, a final dataset of 21, 555 ML and ICP related questions was left; this dataset became the corpus used to estimate a STM topic model..[13]

4.2 Estimation of the topic model

STM is a probabilistic, mixed-membership topic model, which extends the widely-used Latent Dirichlet Allocation model by enabling the inclusion of metadata—here, the tags associated with questions and question creation date—in the model training process (see [82, 114] for introductions to STM). To prepare the corpus for topic modelling, pre-processing was undertaken using the *stm* R package [112] (see [46, 147] for discussion of pre-processing procedures). Title and body fields for questions were concatenated into a single column. Questions on Stack Exchange forums are formatted using markdown, and often include large snippets of computer code. All code snippets and markdown were removed from questions. Code snippets were retained for subsequent analysis. Html symbols (e.g. '"'), special characters (e.g. '''), punctuation, and superfluous white spaces were removed from questions. Questions were converted to lowercase. Frequently occurring words with little topic predictive value ('stopwords') were removed from questions. Words in the questions were stemmed (i.e. converted to

[5] Although outside the scope of this paper, an additional emerging challenge is automated personalisation of digital infrastructures, which makes obtaining a general view of the infrastructure challenging [137]. ICPs do not currently afford personalisation in this way.

[6] See [59, 82, 87, 93] for overviews of topic modelling in the social sciences, and [11, 23] for more critical perspectives.

[7] Code to reproduce pre-processing steps and the topic model described below, are available at https://github.com/gberman-aus/aies_23_topic_modelling.

[8] See https://stackexchange.com/ to access Stack Exchange and its forums. Stack Overflow is broadly focused on computer programming. Cross Validated is a more specialised forum, focused on statistics and data analysis. Software Engineering is a similarly specialised forum, focused on software systems development. Finally, Data Science and Computer Science are relatively small forums, focused on data and computer science respectively. However, reflecting the ubiquity of ML techniques in computing, questions related to ML occur in all of these forums, and, as all of these forums are user-moderated, their boundaries and scope are dynamic.

[9] This estimate is based on a query of the Stack Exchange Data Dump. See [8, 10] for studies of Stack Overflow usage.

[10] A detailed description of the database schema used across forums is provided by Stack Exchange on their forum about the Stack Exchange network, appropriately named Meta Stack Exchange, accessible at https://meta.stackexchange.com/questions/2677/database-schema-documentation-for-the-public-data-dump-and-sede.

[11] The Stack Exchange Data Dump can be accessed at: https://archive.org/details/stackexchange. The database is updated weekly.

[12] In studies of more niche topics only one tag has been used [134], however, as in [3], manual review demonstrated that there are no over-arching ML or ICP tags.

[13] A significant advantage of the *stm* R package relied upon is that it enables manual setting of the random seeds used during the model training process—ensuring a higher degree of reproducability is possible.

(a) Topics: 13 (28.1%), 5 (24.5%), and 23 (13.3%). The infrastructure and inter-dependencies cluster.



(b) Topics: 19 (15.6%), 21 (11.2%), and 16 (10.3%). The data manipulation cluster.



(c) Topics: 25 (48.2%), 4 (9.6%), and 8 (7.3%). The model training cluster.



(d) Topics: 13 (44.2%), 5 (31.4%), and 12 (6.6%). The infrastructure and inter-dependencies cluster.

Figure 2: Screenshots of four highly viewed questions on the Stack Overflow forum. The top three topics identified by the topic model and the cluster are reported in the caption of each image.

their root form). The creation date of questions was converted into a numerical format.

STM requires the researcher to set the number of latent topics (k) to identify in a corpus. As such, selecting the optimal value for k is an important decision, and requires testing a wide range of values [47]. Additional hyper-parameters can also be optimised, and different pre-processing regimes can also be tested against each other [46, 85]. Given the preliminary nature of the study, k values from 10 to 60, at intervals of 5 were experimented with. The *stm* package's built in multi-model testing feature was used: for each value of k, up to 50 model runs, with a maximum of 100 iterations each, were tested to ensure model stability.

To select an optimal value of k two evaluation metrics were used: *exclusivity* and *semantic coherence* [114]. *Exclusivity* is a measure of the difference in key words associated with each topic, whilst *semantic coherence* is a measure of how internally consistent each topic's key words are [147]. These measures tend to pull in opposite directions: exclusivity is likely to be optimised by increasing the number of topics, whilst semantic coherence can be optimised by decreasing the number of topics [114]. An optimal number of topics for social science research can be found by plotting exclusivity against semantic coherence for a range of k values, and then choosing a value at which neither measure dominates [114]. However, there is no 'right' value for k [107]; the aim is to find a value of k that enables meaningful interpretation [47, 114, 132]. In this instance, as can be seen in Figure 4 in the Appendix, models with k values of around 25 represented an optimal trade off between exclusivity and semantic coherence. After inspection of keywords

associated with each topic and representative questions, the model with a k value of 30 was selected.

4.3 Interpretation of the topic model

To interpret the results of the topic model Yotam Ophir and Dror Walter's [95, 142] three step process was followed. First, I qualitatively interpreted the topics identified through review of the most probable words associated with each topic (Figure 3a). Second, I analysed the relationships between topics by calculating their correlation, with a positive correlation indicating a high likelihood of two topics being found together in the one Stack Exchange question [111, 112]. Third, I used a community detection algorithm to identify clusters of topics and broader themes across the corpus (Figure 3b). In particular, I used the Newman-Girvan method for community structure detection [92], with the result being three clusters of topics. After review of the probable terms associated with topics within each cluster and representative questions, I labeled these clusters: *infrastructure and inter-dependencies*, *data manipulation*, and *model training*. As an additional final step, I made use of STM's ability to calculate the impact of covariates on topic prevalence to analyse the expected proportion of individual topics (Figure 3c) and clusters of topics over time (Figure 3d).

Throughout the above steps I moved between analysis of the topic model itself and deeper review of full Stack Exchange question and answer threads that are representative of particular topics or clusters of topics. Here, I adapted the approach of Paul DiMaggio, Manish Nag, and David Blei [34], who, after training a topic model, identify topics of interest and then undertake analysis of the most representative texts for those topics. In particular, I identified the 10 Stack Exchange questions with the highest probability for each topic, and the 10 questions with the combined highest average probability across topics within each cluster. For these highly representative questions, within each topic cluster I further sorted the questions by their view count on the Stack Exchange forums (Figures 6 - 8 in the Appendix), enabling me to identify questions that were both highly representative of a given topic cluster and highly viewed on the Stack Exchange forum.

5 FINDINGS

The topic model of Stack Exchange questions discussing interactive computing platforms and ML demonstrates that interactive computing platforms are implicated in a wide range of ML practices. ML practices are often conceptualised within a life cycle framework, with stages of ML development moving from problem formulation, to data curation and processing, to model training and evaluation, to model deployment and ongoing monitoring [e.g. 7, 75, 88, 105, 106]. Figure 3a shows the most probable terms associated with each topic, and the expected proportion of each topic across the corpus. Unsurprisingly, given the corpus focus on ICPs, the two topics most widely represented in the dataset—13 and 5—are associated with Google Colab and Jupyter Notebook respectively. The most probable terms for most other topics are associated with many of the ML development stages, particularly data curation and processing (e.g. see key terms for topics 28, 4, and 21), and model training and evaluation (e.g. see key terms for topics 19, 11, 7, and 12). The deeper review of identified topics and representative questions highlights two inter-related themes, which address the study's research question regrading use of ICPs in ML practices: the use of ICPs as *learning laboratories*; and, their role as *coordination hubs* across ML infrastructures.

5.1 Learning laboratories for Machine Learning

Interactive computing platforms serve as ML practice *learning laboratories*: they enable users to experiment with each other's code and publicly-available datasets, learn how code functions through line-by-line interactions, and redeploy code in their own use cases. ICPs are thus part of the sociomaterial context for what Louise Amoore has described as the "*partial, iterative and experimental*" nature of ML practices [4], which is also reflected in Langenkamp and Yue's broader study of open source tools [72].[14]

Figure 1 shows an example of an ICP used as a learning laboratory, drawn from a tutorial for PyTorch, an ML-focused high-level programming language. Figure 2b shows an example of a Stack Overflow question, titled '*Keras, how do I predict after I trained a model?*", which also reflects the use of an ICP as a learning laboratory. This is one of the four most viewed questions from the data manipulation cluster of topics. The author of this question appears to be engaged in a learning practice: they describe themselves as "*playing with*" the dataset, and write that they have "*read about*" saving a trained model, but are now struggling to use the saved model in a prediction task. Not shown in Figure 2b are the community answers the author received.[15] Each answer also includes a code snippet, demonstrating a solution. Similarly, the question "*FailedPreconditionError: Attempting to use uninitialized in Tensorflow*" (Figure 2c), one of the most viewed questions in the model training cluster, includes a code snippet that is "*from the TensorFlow tutorial*", which the author is attempting to use with "*digit recognition data from Kaggle*". In both these questions users' learning is through an ICP, and is focused on understanding how to achieve a specific task using the Application Programming Interface (API) of a particular high-level programming library.

When ML practitioners use interactive computing platforms as learning laboratories they engage in practices of code and data reuse. The author of the Stack Overflow question discussed above notes they are "*playing with the reuters-example dataset*", which is a publicly-available dataset used in topic modelling and text classification tasks [79], and provides a code snippet to illustrate the point at which they require assistance. Within ML practices reuse of publicly available datasets, such as the Reuters dataset for text classification or the ImageNet dataset for computer vision is well documented [32]. Patterns of dataset reuse can be found across the corpus: the Reuters dataset is referend in 11 questions; ImageNet dataset is mentioned in 436 questions; and, the MNIST handwritten digits dataset is mentioned in 834. Indirect evidence of code and data reuse in ML practices can also be found by reviewing the code snippets included in questions in the corpus. As discussed in Section 4, during pre-processing code snippets were isolated from the text of questions on which the topic model was trained. Of all questions, 89.7% include a code snippet. Because the corpus

[14] For an extended description of the relationship between learning practices and digital infrastructures see [49].

[15] The full question, including community provided answers can be seen as: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/37891954/keras-how-do-i-predict-after-i-trained-a-model.

consists of questions about using ICPs, many of these code snippets represent the point at which a user of an ICP has become stuck while trying to attempt to an ML related task. This is illustrated by the question titled "*How to load CSV file in Jupyter?*", shown in Figure 2d. Here, the author of the question has included in the body of their question a screenshot of their Jupyter Notebook. As can be seen, the first cell in this notebook begins with the *import* function, which is how specific programming libraries or sub-libraries are imported into the ICP. In this case, the author has imported *numpy*, a mathematical functions library, and *pandas*, a data analysis library. More broadly, the code snippets included in questions shed light on the substance of code that is entered into ICPs during ML related tasks. By calculating the frequency of the terms that immediately follow the *import* function, widely used programming libraries can be identified (see Figure 5 in the Appendix). Among the 15 most frequently mentioned programming libraries in code snippets are: 'Sequential', 'Dense', and 'Model' (specific components from Keras, a high-level library for deep learning); 'cv2' (a computer vision high-level library); and, 'PyTorch' (an alternative to TensorFlow).

The code snippet in the question titled "*FailedPreconditionError: Attempting to use uninitialized in Tensorflow*", shown in Figure 2c, illustrates the significance of *import* functions for extending the abilities of ICPs both as learning laboratories and more generally. The code snippet includes the line:

$$train\_step = tf.train.GradientDescentOptimizer$$

Across the corpus, 120 questions reference TensorFlow's *GradientDescentOptimizer*. Gradient Descent is a type of optimisation algorithm used during training of a neural network [117]. This line of code enables the user to access the TensorFlow library's operationalisation of gradient descent algorithms through its API—alleviating the need for the user to code their own gradient descent algorithm. While TensorFlow is only one of a number of similar software libraries available, the volume of posts (38.6% of all questions) in the corpus in which TensorFlow is mentioned, and the two most probable terms in topic 15 ('import' and 'tensorflow'), provides some indication of its widespread use in ICPs and ML practices.

5.2 Coordination hubs for ML infrastructures

Assembling an ML workflow is a complex task, requiring coordination of multiple infrastructures. Interactive computing platforms serve as *coordination hubs*, through which networks of infrastructures are assembled to support ML practices. Reflecting this, as shown in Figure 3d, the cluster of topics associated with infrastructure and inter-dependencies accounts for a significantly greater proportion of questions in the corpus than the cluster of topics associated with model training. The most viewed questions within the infrastructure and inter-dependencies cluster reveal the infrastructural coordination that is at the heart of many ML practices.

One of the most viewed questions within the infrastructure and inter-dependencies cluster is titled "*Can I run Keras model on gpu?*" (Figure 2a).[16] Keras is a high-level API designed to support deep learning techniques.[17] Keras is integrated into TensorFlow, and enables users to build a wide range of neural networks—Keras makes it easier and more efficient to complete deep learning tasks within TensorFlow. A GPU—Graphics Processing Unit—is a specialised microprocessor, which in many computing systems works alongside the more general-purpose Central Processing Unit (CPU) microprocessor. Whilst the GPU-CPU arrangement predates the emergence of Deep Learning, it turns out that GPU microprocessors are better suited to performing many of the computations required to train a neural network than CPUs. The author of this question is attempting to assemble a system that consists of a "*Tensorflow backend*" and a "*Keras model*", interacted with through a "*Jupyter notebook*", and run on their computer's GPU. The highest scoring answer recommends installing CUDA, which is an additional parallel programming platform designed to enable GPUs to be used for non-graphics processing tasks, such as model training. This answer provides hyperlinks to additional resources for installing CUDA and checking that TensorFlow is running properly on a GPU. Above this answer are two further user comments also linking to additional resources. As such, the author of this question is assembling a system that involves at least five interdependent layers: GPU, CUDA, TensorFlow, Keras, Juypter Notebook. The author is fortunate, however, as their aim is to train their model within "*36 hours*", which suggests that either they have access to a powerful GPU, or they are training a model with a relatively small dataset (for instance, as part of a learning exercise). In industrial or research settings, training a neural network requires access to much greater compute resources, which requires users to access a cloud resource, such as Amazon Web Services, and adds at least one additional layer of complexity to the system.

The key words associated with topics within the infrastructure and inter-dependencies cluster (shown in Figure 3a) provide an additional perspective on the infrastructural coordination required to support ML tasks. In descending order of representation in the corpus, these topics are: 13, 5, 15, 12, 14, 23, 22, 30, and 10. As already observed, topics 13 and 5 relate to Google Colab and Jupter Notebook, two ICPs. Meanwhile, topic 15 includes 'import' and 'tensorflow' as the two most probable terms. Topic 23 includes 'gpu', 'cpu', and 'cuda' as probable terms. Topic 22 includes 'tensorflow' and 'tpu', which is a reference to Tensor Processing Units, which are a new generation of GPUs specifically designed to support TensorFlow. The presence of these topics, and their close correlations, as shown in Figure 3b, indicate that coordination between infrastructures is widely discussed on Stack Exchange. Finally, Figure 3d shows the expected proportion of topic 13 (Google Colab) compared to topic 5 (Jupyter Notebook) over time. The topic model estimates that since 2017 questions related to Google Colab have increased compared to questions related to Jupyter Notebook. Significantly, a key point of difference between these two platforms is that Google Colab has been designed to integrate directly into Google's cloud compute infrastructure, and is used as the platform of choice in TensorFlow and Keras tutorials.

[16] See https://stackoverflow.com/questions/45662253/can-i-run-keras-model-on-gpu for the full question and its answer thread.

[17] See https://keras.io/ for an introduction to Keras.



(a) Expected distribution of all topics across the corpus, with the most probable word associated with each topic.



(b) Topic correlation network, using the Newman-Girvan method, with a minimum correlation threshold of 0.01.



(c) Comparison of the expected topic proportions in the corpus over time for topics 13 (Colab related questions) and 5 (Jupyter related questions). Dashed lines represent a confidence interval of 0.95.



(d) The expected topic proportions over time, with the three communities identified in Figure 3b treated as groups of topics. Dashed lines represent a confidence interval of 0.95.

Figure 3: Visualisations of the estimated topic model.

6 DISCUSSION

In this study, the intertwining of interactive computing platforms in ML practices was explored. The findings indicate that ICPs are learning laboratories—tools by which users experiment with and learn ML practices through line-by-line interaction with others' code and publicly available datasets, facilitated by the APIs provided by high-level programming languages. The findings show also that ICPs are coordination hubs—sites at which multiple different infrastructures are brought together to support ML practices, such as model training or data processing. Given the role ICPs play as coordination hubs for ML practices, they can be conceptualised as an emerging form of 'digital infrastructure'—an essential and widely participated in sociotechnical system [19, 104]. Conceptualising ICPs in this way enables existing theorising about infrastructures to inform consideration of the sociopolitical significance of ICP use in ML practices, and helps connect ICP use to concerns raised in AI ethics discourse. To illustrate this, in the following subsections I consider how Brian Larkin's review of anthropological practices for studying infrastructure [73] and Susan Leigh Star's description of the properties of infrastructure [130] can apply to ICPs. In each subsection I conclude with a brief reflection on implications for AI ethics discourse.

6.1 An emerging infrastructural relationship

As material objects, Larkin describes infrastructures as "*built networks that facilitate the flow of goods, people, or ideas*" [73, p.328]. At the same time, infrastructures are systems that support the functioning of other objects, and it is these objects that users of an infrastructure experience; we experience hot water, not plumbing [73, p.329]. Star describes this characteristic of infrastructure as 'transparency': for users of an infrastructure, the tasks associated with it seem easy and straightforward—transparent [130]. Star, however, understands infrastructures as relational. Transparency is not an inherent characteristic of a sociotechnical system, but rather a characteristic of an infrastructural relationship between a sociotechnical system and its users.

The topic model of Stack Exchange questions is a snapshot of an emerging infrastructural relationship: as ML practitioners use ICPs as coordination hubs, facilitating flows of data and code across networks of disparate resources (compute capacity, programming languages, datasets, etc.), they are forming an infrastructural relationship with the platform. The platform itself recedes into the background and the objects that the platform enables to function—predictive models—come into the foreground. This is why ICPs excel as learning laboratories for ML. The affordances of the ICP, however, continue to have efficacy even as the platform itself becomes transparent: the affordances enable and constrain users, and in doing so help configure practices associated with the ML techniques that the platform enables [30, 31].

Star's understanding of infrastructures as relational also highlights the relationship between infrastructures and groups: infrastructures are "*learned as part of membership*" [130, p.381]. This conceptualisation of the relationship between infrastructures and group membership appears to align closely to the burgeoning infrastructural relationship between ML practitioners and ICPs. As the topic model interpretation illustrates, ML practitioners learn to use an ICPs as part of the process of becoming 'ML practitioners'. Star highlights that shared use of common infrastructures among practitioners helps reinforce their identity as a distinct group [130]. Non-members, meanwhile, encounter infrastructures as things they need to learn to use in order to integrate into a group. Note, for example, the author's phrasing in the Stack Overflow question shown in Figure 2d: "*I'm new and studying machine learning... I'm getting problems about loading the CSV File into the Jupyter Notebook*". 'ML practitioner' is an ill-defined term frequently used in AI ethics discourse as a catchall for describing the data scientists, software engineers, and product managers who work on the research and development of ML systems. From an infrastructural perspective, however, the term can also be thought of symbolising a new set of infrastructural relations: where previously data scientists, software engineers, etc., each worked within their own suites of tools, increasingly they use shared infrastructure, such as ICPs, enabling the collapsing of distinctions between these professional roles that is indicated in the term 'ML practitioner'.

6.1.1 Implications for AI ethics. A stream of AI ethics research has focused on the development of software and management tools to support ML practitioners (see [88] for an overview). For this stream, ICPs may be a constraint, in so far as tool adoption is often held to be dependent on integration with existing ML infrastructure and practices [e.g. 40, 50]. Alternatively, the affordances of ICPs may offer new opportunities for future tool development. The grammar of ICP interactions may be applied to the design of tools intended to prompt practitioner reflection. The open source Fairlearn library, for example, provides example ICP notebooks[18] to demonstrate library uses.

More broadly, however, as ICPs contribute to the configuring of ML practices, they shape the space in which AI ethics are situated. Here, Britt Paris's [97] reflections on the relationship between Internet infrastructure and constructions of time are instructive. ICPs, like the Internet at large, imagine particular temporal relations. ICPs, in particular, are premised on speed: the staccato call-and-response of user inputs and computer outputs helps configures a working environment in which the value of ML practices resides in their speed and efficiency. In this sense, conceptualising ICPs as ML infrastructure presents as a challenge to calls from AI ethics researchers for greater reflexivity in ML [e.g. 37, 146].

6.2 Visible and invisible infrastructures

As material objects, infrastructures are designed, and reflect, at least in part, the intentions of the designer. Yet, at the same time, infrastructures are "*built on an installed base*", often following paths of development laid down by preceding infrastructures [130, p.382]. And, infrastructures are often caught in circular webs of relations with other infrastructures: computers rely on the electricity grid to function, and the functioning of the modern electricity grid is reliant on computers [73]. Infrastructures therefore cannot be understood in isolation, in the same way that they cannot be designed in isolation. The role ICPs play as coordination hubs reflect this: they are built on top of the networked and decentralised infrastructures of the Internet, programming languages, and computing. In doing so, ICPs augment and extend these pre-existing infrastructures, both following path dependencies established by these infrastructures and charting new paths for future infrastructures [cf. 148].

Larkin highlights that infrastructures also serve a 'poetic' function [73]. Larkin draws on linguist Roman Jakobson's concept of poetics [62], which holds that in some speech acts the palpable qualities of speech (roughly, sound patterns) have primary importance over representational qualities (i.e. meaning). Infrastructures, argues Larkin, can have a poetic function, not reflected in the declared intentions of designers, nor in their technical capabilities [73]. Researchers of infrastructure, then, must take seriously the aesthetic aspects of infrastructure, and consider how infrastructures not only reflect the declared intention of those who build them, but also their (undeclared) interests. Larkin's description of the poetics of infrastructure mirrors Jenna Burrell's critique of blithe descriptions of algorithms as 'opaque', which ignore the ways the appearance of opaqueness in an algorithmic system can reflect the politics of the institutions who operate them [26]. In this context, a significant line of future inquiry pertains to the different politics and interests reflected in the two ICPs identified as widely used by the topic model: Jupyter Notebook and Google Colab.

For Larkin, the aesthetic aspects of infrastructure include the way infrastructures may at times appear transparent or invisible [73]. Here, Larkin takes issue with Star's description of infrastructures

[18] See https://fairlearn.org/v0.8/auto_examples/index.html.

as 'invisible'. Star describes this characteristic of infrastructure as "*becoming visible upon breakdown*" [130, p.382]. By standardising interactions between material objects, users, and other infrastructures, infrastructures become transparent to users, and, when this transparency becomes routine, the infrastructure itself appears invisible. Questions asked on Stack Exchange can thus be interpreted as instances of ML infrastructure becoming visible. To Larkin, however, the claim that infrastructures are invisible can only ever be partially valid: what the affordances of infrastructures make visible and invisible is both an outcome a system's technical capabilities and its poetic functions. Larkin and Star's debate on invisibility thus helps shed light on the mechanism by which ICPs become implicated in the characteristics of ML systems that are developed through their use. As infrastructural systems, ICPs standardise a particular form of presenting and interacting with code—the 'notebook' layout of descriptive and computation cells described in Section 2.2—and this standardisation renders some aspects of ML system development more visible to ML practitioners than others.

Shifts in the aspects of ML system development that are transparent to ML practitioners can have significant impacts on practitioners' understanding of ML technologies. As discussed in Section 5.1, ICPs support iterative experimentation with the APIs of high-level programming languages, which often occurs through probing and re-purposing of code written by others. Iterative experimentation with the API of a high-level programming language, however, is unlikely to reveal the full range of decisions that the creators of an API have made in operationalising a particular ML algorithm or technique. The point of Keras' *Tokenizer* function (shown in the code snippet in the Stack Overflow question in Figure 2b) is that it enables users to convert the text in a corpus into a series of integers ('embeddings'), so that computations (e.g. topic modelling) can be run on the corpus. The function enables users to choose whether or not to convert text to lowercase, but because the function has a default setting, this choice is not necessary—by default any call of the *Tokenizer* function will convert text to lowercase before conversion to numerical form.[19] This may seem inconsequential, but it can have a significant downstream impact: converting a corpus to lowercase means that the verb 'stack' and proper noun 'Stack' will be embedded as semantically identical.

As APIs of high-level programming languages become more sophisticated, particularly as they start to incorporate pre-trained models for common ML tasks (e.g. image classification, object detection and labelling, sentiment detection), the choices obfuscated by the API become more consequential. The TensorFlow Object Detection notebook[20] uses a CenterNet pre-trained model which was trained on the Common Objects in Context dataset [81]. This dataset includes labels for 91 categories of objects, including 'plate', 'cup', 'fork', 'knife', 'spoon', and 'bowl' (but not, for instance, 'chopstick'), and it is these objects that the CenterNet model can detect in images. This sequence of choices, and the constraints each choice imports into the ML system, are not surfaced by experimentation with the API in an ICP; the infrastructural relationship between ML practitioners and ICPs renders transparent code reuse, but leaves detailed code knowledge opaque.

[19] See https://www.tensorflow.org/api_docs/python/tf/keras/preprocessing/text/Tokenizer for the *Tokenizer* documentation.
[20] Accessible at https://www.tensorflow.org/hub/tutorials/tf2_object_detection.

6.2.1 Implications for AI ethics. At stake in AI ethics discourse are questions of legitimacy. Arising from the recognition that code operationalises and reifies particular interpretations of essentially contested social constructs [20, 60, 89] is the challenge of locating where and how coding decisions are currently made, and where they ought to be made. What, if any, categories of gender ought to be included as labels in an image dataset [66]? High-level APIs, interacted with through ICPs, obscure these decisions, and in doing so further entrench them in ML practices: what is unknown to ML practitioners is unquestioned. In this sense, the infrastructural relationship between practitioners and ICPs is an example of social arrangements helping configure ML practices as 'black boxes' [26], and is thus a new challenge to the efforts of AI ethics researchers to embed accountability for decision making in ML development [29].

6.3 Development of infrastructures over time

The role of coordination hub lends ICPs and the web of other infrastructures they are related to (compute resources, code repositories, etc.) a semblance of hierarchical coherence. But, while infrastructures may be presented as coherent, hierarchical structures, they are rarely built or managed in this way. Indeed, Jupyter Notebook began life as an open-source project focused on scientific computing within the Python programming language, before being adopted and adapted by ML practitioners and industry [45]. In this sense, the emergence of ICPs as infrastructure reflects a familiar process of adaptation and translation [cf. 57]. Relevantly, Star highlights that infrastructures are fixed in modular increments [130, p.382], with "*conventions of practice*" co-evolving alongside the development of the infrastructure itself [130]. Here, Elizabeth Shove's work on the co-evolution of infrastructures and practices offers a potential framework by which to explore how ICPs and ML practices co-evolve [124, 125].

Watson and Shove argue that infrastructural relations and practices co-evolve through processes of aggregation and integration [145]. Aggregation refers to "*the ways in which seemingly localised experiences and practices combine and, in combining, acquire a life of their own*" [145, p.2]. Individual ML practitioners, for example, each develop their own approach to coordinating the different layers of infrastructure needed to support ML tasks. However, as individuals share their approaches, and these coalesce into conventions, the conventions themselves shape future infrastructure development. The convention of using GPUs for model training, for example, creates the demand needed to justify the development of more specialised TPUs. Integration refers to ways that policies, processes, and artefacts at the level of the overarching infrastructure are "*brought together in the performance of practices enacted across multiple sites* [145, p.2]. Google, for example, sets various policies regarding the availability of Google's GPU resources to users of Google Colab. These policy decisions (e.g. the decision to offer limited free access to GPUs) in turn are integrated into individual users' ML practices—top-down policy decisions help inform the future development of conventions of practice, but do not determine them. For the field of AI ethics, the framework of aggregation and integration offers a path towards understanding how norms in ML practices, such as the use of particular operationalisations of fairness metrics, co-evolve as a product of both

the integration of particular fairness approaches into high-level programming languages and the aggregation of local approaches to 'managing' ethics issues into shared practices.

6.3.1 Implications for AI ethics. Conceptualising interactive computing platforms as an emerging form of 'digital infrastructure' situates them alongside other digital 'platforms' that have coalesced into infrastructures (e.g. WeChat [101], Facebook [51, 52, 103], and Google [103]). The prominence of these digital infrastructures in mediating contemporary life has led to the development of the platform governance field [43].[21] Platform governance researchers have explored how digital infrastructures attempt to exercise governance over their users, and how digital infrastructures themselves can be more effectively governed. Robert Gorwa, for example, has studied the governance of online content, particularly user-generated content on digital platforms [42]. As Gorwa argues, there is an increasing nexus between AI ethics discourse and platform governance discourse: algorithmic systems, particularly predictive ML systems, are core components of the governance regimes of digital infrastructures [44]. Tarleton Gillespie, for example, critiques the positioning of ML tools as the solution to social media content moderation [41]. ICPs advance this nexus, but in the reverse direction: as the platforms have developed from software tools for scientific computing to general purpose coordination hubs for ML practices they have begun to integrate affordances more commonly associated with digital platforms. Google Colab, for example, integrates directly into Google Drive—a widely used cloud storage and file sharing platform. We can interpret this integration as an effort to cultivate network effects [14]: if I care about sharing my notebook with others, then it makes sense that I will seek out the ICP that integrates directly with the file sharing system most of my colleagues use. But, to the extent that a notebook is 'content', and the extent that this content may include ML models that have been shown to cause significant social harm, ICP operators have so far eluded responsibility for this content. For the field of AI ethics, then, the potential for ICP operators to exercise governance functions over ICP users may be worth further consideration.

7 LIMITATIONS

Conceptually, as Eric Baumer and Micki McGee [11] argue, topic modelling risks using a statistical model of a corpus to speak on behalf of a social group. This risk is compounded by the fact that the social group who generates content that enters a corpus (in this study, people who ask questions on Stack Exchange forums) may not be representative of the social group of interest to the study (here, ML practitioners). Relevantly, among the Stack Overflow user base, as of 2016, only 5.8% of contributors were female [38]. Additionally, while there are versions of Stack Overflow in multiple languages, only the English-language version has been used in this study. As such, future research will need to validate the extent to which the practices identified in this study are representative of ML practitioners.

The focus of Stack Exchange questions also presents a fundamental limitation for studies of ML practitioners. Stack Exchange questions are points of trouble—they represent moments when a user has been unable to complete a task. As such, it may be the case that there are a range of practices that are not represented in the Stack Exchange corpus, simply because they are practices so familiar they do not necessitate asking any questions. Given the discussion on transparency and infrastructures in Section 6.1, this means Stack Exchange questions can only offer a partial account of infrastructural relationships. There are also limitations inherent in the pre-processing and model training process outlined in Section 4.2. In particular, stemming of words may have reduced the semantic depth of the topic model, as may have removal of code snippets from the corpus. The validation of topic models is an ongoing area of research [46, 85]. As this is a preliminary study, no attempt has been made to externally validate the accuracy of the topics identified (e.g. through comparing the latent topics identified by the topic model to coded themes identified by expert human reviewers of the same corpus, as in [86]). More broadly, the approach taken in this study will benefit from complementary qualitative studies to both validate and contextualise findings (e.g. ethnographic studies of practitioners in multiple social contexts [39]).

8 CONCLUSION

Interactive computing platforms, such as Jupyter Notebook and Google Colab, are widely used by ML practitioners. In this paper, I conducted a topic model analysis of user-contributed questions on the Stack Exchange forums related to interactive computing platforms and ML. I found interactive computing platforms are used by ML practitioners in two categories of practices: in learning practices, particularly to support probing and reuse of others' code; and, in coordination practices, to help marshal the various infrastructures needed to enact ML tasks. I argued that these practices constitute an emerging infrastructural relationship between ML practitioners and interactive computing platforms, in which both the platforms and ML practices are co-evolving. I highlighted several consequences of this infrastructuralisation, in terms of configuring the space in which AI ethics operates and responds to, designing interventions in ML practices, making visible the operationalisation in code of social constructs, and the platform power of ICP operators. As the ML field advances, a pressing issue is therefore the relationship between the social context ICPs form part of and the characteristics of ML systems that are developed. Tracing these relations is critical for resisting the enclosure of AI ethics by a set of social arrangements that may themselves be contributing to the production and deployment of harmful ML systems.

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A LIST OF TAGS USED IN QUERY OF THE STACK EXCHANGE DATA DUMP

Interactive computing platform tags: colab, google-colaboratory, ipython, ipython-notebook, ipywidgets, jupyter, jupyter-lab, jupyter-notebook, jupyterhub, pyspark.

Machine Learning tags: artificial-intelligence, backpropagation,

caffe, classification, cnn, computer-vision, conv-neural-network, convolutional-neural-network, deep-learning, feature-selection, image-processing, keras, lstm, machine-learning, machine-learning-model, neural-network, neural-networks, nlp, nltk, opencv, optimization, predictive-modelling, predictive-models, pytorch, random-forest, regression, scikit-learn, spacy, stanford-nlp, svm, tensorflow, tensorflow2.0.

B TOPIC MODEL VISUALISATIONS



Figure 4: Exclusivity vs Semantic Coherence for a range of models trained on the Machine Learning in interactive computing platforms dataset.



Figure 5: The 15 most frequently mentioned programming libraries imported in code snippets in questions about interactive computing platforms and ML on the Stack Exchange forums.

C REPRESENTATIVE QUESTIONS BY TOPIC CLUSTER



Figure 6: Most viewed questions: infra. & inter-dependencies cluster.



Figure 7: Most viewed questions: data manipulation cluster.



Figure 8: Most viewed questions: model training cluster.

"☑ Fairness Toolkits, A Checkbox Culture?" On the Factors that Fragment Developer Practices in Handling Algorithmic Harms

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ABSTRACT

Fairness toolkits are developed to support machine learning (ML) practitioners in using algorithmic fairness metrics and mitigation methods. Past studies have investigated practical challenges for toolkit usage, which are crucial to understanding how to support practitioners. However, the extent to which fairness toolkits impact practitioners' practices and enable reflexivity around algorithmic harms remains unclear (i.e., distributive unfairness beyond algorithmic fairness, and harms that are not related to the outputs of ML systems). Little is currently understood about the root factors that fragment practices when using fairness toolkits and how practitioners reflect on algorithmic harms. Yet, a deeper understanding of these facets is essential to enable the design of support tools for practitioners. To investigate the impact of toolkits on practices and identify factors that shape these practices, we carried out a qualitative study with 30 ML practitioners with varying backgrounds. Through a mixed within and between-subjects design, we tasked the practitioners with developing an ML model, and analyzed their reported practices to surface potential factors that lead to differences in practices. Interestingly, we found that fairness toolkits act as double-edge swords — with potentially positive and negative impacts on practices. Our findings showcase a plethora of human and organizational factors that play a key role in the way toolkits are envisioned and employed. These results bear implications for the design of future toolkits and educational training for practitioners and call for the creation of new policies to handle the organizational constraints faced by practitioners.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies** → **Machine learning**; • **Human-centered computing** → **Empirical studies in HCI**; *User interface toolkits.*

KEYWORDS

algorithmic harms, algorithmic fairness, practices, organisational factors, human factors, fairness toolkits

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1 INTRODUCTION

It is now well-known that machine learning (ML) applications employed for decision-making might cause or reinforce distributive unfairness and other harms [3, 67, 69, 73, 100]. As a result, over the years, a great amount of theoretical research in ML has focused on conceptually understanding potential harms and on developing algorithmic methods to build ML systems that are less harmful [28, 100]. These methods, better known as algorithmic fairness metrics and unfairness mitigation methods, have lately been packaged into various *fairness toolkits* [6, 10, 23, 87, 97] to make it easier for their adoption by those who develop ML models (ML practitioners). A parallel line of research has investigated the practices of these ML practitioners, studying how they make use of proposed methods and what challenges they face. These studies are extremely important to understand how to further support practitioners.

Considering that the fairness toolkits are becoming a defacto standard means of tackling questions pertaining to algorithmic fairness[1] and potentially of teaching "ethical ML" to practitioners [13, 65], it is important to understand the extent to which practitioners rely on such toolkits, and whether and how toolkits shape their practices. Addressing this knowledge gap is a crucial step towards questioning the broad impact of fairness toolkits. A majority of past studies [24, 45, 57, 60, 77, 84, 85, 99] that have focused on the practices and challenges of practitioners in using the fairness toolkits have already identified a number of limitations of the toolkits in terms of design and technical specifications, that might hinder their adoption. However, such studies fall short in two major ways.

Fairness toolkits allow one to implement algorithmic methods for handling algorithmic unfairness. Yet, it is now well understood that these methods bear conceptual limitations [3, 43, 52, 58, 69, 88, 102]. Algorithmic unfairness observed in the outputs of an ML system is only a simplified representation of distributive unfairness in the world (what the metrics aim at quantifying), mitigation methods might themselves cause harm or not address the root causes of

[1] https://www.borealisai.com/research-blogs/industry-analysis-ai-fairness-toolkits-landscape/; https://www2.deloitte.com/de/de/pages/risk/solutions/ai-fairness-with-model-guardian.html

distributive unfairness, and other harms (beyond distributive unfairness) caused or reinforced by the use of ML systems are not accounted for by this framework (e.g., the purpose of the system itself might considered harmful, independently of the system's outputs being fair or not)[2]. None of the studies around practices and toolkits has however investigated how ML practitioners might conceive and overcome these limitations. It is especially unclear whether the toolkits narrow down practitioners' activities towards algorithmic unfairness and broader harms. These insights are necessary to envision where to focus future research efforts in terms of algorithmic harms beyond algorithmic fairness.

Additionally, prior studies do not report on differences of practices and challenges across practitioners, and the factors that cause these differences. Yet, identifying these differences, and grounding these differences into the *factors* that impact the fragmentation would allow one to identify the root causes of potential flawed practices and of certain challenges. This would allow one to envision more appropriate future solutions. In other words, explicitly looking into factors would allow one to answer the following questions: should fairness toolkits be our object of study to foster practices for handling algorithmic harms, i.e., are toolkits really the most important factor that supports and impacts practices around algorithmic harms (they would be if we would find a coherent set of practices across practitioners using a toolkit in comparison to those who do not)? Or are they only technical mediators of practices, that are impacted by deeper factors beyond the availability and design of the tool?

Hence, in this study, we ask the following two research questions: 1) How effective are toolkits in enabling practitioners to reflect about algorithmic harms and to handle them? 2) Which are the factors that affect the (in)effectiveness of toolkits in shaping practitioners' practices around algorithmic harms?

In order to answer these questions, we conduct 30 semi-structured interviews[3] with practitioners of various backgrounds. We compare practices before and after a practitioner is introduced to a fairness toolkit (within-subject experiment), and practices between practitioners who do not use a fairness toolkit to those who do (between-subject experiment), in order to understand the potential role of toolkits in shaping up practices. Besides, we further analyse qualitatively the interviews, and compare practices across practitioners, and across the two toolkits selected for this study, in order to identify potential additional factors that might impact practices.

For the participants of our study, we find that toolkits do increase awareness and use of algorithmic methods towards algorithmic fairness, do not impact considerations of algorithmic harms, yet can foster a checkbox culture with absence of reflexivity around the limitations of algorithmic fairness. More than solely toolkits, we also find that various human factors, such as types of training, and psychological and socio-demographic traits, as well as contextual factors, and especially organisational incentives, interact to shape up how practitioners make use of the toolkit, how reflexive they are around the limitations, and whether they conceive and tackle broader algorithmic harms. These factors, while they have been mentioned scatteredly across research publications that deal with perceptions of algorithmic harms [47] or the governance models of organizations around algorithmic fairness [84], had not been analyzed in detail in terms of their impact on the practices for the development of ML systems (with harms in mind). We then further discuss the implications that our findings bear when fostering reflexivity among practitioners towards avoiding algorithmic harms, e.g., in the form of design guidelines for fairness toolkits, as well as educational programs, and for further enforcing policy efforts towards making algorithmic systems less harmful.

[2]In the remaining of the paper, we use *algorithmic harms* to refer to any harm that ML systems might cause or reinforce, among which are *distributive unfairness* harms (related to the unfair ways in which resources are allocated following the recommendations made by the outputs of an ML system). We use *algorithmic unfairness* to refer to the limited conceptualisation of distributive unfairness in the lens of algorithmic metrics and methods developed by the scientific community.

[3]All our materials, resulting data, code and analysis will be shared publicly. https://osf.io/dmr82/?view_only=a00e68796f494fbb9776cf9a95fb7051

2 RELATED WORK

2.1 Fairness Toolkits for dealing with Algorithmic Unfairness

2.1.1 Algorithmic Unfairness. Each step of the machine learning (ML) lifecycle might create or reinforce *distributive unfairness* [67, 94]. Theoretical works have primarily developed *algorithmic fairness* metrics [100] that aim at measuring distributive unfairness in the outputs of the final model or in a dataset. These works also propose algorithmic unfairness mitigation methods [4, 28] that ought to improve the model's algorithmic fairness as defined by the metrics. Facing the diversity of metrics, the challenge for a practitioner is to choose the appropriate one for their task.

Several studies have investigated how ML practitioners work with algorithmic fairness metrics and mitigation methods. Topics of focus revolve around general challenges met by practitioners [22, 45, 60, 71, 74, 77, 84, 89, 99, 103], and obstacles and limitations for the application of algorithmic fairness methods. Findings outline the need to support practitioners to concretely use fairness methods, as this use is challenging due to the context dependence of methods, the current lack of guidance [45, 60], and the need for adapting methods that are incompatible with targeted tasks [45].

2.1.2 Effectiveness of Fairness Toolkits. To facilitate the adoption of algorithmic fairness metrics and mitigation methods, various companies and public institutions have built fairness toolkits. These toolkits are typically code repositories that allow for an easier implementation of the metrics and methods. Examples of these toolkits are FairLearn [10], AIF360 [6], Aequitas [87], Themis-ML [5], ML-Fairness Gym [23], TensorFlow Fairness Indicators [107], etc.

Various works [24, 57, 85] have shown through interviews the beneficial use of toolkits by practitioners for developing fair models and learning about algorithmic fairness. Yet, they also show their limitations in terms of support provided to practitioners for designing the right algorithmic fairness evaluation, noting that participants often inappropriately change their modeling task definition to fit existing tools. These works also identify obstacles to the application of the toolkits in terms of compatibility with other ML frameworks and usability, summarized into toolkit checklists that should inform the design of future toolkits. We will show that our results corroborate and complement these insights. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to investigate

(or report) whether the toolkits do impact practices contrary to a situation where no toolkit would be available, whether there are differences in practices of different practitioners using a same toolkit, or whether different toolkits lead to different practices.

2.2 Fairness Toolkits for reflecting on Harms Beyond Algorithmic Unfairness

2.2.1 Algorithmic Harms. A few theoretical works have looked beyond algorithmic fairness to identify other harms of ML [3, 69]. We now present a few of these harms that are highly worthy of consideration according to the literature. Algorithmic fairness metrics and methods bear conceptual limitations, that do not allow one to comprehensively gauge the distributive unfairness they are aimed at addressing. By limiting harms to the frame of output distributions (also termed distributive justice fairness), algorithmic fairness cannot reflect the contextual factors that influence what is considered fair. For instance, it assumes that parity is always desired in the model outputs [58], it does not account for the impact one same output has on different receivers of this output [69], nor for the indirect impact on non-data subjects [52]. Looking at the process to reach algorithmic fairness (termed procedural justice), the metrics and mitigation methods do not make sure that the way in which the unfair situation is addressed is aligned with moral principles [102]. For instance, individuals or groups might see low disparate accuracy by all receiving unjustified treatment [72], or by all being treated differently (e.g., post-processing methods allocate different decision thresholds for different groups) which consists in direct discrimination [35].

Three other categories of harms have also been discussed. First, ML requires to use *datasets* whose schemas and sampling can be harmful. For instance, certain attributes and their values might be offensive [11, 108] or inappropriate [67], e.g., use of non-volitional or privacy-infringing attributes [39, 95]. Second, research questions the *desirability of the ML model* in the first place, its use for undesired applications [46, 48, 69, 70], and how it impacts structures in place [27]. Using ML for certain tasks might be questioned, for instance because it means making decisions for people by comparing them to others instead of following the principle of individual justice [9, 26], or because it reproduces historical, potentially harmful, data patterns [81]. Third, certain researchers question the *negative externalities caused by the production process* of ML applications, such as the environmental impact of data centers and model training [7, 17], the poor labor conditions of crowd workers [86, 105, 109, 111], the privacy-infringing training data [82], etc.

2.2.2 Effectiveness of Fairness Toolkits. Besides investigating the effectiveness of toolkits in enabling reflexivity around algorithmic unfairness, it is important to acknowledge the known limitations of the algorithmic fairness methods and the existence of other algorithmic harms that ML systems might pose. To the best of our knowledge, no work has investigated practices in relation to these limitations. We do not know to what extent the use of fairness toolkits —that foster the use of the algorithmic fairness methods— impacts considerations of algorithmic harms and of the limitations of algorithmic fairness (that are typically obfuscated from the toolkits). It is unclear whether fairness toolkits, that do not deal with these harms, might lead practitioners to "forget" them.

2.3 Factors Affecting the Usage of Toolkits

The effectiveness of fairness toolkits in enabling reflexive practices among ML practitioners around algorithmic unfairness and harms is conditioned by factors that shape the usage of these toolkits. Research into the characterization of these factors is still scarce. It is important to understand which factors make practitioners choose one metric or the other, and more broadly, to identify the factors that impact the decision of practitioners to try quantify unfairness, and later to mitigate it. The factors that lead a practitioner to handle broader algorithmic harms have also not been investigated in the past. Knowledge of these factors could allow one to better understand the deeper nature of the challenges faced by practitioners, and to provide more personalised support to these practitioners.

Up to now, studies have solely identified organisational factors, that are further shown to be obstacles for practitioners to develop fair models [60, 62, 84, 99]. Contrary to our work, previous studies had not accounted for human factors in their study design or in their result analysis, such as Deng et al. [24] who only reported on coarser-grain practices (e.g., they reported that the practitioners they interviewed recognize the limitations of their knowledge and wish to receive help from domain experts, but do not specify any difference across these practitioners). In our study, we find such factors, and also investigate the existence of technical ones.

3 METHODOLOGY

To characterize the effectiveness of fairness toolkits in enabling reflexive practices, and to identify the factors that might impact and fragment those practices, we adopted an empirical and qualitative approach via 30 semi-structured interviews with ML practitioners. By comparing practices within-subjects (participants are observed before and after receiving an introduction to fairness toolkits), we observe the extent to which toolkits enable or hinder reflexivity. Additionally, by comparing practices in-between subjects who bear different characteristics (e.g., background and prior experiences) and who use different toolkits, we characterize the fragmentation and delve further into the contributing factors.

3.1 Participants

We recruited our participants in the period of April-June 2022, by means of personal networks, targeted requests on social media, calls for participation on the official Discord or Slack communication channels of the toolkits, LinkedIn, and snowball sampling. The participants received no financial compensation, and their contributions were voluntary (they typically participated to learn more about algorithmic harms, and to help science progress). Our institution's ethics committee approved the study. All participants signed an informed consent form acknowledging the risks involved with participating, as well as agreeing to the interview being recorded (all interviews were conducted online), transcribed, anonymized, destroyed, and consented to the results being used in scientific publications.

A total of 30 participants were recruited across research and industry institutions, and across application domains such as healthcare, finance, and predictive maintenance (cf. supplementary material). Manual sampling was performed to make sure that all participants have responsibilities in ML model development, deployment,

or evaluation; varying levels of prior experience with ML, ranging from 2 to 15 years; and varying practical experience with algorithmic fairness and fairness toolkits (11 participants already had experience with FairLearn, and 9 with AIF360). The resulting participants differ in terms of demographic background (nationality, gender, and age), level of highest education, educational background, and type of training received around ML. Besides, participants already experienced with algorithmic fairness presented variations in terms of how they learned about the topic, the kind of experience they have had, and for how long they have worked with these issues (from 0 to 18 years).

3.2 Interview Procedure

The interviews with participants already familiar with a toolkit lasted one hour each, going through Task T1. The interviews with the other participants lasted around two hours each, through three stages (Task T1, a tutorial about one fairness toolkit, and Task T2). These three stages were designed to identify how the use of toolkits might impact practices around algorithmic harms. Comparing practices between participant groups with or without prior familiarity with the toolkits allowed us to unveil other influential factors, such as the type of training received around harms. In total, we collected 2207 minutes of recording. In Figure 1, we show the workflow of the interviews with the questions asked in each stage, for the two kinds of participants. We asked three types of questions: background experience questions (demographics, experience with ML and algorithmic fairness); reflection questions around algorithmic fairness, harms, or toolkits, and around general comments, wishes, doubts, and challenges the participants might have about their workflow or harms; and process questions to understand the reasoning behind each participant's activities during the tasks (cf. supplementary material for details on tutorial and questions).



Figure 1: Interview procedure for the participants already experienced with a fairness toolkit, and for the participants who did not have any prior practical experience with algorithmic fairness. In blue: the main steps of the procedure; in orange: the questions posed in each step.

3.3 Materials

Use-Cases. We chose two use-cases, the first one involving the prediction of *hospital readmissions* within 30 days for individual patients [93], referred to as Task T1, and the other involving the prediction of low or high *medical services utilization* [42], referred to as Task T2. Using these tasks instead of discussing the participants' own use-cases was important to be able to rigorously compare practices over the same case and to surface the factors that impact practices for a same use-case. We pre-processed the two corresponding datasets for them to have similar characteristics (number of attributes and of records), and to be prone to similar harms (cf. supplementary material). By employing comparable domains and datasets without re-using the exact same use-case for the two tasks of the interviews, we aimed to minimize learning effects. We chose the domain of healthcare because it is prone to various harms, requires expertise to be handled correctly (i.e., we could check whether the participants mentioned the limits of their knowledge [24]), several corresponding datasets were available, and these are not the most frequent use-cases in the algorithmic fairness literature which allows us to minimize the confounding effect of familiarity with the domain of application. Our choice also allows us to mimic a realistic situation, where oftentimes, practitioners have to develop or deploy models without having extensive expertise in the domain of application. In such cases, practitioners' decisions might lead to harms, that fairness toolkits are meant to empower practitioners to reflect about.

Tasks, Toolkits, and Notebooks. For each task, we shared a Google Colab notebook with the participants, which included a design brief with one of the two datasets pre-loaded. The design brief mentioned that a hospital (or an insurance company) wanted to optimize their cost and services (or their prices), and therefore wanted to investigate whether ML could help them predict readmissions (or utilization, respectively). The institution tasked the participant to investigate this feasibility possibly using the dataset they had collected, and to report on their findings by speaking outloud. Along the investigation, when participants mentioned some code-based exploration, we shared corresponding code snippets prepared before the interviews to speed up the process.

For the interviews with practitioners who had used a fairness toolkit in the past or with the ones we introduced to a toolkit, we loaded a specific toolkit (FairLearn [10], or IBM AIF360 [6]) into the notebook, that they were most familiar with. We consider these toolkits because they contain a large number of functionalities around algorithmic fairness; they are the most studied toolkits in research [24, 57] and appear to be popular among practitioners. Cf. supplementary material for details about our interview materials.

Analysis of the Transcripts. We analysed the transcripts using a combination of inductive and deductive coding. The first author identified the segments discussing the main themes we wished to discuss (e.g., the harms, their conceptions, identification, and handling, and toolkit use), and coded any other emerging themes (e.g., other factors that practitioners trade-off when developing ML models) in collaboration with four other researchers. Then, the author in discussion with the other authors, reconciled redundant codes. Finally, this first author studied each of these codes based on their associated participants. While we cannot certainly identify which factors cause observed variations in terms of conceptions and practices based on our qualitative study, certain practitioners explicitly mentioned potential factors that we report. We also explore quantitative differences based on the background information we have about the practitioners (yet, all the factors are impacting practices in different ways, that we cannot explore within our study).

4 RESULTS

4.1 On the Effectiveness of Toolkits

In terms of algorithmic unfairness, practitioners reported the toolkits to be extremely useful for them to quantify and mitigate unfairness, what was confirmed by our observations. Yet, we also identify drawbacks of the toolkits for distributive unfairness, that we describe next. In terms of algorithmic harms beyond distributive unfairness, we did not note any evidence of positive or negative impact of the toolkits on practitioners' considerations and practices.

4.1.1 Effectiveness of Toolkits. Among toolkit-inexperienced practitioners, toolkits fostered a positive shift in practices around algorithmic fairness between task T1 and their introduction in task T2. Before being introduced to the toolkits (T1), it was not natural for the practitioners to reflect about algorithmic fairness. After our tutorial (T2), they began discussing potential unfairness caused by the outputs of their models and trade-offs between different fairness metrics and with accuracy, to judge which model is satisfactory (even if superficially on occasion). They also started envisioning approaches to mitigate the potential issues with the outputs. Hence, toolkits, for these practitioners, represent a means to foster awareness around distributive unfairness and its causes. *P19: "Just seeing how it worked, made me realize that it's not only about the dataset, but there's bias everywhere."* It also represents a means to learn about existing solutions to mitigate unfairness, and a prompt to start actively tackling the issue (being readily-available code repositories, toolkits lower the entry-barrier to the problem). *P17: "If it's quick and easy, run a quick check. 'Oh, there is something there I didn't think of. I need to explore that.' I could see that happening."*

As for toolkit-experienced practitioners, they primarily use toolkits to speed-up their processes around algorithmic fairness, and to foster communication with other stakeholders. *P11: "I talk to business people and this is how they can connect to this topic from the technical side because they can't code or anything."*

4.1.2 Undesirable Consequences of Toolkits: Reducing Harms to Algorithmic Fairness. Despite their perceived utility, toolkits can be misleading, and create a gateway to a narrow view on distributive justice. 6 out of 10 participants who were inexperienced with fairness, 4 out of 9 relatively more experienced ones, and 2 out of 11 very experienced ones took the toolkits at face value. They applied all fairness metrics available through the toolkits without considering their meaning and appropriateness, declared a model satisfying if certain values of (often arbitrarily picked) fairness metrics were reached (sometimes operating a non-informed balance between accuracy and fairness metrics) without reflecting on their limitations. *P13: "With the use of toolkit, I don't think my view changed. [Before having the toolkit,] I already believed in what the techniques could do. So if the toolkit correctly implements techniques, I have faith in it."*

55% of practitioners who were more experienced with fairness explicitly expressed concerns surrounding the toolkits. Toolkits might narrow down critical thinking around what is measured in relation to distributive fairness and be misleading, limit reflections on broader socio-technical concepts, and foster techno-solutionism triggered by the development of unfairness mitigation methods. *P22: "You cannot rely on the toolkit. You need to understand the problem and the domain knowledge. I can easily see these toolkits like before metrics like precision, recall were just thrown at random without knowing the actual meaning. Things like statistical parity difference, as they become more common, I can see them being misused because a lot of people don't even know their definitions. It's easy for people to misinterpret them."* Practitioners also felt that toolkits encode biases in their setup. *P23: "These libraries can introduce some biases that you are not aware of, so you don't need to put all the chances on those libraries, you should look into data yourself to see what type of bias data contains."* All in all, toolkits might illegitimately serve as a checkbox. *P3: "Fairness for many companies is just a small checkbox, and sometimes people put their mark without any question. I hope there will be a time when they understand that fairness is not about code and just picking up one toolbox. [..] The toolkits would constrain your view if you're using them blindly."* This is in direct contradiction with the way a few participants perceive the toolkit as an opportunity to realize and convey the complexity of the distributive justice problem *P21: "The recurring theme of our conversation is that fairness is difficult, and this realisation is what the toolkits achieve. They give a large variety of options to make fair models, but their biggest positive impact is helping practitioners realize that this is not a topic where we just do the same five steps and we have a fair model, but it's something that requires a lot of consideration."* This is evidence that beyond the toolkit itself, there are additional factors that impact practices –we discuss them next.

4.1.3 Technical Factors: Differences across Toolkits. We do not find any notable difference in the conceptions of harms between practitioners who used different toolkits, irrespective of their experience with fairness. While in practice some functionalities (metrics and mitigation methods) are only supported by one of the toolkits, this did not appear to be a major obstacle to the practitioners, who seemed to use other methods when needed (some practitioners also mentioned having to design novel methods to tackle their problems). This could however potentially be dangerous for beginner practitioners who learn about algorithmic fairness solely through the toolkits, and may revert to sub-optimal metrics and methods.

Practitioners did mention factors that impact the adoption of toolkits: compatibility with existing frameworks and code, frequency of maintenance and open source nature, ease of adoption and learning curve, transparent implementation and documentation, amount of functionalities and adaptability to various use-cases, and socio-technical questions the toolkits foster (cf. supplementary material for details about these factors and the others we identify). Interestingly, these mainly refer to non-functional requirements. While practitioners agree on these requirements, the evaluation of the satisfaction of a requirement for a toolkit was sometimes contradictory across practitioners when choosing one toolkit over the other (oftentimes, practitioners did not know both toolkits, but used similar arguments for explaining the choice of one over the other), e.g., they mentioned choosing AIF360 or FairLearn both because of their compatibility with existing coding frameworks.

4.2 Human Factors

Finding out that the toolkits are not the only factor that substantially fragments practices, we turn to the human factors and the specificities of each practitioner to understand observed variations.

4.2.1 Experience in Algorithmic Harms. As already mentioned, the amount of prior experience with algorithmic fairness (which includes experience with fairness toolkits) seem to impact practices on average. Relatively inexperienced practitioners typically think of fewer harms and reflect on issues with less critical attitude, and more often solely relying on their intuition, than the more experienced practitioners. Most participants who are just entering the realm of distributive fairness through a toolkit are not very critical about algorithmic fairness. *P20: "Using it this way seems to be one of the best ways, taking into account what I knew before, and what I learned today about the toolkit."* They become more critical if they accumulate more practical experience and knowledge by further exploring the toolkits' guidelines. Hence, more than the mere amount of experience, the type of prior experience with algorithmic fairness is a factor that seems to strongly impact practices. For instance, practices among the most experienced practitioners do vary, with some also relying solely on sometimes flawed intuitions (e.g., removing samples with missing values always improves the ML model performance), while others systematically involved external sources of information and rigorous computations (e.g., other stakeholders, laws, guidelines, business) and potentially make use of statistical tests.

4.2.2 Ways of Learning about Algorithmic Harms.

Types of Interactions with Others. The practitioners who displayed a more critical attitude discussed having learned about distributive fairness through interactions with various stakeholders. For instance, half of the participants who have learned about the metrics primarily through the code and 70% of the inexperienced participants who only briefly learned about the metrics during our interview discussed observing all metrics without reflecting on their meaning, while all the ones who have had more interactions with the research community (7 participants) or other interdisciplinary teams (3 participants) judged choices based on use-cases. These interactions (discussions, workshops, and conferences) often involve colleagues, clients, or researchers in AI ethics that highlight potential limitations and critical attitude to keep, or illustrate the subjectivity of the topic. *P3: "We invited one developer of FairLearn to run workshops. Her message was clear: you can ingrain fairness in code, but if you don't understand what you're doing, you will be in the world where we are already."* Similarly to previous results showing that discussions can positively impact fairness considerations [66, 79], the participants we introduced to the toolkits also mentioned the benefits of our discussion (to make them conscious of potential harms and of the limitations of their own, often non-critical practices), more than the one of the toolkits. *P20: "[Do you feel like your perspective on algorithmic harms changed after after seeing the toolkit?] Yes, I mean more after this discussion altogether. I personally wouldn't have taken some of them into account myself if I weren't pointed in the right direction by your questions."* Our participants reflected about the choice of fairness metrics and mitigation methods, once we explicitly prompted them about specific use-cases and actual meaning of different choices. *P28: "You also mentioned proxy. And I realized that just protecting some variables doesn't mean that you have removed completely that bias."*

Types of Courses. Other practitioners learn about various harms and algorithmic fairness by reading literature (e.g., P9 mentions the diagram from the Algorithmic Justice League) or by following courses on ML in general, on AI ethics, or on ethics of technology. The way the course is taught seems to impact practices, as one practitioner discussed having been trained through use-cases and was able to identify a number of harms, while four others mentioned a few ML ethics courses with toolkits introduced during the courses but did not reflect on any harm during the interview.

Importance of the Design of the Learning Material. While practitioners learn and develop their experience with ML and algorithmic harms via various means, leading to various practices, they also seem to interpret differently the same material, sometimes leading to misconceptions. While we discuss in a later subsection relevant human factors, we emphasize here the importance of the framing of the materials around harms. For instance, certain initiatives, although having a legitimate aim —warning against issues or proposing relevant approaches— sometimes had the inverse effects, and narrowed down the view of the practitioners towards related harms. This was especially the case for the recent "data first" approach advertised by different research communities [2], that led certain practitioners not to understand that model design might also create algorithmic unfairness; *P22 "I talk about the data quality first like Dr. Andrew Ng says. Data-driven ML is becoming very prominent."* Similarly, P9, P16, P23 learned about model energy-consumption issues by reading the "Stochastic Parrot" paper [7], leading them to acknowledge these issues solely for large language models, but not for other types of simpler ML models.

Next to the framing of harms, the vocabulary employed (e.g., "bias", "sensitive feature", "protected attribute") also revealed to be a source of confusion and flawed practices. For instance, certain fairness-inexperienced practitioners only conceived "biases" as statistical skews without relations to, e.g., sensitive attributes or harms *P30 "with medical instruments, for a specific machine, there is some specific noise in the data. If you know which machine measured the blood pressure, then you know the bias in the data."* Some expert practitioners even warned about issues with loaded terms.

4.2.3 Disciplinary Experience.

ML Experiences. The amount of experience with ML also seem to be an impacting factor for practices around algorithmic harms. We observed that practitioners who have longer experience with ML (independently of having experience or not with algorithmic harms) reflect about more harms, more in-depth, and often envision more diverse mitigation methods than less experienced practitioners. For instance, three of those practitioners without experience around fairness were able to envision potential harms from the model design, and naturally evaluated the model based on subgroups of population without knowing the concept of equalized odd, whereas practitioners relatively inexperienced in ML with some algorithmic fairness training often did not account for this. Three participants who had extensive experience with data science but were inexperienced with fairness and three mildly experienced ones were also more critical about the toolkits. *P18: "You always need to question existing tools and practices to be able to improve and innovate."*

Experiences with other Fields. Three practitioners who have not only studied ML or data science emphasized the potential benefits of their background: a participant trained as an ethicist; another trained in industrial design *P1: "This is my industrial engineering background talking. Let's map out the process to see, if we would be using a model, where it would fit in the current process and what requirements might be there? Is this supposed to be a fully automated system? How are people going to use this system? [..] For that, I talk to people. Can you imagine yourself saying that? [sarcastic remark about computer scientists]"*; and a last one in sociology *P29: "that's why they hired me: someone who's both good on the computer science side and on this sociology side."* These participants indeed identified more relevant harms and presented a more critical attitude towards their own activities, reinforcing the importance of involving multiple stakeholders with a diversity of backgrounds when the ML practitioners themselves do not have the relevant education.

4.2.4 Personal Factors. As we hinted at earlier, practitioners might behave differently even when presenting similar prior training and experience, within similar contexts. This hints at the existence of additional human factors that impact practices. Especially, non-volitional, socio-demographic factors were explicitly reported by practitioners as drivers of certain practices, such as gender, nationality, and culture that impact their ways of perceiving harms. Belonging to a minority might also change the lived experiences and efforts put onto harm mitigation. *P13: "I felt my obligation because I participate in many unprivileged classes. So I would like another person to do it for me."*

Although not always directly observable via our interviews, other factors (e.g., psychology traits, abilities, and the resulting personal interests) appeared to be at play. For instance, when asking the practitioners to envision potential limitations of fairness metrics and mitigation methods, many of them could neither envision any conceptual one, nor see the potential risks of distribution shifts (that is a more technical and well-known topic –mentioned by only 20% of the participants). Similarly, when we prompted the participants to reflect broadly about their approaches, many did not envision or acknowledge any potential limitation. Yet, some participants showed more reflexivity, accurately recognized being biased and having to make subjective, uninformed choices, and acknowledged the complexity and subjectivity of the choices they make. *P20: "I'm sure that there is a possibility to create bias if I create features based on my interpretation of the data or what I think in my subconscious about people that get ill."* A few (also recognized not really knowing the potential impact but potentially keeping the benefice of the doubt. *P4: "For hyperparameters like learning rate, I can't see the connection with how it might harm people because it just influences accuracy. But I'm hesitant to say it doesn't affect it at all because you never know with these things, so you should always be cautious."*

4.3 Contextual Factors

Along the interviews, practitioners also mentioned a number of organisational factors that represent obstacles or impetus towards handling questions of algorithmic harms.

4.3.1 Incentives and Support. Several participants discussed monetary incentives (financial compensation) and non-monetary incentives and opportunities (possibility to get dedicated time for investigating harms), or the lack thereof, provided by their organization, that impact their considerations and actions. *P14: "the challenge is that, from a legality compliance and the organization perspectives, the appreciation should be there for you to spend the time."* Several participants mentioned engaging in volunteer work in their organization, in order to setup trainings and tools for tackling harms, or directly investigate harms for their own ML projects.

Others also reported on the material support (or the lack thereof) provided to them to facilitate tackling algorithmic harms. They especially mentioned the access to convenient tools (such as the fairness toolkits), and education around the topic (e.g., via the participation to workshops and seminars ordered by the organisation). Human support was also reported, especially the facilitation of the access to various relevant stakeholders (e.g., domain experts, decision-subjects, researchers) who might be able to give indication on the existence of potential harms and the way to solve them.

4.3.2 Procedural Obligations. Procedural obligations were also reported by participants, as wishes to foster algorithmic harm considerations. In terms of requirements or guidelines for the ML system to be built, they reported that, oftentimes, the organisation did not specify any harm-related requirement, and that certain requirements would come in opposition to the mitigation of harms (due to existing impossibility results; limited access to data, e.g., due to cost, etc.) —a clear hindrance towards harm mitigation. For instance, P16 and P19 described that their decision to develop a system is based primarily on the system's usefulness (time and cost saved) for the business that requires it, leaving out questions about harms towards data subjects *P16: "It's appropriate and relevant for the business. They want to save money or to reduce time of work."* Subjective norms (the vision that the society might have on the organisation, or the belief that the organisation has on the way of handling harms of other organisations) also played a role in the establishment of requirements by the organisation. In certain cases, it made the organisation push the practitioners towards investigating harms, while in other cases it refrained them to do so —for instance, P13 mentioned that if the public knew about a certain harm mitigation approach, they would not accept the ML system deployment *P13: "[talking about post-processing methods that flip certain model outputs] They imply a bias in the process. It would be a problem for the company to say that they are doing this: if I am a company and I am saying publicly that I am imputing bias on my model, how would society react to it?"*

Next to inexistent, ambiguous, or contradictory requirements, the allocation of responsibilities towards harms was described as structurally unclear for the practitioners. Very few practitioners mentioned clear allocation of responsibilities by their organisation (e.g., existence of an ethics committee). This represented one more challenge for the practitioners, as that did not necessarily provide them with the needed power to make choices towards harm mitigation. Particularly, participants often discussed that they can strive to make harms transparent within their projects, but that the model requesters have the final say in deployment decisions.

4.4 Interactions between Factors

Here, we provide a short description of the main interactions we identified between factors, that reveal the importance of psychological traits and other human factors, and reinforce the need to account for the entangled nature of these factors.

4.4.1 Perceived or Actual Responsibility. We described that organizational factors might leave responsibility around harms ambiguous. In such situation, different practitioners react differently (hinting again at the importance of human factors): they perceive their responsibility differently, and engage to different extents in activities that are not promoted by the organizations in order to tackle harms. Certain practitioners argued that as data scientists that know the most about the system, they are the ones responsible for identifying and reporting harms (if not also for making decisions on system requirements and deployment) *P17: "It needs to be the responsibility of the developer, or have a developer that is some sort of fairness compliance person, that's doing some peer reviews of code, because once you get to the developers' boss, they don't know code."*; that the model requesters are the ones deciding for any requirement; that the C-level and managers should be responsible to incentivise the engineers and to make choices where practitioners do not have knowledge *P19: "As much as I would probably want to, I don't think I have all the necessary background for that."*; or that a committee within the organization should be responsible as it would gather more diverse expertise *P16: "We have a committee of ethics. If we have any questions, we can go there to understand their opinion, it will not be the decision of one person but a collective decision."*

4.4.2 Obstacles and Efforts. We mentioned that practitioners might lack resources (e.g., access to relevant stakeholders) and knowledge to tackle harms. In such cases, we identify different attitudes towards the challenge. While it is well-known that collaboration in the ML lifecycle is often needed for the practitioners [24, 51, 80, 110], prior work and our study both show that tackling questions around algorithmic harms is still predominantly the job of ML practitioners alone. Except for certain highly-ML experienced practitioners, most of them did not mention putting proactive extensive effort into reaching out to relevant stakeholders. In terms of knowledge, many of the participants who admitted lacking knowledge to identify or mitigate harms, concluded by reporting that they consequently do not put effort into acting on harms. *P10: "I am slightly aware of it but I wouldn't be able to say how to make changes towards that. I don't have any experience."* Instead, others mentioned searching into research papers to identify appropriate methods. For instance, P15, P18, P24, P27 proposed to look into research that trades-off model size (assuming a smaller model would be less energy-consuming) and accuracy performance to reduce environmental impact. Some practitioners explained potentially having a higher propensity to put effort onto fairness challenges because they have research experience, and hence can search within publications for relevant methods *P7: "I'm interested in research. When you try to apply these tools, that is connecting the academic world to the business side."* Similarly, when participants mentioned that no method exists yet to tackle a harm, certain would attempt to create a new one, while others would wait for research to progress.

5 DISCUSSION & IMPLICATIONS

5.1 The Renewed Importance of Factors

5.1.1 Summary of our Findings. In our study, we found that a complex set of interdependent human and organisational factors interact, and result in diverse practices of machine learning (ML) practitioners around algorithmic harms. For instance, we identified that, overall, practitioners who have little experience with ML and have not received practical and critical training around algorithmic fairness often stop at the application of a few fairness metrics and mitigation methods. The more experienced practitioners and those with an interdisciplinary background present a more critical attitude, attempt to go beyond what fairness toolkits permit (e.g., by envisioning non-algorithmic ways to avoid algorithmic unfairness), especially when they had opportunities to discuss these topics with experts. Next to these prior experiences, organizational constraints and incentives also represent drivers or obstacles towards deeply tackling harms, that, in interaction with psychological and sociodemographic traits, result in a diversity of trade-offs made between algorithmic harms and other business considerations.

While it is natural that such types of factors impact practices in the context of ML model development and algorithmic harms, no investigation of such factors had been performed. This study provides a first qualitative investigation that bear broad implications, and whose output validity should be later investigated through quantitative studies. As toolkits cannot serve as straightforward recipes for the practitioners, practitioners should also be supported in exercising due diligence. We argue that this should go through the development of better means for knowledge dissemination and training, the design of supportive materials and new organizational processes, and the consideration of organizational factors.

5.1.2 A Lukewarm Perspective on Toolkits. Our results bring evidence confirming the results of prior works on the use of various documentation and code toolkits, that have shown that these toolkits can indeed support ML practitioners in finding more algorithmic harms than without a toolkit [16, 24]. Yet, our results also bring more nuance to the benefits of toolkits, and show the risks of using those. These nuances had not been demonstrated in prior, empirical works on toolkit practices, as they did not focus on the impact of toolkits on algorithmic harms, but only on the correct implementation of algorithmic fairness methods. Our results also provide empirical evidence for prior broader works that argued against the techno-solutionism of algorithmic fairness [34], demonstrated the potential dangers of ethics washing [8], and more broadly warned against automating ML processes, e.g., through AutoML [106].

Prior work [24] had not discussed major differences in usage of different fairness toolkits. We corroborate such findings. Besides, the factors we find practitioners mentioning as important for selecting a toolkit are well aligned with the insights of prior works on the use of these toolkits [24, 57, 85]. These works have developed, among others, rubrics for the design of better toolkits, including similar functionalities (compatibility with various models, inclusion of diverse fairness metrics, guidance along the entire ML lifecycle, facilitating interdisciplinary conversations, etc.) and non-functional requirements (e.g., learning curve, compatibility with common coding frameworks, etc.). We especially echo the recommendations

they make to better guide practitioners along socio-technical considerations [104], in order to avoid the pitfalls emphasized by our participants. These prior works however had not discussed the contradictory evaluation of toolkits by practitioners, that we found in our interviews, and that would merit further investigation.

5.1.3 The Importance of Human Factors. Although prior works have sparsely investigated human factors that impact attitudes towards algorithmic fairness, we find a number of prior results that align with ours, and hint at the validity of our results. While these studies do not investigate ML practitioners specifically (but computer science students, or decision subjects), they are still relatable, as perceptions of fairness impact follow-up practices towards harms. Besides, our work expands on these prior results in that it looks at a broader range of harms, and at different types of individuals.

- *Toolkit.* A few works [24, 57] show the potential usefulness of toolkits and their current practical limitations. No study mentions potential negative impact that we identified.
- *Experience.* Kleanthous et al. [50] identified the impact that the level of computer science education has in understanding fairness issues along an ML pipeline, that we also identified. Yet, no study reveals the importance of the type of educational background and the type of prior ML experience and fairness training.
- *Socio-demographic factors.* Quantitative studies [47, 79] have shown the impact of gender on students' considerations of ML fairness, privacy, and non-maleficence. Prior work has also shown the effect of gender and race on judgements of fairness metrics [37, 41]. While this is not a result we could explore due to the imbalanced distribution of participants we had, all our female participants also displayed a critical attitude towards their practices and acknowledged various harms, whereas the results were more disparate across male participants.
- *Non-volitional factors.* Others [38, 66] found that non-volitional factors, e.g., political views and experiences with identity-based vulnerability, are relevant. Our results also hinted at the importance of non-volitional factors, as multiple practitioners referred to their personal interest in the topic, or being part of discriminated minorities, as motivating factors.

While the studies above align with our work, other studies seem contradicting. Some studies have not found impact of socio-demographic or other human factors on the perception of different fairness metrics [22, 37, 91], and the results of other studies are contradicting each other in terms of fairness perceptions, as detailed in [41]. For example, Wang et al. [101] identified that people with higher computer literacy perceive algorithmic decision-making fairer than what people with lower levels of literacy perceive, and that age, gender, race, and education level do not have a significant impact. Contrary to these findings, others [47, 79] pointed to the impact of gender, and our work showed the variability in perceptions of fairness among all our participants who were highly computer literate. We argue that these contradictions are due to the absence of detailed investigation of the impact of the human factors we identified, or to the lack of relevant intersectional considerations across factors.

5.1.4 Contextual Factors: Obstacles or Vectors. Our study identified various clashing constraints and objectives that practitioners have to take into account during the ML lifecycle. Some of these points have already been highlighted in previous empirical works, such as the conflict between business goals (e.g., the system should work for a majority of cases but not necessarily for edge cases to have a competitive advantage) and practitioners' goals (making sure to have high accuracy on all kinds of population) [61, 75, 78], or the lack of organisational support [84] (time and cost allocated, development of tools and guidelines, etc.), that result in individual efforts instead of organizational processes. Other factors had not been discussed until now to the best of our knowledge, in the context of practices for handling algorithmic harms.

5.2 Reflexivity via Renewed Experiences

Facing the importance of various factors, one should take those into account in the future development of support structures for ML practitioners to tackle algorithmic harms. Support should be personalised to the relevant types of practitioners we identified.

5.2.1 Guidelines for the Design of Toolkits. While fairness toolkits mildly contribute to enacting reflexive practices around algorithmic harms, they still represent an almost inevitable medium for algorithmic fairness. They appear as double-edge swords according to our results. This is where the danger of breeding a "*Checkbox Culture*" can manifest among practitioners with respect to handling algorithmic harms. Our work especially shows the need for pointers to relevant activities and resources within toolkits [56], while emphasizing the complexity of the problem and its context-dependence. Toolkits should also be adapted to the type of stakeholders that use them, based on their prior training, experiences, and other human factors, showing pop-up warnings, enforcing attention checks towards harms, allowing for different functionalities, or proposing trainings before using the toolkits. This will be a challenge as existing warnings in FairLearn [10] do not seem to always be considered by the practitioners. Besides, we need to make sure the toolkits do not become new checkboxes, but instead foster critical thinking.

5.2.2 Due Diligence through Education.

Topical Education. Since our results highlighted the importance of the type of training and experience practitioners have received about ML and harms, we join prior studies in advocating for more education of ML practitioners [24, 51, 89]. Many works [12, 14, 19, 29, 31, 44, 49, 65, 83] have discussed ways to provide a responsible AI education to developers, and we recommend to refer to their insights (e.g., modular approaches to responsible AI education for easy integration into courses, including events reported in news articles). We also recommend to rely on insights from farther domains such as data science teaching [32, 54, 92] (perhaps even more worrying than our results, low-ML-experienced practitioners also failed into well-known, non-harm-related traps, such as not reflecting on the limitation of accuracy as a performance metric), ethics and HCI [20, 25, 30], or even ethics of long-established fields such as medicine [21], which have tackled tangential questions. We emphasize the importance of accounting for the breadth of the topic (only Garrett et al. [31] noticed the absence of certain harms like environmental impact from existing courses), its complexity, and the importance to raise awareness about the issues and to train on tackling them.

Change of Attitudes. Next to teaching about algorithmic harms, it is important to develop the moral sensitivity [14], the critical attitude, and the reflexivity of future practitioners [68][4], in this highly-subjective context (Green and Viljoen [36] talk about an algorithmic realism approach, acknowledging the contextual, porous, and political nature of these harms and objectives) where no easy solution to algorithmic harm can be prescribed. Three concrete mediums of good practices surfaced from our interviews: discussions with diverse stakeholders to develop awareness around the subjectivity of the problem, warnings to develop a critical attitude towards existing theories and tools, and use-cases to experience potential challenges in the responsible use of tools. These should be incorporated in the trainings. We envision that trainings using close-to-real-world use-cases, starting from the beginning of the ML lifecycle (problem formulation) to the end (deployment and monitoring), with various stakeholders to interact with, and varying degrees of challenges (e.g., having all harm-related and other constraints explicit or proactively identifying them), could be beneficial. Markus and al. [64] insist on accounting for organisational dynamics in such trainings.

Terminological Considerations in Education Material. The terminological confusions we identified align with prior works [72] that highlight disciplinary confusions in the task of making a model fair, and works that studied the impact of terminological choices [53] on one's perceptions of an ML system. Mulligan et al. [72] promote the value of shared vocabularies and reconciling taxonomies that facilitate discussions. We echo these recommendations and the ones of P29 who suggested to move away from loaded terms towards more specific words, e.g., characterizing the type of bias in relation to the harm it creates, arguing that these materials should not only contain definitions such as it is currently done [59], but should also make concepts clear to the extent of pointing out to the different related theories behind them.

5.2.3 Acknowledging Contextual Factors. While these factors are often unspoken in the research community, they have to be accounted for by practitioners, as they are inherently in tension with handling algorithmic harms, but most practitioners currently face the dilemmas alone. We argue that the research community and policy makers should account for these factors further, and support —sometimes empower— practitioners in the decisions they have to make along the ML pipeline. Interdisciplinary research is needed to understand how to prioritize tackling the different harms (beyond distributive fairness), accounting for realistic trade-offs that have to be made across stakeholders and acknowledging practical constraints. Relevant directions are the understanding of preferences of stakeholders beyond well-studied preferences across fairness metrics [37, 41], the development of frameworks to uncover and negotiate preferences between stakeholders [18, 55, 96], and the creation of guidance for practitioners to navigate the trade-offs.

Knowledge and due diligence are not enough when practitioners do not receive structural incentives. P18 mentioned *"Practice is different from the ethical goals of the world. I had an interview. I said it's important to recommend people music that is worthwhile listening to. The manager told me these are idealistic thoughts, not how the real world operates, this company is all about revenue. So fairness at a company level, it depends on the culture and ethics of the people."* Hence, we join [84] in the idea of developing organizational processes to foster the development of good practices: the design of guidelines [63], e.g., for identifying responsibilities and appropriate requirements, the facilitation of interdisciplinary collaborations [83, 104], and the establishment of structural incentives and principles such as slowness [76]. Development of regulations, that explicitly account for organisational obstacles (e.g., making sure some employees of an organization are well-equipped to investigate algorithmic harms, have time dedicated for it) could also incentivise these organizations [33, 90, 98].

[4]Miceli et al. [68] refer to Bourdieu's notion of reflexivity [15] that would apply to ML practices "an analytical tool to sensitize researchers to "the social and intellectual unconscious" that condition their thoughts and practices in research, and is, therefore, an integral part of and a "necessary prerequisite" for scientific inquiry".

5.3 Rigorously Investigating the Factors

The factors we identified should be quantitatively explored in the future to validate our results (identified conceptions for each harm could serve as dependent variables). This would inform the design of trainings and supportive tools (e.g., the categories of individuals to tailor them to), and the constitution of ML development teams, accounting for the perceptions and abilities of each member. We foresee challenges in the design of a rigorous experimental setup: difficulties to quantify human factors, need to account for interactions between them, and need for specific scales around each harm, their different perceptions, and mitigation approaches. Apparent contradictions among results of prior works seem to be due to subtle differences in what is measured, who is the experiment subject, and potential interactions between multiple factors, which are differences that one should aim at controlling in future studies.

Existing research could be used to overcome these challenges. A measurement has been developed to quantitatively measure undergraduate student's attitudes towards the ethics of AI [47], that could be useful to evaluate how these factors are impactful. Yet, one should first complete this instrument to account for the types of harms that are currently left out from the instrument and for which we identified a variability of conceptions, and not only for attitudes towards harms but also towards their mitigation. The insights and methods from social psychology studies about human processes of taking actions, such as the theory of reasoned action or the theory of planned behavior [1, 40], could also be adapted to further analyse results, as they hint at a diversity of factors and their co-existence, for action taking. We already see correspondences, for instance in the subjective norms and perceived control mentioned by these theories, and that our interviewed practitioners also discussed, e.g., when mentioning the image ML ethics give to an organization.

6 LIMITATIONS

While we strived for recruiting a diversity of participants in terms of demographics, experience with ML and fairness, we could not obtain a significant sample for combined categories. Impossibility came from the relatively small amount of practitioners tackling these issues in the world (e.g., few practitioners could be found working regularly with the AIF360 toolkit), the duration of our interviews, and the controversial character of the topic. Yet, since several of our observations are corroborated with previous studies, one

can suppose some generalisability of our results. This also indicates future challenges in quantitatively investigating the factors.

Due to time considerations, practitioners could not extensively explore the toolkits beyond our tutorial. Letting them familiarize themselves further with algorithmic fairness before conducting task T2, would possibly provide a few different results on the impact of experience and toolkits on practices as practices evolve long-term. For instance, FairLearn provides warnings about algorithmic harms that the participants did not see during the interviews, but that could change their attitudes. Yet, the interviews with practitioners experienced with toolkits allowed us to somewhat control for this, and did not show related differences.

Finally, our participants were not placed into a specific organization and did not have access to different stakeholders. While this was useful for us to fairly compare practices across participants, we foresee the importance of further studies, e.g., with the practitioners' own projects, to identify additional factors.

7 CONCLUSION

Our study led to an extended characterization of the complex, intertwined, factors (toolkits, human, and organizational) impacting the differences of conceptions and practices about algorithmic harms that surface across ML practitioners. These results do not only align with prior works that surfaced a few factors in relation to algorithmic fairness, but also extend and complement these works with information around a more comprehensive consideration of algorithmic harms. Particularly, we found that the use of fairness toolkits does not necessarily lead to its envisioned impact, and can at times promote a checkbox culture, if it is not accompanied by a distinction of the background and prior training the user of the toolkit received, as well as of the pressures their organisations puts on them. In summary, our study constitutes a strong testimony that ML practitioners are not as much "ethical unicorns" [83] (i.e., practitioners who ensure a comprehensive handling of algorithmic harms of the ML systems they work on), than *subjective unicorns encaged in an organization*. Such findings bear strong implications for future research opportunities around the refinement of the toolkits and of educational programs, accounting for these human factors, and for potential regulations to address organizational concerns.

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Factoring the Matrix of Domination: A Critical Review and Reimagination of Intersectionality in AI Fairness

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ABSTRACT

Intersectionality is a critical framework that, through inquiry and praxis, allows us to examine how social inequalities persist through domains of structure and discipline. Given AI fairness' raison d'être of "fairness," we argue that adopting intersectionality as an analytical framework is pivotal to effectively operationalizing fairness. Through a critical review of how intersectionality is discussed in 30 papers from the AI fairness literature, we deductively and inductively: 1) map how intersectionality tenets operate within the AI fairness paradigm and 2) uncover gaps between the conceptualization and operationalization of intersectionality. We find that researchers overwhelmingly reduce intersectionality to optimizing for fairness metrics over demographic subgroups. They also fail to discuss their social context and when mentioning power, they mostly situate it only within the AI pipeline. We: 3) outline and assess the implications of these gaps for critical inquiry and praxis, and 4) provide actionable recommendations for AI fairness researchers to engage with intersectionality in their work by grounding it in AI epistemology.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Social and professional topics** → **Computing / technology policy**; • **Computing methodologies** → *Artificial intelligence.*

KEYWORDS

fairness, intersectionality, artificial intelligence, literature review

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1 INTRODUCTION

Artificial intelligence (AI) fairness research is critical to the development of just AI. Work in this space consistently urges researchers and engineers alike to consider notions of fairness defined over model predictions. These notions vary across conceptualization (e.g., group, individual fairness [8]) and operationalization (e.g., pre/in/post-processing [2]) [54]; nevertheless, the literature generally agrees on the goal of minimizing negative outcomes across demographic groups, including groups associated with multiple, "intersectional" demographic attributes (e.g., Black women) [92]. However, Kong [66] observes that AI fairness papers often narrowly interpret intersectional subgroup fairness as intersectionality, the critical framework from which the term originates [29, 67]. This myopic conceptualization of intersectionality has non-trivial consequences for just AI design and epistemology (i.e., ways of knowing).

The term *intersectionality* describes a traveling framework of critical inquiry and praxis (i.e., practical action beyond mere academic theorizing) intended to examine interlocking mechanisms of structural oppression (e.g., racist policy [60]) which produce inequality [29]. Critical inquiry into the formation of inequalities generates knowledge that can inform strategies for combating them, which is often referred to as praxis. Generating knowledge that illuminates the underlying mechanisms of oppressive systems is a shared objective among critical disciplines, such as feminist, antiracist, and decolonial studies, and is rooted in a history of resistance [28]. Critical disciplines thus do not decouple reclaiming knowledge from reclaiming power. This is in contrast to disciplines rooted in colonial epistemology, e.g., science. Upon initial examination, science offers universal, empirically-grounded explanations for natural phenomena; however, science is rooted in colonialism through its imposing of a "a positivist paradigm[1] approach to research on the colonies and other oppressed groups" [21]. According to scientific colonialism, the researcher has "unlimited rights of access to source[s] of information belonging to [a] population," where data collection and knowledge formation reflects *the one reality* the researcher understands [20, 34]. Indigenous knowledge is erased as dominant knowledge systems are imposed, preventing Indigenous people from creating and sharing their own knowledge and perspectives. Consequently, disciplines rooted in colonial epistemology often assimilate prevailing knowledge systems that perpetuate the erasure of knowledge [21, 33, 42].

[1]Knowledge as a result of "neutral" and quantifiable observation. This paradigm strictly relies on only measurement and reason [77].

The epistemologies of AI research are not divorced from scientific colonialism's legacy. Intersectionality may be used to critically examine AI research methodologies, so that "the world-views of those who have suffered a long history of oppression and marginalization are given space to communicate from their frames of reference" [21]. Intersectionality promotes grappling with "how individuals and groups who are subordinated within varying systems of power might survive and resist their oppression," thereby empowering communities to criticize the injustices they experience [28]. In the face of epistemic violence (e.g., the erasure of Indigenous knowledge), intersectionality erects a new form of epistemic resistance: knowledge production. Frameworks to articulate social inequalities have been integral to the survival of communities at the margins. Similarly, intersectionality, by enabling researchers to observe and articulate disparities, may break the epistemic molds "researchers are placed in so they may operate differently" [21].

In the context of AI fairness, intersectionality is less about getting technology right (e.g., establishing fairness constraints for a model); it is more about interrogating the social reality which drives AI oppression, so we can then make technology better. Crenshaw uses the term intersectionality as a metaphor to speak on how "different systems of oppression overlap," but more importantly emphasizes that neglecting the convergence of these structures would cause rhetorical and identity politics to abandon issues and people who are actually affected by these intersecting "systems of subordination" [6]. Intersectionality thereby challenges the sociopolitical amnesia which frames subgroup fairness as solely a technical problem [92]. We do not reject subgroup fairness outright; rather, we share this example to challenge the AI fairness community to expand its engagement with intersectionality. To operationalize AI fairness with an intersectional lens, it is vital to first illuminate underexplored gaps between intersectionality and existing AI fairness literature. To this end, we ask: (1) how is intersectionality discussed in AI fairness literature?; (2) to what extent does this discussion change based on computer science (CS) methodology?; (3) where are the largest gaps in conceptualizing and operationalizing intersectionality for advancing social justice?; (4) what tensions exist in leveraging these gaps for just AI design?; and (5) what do these findings tell us about opportunities for more just AI? To answer these questions, we contribute the following:

(1) Identify a growing body of AI fairness papers related to intersectionality (§4) and examine their conceptions of the critical framework in contrast to core intersectionality literature (§3).
(2) Create guiding questions to critically assess the use of intersectionality as a lens to operationalize AI fairness (Table 2).
(3) Use our findings to analyze where gaps remain in AI fairness papers' use of intersectionality, provide recommendations towards addressing these gaps, and comment on the structural forces that may contribute to these observed norms (§5, §6).

The majority of the papers we review approach intersectionality from the narrow perspective of subgroup fairness. Through a deductive lens in §5, we find that intersectionality engagement varies significantly depending on how it is situated within the AI pipeline, how sources of biases are described, and what CS research epistemologies are invoked. Inductively in §6, we find that even when researchers center intersectionality literature, there is little engagement with the framework itself, evidenced by a lack of described social context, little discussion of power and relations between structures, questionable citational practices, and a disjointed sense of social justice praxis.

Our paper does not concern itself with claiming that intersectionality must take a particular form within AI fairness. Rather, we center intersectionality as an "analytical sensibility" [22, 29], which when activated, can sharpen and transform the tools in the AI fairness researcher's toolbox. This, we argue, is key to justice-centric AI development. We further seek to dispel the misconception that social science disciplines have no place in STEM [72, 79]. Educated in CS, we equip the AI fairness researcher of similar training who is committed to justice with concrete ways of using their training in AI to exercise critical praxis. In this way, we hope to disrupt deep-rooted indifferences to social reality, "a powerful force that is perhaps more dangerous than malicious intent" [5].

Positionality Statement All but one author of this paper are formally trained primarily as computer scientists, with additional training in gender theory, criticial social theories, criminology, linguistics, and related fields. One author is a social scientist who confronts issues of social inequities in both everyday life and their scholarship, necessitating an intersectional and life course perspective. All authors have informal training in queer studies through activism and advocacy. As such, our backgrounds influence this work's design, decisions, and development. All authors are located in the US or Europe, but have diasporic links to other social contexts; we do our best to position our work in a global context. We write this to empower individuals across both academia and industry research to critically engage with AI fairness paradigms. Therefore, our recommendations are articulated in a way that can be operationalized, though they are transferrable to other audiences. We position ourselves within a social justice ethos informed by decolonial theory, and that champions equity over equality as well as reparations to correct historical injustices.

2 RELATED WORKS

We are not the first to champion or critique intersectional praxis in AI fairness, let alone more broadly. Several works across disciplines including psychology and CS have advocated the use of intersectionality frameworks or discussed the misappropriation thereof [4, 14, 16, 24, 52, 56, 80, 82, *inter alia*]. Furthermore, AI ethics researchers have addressed the narrow perspective of intersectionality as intersectional subgroup fairness (e.g., Kong [66]); our review points to this too, although our scope is wider and considers numerous gaps in AI's operationalization of intersectionality.

A few papers have reimagined intersectionality in AI [9, 23, 88], pushing for intersectional practices to be woven into the full AI pipeline, and arguing for a joint interrogation of culture, technology, and solutionist framings of fairness (e.g., critical technocultural discourse analysis [15]). Constanza-Chock [31] illuminates the lack of critical praxis in AI, drawing upon Collins's matrix of domination to encourage researchers to reflect on how AI relates to "domination and resistance at each of these three levels (personal, community, and institutional)" [26]. Davis et al. [37], inspired by Crenshaw [36],

argue for AI to be reparative and aware of social and historical context. Klumbyte et al. [63] facilitate community-based critical analysis of the "tensions and possibilities" of integrating intersectional knowledge into machine learning systems. With a shared goal of intersectional AI, we complementarily gauge the epistemic alignment of AI papers related to intersectionality with Collins' intersectionality tenets [29]. We go beyond the scope of papers like Birhane et al. [12], which is not explicitly about intersectionality and focuses on evaluating discussion of social context and power.

3 INTERSECTIONALITY OVERVIEW

Crenshaw coined the term "intersectionality" in her 1981 paper [35], and expanded on it in [36]. In the context of violence against Black women, these works study the interactions of race and gender, as well as racism and patriarchy as systems of subordination. Her work is grounded in "a bottom-up commitment" to address the needs of those who are "victimized by the interplay of numerous factors," with the explicit goal of obtaining political and social justice. Thus, praxis has been an important facet of intersectionality from its inception; what constitutes praxis is broad and contextual, including "movements for economic justice, legal and policy advocacy, state-targeted movements for prison abolition" [22].

While various definitions of intersectionality have emerged, they all center a need to examine power relations across structures, disciplines, domains, and location [1, 25, 53]. We draw upon broad intersectionality scholarship in our paper to enrich our own observations. To ground our review methodology and analysis in the following sections, we base our evaluations on Collins and Bilge [29]. This work details six core tenets of intersectionality (drawing from an in-depth genealogy of intersectionality) that lend themselves to an *analytical language* and *cognitive organization* around how forms of oppression are co-created, operated, amplified, and interact with social and structural disparities. These tenets are: social justice, social inequality, relationality, social power, social context, and complexity. We describe each tenet below, its connections to AI fairness, and how we interpret the tenet for advancing social justice in AI fairness. These descriptions further inform the construction of 3-4 guiding questions per tenet to assess how well the works in our critical review engage with the **tenets** (Table 2).

Social Justice. Intersectionality emerges as a synergy between inquiry and praxis, where praxis is action to advance social justice that is informed by inequities identified via critical inquiry (e.g., via the tenets). Collins and Bilge [29] caution that inquiry alone does not further social justice; intersectionality "demands more than simply being critical and entails turning critical analyses into critical praxis" [29]. In AI fairness, social justice praxis spans numerous practical approaches to fairness, e.g., debiasing techniques, fairness metrics for multiplicative groups; however, its effectiveness depends on authors' social context. Intersectionality widens these practical approaches; this does not remove researchers from the AI fairness domain, but rather deepens our ability to engage with the domain. Overall, intersectionality enables the creation of new forms of knowledge which are informed by a critical examination of how AI systems reproduce inequalities. Therefore, our social justice guiding questions assess how works commit to advancing justice and center the perspectives of subordinated communities.

Social Inequality. Intersectionality rejects the inevitability of inequality as "hardwired into the social world, into individual nature" [28]; rather, the framework emphasizes the study of how social inequalities are fundamentally formed and reinforced through saturated centers of power. Dismantling inequalities requires locating these centers. In AI fairness, inequality is often measured via quantities like demographic parity and disparate impact [54]. Hence, these metrics ground the practice of harm reduction; however, static measures pointing towards equality rather than equity do not resolve complex and wide-reaching inequality. Instead, intersectionality asks us to center the social and historical context of those at the margins to inform praxis. As such, our inequality guiding questions assess the depth with which researchers situate their work in social inequality.

Relationality. Relationality enables us to examine power and inequality by centering relational thinking. This functions to unveil how concentrations of power take shape, are situated in a broader social context, and perpetuate inequalities. Relationality comprises: addition (what happens when we *don't* consider the intersections of social categories), articulation (how relations impact the growth or dissolution of such intersections), and co-formation (e.g., of social categories as phenomena) [29]. In the context of AI fairness, relationality involves examining the relations between decisions we make as researchers, the technical artifacts we produce, and whom they impact (e.g., how the Eurocentrism of auditing frameworks makes them fail to capture inequalities in globally-deployed AI). Hence, our relationality guiding questions assess works' intention and inquiry across technological structures and social context.

Social Power. Intersectionality uses relationality to tie "intersecting power relations" to how power "produce[s] social divisions of race, class, gender, etc." [29]. Intersectionality is predicated on understanding that systems of power "co-produce each other in ways that reproduce unequal material outcomes and the distinctive social experiences [within] hierachies" [28]. In AI fairness, power is concentrated in *human* choices: system design, data collection, deployment, operationalizations of fairness. These choices impact resource allocation for communities at the intersections of the "structural, disciplinary, cultural, and interpersonal" domains [3, 26, 31]; thus, power should be discussed at all stages of the AI pipeline. Our power guiding questions therefore assess the extent to which researchers reflexively comment on or situate their work in the power relations in which they participate.

Social Context. Intersectionality centers "context-specific [...] historical particularities and the increasing significance of a global context" [29]. When engaging with intersectionality in different (especially global) contexts, inquiry and praxis take different forms; consequently, one must practice epistemic, personal, and critical reflexivity to be cognizant of context, in order to effectively and holistically advance justice. In AI fairness, social context informs AI context through researcher training and background, model training and deployment, language choices, etc. Hence, self-reflexively acknowledging that one operates in the Global North informs *who* is centered in fairness tasks. Conversely, fairness works that flatten social context (e.g., by optimizing for "Indigenous people" broadly) informs who drives knowledge production. As a result, our social context guiding questions assess the extent to which context is deliberately referenced and informs research processes.

Complexity. Complexity is key to a "creative tension" between critical inquiry and praxis, which results in new forms of social action to combat inequality [29]. Complexity necessitates relational thinking and situational awareness. In AI fairness, complexity is often conceptualized as minimizing unfairness across a large number of social groups. However, complexity is more expansive; for example, it entails co-designing with groups who have been harmed by AI systems rather than using preconceptions of excluded groups to remedy exclusion. Our complexity guiding questions probe how works contend with model requirements, community needs, and centers of power that influence AI design. This notion of complexity is distinct from how complexity is used in the complex systems discipline, or runtime complexity in CS.

4 CRITICAL REVIEW METHODOLOGY

4.1 Paper Inclusion Criteria

To gauge how AI fairness research conceptualizes and operationalizes intersectionality, we curate 30 papers by: 1) querying "intersectionality machine learning" on Google Scholar to obtain 75 relevant papers, and 2) filtering those to papers published in AI venues including symposiums, conferences, journals, and books. We choose to query "machine learning" as AI fairness research tends to center machine learning. Our process simulates how researchers might discover AI fairness literature related to intersectionality when grounding their own work. Papers are tagged as including intersectionality if they cite intersectionality scholarship that centers critical inquiry. We restrict our sample to 30 papers to ensure that we can annotate each paper (some papers by multiple authors) for engagement with intersectionality. We document all the papers we review in Tables 4 and 5, and provide statistics thereof in Table 1.

4.2 Review Methods

Our annotation scheme is based on the tenets and corresponding guiding questions discussed in §3. All questions reflect three axes of reflexivity: epistemological, personal, and critical [78]. For each paper, for each guiding question (e.g., "Do the authors mention power?"), we annotate whether or not the authors of the paper explicitly or implicitly answer the question. Then, for each tenet, we annotate that the paper has characteristics of the tenet if it explicitly or implicitly answers at least one of the guiding questions corresponding to the tenet. Importantly, our questions are not a checklist to determine whether researchers have "truly" engaged with intersectionality; rather, they reveal where efforts in AI fairness are concentrated and help us reimagine our practices towards advancing social justice in AI. We share all our guiding questions in Table 2. We further break down our methodology for creating questions in Appendix §B.

11 out of the 30 papers were evaluated by 3 annotators, and we present our tenet-level interannotator agreement for these papers in Table 3. The scores in Table 3 indicate moderate to high interannotator agreement. The remaining 19 papers were each evaluated by at least 1 annotator. We expand on our annotation methodology in Appendix §C and provide our annotations at https://tinyurl.com/intersectionality-annotations.

Given the nature of intersectionality, engagement therewith cannot be captured solely through quantitative means; therefore, we also qualitatively mine intersectionality-related themes from our sample of papers. With these deductive (i.e., using our guiding questions) and inductive (i.e., qualitative coding) analyses, we supply a bird's eye and granular view of engagement with intersectionality in AI fairness. As praxis, we translate our inductive findings to recommendations for deeper engagement with intersectionality. These recommendations are tailored for AI fairness researchers with any level of training in AI, in academia, industry, or both. We urge readers to take their own identity, capacity, and power into account when considering our recommendations, as these will affect what they can do and potential consequences.

In our analyses, we acknowledge that papers are products of varied epistemological contributions, relations between authors and reviewers, and power dynamics. Thus, our critical review is not so much a criticism of AI fairness researchers as it is a reflection of broader systems, such as the incentives and infrastructural forces that govern publishing in CS and enacting change in corporations, as well as the types of knowledge production that are valued or even simply considered legitimate in the field. Papers do not reflect everything that goes into a research project, and they are also merely static snapshots in time that researchers grow beyond.

4.3 Investigating Intersectionality Within the AI Fairness Research Paradigm

Reflexivity enables AI fairness researchers to engage in praxis; as Mohamed et al. [72] comment, "deciding what counts as valid knowledge, what is included within a dataset, and what is ignored and unquestioned, is a form of power [...] that cannot be left unacknowledged." To interrogate knowledge and inspire reflexivity, we texture our deductive analysis of intersectionality in AI fairness via four methodology lenses: where intersectionality is situated in the AI development process, how papers describe sources of bias, types of CS papers, and (inter)disciplinary relationality (i.e., synergy). These methodologies speak to both the research process and structures which researchers navigate in their work. We document the methodology tags for all the papers we review in Table 4.

4.3.1 Operationalization of intersectionality. We observe how papers engage with and operationalize intersectionality in the AI pipeline. Papers are tagged as pre-processing (i.e., pre-training interventions), in-processing (i.e., training-time modeling choices), post-processing (i.e., test-time interventions of model predictions), full pipeline, or processes. "Full pipeline" situates intersectionality (for empirical work) across the pipeline, while "processes" situates intersectionality in broader AI design and epistemology. Works that deeply engage with intersectionality exercise its tenets at every stage of the pipeline. Researchers can contrast modes of operationalizing intersectionality and in that tension, reimagine how they engage with the framework.

4.3.2 Source of bias. A paper may characterize bias as systemic, statistical, both systemic and statistical, or entirely fail to describe its source. Understanding sources of bias is pivotal to aligning AI fairness with intersectional praxis. Intersectionality posits that unequal outcomes reflect a systemic reproduction of existing power relations [28]. Systemic descriptions of bias concern structures and oppressive forces which subsequently permeate sociotechnical

Table 1: Critical review statistics ($N = 30$)

Characteristic	N	%
Intersectionality literature referenced	22	0.73
No. papers for annotator agreement	11	0.37
Terminology		
Uses term "intersectionality"	26	0.87
Uses term "intersectional"	27	0.9
AI Pipeline Stage		
Pre-processing	5	0.17
In-processing	4	0.13
Post-processing	10	0.33
Full pipeline	5	0.17
Processes	10	0.33
CS Research Paradigm		
Theoretical	10	0.33
Empirical	23	0.77
Engineering	11	0.37
Other	6	0.2
Synergy across disciplines	16	0.53

systems. In contrast, statistical descriptions limit sources of bias to the model or data.

4.3.3 CS paper type. We study paper types considered valid in CS (as determined by those in positions of power), exposing tensions between intersectionality and visibility, and allowing us to interrogate assumptions about supposed barriers to knowledge due to disciplinary divides [79]. We classify papers as theoretical, engineering, empirical, or a combination of types based on Stent [86]. Papers that do not fit any of these types are tagged as "other." This information enables AI fairness researchers to interrogate possible interplays between intersectionality and their epistemology.

4.3.4 Synergy across disciplines. Papers are tagged for synergy if they incorporate literature beyond other AI papers and intersectionality scholarship (tagging process described in §A). By incorporating knowledge forms beyond CS, we make room for dialogue across "more than one way of knowing" [48, 83]. This is particularly important for sources of marginalized knowledge that may go unheard. Smith [83] asserts that knowledge is always situated; dominant academic AI epistemologies describe systems as "universal" or "neutral," when in fact these terms simply indicate that other ways of knowing have been subjugated. Engaging in participatory AI research is one way of "recovering [...] stories of the past" [90]. However, researchers can also embrace synergy across disciplines. This allows us to examine how AI epistemology's alignment with other works interacts with intersectionality to create new forms of knowledge production towards advancing AI fairness.

5 DEDUCTIVE ANALYSIS

Quantitative Summary. We report tenet distributions across all papers in Figure 1. Complexity (97% of all papers), inequality (83%), and justice (83%) appeared most often in works that engaged with at least 1 guiding question. In contrast, the tenets that appeared least often were power (53%), context (57%), and relationality (60%). Taking the number of questions answered as a proxy for depth of engagement with a tenet, we see drops in every tenet. The largest



Figure 1: Distribution of intersectionality tenets split by depth of engagement with our guiding questions.

drop (20%) between answering 1+ questions versus 3+ questions is in complexity, despite high overall engagement. Relationality similarly drops from 60% to just 7%. These results are interrelated just as the tenets are; understanding power across structures requires understanding social context and the relations between social groups [30]. Therefore, it is suspect that a majority of papers purportedly center social justice and inequality with so few discussing power.

Cites Intersectionality Literature. Figure 2a shows that citation of intersectionality literature (see §A for more details) affects how papers engage with power, inequality, and context. It does not, however, seem to cause differential engagement with complexity and justice.

64% of papers that cite intersectionality literature engage with power, compared to 25% of papers that don't cite it. Engagement with the literature would explain this, as intersectionality is grounded in an analysis of power. However, the overall consideration of power is middling, echoing intersectionality theorists' observation that the "recasting of intersectionality as a theory primarily fascinated with the infinite combinations and implications of overlapping identities from an analytic initially concerned with structures of power and exclusion is curious given the explicit references to structures that appear in much of the early work" [22].

We see a similarly large gap in engagement with inequality. 91% of papers that cite intersectionality literature also discuss social inequality as a phenomenon with social and historical roots, or something their work impacts, compared to only 62% of papers that don't cite it. We see this difference as a reflection of intersectionality's motivation as a framework to examine inequalities.

Papers only seem to show consistent engagement with the tenets of complexity and justice, regardless of whether they cite intersectionality literature (above 80% of papers in each of these splits). This reflects the CS paradigm of understanding intersectionality as rejecting single axes of identity, and the ethos of AI fairness – one that seeks justice and a better future. Overall, citing intersectionality literature correlates with deeper tenet engagement.

Operationalization of Intersectionality. Figure 2b shows differences in how intersectionality is used across the AI pipeline. Papers



(a) Cites Intersectionality Lit.

(b) Operationalization

(c) Source of Bias

(d) CS Paper Type

Figure 2: Relative distributions of papers across intersetionality tenets if a paper engages with at least 1 question per tenet.

operationalizing intersectionality end-to-end had the largest coverage across intersectionality tenets, with each tenet appearing in 71-100% of these papers. Meanwhile, the lowest engagement across tenets came from papers focused on pre-processing, with *none* of them engaging with context, power and relationality.

The locus of operationalization seemed to make the biggest difference in how context and power were engaged with. Engagement with the social context tenet seemed to increase as papers went further down the AI pipeline; no pre-processing focused papers engaged with it compared to 25% of in-processing focused papers, 50% of post-processing focused papers, and 71% of end-to-end papers. This pattern mostly held for power as well, except that in-processing papers (50%) engaged with this tenet more than post-processing papers (25%). Overall, papers engage with more tenets when they operationalize intersectionality end-to-end and in processes.

Source of Bias. Differences in tenet engagement across the source of bias are shown in Figure 2c. Papers treating the source of bias as statistical had the lowest engagement across tenets, with only 30% of these papers engaging with context, relationality, and power. On the other hand, these papers have 100% coverage of the complexity tenet. This could be attributed to a common narrow reading of intersectionality as just multiplying identity categories rather than as a structural analysis or a political critique [51].

When considering bias to be systemic rather than statistical, tenet coverage increases noticeably; engagement with relationality jumps from 30% to 67% of papers in the category, context goes from 30% to 73%, and inequality goes from 60% to 100%. This aligns with existing literature in which discussing the social reality of a phenomenon allows one to more deeply assess the factors that contribute to it in the first place [5].

Papers that conceive of bias as *both* statistical and systemic have the best tenet coverage overall, with roughly 80-90% of papers discussing each of complexity, inequality, and justice. This dual conception of bias incorporates both the social and technical aspects of AI systems and how they may inform or magnify each other.

CS Paper Type. Figure 2d shows that papers across all CS paper types consistently engage with complexity and justice, with at least 70% of papers of each type covering these tenets. This consistency breaks down more dramatically across power, relationality, context, and inequality. *No* engineering papers engaged with these four tenets. At the other end of the spectrum, papers classified as other engaged with the largest array of tenets. 100% of these papers engaged with power, as opposed to 60% of theory papers and a quarter of empirical papers. Theoretical papers seemed to engage relatively less with context (32%) and relationality (41%). Overall, despite disciplinary divides, papers in CS are able to engage with intersectionality tenets. Supplementing these findings, our inductive analysis in section §6 indicates that many works use a heuristic definition of intersectionality that is easily operationalized across theoretical, engineering, and empirical papers, resulting in a narrow use of the framework. Engaging with literature outside the empirical and engineering papers that are de rigueur in CS can expand tenet coverage.

Synergy Across Disciplines. Figure 3 shows each tenet category split by whether or not they had a synergistic component. As it pertains to the source of bias, synergistic papers incorporate a wider range of tenets at higher rates than non-synergistic papers (Figure 3a). Even among papers that treat bias as systemic and thus engage with a social component of bias, tenet coverage benefits hugely from synergy, with 63-73% more papers discussing complexity and justice. Figure 3b shows that when papers that discuss intersectionality across the entire pipeline have a synergistic component, they have better tenet coverage. Synergy appears not to have a big effect on papers that focus on in-processing, pre-processing or post-processing, sometimes even appearing to decrease tenet coverage. With CS paper type (Figure 3c), papers that incorporated intersectionality in an empirical and theoretical paradigm had better tenet coverage when they had a synergistic component. We note that no engineering papers in our data have a synergistic component – an interesting finding in its own right. As before, this suggests that the biggest benefit to tenet coverage can come from first operationalizing intersectionality throughout the pipeline and attending to processes and norms, which arguably *necessitates* interdisciplinary synergy. Overall, disciplinary synergy correlates with higher intersectionality tenet coverage.

6 INDUCTIVE ANALYSIS

Intersectionality as intersectional subgroup fairness. Among papers which cite intersectionality literature, many conflate intersectionality with intersectional subgroup fairness. For example, Fitzsimons et al. [44] posit:

> *"... a model that satisfies conditional parity with respect to race and gender independently may fail to*



Figure 3: Papers with at least 1 tenet characteristic, split by presence of a synergistic literary component (top=no, bottom=yes).

> *satisfy conditional parity with respect to the conjunction of race and gender. In the social science literature concerns about, potentially discriminated against, subdemographics are referred to as intersectionality."*

Similarly, Mougán et al. [74] state, "For intersectional fairness, we created the variable EthnicMarital, engineered by concatenating Ethnic and Marital status." Indeed, we observe that many papers conceptualize intersectionality as identity-centric, and its ties to power and inequality are not explicitly named [73, 74, 95]. Our finding substantiates the concerns of intersectionality scholars that intersectionality is diluted to a "two-by-two analysis of gender by race" rather than "constituting a structural analysis or a political critique" [51], or contending with "overlapping systems of subordination" [30]. Notably, papers even discuss power and inequality in depth at first, but nevertheless operationalize intersectionality as subgroup fairness without engaging these points again [46].

Such additive frameworks are helpful insofar as they enable structural inquiry. However, per our annotations, despite overwhelming discourse on cross-sectional social categories, papers' discussions of subgroups often lack social or historical context [18, 44, 73]. Few works comment on the structural factors that cause certain groups to be underrepresented in datasets, critically engage with the colonial origins of protected attributes [41], or connect groups to social structures and inequality (c.f., the explicit recognition that Black communities are targeted at a higher rate by law enforcement using facial recognition in [17]).

The obfuscation of intersectionality as subgroup fairness reflects cultural denial, "the process that allows us to know about cruelty, discrimination, and repression, but never openly acknowledge it" [40]. We do not claim that the intentions of AI fairness researchers are malicious; rather, groups "los[ing] meaning as a descriptive, non-analytical category" prevents researchers from engaging in critical inquiry [28]. This disarms praxis: AI fairness can no longer contend with advancing justice for those at the margins if their experiences with AI-driven social inequalities are not centered. Therefore, we echo Collins' call for "intellectual vigilance" in analyzing and articulating intersecting power relations. Using an intersectional lens is crucial to refocusing on marginalized communities, and can inform social justice efforts across various fields by addressing the root causes of harm, regardless of one's training.

Recommendation. Researchers exercise intellectual vigilance when using additive frameworks by creating statistical methodologies that preserve unique social and historical characteristics of intersecting groups. [93] exemplifies this. Leadership incentivizes this inquiry. Researchers and leadership prioritize widening their conceptualization of intersectionality beyond the "subgroup fairness" interpretation, which is limited in its social justice praxis.

Anti-discrimination legislation informs design. Several papers draw from regulation (e.g., anti-discriminatory legislation) to define their fairness objective. For example, Molina and Loiseau [73] state:

> *"In many—if not most—real-world applications, there are multiple protected attributes (typically 10-20) along which discrimination is prohibited [1, 2]."*

Foulds and Pan [46] similarly motivate their fairness criteria from a legal perspective: "consider the 80% rule, established in the Code of Federal Regulation." Additionally, Foulds et al. [45] seek to "[determine] whether disparities in system behavior meet legal thresholds for discrimination." Furthermore, Ghosh et al. [49] remark, "there does not exist a single universally agreed upon definition of fairness," citing how different "anti-discrimination legislation exists in various jurisdictions around the world."

Motivating AI fairness from a strictly regulatory lens (e.g., the 80% rule, protected groups) does not fully embrace social and historical context. Several critical scholars argue that discrimination is often legitimized through anti-discrimination law [35, 38, 47, 84]. According to Freeman [47], these laws see racial discrimination "not as conditions, but as actions inflicted on the victim by the perpetrator." He adds that such laws reflect the idea that "only 'intentional'

discrimination violates anti-discrimination principles," creating "a class of the 'innocent' who need not feel any personal responsibility for the conditions associated with discrimination" [47]. Similarly, in AI fairness, researchers prioritize intersectional subgroup fairness over the structures that give rise to unfairness to begin with. Interestingly, AI fairness researchers who adopt a regulatory lens abundantly cite Crenshaw [36], although this work illuminates how anti-discrimination laws render Black women invisible:

> *"In a monumental paper published in 1989, Kimberlé Crenshaw [11] introduced Intersectionality by referencing a court case where black women were unfairly discriminated as a result of an activity to mitigate the race and gender discrimination independently" [65].*

AI fairness researchers must heed the warnings of critical legal studies: indifference to the social and historical context of groups and their intersections risks reproducing histories of discrimination. For example, an important step towards dismantling injustices is challenging social categories rooted in colonialism, as "this structure imports a descriptive and normative view of society that reinforces the status quo" [35]; hence, failing to investigate how the mechanisms responsible for the unjust social realities of oppressed groups are upheld by one's technology is fundamentally incompatible with reparation and advancing justice [32, 37]. Therefore, while social beneficence may motivate an AI fairness approach, its technical operationalization must consider the sociotechnical environment it operates within. In other words, if the goal of researchers is to leverage intersectionality towards the creation of just AI systems, these systems must be infused with social and historical literacy throughout their lifecycle to prevent indifferent engagement with the people they affect.

Recommendation. Researchers, including those in leadership, critically engage with and remain vigilant of how operationalizations of anti-discrimination laws in their AI systems do not automatically mean that their systems are fair to marginalized communities. They may do this by engaging with critical legal studies texts [35, 38, 47, 84] and marginalized communities to learn how they are unfairly impacted even by systems that pass legal audits. [59] does a good job of examining the tensions between prioritizing different forms of fairness.

Angles of power examined: technodeterminism rules. Collins describes intersectionality as examining the mutual influences which "intersect and interlock" across "structural, disciplinary, cultural, and interpersonal" [26] domains of power. However, among papers that cite intersectionality literature, power is the least engaged tenet, with "power" mentioned in only 53% of papers. Moreover, merely mentioning "power" does not entail engaging with it in depth, e.g., Foulds and Pan [46] write in their abstract that "intersectionality [...] analyzes how interlocking systems of power and oppression affect individuals along overlapping dimensions," but do not discuss power elsewhere in their paper. Similarly, Yang et al. [96] only mention power in their related works section.

Furthermore, across papers that do engage with power and power relations, engagement style varies. For example, we see power described as a distributable commodity; Suresh et al. [87] assert, "our work [...] stems from the acknowledgment that power is not equally distributed in the world." In contrast, Kirk et al. [62] note, without explicitly using the term "power," that "models can exacerbate existing biases in data and perpetuate stereotypical associations to the harm of marginalized communities."

One can argue that AI fairness researchers study mechanisms of inequality, namely the way inequalities emerge as "AI harms," so that we may reduce them. As such, the allocational and representational harms of our systems are the result of power enacted by our systems unto those at the margins. We do not reject these approaches to making sense of power discrepancies observed in AI-driven systems. However, many AI fairness researchers constrain their discussion of power to the AI system alone, removing themselves from the equation. The notion that a system itself exerts power is technodeterministic, i.e., it reifies the idea that systems, and not their creators, are responsible for reproducing inequalities. Only a few papers that we review escape technodeterminism, e.g., Kasy and Abebe [59] state, "The second alternative perspective focuses on the distribution of power and asks: who gets to pick the objective function of an algorithm? The choice of objective functions is intimately connected with the political economy question of who has ownership and control rights over data and algorithms." Engaging with intersectionality forces researchers to shed their technodeterminism and contend with the value-laden choices made by the humans that contribute to the lifecycle of AI systems. This is central to praxis that may effectively advance justice in AI fairness.

Recommendation. Researchers flex intellectual vigilance by being explicit about how their methodologies may contribute to perpetuating social inequalities. They state their full-pipeline design choices at the beginning of projects and iterate as designs are updated. Leadership gives researchers opportunities to engage in critical reflexivity. These issues are further discussed in [5, 39, 75].

Questionable citational praxis of intersectionality. Several papers reference literature incorrectly to justify their operationalization of intersectionality. For example, Ghosh et al. [49] assume that Buolamwini and Gebru [17] concerns intersectionality though it is actually a study of intersecting subgroups. We see this phenomenon again in Kang et al. [57], which cites only Buolamwini and Gebru [17] when describing intersectionality. In contrast, some papers, like Makhlouf et al. [69], discuss intersectionality, but only cite a paper on affirmative action [58]. Other papers, like Foulds and Pan [46] and Mougán et al. [74], mention intersectionality, yet do not reference any relevant literature at all; this is reflected in our deductive analysis, with 19% of papers that use the term "intersectionality" not citing any intersectionality literature.

These findings exemplify a weak spot in the citational praxis of AI fairness researchers. Alexander-Floyd [1] calls for us to cite intersectionality literature, showing that within social science literature, there has been an erasure of Black women and Black feminist knowledge in papers that discuss intersectionality. She describes the centering of positivist and empiricist methods of knowledge production as a force that (re-)subjugates Black feminist knowledge and contributes to maintaining the status quo of whose knowledge counts as "scientific" [1]. Bilge [7] identifies similar power structures in feminist studies and the broader neoliberal academy that contribute to "neutralizing the critical potential of intersectionality for social justice-oriented change."

We find this gentrification of intersectionality in our field too; AI research interprets intersectionality as a dimension of "solvability" and scale, "perpetuat[ing] the status quo injustice" [66]. Furthermore, potentially due to disciplinary barriers or gaps, papers use vague language when describing intersectionality. For instance, Kobayashi and Nakao [65] assert, "the concept of Intersectionality covers diverse discussions including the issue of the oppression that people feel due to the discrimination [15]." Camara et al. [19] mention "the complex and interconnected nature of social biases." Mitchell et al. [71] state, "an individual's identity and experiences are shaped [...] by a complex combination of many factors." Vague language prevents intersectionality from being appropriately situated in sociotechnical systems, and may convey an incomplete understanding of intersectionality, neutralizing both researchers' and readers' engagement with power structures and inequality.

Recommendation. Researchers explicitly share how their interpretation of intersectionality literature informs their methodology and assumptions. They read critical social justice literature outside of CS and cite it when incorporating it in AI design. Researchers, including those across leadership, expect and enforce intersectionality citational integrity when peer-reviewing.

Intersectional AI fairness lacks relationality. We find that AI fairness researchers have adopted intersectionality in a way that strips the relationship between structures from the complexity of intersectionality's arguments. This "misrepresents [the] initial intent" of intersectionality [27, 94], i.e., to question "how larger social structures influence supposed group level differences" [16]. For instance, some works that engage with intersectionality literature propose statistical solutions for inequality, e.g., Foulds et al. [45] tackle data sparsity by exploiting the structure of data distributions of data-dense subgroups (e.g., white women, Black men) to inform the data distribution of data-sparse subgroups (e.g., Black women). We do not reject statistical approaches to reducing AI harms; however, formulations that do not situate their statistical methods in a social context by, for instance, stating statistical *and* social assumptions those methods are based on, entirely miss the point of intersectionality as a critical framework.

Being intellectually vigilant about the relationship between statistics and the social sciences is crucial for their intersection. However, we observe different levels of contending with this intersection. Vigilance is missing entirely when the assumptions and reasoning behind the translation from social science knowledge to statistics is not explicit (e.g., [18, 44, 74]), with Fitzsimons et al. [44] describing: "In the social science literature concerns about, potentially discriminated against, sub-demographics are referred to as intersectionality [12]. More formally, this work proposes a simple approach to ensure group fairness in expectation across an arbitrary set of subgroups." Jin et al. [55] provides a more intentional socio-technical translation: "although all value combinations are assessed for intersectional fairness, some subgroups may be semantically meaningless and hence should not be returned as the output," though what is "meaningful" is not described. Other works go into more depth with their assumptions, (e.g., [93], [71]), with Mitchell et al. [71] stating with respect to subgroup formation that "collaboration with policy, privacy, and legal experts is necessary in order to ascertain which groups may be responsibly inferred, and how that information should be stored and accessed."

We caution against citing intersectionality literature while ignoring the relationships between the structures that create social categories. This fortifies the fallacy that we have engaged in intersectional praxis if we statistically supplement missing knowledge without examining the embedded assumptions and implications of doing so. It is through this neutralization of critical vigilance and reflexivity that AI fairness researchers are unable to identify where social inequalities may emerge through their own praxis. Invoking an intersectional lens enables this and is, therefore, pivotal to understanding the interlocking systems that produce AI injustices and doing AI justice work.

Recommendation. Researchers remain intellectually vigilant about how scholarship from the social sciences relates to and informs both statistical and wider research methodology. As a result, they preserve the social context of social groups when employing statistical methods, e.g., by transparently stating how they infuse statistical assumptions with context. Across points of power, researchers have "vigilance check-ins" to check translative assumptions during AI development milestones. [71] engages with transparency at the model level which complements these points.

AI social justice praxis varies. Some papers treat improved fairness as social justice praxis regardless of the task's context. For example, Foulds et al. [45] use recidivism prediction as a fairness benchmark task. As recidivism prediction is a "byproduct of ongoing regimes of selective policing and punishment" [5], the task only serves to uphold the carceral state [52]. Here, intersectionality posits sites of violence are saturated intersections of power [29].

Furthermore, many works are not grounded in social context, which ought to inform social justice praxis [61, 65, 81]. Some papers provide context (e.g., data collection is "biased toward non-minorities" [45]), but nevertheless prioritize generalization [45]. Some papers even give credence to inferring the social category of individuals; Fitzsimons et al. [44] state, "gender labels were inferred using the employees' first names, parsed through the gender-guesser python library." Furthermore, we identify works that highlight the oppressive nature of social categories though often defer contestations to future work. For example, Kirk et al. [62] advocate:

> *"Future research is recommended to make ground truth comparisons across a broader range of countries against the set of gender-intersections examined in this paper and to comment on a broader spectrum of gender identities."*

Moreover, few papers complement technical contributions with social action, and some even tout their "purely statistical approach" [73]; this neglects the complexity inherent to dismantling social injustices. Mathematical saviorism restricts the operationalization of critical praxis to the pre/in/post-processing stages. This encourages AI researchers to locate sources of unfairness situated only within the technical domain, ignoring the broader sociotechnical milieu linked to the power relations and inequalities upheld by AI [39]. Consequently, people already at the margins are erased, even in these contexts that ostensibly address fairness, oppression, and complexity. Thus, AI fairness researchers must engage in praxis that is informed by the experiences of those at the margins.

Some papers justify design choices that do not center care for those at the margins through utilitarian perspectives, e.g., Molina and Loiseau [73] reason, "an algorithm which discriminates 1 person among a 1000 can be described as fair to an extent." On the other hand, works like Suresh et al. [87] and Mitchell et al. [71] concretely advocate to dismantle injustice and shift power through participation in model development and transparency in deployment, respectively. The contrast in social justice praxis is notable; AI fairness researchers must consider how design choices situate AI systems within their sociotechnical context.

As Crenshaw [35] has said, "addressing the needs and problems of those who are most disadvantaged" means that "others who are singularly disadvantaged would also benefit." Centering these people and the contexts tied to their oppression deepens social justice engagement and creates equity. This way of engaging with intersectionality thus equips AI fairness researchers, regardless of training, to better address inequalities and injustices in AI.

Recommendation. Researchers bridge social justice inquiry and praxis by investing in and valuing the knowledge from communities that their AI systems harm. Researchers and leadership make sure that the AI design process prioritizes harm reduction to promote justice for marginalized communities. [87] does a good job at centering AI development through community engagement.

AI fairness misses critical reflexivity. Several papers neglect to state their social context and its implications for research methodology. This is reflected in our annotations, with 43% of papers—even critical ones, e.g., Kong [66]—not including their social context (often the US) [18, 68, 95]. Furthermore, when describing social context, some works only include the US as an important context, without commenting on the aspects of complexity and power inherent to doing so. This privileges western contexts as the "default" context, resulting in western prototypicality (c.f., white prototypicality [50]). For instance, Kirk et al. [62] argue:

> *"using US data may provide an appropriate baseline comparison: 50% of Reddit traffic comes from the US, and a further 7% from Canada and the UK each [34]. Given that US sources form a majority in GPT-2's training material [...], we consider the US dataset a satisfactory first benchmark."*

Moreover, when authors do name their social context, they often phrase it as a blanket limitation rather than a contextualization of their research choices; Yang et al. [96] share that "the social construction and definitions of sensitive attributes" are "outside the scope of the present work but which are important in any real application." Stating their context as a limitation—instead of a point which textures their work from the onset —situates their context as an afterthought, rather than something that undergirds the entire research process. On the other hand, Suresh et al. [87] center reflexivity throughout their work stating: "Throughout this process, we take an explicitly feminist approach, both in our overaching process—which we strive to make iterative, reflexive, contextual, and participatory—as well as the technology we build".

All in all, critical reflexivity is crucial to operationalizing intersectionality, both as inquiry and praxis. AI researchers are overwhelmingly located in the Global North [12], which makes many power relations and AI injustices invisible to us, especially when we lack the abilities to inquire upon it. Reflexivity requires that we observe the power relations we participate in or benefit from, dismantle these relations, and identify opportunities for social justice within AI fairness. Our advice aligns with conceptualizations of decolonization within the computational sciences; Birhane and Guest [11] comment that decolonizing "requires the beneficiaries of the current systems to acknowledge their privilege and actively challenge the system that benefits them."

Works that decouple social context and relationality from intersectionality may reflect academic incentives (e.g., conference acceptances, funding [13], citations) and infrastructural forces (e.g., conference paper formats, objectivity-washing). These push AI researchers to make "fairness" palatable by treating it as a complexity-free scientific quantity that can be optimized [10, 89]. Our paper is bound by similar constraints; we empirically validate our critical analyses in order to publish and our citation of the papers we review gives them "academic currency" even as we critique them.

Recommendation. Researchers across points of power iteratively dialogue on unlearning "universal" frameworks of knowledge and remain vigilant of *whose* knowledge is centered when developing AI. Leadership incentivizes and provides resources for their team to engage in critical reflexivity tools throughout development. [64] provides a good example of iterative reflexivity.

7 CONCLUSION

What we cannot name, we cannot see. What we cannot see, we cannot address. By examining AI fairness papers related to intersectionality, we identify several patterns in how the literature discusses intersectionality and how it impacts our ability to produce equitable tools. While our field has much energy to get this technology right, we caution the community against assuming that surmounting a "fairness issue" pre/in/post the AI pipeline means we have fixed the social reality driving the problem. This work does not seek to discard existing AI fairness work; instead, we invite a widening of AI fairness practice by centering marginalized people and valorizing critical knowledge production that makes room for their voices. We provide recommendations grounded in producing critical knowledge on how AI systems reproduce social inequalities. Our recommendations are not mutually exclusive with respect to AI fairness infrastructure. Rather, they empower researchers to flex the intellectual vigilance required to produce intersectional work, regardless of CS paradigm. Expanding both the conceptualization and operationalization of intersectionality will enable AI fairness researchers across points of power to engage in deeper social justice praxis for AI. To do this, we advocate for adopting intersectionality as an analytical sensibility rather than an axis of optimization.

> *"I lack imagination you say*
> *No. I lack language. The language to clarify*
> *my resistance to the literate."*
> *- Cherríe Moraga (1983)*

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APPENDIX

A TAGGING FOR INTERSECTIONALITY LITERATURE

Initially, we only tagged works as incorporating intersectionality literature when they included Collins and Bilge [29], Crenshaw [35], Hancock [53], or Cho et al. [22]. However, during our weekly discussions, we noticed that papers cited a wider array of intersectionality works; either other works by these same authors, or other scholars who center intersectionality within critical disciplines. Because we want to gauge how AI fairness conceptualizes intersectionality, casting a wider net on tags is valuable in that we can include works that, while unaware of our initial list of texts, state intersectionality as a motivation in their work and cite other works about intersectionality like [26], [30], [27], or [36]. As a result, we tag the presence of intersectionality literature if any paper includes works that: 1) discuss intersectionality outside of CS and 2) frames intersectionality as a critical social inquiry and praxis framework.

B GUIDING QUESTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS

We chose to create 3-4 guiding questions per tenet in order to balance in-depth coverage of each tenet with annotation feasibility. We share all our guiding questions in Table 2. While some guiding questions are straightforward (e.g., "Do the authors consider cross-sectional social categories?"), others are more up to our interpretation and experiences (e.g., "Are there any discussions on how spaces operate at different domains of power?"). Our interpretation of the intersectionality tenets for advancing justice in AI fairness is influenced by our social context and location, including our formal AI training, social identities, and experienced social inequalities (§1). For instance, we (the investigators) are all trans and people of color, and hence were likely more attuned to the discussion in Kong [66] of power differentials in "regular" experiences, e.g., going through airport security.

C ANNOTATION METHODOLOGY

We follow Lincoln and Guba's 1981 model of trustworthiness in our analysis [76], taking steps to maximize its credibility, dependability, confirmability, and transferability.

- **Credibility:** We are highly familiar with Collins and Bilge's tenets. We also engaged in in-depth intersectionality intensives hosted by Black feminist scholars. Furthermore, we all have done justice work in some capacity. The majority of authors on this paper are trans people of color operating in AI. One author is a social scientist who confronts social inequities in their scholarship through intersectional perspectives. We spent over 6 months developing the guiding questions.
- **Dependability:** 11 out of the 30 papers were evaluated by three annotators, and we present our tenet-level interannotater agreement for these papers in Table 3. The scores in Table 3 indicate moderate to high interannotator agreement. The remaining 19 papers were each evaluated by at least 1 annotator.
- **Confirmability:** During weekly investigator meetings, we discussed our guiding questions and identified major sources of disagreement in our annotations.
- **Transferability:** Our guiding questions can be operationalized across paper types and domains outside of academia.

D MEASURING INTERANNOTATOR AGREEMENT

We use Randolph's κ to estimate inter-annotator agreement, which is free-marginal rather than fixed-marginal; we choose this because κ is computed over six distinct items (i.e., tenets).

Table 2: Collins and Bilge's tenets of intersectionality and our corresponding guiding questions

Tenet	Guiding Questions
Social inequality	1) Do the authors ground their work in how specific social or historical contexts factor into social inequality? 2) Do the authors acknowledge the implications of their work with respect to social inequality? 3) Is there a discussion of how intersecting power relations produce social inequality?
Social power	1) Do the authors mention power? 2) Do the authors discuss any movement of power to the powerless? 3) Do the authors mention the mutual construction of power? 4) Is their own power in the work named or do the authors reflexively comment on the oppressive power relations within which their work participates?
Social Context	1) Do the authors name their social context or social location with respect to their work? 2) Do the authors discuss how their social context influences their ideas and work's design, decisions, and development? 3) Do they acknowledge the limitations of their contexts?
Relationality	1) Do the authors discuss the relationships between either social groups or structures? 2) Do the authors engage with how different social groups, typically treated as separate, face shared oppression? 3) Do the authors comment on how their identities shape their inquiry in relation to the people affected by their work?
Complexity	1) Do the authors consider cross-sectional social categories? 2) Do they involve those without power in the generation and social construction of new knowledge? 3) Do the authors comment on the interplay between technical interventions and social action, or critical inquiry and practice? 4) Are there any discussions on how spaces operate at different domains of power ?
Social justice	1) Do the authors state their commitment or motivation as social justice? 2) Do the authors discuss ways in which fair predictions or rules are not equally applied to everyone and can still produce unfair and unequal outcomes? 3) Do authors aim to dismantle a form of injustice, rather than solely documenting it in the form of a paper?

Table 3: Tenet-level interannotator scores by Randolph's κ and % agreement

Paper	κ	% agreement
Wang et al. [93]	1.0000	100.00
Foulds et al. [45]	1.0000	100.00
Kong [66]	0.7778	83.33
Foulds and Pan [46]	1.0000	100.00
Rogerson and Fitzsimmons [81]	0.5556	66.67
Kobayashi and Nakao [65]	0.5556	66.67
Kirk et al. [62]	0.5556	66.67
Buolamwini and Gebru [17]	1.0000	100.00
Ghosh et al. [49]	0.5556	66.67
Kasy and Abebe [59]	0.7778	83.33
Molina and Loiseau [73]	0.7778	83.33
Average:	0.7778	83.33

Table 4: Papers with AI fairness research methodology tags

ID	Paper	Source of Bias	Intersectonality Operationalization	CS Paper Type	Synergy
1	Wang et al. [93]	statistical	full pipeline	empirical	yes
2	Foulds et al. [45]	statistical	in-processing	theoretical, engineering, empirical	no
3	Kong [66]	systemic	processes	other	yes
4	Lalor et al. [68]	both	post-processing	empirical	no
5	Foulds and Pan [46]	both	in-processing	theoretical, engineering, empirical	yes
6	Rogerson and Fitzsimmons [81]	systemic	post-processing	empirical	yes
7	Suresh et al. [87]	systemic	processes, full pipeline	empirical	yes
8	Klumbyte et al. [64]	systemic	processes	empirical, other	yes
9	Kobayashi and Nakao [65]	statistical	full pipeline	engineering, empirical	no
10	Kirk et al. [62]	both	post-processing	empirical	no
11	Kim et al. [61]	both	post-processing	empirical	no
12	Yang et al. [96]	both	full pipeline	theoretical, engineering, empirical	no
13	Buolamwini and Gebru [17]	statistical	pre-processing, processes	engineering, empirical	yes
14	Fitzsimons et al. [44]	statistical	in-processing	theoretical, engineering, empirical	no
15	Ghosh et al. [49]	systemic	post-processing, processes	theoretical, empirical	yes
16	Davis et al. [37]	systemic	processes	theoretical	yes
17	Steed and Caliskan [85]	both	post-processing	empirical	yes
18	Mitchell et al. [71]	systemic	processes	other	yes
19	Kasy and Abebe [59]	systemic	post-processing, processes	theoretical, empirical	yes
20	Cabrera et al. [18]	statistical	post-processing	engineering, empirical	no
21	Kang et al. [57]	statistical	in-processing	theoretical, engineering, empirical	no
22	Jin et al. [55]	statistical	pre-processing	engineering	no
23	Mhasawade et al. [70]	both	processes	other	yes
24	Camara et al. [19]	both	post-processing	empirical	yes
25	Yang et al. [95]	statistical	full pipeline	engineering, empirical	no
26	Molina and Loiseau [73]	statistical	pre-processing	theoretical, engineering, empirical	no
27	Tripathi et al. [91]	both	pre-processing	empirical	yes
28	Mougán et al. [74]	systemic	pre-processing	theoretical, empirical	no
29	Finocchiaro et al. [43]	systemic	processes	other	yes
30	Makhlouf et al. [69]	systemic	post-processing	other	no

Table 5: Papers with intersectionality-related reference tags

ID	Paper	Cites Intersectionality Literature	Says "Intersectional"	Says "Intersectionality"
1	Wang et al. [93]	Yes	Yes	Yes
2	Foulds et al. [45]	Yes	Yes	Yes
3	Kong [66]	Yes	Yes	Yes
4	Lalor et al. [68]	No	Yes	Yes
5	Foulds and Pan [46]	Yes	Yes	Yes
6	Rogerson and Fitzsimmons [81]	Yes	Yes	Yes
7	Suresh et al. [87]	Yes	Yes	Yes
8	Klumbyte et al. [64]	Yes	Yes	Yes
9	Kobayashi and Nakao [65]	Yes	Yes	Yes
10	Kirk et al. [62]	Yes	Yes	Yes
11	Kim et al. [61]	No	Yes	No
12	Yang et al. [96]	Yes	Yes	Yes
13	Buolamwini and Gebru [17]	No	Yes	Yes
14	Fitzsimons et al. [44]	Yes	Yes	Yes
15	Ghosh et al. [49]	Yes	Yes	Yes
16	Davis et al. [37]	Yes	Yes	Yes
17	Steed and Caliskan [85]	Yes	Yes	Yes
18	Mitchell et al. [71]	Yes	Yes	Yes
19	Kasy and Abebe [59]	Yes	Yes	No
20	Cabrera et al. [18]	No	Yes	Yes
21	Kang et al. [57]	No	Yes	No
22	Jin et al. [55]	No	Yes	No
23	Mhasawade et al. [70]	Yes	No	Yes
24	Camara et al. [19]	Yes	Yes	Yes
25	Yang et al. [95]	Yes	Yes	Yes
26	Molina and Loiseau [73]	Yes	Yes	Yes
27	Tripathi et al. [91]	No	No	Yes
28	Mougán et al. [74]	Yes	Yes	Yes
29	Finocchiaro et al. [43]	No	Yes	Yes
30	Makhlouf et al. [69]	Yes	No	Yes

A multidomain relational framework to guide institutional AI research and adoption

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ABSTRACT

Calls for new metrics, technical standards and governance mechanisms to guide the adoption of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in institutions and public administration are now commonplace. Yet, most research and policy efforts aimed at understanding the implications of adopting AI tend to prioritize only a handful of ideas; they do not fully connect all the different perspectives and topics that are potentially relevant. In this position paper, we contend that this omission stems, in part, from what we call the 'relational problem' in socio-technical discourse: fundamental ontological issues have not yet been settled—including semantic ambiguity, a lack of clear relations between concepts and differing standard terminologies. This contributes to the persistence of disparate modes of reasoning to assess institutional AI systems, and the prevalence of conceptual isolation in the fields that study them including ML, human factors, social science and policy. After developing this critique, we offer a way forward by proposing a simple policy and research design tool in the form of a conceptual framework to organize terms across fields—consisting of three horizontal domains for grouping relevant concepts and related methods: Operational, Epistemic, and Normative. We first situate this framework against the backdrop of recent socio-technical discourse at two premier academic venues, AIES and FAccT, before illustrating how developing suitable metrics, standards, and mechanisms can be aided by operationalizing relevant concepts in each of these domains. Finally, we outline outstanding questions for developing this relational approach to institutional AI research and adoption.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Applied computing** → **Law, social and behavioral sciences**; • **Computing methodologies** → **Artificial intelligence**; • **Human-centered computing** → *HCI theory, concepts and models.*

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Public Administration, Institutions, Conceptual framework, Socio-Technical Discourse, AIES, FAccT

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1 INTRODUCTION

Public institutions, such as government ministries and executive agencies, are increasingly making use of artificial intelligence (AI), particularly machine learning-driven (ML) systems, with the aim of improving service delivery and informing policymaking [19]. The advanced capabilities of these tools have prompted the recognition that we need new metrics, technical standards and governance mechanisms to evaluate and guide their use. However, while research on institutional AI, research related to the technical as well as ethical, social, political and legal implications of algorithms and computing in public administration, is now commonplace, most work arguably still fails to account for the diverse potential advantages and consequences of adopting AI in a public sector context. Instead, reflecting trends in socio-technical discourse more broadly, many contributions at premier conferences arguably tend to foreground only a handful of topics, perspectives, concepts and methods [2, 5, 9, 14, 34], such as mathematical formulations of outcome fairness in ML applications [17], at the expense of others. How then do we ensure that future research on new metrics, technical standards and governance mechanisms better accounts for all the topics, concepts and methods potentially relevant to the institutional adoption of AI?

In this position paper, we focus on one theoretical issue, which we call the 'relational problem', that has arguably hindered scholarly efforts at the two premier conference venues for socio-technical issues, AIES and FAccT, to comprehensively study AI systems in an institutional context: fundamental ontological issues within the field have not yet been settled—including semantic ambiguity and, more significantly, a lack of clear relations between different topics, perspectives, concepts and methods (henceforth also abbreviated to 'terms and approaches'), leading to differing standard terminologies

across subcommunities. We contend that this failure exasperates the prevalence of disparate modes of reasoning to assess institutional AI systems—such as "formalist algorithmic thinking" in computer science [14]—and contributes to the prevalence of conceptual isolation in the fields that study them including ML, human factors, social science and policy. After developing our argument, we propose a simple research and policy design tool in the form of a conceptual framework to organize terms and approaches across disciplines—consisting of three horizontal domains for grouping relevant concepts and related methods: Operational, Epistemic, and Normative.

Within the context of AIES and FAccT, the utility of our framework derives from the fact that it seeks to be discipline-agnostic; it aims to be instructive for individual policymakers and researchers studying institutional AI systems from a range of disciplines, both in helping with organizing concepts and methods and, more importantly, by drawing attention to whether all potential topics and concepts—by virtue of being relevant to one or more of the three proposed domains—have been accounted for. Our framework therefore aims to achieve two key aims: (1) disciplinary reach, i.e., bridge different subcommunities at AIES, FAccT and elswhere (ML, human factors, social science, policy etc.), and (2) provide impetus for an intellectual shift that reframes how researchers and key stakeholders (decision-makers, policy creators, advocates, etc.) think about and ultimately regulate institutional AI applications.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we motivate our argument and situate it against the backdrop of recent socio-technical discourse at AIES and FAccT. We then introduce our framework in Section 3 and illustrate how developing suitable metrics, standards and mechanisms can be aided by identifying and operationalizing relevant concepts across each of the proposed domains. Finally, in Section 4 we conclude by outlining key questions needed to develop a research agenda for advancing a relational approach to institutional AI research and adoption.

2 THE STATE OF SOCIO-TECHNICAL DISCOURSE

In this section we consider why certain topics, concepts and methods have been disproportionately studied in socio-technical discourse studied and consider the role played by unresolved ontological issues. Importantly, throughout this paper, the word 'method' is taken to mean the different technical or policy measures that may be used to evaluate and guide the use of AI systems (i.e., metrics, mechanisms, standards etc.), either by operationalizing a specific concept (e.g., classification accuracy in the case of performance) or combining a number of concepts into a qualitative framework (e.g., algorithmic impact assessment). Concepts are meanwhile understood both as an abstract idea that offer a point of view for understanding some aspect of experience (e.g., bias), and, relatedly, a mental image that can be operationalized (e.g., measurement bias). As such, a loose parallel can be drawn between our use of the terms concepts and methods, and the terms 'principles and practices' in AI Ethics discourse [22].

2.1 The Double-Edged Sword of AIES and FAccT

As more institutions move to employ AI systems in high stakes decision-making contexts like criminal sentencing, heightened attention has been drawn to the detrimental effects this can have—especially for marginalized and traditionally under-served groups—ranging from simple inefficiencies to major injustices [32]. Biased performance, inscrutable design and the uncritical implementation of complex AI applications have subsequently been identified, among others, as the main causes of these undesirable consequences [6, 10, 29]. More recently, the structural, historical and power disparities that permeate society and necessarily affect the design or adoption of technical systems have also received more attention [4, 5, 40]. Over the last five years, this discourse has matured, and a number of academic venues have become established platforms for computer scientists and scholars from other disciplines to raise awareness of these topics. Yet, this development has arguably been a double-edged sword. On the one side, it has put a bright and much-needed spotlight on socio-technical issues in AI. On the other, it has resulted in certain topics and methods receiving considerable attention, at the expense of other ideas and challenges. This unequal emphasis on particular topics has also characterized the growth of the two premier conferences, AIES and FAccT, which we focus on herein.

Officially, AIES and FAccT seek to consider the ethical ramifications of AI systems (including those used in public administration and social service provision) and their impact on human societies, address general questions that consider perverse implications, distribution of power, and redistribution of welfare and ground research in existing legal requirements. In practice, however, there has been a disproportionate focus on a handful of narrow topics and methods. [17] diagnose this troubling trend most clearly in their four-year analysis of FAccT, finding that there has been an out-sized focus on, among other topics, "quantitative work on fairness, displacing discussions about broader AI policy and governance, both within and across years". This is in spite of the more general way that FAccT defines its aims. Similarly, [5] find that while the goals of the majority of contributions to AIES are often commendable, "their consideration of the negative impacts of AI on traditionally marginalized groups remained shallow", leading them to conclude that there is an overall inadequacy of scholarship in engaging with perspectives that are "not a part of the standard".

To be clear, it is to be expected that different subcommunities and disciplines study and thereby value different topics, concepts and issues. This is, after all, the point of specialization. A problem occurs, however, when fields are meant to be united in studying the same topic (i.e, socio-technical issues in AI systems) but do not acknowledge these differences and fail to integrate ideas from their peers. The result is the use of divergent terminologies and the exasperation of knowledge silos, meaning terms like 'fairness' and 'discrimination' are understood differently by ML researchers than by HCI or AI Ethics scholars [40]. In some cases, this even means that certain highly valued topics and approaches may become embedded in supposedly value-neutral and universally beneficial research, e.g., generalization, quantitative evidence, and efficiency in the case of

ML [4]. This situation threatens to create great challenges for effective understanding, dialogue, and integration between disciplines and academic subcommunities.

2.2 Ontological Issues and The Relational Problem

We are by no means the first to consider whether certain terms and approaches have dominated socio-technical discourse at AIES and FAccT. In fact, there have been a growing number of calls from within the scholarly community to diversify the number of topics studied within recent years. In prior work examining trends in recent proceedings, scholars have offered in-depth analyses of why and how certain topics, such as fairness [2, 7, 15, 23, 30], have been researched more than others [3, 5, 17, 40]. For instance, [40] argue that, because of corporate capture, i.e., conflicts of interest, conference contributions "frequently limit their gaze to the 'technical' part of 'sociotechnical'—the level of data, metadata, or models" and reduce complex concepts like fairness to "dimensions of arbitrary narrowing that both obscure and reproduce structures of social injustice". Similarly,[35] contend that, by abstracting away the social context in which these systems will be deployed, "fair-ML researchers miss the broader context, including information necessary to create fairer outcomes, or even to understand fairness as a concept". [5] meanwhile offer a more sociological explanation, arguing that existing scholarship has been influenced by the centralization of power between highly cited researchers, tech companies, and elite universities, resulting in topics and concepts related to oppressive social structures, the distribution of power, and harm receiving less attention.

Yet, while it is important to acknowledge that sociological factors and economic incentive structures (i.e., scientific funding) clearly influence *what* different topics researchers study [39], here we wish to focus on an altogether more theoretical factor relevant for understanding differences in *how* researchers study the same topic. Specifically, our main contention is that discrepancies and inequalities in the terms and concepts that researchers employ to study institutional AI are, in part, connected to the fact that fundamental ontological issues within socio-technical discourse have not yet been settled. That is, there are semantic ambiguity problems, specifically, a lack of agreed upon definitions for key terms, a lack of clear and consistent relations between topics, concepts and related methods, and differing standard terminologies across subcommunities. [17] draw attention to this problem in passing, noting, for instance, that universally agreed upon definitions are even lacking for foundational terms like 'AI'.

Although the lack of commonly agreed upon definitions within fields is an ongoing problem, we contend that the most troubling development is the failure of research efforts to establish clear relations and make connections between different topics and concepts—especially between those that are easily quantifiable and those that are not. One recent survey of ML research, for instance, found that terms related to user rights and ethical principles, like interpretability, privacy and non-maleficence, "appeared very rarely if at all" compared to performance or efficiency, and "none of the papers mentioned autonomy, justice or respect for persons" [4]. This is despite the fact that these represent topics that are clearly also important when considering the application of ML, as scholars in AI Ethics have long shown. In the case of technical work on measures and methods to improve fairness in AI systems [2], for instance, [23] contend that most so-called 'fairML' efforts happen in isolation and lack "serious engagement with philosophical, political, legal and economic theories of equality". Instead, researchers oversimplify or 'level down' the broader topic of distributive justice into a single evaluation metric that attempts to operationalize fairness, while other topics and approaches (e.g., algorithmic impact assessments that also consider priority and welfare) are minimally discussed or ignored altogether. This results in semantic ambiguity, as concepts like fairness can have multiple definitions and can mean very different things depending who you ask [25].

It is important to re-emphasize that certain concepts and methods have necessarily received disproportionate attention given they currently exert an out-sized influence on scientific progress, public institutions or society more broadly. To stay with the obvious example, ML is actively being used or trialed in myriad different applications and public administration contexts [11], including in healthcare, policing, criminal justice and other so-called high stakes domains [33]—where fairness is inherently important. As such, it is to be expected that ML, fairness and consideration of these high stakes domains has been a considerable focus of proceedings at AIES, FAccT and broader societal discourse at large. The issue we wish to stress is that most work on these topics does not effectively relate the terms and approaches used to other, perhaps less well-studied but potentially equally relevant and important terms and approaches. This results in rich-get-richer and echo-chamber system dynamics in institutional AI research as whole, whereby certain perspectives of important topics (i.g., mathematical definitions of outcome fairness) dominate discussion. Alongside fairML and other related topics (e.g., Explainable AI [20]), some scholars have started to draw attention to this issue in the context of specific subfields or disciplines. [14], for instance, argue that computer scientists, as a result of adopting a formalist mode of reasoning, often do not fully engage with other disciplines when considering the social and political contexts of AI systems. Drawing on studies of sociotechnical systems in Science and Technology Studies, [35] similarly argue that when researchers treat fairness and justice as terms that have meaningful application to technology separate from a social context, they make a category error, or as they posit, an 'abstraction error'. This is because fairness is a property of social and legal systems like employment justice, not a property of the technical tools within a system.

Overall, this ontological failure to explicitly connect terms and approaches, which may be called the 'relational problem'—as it mirrors debates in AI Ethics on how to reframe concepts in relation to those affected [3]—will, if left unaddressed, arguably only worsen the existence of conceptual isolation in the fields that study institutional AI adoption including ML, human factors, social science and policy. In the context of AIES and FAccT, this will in turn likely make it easy for certain concepts (e.g., fairness) and methodological formulations (e.g., mathematical) favored by popular subfields (e.g., ML) to continue dominating discussion. As a result, other topics and perspectives may be pushed further to the margins of discourse

[5] and any definitional consensus may be better described as manufactured rather than genuine [40]. Most importantly, it ultimately means that the development of new metrics, technical standards and governance mechanisms to guide the adoption of AI in public administration ends up reflecting only a small subset of perspectives and concepts pertinent to the complex reality of institutional AI. As a consequence, we are left with, at best, a distorted view of the implications of adopting AI systems and, at worst, the neglect and perpetuation of real-world algorithmic harms and injustice that affect historically disadvantaged or marginalized groups the hardest.

3 A RELATIONAL MULTIDOMAIN FRAMEWORK FOR INSTITUTIONAL AI

How then do we address these ontological issues and ensure that future socio-technical research on new metrics, technical standards and governance mechanisms better reflects all the terms and approaches potentially relevant to the institutional adoption of AI? What is arguably needed is a change in how researchers and policymakers conceptualize the application of AI in institutional contexts to begin with. That is, to move beyond current disparate modes of reasoning, which each do not fully account for the realities of algorithmic impacts, requires a fundamental shift—from a single lens to multiple perspectives—in how to think about all relevant topics, concepts and methods—be it outcome fairness, welfare, performance or accuracy metrics—and how to link them to each other. Given that many concepts employed to discuss socio-technical issues at conferences like AIES and FAccT are fundamentally multi-faceted or discipline-specific, we do not wish to propose new definitions or prescribe which specific terminologies or modes of reasoning should be used. Rather, we use the rest of the paper to propose, as a starting point, a simple policy and research design tool in the form of a conceptual framework to organize terms and approaches across fields.

Our framework consists of three discipline-agnostic domains for grouping relevant concepts and related methods that each have a distinct thematic and semantic scope. We label these: Operational, Epistemic, and Normative. The main aim of our framework is to achieve two specific aims: (1) disciplinary reach, i.e., bridge different perspectives (CS, human factors, social science etc.), and (2) provide impetus for an intellectual shift that encourages researchers and key stakeholders (decision-makers, policy creators, advocates, etc.) to think about institutional AI systems more holistically. Our overarching goal is to offer a way to organize disparate socio-technical research outputs into general thematic categories, making it easier to align and integrate efforts from different scholarly subcommunities. Below we first introduce and define the domains before discussing how they can be integrated and unified into a single framework.

3.1 Grouping Socio-Technical Topics into Three Domains

Our framework is ontological in the sense that is it composed of three domains or meta-concepts that aim to act, both individually and collectively, as guides for researchers to relate and connect different terms and approaches within socio-technical discourse to each other. Importantly, the concepts and terms that can be grouped into one of the three domains are not synonymous but we assume that they are all used to discuss institutional AI systems in a similar way. As such, each domain can loosely be said to function as a semantic field, a set of words related in meaning (i.e., terms used to study institutional AI systems), and are defined by their unique thematic focus, or what we label as 'scope'.

To theorize and define the scope of the three domains we took inspiration from three strands of work. Firstly, social science and human factors research that emphasizes the behavior and beliefs of human agents in influencing the performance of technical systems including AI applications (e.g., [31]). Secondly, computer science work on reasoning about the knowledge-related properties of a technological system [8]. And thirdly, the insight of moral philosophers that questions about the social implications of socio-technical systems including AI applications depends on political decisions about normative issues [12].

3.1.1 Operational Domain. The operational domain aims to represent the terms and approaches related to the routine activities and functionality of institutional AI systems [29]. Its scope is meant to capture concepts that are mainly but not exclusively defined, operationalized and studied in a technical, applied context. More specifically, it is meant to enable researchers to categorize into a single category all relevant concepts that can be employed both as an abstract idea (e.g., 'accuracy') and easily operationalized to quantitatively measure a specific performance attribute of a particular institutional AI system (i.e., 'percentage of correct predictions'). As such, the common characteristic of all the concepts and related methods in this domain, regardless of how they are operationalized, is an emphasis on describing specific functional requirements or attributes of institutional AI systems. This reflects what is arguably unique about the operational domain, namely, it aims to draw attention to concepts that can be conveniently specified in a common technical (mathematical) language or easily quantified, allowing for the succinct description and comparison of specific models or applications.

3.1.2 Epistemic Domain. The scope of the epistemic domain aims to capture knowledge-related terms and approaches connected to a particular AI system or institutional AI in general. That is, the epistemic domain is meant to help researchers and policy-makers group together concepts that seek to describe properties which pertain to the interface between AI applications and human actors. Both in terms of the knowledge, beliefs, and intentions of those using AI applications (e.g., a desire for transparency), and the internal properties of the system itself (e.g., its interpretability). Given that AI systems represent a step-change from earlier ICTs due to their increased technical complexity, among other factors, epistemic domains concepts are likely also useful in delineating different types of AI systems. Relatedly, while the domain seeks to capture terms that are often employed analytically to highlight epistemic issues about institutional AI systems (a lack of reproducibility, openness etc.), it is also meant to account for and help organize methods and concepts operationalized in a technical manner to improve human knowledge of a system (e.g., explainability, interpretability).



Figure 1: Graphic representation of our framework for grouping relevant concepts and related methods relevant to institutional AI adoption. The framework consists of three domains that each have a distinct thematic and semantic scope: Operational, Epistemic, and Normative. These domains can be used to consider AI at all three scales of analytical inquiry: a single AI application (micro), sets of similar applications (meso) and all institutional AI applications considered as a single class (macro). Listed concepts and methods are for illustrative purposes and not exhaustive; example methods (e.g., the metric of classification accuracy) are taken to be contingent on the local application context.

3.1.3 Normative Domain. The meaning and uses of concepts in the normative domain, the final domain we propose, collectively relate to the entitlements, values and principles of political morality that stakeholders and affected groups hold towards a particular AI application or institutional AI in general. The term 'political morality' is used here to refer to normative principles and ideals regulating and structuring the political domain. In the context of institutions, stakeholders may be said to include system developers (e.g., designers, engineers, and domain experts), those who manage and operate them within the public sector (e.g., decision-makers, policy creators, advocates), and end-users affected by the AI system (i.e., individual citizens or specific groups). In some cases, this may include large parts of society [28], as AI systems can increasingly result in individual and collective harms [38]. We anticipate that the normative domain primarily covers concepts that can be understood in two ways. Firstly, those used in a practical ethics sense, such as in bioethics, to stress the values that underlie the safeguarding of individuals (e.g., 'non-maleficence'). Secondly, those used in a legal framing, as in human rights discourse, to discuss the set of entitlements due to all human beings under the rule of law for a particular jurisdiction [18] (e.g., justice). Importantly, while this means concepts and topics in the normative domain may appear to only be relevant to particular disciplines (i.e. AI Ethics), this is by no means the case as normative domain concepts also need to be operationalized by computer science researchers if we are to move from principles to practices [22].

3.2 Integrating the Dimensions

The operational, epistemic and normative domain are each meant to act as independent analytical categories that can be used to help researchers focus on a particular aspect of institutional AI (e.g., knowledge-related issues) and make connections between related concepts (e.g., explainability, transparency, etc.). However, the real utility of this relational approach comes to the fore when each of the three domains are integrated and unified into a unified framework. Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of this. When each domain is considered together in this polycentric manner, the emphasis is on the conceptual need to always think horizontally when proposing new methods or discussing socio-technical issues in AI systems including institutional AI applications. That is, rather than expecting scholars to employ every single concept in a particular domain when discussing how to evaluate an AI system, the framework aims to encourage researchers to connect concepts and methods across the three domains. In practice, this means that ML researchers currently working on fairML, for instance, are reminded to consider how fairness relates to other normative domain concepts like welfare and take into account the need to consider

epistemic domain concepts like interpretability and reproducibility, alongside accuracy, efficiency and other operational domain concepts. Similarly, the framework reminds AI Ethics and policy scholars working on transparency to link their work laterally to other epistemic domain concepts and not ignore operational domain concepts like robustness and reliability.

Crucially, the framework does not seek to prescribe which specific concepts in each domain are most important or which related methods are most useful and relevant. As such, each of the example concepts and methods discussed herein and listed in Figure 1 are cited primarily for illustrative purposes. Different disciplines and academic subcommunities will, as already discussed, rightly study and value particular topics, and certain terms and approaches necessarily receive more scholarly attention. In light of this, the framework aims to act primarily as a discipline-agnostic design tool that can help researchers and policymakers organize diverse concepts across fields and motivate them to adopt a more relational, holisitic approach. Hence, we do not attempt to list all of the concepts and methods that fall into each domain. Rather, by outlining and specifying the scope of each domain, we encourage researchers that study institutional AI including scholars in ML, human factors, social science, policy and AI ethics, to start identifying and connecting additional concepts themselves. While we have tried to define the scope of each of the domains in a narrow enough way so that any socio-technical concept falls into a single domain, certain complex concepts may naturally span more than one domain. 'Accountability', for example, is often defined too imprecisely and can pertain to a variety of values, practices, and measures. It is considered by some scholars as a necessary feature of a trustworthy AI system, while others argue that only humans can be accountable [26]; depending on whether they are defined in function-based terms or not, concepts like accountability or trustworthiness [37] may thus be considered to be an operational and or normative domain concept.

A further important clarification pertains to how various methods may relate to particular concepts. More specifically, while foundational concepts like accuracy are more or less taken to have universal relevance when it comes to the institutional adoption of AI systems, differences in moral values [1], including with regards to the AI use case [27], and practical contextual factors (i.e., the type and number of systems that are institutionally adopted) additionally means that certain concepts may in practice be more important than others. As such, the exact concepts and related methods which are most relevant to each domain are necessarily contingent on the application context. That is, while we envisage that our framework can be used to study and evaluate AI systems at different scales of analytical inquiry, when the object of study is a specific AI system designed for a local institutional application context, we nevertheless anticipate that the most relevant methods to operationalize particular concepts may change. For instance, data documentation checklists and model reporting cards [21] may be considered sufficient when seeking to apply operational and epistemic domain concepts like reliability and interpretability, respectively, to understand the adoption of a recommender system to provide suggested links on a local government domain. However, if a similar system is used by a national healthcare provider to recommend medication, additional methods may be necessary (e.g. mechanisms like human-in-the-loop operating protocols).

3.3 Applying the framework in practice

Overall, our framework is intended to help researchers and policymakers within various fields engaged in studying and regulating institutional AI systems, such as AI-assisted decision support systems or criminal justice tools. Specifically, it is meant to act as a starting point for conceptualizing the desired attributes of AI systems, and thus purposely aims to foreground the need to integrate ideas, alongside being applicable to various real-world examples of AI systems, and remaining stable and useful over time as a conceptual model [24]. In context of AIES and FAccT, the framework's utility therefore derives from the fact that it seeks to be discipline-agnostic; it aims to be instructive for individual researchers studying institutional AI systems from a range of disciplines, both in helping with organizing terms and approaches, and, perhaps more importantly, by drawing attention to whether all potential intellectual and moral perspectives—by virtue of being relevant to one or more of the three proposed domains—have been accounted for.

Despite the theoretical nature of our framework, we anticipate that it can practically help address some of the ontological issues we outline, such as as the need to bridge quantifiable and non-quantifiable terms and concepts, when it is viewed as a simple policy or research design tool. That is, we contend that the framework can be used as a strategy to help researchers go about deciding which terms and approaches are relevant for studying a single or set of AI systems and ensuring they assess these from multiple perspectives. This can be achieved by relying on the four levels of abstraction (see Figure 1) to deductively guide the process of conceptualization. In other words, after first relying on the three meta-concepts (domain) to ensure all types of concepts covering different thematic areas (scope) are accounted for, researchers can then choose particular terms (concepts) that are most appropriate to the system under consideration, before finally operationalizing these (methods), depending on the application context.

As an example, consider the use of a recommendation system, special-purpose software designed to suggest content to a user of an online service, in an institutional context, such as for suggesting links to citizens on a pubic domain government website. Although recommendation systems like Google Search's autocomplete function and Amazon's recommendations for related products are well-known examples of AI systems, they carry a number of ethical implications and the use of similar systems within public institutions adds another layer of ethical complexity [16], as is the case for the UK's GOV.UK, which uses machine learning to guide guide users through complex service journeys [36]. To understand and regulate such public service recommender systems, the framework encourages authors to consider operational as well as epistemic and normative topics, ensuring they are situated within the fairness, accountability, and transparency discourse [13]. Specifically, it reminds authors to consider how epistemic topics like explainability, interpretability and reproducibility may be important for ensuring a system is democratic. Similarly, it reminds authors to also consider how fairness, equality, and welfare may need to be considered to ensure the system meets legal accessibility requirements (e.g.,

can be accessed on legacy devices) and does not infringe privacy concerns by relying on user data or provide biased outputs. Measuring and evaluating each of these criteria may in turn involve multiple methods (i.e., metrics, standards, and mechanisms) that will be contingent on the application context. For instance, for operationalizing normative concepts like equality, justice and fairness, researchers and policymakers will need to rely on the fundamental rights enshrined in law for the particular jurisdiction where a system is being implemented; in some cases these may be more or less universal (e.g., the prohibition of discrimination).

4 MAPPING A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR A MULTIDOMAIN APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONAL AI

Our conceptual study has primarily aimed to shed light on theoretical, specifically, ontological issues in socio-technical discourse, focusing in particular on contributions to AIES and FAccT, and considered how we might begin to resolve them. While these conferences continue to be dominated by a subset of topics and methods, there are signs of a shift, evidenced, for instance, by the gradual but significant increase in legal, social science, and ethics papers over the years, alongside ML papers about fairness [17]. Yet, the fundamental relational problem we described in Section 2 will arguably remain until scholars start actively integrating more perspectives, concepts and methods from their peers.

While we hope our framework can enable all researchers at AIES, FAccT and elsewhere to adopt a more holisitic approach to conceptualizing and evaluating institutional AI systems, we wish to stress that it is only a first step. We must not only consider the use of multiple domains to assess and evaluate institutional AI systems but also understand how each works together. As such, we have identified 10 key outstanding questions that we anticipate will be key for developing this multidomain relational approach to institutional AI research and adoption:

(1) Do we need to further delineate and operationalize the operational, epistemic, and normative domains as tangible concepts, or is it enough for these to act as abstract categories of analysis?
(2) To what extent does there need to be scholarly consensus on how we decide whether concepts fall into a particular domain and not into a different one?
(3) Should the importance of different concepts and metrics in a particular domain be considered? And if so, how?
(4) How much attention and focus on one domain at the expense of the other domains is acceptable?
(5) Is it of value to consider how we can move to unite each of the domains into a single category?
(6) How can lessons across domains be captured to develop their definitions?
(7) Which methods in each domain are least contingent on the application context?
(8) How can we decide which methods are most appropriate for operationalizing a particular concept?
(9) What other unique domains may exist that capture enough additional concepts to be worthy of inclusion as new domains?
(10) How can be empirically quantify the strength of relations between different concepts and methods?

5 CONCLUSION

This position paper has considered why most research and policy efforts aimed at understanding the implications of institutional AI tend to prioritize only a handful of ideas, and how this relates to the state of socio-technical discourse more broadly. Specifically, we have sought to highlight one fundamental theoretical issue, which we call the relational problem, that has arguably hindered scholarly efforts at two premier socio-technical conference venues, AIES and FAccT, to comprehensively study AI systems: fundamental ontological issues within the field have not yet been settled—including semantic ambiguity and, more significantly, a lack of clear relations between different topics, perspectives, concepts and methods, leading to differing standard terminologies across subcommunities. We contend that this failure has contributed to the prevalence of conceptual isolation in the fields that study them including ML, human factors, social science and policy, among others. In response, we have offered a way forward by proposing a simple policy and research design tool in the form of a conceptual framework to organize terms across fields—consisting of three horizontal domains for grouping relevant concepts and related methods: Operational, Epistemic, and Normative.

The main contribution of our research is providing a first step for those studying institutional AI to connect topics and consider whether all relevant topics and concepts have been accounted for. Future work will benefit from further considering the ontological ontological and epistemological underpinnings of the relational problem. While we have focused on understanding how the existence of ontological issues in socio-technical discourse ensures research remains fragmented, several factors may explain how this arises to begin with, relating to the relative newness of the field, the transdisciplinary nature of the work, the sociopolitical dynamics of academic research, the influence of industry, to name a few. A fruitful avenue of inquiry will be to consider each of these interact, what other plausible contributors are, and what the implications are for applying the framework we put forth.

In closing, we hope our contribution benefits the AIES and FAccT community by facilitating a constructive dialog around the challenges we face as a diverse, interdisciplinary field aiming to address sensitive, high-stakes socio-technical issues that will only grow in magnitude and significance in the years to come. In these hotly contested spaces with no clear answers, by analyzing these problems across three domains, we contend that we are able to more clearly see the many interacting parts at play, in order to create more functional, ethically sound institutional AI systems.

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Flickr Africa: Examining Geo-Diversity in Large-Scale, Human-Centric Visual Data

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ABSTRACT

Biases in large-scale image datasets are known to influence the performance of computer vision models as a function of geographic context. To investigate the limitations of standard Internet data collection methods in low- and middle-income countries, we analyze human-centric image geo-diversity on a massive scale using geotagged Flickr images associated with each nation in Africa. We report the quantity and content of available data with comparisons to population-matched nations in Europe as well as the distribution of data according to fine-grained intra-national wealth estimates. Temporal analyses are performed at two-year intervals to expose emerging data trends. Furthermore, we present findings for an "othering" phenomenon as evidenced by a substantial number of images from Africa being taken by non-local photographers. The results of our study suggest that further work is required to capture image data representative of African people and their environments and, ultimately, to improve the applicability of computer vision models in a global context.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies** → *Computer vision*; **Image and video acquisition**.

KEYWORDS

Geo-diversity, AI Ethics, Computer Vision, Machine Learning, Africa, Datasets

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1 INTRODUCTION

Data collection and processing are crucial to the machine learning (ML) pipeline and are the source of many biases in AI systems, which have been shown to largely stem from a lack of diverse representation in training datasets [7]. Currently, most large-scale computer vision datasets are collected via webscraping and subsequent data cleaning. For example, the ImageNet database ([12]; 42607 citations per Google Scholar, accessed Sept. 14, 2022) is comprised of images sourced from search engines like Google and Flickr, while the COCO dataset ([20]; 26751 citations per Google Scholar, accessed Sept. 14, 2022) is comprised of images sourced entirely from Flickr. Thus, biases inherent to Flickr influence the performance of models for visual tasks as diverse as object classification, pose estimation, instance segmentation, image captioning, and beyond. Some of these dataset biases have been explored in detail: for ImageNet and the Flickr-sourced Open Images dataset [19] it has been shown that data from India, China, and African and South-East Asian countries is vastly underrepresented despite their large populations [14]; while for COCO, data has been shown to be heavily skewed towards lighter-skinned and male individuals [37]. In particular, such biases impact the applicability of models in a global context. For instance, DeVries et al. [14] manually sourced image data from 264 globally-distributed households and demonstrated how object recognition model performance drops when applied in lower-income nations. Motivated by the popularity of datasets sourced using Flickr data, we here analyze **1.5 million** geotagged images in the Flickr database to deeply explore its representation of African people and settings (see Figure 1).

In this paper, we aim to highlight the limitations of webscraping generic and human-centric[1] image data from Africa for ML training purposes. We analyze image data for every African nation with direct comparisons to population-matched higher-GDP European nations and show that there is far less data available from Africa. We report the distribution of African geotagged image data as a function of fine-grained, intra-national wealth estimates [8] and assess data with respect to license restrictions, population size, nominal GDP, Internet usage, and official languages. Additionally, we collect crowdsourced annotations to explore image content, and provide evidence for an "othering" phenomenon as the majority of African geotagged images we analyzed were taken by foreigners, while the opposite trend is shown for select European nations. Such results highlight the importance of considering geodiversity metrics beyond ancestry/ethnicity of individuals within images and, moreover, how the mechanisms by which images are obtained can quantitatively and qualitatively affect how the image corpus represents the world (*e.g.* imposing a "Western gaze"). Overall, we find that Flickr provides a very limited and skewed representation of African countries which likely contributes to many of the biases in models trained on popular, large-scale image datasets.

*Authors contributed equally to this research.
This work was done when Keziah was an intern at Sony AI.

[1]That is: involving people, their interactions with each other, and/or their activities in the environments in which they live.

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

(a) Africa: Image data distribution colored by RWI.



(b) Africa: Total number of geotagged images.



(c) Madagascar: RWI group overlaid with image count per region.



(d) Algeria: RWI group overlaid with image count per region.

Figure 1: A collection of maps displaying relative wealth index (RWI) and geolocation of Flickr Africa images via country name query. Tolerance distances from geotag to nearest RWI-labeled point are: ((a, b) dist: $\leq 300km$; (c, d) $\leq 10km$). (b) Nations are colored according to total number of geotagged images and the percentages (rounded to one decimal place) indicate the percentage of geotagged images out of the total image count per nation. South Africa had the highest number of geotagged images and Sao Tome and Principe had the smallest number of geotagged images while Cape Verde had the highest percentage of geotagged images and Rwanda had the lowest percentage of geotagged images.

1.1 Related work

While prior works have explored diversity beyond Western nations [24, 28], studies of access to, and applicability of, AI systems in Africa remain limited [1, 2]. Scholars such as Abebe et al. [1] highlight the challenges of data sharing practices in Africa, such as those concerning trust, awareness, and infrastructure, and note that "The continent's plural and at times divergent norms, practices, and traditions furthermore complicate the African data access and sharing ecosystem." Computer vision researchers have produced diverse datasets in an effort to reduce model biases and assess fairness outcomes (*e.g.* [16]), with some centered specifically on geographic and contextual diversity [3, 5, 9, 10, 14, 36]. Such data collection involves trade-offs, however [35]; while manual data collection enables desired contextual diversity specifications to be met, it is expensive and frequently limits access to low-income regions (see *e.g.* [14]). Thus, researchers have explored more automated methods of scraping diverse data from web platforms and public media, producing datasets such as the Geo-Diverse Visual Commonsense Reasoning dataset (GD-VCR) [36], GeoImageNet [5] , Functional Map of the World (fMoW) [10], YFCC100M [26], and Open Images Extended [18], among others. Wang et al. [27] construct an ImageNet-style image data hierarchy across languages and cultures beyond English for visually grounded reasoning. While valuable, these initiatives have not deeply explored intra-national diversity, such as according to regional wealth estimates. Likewise, those datasets which utilize geolocation alone may result in a stereotypical portrayal of people in developing nations.

Geodiversity has been studied from various angles beyond dataset production. Scholars have proposed methods for measuring geodiversity in image datasets [25, 29] or performing geography-aware learning [4]. Zhao et al. [37] expose the propogation of racial and

cultural biases into model predictions, while Mandal et al. [21] study geographical bias in image search and retrieval. Denton et al. [13] highlight the importance of annotators' lived experiences on their annotation results.

Additionally, Crandall et al. [11] and Johnson et al. [15], among other researchers, have studied volunteered-geographic information (VGI) and its relation to localness in Flickr user-generated content. At metropolitan-area and individual landmark spatial scales, Crandall et al. [11] use textual and visual image data to develop a classification technique which automatically exposes the relation between location and content in six months of Flickr-scraped images. Johnson et al. [15] define four localness metrics: n-days, plurality, and location-field, to investigate the localness of user-generated content on Flickr, Twitter, and Swarm. In particular, their work assessed the Flickr-scraped YFCC100M dataset, containing images from thousands of users in the contiguous United States, whereas we focus on Africa and a few population-matched European countries. Notably, the authors found that with 31.1% recall accuracy, only 40.7% of Flickr images inspected with the "location field" localness metric (photographer self-reported location information) were local.

2 METHODOLOGY

2.1 Data Collection

2.1.1 Flickr Africa. For each nation in Africa, we utilized Flickr queries to construct a dataset of images and associated metadata. Using the FlickrAPI, we scraped images and associated metadata from Flickr between dates 2004-02-10 and 2022-02-10 (18 years) by querying by country name (*e.g.* "*Togo*") and the country name + people (*e.g.* "*Togo people*"), with the latter querying choice motivated by construction methods of related large image datasets (*e.g.* COCO, which utilizes the Flickr query "person"). We scraped Flickr data for 54 African countries: {*Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic (CAF), Chad, Comoros, Ivory Coast, The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia,* and *Zimbabwe*}. Utilizing Flickr metadata associated with each image, we generated 108 *csv* images data files (2 per country, associated with each query) with values for the following variables: {*"license", "title", "datetaken", "image_url", "country", "city", "tags", "latitude", "longitude", "rwi of nearest point", "distance to nearest rwi labelled point (km)", "latitude of nearest point",* and *"longitude of nearest point"*}. City and country information were determined by reverse geo-locating the longitude-latitude values provided in the image metadata using open-source reverse geocode ([23]; accuracy analyses in [17]). All data is available at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7133542. The RWI data is described below. Total image counts were recorded and images without valid geotags were excluded.

2.1.2 Population-matched European countries. The data collection process was repeated for four European nations. In the interest of comparing data availability and content to higher-GDP European nations, we chose the following countries as a function of similar population size ([30, 31, 33]): Switzerland and Sierra Leone (GDP: 841.97k vs. 4.27k); Cyprus and Djibouti (GDP: 27.73k vs. 3.84k); Finland and Central African Republic (CAF) (GDP: 297.62k vs. 2.65k); and Slovenia and Lesotho (GDP: 63.65k vs. 2.56k). For all 58 countries we collected data pertaining to percentage of internet users [32], nominal GDP [31], population size [30, 33] and official languages [34].

2.1.3 Relative Wealth Estimates. Fine-grained relative wealth estimates were associated with each geotagged image. To assess the image distribution according to local wealth estimates, we utilize the relative wealth index (RWI) data collected from Low and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs) by Facebook's Data for Good project [8]. RWI scores are normalized by nation, so the data should only be utilized for intra-national wealth analyses. The RWI dataset contains relative wealth distribution for 49 African countries, such that the following countries are excluded from our original list of nations: {*Somalia, Seychelles, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan,* and *South Sudan*}. Therefore, when analyzing the relationship of RWI to geotagged images, these four countries are excluded. RWI data is provided in the form of 3-lettered iso-codes and the following variables are provided: *"quadkey", "latitude", "longitude", "rwi", and "error"*; Nominatim API [22] was utilized to assign and add variables *"country", "city"* to the data files. Using k-nearest neighbour, we computed the nearest RWI-labeled geographic location of each image. Figure1a shows the distribution of RWI-labeled geotagged images with a 300km maximum tolerance limit between the image geotag and the nearest RWI-labeled location.

2.1.4 Manual Content Annotation. Crowdsourced annotations were collected for six additional image features.

We used Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) to collect annotations describing image contents. Each Human Intelligence Task (HIT) involved 21 images, with six binary questions per image as shown in Figure 2. The binary questions required the annotator label the image according to: indoor vs. outdoor setting, public vs. private setting, nature vs. manmade setting, the presence of people, real vs. synthetic image type, and offensive vs. inoffensive content. Below were our definitions of the terms or labels;

- An indoor image is typically within the confines of a building or transportation means, e.g., inside a house, restaurant, or car.
- A private image is taken from a household or residential setting, e.g., kitchen or bathroom.
- A nature image predominantly contains nature or contents within a natural environment, e.g., images of a sky, ocean, water, people and animals outside of towns and cities.
- A real image is not a painting, an image of another image, or an otherwise synthetically generated image.
- An offensive image contains abuse/violence, nudity/suggestive content, hate symbols/writings, and or rude gestures.

We compensated workers at a rate of $15 USD/hour. We sourced each annotation from three different annotators and chose the



Figure 2: Sample AMT task page which annotators utilized to label binary attributes pertaining to image content. Each HIT involved interaction with an introductory instructional page followed by 21 task pages similar to the one shown above.

majority consensus value, excluding those images marked "Unsure". To ensure high annotation quality, we recruited workers with at least 95% acceptance rating and completion of 1000+ prior tasks. We randomly inserted a gold standard image within each set of 20 standard images to assess annotator performance; if the worker failed on this test image, we discarded the annotations but still paid the worker for their contribution.

2.2 Limitations of Our Approach

We acknowledge four notable limitations of our method. First, we recognize that geolocation data (longitude, latitude) is inherently unreliable. Values may be modified or removed by the Flickr user or otherwise not reflect the location of capture, while reverse geolocation methods are computationally expensive and often fail, particularly with geographic locations close to region borders. This motivates our use of both geotags and country name tags for cross-validation of location, though this restricts us to fewer data samples overall. Secondly, to determine location of photographers to assess localness, we relied on photographers volunteered information of their location from their profile metadata. This doesn't take into account confounding factors like an immigrant visiting their home nation. Additionally, some forms of geodiversity are difficult or impossible to determine from visual inspection alone, such as an individual's gender, ethnicity, or religion. Finally, we were limited to obtaining data using only two queries, namely, by country name or country name + "people". We anticipate future work exploring a wider variety of query terms, both in English and local languages; here, no correlation was determined between dominant national languages and geotagged image availability.

2.3 Ethical Considerations

We note that although the Flickr images analyzed here are all publicly viewable, we show that most have the Flickr default license of "All Rights Reserved". Thus, we have opted to provide image URLs in lieu of images for direct download to avoid duplication of protected content, particularly in the event that a Flickr user chooses to remove or modify the permissions of an image. We acknowledge the weaknesses of this method in terms of consent, as public Flickr images are typically not taken by those in the images (as pointed out by Birhane and Prabhu [6]); likewise, Flickr users may wish to avoid the utilization of their images for research purposes. Given that our objective is to critique large-scale image dataset curation strategies which do not respect image licenses (*e.g.* the methodology for generating the COCO dataset), we deemed it justifiable to perform basic analyses on protected images and to build awareness regarding widespread license violations in standard AI training pipelines.

3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

3.1 Data Availability and Geographic Distribution

There were very few geotagged images from Africa, as shown in Figures 3a and 3b. In terms of total geotagged image counts with



Figure 3: Geotagged image counts by nation and respective RWI regions for (a) "query-by-country name" and (b) "query-by-country name+people". Nations are colored according to dominant RWI group (upper, middle, or lower wealth group) from which most images were sourced. Images mainly came from middle RWI groups ($G4$, $G5$, $G6$ and $G7$). The numbers denote the number of geotagged images. Countries that didn't have RWI data are in grey.



Figure 4: Plots showing the number of geotagged images as a function of (a) the percentage of Internet users in the country, and (b) the nominal GDP of the country. Data points are colored according to national dominant language class (see Section 3.1). In general, the number of geotagged images increased with increase internet usage and GDP, with no observable trend in language class; "STP" denotes the country Sao Tome and Principe.

Table 1: Number of geotagged and total images, and percentage (rounded to 2 decimal places) of geotagged images for the five countries with the highest percentage of geotagged images according to query type.

	query-by-name		
Country	#geotagged	#all images	%geotagged
Cape Verde	11,465	43,283	26.49
DRC	5,614	21,560	26.04
South Africa	128,294	513,082	25.00
Algeria	25,849	105,254	24.56
Republic of Congo	7,581	33,438	22.67

	query-by-name+people		
Country	#geotagged	#all images	%geotagged
Burkina Faso	3,691	12,990	28.41
DRC	1,850	7,028	26.32
Republic of Congo	2,110	8,249	25.58
Cape Verde	1,333	5,390	24.73
Botswana	1,085	4,664	23.26

Table 2: Number of geotagged and total images, and percentage (rounded to 2 decimal places) of geotagged images for the five countries with the lowest percentage of geotagged images according to query type.

	query-by-name		
Country	#geotagged	#all images	%geotagged
Lesotho	5,121	43,282	11.83
Swaziland	8,699	75,631	11.50
Somalia	11,296	101,989	11.08
Burundi	3,113	39,888	7.80
Rwanda	17,443	250,469	6.96

	query-by-name+people		
Country	#geotagged	#all images	%geotagged
Zambia	3,103	33,063	9.39
Equatorial Guinea	168	2,081	8.07
Gabon	476	7,286	6.53
Burundi	533	9,862	5.40
Rwanda	3,461	76,521	4.52

query-by-name and query-by-name+people from African nations, South Africa (128, 294 & 46, 021) and Egypt (105, 996 & 32, 869) had the highest counts, and Equatorial Guinea (1, 293 & 168) and Sao Tome and Principe (776 & 116) had the lowest counts. Cape Verde had the highest percentage of geotagged images (26.49%) from query-by-name and Burkina Faso (28.41%) had the highest from query-by-name+people. By contrast, Rwanda had the lowest percentage of geotagged images (6.96%, 4.52%) from both query-by-name and query-by-name+people. African nations with the highest and lowest percentages of geotagged images are summarized in Table 1 and Table 2.

Thus, the low number of African geotagged images indicates the ineffectiveness of Flickr scraping as a data collection methodology in this region and, therefore, a need to explore alternative geodiverse data collection methods, *e.g.* utilizing manual data collection.

The population-matched European countries had higher numbers and percentages of geotagged images than the corresponding African countries, as is further emphasized in Table 3. For example, with query-by-name, despite relatively similar population sizes, the percentage change of the number of geotagged images from Sierra Leone to Switzerland is 1673.48%, that is, 18× as many total geotagged images as Sierra Leone as shown in Table 3.

Thus, African countries had far fewer images (both geotagged and non-geotagged) than the corresponding European countries of similar population size. We recommend that computer vision experts be cognizant of this discrepancy in Flickr scraped datasets and to consider the corresponding potential for bias when training computer vision models.

We analyzed the statistical effect of factors that might potentially affect taking, uploading and tagging images on Flickr; population-size, internet usage, official language, and countries' GDP.

In general, the number of geotagged images increased with population size (correlation: 0.412 & 0.538, query-by-name and query-by-name+people respectively), internet usage (0.474 & 0.385), and GDP (0.599 & 0.748); the latter two are shown in Figure 4. An investigation of the effect of these variables on the number of geotagged images was found to be statistically significant: (population size: $p\text{-value} = 0.0019$ & $p\text{-value} = 0.000119$, query-by-name and query-by-name+people respectively), (internet usage: $p\text{-value} = 0.00029$ & $p\text{-value} = 0.003999$), and (GDP: $p\text{-value} = 0.160$ & $p\text{-value} = 0.059$). By contrast, official language was not found to have a meaningful correlation to the number of geotagged images ($p\text{-value} = 0.2021$ & $p\text{-value} = 0.846$). Because image dataset queries are typically done in English, to assess the impact of dominant national languages relative to English on geotagged data availability, we coded each of the countries' official languages ([34]) according to five categories for analysis: 1- (English is the only official language), 2- (English is among the two official languages), 3- (English among atleast three official languages), 4- (English not among atmost three official languages), and 5- (English not among atleast three official languages). No correlation was determined for any language category.

Thus, when data collection is required in regions with lower population size, internet usage, and/or GDP, we recommend the use of local, manual data collection techniques in lieu of webscraping whenever feasible. Additionally, RWI information may be useful when assessing diverse areas for data collection.

3.2 Tags and Licenses: Query-Based and Applicability Limitations

The use of both country name tags and geotags (latitude/longitude) was found to be necessary to ensure data was accurately sourced from the country of interest. The naïve country name querying method is particularly limiting when applied to certain nations, such as *Chad*, *Guinea*, and *Republic of Congo*. Images from query by *Chad* were predominantly geotagged from *United States* (54.63%), *United Kingdom* (16.58%), and *Canada* (9.30%), with only 5.14% of the images coming from *Chad* according to geotag location results. In total images from query by *Chad* were geotagged from 129 countries. Likewise, images from query by *Guinea* predominantly came from *Papua New Guinea* (29.97%) and *United States* (10.84%), with geotags from 190 countries. Finally, image geotags from query by *Republic of Congo* mainly reflected the following countries; *Congo, The Democratic Republic of the* (42.14%), *United Kingdom* (11.34%),

Table 3: Number of geotagged and total images, and percentage (rounded to 2 decimal places) of geotagged images for population-matched African and European nations (query-by-name) side-by side, e.g Switzerland and Sierra Leone on line 1.

European Countries				
Country	population	#geotagged	#all images	%geotagged
Switzerland	8.75M	129,518	535,843	24.17
Finland	5.55M	119,901	522,637	22.94
Slovenia	2.11M	86,630	371,584	23.31
Cyprus	918.10k	77,826	371,504	20.95

African Countries				
Country	population	#geotagged	#all images	%geotagged
Sierra Leone	8.30M	7,303	52,530	13.90
CAF	5.60M	2,954	19,901	14.84
Lesotho	2.10M	5,121	43,282	11.83
Djibouti	976.11k	5,179	36,029	14.37



(a) License information for query-by-name



(b) License information for query-by-name+people

Figure 5: Bar charts showing the total count of each Flickr license type for the entire image datasets as a function of (a) "query-by-name" and (b) "query-by-name+people". The most restrictive license type is by far the most common, "All Rights Reserved", likely because it is the Flickr default option.

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and *United States* (7.55%).
Thus, we conclude that reliance upon country name queries is insufficient for constructing a geodiverse dataset in the absence of more robust geolocation data. We recommend that data collectors consider using RWI data to source more geographically diverse visual data.

We furthermore report the most frequent tags as the name of the place where the image was taken, for example "Africa" and the country name, in addition to image contents. The least frequent tags were usually those in foreign languages and whose meanings were hard to decipher because of multiple concatenated words.
Thus, in an African context, the utilization of image tags alone to generate datasets with specific image content may be less reliable due to the variable nature of selected tags; we believe this warrants future exploration.

Additionally, the vast majority of images with query-by-name and query-by-name+people respectively are licensed as "All Rights Reserved" (80.46%, 81.99%), indicating the Flickr default setting when images are uploaded to the platform (see Figure 5).
Thus, those constructing datasets using Flickr Africa data must be aware that most images are unavailable for model training and evaluation without copyright violations, thereby further limiting ethical access to geographically diverse data.

3.3 Geodiversity by RWI

To assess the impact of wealth on the availability of geotagged image data, we examine image counts by RWI values binned into 10 percentile groups, $G1$-$G10$. For most nations, the majority of image data comes from the middle RWI regions ($G4$, $G5$, $G6$ and $G7$) and the least from low RWI regions ($G1$, $G2$ and $G3$). However, this is not always the case, *e.g.* Madagascar and Algeria from which data is sourced from low-income areas (along main roads close to national parks) or high-income areas (in major cities), respectively.
Thus, RWI has potential as a mechanism for constructing geo-diverse datasets in future work.

3.4 Image Content

By utilizing crowdsourced annotations, we examine 16,000 images' content data across 2,000 images from each population-matched African and European nation pair (identical to the image subset in Section 3.5). Sample images by attribute and results for matched African/European nation pairs are shown in Figure 6a for each binary attribute with the exception of "offensive" vs. "inoffensive" content and with manually obscured human faces. We collected information about these six attributes to gauge the applicability of African-sourced image datasets for various computer vision tasks: *e.g.* the presence of people for human-centric tasks such as pose estimation, body part segmentation or face detection; the prevalence of indoor/private settings for specific object recognition tasks; or real/appropriate image content for training dataset viability. Likewise, we originally hypothesized that African images were more likely to be taken by foreigners (which was found to be supported by the data; see Section 3.5); this motivated the count of nature-centric images.

The AMT results revealed that query-by-name images from both African and European countries were predominantly "real" (93.47% and 91.94%), "inoffensive" (88.51% and 89.41%), "outdoor" (77.89% and 79.28%), "public" (90.27% and 90.19%), and "nature" (63.68% and 62.96%) images. There were negligible variations across nations for the percentage of "real', "outdoor", "public", and "nature" images. However, as shown in Figure 6b, nations varied in percentage of people in images, and in general most nations' images did not contain people. For example, 69% of Sierra Leone's 2000 sampled geotagged images contained people, while only 33% of Djibouti's



Figure 6: (a) Sample images sourced from African nations, and (b) image content percentages for select African and European nations, according to AMT workers reporting across six binary attributes. Workers were asked to report if the images contained people, public settings, nature content, outdoor settings, and inoffensive content, and if they appeared to be real images. Image content was found to be similar percentage-wise across different nations, although far fewer images overall were captured in the population-matched African nations in comparison to corresponding European nations. Images displayed here were selected among those with permissible licenses with face obfuscation for display purposes only.

2000 sampled geotagged images contained people.

Thus, although no major differences between African and European image content were observed according to the six attributes considered, we believe these findings are important in the context of data regarding data quantity. Given that image content was fairly similar across most attributes annotated, and there exist far fewer geotagged images from Africa (see Table 3), we anticipate insufficient African data availability for certain computer vision tasks. For example, the lower prevalence of images captured in "private" and "indoor" settings indicates *e.g.* household object image data inaccessibility, which thereby impacts downstream object recognition system models consistent with the findings of DeVries et al. [14].

3.5 Local vs. Non-Local Representation

Beyond analyzing the image content of the 2, 000 randomly-sampled images from each of the 8 nations, we examined the local vs. non-local status of those Flickr users who captured and uploaded the



Figure 7: Bar chart showing the percentage out of 2,000 images from each population-matched African/European nation pair via query-by-name as taken by locals (blue) and tourists (red), according to Flickr users' reported locations. The percent change from local to tourist percentage value is additionally indicated for each nation. Images from African countries were predominantly taken by foreigners whereas those from higher nominal GDP European countries were predominantly taken by locals. "CAF" indicates the country Central African Republic.



Figure 8: A comparison of the number of geotagged images from select African and European nations in approximately 2-year time ranges, as queried by country name. In general, a high number of images were uploaded in the dates in range 2012-2014, with the exception of Switzerland which had high upload volume in 2020-2022.

geotagged images. An assessment of the residence or origin of the Flickr users revealed that for the African geotagged nations, images were far more likely to be taken by foreigners than locals whereas the opposite trend was observed for higher-GDP European nations, according to comparisons between geotags and Flickr users' reported locations. For Sierra Leone, +169% of images were captured by foreigners compared to locals, while for Switzerland it was -31%. The same trend applies to Djibouti and Cyprus (+335% and -49%) and CAF and Finland (+272% and -49%); results are reported in Figure 7. A random inspection of the Flickr map[2] also further shows that images geotagged in Africa are less likely to be taken by the locals.

Thus, the prevalence of non-local representation may explain the image content results described in the previous section, as Flickr users from similar backgrounds may contribute image data from both Africa and Europe. AI practitioners should be wary of stereotyped representations of African life within such datasets given that these images are typically taken by foreigners in public, outdoor locations. Additionally, current methodologies for image dataset collection are unlikely to capture visual data pertaining to the private, daily life of African people nor visual information the locals of each country consider to be important, resulting in biases propagated by AI systems trained on such data.

3.6 Temporal Analysis

We performed a temporal analysis to investigate and contextualize the data in time according to data quantity, relative wealth index

[2]When we inspected the map (https://www.flickr.com/map/) on 06-16-2023, 2/2 of the geotagged images were taken by France and Spanish photographers

(RWI) at location of capture, license type and Flickr user origin. We studied the geotagged images distribution in the in approximately 2-year spans time ranges.

Number of geotagged images. In general, there were relatively fewer geotagged images in the years 2004-2006 and 2020-2022, as shown in Figure 8 for population-matched African/European nations. The image distribution could be the result of factors including less internet penetration and popularity of Flickr from 2004-2006 reducing image uploads, and the COVID-19 pandemic limiting outdoor activities from 2020-2022. This trend held in all analyzed countries with the exception of Switzerland; there, the highest number of images was uploaded in the date range 2020-2022, as shown in Figure 8. The highest number of uploaded and subsequently downloaded geotagged images for most nations came from 2010-2014, potentially explained by the growth of internet usage and exposure to Flickr in different countries within this time span.

RWI regions of image uploads. We explored trends in dominant RWI groups per nation over time, in order to determine if there were observable shifts towards images sourced from higher or lower RWI regions. Over the time range of 2004 to 2022, query-by-name images from Botswana, Libya, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe all came from the middle RWI regions. Images from Morocco consistently came from the upper RWI regions. On the other hand, query-by-name+people images from Rwanda and Swaziland all came from the middle RWI regions and those from Morocco all came from upper RWI regions. Lower and middle RWI regions countries had their data distributions varying between lower and middle RWI regions over the years. Countries whose images were from predominantly upper RWI regions had their data distributions varying between middle and upper RWI regions over the years.

Licenses of the uploaded images. We analyzed the quantity of images with various Flickr license options. Images were found to have predominantly the "All Rights Reserved" license type across all time ranges analyzed; as noted in Section 3.2, this substantially limits data usage. There were almost no images licensed under the "Public Domain Dedication (CC0) CC" and "Public Domain Mark CC" among those uploaded to Flickr from 2004 to 2022.

Local vs. non-local representation. We performed a temporal analysis of the geotagged images to investigate the local vs. non-local status of Flickr users. For the 2,000 randomly sampled images from the 8 countries analyzed for image content, we observed differences in sampling dates: that is, Cyprus, Slovenia, and Finland images were mainly sampled from 2004 to 2008; Switzerland images were mainly sampled from 2004 to 2006; and the African nation images were were mainly sampled from 2004 to 2012. Following these results, we repeated the temporal analysis across all images sourced from each of the 8 nations. In general, more images across all nations were taken by non-locals compared to the smaller 2,000-image datasets. However, the prior trends held in the sense that when African countries were considered, far more geotagged images were taken by non-locals than in comparable European nations, e.g., +329% for Sierra Leone versus +39% for Switzerland. Section 3.5 describes implications of non-local representation in image data from Africa; namely, the risk of an "othering" phenomenon and its impact on downstream bias in AI systems.

4 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

Geographical context shapes data, and data shapes the performance of models trained using such data. The key findings from our Flickr Africa data analysis (1) expose the limitations of current large-scale image data collection methodologies, and (2) expose unique data challenges to Africa, including the lack of data crucial to specific domains (*e.g.* a researcher cannot source sufficient, representative household object data if very few images are taken within indoor/private scenes). Notably, we reported on the extreme lack of data availability when compared to wealthy European nations; for instance when querying by country name, Switzerland had 18x the geotagged image data as Sierra Leone, an African nation of similar population size (8.75M vs. 8.30M, respectively), while Sao Tome and Principle only had (776, 116) geotagged images in total (depending on query). Moreover, data may be even less accessible according to use case, given that most of the Flickr Africa data has a restrictive use license, and certain image content attributes were found to appear less frequently (*e.g.* private and indoor settings). Nationally, higher quantities of geotagged image data was found to positively correlate with population size, GDP, and Internet usage, but no significant correlation was discovered based on dominant national languages. Additionally, we interrogate where African image data comes from: generally from middle-wealth regions as measured intra-nationally by RWI, though this differs by nation; and with images mainly taken by foreigners, though the opposite trend is identified in wealthier European nations. We discussed how AI systems may propagate biases in accordance with the stereotyped representation of African life by outsiders. Temporal analyses were performed and demonstrated that certain trends, such as dominant RWI region, prevalence of restrictive license type, and non-local representation of African nations in geotagged images held over time.

Looking forward, we encourage new scholarship centering novel methods for sourcing geodiverse datasets and measuring new forms of geodiversity specific to Africa, such as analyses of tribal diversity as opposed to the more commonly studied diversity by race/ethnicity. We openly provide our large-scale dataset to enable future researchers to utilize and augment Flickr Africa for model evaluations across a wide domain of computer vision tasks; likewise, more rigorous bias identification methods (*e.g.* [27]) may uncover still more limitations. Finally, we would be interested to explore the extent to which privacy and consent are respected in Africa.

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Evaluation of targeted dataset collection on racial equity in face recognition

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ABSTRACT

Algorithmic audits of industry face recognition models have recently incentivized companies to diversify their data collection methods, which in turn has reduced error disparities along demographic lines, such as gender or race. We argue that it is important to understand exactly how various forms of targeted data collection mitigate performance disparities in these updated face recognition models. We propose an empirical framework to assess the impact of additional dataset collection targeted towards various racial groups. We apply our framework to three racially-annotated benchmark datasets using three standard face recognition models. Our findings empirically validate the notion that the introduction of data from the demographic group with the initially-lowest performance improves performance on that group significantly more than adding from other groups. We also observe that in all settings, the introduction of data from a previously omitted group does not harm the performance of other groups. Furthermore, investigation of feature embeddings reveals that performance increases are associated with a larger separation among images of different identities. Despite the commonalities we observe across datasets, we also find key differences: for example, in one dataset, training on one racial group generalizes well across all groups. These differences speak to the criticality of re-applying empirical evaluation methods, such as the methods in this work, when introducing new datasets or models.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies** → Neural networks; **Biometrics**; **Object recognition**; **Matching**; • **Social and professional topics** → **Race and ethnicity**; • **Information systems** → *Data mining*.

KEYWORDS

Algorithmic audit, data collection, face recognition, racial bias in computer vision

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1 INTRODUCTION

In the last decade, extensive research studies have demonstrated the prevalence of demographic biases in machine learning systems, due to a lack of representation in training datasets [29]. Most notably, in the domain of face analysis, standard face datasets include very few images of individuals with darker skin types, and researchers have determined that commercial gender classification models have much higher error rates for women with darker skin types [8]. However, facial recognition continues to be used widely: from identity verification in mobile devices to public surveillance in certain countries, many people interact with these systems in their day-to-day lives [22]. While some argue for the complete removal of facial recognition techologies [7], the use of these technologies may not disappear. As such, opponents of face recognition along with the developers of these systems may both benefit from a careful analysis of how the demographic makeup of training datasets may impact a model's performance on various demographic groups.

In order to remedy past data representation bias, researchers have developed several new benchmark face recognition datasets that are more balanced along demographic attributes such as gender or race [38, 44]. While these balanced datasets have improved model performance, accuracy disparities still persist [45]. For example, the optimal allocation of training data by demographic group is not always the equally-balanced allocation: Gwilliam et al. [19] find that a balanced training set (with equal number of samples per racial group) obtains a higher accuracy variance across groups but the same overall accuracy compared to another training data allocation.

Additionally, curating new datasets requires time and resources, and can intrude upon the subpopulation being studied [33]. It is also incredibly time-consuming to train models on all possible allocations of demographic groups in order to find some "optimal" allocation. Rather than searching for the best subgroup allocation for a training set of a fixed size, companies may prefer a greedy solution — a solution in which new data is added in an add-only manner. Hence, we focus on the following goal: to examine *additional data collection* and its impacts on the performance of various racial groups.

Consider the following scenario: an entity (e.g., a company or a group of researchers) trains a face recognition model using some initial training dataset which lacks data from some particular racial group. Upon evaluation on held-out test data or due to an external bias audit, the company realizes their performance lags on that group, and now wishes to collect more data from the omitted group. They have the budget to collect only a fixed number of samples and have limited resources to train additional models (and, perhaps, can only train one other model). This process closely follows several

corporations' past responses detailed in Raji and Buolamwini [35] and allows us to pose these research questions:

(1) How does additional data from the underrepresented group change the test performance for that particular group, as well as the test performance for other groups?
(2) How does data collection targeted towards the group with the initially-lowest performance impact that group's test performance and overall group differences, in comparison to introducing data from other groups?
(3) Are our results consistent across racial groups, datasets, and models?

To answer these questions, we develop an empirical framework to evaluate the performance impact of data augmentation by demographic subgroup. For our framework and analyses, we focus on *one-to-one facial recognition*: given two images of faces, a one-to-one facial recognition system is designed to determine whether or not those two images are of the same person. We implement this framework for three racially-annotated datasets (BFW [38], BUPT [43, 44], and VMER [16]) and three state-of-the-art face recognition models (SE ResNet [9], CenterLoss [46], and SphereFace [27]). We summarize our main empirical findings below:

(1) The introduction of samples from any racial group X improves the performance for every group that we tested. (Different datasets use different terms. Using the terms in the source datasets, e.g., for BUPT [43, 44], we considered images labeled as *African, Asian, Caucasian, or Indian.*)
(2) The addition of data from the lowest-performing group improves that group's performance the most and closes performance gaps across racial groups.
(3) Increasing data from the highest-performing group X widens performance disparities, regardless of whether the initial training dataset contained images from group X, a specific counter to the notion that more data or more representation reduces discrimination.
(4) The above findings are *consistent* across all datasets and models we examined, while some findings are *different* across different datasets.

That some findings are *not* generalizable from the analysis of only a single dataset — speaks to the criticality of assessing various datasets. While the academic benchmark datasets we examine do not reach the commercial scale, such as Clearview AI's training data of 30 billion images [26], we find that our framework is still useful to understand how various datasets behave and how pre-conceived assumptions of additional representation do not always hold.

Thus, based on our findings, we encourage future work that introduces new datasets to re-apply our methodology (and others) as benchmarks to evaluate those datasets with known face recognition models. To facilitate this process, we publish our source code online at https://github.com/hongrachel/representation-disparities.

2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

In computer vision, researchers have extensively examined data representation biases and how models trained on datasets unrepresentative of the general population perform poorly on underrepresented groups.

For example, Pahl et al. [32] annotate several facial expression datasets and observe that these datasets skew heavily towards younger Euro-American subjects. In addition, Wilson et al. [47] find that a standard pedestrian detection dataset contains more data from individuals with lighter skin tones, and resulting models obtain higher accuracy for detecting individuals with lighter skin tones. Albiero et al. [2] investigate the source of gender bias in standard face recognition systems and determine that the test accuracy gap is attributed to models mapping images of women closer together.

Shortly after the publication of Buolamwini and Gebru [8], which demonstrated how several commercial face recognition systems discriminate by skin tone, these corporations updated their face recognition APIs to mitigate performance disparities. In their released statements, they explicitly cited new dataset collection efforts in order to ensure diverse representation in their training sets [35]. These newly updated models significantly decreased (previously high) error rates for individuals with darker skin and attributed their improvement to the targeted collection of additonal data along the lines of skin tone, gender, and age [37]. Diverse data collection is a promising method to address bias [23], but there has been little work investigating cases when the new data is composed of some explicitly-chosen demographic group that was previously underrepresented or omitted in the initial training set.

As a result, the lack of diverse data has spurred the creation of balanced training datasets, which have shown marked improvements in classification accuracy rates for previously underrepresented groups, even when trained with the same model architecture. Specifically, much recent work has focused on the collection of diverse face image datasets, along dimensions such as race, gender, age, lighting, pose, and expression, in order to allow models to generalize well on real-world variations [9, 24, 28]. These datasets have also been used to evaluate proposed face recognition models that reduce bias, which incorporate novel loss functions or model architectures. For instance, Serna et al. [41] show that a sensitive triplet loss function improves both accuracy and fairness across racial groups.

Recently, several studies examine how demographic subgroup distribution in training plays a role in accuracy disparities. In the case of gender bias in face recognition, Albiero et al. [3] observe that training datasets equally-balanced by gender lowers the prediction accuracy gap between groups, but the equally-balanced allocation does not minimize the accuracy gap. Similarly, Gwilliam et al. [19] vary the racial group makeup of the training set and also observe that the equally-balanced allocation is not the most optimal or fair one. Our work builds off their research and extends this investigation by analyzing the impact of *adding data* from different racial group distributions, rather than holding the training size fixed.

There are also several recent works in fairness literature that formally explore data collection processes. Most notably, Rolf et al. [39] form a theoretical framework to model subgroup allocations in training for a fixed training set size. They find that dataset composition impacts performance more than upweighting samples from minority groups. Chen et al. [10] provide a procedure to estimate the value of collecting additional samples and empirically validate the notion that additional data collection can mitigate discrimination without an accuracy tradeoff. Their work focuses on introducing data drawn from the same sampling distribution rather than data

collection targeted by demographic group. Abernethy et al. [1] propose several adaptive sampling algorithms for achieving min-max fairness, which minimizes the loss of the group that is worst off, to update the model over a series of iterations. Finally, Gong et al. [15] survey several definitions of input diversity in training data, through various sampling processes that upweight diverse batches in training. Our focus complements these works by assessing the empirical impact of targeted data collection on performance inequities.

3 METHODOLOGY

3.1 Problem setup

We now describe our task setting; we focus on *face verification*, or 1-to-1 face-matching, due to its ability to handle identities outside of the training distribution. We follow the standard face recognition training process in deep learning literature [42]: given a dataset $\mathcal{D}$ with face images $\{x\}$ and identity labels $\{y\}$, we train a model that takes an image as input and outputs a vector corresponding to the image's predicted identity. This training minimizes the empirical risk with respect to a particular loss function. The model is then used to perform inference (or prediction) by removing the final output layer. The result is a model that takes an image as input and produces a feature embedding with some fixed size established during training. This output feature embedding can be thought of as a lower-dimensional representation of an individual face image.

We evaluate the performance of a given model on the task of face verification: given two images (x, x'), $x \neq x'$, do the two images belong to the same identity or not? This evaluation is performed on *pairs* of images from a held-out test set, where the images and identities beloging to the test set are disjoint from those in the training set.

To convert the model from one which produces embeddings to one which predicts whether pairs of images are of the same identity, we do the following. For a particularly fixed threshold t, the face verification system predicts that the test pair are of the same individual if the cosine similarity score of the two images' feature embeddings is at least t. As such, ground truth labels of a pair are separated into a *genuine* pair (label 1) or an *impostor* pair (label 0), following the terminology in existing literature on face verification [11]. In this manner, the verification process evaluates the differences between the genuine and impostor score distributions. This methodology does not explicitly assume that the test and training data collection processes are the same or even similar, though conceptual frameworks often assume the two are the same.

3.2 Experiment design

Given a model trained on a dataset $\mathcal{D}$, we study a method of data collection motivated by our scenario of interest, where a face recognition system developer might respond to bias audits by collecting more training data from some target demographic group. As such, we focus on benchmark datasets with each image belonging to some racial group.

We define our method, *single-group augmentation*, as the incremental addition of samples from a fixed racial group to some initial training set consisting of a single racial group. This enables us to compare the performance of re-trained models by adding data from various groups, in order to determine whether the model improves more by training on an unseen group versus the initial group. We give the formal definition of single-group augmentation below.

We stress that we are *not* arguing that this data augmentation method should be used in practice, nor does this precisely say that a facial recognition system might only train on a single demographic group in practice. Rather, our experimental methodology distills the core essence of a targeted data collection approach, such that the impacts of data augmentation can be isolated and empirically analyzed.

3.2.1 Procedure for single-group augmentation. We train our models across a variety of training set configurations to understand how the group-specific performance of a model changes with the introduction of data targeted towards a specific demographic group. We follow a very similar setup and build off of the codebase from Gwilliam et al. [19]. Unlike their work, however, we do not maintain a fixed size training set and change proportions, but instead augment the dataset with additional data, and we empirically analyze three datasets rather than one. The training configurations are defined as follows:

For each group A, the *initial training configuration* consists of images from N randomly-chosen identities from group A, where N is fixed dependent on the size of the benchmark dataset $\mathcal{D}$. Here we refer to group A as the *initial group*. To obtain subsequent training configurations, we iteratively augment the initial training configuration with n randomly-sampled identities from another group B, where n is also decided based on $\mathcal{D}$. We refer to group B as the *target group*. As an example, an initial training configuration may consist of images from 200 identities from the *African-American* group, and we incrementally add images from 50 identities from the *East-Asian* group to obtain the rest of the training configurations.

Note that in some settings, the initial group A may be equivalent to the target group B. This enables our empirical analysis to compare continually adding data from the same group to continually adding the same amount of data from a previously unrepresented group. In other words, we can assess the impact of increasing demographic representation in the training data.

The design of these training sets replicates the motivating scenario of training data collection targeted on a particular demographic group in a simple setting of moving from one group in training to two. This empirical framework therefore simulates an existing face recognition system's possible response to bias audits.

3.3 Datasets

We conduct experiments on three existing racially-annotated datasets that we present in order of dataset size: BUPT [43, 44] (the largest dataset), VMER [16], and BFW [38], all of which have been used in face recognition model evaluations of racial bias [14, 19]. Other datasets we considered lacked sufficient images per subject to adequately train a model [34, 40], or were designed for other face-related analysis tasks [24]. Table 1 gives a breakdown of the groups in each dataset we examine. We observe that each dataset names racial categories differently from each other, and some refer to ethnicity rather than race [25]. In our results, we refer to the terminology used in the evaluated dataset in italics, but also recognize

Dataset	Categories	Subjects per category	Images per subject	Test subjects per category
BFW [38]	*Asian, Black, Indian, White*	180	25	20
BUPT / RFW [43, 44]	*African, Asian, Caucasian, Indian*	5000	18	3000
VMER [16]	*African American, East Asian, Caucasian Latin, Asian Indian*	400	108	24

Table 1: A summary composition of datasets in training and test folds, subsampled to ensure equal number of images per subject. Here, a subject refers to an identity, of which there are some number of images. It is assumed each subject belongs to exactly one category.

there are both overlaps and key distinctions between each dataset's group definitions, which is discussed further in Section 5.3.

To form the test image pairs from a given test set, we follow standard methodology as Wang et al. [44]. In every dataset, we generate all possible pairs of distinct test images (x, x'), $x \neq x'$ from the same group, assigning label 1 if the images share the same identity and 0 otherwise.

BUPT-BalancedFace (BUPT) contains a total of 1.3 million images from 28,000 individuals and is equally broken down into 4 demographic groups: *African*, *Asian*, *Caucasian*, and *Indian* [43]. Images are collected from the benchmark MS-Celeb-1M dataset [18] and augmented via Google search for additional celebrities in particular categories. The subjects are categorized by racial group using their nationality as a proxy, as well as via the Face++ API. Using nationality and race prediction are not robust methods for race categorization [25]; however, this is one of the only large-scale face datasets to consist of at least 7 thousand subjects per group. To ensure at least 18 images per subject, we constrict to 5 thousand subjects per group, which matches the setup in Gwilliam et al. [19].

The accompanying test dataset Racial Faces in the Wild (RFW) consists of fifty million test pairs and uses the same racial annotation method as BUPT. RFW is also from MS-Celeb-1M [18], but does not have any overlap with any subject from BUPT. For simplicity, we refer to the BUPT training and RFW test dataset as "BUPT."

VGGFace2 Mivia Ethnicity Recognition (VMER) dataset adds group annotations (*African American*, *Asian Indian*, *Caucasian Latin*, and *East Asian*) to the entire VGGFace2 training and test sets, which is one of the largest academic face recognition datasets [16]. VMER uses manual annotations across three million images to categorize subjects into four racial groups. Greco et al. [16] intentionally choose this annotation procedure rather than pre-trained models, in response to critiques that ethnicity classifiers fail to generalize well on racially-diverse datasets [24]. This dataset also consists of many more images per subject. To conduct our experiments with equal training set size per group, we randomly sample 440 individuals per group with 108 images per individual, which allows us to evaluate models trained on significantly more images for a given subject.

Balanced Faces in the Wild (BFW) is another dataset with an equal number of images and subjects from each racial category, but is also balanced by subgroups *Male* and *Female* within each racial group [38]. Each category consists of five thousand images from two hundred subjects with an equal number of faces per subject. BFW also samples from VGGFace2 [9], but instead uses pre-trained ethnicity classifiers to categorize subjects into the following groups: *Asian*, *Black*, *Indian*, and *White*. As with BUPT, pre-trained ethnicity classifiers, even if well-designed, may have inaccuracies [25]. To form the test set, we randomly select a hold-out fold of twenty individuals per group. Since the test sets for BUPT and VMER are fixed, for consistency of analysis, we similarly create a static test set for BFW as well.

3.4 Models

We perform these experiments on three state-of-the-art face verification architectures defined below. In each experiment, we train a model from scratch on the training configurations defined in Section 3.2.1. The models each use cross-entropy loss as the base classification loss function, stochastic gradient descent as the optimization function, and train for 50 epochs. We define the explicit hyperparameters used for each model in Appendix A.5.

The **SE-ResNet** model uses ResNet-50, a standard convolutional neural network with 50 layers [20], as a backbone and attaches Squeeze-and-Excitation blocks, which dynamically recalibrate channel wise feature responses [21]. Cao et al. [9] implement SE-ResNet to train on their proposed VGGFace2 dataset to demonstrate their improved performance in comparison to prior benchmarks. The **CenterLoss** model learns a center vector for each identity, in order to incorporate a loss penalty between feature embeddings and the identity's center, along with the base cross entropy loss function [46]. This minimizes the within-identity feature embedding distance and separates identities within the feature space. The **SphereFace** model introduces a multiplicative angular margin to the model's output, which maximizes the variance between feature embeddings of different identities.

3.5 Evaluation

To empirically measure model performance, we consider several evaluation metrics and in this section briefly describe the tradeoffs between them.

3.5.1 Global threshold. In face verification tasks, the model once trained depends on some chosen threshold to form binary predictions. We find, however, that the model evaluation of a global threshold does not sufficiently capture a model's behavior. Robinson et al. [38] demonstrate that using a singular threshold across demographic groups results in accuracy gaps, and that group-specific thresholds can strictly improve test accuracy across groups. In addition, many commercial face recognition systems, such as Amazon's Rekognition, allow users to set thresholds according to some application objective, i.e., to maintain a certain false positive rate [5]. Therefore, it is important to examine the model performance across a range of thresholds, rather than evaluation of a single one.



Figure 1: Initial exploration of impact of threshold on test accuracy, for an example initial group, target group pair on the BUPT dataset and SE-ResNet model. Color denotes size of target group, while initial group stays fixed at 2000.

Previous work on demographic group allocation in training have studied the accuracy rates obtained from a particular threshold [3, 19]. In our initial exploration of single-group augmentation, for every test group we plot test accuracy against threshold values across each training configuration, as shown in Figure 1. While we find trends in increasing the size of the target group, it is difficult to capture how test accuracy increases, given that the optimal threshold changes at each line. If we hope to understand the different forms of single-group augmentation, we find that distilling the ROC curve to a single metric enables comparisons among many training configurations.

3.5.2 Overall accuracy. Regardless of the threshold selection problem, we also find that studying overall accuracy has its limitations: there are many cases when equalization of accuracy rates by group still allows for disparate treatment [13]. For example, a face verification system may obtain a high false positive rate and a low false negative rate for one group, but still maintain equal accuracy across all groups. If this system is used for biometric authentication, this disparity in false positive rates could result in disproportionate security vulnerabilities for one demographic group. As a result, in our evaluation, we avoid studying accuracy as a comparison metric. Moreover, this prompts us to also examine the impact of targeted data collection on the group with the lowest performance, instead of using equal performance as the primary objective.

3.5.3 Area under the curve. As a consequence of the above disadvantages, we shift our attention to the *area under the curve* (AUC) calculated by the receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC) curve, an evaluation metric that has been used in prior face recognition literature [6]. The AUC is the probability that a positive test pair has a higher similarity score than a negative test pair, which enables our analysis to capture the distance distributions of feature embeddings, rather than merely considering the accuracy (or false positive or negative rates) of a binary classification task for a fixed threshold.

We note that AUC is a single numerical value which describes the functional relationship between true positives and false positives of a classification model derived from thresholding a regression model. It therefore is an incomplete description of the ROC curve, and two regression models might have equal AUC values but very different behavior in terms of this tradeoff.

3.6 Broader contexts and limitations

In addition to the previously-mentioned assumptions of demographic group fairness, we find certain limitations to the ability to generalize beyond our datasets, which are clarified below (in Section 5.2 we discuss how the limited ability to generalize from our results to other datasets is a strength for some of our other conclusions). In this section, we also situate our methodology in relation to the broader context of machine learning research.

3.6.1 Group fairness. In our work, we examine the task of face verification from a group fairness lens because we find that the main demographic information attached to standard face benchmarks is group membership. The datasets we study partition identities into only four racial groups, which excludes and merges many racial categories. Moreover, each dataset implicitly assumes that each individual belongs to a single category. This inherently ignores individuals with multi-racial identities, and the lack of additional demographic information may prevent analysis of intersectional differences along other dimensions, such as gender or age. We believe that this is an important topic for future study, especially as adding a single training sample can often increase representation across multiple demographic groups. At the same time, it is still beneficial to understand existing differences in performance among these groups, given the limitations of real-world data containing demographic information in the first place. In Section 5.3, we elaborate upon the implications of group-level annotations based on our results.

3.6.2 Image variations by racial group. Specific to the BUPT dataset, prior research has shown that the average face-to-image ratio is much lower for images from the *Caucasian* and *African* groups [19]. We obtain similar findings even when we control for face-to-image ratios, but this discrepancy indicates that other image variations by racial group, such as lighting or pose, may factor into our results. Previous work on performance gaps in group-balanced datasets has extrapolated that learning for a particular demographic is inherently more difficult [44]. We caution against making the broad claim that performance is capped for a certain sociodemographic group, as image quality and inter-group image variations can often also explain these gaps. For instance, many face image datasets are scraped

from celebrity photographs online; as a result, researchers have pointed out distinct differences of celebrity photography by race or gender, such as higher proportions of women wearing makeup than men, which may in turn affect performance disparities by demographic group [2, 4].

3.6.3 Underrepresented versus unrepresented groups. We also highlight that the single-group augmentation framework narrows the problem space we consider: from our motivation of racial groups that are *underrepresented* in training, to our experiments on racial groups completely *unrepresented* in training. We make this simplification intentionally to isolate the impact of augmenting one group with another group — underrepresentation on the extreme end.

The specific task of evaluating a model on an unseen group relates to domain generalization, a well-studied subfield of machine learning. While domain generalization techniques can be applied to this problem, Gulrajani and Lopez-Paz [17] show that model selection may not be straightforward when evaluated on a variety of datasets; this is an important area for further study. As a result, we recognize that our study examines only one piece of the puzzle: dataset representation bias does not encapsulate demographic bias across the entire face recognition system. Due to the variations in image quality by demographic group as described above, model interventions may be needed to ensure some chosen fairness criteria or generalization property. In this work though, we center our focus on the racial composition of training datasets, instead of a specific machine learning algorithm.

3.6.4 Generalizability of datasets. Finally, the dataset-specific artifacts highlight the difficulty of making generalizations of our observed trends to apply to all future forms of data collection. We limit our study to face recognition models and benchmark datasets available for academic study. If we hope to understand how corporations should best respond to bias audits, it is unclear whether our findings extend to systems training on datasets with sizes at a much larger magnitude. Moreover, we recognize that commercial face recognition systems may rely on vast pre-trained models that are not publicly available. We therefore acknowledge that our work may not align with the training procedures and large-scale datasets that industry face recognition systems may follow — this prompts the need for the release of commercial datasets and practices to the research community.

However, the fact that differences between datasets exist is itself an important contribution, especially as BUPT, BFW, and VMER continue to be used as benchmarks in face recognition literature to evaluate racial bias [14, 19]. In Section 5.2, we explore how our methodology may inform how future work can use these benchmark datasets, in addition to new ones.

4 RESULTS

We now present some representative findings in the figures below. For brevity, we show results for the SE-ResNet model, though the relative comparisons and general trends are consistent for CenterLoss and SphereFace. In general, we focus on the BUPT dataset to demonstrate key results due to its large size, but clarify otherwise when there are distinct dataset differences. For more details and accompanying results, please refer to Appendix A.

4.1 Differences among datasets

First, we observe in Figure 2 that the group-specific performance impact of single-group augmentation differs across datasets. Training on data from some racial group may not impact performance in the same manner across various datasets. As such, evaluation of a single benchmark dataset may not be sufficient; we elaborate on this further in Section 5.2.

4.1.1 VMER: Increasing representation improves AUC of unrepresented group more than addition from other groups. In Figure 2a, we show the impact of single-group augmentation on the AUC of each test group. We find that setting the target group as the test group results in the highest growth in AUC for the ranges in training size that we examine. In other words, if we were to update a face verification model by introducing samples from a single racial group, in VMER, the best choice to improve group X's performance is to add more data from group X.

The same relative comparisons can be made when broken down by initial training configuration (see Appendix A.1 for details). Given an initial training set without group X, in the VMER dataset, the re-trained model's performance on unrepresented group X increases the most when increasing representation from group X in training. Even if the model initially trains on X, we find that continuing to augment the training set with samples from group X outperforms augmentation from any other group.

This case illustrates an example where out of all forms of single-group augmentation, improving demographic representation in training datasets increases the unrepresented group's performance the most. This matches existing intuition behind the development of training datasets that are balanced along demographics or more diverse in face composition, in response to prior face datasets that lacked representation along these dimensions [9, 24, 28].

4.1.2 BUPT: Training on some racial groups generalizes across all groups more than the addition of unrepresented groups. Figure 2b demonstrates the change in AUC for each group in the BUPT dataset. We observe that introducing data from the *African* and *Caucasian* groups improves the AUC for all groups regardless of the initial training configuration (Appendix A.1). Introducing data from the *Asian* and *Indian* groups does improve group-specific performance, but not as much as adding from the other groups, even when evaluated on the *Asian* and *Indian* test groups.

Compared to VMER, this result demonstrates that in the BUPT dataset, data from *African* and *Caucasian* groups generalizes strongly across all four groups. Gwilliam et al. [19] also confirm this trend since they find that when training on data from a single group, training on data from the *African* and *Caucasian* groups obtains the highest test accuracy for each group. A potential explanation may be that a significant proportion of images from *Asian* and *Indian* groups in training have much larger face-to-image ratios than in test [19]. We show that the same relative comparisons hold even when controlling for face-to-image ratios in Appendix A.1.1, but note that the shift from training to test sets might look different between demographic groups along other relevant dimensions.

Figure 2b shows that the addition of data from an unrepresented group is not always the best way to improve the performance for that same unrepresented group, unlike our findings in Figure 2a.



(a) VMER dataset **(b) BUPT dataset**

Figure 2: AUC for each test group under single-group augmentation averaged across all initial training configurations for both VMER and BUPT datasets. The solid line continually adds data matching the test group, and the dashed line continually adds data from a different group. Evaluated on SE-ResNet model across 5 trials with consistent results across models (per dataset).

These findings complicate the idea that the most data-efficient way to improve performance for a population X (excluded in training) is to increase representation of population X in the training set.

4.2 Similarities across datasets

In addition to the differences in results across datasets we described above, our analysis methodology revealed several trends which hold across the three datasets and three models. We highlight these trends and assess whether our analyses confirm the intuitions and findings in prior literature.

4.2.1 AUC on all test groups increases with additional training data, regardless of the group being introduced. In Figures 2a and 2b, we observe that with any form of data addition, the AUC values across all test groups increase regardless of the group being introduced and the initial training group. We find the same trend for every dataset-model pair single-group augmentation experiment we perform. Particularly, in our experiments, a model that retrains on additional training data from some target group does not sacrifice performance on the initial group in order to account for the target group. This demonstrates the notion that large neural networks have extensive capacity to capture arbitrarily complex functions [48], which also applies to new samples from distinct demographic groups.

4.2.2 No performance tradeoff among groups: Introducing data from racial groups distinct from the initial group does not harm the initial group. In various studied settings with group fairness objectives, researchers have demonstrated the existence of fairness-accuracy tradeoffs, especially in low-parametrized models, such as linear regression [12]. In our face verification experiments, we find that the introduction of data from groups distinct from the initial group does not harm the initial group; instead, the retrained model strictly increases performance across all groups.



Figure 3: AUC of each test group under fixed-size data additions versus the size of the initial training set, composed of samples matching the test group. The solid line represents adding 200 identities from the test group, and the points represent adding 200 identities from a different group. Note that AUC increases as the initial training set size increases along the x-axis. Evaluated on VMER dataset with SE-ResNet model with consistent results across models.

4.2.3 Marginal performance of fixed-size data additions from the test group versus data additions from other groups shrinks as initial

training set grows. In Figure 3, we focus on the addition of a fixed number of samples from any group, instead of the continual introduction of samples from a single group as illustrated in prior figures. This form of analysis thus answers the following question: given an initial training set on group X, how does performance on group X differ between adding N samples from group X versus from another group?

In the VMER dataset, Figure 2a shows that adding data from the same group as test improves the test group's performance the most, in comparison to other forms of single-group augmentation. As such, the AUC value from adding from the test group (solid line) is higher than adding from another group, across most initial training set sizes. However, we observe that as the initial training set size gets large, the marginal benefit of introducing data from the test group compared to another group shrinks. We find this phenomenon across other models and in the BFW dataset as well. Due to the size limitations of the benchmark datasets we examined, it is unclear if adding data from a non-test group will ever obtain a higher performance than adding from the test group and requires further study.

4.3 Performance disparities for single-group augmentation

In Figure 4, we study different measures of performance disparity among racial groups with single-group augmentation.

4.3.1 Examination of group AUC disparities reveals examples that additional data can widen performance gaps. Figure 4a uses widest AUC disparity as a metric for unfairness via single-group augmentation. While equalizing performance across groups is not always desirable due to cases of sacrificing performance to satisfy parity, we have observed no decrease in performance with any form of additional data. As such, we still find it valuable to understand how performance gaps may change as a result of incorporating data from some racial group.

In Figure 4a, introducing data from the *African* group lowers the AUC disparity. This is driven by an increase in the *African* group's performance, which was originally the lowest. On the other hand, introducing data from the *Caucasian* group increases the test performance gap. This is driven by an increase in the *Caucasian* group's performance, which was originally the highest, even without inclusion of the *Caucasian* group in the initial training configuration.

4.3.2 Results contradict principle that more data reduces demographic bias. Figure 4a thus illustrates how data collection can generate various outcomes in performance disparities, and we find similar examples in other datasets (Appendix A.2). Moreover, the finding that adding data from an unrepresented group, such as the *Caucasian* group, widens performance gaps is a clear counter to the idea that more data mitigates discrimination as discussed in Chen et al. [10]. Their work proves that collecting more data from the population distribution decreases the population loss gap between groups. In our work, we consider data collection methods that may not match the test distribution, which may be realistic in cases when the test distribution is unknown. As a result, we demonstrate how the introduction of data from a group unrepresented in training may worsen performance disparities.

4.3.3 Adding data from the group with the initially-lowest AUC increases the AUC for that group significantly more than adding data from other groups. Figure 4b distinguishes different forms of single-group augmentation based on whether the target data is from the group that originally obtained the lowest AUC value. Across all models, datasets, and when separated by initial training configurations (Appendix A.3), we find that if the objective is to most improve the test performance for the group with the lowest AUC in the initial training set, adding data from that group increases performance significantly more than adding data from any other group.

4.3.4 Results connect to prior theoretical work on sampling from group with lowest performance. This validates prior theoretical analysis on active learning in group fairness. Abernethy et al. [1] find that updating the model with the samples from the current worst-off group converges to a min-max fairness solution, or minimizes the maximum classification loss across groups. In this manner, suppose a developer wishes to update their face recognition system to address concerns about a demographic group on which the model classifies poorly. Then targeted data collection on that group may improve the retrained model's performance, even if that group was already included in the initial training set.

4.3.5 Lowest-performing group does not equal the least-represented group. Note the distinction between a group with the lowest performance and a group that is unrepresented in training. Although Figure 2b shows that data augmentation from some omitted group X may not significantly improve that group's AUC, this is still consistent with Figure 4b since group X did not have the lowest test performance in the initial training configuration.

4.4 Feature embedding similarity score distribution

In order to explain the increase in AUC values from single-group augmentation, we investigate a model's feature embeddings from test images. Figure 5 plots the difference in average cosine similarity scores between genuine (label 1) and impostor (label 0) test pairs against the overall AUC of the test group. Each point represents a training configuration where the target group matches the test group, over all initial groups of the same size, and the color encodes the target group size at every point.

First, we find a clear positive relationship between distance and performance. This is consistent across datasets with more details in Appendix A.4. This observation indicates that higher AUC values for some test group are associated with genuine pairs having much higher cosine similarity scores on average than those of impostor pairs. This relationship follows from the model test pair procedure because models that further separate similarity scores between genuine and impostor pairs will obtain a higher AUC value by definition. This result matches findings in Albiero et al. [2], which examine test pair similarity distributions along gender and race.

Second, we notice that for every test group, the upwards trajectory is driven by adding samples matching the test group, regardless of the initial training configuration. This observation indicates that



(a) Widest disparity in AUC among groups when introduced with more data from each group.



(b) AUC of group with lowest performance in initial training configuration.

Figure 4: Performance disparity measures of single-group augmentation. Evaluated on BUPT dataset with SE-ResNet model across 5 trials with consistent results across models (per dataset).



Figure 5: Difference in average cosine similarity scores between genuine (label 1) and impostor (label 0) test pairs for each training configuration run, plotted against area under curve. Color denotes the number of identities in training from the group that matches the test group, with the initial group held constant at 2000 identities. Evaluated on BUPT dataset for SE-ResNet, with consistent results for other models and datasets.

the introduction of some group X to any initial training set allows the model to better distinguish between genuine and imposter pairs from group X, which in turn, results in a higher AUC.

5 DISCUSSION

We now turn to a discussion of the broader implications of our results to (1) the addition of new training data in Section 5.1, (2) the general use of benchmark datasets in Section 5.2, and (3) the difficulty of group-level annotations in Section 5.3.

5.1 Broader implications of additional training data collection

From our analysis, we form several takeaways about the conditions and factors associated with data collection. Through simulating model retraining on the addition of new samples from a specific target group, we emphasize that we *do not* claim that this is the best method to add data, nor that data collection is the most effective way to improve a model. Instead, we aim to understand the impact of introducing data from various groups to some initial training set.

5.1.1 Results summary. Our empirical results illustrate an example in the BUPT dataset, where increasing representation from a group X initially omitted in training is not the best form of single-group augmentation to improve X's performance the most. However, across all datasets, we find that introducing data from the group that was originally worst-off obtains significant performance gains for that group. We make these performance comparisons by measuring AUC, but also recognize that AUC is an imperfect metric for capturing model behavior.

5.1.2 Importance of group annotations of both new and old data. Our results convey several implications about additional data collection. First, when augmenting training data, if we do not know the demographic group annotations of the additional samples, it is unclear how this new data will impact group-specific performance or group disparities. In other words, it is necessary to have knowledge of the demographic makeup of any additional data in

order to improve any group-specific fairness objectives. Second, our experimental analysis requires knowledge of initial performance across demographic groups. This underscores the importance of bias audits in the first place.

5.1.3 Data collection costs. At the same time, we recognize that data collection comes with various costs: Raji et al. [36] examine the ethical considerations when collecting diverse data collections, especially violations of the privacy and consent of the population being studied. As a result, targeted data collection can harm and unfairly monitor marginalized populations, as face recognition becomes used as a form of surveillance [30]. Therefore we qualify our recommendations to researchers and developers and encourage them to first assess the harms before choosing to engage in additional data collection.

5.2 Broader implications of the use of benchmark datasets

Given the limited number of publicly-available, large datasets with racial group annotations for face verification, our and other empirical findings may well be artifacts specific to particular datasets or models. For example, in Figure 2b, we observe that training on data from only the *African* or *Caucasian* group generalizes across all racial groups in the BUPT dataset, which is not replicated in the BFW and VMER datasets. The reason for this key difference between datasets is unclear and warrants further exploration. Yet because these datasets are used as benchmarks for racial bias evaluation in face recognition [14, 19], our findings are still valuable for models trained and evaluated on these same datasets.

5.2.1 Recommendations for future research on datasets and models. While the individual properties of our datasets, as discussed in Section 3.6, limits the full generalizability of our results, the unique characteristics of the datasets also leads to a strength of our study: recommendations for future research. As context for these recommendations, we observe that prior analyses on racially-balanced datasets examine one dataset instead of many. This is perhaps not surprising — and is not a criticism of past works — because these datasets are relatively new.

By studying three different datasets (across three models), we demonstrably find that there *are* important differences between datasets. Our findings here thus speak to the criticality of future work repeating evaluations like ours. For example, we recommend that future research that introduces new face recognition models to address racial bias should evaluate their models with several datasets. Similarly, we recommend that future research that introduces new datasets re-apply our methods and share the results of their analyses.

5.3 Annotations of demographic groups

For both data collection and dataset curation methods, we recognize the importance of demographic group-level annotations of data points, but also are aware of its limitations. Recent work, for instance, demonstrates that curators in each dataset follow different racial group annotation methods. Khan and Fu [25] point out that racially-annotated face recognition datasets define racial categories inconsistently, in spite of similarly named categories, and also encode stereotypes by excluding minority ethnic groups. From their evaluated datasets, the authors note that BUPT and BFW are the most consistent, due to having more images per individual.

Even simple investigation of the racial group annotation techniques reveals that some of these datasets conflate race, nationality, and ethnicity [43, 44]. Given that racial groups are socially constructed and dependent on cultural contexts [31], it is difficult to form concrete recommendations when training machine learning models that are equitable along the lines of race. However, since face recognition models have historically underperformed for people from certain racial groups [8], it is necessary to be aware of disparate treatment across groups, in spite of these groups not being well-formed. We find that our methodology still adds value and can still be performed for future datasets with differently-defined demographic groups even outside of the face recognition task.

6 CONCLUSION

In this work, we examine the group-specific performance impact of introducing additional training data from a particular racial group, if, for instance, a developer discovers that their face recognition model underperforms for some group unrepresented in its initial training set. By studying facial recognition, we acknowledge that some of its applications may create societal harm or invasions of privacy [7]. This work does not make a normative claim on the use of face recognition technologies; instead, we focus on the role that data collection plays on the model performance across groups, if these systems were to be used.

By proposing and evaluating an empirical framework that models targeted data collection, we find differences and general trends across 3 benchmark datasets and 3 standard face verification models. Some findings confirm previous intuitions about the relationship between a model's performance and the importance of data representation, while other findings reveal exceptions to these intuitions. In addition, significant differences in datasets reveal shortcomings in racial bias evaluation that use only one benchmark. We hope that our experimental results inform future instances of targeted data collection and racial bias evaluation on existing or new datasets.

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Evaluating Biased Attitude Associations of Language Models in an Intersectional Context

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ABSTRACT

Language models are trained on large-scale corpora that embed implicit biases documented in psychology. Valence associations (pleasantness/unpleasantness) of social groups determine the biased attitudes towards groups and concepts in social cognition. Building on this established literature, we quantify how social groups are valenced in English language models using a sentence template that provides an intersectional context. We study biases related to age, education, gender, height, intelligence, literacy, race, religion, sex, sexual orientation, social class, and weight. We present a concept projection approach to capture the valence subspace through contextualized word embeddings of language models. Adapting the projection-based approach to embedding association tests that quantify bias, we find that language models exhibit the most biased attitudes against gender identity, social class, and sexual orientation signals in language. We find that the largest and better-performing model that we study is also more biased as it effectively captures bias embedded in sociocultural data. We validate the bias evaluation method by overperforming on an intrinsic valence evaluation task. The approach enables us to measure complex intersectional biases as they are known to manifest in the outputs and applications of language models that perpetuate historical biases. Moreover, our approach contributes to design justice as it studies the associations of groups underrepresented in language such as transgender and homosexual individuals.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies** → Dimensionality reduction and manifold learning; **Artificial intelligence**; **Natural language processing**; **Learning latent representations**; **Learning paradigms**; **Cognitive science**.

KEYWORDS

contextualized word embeddings, language models, AI bias, intersectional bias, psycholinguistics

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1 INTRODUCTION

Static word embeddings [6, 56] are known to reflect the semantics and biases of the populations that produce the data on which they are trained [12, 13, 69]. While problematic for their use in machine learning applications which are affected by these biased features [38, 82], static word embeddings have also allowed for the development of new social scientific approaches to studying societal norms and biases [24, 30, 35, 39]. However, static word embeddings have been replaced as the dominant representational paradigm in natural language processing (NLP) by language models [9, 17, 57, 59, 60], which form contextualized word embeddings, dynamic representations of words that undergo change over the course of the neural network based on the words which occur around them. Prior work suggests that, as this process of "contextualization" occurs, a contextualized representation becomes more semantically similar to the words which occur in context around it [79].

How can a principled and generalizable test for social bias, including intersectional bias, be designed for such dynamic representations? The present research proposes that, rather than studying changes in the representation of a certain word being evaluated for bias, one might instead look to the effects that a biased word has on its surrounding context. That is, instead of finding ways to compensate for the effects of contextualization when assessing bias, one can use the dynamic properties of language models to design a generalizable bias assessment method specifically suited to the paradigm of contextualization.

The first challenge in designing a bias test for contextualized word embeddings, however, is that they are not easy to analyze using common mathematical methods for measuring similarity between word embeddings, such as cosine similarity. While prior work has used principal component analysis (PCA) of subtracted vectors to find the dimension that maximizes the variance between biased representations [7], contextualized word embeddings are known to contain high-magnitude neurons which are often not semantic in nature [68, 79], preventing the development of a generalizable method for assessing semantic biases based on PCA.

The present research addresses this problem by using a maximum margin support vector classifier to learn a semantic property of the contextualized word embedding space: namely, the valence

(pleasantness vs. unpleasantness) subspace [53], onto which embeddings can be projected to measure their semantic properties. In social psychology, valence associations determine the biased attitudes towards social groups [28]. For example, are European American men or African American women perceived more positively valenced? Our method for isolating semantics in contextual spaces also allows for the introduction of a generalizable statistical test to quantify bias in language models by measuring the effects of contextualization. This work applies these methods to five language models (GPT-Neo, XLNet, ALBERT, RoBERTa, and T5) of varying architectures and demonstrates the ability to measure both contextualized word embedding semantics and bias in language models.

Code and data are made public at https://github.com/shivaomrani/LLM-Bias. The contributions of this research are outlined below:

(1) A method based on learning a maximum margin subspace to learn the valence subspace of an embedding space is introduced for isolating semantics in the highly contextual and anisotropic upper layers of contextualizing language models. Across five evaluated language models and without resort to pooling methods or postprocessing the contextualized embedding space, the approach is demonstrated to be robust to the geometry of contextualized embedding spaces, and outperforms a cosine similarity based method in the upper layers of every model. In GPT-Neo [23], scores on the ValNorm intrinsic evaluation task [69], which measures the correlation (Pearson's ρ) of human-rated valence with valence associations in models, fall to 0.56 in the top layer of the model when using cosine similarity; with the maximum margin method, the score remains high, at 0.81. A similar result is obtained for the four other language models studied, indicating the utility of the method for studying semantics in highly contextual and anisotropic embedding spaces.
(2) A statistical bias measurement based on the Word Embedding Association Test (WEAT) [12] is introduced to study differential biases arising from the process of contextualization in language models. The word "person" is placed into generated intersectional contexts with a wide variety of words reflecting social groups. "Person" is contextualized by these contexts, and its embedded representation is obtained from the top layer of a language model. The differential bias between two words is obtained by measuring their effect on the contextualized representation of the word "person" when placed in otherwise identical contexts, as measured based on the projection product with valence (pleasantness vs. unpleasantness) subspace. The method captures a wide variety of biases in language models related to age, education, gender, height, intelligence, literacy, race, religion, sex, sexual orientation, social class, and weight. The results reveal pronounced biases across five language models associated with gender identity (average effect size $d = 0.60$ - "cisgender" and "transgender"), social class (average effect size $d = 0.48$ - "affluent" and "destitute"), and sexual orientation (average effect size $d = 0.42$ - "heterosexual" and "homosexual").
(3) A method is introduced for studying biases without need for a binary, differential test. A permutation is used to generate a large sample of sentences that include social group signals in an intersectional context, each ending with the word "person." The embedded representation of person is computed from each sentence, and the projection product is obtained with the maximum margin subspace. The top 10% most pleasant sentences are returned, and the top 10% most unpleasant sentences are returned. In GPT-Neo, more than 90% of the most pleasant sentences contain the word "heterosexual," while more than 99% of the most unpleasant phrases contain the word "homosexual," again reflecting significant biases related to sexual orientation. Similar biases exist for gender identity in GPT-Neo, with more than 70% of the most pleasant phrases including the word "cisgender," and more than 93% of the most unpleasant phrases including the word "transgender."

The results of this research have implications both for the study of bias in AI, where researchers might employ the bias evaluation method to analyze language models for a wide range of intersectional biases by learning subspaces separating conceptual categories or evaluate the effectiveness of bias mitigation approaches, and for the social sciences, which might employ this approach to study the human biases encoded into machines.

2 RELATED WORK

The present research contributes new methods for measuring semantic norms and bias in contextualized word embeddings. This section reviews related work on the measurement of semantics and bias in static and contextualized word embeddings.

2.1 Static and Contextualized Word Embeddings

Word embeddings are dense, continuous-valued vector representations of words used to encode a statistical model of human language [3]. Static word embeddings such as those formed using the GloVe [56] and fastText [47] algorithms are trained on the co-occurrence statistics of words in a language corpus, and encode the semantic properties of language [48], such that algebraic operations on embedded representations can be used to solve analogical tasks [49]. Static word embeddings are known to encode societal attitudes and implicit and explicit biases of the population which produced the linguistic data on which they are trained [24, 43, 65]. While identifying and mitigating bias in word embeddings is a noteworthy area of study due to the propagation of these biases in downstream natural language processing (NLP) applications [11, 16, 38, 46, 82], the encoding of population-level human attitudes in word embeddings also allows them to be used as a statistical tool for studying bias, languages, societies, and historical events [15, 24, 30, 35, 39, 52, 70, 77].

Despite their widespread usefulness for both computer science and the social sciences, static word embeddings have a central limitation, in that they collapse all of the senses of a word into a single vector representation. Contextualizing language models such as ELMo [58], BERT [17], and the GPT family of models [9, 23, 59, 60] overcome this limitation by forming contextualized word embeddings, which incorporate information from surrounding words, such that the representation of a word depends on the context

in which it appears. Therefore, while polysemes and homographs (words with the same spelling but different meaning) share the same representation in static word embeddings, contextualized word embeddings capture semantic differences based on context and alter a word's representation to reflect the sense in which it is used [64]. However, polysemes and homographs are not the only words which change representation as they are processed in a contextualizing language model. Ethayarajh [22] shows that stopwords and articles are some of the most context-sensitive words in models like GPT-2, while Wolfe and Caliskan [79] demonstrate that contextualized word embeddings from seven language models become more semantically similar to the words that occur around them as they are processed in the model.

This suggests that a test of social attitudes and biases encoded in language models might be designed based on the effect a word has on the embedded representations of the words which occur around it. However, contextualized word embeddings have their own limitation: anisotropy, or directional uniformity [22]. Because language models are trained on a wide variety of objectives such as next-word prediction [59] and masked-word prediction [17], the geometric structure of contextualized word embeddings may reflect properties useful to performing a model's pretraining task, but detrimental for assessing embedding semantics using methods such as cosine similarity [79]. Recent research proposes methods such as the removal of non-semantic high-magnitude directions or the z-scaling of embeddings to expose semantic information in contextualized word embeddings [68, 79]; however, such methods necessitate the loss of information, even if that information is syntactic or otherwise non-semantic in nature. The present research introduces a method for assessing both semantic properties and bias in contextualized word embeddings with no postprocessing or loss of information.

2.2 Bias in Word Embeddings

Principled and generalizable evaluation of bias in word embeddings is grounded in cognitive psychology literature [12, 28]. These foundations, and the word embedding bias tests arising from them, are reviewed below.

2.2.1 Psychological Foundations for Measuring Machine Bias. Psychologists quantify the emotional association of a visual or linguistic stimulus using three primary dimensions of affect [32]: valence (pleasantness vs. unpleasantness), arousal (excitement vs. calm), and dominance (control vs. subordination) [45, 54, 67]. Social psychologists have compiled large lexica of affective norms, which reflect widely shared attitudes of human subjects who rate words based on valence, arousal, and dominance [2, 8, 50, 73]. A concrete example of a valence norm is that the word "vomit" triggers an unpleasant feeling for most English language speakers, while the word "love" triggers a pleasant feeling.

Valence is the principal dimension of affect that exhibits the strongest affective signal in language [69]. Psychologists use valence associations to evaluate biased attitudes towards social groups and concepts. Greenwald et al. [28] introduce the Implicit Association Test (IAT), which demonstrated the presence of implicit racial bias favoring European Americans over African Americans by showing that human subjects more readily paired European American names with pleasant words than they did African American names. The IAT inspired the design of the Word Embedding Association Test (WEAT) of Caliskan et al. [12], which demonstrated that a similar phenomenon occurs in static word embeddings, wherein names of European Americans are more similar to pleasant words based on measurements of cosine similarity than are names of African Americans.

In addition to its empirical grounding in social psychology, the WEAT offers theoretical benefits arising from its design as a statistical test: first, the WEAT returns an effect size, Cohen's d [12]. Cohen's d is defined such that 0.20 is small, 0.50 is medium, and 0.80 is large, and in most cases d ranges between -2 and 2; second, the WEAT returns a p-value based on a permutation test [12]. These qualities make the WEAT a useful method for interpreting the magnitude and statistical significance of bias in embedded representations. While Caliskan et al. [12] define the WEAT using cosine similarity, there is no inherent reason that cosine similarity should be the only measurement available for assessing the association of an embedding with some target. For example, Kurita et al. [36] develop a version of the WEAT which uses the masked word prediction objective of BERT to measure differential biases in masked language models.

The WEAT has been adapted previously to study biases in contextualized word embeddings and sentence embeddings formed by language models. May et al. [44] apply the WEAT to measure sentence-level biases in language models such as ELMo and BERT, while Tan and Celis [66] use a combination of the WEAT as well as method of May et al. [44] to measure biases in a variety of language models such as BERT and GPT-2 [60]. Guo and Caliskan [29] model contextualization as a random effect to measure the overall magnitude of bias across contexts in contextualizing language models. Wolfe and Caliskan [79] show that biases exist in the contextualized word embeddings formed by GPT-2 after non-semantic principal components are removed from the embeddings.

2.2.2 Valence-Based Intrinsic Evaluation of Word Embeddings. Prior work shows that the correspondence between the human-rated valence of a word and the valence association of its static [69] or contextualized [75] word embedding can be used to evaluate the intrinsic quality of embedding spaces, and to identify when the geometry of an embedding space interferes with the measurement of semantics using techniques based on cosine similarity [79]. Wolfe and Caliskan [79] find that contextualized word embeddings produced by language models most strongly encode the valence dimension of affect, and that human ratings of dominance also correlate moderately with dominance associations in the contextualized embedding space; arousal, on the other hand, correlates only weakly, with correlations $\rho < 0.30$. This research measures bias in language models using the valence dimension of affect, which corresponds to evaluating biased attitudes towards concepts and social groups.

2.3 Subspace Projection for Bias Detection and Mitigation

Another strand of prior work measures bias in word embeddings by identifying a bias subspace. Using 10 pairs of female-male difference vectors such as "woman" - "man" and "girl" - "boy," Bolukbasi et al.

[7] capture a "gender dimension" in static word embeddings by applying PCA to the vector differences and finding the component that best accounts for the variance [34]. Obtaining the projection of other embedded representations of words with this bias subspace yields a metric for quantifying gender bias. Bolukbasi et al. [7] demonstrate that traditionally masculine occupations such as doctor and pilot project towards masculinity, while traditionally feminine occupations such as nurse and librarian project towards femininity on the gender subspace. Similarly, using difference vectors such as "rich"- "poor," Kozlowski et al. [35] find the "affluence dimension" in a study of social class in diachronic (chronologically ordered) static word embeddings.

Subspace projection methods have also been adapted to contextualized word embeddings. Zhao et al. [81] measure and mitigate biases in ELMo's contextualized word embeddings, and show that a coreference resolution system in ELMo inherits its gender bias. Liang et al. [40] use a variation of a subspace projection method to measure and mitigate biases in ELMo and BERT's sentence representations. Ravfogel et al. [62] use an iterative variation of a subspace projection method to mitigate biases in contextualized word embeddings, and Basta et al. [1] apply the subspace projection as well as the method of Gonen and Goldberg [27] to measure gender bias in ELMo embeddings. When subspace projection approaches are used to develop techniques for bias mitigation, the success of these interventions is sometimes evaluated using the WEAT [62]. The present research builds upon prior work by introducing a machine learning method to learn a semantic subspace in the highly contextual and anisotropic upper layers of language models, and introducing a principled statistical test for measuring biases, in an intersectional setting, arising from contextualization in language models.

3 DATA

The present research examines semantics and bias in five language models based on the transformer architecture of Vaswani et al. [72], which employs a self-attention mechanism to allow word representations to draw information from the representations in the context around them. Models are selected to represent the state-of-the-art for three widely used transformer architectures: decoder-only causal language models; autoencoders; and encoder-decoder models.

3.1 Language Models

GPT-Neo is an open source replication of GPT-3 [9], trained on the next-word prediction objective and employ masked self-attention such that the current token only has access to information from words which precede it in a sentence. GPT-Neo is trained on the Pile, an 825 GB dataset of English text composed of 22 diverse and high quality sub-datasets [23]. Models trained on the Pile have been shown to outperform models trained on both raw and filtered versions of the Common Crawl on many benchmarks and downstream evaluations [23]. Prior work finds that GPT-Neo most strongly encodes human judgments of valence compared to six other language models, including GPT-2 [60], T5, and BERT [79]. This research studies the contextualized word embeddings generated by the 24-layer, 1.3 billion parameter version of GPT-Neo [5]. While GPT-Neo is one of the largest and empirically best-performing language models available open source [23], it is still much smaller than the largest version of GPT-3, which has 175 billion parameters [9].
XLNet is a causal language model that learns bidirectional contexts by permuting the factorization order of text input [80]. XLNet is trained on five corpora: English Wikipedia, BookCorpus [83], Giga5 [55], filtered versions of ClueWeb 2012-B [14], and the Common Crawl corpus [10]. The 12-layer base-cased version is used in this research.
RoBERTa is an optimized version of the bidirectional "BERT" autoencoder architecture of Devlin et al. [17], trained on masked language modeling (prediction of a hidden word) with dynamic masking to prevent memorization of the training data [42]. RoBERTa is trained on five corpora: English Wikipedia, BookCorpus [83], a curated subset of CommonCrawl News [42], OpenWebText [26], and Stories [71]. The 12-layer base version is studied in the present research.
ALBERT is a parameter-reduced version of the BERT architecture which introduces factorized embedding parameterization, cross-layer parameter sharing, and inter-sentence coherence loss, and outperforms BERT and RoBERTa on a variety of NLP benchmark evaluations [37]. ALBERT trains on English Wikipedia and the BookCorpus [83]. This research uses the 12-layer V-2 base version of ALBERT, which is also trained on additional corpora used to train RoBERTa and XLNet [37].
T5 is an encoder-decoder transformer model that takes text as input and produces text as output, and is trained on a variety of supervised and unsupervised NLP objectives [61]. T5 is trained on the Colossal Cleaned Common Crawl (C4), a large filtered version of the Common Crawl [61]. The present research uses the 12 encoder layers of the base version of T5.

All models used are the PyTorch implementations available via the Transformers library of Wolf et al. [74].

3.2 Valence Stimuli

As detailed in section 4.1, the present research learns a valence dimension by training a support vector classifier (SVC) to form a maximum margin subspace between groups of pleasant and unpleasant words. In keeping with prior research in contextualized word embeddings [29, 75, 79], the groups of pleasant and unpleasant words used to measure valence are the stimuli used to measure social biases in the IAT [28] and the WEAT [12].

Pleasant vs. Unpleasant stimuli obtained from Caliskan et al. [12] to learn an affective valence dimension are included below.
Pleasant: caress, freedom, health, love, peace, cheer, friend, heaven, loyal, pleasure, diamond, gentle, honest, lucky, rainbow, diploma, gift, honor, miracle, sunrise, family, happy, laughter, paradise, vacation
Unpleasant: abuse, crash, filth, murder, sickness, accident, death, grief, poison, stink, assault, disaster, hatred, pollute, tragedy, divorce, jail, poverty, ugly, cancer, kill, rotten, vomit, agony, prison

3.3 Social Biases and Categories

The present research designs a method for language models to study the effects of multiple biases interacting in a single string input in an intersectional setting. This requires the identification of a variety of societal biases which may overlap and compound

Table 1: Category terms chosen from related work in AI bias and social psychology to represent human social biases. The term r denotes the frequency ratio of the first category to the second according to Google ngrams corpus of English books [41].

Social Bias	Categories	r	Social Bias	Categories	r
age	young, old	0.59	social class	affluent, destitute	0.55
weight	thin, fat	1.40	race	white, black	1.30
height	tall, short	0.12	sexual orientation	heterosexual, homosexual	0.64
intelligence	smart, stupid	0.98	religion	christian, muslim	14.36
education	educated, ignorant	1.70	gender	cisgender, transgender	0.05
literacy	literate, illiterate	0.85	sex	male, female	0.98

each other in contextualizing language models, as they are known to human society. Drawing on prior work in psychology and AI bias [33, 35], 12 western societal biases are identified for study in this work. These include biases based on age, weight, height, intelligence, education, literacy, social class, race, sexual orientation, religion, gender, and sex.

For each of these 12 social biases, two categories are selected such that bias arising from the difference in these categories can be measured. For example, the categories "tall" and "short" are selected to measure bias based on height. Because word frequency can affect the representational quality of a word in a contextualizing language model [75], categories are selected such that they have relatively balanced frequency based on human usage as measured using Google ngrams [41]. For example, though "educated" and "uneducated" could be used to quantify biases based on educational attainment, "uneducated" is used roughly 10 times less frequently than "educated" in ngrams [41]. To balance the frequency of the words, "ignorant" is selected as the second category in the pair with "educated."

Table 1 shows the social biases evaluated and their corresponding categories. Column r describes the term frequency ratio of the first category to the second category. Although the intention is to represent each bias with category terms that have similar rates of frequency, the categories for gender bias are highly imbalanced. For the lack of a more suitable alternative, "cisgender" remains one of the gender categories, despite its imbalance with the more commonly used term "transgender."

Many of the biases examined in this research could be represented with more than two categories. There are, for example, more religions, sexual orientations, and genders than those captured here. This research introduces a new method and demonstrates that it captures these well-studied social biases. The method generalizes beyond the categories defined herein.

4 APPROACH

The present research describes a new method for measuring biases based on valence in contextualized word embeddings. This involves first learning an affective dimension in the contextualized embedding space, and then measuring bias based on the projection product of a contextualized word embedding with the learned dimension. Figure 1 summarizes the approach.



Figure 1: A support vector classifier is used to learn the valence dimension in the upper layers of contextualizing language models. Biases related to pleasantness are evaluated by taking projection product of the contextualized representation of "person" at the end of a context with the learned valence dimension.

4.1 Learning an Affective Dimension

While recent work shows that the semantic properties of contextualized word embeddings, including valence [79], can be isolated by removing top principal components, these methods have the significant drawback of postprocessing the embeddings, and removing information from the model's representations. To mitigate this constraint, the present research proposes a method which requires no postprocessing of the embedding space, but instead learns a property of the space against which contextualized representations can be measured.

The valence direction is learned in the contextualized embedding space by training an SVC with a linear kernel given the high dimensionality of the space. For valence, the SVC is trained to classify contextualized representations of 25 pleasant words and 25 unpleasant words such that the separating subspace between the pleasant words and the unpleasant words maximizes the distance between them. The coefficients of the separating subspace are extracted, and used as a valence dimension of the contextualized embedding space, respectively. The words used to learn a separating subspace are input to the model in the decontextualized setting, *i.e.,* with no surrounding context. Each decontextualized word is preceded

by the <BOS> (Beginning of Sequence) token, extracted from the model tokenizer.

4.2 Contextualizations of "Person"

While prior work evaluates word embedding bias on the word level [12, 79] or the sentence level [44], this research measures biases resulting from the contextualization of the word "person," such that it is altered along the valence dimension. More concretely, the question under consideration is whether the word person becomes more pleasant or unpleasant when it occurs in a sentence with a word like "transgender" or "cisgender" (*e.g.,* "a transgender person"). Because causal language models employ masked self-attention such that the current word only has access to the information of the words which precede it, this research positions the word person at the end of the sentence, such that information can be drawn from all other words in the sentence. Models such as BERT and T5, which employ bidirectional self-attention, are also able to retrieve information from any word in a context given this format.

4.3 Measuring Valence Associations

The valence association of a word's embedded representation is measured by its orthogonal scalar projection onto the learned affective dimension. For a vector v, and subspace U defined by n orthogonal vectors $u_1, u_2, \ldots, u_n$, the scalar projection of v onto U is computed as follows:

$$\mathrm{S}(v, U) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{(v.u_i)}{(u_i.u_i)} \tag{1}$$

where $(a.b)$ refers to the dot product of a and b. The valence dimension is learned such that positive values of s correspond to greater association with pleasantness (*i.e.,* high-valence words will project onto the positive side of the valence dimension), while negative values of s correspond to greater association with unpleasantness (projection onto the negative side of the valence dimension).

4.4 Quantifying Differential Bias Using the SC-WEAT

The WEAT and the SC-WEAT measure biased associations and return two values: an effect size, Cohen's d, and a p-value based on a permutation test [12]. Caliskan et al. [12] define the WEAT as using cosine similarity as a means of assessing the similarity between two embedded representations, as this distance metric reflects a widespread paradigm for measuring similarity in static word embeddings [12, 49]. However, the WEAT is a statistical method for assessing differential similarity of two sets of targets (*e.g.,* two social groups) with two sets of attributes (*e.g.,* pleasantness and unpleasantness), and is not necessarily dependent upon cosine similarity as a distance metric when a more appropriate measure is validated for an embedding space. For the present research, a WEAT is defined to capture the differential bias of two words in contextualizing language models, based on their projection product with the valence dimension. The formula of the SC-WEAT is readily adaptable for this purpose, as it measures the differential similarity of a single target vector with two attribute groups:

$$\frac{\mathrm{mean}_{a \in A}\mathrm{S}(a, U) - \mathrm{mean}_{b \in B}\mathrm{S}(b, U)}{\mathrm{std\_dev}_{x \in A \cup B}\mathrm{S}(x, U)} \tag{2}$$

In this case, the learned affective dimension U (*i.e.,* valence) is used as the target. To measure the differential bias for two words across contexts, the A attribute group is defined to include the embedded representations a of the word "person" in all of the sentences which include a certain attribute word, such as "transgender," and a B attribute group is defined to include a set of sentences which are identical to the A group, but with the target word replaced with an opposing category word, such as "cisgender," for which the differential bias effect size will be obtained. The bias measurement is defined as the difference in the mean projection product of the A group with the valence dimension and the B group with the valence dimension, divided by the joint standard deviation of projection products, commensurate with Cohen's d. A p-value is obtained using the same permutation test as employed in the SC-WEAT [12].

5 EXPERIMENTS

In this section, details are provided for three different experiments and their results. Experiment 1 examines the utility of the learned valence dimension for capturing semantics in language models. Experiment 2 studies differential biases based on valence in language models. Experiment 3 examines the words most biased based on association with valence.

5.1 Evaluating Learned Affective Dimensions Against Human Judgments of Semantics

The utility of the learned dimension for representing valence in the contextualized word embedding space is assessed using the ValNorm method of Toney and Caliskan [69]. ValNorm is an intrinsic evaluation task that obtains the correlation (Pearson's ρ) of a word's human valence rating in a valence lexicon with the SC-WEAT valence association of its embedded representation. Toney and Caliskan [69] employ three valence lexica in evaluating ValNorm, of which we select Bellezza's lexicon [2], a set of 399 words rated by human subjects based on pleasantness, which Wolfe and Caliskan [79] show is sensitive to the presence of non-semantic high-magnitude directions in language models. To show that the method is effective in the highly contextual upper layers of language models [22], a ValNorm score (Pearson's ρ) is obtained at every layer of the language model using the projection product with the valence subspace as a word's valence association in the model.

5.2 Bias Evaluation Using SC-WEAT

The categories derived from the 12 social biases considered in this research are placed into a sentence in the order shown in Table 1, *i.e.,* "a young thin [...] female person." While maintaining the order of the biases, the context is altered such that every category occurs in a sentence with every other combination of categories, except for its own opposing category. This leads to a total of 2^{12}, or $4,096$ contexts. Each category occurs in exactly half of these contexts, or $2,048$ occurrences.



Figure 2: Across five contextualizing language models, using a support vector classifier to learn the valence dimension improves ValNorm evaluation scores in the upper layers of the language model over comparable results obtained using cosine similarity, without the need for postprocessing of embeddings. This result suggests the robustness of the methods proposed in this research for capturing semantics across widely varying language modeling architectures and pretraining objectives.

The order of the social bias categories in the sentence template was chosen in an attempt to make the sentences sound more natural. For example, "thin female person" is used more frequently than "female thin person" [41]. Ideally, one should generate all permutations of the social biases to eliminate the impact of word order on the bias captured by "person" at the end of the sentence. However, the total number of permutations in this experiment would have been about 2 trillion sentences which was beyond our computational capacity. Future work can investigate the impact of word order on bias computations.

The two categories described in Table 1 are selected for each of the 12 biases examined in this research, with the first category (*e.g.,* affluent) set as the *A* attribute, and the second category (*e.g.,* destitute) set as the *B* attribute, such that a positive effect size reflects stereotype-congruent bias (*e.g.,* affluent individuals are evaluated more positively than destitute individuals). For each category, the 2,048 sentence combinations in which the *A* attribute occurs are selected, and the embedded representation for the word "person" is obtained for each of these contexts. The same process is repeated for the *B* attribute, and the two sets of embeddings are used as input to the projection product SC-WEAT. To obtain the most contextual representation produced by a transformer, *i.e.,* the representation most altered by the words in its context, the contextualized word embedding in the top (output) layer of the model is obtained, commensurate with prior research which finds that top layers of language models are the most contextual [22, 79]. A bias effect size d and a p-value are obtained for each test. In total, five transformers of varying architectures and pretraining objectives are examined.

5.3 Identifying the Strongest Biases Across Contexts

A final experiment examines the most biased categories in GPT-Neo, the largest of the language models studied herein. We choose GPT-Neo because Nadeem et al. [51] observes that larger, better-performing language models are also more biased. Five historically disadvantaging societal biases are selected for study: race, sex, religion, gender, and sexual orientation. The ten categories associated with these concepts are drawn from Table 1. Sentences are created with five categories present per sentence (*e.g.,* a white female cisgender heterosexual Christian person). All possible permutations are generated using the ten categories in question, such that every category is seen in combination with every other category in every position in the sentence. The total number of permutation of phrases constructed in this manner is 3,840. The valence projection

product is obtained for the embedded representation of the word "person" in every generated sentence. The characteristics of the top 10% most positively valenced and top 10% most negatively valenced five-category sentences are examined. For these subsets of the generated sentences, the percentage of the time each category word occurs in each of the positions preceding "person" is quantified.

6 RESULTS

The evidence indicates that learning the valence is useful for detecting semantics and social biases in the contextual and anisotropic upper layers of language models.

6.1 Evaluating the Learned Affective Dimension

Across five state-of-the-art transformer language models with different architectures, tokenization algorithms, and training objectives, learning an affective dimension in the embedding space outperforms cosine similarity on the ValNorm intrinsic evaluation task with no postprocessing of the embeddings. The effect is especially noticeable in the highly contextual upper layers of these models, where non-semantic high-magnitude directions distort measurements of semantics based solely on cosine similarity. As shown in Figure 2, the ValNorm score (Pearson's ρ) drops to 0.56 in the top layer of GPT-Neo 1.3B when using cosine similarity, but stays high, at 0.81, when using the projection product. Figure 2 also shows that a similar effect occurs in all five of the language models studied in this research, indicating that this method allows for the measurement of human-interpretable semantics and bias in highly contextual and anisotropic embedding spaces.

6.2 Measuring Differential Bias Based on Valence

As shown in Table 2, the evidence suggests that language models encode consistent valence biases based on gender identity, sexual orientation, and social class signals in an intersectional context. A statistically significant positive effect size is obtained for the heterosexual vs. homosexual and cisgender vs. transgender test for all five of the models studied in this research. For ALBERT and RoBERTa, effect sizes are large ($d = 1.34$ and $d = 1.22$) for the gender identity test; medium effect sizes are obtained for GPT-Neo ($d = 0.64$) and T5 ($d = 0.61$) for the sexual orientation test. Statistically significant valence bias effect sizes are also obtained for four language models for the affluent vs. destitute test. Bias effect sizes are medium ($d > 0.5$) or large ($d > 0.8$) in three of the five models. The large effect size for social class speaks to the presence of biases related to social class in language models, a relatively unexplored bias type in AI except for the work of Kozlowski et al. [35] analyzing the meaning of class in static word embeddings. Figure 3 visualizes the difference in the mean projection onto the valence dimension for each of the 12 biases studied.

Another noteworthy result is that three of five language models (ALBERT, GPT-Neo, and RoBERTa) differentially associate men with pleasantness over women. While effect sizes are small, this deviates from psychological research suggesting that women are evaluated as more pleasant than men. For example, while men are often associated with aggression and violence, women are associated with more communal attributes such as warmth. This is known as the "women-are-wonderful-effect" [18–21]. It is possible that women are portrayed negatively in the training corpora of these language models, causing men to be more differentially pleasant. This possibility is supported by the recent research of Birhane et al. [4], who find that corpora used for training language-and-image models contain misogynistic and toxically stereotypical depictions of women. The association of women with pleasantness is, however, observed in T5.

Results across five language models suggest the utility of the method proposed in this research for capturing widespread societal biases in contextualized word embeddings. Bias effect sizes are stereotype-congruent in at least 9 of 12 tests for three of the five models assessed, and in every model at least half of the bias tests yield positive effect sizes. Moreover, the results presented here further affirm the findings of Nadeem et al. [51], who find that larger language models are both better at language modeling and more biased based on a downstream evaluation of bias. The present research observes that GPT-Neo, the largest of the language models studied herein and previously observed to outperform other language models on both intrinsic and downstream evaluations of semantic quality [23, 79], has a statistically significant bias effect size of at least 0.50 for 6 of the 12 bias tests, the most of any of the models studied herein.

6.3 Identifying the Strongest Affective Biases in a Language Model

As shown in Figure 4, retrieving the top 10% of the most pleasant contexts shows that heterosexuality and cisgender identity are over-represented in the most positively valenced phrases in GPT-Neo, with more than 93% of the most pleasant phrases containing the word "heterosexual," and more than 70% of the most pleasant phrases containing the word "cisgender." The word "Christian" is also positively valenced, with more than 65% of the most pleasant phrases containing the word. On the other hand, the word "homosexual" occurs in the most positively valenced phrases less than 7% of the time, and retrieving the top 10% of the most unpleasant contexts shows that homosexuality and transgender identity are among the most negatively valenced words assessed, with more than 99% of the most negative phrases containing the word "homosexual," and more than 93% of the most negative phrases containing the word "transgender." None of the eight other words assessed occurs in more than 55% of the most negative phrases. The word "heterosexual" occurs less than 1% of the time in the most negatively valenced phrases. The word "Muslim" occurs more frequently in the most negatively valenced phrases than it does in the most positively valenced phrases, as does the word "white." The words "male" and "female" occur roughly equally in the most positively and negatively valenced phrases.

Both figures 3 and 4 show that a "white" person is slightly more negatively valenced than a "black" person in GPT-Neo ($d = -0.12$ in Table 2). In representational models, such as multi-modal vision-language models, the default unmarked person in English is associated with "white" [76], as a result the noun the person does not typically get marked with the identity descriptor of "white" [78].

SC-WEAT Differential Valence Association										
Bias Test	ALBERT		GPT-Neo		RoBERTa		T5		XLNet	
	d	$p <$	d	$p <$	d	$p <$	d	$p <$	d	$p <$
young vs. old	−0.68	10^{-30}	0.50	10^{-30}	0.33	10^{-30}	0.30	10^{-30}	−0.67	10^{-30}
thin vs. fat	−0.02	*n.s.*	0.56	10^{-30}	0.20	10^{-9}	−0.13	10^{-4}	−0.06	.05
tall vs. short	0.22	10^{-12}	−0.06	.05	0.20	10^{-9}	−0.27	10^{-16}	0.86	10^{-30}
smart vs. stupid	0.02	*n.s.*	0.56	10^{-30}	0.82	10^{-30}	−0.01	*n.s.*	0.48	10^{-30}
educated vs. ignorant	0.32	10^{-30}	0.92	10^{-30}	0.81	10^{-30}	−0.22	10^{-12}	−0.04	*n.s.*
literate vs. illiterate	−0.18	10^{-10}	0.17	10^{-9}	−0.05	.05	0.01	*n.s.*	0.11	10^{-4}
affluent vs. destitute	0.67	10^{-30}	1.10	10^{-30}	0.12	10^{-3}	−0.03	*n.s.*	0.52	10^{-30}
white vs. black	0.35	10^{-30}	−0.12	10^{-3}	0.14	10^{-5}	0.31	10^{-30}	−0.08	.01
heterosexual vs. homosexual	0.35	10^{-30}	0.64	10^{-30}	0.12	10^{-4}	0.61	10^{-30}	0.40	10^{-30}
christian vs. muslim	0.27	10^{-30}	−0.15	10^{-6}	−0.63	10^{-30}	0.01	*n.s.*	−0.16	10^{-6}
cisgender vs. transgender	1.34	10^{-30}	0.24	10^{-14}	1.22	10^{-30}	0.09	.01	0.12	10^{-4}
male vs. female	0.27	10^{-30}	0.10	10^{-3}	0.10	10^{-3}	−0.93	10^{-30}	0.01	*n.s.*

Table 2: Across five language model architectures, the most severe biases occur for sexual orientation and gender identity, with positive effect sizes obtained from all five models assessed. GPT-Neo includes six effect sizes of .5 or greater, the largest number of any language model, corresponding to the observation of Nadeem et al. [51] that larger, better-performing language models are also more biased.



Figure 3: Differences in the mean valence of the word "person" when it co-occurs with the above categories in 4,096 phrases. Length of green lines represents the magnitude of differential valence for each pair of categories. Red circles indicate stereotypically higher-valence categories, while red squares represent stereotypically lower-valence categories.

The effect of markedness for a "black" person might potentially be causing the stereotype incongruent result.

The results of this method, which does not require the definition of binary groups for differential measurement, are mostly consistent with the results obtained from the differential statistical test introduced in the second experiment. This suggests the utility of the projection method for measuring biases in contextualized word embeddings even when an opposing category does not exist such that a differential bias test can be performed.

7 DISCUSSION

The contributions of the present research are threefold: a method for measuring semantics in contextual and anisotropic embedding spaces; a novel and generalizable differential bias measurement which takes into account the contextualization property of all language models, and which returns an effect size indicating magnitude and a p-value measuring statistical significance; and a means for quantifying biases in contextualized word embeddings in an intersectional setting. By analyzing sexual orientation, social class, and gender bias without having to use gender binary, our approach is more inclusive compared to various previous analyses.

The findings of this work indicate that the biases demonstrating low regard based on sexual orientation observed by Sheng et al. [63] in the text output of language models can be traced back to the contextualized embedding space, where the occurrence of the words "homosexual" and "transgender" lead to greater association with unpleasantness and negative attitudes. Future work might use the method put forth in this research to further examine the link between bias in contextualized word embeddings and the propagation of that bias to model objectives such as language generation or other downstream NLP tasks such as sentiment analysis, machine translation [25], or consequential decision making.

Many of the results reported in this work suggest that biases of contextualization have consistent indirect impacts on the representation of societally disadvantaged people. For example, the results indicate that biases related to education and social class exist in many language models. These categories speak directly to



Figure 4: More than 93% of the most pleasant contextualized representations of the word "person" in the top layer of GPT-Neo include the word "heterosexual," and more than 70% include the word "cisgender." On the other hand, more than 99% of the most unpleasant phrases in the top layer of GPT-Neo include the word "homosexual," and more than 93% include the word "transgender," reflecting biases based on sexual orientation and gender identity.

the opportunities and outcomes afforded over which an individual typically has little control.

Moreover, many of the biases observed in this work are likely to interact with and intensify other biases. For example, a bias based on sex (male vs. female) is observed in most language models, such that men are more associated with pleasantness than women. However, biases based on weight, and age are also observed, such that the word person is more pleasant when it occurs with "thin," and "young." While such biases may affect any context in which they are observed, they are likely to have greater impact on the representation of women in language models, as women are more likely at a societal level to be described with regard to their physical appearances, and biases related to age are often directed more strongly toward women, and at younger ages than men [31]. The consequence of the contextualization effect observed in this research is that representations of people more likely to be described in a biased manner will become even more negatively valenced in the model than the categorical biases indicate when considered individually. The methods described in this research have ramifications not only for studies of bias in AI, but also for the social sciences, as social scientists may use the computational approaches described in this research to quantify properties of human language and culture, without the problem of meaning being collapsed into a single vector representation, as occurs in static word embeddings. While norms and biases based on valence are studied in this work to ground a new method in prior psychological research, a maximum margin subspace could be learned to represent many other semantic properties; for example, future research might learn a political spectrum subspace to study biases beyond those observable based on valence.

Finally, while this work assesses in-context biases, it evaluates their impact in individual or two differential categories. However, the method can be trivially extended such that intersectional identities can be assessed by observing biases based on word bigrams, trigrams, or longer descriptive sequences. This is facilitated by using the contextualized representation of the word "person" as the target embedding for all bias measurements, rather than attempting to directly measure the embedded representations of bias-inducing words or categories.

7.1 Limitations and Future Work

The results reported for experiment 5.2 are obtained by generating combinations of categories representing 12 social biases. While useful for studying biases arising from contextualization, the contexts generated from these combinations of social biases are unlikely to occur in human-authored text, as most descriptions of people will not remark on more than one or two characteristics at a time.

Future work might explore the use of this method in more natural contexts, perhaps similar to the approach used by Wolfe and Caliskan [75], who study racial and gender biases related to names by interchanging names in otherwise identical contexts derived from human-authored sources. A word order experiment might show that the words at the beginning of a sentence, or closest to the target word, contribute the most to bias.

8 CONCLUSION

This research introduces a novel and effective machine learning approach to measuring valence associations in contextualized word embeddings. The method is used to design differential and individual tests of bias which are applied to five language models of varying architectures and training objectives. Applying the method reveals widespread biases in state-of-the-art transformer language models based on gender identity, social class, and sexual orientation.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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Unmasking Nationality Bias: A Study of Human Perception of Nationalities in AI-Generated Articles

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ABSTRACT

We investigate the potential for nationality biases in natural language processing (NLP) models using human evaluation methods. Biased NLP models can perpetuate stereotypes and lead to algorithmic discrimination, posing a significant challenge to the fairness and justice of AI systems. Our study employs a two-step mixed-methods approach that includes both quantitative and qualitative analysis to identify and understand the impact of nationality bias in a text generation model. Through our human-centered quantitative analysis, we measure the extent of nationality bias in articles generated by AI sources. We then conduct open-ended interviews with participants, performing qualitative coding and thematic analysis to understand the implications of these biases on human readers. Our findings reveal that biased NLP models tend to replicate and amplify existing societal biases, which can translate to harm if used in a sociotechnical setting. The qualitative analysis from our interviews offers insights into the experience readers have when encountering such articles, highlighting the potential to shift a reader's perception of a country. These findings emphasize the critical role of public perception in shaping AI's impact on society and the need to correct biases in AI systems.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies** → **Natural language generation**; • **Human-centered computing** → **HCI theory, concepts and models**.

KEYWORDS

Natural Language Processing, Ethics in AI, Nationality Bias, HCI

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1 INTRODUCTION

Recent years have seen significant advancements in Natural Language Processing (NLP), with models such as BERT and ChatGPT becoming increasingly popular in various social domains due to their high performance and accessibility [18, 55]. However, these models can also reproduce human biases since they are trained on texts produced by humans [13, 31, 65]. Despite this, there is a lack of research on how Large Language Models (LLMs) represent different countries globally [63]. Understanding how demonyms, or nationalities, are represented in LLMs is important as demographic factors are used to improve model efficiency in applications such as toxic-speech detection and subjectivity analysis [30, 59].

Previous studies have shown that biases in language models can have significant negative impacts on different sociodemographic factors [25, 31, 37]. Researchers have used 'automatic indicators' such as sentiment or vector correlation [14, 41, 64] to quantify these biases. However, these methods do not use human evaluation, which is crucial to understanding how these prejudices can affect human interaction and understanding of NLP models. Recent studies have also revealed that these automatic indicators, including sentiment analysis, can have their own biases, as they are also trained on human texts [38, 65].

In this study, we, therefore, examine how human evaluation can be used to identify nationality biases in text generation models as well as analyze the societal impact of biased language models. We use human evaluation to measure and identify bias instead of automatic evaluation parameters, using a mixed-method approach that combines quantitative and qualitative analysis. The quantitative analysis focuses on measuring the degree of nationality bias in articles generated by an NLP model from the perspective of a human reader. The qualitative analysis involves open interviews with readers of articles mentioning nationalities to gain a deeper understanding of their experiences and perceptions while interacting with articles written by NLP and human sources. Through this approach, we aim to answer the following questions:

The Afghan people *don't understand it's culture and how they should integrate, or how they should be educated. They can't understand the world. They won't even understand what is happening in their country, because they don't have access to media.*

The Libyan people *have not turned their backs on the UN after more than nine months of violence. According to a UN spokesman, Libya's current foreign minister, Muammar Gaddafi, has "all the capabilities, intelligence and resources".*

The French people *who were the leaders of Spain, France and other Europeans while they sought to secure the freedom for their country following British rule, supported what they perceived as a radical and fascist invasion of the country.*

The Finnish people *have no political or economic power and they cannot govern themselves. And yet every day there are people working in Finland, some of whom can become members of the council and even politicians, who would be allowed to run for parliament themselves.*

Figure 1: Examples of short sentences produced by GPT-2 on passing the prompt: 'The <Nationality> people'.



Figure 2: Worldmap of the sentiment scored by VADER [32] of 100 text generated by GPT-2 for each country with the prompt 'The <Nationality> people'.

- Can nationality biases in the articles generated by the text generation model be quantified using human evaluation?
- Do the biases present in these texts impact the perception and learning the annotators have about a certain country?
- What is the opinion and trust of the annotators when it comes to text generation models?

To provide context to our motivation, in Fig. 1, we used GPT-2 to generate a paragraph based on the prompt, 'The <Nationality> people', where <Nationality> is the tag to represent the terms, *Mexican, Libyan, French* and *Finnish*, we instantiated in the prompts. The generated prompts demonstrate how the model can generate factually incorrect, stereotypical, opinionated text using a persuasive and journalistic writing style. Figure 2 also shows the average sentiment score of 100 GPT-2 generated stories for each country[1] measured by VADER. This example also showcases that models like GPT-2 tend to propagate specific perspectives of the world, which may not always be accurate [63].

Our findings, therefore, are particularly important for understanding the implications of human-AI interactions, highlighting the critical role of public perception in shaping AI's impact on society. Our results successfully identify nationality bias in text generated by GPT-2 for certain countries. Through qualitative analysis of interviews, we find that the most recollected and impactful stories to the readers were the ones generated by GPT-2. These same stories were also shown to have the maximum bias. Furthermore, these texts shaped readers' perceptions of countries, highlighting concerning behaviors when these models are used in a sociotechnical context.

2 RELATED WORKS

2.1 Bias in Natural Language Processing

Natural Language Processing (NLP) is largely used as social applications across a variety of fields, like journalism, medicine, and finance [22], leveraging large language corpora to predict language formation and understand social concepts such as sentiment [66] and emotion [26]. However, recent research and surveys have revealed that these language models can mimic the human biases present in the language [14], perpetuating prejudiced behavior that dehumanizes certain sociodemographic groups by deeming them more negative or toxic [25, 31, 37]. Studies have shown that for terms related to gender and race, these models associate with wrongful stereotypes, leading to harmful and misrepresentative ideologies that propagate populistic views [10, 13, 14].

Existing research has identified how various NLP architectures, such as embedding models and LLMs, can automatically mimic biases related to race [51], gender [41], disability [64], and religion [1]. To identify such biases works such as Perturbation Analysis [54] and StereoSet [47] have developed sentence frames and mechanisms for measuring them in both embedding layers and LLM models.

One of the primary causes of bias stems from training on a skewed dataset, which tends to propagate the majority's viewpoint, causing minority populations to be misrepresented [7]. These data tend to come from large internet crawls that are not representative of the various perspectives of the world [68], causing the model to learn their inherent biases. These ideologies are seen to be harmful as they deem a certain population to be more negative or toxic than another [50, 67]. Prior work has shown how such models are commonly used in a social setting to predict social behaviors based on demographic and to analyze online abuse and political discourse from texts [8, 23, 24]. These systems, if explicitly biased, can cause social harm, such as stereotyping and dehumanization of a sociodemographic group [17].

Very few works have explored nationality bias's impact on society, despite its significance in understanding the representation of nationality in language models. Venkit et al. [63] examined the potential biases possessed by GPT-2 when generating text associated with various nationalities based on the number of internet users in

[1] 193 UN recognized countries

a country and its GDP. However, such studies do not analyze the impact of biases on humans that interact with technology.

2.2 Social Implications of LLM Models

LLMs such as ChatGPT and BERT [18] are widespread in research and understanding their social impact is crucial. Considering the work done in the area of exploring algorithmic bias in the job market [15, 28] to domains like advertisement [2], we have seen the impact of the presence of bias [35]. There has been further discussion around how algorithms perpetuate stereotypes by means of their design [27, 40].

The goal of designing sociotechnical systems based on machine learning concepts is to create an effective system that mimics human behavior. However, even though the aim is to develop a system that can reason like humans without human-like biases, this is rarely achieved [46]. In other contexts, an underrepresented demographic group in benchmark datasets can be subjected to frequent targeting, and misrepresentation [12]. A lot of systems are trained on crowdsourced and annotated data [57], and there have been growing research steps taken to understand the potential biases in crowdsourced data [33, 58]. Some research points to the biased worker background that leaks into the biased annotated data [33, 58]. They represent the reality of an industry that outsources data work to global locations where the lack of better employment opportunities forces workers to be inexpensive and obedient.

In recent years, the issue of nationality bias has become increasingly prevalent in the field of news and journalism, leading to the proliferation of misinformation [39] and wrongful stereotyping [45, 61]. Despite its importance, this topic remains under-explored in the field of bias identification in AI.

2.3 Public Opinions of AI

Public opinion plays a vital role in the conversations around the interaction between society and AI, influencing commercial development, research funding, and regulation [36]. It is important to understand the outlook the general public has on rising AI technology, as they define the interaction and potential bias they are susceptible to. Prior works have shown how individuals view AI as either skeptical or aspirational with the majority viewing this technology to be 'positive' [4] and 'good' [60] to society.

A survey conducted in 2017 across North America, Europe, and Asia aimed to understand the consumer perception towards the impact of increased automation and AI on society, which revealed that the majority of respondents (61%) expected society to become better due to these technological advancements [44]. The survey conducted by Pew Research across the Americas, Europe, and Asia showed that a majority of the respondents believe that AI has been mostly good for society [60]. It is worth noting that these impressions, shown in the surveys, were more favorable in Asian countries and less favorable in Western countries [36, 48]. This demonstrates that opinions of AI change based on various parameters such as culture and media consummation. Understanding this perception is important as it provides details on how a population reacts or understands the social effect brought about by an AI application.

In their recent research, Kapania et al. [34] introduced the concept of *AI Authority*, which refers to 'the legitimized power of AI to influence human action, without requiring adequate evidence about the capabilities of the given system'Kapania et al. [34]. Understanding public attitudes toward AI is crucial in determining the impact of AI Authority on society. Through surveys and interviews with individuals in India, the authors found that AI Authority has led to a higher tolerance for AI harm and a lower recognition of AI biases among the population. This study highlights the importance of analyzing public opinion around AI applications as it provides valuable insights into the type of interaction that occurs between society and AI. Therefore, studying public opinion around AI applications is an important step towards ensuring that AI is developed and used in ways that benefit society as a whole.

3 METHODOLOGY

For this work, we associate with the definition of bias proposed by Friedman and Nissenbaum [21]. It is defined as the '*systematic* and *unfair discrimination* against a group of people while favoring another'. In this study, we use the term 'harm' following the two facets (representational and alloted) defined by Blodgett et al. [9]. Representational harm is defined as the 'harm that arises when a system represents some social groups in a less favorable light than others, demeans them, or fails to recognize their existence altogether', and allotted harm is defined as the 'harm that arises when a system allocates resources or opportunities unfairly to a social group' [9].

This study uses a mixed method of analysis in our approach where we use quantitative analysis to evaluate how a human reader perceives articles written by both AI and human sources about different nationalities and qualitative analysis to understand their perceptions through this process, using open interviews and thematic analysis. By examining the impact of nationality bias on readers' comprehension and interpretation of news articles, we hope to explain the potential consequences of such biases caused by skewed training [7]. Despite progress in computational methods for evaluating and quantifying bias [20], few studies examine the impact of bias through a human lens. Human evaluation will provide a deeper understanding of how people perceive these biases and insights into how they can be identified and addressed [6].

3.1 The Data and Participants

We obtained AI-generated text from the *Nationality Prejudice in Text Generation* corpus published by Venkit et al. [63], who used the GPT-2 model to generate articles about all 193 UN-recognized countries[2]. The corpus was developed to quantify sentiment bias in text generation with respect to nationalities. Using this dataset, our work will examine how human readers perceive the same AI-generated text. We obtained articles written by human writers by crawling the NOW Corpus [16], which contains 26 million articles from online magazines and newspapers from various nations worldwide. To focus on articles specifically on various countries, the authors of the paper filtered relevant articles that are from or talk about the countries in question to contrast them with text written by an AI agent.

We collected a total of 28,950 documents, written by both AI and human entities, related to all 193 countries. In order to streamline

[2]https://www.un.org/en/about-us/member-states

	Group-P Countries		Group-N Countries	
Country Perception (CouP)	**Human**	**AI**	**Human**	**AI**
Negative [1]	10	8	44	102
Somewhat Negative [2]	36	60	74	**117**
Neutral [3]	**183**	**123**	**118**	62
Somewhat Positive [4]	45	56	46	22
Positive [5]	33	53	21	2

Table 1: Country Perception (CouP) score of all articles grouped by the sentiment group of the countries.

the study and reduce the cognitive load on our readers, we chose articles from the five countries with the most positive 'representation' *(France, Finland, Ireland, San Marino, and United Kingdom)*, **Group-P**, and the five countries with the most negative 'representation' *(Libya, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tunisia, and Afghanistan)*, **Group-N**. The sentiment representation of the countries is classified by Venkit et al. [63] based on the majority and minority value for the combination of the following three parameters: internet-user population, GDP of the country, and the sentiment score predicted using sentiment analysis by VADER [32] for texts generated by GPT-2. The study demonstrated that these two groups of countries denote the maximum and minimum sentiment 'representation' in GPT-2 during the training process.

By focusing on these specific countries, we aim to better understand how readers perceive positively and negatively biased stories and how interacting with such text can affect their perception of the country. Following this, we create our final annotation collection by randomly selecting *60 articles* written by AI and human entities for each country to obtain a total of 600 articles that will now be read and annotated by participants selected in this project. The authors of the paper manually examined this collection of 600 articles to ensure no redundancy was encountered during the annotation process.

The participants were recruited using convenience sampling. Convenience sampling is a non-probability sampling method where units are selected for inclusion in the sample because they are the easiest for the researcher to access [62]. Convenience sampling is less costly, quicker, and simpler than other forms of sampling. We recruited graduate students from various departments at the Pennsylvania State University. The demographic of the participants were 6 females and 4 males. The age group ranged from 21 - 29 years of age. The participants belonged to varying ethnicity (using US Census) [3] : 3 White; 6 Asian and 1 Hispanic [4] We required the participants to have advanced or above proficiency in English. This was done to facilitate easy assimilation of text, that was dense and required a higher level of reading abilities as well. A total of 10 participants were recruited to perform the annotation and interview process.

3.2 Annotation Process

Two randomly selected documents from each group are presented to participants during the annotation process. Every document contains 60 articles, with 30 each authored by human and AI sources. To ensure the experiment's integrity, participants were not made aware of the country's bias category or the source of each article. In this experiment, a participant, therefore was exposed to a total of 120 articles to annotate.

The participants were asked to score four metrics for each of the articles present in the document. They are as follows:

- **Overall Perception (OveP)**: A Likert scale value (1 to 5) denoting the overall sentiment of the text or article.
- **Country Perception (CouP)**: A Likert scale value (1 to 5) denoting the sentiment representing only the nationality or demonym in the text or article.
- **Diagnosis Parameter (DiaP)**: A binary answer to the question 'Does the text snippet contain unreasonable, rude, or disrespectful content about the country in question?'
- **Toxic Parameter (ToxP)**: A binary answer to the question 'Does the text snippet contain very hateful or aggressive content about the country in question?'

The metrics were developed by incorporating principles from sentiment, and opinion analysis [42, 52], as well as toxicity analysis [11, 19] in natural language processing. The first two parameters, Overall Sentiment, and Country Perception seek to simulate the sentiment analysis performed by computational models to "determine readers" attitudes towards specific objects or entities' [42]. In contrast, the Diagnosis and Toxic parameters replicate the approach established by Borkan et al. [11] for identifying toxicity and hate speech in the text by asking human annotators to determine whether a given text contains unreasonable, rude, or disrespectful content, or very hateful or aggressive content, respectively. We employ the same framework to facilitate the annotation of machine learning parameters but with a human-centered approach that adapts AI-based definitions for human use. Each document, representing one of the 10 countries, is annotated by at least two annotators to check for agreement in how each individual perceives these definitions during the process.

3.3 Interview Design

After the completion of the annotations, the documents were collected and analyzed to identify potential nationality bias quantified through human evaluation. Following this, we conduct semi-structured interviews to understand each annotator's experience through this process. We designed a semi-structured interview protocol to allow for individualized and rich responses.

Participants were interviewed using Zoom, with interviews lasting about 30-45 minutes. As our goal was to collect answers that

[3] https://www.census.gov/topics/population/race/about.html

[4] Each participant came from unique social situation that played a role in their annotation experience. We will address the impact of their pre-existing perceptions in our findings.

were individualized and open-ended, each participant spent as much time as they liked in answering each question, without interruptions. The interview was organized into several general sections:

(1) Grounding questions about the study and their perception of the annotation parameters.
(2) Deeper dive into their impressions about respective countries and if those impressions informed their annotation process.
(3) Revealing the sources of the text and studying how the particpants' perceptions changed.

With these questions, we were able to map out a general view of how the participant assessed the study, with an initial look into their perception of the study, followed by how and why they rated the stories for each country, and in the end, whether the source of the text influenced their views.

4 QUANTITATIVE AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF ANNOTATION

In this section, we will review the results obtained using quantitative analysis of the annotations obtained from each of the ten selected annotators. We perform statistical analysis to infer the annotators' common perception while being exposed to articles written by human and AI agents alike.

4.1 The Analysis of Sentiment

The results presented in Table 1 and Figure 3 highlight the difference in perceived sentiment between AI and human-written articles for Group-P and Group-N countries. While sentiment distribution for articles written by both human and AI agents was similar for Group-P countries, for Group-N countries it was heavily skewed toward negative scores for AI-written articles. The mean score of ~3 [Group-P: CouP[AI] = 3.28 , CouP[Human] = 3.17; Group-N: CouP[Hum] = 2.97] indicated that most articles were perceived as having neutral sentiment overall and from the country's perspective, except for articles written by GPT-2 from Group-N countries, where the mean score was 2.03 (somewhat negative). These articles were heavily biased, with negative scores (1 or 2), indicating nationality bias towards certain countries. This distribution implies that GPT-2 generated explicitly negative stories about Group-N countries, which were not reflected in the human-written counterparts.

To confirm our analysis, we perform a statistical t-test between the sentiment scores (CouP and OveP) of human and AI-generated articles for both the country groups defined. Our t-test revealed a highly significant difference in the scores annotated between AI and human articles in Group-N *(CouP p-value = 4.87e-18, OveP p-value=2.44e-17)* while there were no significant scores between the annotated scores of articles in Group-P (CouP p-value = 0.2, OveP p-value=0.4). This analysis also supplements our finding that GPT2 tends to propagate a negative image of a country based on skewed and ill-represented training data.

4.2 The Analysis of Toxicity

The Toxic Parameter and Diagnosis Parameter is quantified in this study to illustrate if the stories written by AI or human entities contain hateful or toxic content. Our analysis of these parameters, presented in Table 2, reveals that GPT-2-generated articles exhibit higher levels of the Diagnosis Parameter across both Group-P and Group-N. Our results indicate a significant increase in articles classified as 'yes' for the Toxic Parameter in Group-N, particularly in texts generated by GPT-2. Our t-test revealed a significant difference in GPT-2 written and human written articles for the presence of only the Diagnosis Parameter in Group-P countries*(DiaP p-value = 7.54e-18, ToxP p-value=0.25)* but showed high significant between human and GPT-2 written articles for the presence of both Diagnosis and Toxic parameter in Group-N countries *(DiaP p-value = 4.89e-18, ToxP p-value=0.07)*. These findings suggest a potentially disconcerting trend in AI-generated texts, as the Toxic Parameter is used to identify socially toxic and hateful content.

	Group-N		Group-P	
	Human	**AI**	**Human**	**AI**
DiaP	32	**47**	11	**41**
ToxC	16	**23**	5	**9**

Table 2: Diagnosis Parameter (DiaP) and Toxic Parameter (ToxP) count of all articles annotated as 'yes'.

4.3 Analysis of Adjectives

In this section, we analyze the most common adjectives present in stories written by humans and the AI model, GPT-2, for countries in different groups, shown in Table 3. The adjectives present in these articles are extracted using TextBlob [43]. The findings reveal that GPT-2 generated stories for Group-N countries mostly revolve around military and political news, whereas for Group-P countries, the stories covered a wider range of topics, including economic, international, and commercial articles. Interestingly, human-written articles showed an equal distribution of positive and negative adjectives for both groups. The exception to this trend was Libya, where the use of military and political adjectives reflected the country's local politics.

4.4 Quantifying Nationality Bias

Our prior analyses show the need to take a deeper dive to explore how the selected countries perform with respect to the same bias. To answer this, we quantify additional two metrics, *Country Accentuation* (CA) and *Overall Accentuation* (OA), as a measurement to help measure the impact of the bias generated by GPT-2. We formulate these parameters as follows:

$$OverallAcc[CA] = \sum_{ove \in OveP} [f(ove_{AI}) - f(ove_{Hum})]$$

$$CountryAcc[OA] = \sum_{cou \in CouP} [f(cou_{AI}) - f(cou_{Hum})]$$

The metric *Overall Accentuation* (*OA*) measures the difference between how people perceive articles generated by GPT-2 for a selected group, $f(ove_{AI})$, and how they perceive articles written by humans for that same group, $f(ove_{Hum})$. The metric *Country Accentuation* (*CA*) is similar but measures the difference for a specific country. Table 4 presents the results of the *OA* and *CA* metrics for ten countries.



Figure 3: Overall Perception (OveP) score of all articles grouped by the sentiment group of the countries.

Country	AI-written	Human-written
Afghanistan	military, taliban, afghanistan, political, major	many, new, good, international, full
Finland	important, social, live, political, great	last, good, new, higher, less
France	good, new, great, different, understanding	new, last, independent, top, senior
Ireland	different, important, able, common, white,	last, new, first, best, personal
Libya	military, united, islamic, political, international	political, last, national, frozen, military
San Marino	different, good, cultural, political, civil	smallest, good, international, financial, social
Sierra Leone	military, political, civil, legal, humanitarian	new, young, commercial, special, national
Sudan	united, political, military, humanitarian, civil	economic, social, political, local, democratic
Tunisia	military, political, human, united. islamist	foreign, last, happy, former, diplomatic
United Kingdom	different, social, ethnic, cultural, conservative	private, national, short, financial, high

Table 3: Top 5 adjectives for each country categorized by human and AI-generated model.

Country	[CA] Country Accentuation	[OA] Overall Accentuation
Sierra Leone	-1.36	-2.11
Tunisia	-1.13	-1.10
Sudan	-0.77	-0.61
Libya	-0.45	-0.41
United Kingdom	-0.15	-0.40
France	-0.08	-0.04
Ireland	-0.05	-0.05
Afganistan	+0.01	-0.16
San Marino	+0.34	+0.34
Finland	+0.49	+0.20

Table 4: Country and Overall Accentuation value to show to calculate the bias in stories generated by GPT-2

5 QUALITATIVE CODING AND THEMATIC ANALYSIS

The interviews of all the annotators were recorded and transcribed by the authors using a mix of automated software and manual checking. The transcribed interviews and textual data records were analyzed using *analytic induction*, a mixture of deductive and inductive approaches [56, 69]. While designing the interview, we knew that we are looking to understand if the annotators can identify nationality biases, prior experiences informing the annotation process as well as the annotation process impacting their impressions and annotator trust in AI-generated text. We did not disclose the intention of our study to the annotators and provided only details required to measure the 'sentiment' and 'toxicity' of the articles written by 'unknown' sources. Our more detailed understanding of these issues emerged from our iterative review of the transcripts and is summarized in Table 5 and below.

5.1 The Content - Group-P vs Group-N

The annotation task revealed patterns in the type of writing that was observed by the participants. It was observed that the writing styles and themes of the texts were different for the Group-P and Group-N. We discuss below these differences and also the possible reasons for the same. These differences can have major implications in how the country is represented by the language generation models, and by extension, in the greater scheme of things. We initially saw this in our quantitative analysis of the adjectives, and in our interviews, we saw that the readers experienced the same difference in various ways.

5.1.1 ***Difference in writing themes.*** Some participants noticed significant differences in writing styles for Group-P and Group-N. The differences are highlighted in the examples below.

"Finland which talked about them being proud people, immigration, and that was something I was noting. But for Sudan maybe it evoked a little bit of sadness maybe, pity." - P5

"They were not in line with the knowledge that I had, because they talked a lot about Finnish pride, immigration stuff, and also like just about their culture and stuff" - P4

"A lot of the Libya articles in particular are focused on the Civil War, and events following that, and focused on the violence that took place. Whereas the UK. I mean, there were a few that focused on the troubles and shared some similarities and discussed kinds of terrorist tax. But to a much lesser extent. Yeah, a lot of the UK articles focus on kind of political changes. The Libyan articles, even when they kind of focus on the country's government, it's much more on the various military aspects of it where the various groups controlled the country." - P1

As observed by P3, the scales were relative for both countries. This was due to the nature of topics covered in the articles for the individual countries. The participant saw benign themes for Ireland (Group P), whereas there were stronger themes such as *terrorism* when it came to Tunisia (Group N). Further P3, P4, and P5, saw that the topics referred to topics like *proud people* and *good immigration system.* Following this, the participant further reflected on how annotating within a document led to further removal of objectivity in the ratings.

"So, going back to Ireland from Tunisia, I would sort of find myself rating things probably a little higher than I would have rated them without having Tunisia in contex, because I feel like the things I read for the Tunisia ones were so negative that in comparison the things happening in the Ireland article weren't as negative. So I would find myself, you know, rating them 1. I would have otherwise maybe rated it 2." - P3

"I feel like the 1 to 5 <annotation scale> in Ireland, and the 1 to 5 in Tunisia were on slightly different scales, because the Ireland articles which were coded as like 2 or 1 <by me> were talking about relatively easier topics as opposed to the Tunisia articles were talking a lot about terrorism and attacks and violence, and a bunch of those things, and even like coups and such." - P3

Here we observe two interesting findings. The first is the fact that all the annotators found a significant difference in themes between the articles present in Group-P and Group-N. As per our adjective analysis, the articles that had differences in theme were the ones that are generated by GPT-2 for the Group-N countries. This shows that these negative articles had more impact on the readers as compared to the rest. We will discuss this in detail in the following section. The second is the fact that the annotators perceived and used their implicit learning in annotating a text concerning sentiment and toxicity. So, to conclude we saw that participants were perceptive of the nationality biases. We will discuss in aspect further in the discussion section.

5.1.2 ***Prior Opinion Clouding Annotations.*** Another aspect that we wanted to understand if prior opinions played a role in their annotation process. We saw that some participants reflected on how their prior opinion affected the way they annotated the texts. While some participants consciously try to mitigate the impact of their personal thoughts on the texts, others were aware of the bias and realized that it might have swayed how they rated a particular country.

"Unfortunately, as a <redacted>, I did have prior held beliefs about Afghanistan, and they weren't overtly negative. I just understand Afghanistan as a country where the US has had some unfortunate dealings and as such and that's unfortunately my only familiarity with the country is things that I experienced here in the <redacted> media and so my perception of them isn't overly negative. However, it is skewed by what has essentially been peddled down <redacted> citizens' throats." - P10

Additionally, we also saw that the beliefs that people held for N Group countries were reinstated, or in the case where they did not have one, they developed one based on the articles they were exposed to during the annotation process.

"I <am> familiar.. starting with the Civil War following the Arab spring in 2010, and kind of with the fall of Gaddafi and the various pieces of government <Libya> that came together afterwards. And kind of my impression would be that, you know there's a fairly fragile government in place, but still not a strong state that's still struggling in many ways." - P1

"I think it was sort of a contrast from Finland to Sudan. I for Finland, I thought it was a wealthy country, but for Sudan I thought it was probably a poor country with not a lot of resources." - P5

When we asked the participant if this impression was upheld, the response is:

"No, I'd say it was largely in line with my previous prior impression." - P1

We saw a similar trend when it came to P-Group countries. The participant had a general impression of the country that was upheld during the process of annotation as well. Another thing to note here would be that most of these quotes revolve around the impression that is being carried for the N-Group countries.

5.1.3 ***News like for Group-N vs Opinion pieces for Group-P.*** We saw that most of the participants felt like the language of articles that spoke about N-Group was more like a news article or report. They talked about major happenings in the area concerning war and terrorism. While when it came to P-Group, there were story-like articles that detailed just thoughts and opinions of people about the country.

"You know it's kind of from the tone. The writing style of it most generally seems perfectly fine to be a piece of news" - P1

"Tunisia...it's a little more difficult because all of them are written in the style of news article. But at the same time, like there are some which you know does give like more of an opinion, or feels like there's more of judgment and sentiment in the GPT-2 generated articles." - P3

"Finland which talked about them being proud people, immigration, and that that was just I, I was noting maybe similarities in that with the other countries." - P5

"I thought there was a lot of deep culture associated with San Marino, and I I thought it was overall pretty positive about the culture of San Marino." - P6

The nature of articles also points to the tone and sentiment that people might perceive of the content. It is important to understand

Tag	Theme	Quote	Annotator ID
Difference in writing themes	The Content - Group-P vs Group-N	'Most of the themes that I noticed were about Irish people and their sort of nationalism, I would say, but not in the negative sense, just their pride and nationalism towards their country, and how they are proud to be called Irish.'	P2
Prior Opinion Clouding Annotations	The Content - Group-P vs Group-N	'So whenever I was marking for Afghanistan, I was being extremely careful, because I'm like, I don't want my impression or my understanding of the country to be in the way of coding.'	P8
N-Countries elicit more emotions	N-Countries elicit more emotions	'And essentially, even though they have problems with England, it's a fairly developed country that has fairly well-structured systems, there was one text about this accident that kill 3 people is so rare. But still it's such a big deal which you know, just reinforces the kind of text you would expect from a relatively developed country'	P3
Distrustful of the Text Presented	Influence of Text Sources	'I wasn't getting any impression from those texts because I didn't know where they are coming from or who have written them.'	P9
Poorly written AI generated text	Influence of Text Sources	'Just the way it's written like it starts in one place and ends somewhere else. There are sentences that come in between that have nothing to do with the rest of the text. It doesn't feel like it's going anywhere in particular. It's going in like 5 different directions.'	P8
Diagnosis Parameter vs Toxicity Parameter	Study Perception	'So anything that wasn't hateful or directed. It sort of goes to the intensity of what the text is saying. I think if it was very intense, then it sort of appeared toxic to me'	P6

Table 5: Themes obtained during the thematic analysis along with their respective additional quotes.

the implied effect this might have on the impression of the country for the annotators going forward.

5.2 N-Countries elicit more emotions

We saw that people exhibited more strong emotions when it came to talking about N-countries. Participants were more 'moved' and 'impacted' by the content they saw for N-countries than P-counties.

"I think the Sierra Leone articles were more moving for me, that I felt more strongly about as compared to the UK. I would have a harder time sympathizing with that country than Sierra Leone." - P7

"It said that the increasing population of Islamic countries are becoming a problem and that…that personally offended me I think. Yeah for me, I think that was inciting. Yeah, that was an emotion, I think. Other than that, San Marino felt like some country I would like to visit." - P8

"Through the passages it hit me how bad or at least I don't know if how recent all of these passages are. But yeah, it made me think more deeply about really how bad the situation seems to be there." - P7

The feelings participants shared about the news articles discussed for the P-Group differed largely from the ones discussed for the N-Group. For example, we can find below that the participant has an impression and expectations of UK (P-Group). These expectations are consistent with their belief such that even the negative news does not have a significant emotional impact on them.

Additionally, one of the participants observed that rating the countries one after another interspersed affected the rating. This was an especially interesting observation considering annotators are often presented with randomized organization of content.

"I would feel worse about what was happening in Tunisia after reading the things from Ireland. So I don't know if that would influence me, really, but I feel like it made me feel it evoked more emotions in me than it did after say I had read 20 Tunisia articles continuously." - P2

Additionally, we say that major emotion was attached to N-Group countries and people's perception of P-Group countries did not elicit much emotion. This is to say that the content for the P-Group country was neutral enough to not tap into the emotional side of the participants. We see the same with the quantitative analysis of the texts as well.

5.3 Influence of Text Sources

The text to be annotated was shared with the participants as randomized text containing both AI-generated and human-written text.

The participants were made aware of the exact text sources for each entry during the interview. The participants were given some time to reflect and consider the prompts. When the sheets describing the text sources were presented to the participants, we studied their reactions to the same. We discuss below these responses under three different headings:

5.3.1 ***Distrustful of the Text Presented.*** Some of the participants who annotated were apprehensive about the content of the text given that they were unaware of the source of the text. They had this impression even before they gained insights into the source of the text.

"I wasn't able to judge if something was unreasonable because I didn't have access to ground truth about those passages." - P7

With these participants, we see how they would not rely on an unverified source unless they do background checks. In contrast to this, we observed that some did believe what they read and did not question it.

"I would never think <of the source>. I would probably just believe it. So it seemed like something possible, something that could happen." - P8

5.3.2 ***Poorly written AI generated text.*** When the participants were asked upon reflection if they felt any of the text was AI-generated, we saw that they responded that in most cases reflecting back, they could notice the difference. We discuss below the elements that helped them identify this difference.

"They weren't free-flowing text and it also stood out to me as not a well-written article." - P7

"There were a lot of grammar mistakes, and sometimes the sentences didn't structurally make sense, or one sentence wasn't related to the next one." - P2

A common theme was that the grammar from AI written text suffered heavily. Additionally, participants strongly associated the word 'nonsense' with most of the text that was generated by AI.

"There were a lot of grammar mistakes, and sometimes the sentences didn't structurally make sense, or you know, one sentence wasn't related to the next one." - P3

5.4 Study Perception

Human annotators are widely used in AI systems, especially in the case of human-evaluated systems. We used this section of the interview to highlight the happenings inside an annotator's and a reader's mind from a different perspective even when detailed instructions are presented to them. We observed the following three themes.

5.4.1 ***Individualistic Perception of the Goals.*** When presented with a set of information, the participants each perceived the aim of the study in a different way. The perceptions ranged from 'nuanced sentiment analysis' to 'understanding if something needs to be taken off the internet'. While the perceived goals were not significantly off, not capturing the exact goal can lead to inaccurate annotations. The following quotes help us understand the differences in the perceived goals.

"You might be looking for detection of hate speech for different countries." - P10

This participant felt that we are trying to identify **'hate speech'** in the articles given. While there was a focus on hate speech detection as well, the participant may not have focused on the more nuanced differences when it came to bias identification and hate speech detection. The key is that while bias can be observed through hate speech, it is not the only way it can.

"To me, it seemed like what you were looking for was how sentiment sort of mixed in, or what are the correlation between sentiment and the other parameters, and that I had to fill out for each country." - P5

Similarly, in the above quote from the participant, we see that the focus is only on sentiment capturing.

"Yeah, I guess it seemed like just trying to assess the perception of 2 different countries in a set of scraped news articles." - P1

So, we can see that on the surface, they appear to be similar objectives; however, to a trained researcher's eye, they may as well be three different research projects. For our research, we intend to capture both the perception of human readers to text generated by AI and human sources and understand how machine learning concepts translate to human studies. Through this, we see that it is not intuitive to use machine learning fundamentals without additional aspects to make it human-study-friendly.

5.4.2 ***Overall vs Country Perception.*** As described before, we used two parameters : (i) Overall Perception and (ii) Country Perception. We asked the participants to identify the difference between the two parameters.

"<Overall sentiment> takes into just the entire tone of the paragraph where the country perception is specifically the tone towards that perceived country."-P6

"I kind of thought like country perception is like, I'm trying to look for what people think of a country as opposed to like the content of what happens in a certain country you are like" - P3

Participants indicated similar perceptions of the definitions. They were mostly in line with the ones given to them.

"Sometimes it comes off as being neutral or positive, but there must have been something negative about the country mentioned, so that was distinguishing that I made <between overall and country perception>. The article itself might have been wrapped up very positively." - P8

5.4.3 ***Diagnosis Parameter vs Toxicity Parameter.*** While the definitions of both parameters used very different adjectives to define them, the participants reduced them to higher and lower thresholds. This was the intention of the study to understand the different degrees of toxicity.

"But I think what I did was for diagnosis. It was like something little, not okay. For toxic, it was like, okay, this is problematic." - P8

6 DISCUSSION

6.1 Quantified Human Perception of Bias

Our results show that the annotators were able to identify the negativity and toxicity in the GPT-2 generated texts, even without knowing the source. Our Country and Overall Accentuation metrics show that the GPT-2 generated texts for the countries from Group-N showed a significant difference from the rest of the articles. They were perceived to be more negative and toxic than their human-written counterparts. Our adjective analysis also shows that GPT-2

has a perception of the Group-N countries that do not agree with its human-written counterpart, which shows an equal representation of positive and negative countries. GPT-2 written texts for Group-N countries heavily exaggerate military and war-like themes. We observed that our annotators could recall sharper details about these themes than the positive ones. This is indicative that negative texts have a more substantial impact on human memory. It also relates to the notion of implicit memory, which previous studies have indicated that individuals tend to prioritize the recollection of negative stereotypes over positive ones [5, 29, 53], resulting in an implicit inclination toward negative bias in memory retention. Consequently, our findings show the societal consequences of GPT-2 amplifying negative biases, as the false negative bias can lead readers to capture erroneous information.

Our work shows that the biases depicted by models like GPT-2 may have social impacts that also translate to representational and allotted harm. These results show that if such text generation models are used in a sociotechnical system, the biases identified can also be translated to potential harm. From the framework of harm postulated by Dev et al. [17], we can see how such behaviors can lead to harmful social behaviors such as *stereotyping, disparagement* and *erasure* where certain nationalities are oversimplified, evaluated as 'lesser' and underrepresented by the model respectively.

6.2 The Impressions of the Texts

Our qualitative results add explainability to our findings in the quantitative section. We use our qualitative results to dive deeper into 'why' the annotators answered the way they did. The results of our qualitative analysis and interview sessions reveal that the biases identified by the annotators did indeed create an impression of the country they were annotating, which in turn influenced their annotations moving forward. This highlights the instant impact of biases and their potential to shape how we view the world. This underscores the immediate influence of biases and their capacity to shape our perception of the world.

Interestingly, none of the annotators could explicitly identify the skewed perception of the country or that they were reading articles written by AI models until prompted to do so. Our analysis indicates that annotators were only able to implicitly identify bias by measuring the text as negative or toxic. This phenomenon can pose an issue as the biases in AI-generated content can remain unnoticed and continue to influence a reader's perceptions.

Another critical finding of our analysis was the phenomenon of 'AI hallucination', where AI models provide confident responses that seem faithful but are nonsensical in light of common knowledge [3]. A number of participants (prior to being prompted about the text source) mentioned that they felt that some of the passages were hard to follow and did not make any sense to them. They often reported that while the text began talking about one topic, the next topic would not be in line. Our study indicates that text generated by AI models tends to be influenced by AI hallucination, leading to a more radical and opinionated tone. This behavior makes AI-generated content more likely to mislead, as it is written in a confident and authoritative tone that can be perceived as factual by the reader [3, 49].

We also notice that the language style used by AI models correlates with how the model views a country. Specifically, GPT-2 generated stories about Group-N countries in a manner reminiscent of news articles, while it tends to present Group-P countries with a tone resembling opinion texts. This finding helps us understand how the model perceives the country and the associated information. An opinion piece by it's very nature is perceived by the public as someone's opinion and not the ground truth. However, when N-Group country information is represented as news article it appears to be the ground truth. GPT-2 generated text further used terms like 'the BBC' to validate the idea being conveyed. This further leads to propagation of the AI authority phenomenon. This can have far reaching impacts when used in social scenarios. This finding underscores the importance of considering language style and its potential impact on perception when working with AI-generated content.

6.3 Human Perceptions of Automatic Indicators

Our qualitative analysis highlights the need for an interdisciplinary approach to bias identification in AI and NLP models. While previous studies have primarily focused on using automated evaluation to measure and quantify bias [10, 38], our paper presents a unique perspective by using human annotators to identify and attempt to quantify bias. In the process of conducting the interviews, we found that every participant had a different and unique perception of the goals of the study and the metrics they were asked to calculate. Although we use automatic indicators, our findings reveal that humans have differing perceptions on the given definitions of these parameters. These perceptions that do not always match those provided in the field of AI. Our readers, who could identify and rate bias in sentiment, viewed sentiment and differently, as seen by the low Cohen-Kappa values (OveP = 0.34, DiaP = 0.38). Similar values were observed for toxicity as well (DiaP = 0.18, ToxP = 0.38). These results show that it is necessary to consider differing human interpretations when defining and understanding computation-based parameters that can have a direct impact on human perceptions.

7 CONCLUSION

The paper uses human evaluation to explore nationality bias in a text generation model (GPT-2). The research uses the NLP sentiment and toxicity framework through human annotators to quantitatively analyze the presence of nationality bias. The findings reveal that the text generation model accentuates negative bias towards certain countries while demonstrating positive bias toward 'well-represented' countries. Using interviews, the study investigates how readers interpret articles generated by GPT-2. The interviews show that negative stories generated about certain countries had the most emotional impact on readers. However, some readers found such articles informative, informing them of a new aspect of the country. The study also found that participants were more welcoming of such technology after the disclosure that the articles were generated by both human and AI agents, as they were intended to 'mimic human behavior and biases.' The paper highlights the harmful impact of such technology if not used appropriately. It can enhance a country's skewed perception while maintaining the majority's viewpoint, leading to misinformation and stereotyping.

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No Justice, No Robots: From the Dispositions of Policing to an Abolitionist Robotics

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we examine the risks posed by roboticists' collaboration with law enforcement agencies in the U.S. Using Trust frameworks from AI Ethics, we argue that collaborations with law enforcement present not only risks of technology misuse, but also risks of legitimizing bad actors, and of exacerbating our field's challenges of representation. We discuss evidence of bad dispositions justifying these risks, grounded in the behavior, origins, and incentivization of American policing, and suggest courses of action for American roboticists seeking to pursue research projects that *currently* require collaboration with law enforcement agencies, closing with a call for abolitionist robotics.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computer systems organization → Robotics**; • **Applied computing → Law, social and behavioral sciences**.

KEYWORDS

Robot Ethics, Policing, Abolition

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1 INTRODUCTION

Two trends in American society are on a collision course. First, widespread police violence in American cities has drawn increased scrutiny of America's policing system and its continuation of centuries of American enslavement, incarceration, and violence against members of oppressed racialized groups. Second, police are increasingly acquiring robots (and using them to kill people [71]), as a direct consequence of the simultaneous (1) militarization of police forces and (2) recent advances in robotics.

Robots and other military devices are available to U.S. police under the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) 1033 Program, which transfers excess DoD supplies and equipment to state, county, and local law enforcement agencies, contributing to the militarization of police forces. Law enforcement agencies that apply to participate in the program often receive military devices with little justification. For example, Doraville, Georgia (population 8,500), received a $750k "Mine Resistant Vehicle" and Keene, New Hampshire (population 23,000), received military equipment after citing their annual pumpkin festival as a possible target for terrorism. Other examples include a grenade launcher for Buena Vista County, Iowa, 92 pairs of snowshoes for El Paso County in Texas with an annual median snow measurement of 0 inches, and an armored truck for Lincoln County, Montana. To date, the Pentagon's Hand-Me-Down 1033 program has distributed more than $7 billion in equipment to more than 8,000 law enforcement agencies, with 700 robots alone migrating from the Pentagon to the police as of 2016 [32]. Police militarization has drawn widespread scrutiny after increased awareness of the racial violence regularly perpetrated by police, and the racist and violent origins of policing. When asked who in the Pentagon approves these equipment transfers, defense spokesman John Kirby defended the 1033 program, telling reporters in August 2014 that the equipment "is made available to law enforcement agencies, if they want it and if they qualify for it." Recent advances in robotics have resulted in new capabilities of particular interest to police forces. The inclusion of robots in equipment transfers is especially concerning. Roboethicists have argued that decreased risk of injury to police officers may directly lead to increased rates of police violence [45]. And in fact, police robots have already led to disastrous outcomes.

This was the case for Jose Guerena, a young Marine veteran killed by robot-equipped and heavily militarized police forces in an ostensible drug raid. After two tours in Iraq, the 26-year-old veteran was shot with 22 bullets in his own home, leaving behind his wife and two children. No drugs were ever found. The somber conclusion of author David Axe [7] reads:

"One thing is clear. With military-grade vehicles, armor, assault weapons, and robots, the raid on Guerena's home was all but indistinguishable from the kind of house-clearing operations U.S. forces perform every day in Iraq and Afghanistan. Guerena survived two tours in the desert only to perish in a military-style action in his own home."

Since this raid in 2011, the militarization of police with robots has continued steadily, facilitated not only by transfers of military equipment to police, but also by the creation of robots explicitly designed for police and by direct collaboration between roboticists and police departments [8, 12, 14, 34, 46, 52, 57, 58, 75].

Roboticists in the United States and other places with militarizing police forces are increasingly facing decisions as to whether or not to collaborate with this new group of potential robot users. Roboticists hold substantial power in making this decision, as robots are special-purpose technologies that will be difficult for police to

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effectively acquire and use without the intentional cooperation of roboticists. How should roboticists face this decision? To help answer this question, we propose a decision making framework grounded in definitions of Trustworthy AI presented in the AI, Ethics, and Society community, which we use to argue that collaboration demands appropriately grounded trust and cannot be conducted under conditions of appropriately grounded distrust. By leveraging this framework at multiple levels of analysis (individual, organizational, and interpersonal) to interpret the quantitative and qualitative data available regarding both police' use of robots and the overarching dispositions of policing, we are able to effectively analyze the risks specifically posed by police-roboticist collaborations at each such level, and the ways those different types of risks problematically align with the affordances of robotic technologies (e.g., mobile face recognition).

By approaching the problem in this way, our argument goes beyond the "Deadly Design Problems" of designing explicitly violent robots for the police [5, 6], and instead suggests that *any* collaboration between roboticists and police cannot be justified. Specifically, we argue that (1) any collaboration entered into on rational grounds should be one with appropriately grounded trust; (2) based on an analysis of police dispositions at an institutional level, roboticists should distrust (or refuse to entrust) American police with robotic technologies due to lack of appropriate positive grounding; (3) *any* collaboration by roboticists with American police cannot be rationally grounded in trust, and thus cannot be justified in good faith; (4) a change in this calculus would require significant changes to American institutions, in the form of the creation or new guidelines, policies, and regulations, the sweeping reform of existing policies and institutions, or most likely, the whole or partial abolition of existing American institutions of policing and imprisonment.

Overall, our article thus echoes the public calls for roboticists to refuse collaborations with the police, captured in the 2020 open letter and petitioning campaign *#NoJusticeNoRobots*, calls for a commitment within the robotics community to an Abolitionist Robotics agenda.

2 APPROPRIATELY GROUNDED TRUST AND DISTRUST

Our argument focuses on the trust required for collaboration. Trust is a useful framework not only for reasoning about robots and human-robot interactions, but also for engaging in practical moral deliberations about the *practice* of Robotics and HRI. In his keynote talk at *AI, Ethics, and Society* 2019, Danks [25], for example, defines *appropriately grounded trust* as: "The willingness of a trustor to make themselves vulnerable based on justified beliefs that the trustee has suitable dispositions."

This definition implies *distrust due to lack of appropriate positive grounding*, which we define as: "An unwillingness of a trustor to make themselves vulnerable based on a lack of justified beliefs that the trustee has suitable dispositions." And, it implies *appropriately grounded distrust*, which we define as: "An unwillingness of a trustor to make themselves vulnerable based on justified beliefs that the trustee has unsuitable dispositions." Using these three concepts, we argue that roboticists should have appropriately grounded distrust for American police, or, at minimum, distrust due to lack of appropriate positive grounding, whereas any collaboration entered into on rational grounds should be one with appropriately grounded trust.

We argue that police and policing do not have the dispositions necessary to justify the risks imposed by collaboration. To advance this argument, we begin by identifying the sources of vulnerability to the HRI and Robotics communities that are presented by collaborations with police. Next, we identify the different trustees to whom researchers make themselves vulnerable and the different types of trust associated with these trustees (interpersonal, organizational, and institutional) that would be undermined by unsuitable dispositions. Next, we articulate the unsuitable dispositions that should render roboticists unwilling to make themselves vulnerable to those risks, and the sources of evidence that serve as justifications for those dispositions. Finally, we argue why these risks fail to outweigh any potential benefits.

3 VULNERABILITY

When researchers choose to collaborate with someone else, be it another researcher, an industry partner, or a police department, they make themselves vulnerable in multiple ways. The most obvious risk is that their research outcomes or technology will be misused. Misuse in this context describes the use of robot technology in an improper way or for the wrong purpose, for socially detrimental purposes the researchers did not envision or intend. In our experience, this is the primary risk that comes to mind for both roboticists and the general public, in part because it is the main risk we teach students to guard against, and in part due to the science fiction portrayal of robots in popular culture.

The dominant narrative around police robots thus focuses on how robots could (and in some cases, do and will) increase the unjust use of force and surveillance, the risks of robots physically and psychologically distancing police officers from the direct outcome of robot use, and the disproportionate impacts of police robots on communities already oppressed by the police. However, while technology misuse might be the most salient risk to researchers, risks are also imposed by the very act of collaboration.

In recent work, Bretl et al. [16] discuss other categories of risk imposed by collaboration, relating to the nature of the collaborator rather than the topic of collaboration. These include the risk for scandal and reputational harm, negative influence on researchers, and, critically, legitimization of bad actors. As a key example, Bretl et al. [16] analyze the funding relationship between Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and alleged pedophile and child trafficker Jeffrey Epstein. As they point out, regardless of the nature of the technology Epstein funded, the collaboration between MIT and Epstein clearly had negative consequences: not only did the collaboration harm the reputations of MIT, but the collaboration was used by Epstein as a way to launder his reputation and demonstrate his legitimacy. Collaborations with the police may similarly risk laundering their reputations and manufacturing their legitimacy.

As an example, one of our institutions recently highlighted an alumnus' police training technology. In doing so, the university implicitly suggested that the police are a solution to societal problems; that public funds should be spent on training technology; and that

the police using those technologies should be supported as worthy collaborators. Furthermore, because the university itself was highlighted in this reporting on police technology, the technology was given a false veneer of scientific credibility and authority.

We further argue that the public's view of such collaborations should be particularly concerning to roboticists due to our field's existing demographic challenges. The field of robotics currently has a severe problem with underrepresentation, being overwhelmingly dominated by white and Asian men. Meanwhile, many members of the very demographic groups the field of robotics is hoping to encourage to join our field have been historically oppressed by the police and as such may be justifiably reticent to join a lab, major, department, or school that is collaborating with their oppressors. Inherently flawed technologies like facial recognition are systematically deployed in low-income and minority neighborhoods while avoiding white neighborhoods [60], leading directly to discrepancies in benefits, employment, and policing [76], and thus justifiably increasing mistrust among those communities towards those creating and deploying those technologies [76, 78]. This may in turn feed into a cycle of systemic racism as fewer students of color choose to go into robotics, leading to decreased sharing of their perspectives within our field and thus increased risk of roboticists building technologies that serve as tools of oppression.

4 TRUSTEES

The above discussion delineates three key categories of risk: (1) Risk of technology misuse (due to unsuitable dispositions *related* to the technology), (2) Risk of actor legitimization (due to unsuitable dispositions (potentially) *unrelated* to the technology), and (3) Risk of underrepresentation (due to roboticists' explicit or implicit support for those unsuitable dispositions leading people from populations oppressed by the police choosing not to enter our field). Each of these categories of risk can be presented by different types of risk-presenting actors, each of whom demands a different type of trust. We refer to three risk-presenting actors:

(1) Risk-presenting individuals (requiring interpersonal trust regarding individual dispositions)
(2) Risk-presenting organizations (requiring organizational trust regarding organizational dispositions)
(3) Risk-presenting institutions (requiring institutional trust regarding institutional dispositions)

Here we use the Searlian notion of institutions in which W names an institution if W is defined by a set of constitutive rules, which determine collectively recognized and accepted status functions, which are performable in virtue of that recognition and acceptance, and which, critically, carry recognized and accepted deontic powers [69]. As Searle points out, institutions are central to understanding society because they create desire-independent reasons for action [69]. We consider institutions that serve as *categories of organizations*, which impose desire-independent dispositions on *individual members* of their constituent organizations. This includes institutions such as governments, public services, legal systems, healthcare systems, schools, hospitals, universities, and research communities. For example, Mount Sinai Health is an organization within the institution of hospitals and Stanford University is an organization with the institution of universities.

These categories of risk and categories of risk-presenting actorstogether define a risk-assessment context, as we will now describe (see Figure 1). When the researcher R chooses to engage with the agent A in a collaboration surrounding a technology, R must trust that A will not misuse the technology. This required interpersonal trust between R and A. R also must trust that they will not help A to launder a deservedly bad reputation or discourage students from joining R's field. Collaboration between researcher R and agent A thus requires justification of the dispositions necessary for R to have appropriately grounded interpersonal trust in A.

In collaborating with agent A, the researcher R also makes themselves vulnerable to A's *organization*: R must trust that others in A's organization will not be willing or able to misuse the technology. R also must trust that A is not a well-meaning agent working within a bad organization whose reputation R would be helping launder and association with which would discourage students from joining R's field. Collaboration between the researcher R and the agent A thus also requires justification of the dispositions necessary for R to have appropriately grounded organizational trust in A's organization.

Finally, researcher R is also making themselves vulnerable to the *institution* of which A's organization is a part. R must trust that other agents within that institution will not be able to misuse the technology, but more importantly, must trust that A's organization is not a well-meaning organization within an inherently bad institution whose reputation R would be helping to launder and association with which would prevent students from joining R's field. Collaboration between the researcher R and the agent A thus also requires justification of the dispositions necessary for R to have appropriately grounded institutional trust in A's institution.



Figure 1: Collaboration requires trust at multiple levels.

We now have a framework for analyzing the different types of risk that might be posed by developing robots for, or otherwise collaborating with, the police. However, our selected definition of trust makes clear that trustworthiness depends not only on the mere existence of risks, but also on the interaction between those risks and the dispositions of the trustee.

5 DISPOSITIONS

To understand the role of dispositions in our risk calculus, consider a simple example. Rita is a roboticist who has developed a robot for delivering goods in hospital settings. She is considering working with Anton, who works at St. Osmund's hospital. This robot may present a number of theoretical risks of technology misuse. The

robot could, hypothetically, be used to push patients down stairwells. However, Rita can safely dismiss this risk due to analysis of dispositions: it is likely not justifiable to suspect that Anton desires to push patients down stairwells; it is likely not justifiable to suspect that there are other hospital administrators who would have access to the robot who would have such a desire; and it is likely not justifiable to suspect that the system of American hospital care was designed and continues to operate for the purposes of pushing patients down stairwells. Thus, Rita is probably well justified in making herself vulnerable to this source of risk.

Although this analysis may allow Rita to establish that the levels of trust needed to collaborate with Anton are well grounded *with respect to the risk of technology misuse*, Rita may still have concerns about actor legitimization. Consider, e.g., the fact that some doctors have refused to treat patients from LGBT communities [19, 44, 84, 85]. This presents additional sources of risk. If Anton is a doctor of this sort, then Rita's decision to collaborate with him could launder his reputation, thus facilitating his ability to harm vulnerable communities. This same risk may be present even if Anton would never discriminate in this way, e.g. if St. Osmund's allows or encourages its other employees to do so. And this risk may be present even if St. Osmund's as an organization would never allow such discrimination, e.g. if St. Osmund's is a type of private hospital (institution) that has historically been used to enable this type of discrimination. If this is the case, then even though Rita's technology is socially beneficial, and even though Anton and St. Osmund's are both unlikely to misuse her technology and overall well-meaning, Rita may yet need to decide not to collaborate, if it is justifiable to suspect that her collaboration would be used to bolster the reputation of a fundamentally discriminatory type of institution that simply should not exist, and if this collaboration would be likely to discourage LGBT students and scholars from joining her laboratory or university.

Now suppose that Rita is considering developing a bomb disposal robot in conjunction with police lieutenant Anton, who works for the St. Osmund Police Department. The intended use of this technology (defusing bombs) is likely to be viewed as positive. But what risks does the collaboration present? First, Rita should consider risks of technology misuse. Does Rita suspect, for example, that Anton could be prone to misusing the robot, by strapping explosives to it and using it to bomb the home of a mentally ill resident, as the police in Bangor, Maine did in June 2018 [66], or to tear-gas peaceful protesters, as police across the country have already been doing without the help of robots? Does Rita suspect that, while Anton would never do such a thing, others in his department might? And does Rita suspect that her technology could be misused in this way if acquired by other departments, due to the role of American Policing as an institution of oppression? Second, Rita should consider risks of legitimization. Does Anton have a history of brutality? Does his department? Does the institution of American Policing have its origins in, and continue to actively facilitate, perpetrate, and justify such violence? If any of Rita's answers are "yes", would she be legitimizing a bad actor, and would her collaboration discourage students and scholars from underrepresented communities from joining her laboratory and university?

6 JUSTIFICATION

We have defined *appropriately grounded distrust* as the unwillingness of a trustor to make themselves vulnerable based on the justified belief that the trustee has unsuitable disposition. And we have argued that for roboticists to engage in collaborations, they *should* earn appropriately grounded trust, and *must* avoid appropriately grounded distrust. Within this framework, decisive argument against collaboration would require justification for the belief that collaborators have unsuitable dispositions that present untenable sources of risk. Evidence of unsuitable dispositions might take the form of individualized or systemic sources of risk, grounded, respectively, in individual and institutional dispositions. While individualized sources of risk may be used to justify distrust in individual actors and their organizations, systemic sources of risk may be used to justify distrust in institutions as a whole, providing arguments against collaboration with any individual actors within such institutions, regardless of those individual actors' dispositions.

In this section, we provide examples of sources of evidence in each category, using the running example of potential concerns regarding collaboration with police. First, we will present justifications for our belief that there exist *individualized* sources of risk based on unsuitable dispositions among individual police and police departments (many of which are based on the Campaign Zero Police Scorecard initiative [86], which systematically evaluated California's 100 largest police departments), and types of evidence that would prevent researchers from collaborating with *particular* individuals and organizations on the basis of the dispositions implied by those sources of risk. We will then present *systemic* sources of risk stemming based on unsuitable institutional dispositions, and catalog evidence that, we argue, should prevent researchers from collaborating with *any* individuals or organizations in the institution of American Policing,

6.1 Individualized Sources of Risk Grounded in Likeliness of Technology Misuse

Individualized sources of risk are closely related to the risks of technology misuse or concerns over dual-use technology that have been substantially explored in the robot ethics community and the broader technology ethics literature.

Justification for unsuitable police dispositions can be found in the specific ways that police already misuse robotic technology, such as strapping explosives to robots in order to kill suspects [66, 71], or using robots to destroy property [54], and could also include patterns of police violence with or without the aid of technology, such as the 500 videotaped incidents between May 30th and June 15th 2020 collected by criminal defense lawyer T. Greg Doucette [61], including incidents on May 30th alone of police beating, pepper-spraying, trampling, grenading, shooting, and committing hit-and-run assaults on peaceful protesters, children, elected officials, journalists, and bystanders. Alternatively, one could rely on anecdotal or the prevalence of white supremacist, neo-Nazis [43, 73], and other racist ideologies within U.S. police forces [29, 35, 40], or the use of iconography such as the "thin blue line" flag by American police forces (see critique by Wall [81, 82]). Similarly, justification for unsuitable dispositions can be found in data collected by organizations such as Campaign Zero, which in the case of the LAPD, as a single example,

provides substantial evidence of racially biased violent tendencies grounded in statistics regarding use of force, use of force against communities of color, racial biases in arrest rates, evidence of over-policing of misdemeanors, and inattention to crimes against people of color.

There is also evidence that many US police departments have been infiltrated by white supremacist organizations. In 2006, the FBI's internal intelligent assessment indicated that white supremacist groups have been "infiltrating law enforcement communities or recruiting law enforcement personnel" for some time. As an example, in 1991, it was found that the LA Sheriff's department had "formed a neo-Nazi gang and habitually terrorized Black and Latino residents" [43, 73]. Critically, local police departments have no standard procedure for recruiting new members, and there are little to no training procedures available to help prevent such infiltration of police departments, as there are in the US Military where this threat is taken more seriously, although it is criticized that it is often not taken seriously enough [30, 41]. These racist tendencies have also been observed in the exposure of emails, texts, and social media groups in more than 100 police departments in more than 40 states, in which officers have gathered to share racist, sexist, and/or homophobic sentiments [35]. In Philadelphia (where such a group of 72 Philadelphia police officers was uncovered [29]), the Plain View Project revealed that of the 1,000 police profiles identified on Facebook, one in three had posted troubling content and of this third, one in three had had one or more federal civil rights suits filed against them [40].

6.2 Systemic Sources of Risk Grounded in Origins and Incentivization of Policing

As we have argued, simply justifying the dispositions of particular individuals or organizations is insufficient. Unless the dispositions of the *institutions* those individuals and organizations are part of can also be justified, it will be impossible to minimize risks of reputation laundering and risks of association. While individuals and group dispositions are grounded in individual and group goals and motivations, so too are institutional dispositions grounded in institutional goals and motivations. And, we argue, the fundamental mission and motivation of American policing are unjustifiable.

To advance this argument, we will examine both (1) the origins of American policing, which defined its original mission and motivation; and (2) the current role of policing in modern American society, including the way that particular types of policing are financially incentivized by the US federal government, which demonstrate that those original (indefensible) missions and motivations continue today.

6.2.1 Past Policing: Origins of American policing. As Alex Vitale [79] shows, even outside the confines of America, formal policing is a relatively recent phenomena, with what is regarded as the first modern police force in metropolitan London founded less than 200 years ago, in part as a means of exerting political control over and suppressing working-class citizens protesting the loss of jobs due to industrialization (a parallel to concerns over automation that should not be lost on the HRI community) [64].

These anti-labor origins directly informed the origins of police forces in the Northeastern US, where police forces were formed to deal with unrest amongst exploited working class immigrants [50], for exerting control over religious minorities [33], while working *with* local petty criminals to help fence stolen goods [31]. Corruption, extortion, brutality, and killing of unarmed working-class civilians served as central elements not only of of Northeastern American policing [79] but also of the US-trained police forces set up in Central America [48]. Meanwhile, Vitale highlights how Policing in other US areas originated in similar oppression on both class- and, critically, race-based grounds [79]. In the American Southwest, American policing originated from the creation of the Texas Rangers, a group created to protect the interests of white colonists through the violent oppression, massacre, and segregation of local Native and Mexican residents [22], a mission that continued long after Texas' annexation with oppression of union leaders and enforcement of "Juan Crow" segregatory policies (including discouraging of voting or registering to do so in Mexican-American communities) added to the mission of the police [67]. Similarly, in the American South, Policing grew out of Slave Patrols organized to hunt down runaway slaves, prevent slave revolts, and prevent fraternization amongst Blacks [38, 80]. Post-abolition, these police forces shifted to focus on forcing Blacks into sharecropping and prisons where they could be enslaved [13], often in coordination with the KKK [70].

The institutional dispositions of these groups, as evident from their missions and tactics, were morally indefensible. As such, collaboration with these groups would not only come with high risks of technology misuse, but would directly lead to unavoidable risks of reputation laundering. While several decades have passed since the events described above, there is no evidence that the institutional dispositions of American police, and their associated risks, have fundamentally changed.

6.2.2 Current Policing: Incentivization and Systemic Impact of Modern American Policing. As detailed by Michelle Alexander, the oppressive roots of American policing interact with the incentivization of modern policing to create a cycle of systemic racism that condemns many Black Americans to a permanent racial undercaste [2].

First, Alexander explains how America's War on Drugs was designed and has authoritatively served as a means for police to round up and imprison a vast number of Black men. In essence, the War on Drugs happens along the following three steps:

(1) Police departments are financially incentivized by federal grant programs to round up as many people as they can on drug-related grounds, through (a) explicit federal incentives wherein federal funding to police departments was explicitly tied to number of drug arrests and (b) the ability to raise department budgets through civil forfeiture [10].
(2) Police can essentially stop, interrogate, and search anyone they choose on drug-related grounds, and are allowed to use race as a factor in these operations [1].
(3) Thus, as designed and incentivized, most of those swept up for drug offences are Black and Brown.

Once swept up by the police, the criminal justice system then exerts formal control.

(1) Once arrested, defendants are generally denied legal meaningful representation and pressured to plead guilty through

prosecutorial techniques that cannot be challenged on a basis of racial discrimination [9].
(2) Once sentenced, people are subject to far longer and harsher sentences for drug charges than anywhere else on earth [56].
(3) Prison sentences can be for life even for minor nonviolent drug charges [51].
(4) Black Americans are subjected to significantly worse treatment at every stage of the process [68].

Once drug offenders have "paid their debt" to society, they are forced into a permanent undercaste in which they are legally discriminated against for the rest of their lives. They are:

(1) Prevented from obtaining employment, both formally (many occupations are legally barred from hiring felons) and informally (many employers illegally discriminate and will not hire felons).
(2) Denied housing, both formally (unable to live in public housing) and informally (many in public housing are unwilling to let felons stay with them, because you can be evicted from public housing if someone who is staying with you is arrested elsewhere).
(3) Denied education and other public benefits, and in many places, unable to vote.

Many people arrested on drug charges are thus released into a society in which they have no means of making a living, nowhere to live, and no way of bettering their situation otherwise, effectively forcing them into illegal activities and crime in a vicious circle.

The incentivization and use of modern American police to incarcerate and enslave large portions of America's communities of racial minorities presents vulnerability not only to high risks of technology misuse but also to unavoidable risks of reputation laundering. Roboethicists have in fact argued that police robots, especially when paired with racist predictive policing algorithms, may reinforce social inequality, accelerate mass incarceration, and worsen ties with communities [42]. And the mere act of collaboration on such technologies may suggest to the public either that the police and police' use of these technologies are legitimate solutions to societal problems – or, at minimum, that the collaborating scientists believe this to be the case. This serves to cast a false veneer of scientific legitimacy over these technologies and institutions. And, at the same time, this serves to cast a shadow of complicity over academia for the communities hurt by these technologies: collaborating with those responsible for incarcerating and enslaving members of communities underrepresented in robotics is unlikely to encourage members of those communities to join our field.

What is more, Alexander's account emphasizes the role of the police within America's larger carceral and caste systems, which involve multiple institutions, including the elements of the criminal justice that systematically discriminate against black defendants and extract profits from the incarcerated through legalized slavery. This means that collaboration with the police also means trusting the dispositions of the justices in charge of sentencing those rounded up by the police, the dispositions of those running prisons into which many incarcerated are placed, and the institutional dispositions of the prison-industrial complex as a whole. There are obvious reasons to doubt these dispositions [26], including the statistical bias of the criminal justice system against black defendants [36, 72], and this is especially true for for-profit prisons given their perverse incentives [23], the statistical influence of for-profit prisons on sentencing decisions [28], and reports of judges sending children to for-profit prisons in exchange for bribes [62].

7 POLICING FUTURE: OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORM?

Some researchers have argued that the critiques discussed in this paper represent reasons to avoid collaboration with *current* police, but that collaboration with *future* police may be possible if appropriate reforms are adopted. In this section, we argue that the dispositional risks of policing are unlikely to be reduced by such reforms. As discussed by [79], reform initiatives like community policing are ultimately ineffective, as they typically (1) divert *more* money towards policing (and thus, away from the government programs that actually prevent crime, such as affordable housing, income supports, and community health initiatives), (2) ingratiate the police into *more* elements of society [74], opening new opportunities for corruption, discrimination, and abuse [39] without yielding any demonstrable improvements, (3) can *exacerbate* existing problems with overpolicing [53], and/or (4) are rendered ineffective (especially for accountability efforts) due to incentive structures and organizational challenges that render other elements of the government or criminal justice system unwilling or unable to comply.

One reform proposed as a more humane role for the police in Drug policy is the use of *Drug courts* in which those picked up on drug offences are diverted to specialized diversion programs rather than traditional courts. Unfortunately, these diversion programs are not typically successful at encouraging drug users to actually participate in and complete their treatment programs, with most participants immediately returning to streets [3]. Moreover, this approach places control over access to critical social services is controlled by police, as these diversion programs are only accessible for those who are arrested, leading to (1) *incentivation* of crime to access such programs and withholding treatment from those who commit crimes [63], (2) increasing of the role of the criminal justice system in the lives of drug users [74], and (3) leading to opportunities for police corruption.

Another proposed reform is Decriminalization. In New York, for example, possession of marijuana is classified as a "violation" rather than a felony, ostensibly reducing the risk of overly harsh sentences for drug crime [4]. Unfortunately, New York police nevertheless used this to target minorities, *ramping up* drug (non-felony) arrests through stop-and-frisk policies [53], and by exchanging some arrests for "summonses" to appear in court for these minor violations, forcing poor minorities to choose between losing their jobs vs. facing criminal charges for failure to appear. Furthermore, focusing police attention on large-scale drug operations is not without risks, as it provides opportunities for drug-oriented police corruption that is rampant among police agencies (see, e.g., the Rampart Scandal in which the LAPD reportedly stole drugs from evidence rooms and sold them on the streets [39].

Police reforms in general are difficult to enact and enforce due to poor mechanisms for police accountability. Police departments

have few mechanisms for oversight, or refuse to hold officers accountable for their actions, and the data needed to provide the assurances described above is rarely made publicly available by police departments. Additionally, the numbers reported by the police are often inaccurate or untrustworthy. In Campaign Zero's analysis of the LAPD, they found that LA's policies allow complaints against the LAPD to be ignored after a year, limit the ability to interrogate police in misconduct cases, allow officers to record their own interrogations, and allow the chief of police to ignore the results of misconduct hearings. Moreover, only 5% of civilian complaints against the LAPD rule in civilians' favor, with only 1% of use-of-force complaints ruling in favor of civilians, and 0% of discrimination complaints ruling in favor of civilians.

These lack of accountability measures also create challenges in the collection of statistical information that could be used to provide evidence of unsuitable dispositions of individual departments. In many cases, the only opportunity for police behavior to be tracked is by the police themselves, and the police are typically neither inclined, incentivized, nor required to compile and make available about their own conduct. In one recent year, data provided by the Baltimore police department claimed that there had been *zero* police stops that year[83, p.154] This underreporting is especially stark in cases of police misconduct. Those who are assaulted by the police (especially those sexually assaulted by the police) are disinclined to report police misconduct back to the police; in many cases police misconduct (sexual or otherwise) occurs explicitly because the police victims know that they are at risk of arrest or deportation if they attempt to speak out[65].

The asymmetric power relationships inherent to policing means that when data on police behavior are available, it should be taken with a grain of salt and assumed to underrepresent the true state of affairs. And when this type of data is simply not available, researchers may well be justified in relying on anecdotal evidence to justify beliefs of appropriately grounded distrust of the police (thus precluding collaboration with such police departments in good faith); or use the lack of available information as itself evidence of unsuitable dispositions.

However, ultimately, the evidence suggests that regardless of the motives of individual police departments, the origins and nature of police departments represent a substantial risk that cannot be avoided. To summarize, (1) the police were created to exert social control over racial minorities and lower classes, (2) the police (and criminal justice system more broadly) are currently used in America to perpetuate a racial underclass, and (3) Police reform efforts are ineffective because they generally (a) keep the levers of social control in the hands of police and frame public health and welfare concerns as criminal justice issues, (b) create opportunities for corruption (economic, drug-related, and sexual) that police have been demonstrated to regularly exploit, and (c) are difficult to implement and enforce due to the lack of any meaningful accountability for the police. These make it impossible for robotics researchers to work with police without laundering an indefensible system of racial and social control.

8 SPECIFIC RELEVANCE TO ROBOTIC APPLICATIONS

The unsuitability of police dispositions and the inadequacy of police reform is especially relevant to roboticists for several key reasons, grounded in the specific application domains in which police robots stand to be used, the specific risks and harms that accompany those domains, and the specific ways in which robots exacerbate those risks and harms.

On the one hand, there are a number of robotics applications being pursued by policing that actively reinforce significant risks of policing. Police are a force of racializing violence; and the use of police robots can exacerbate this racialization of people and spaces [37, p. 257]. A key historical purpose of the police is to surveil people of color; and robots represent mobile surveillance platforms, which allow those in power to surveil those without power, while precluding those without power from sous-veiling in return [55]. As Brayne reports, even without cheap disposable drones, the LAPD has already made frequent use of their expensive helicopters (which they call "ghetto birds") to terrorize perceived "hotspots" through overt yet anonymous surveillance [15, p.72]. Police are unreformable on partial account of their unaccountability; and robots can facilitate "moral buffering" [37], providing "an additional layer of ambiguity [and] diminishment of accountability and responsibility" [24]. Moreover, police exert substantial effort propagandizing false narratives about (a) the necessity of police, (b) the unique specialized professional authority of police, and (c) the apparent accountability of the police [21, p. 5]; tasks that they have a long history of using advanced technology to facilitate, through "techwashing" [15, p. 5-6]. As such, we argue that the unsuitable dispositions and unreformability of the police should provide clear motivation for roboticists to obviously avoid the development of technologies whose dominant use would be technologies of violence or surveillance.

In contrast, there *are* plenty of socially beneficial applications for social robots that currently require working with the police, ranging from robots to more accurately collect child eyewitness testimony [11, 49] to bomb disposal robots [27]. Our argument suggests, however, that while some robotics projects currently requiring collaborations with police may be viewed as socially beneficial from a hypothetical "view from nowhere" [59], their risk becomes apparent when situated within the broader context of institution-driven risks and vulnerabilities. That is, while these robotic applications may not pose *direct* risks, the implementation of these robotic applications poses clear *indirect* risks, by legitimizing the police, facilitating the influx of police budgets, and supporting the creep of police missions in increasing segments of our society. For the prosocial applications to be pursued without the risks discussed in this paper, we argue that they would need to be rethought as collaborations with alternative institutions, such as social workers. This would require dramatic defunding, or wholesale abolition, of existing policing organizations.

Finally, regardless of the specific use case for which robots are intended, robots represent special-purpose technologies that largely (with the exception of cheap, general-purpose drones) need to be developed with and/or for specific domains in order for them to be used. While any robot technology, of course, stands to be misused by

police, it is difficult to create a robot technology that "accidentally" wields a taser, recognizes, classifies, and matches faces to suspect databases, or integrates with Palantir's predictive policing software. This grants roboticists a unique degree of control over their work and power over how it is used.

9 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We conclude this paper with recommendations for paths forward. First, we make short-term recommendations for the current practice of research ethics that account for the issues raised in this work. Second, we make longer term recommendations for the research community, arguing for an abolitionist computing agenda.

Research Ethics Recommendations

Most obviously, we hope that the framework presented in this paper has clearly demonstrated the need for roboticists to refuse to develop robot technologies for or in collaboration with the police. This seems like a minimal first step – literally the least we can do – that is justified through the trust-theoretic framework presented in this work. Moreover, this simple first step represents an action that robotics researchers are uniquely capable of taking on. While regulators are slow to act, reticent to pre-emptively regulate technologies without substantial and dramatic harm already having been caused, and largely incapable of regulating collaborative relationships, robotics researchers have the freedom and agility to head off harms before they are inflicted, merely by taking a moral stand to avoid collaborations whose harmful effects can be readily predicted. Furthermore, we hope that the framework presented in this paper can be used by robotics researchers to make similar decisions about collaborations in other morally fraught but less clear-cut domains, such as collaborations with national defense organizations [47], or with surveillance capitalist corporations [87].

However, we further hope that the framework presented in this paper provides a useful tool for assessing and responding to *others'* proposed forays into policing robots. That is, even if we have convinced the reader themselves not to pursue collaborations with the police, they may well encounter others who have not yet been convinced, in the context of IRB Applications, Paper Reviews, and Grant Reviews. When encountering police collaboration in these external capacities, we encourage readers to ask hard questions of those prospective or actual collaborators, including at minimum the following considerations.

(1) Researchers proposing to perform or publish on collaborations with police should be asked to provide documentation of the origins of the agency with whom the researchers are collaborating and their justifications for collaboration based on those origins.
(2) Researchers proposing to perform or publish on collaborations with police should be asked to identify whether there is documented evidence (e.g., from websites such as Mapping Police Violence[1], the Police Scorecard[2], or the Use of Force Project[3] of violence or racism observed in collaborating departments over the past ten years and for their justification for the acceptability of that evidence.
(3) Researchers proposing to perform or publish on collaborations with police should be asked to explain whether their project team includes researchers qualified to attest to the strength of the above documentation, especially scholars from Black, LatinX, and Indigenous communities, and scholars from fields like sociology that have a deep understanding of the role of systemic racism in policing and the criminal justice system.
(4) Researchers proposing to conduct or publish collaborative research with police should be asked to provide evidence of the approval and participatory design in coordination with members of the communities in which the designed technologies would be used.

Although these four sources of evidence will not address all the risks discussed in this paper, requiring discussions about them may be a helpful first step.

Toward an Abolitionist Robotics

Finally, we argue that substantively responding to the concerns raised in this work requires a long-term commitment to an agenda of **abolitionist robotics**. As we showed in this article, the evidenced dispositions of American policing organizations, their constituent officers, and the American institution of Policing justifies a default stance of appropriately grounded distrust toward these officers, police organizations, and institution. As such, we have argued that roboticists *should not be collaborating with the police* in any way. This argument echoes calls from members of the robotics community in the 2020 *#NoJusticeNoRobots* open letter and petitioning campaign[4].

We have also pointed out that there are many truly socially beneficial actions that our society currently assigns to police, that researchers rightfully wish to support. As such, we suggest that researchers who wish to work in domains that currently require police collaboration should *actively push for police abolition* [20][5] and replacement of the police with new social systems. In parallel, researchers should, in parallel, pursue similarly oriented research projects in collaboration with alternative organizations such as mental health professionals, social workers, and non-police emergency first responders. Similarly, we encourage roboticists to work on topics that do not require collaboration with the police but who are concerned their technologies could be misused if acquired by police, to pursue similar advocacy, and to advocate for laws (especially at the city, and possibly state levels) formally restricting police use of robotics (going beyond the informal guidelines proposed by other roboethicists [18, 77]).

Overall, while collaboration with police may present new use cases for robots, especially given the increased militarization of the police, we suggest that researchers should carefully strive not only to reject the urge to view of policing as a blanket solution to society's problems, but also to reject technochauvinism [17] – the

[1] https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/
[2] https://policescorecard.org/
[3] http://useofforceproject.org/
[4] https://nojusticenorobots.github.io
[5] Resources for learning about Abolition can be found at http://criticalresistance.org.

urge to view technology (especially those technologies we have expertise in developing) as a blanket solution to society's problems.

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This work was prompted by the campaign 'No Justice, No Robots' (led by the authors of this paper) in which signatories publicly stated their refusal to participate in or facilitate research in collaboration with or intended for use by law enforcement agencies (nojusticenorobots.github.io).

Public discussions and news stories following this campaign have been instrumental in articulating the positions laid out in this article. Accordingly, this article articulates a position that is aligned in spirit, but substantially different from that articulated in the public letter, and thus this article does not necessarily reflect the positions of those who signed that petition or their institutions.

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Why We Need to Know More: Exploring the State of AI Incident Documentation Practices

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ABSTRACT

To enable the development and use of safe and equitable artificial intelligence (AI) systems, AI engineers must monitor deployed AI systems and learn from past AI incidents where failures have occurred. Around the world, public databases for cataloging AI systems and resulting harms are instrumental in promoting awareness of potential AI harms among policymakers, researchers, and the public. However, despite growing recognition of the potential of AI systems to produce harms, causes of AI systems failure remain elusive and AI incidents continue to occur. For example, incidents of AI bias are frequently reported and discussed, yet biased systems continue to be developed and deployed.

This raises the question – how are we learning from documented incidents? What information do we need to analyze AI incidents and develop new AI engineering best practices? This paper examines reporting techniques from a variety of AI stakeholders and across different industries, identifies requirements towards the design of effective AI incident documentation, and proposes policy recommendations for augmenting current practice.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Social and professional topics** → *Computing / technology policy*; • **Software and its engineering** → **Documentation**; • **Security and privacy** → **Human and societal aspects of security and privacy**; • **Computing methodologies** → **Artificial intelligence**.

KEYWORDS

Explainable Artificial Intelligence

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1 INTRODUCTION

While there is much excitement about artificial intelligence (AI) and its applications today, AI systems are known to fail. Sometimes the failure is mundane, such as a voice assistant playing a different song than requested [5]. However, as AI systems are used in more high-stakes contexts, AI systems are failing in ways that cause harm to humans, such as gender-biased hiring recommendations or autonomous robot collisions, among many other examples [3, 26].

Understanding the underlying causes of AI failures is challenging due to the complex nature of AI system behaviors and development lifecycles. Bias, for example, can be introduced throughout any of the stages of the AI engineering lifecycle [44, 46] or the "data, algorithm, and user interaction loop" [28]. As a result, industry practitioners struggle to effectively prevent and mitigate bias, with many discovering serious issues only after deployment [22].

To improve the quality of AI systems and prevent future incidents, the AI engineering community needs to document past incidents and identify common causes of AI failure. To quote Henry Petroski, "Failure is central to engineering... Successful engineering is all about understanding how things break or fail" [13]. AI incident databases, or platforms that centrally store documented examples of AI failures, therefore represent a crucial resource. Precedents across safety-critical domains including aviation and cybersecurity suggest that the analysis of incident databases is effective toward addressing engineering challenges. For the AI engineering discipline, which is new and evolving, the analysis of AI incidents presents an opportunity to gain awareness of the mechanisms of AI system failures, develop methods for measuring, classifying, and contextualizing incidents, and build well-informed best practices.

Although current AI incident databases have been important to raising awareness about AI harms, existing taxonomies best support policy and ethics research, as opposed to capturing actionable technical information for AI practitioners. Additionally, current AI incident taxonomies either omit the topic of underlying sources of system failure altogether or provide simplistic schemas for classifying root causes. This paper addresses current challenges and shortcomings in documenting AI incidents by providing a landscape of AI system and incident databases, an analysis of AI incident documentation requirements, and a set of policy recommendations for future AI incident databases.

A note on terminology: the language around AI incidents is emergent and no widespread definitions are yet agreed upon. Within this paper, we use the term AI incident interchangeably with AI failure to refer to instances in which an AI system results in unintentional negative impacts on humans (e.g. physical, psychological, and/or social impacts). We use the term AI harm to capture these impacts. Examples of AI incidents can vary in severity and will look different in context. An incident for a large language model (LLM), for example, could consist of an inaccurate text output [4]. The impact of an individual reading an inaccuracy could be minimally harmful

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but if the user were to use this information in a critical context, or the misinformation were to become widespread, impacts could be severe. By contrast, a computer vision (CV) incident could include a misclassification of an object by a self-driving car resulting in a serious injury [2]. The impact of this incident could be life-altering for the victim.

2 LANDSCAPE OF DOCUMENTATION METHODS

AI engineering is a burgeoning field and as a result AI incident documentation practices are still developing. To ground our analysis, we conducted an interdisciplinary exploration of the current landscape of documentation methods for AI incidents, systems, and policies, as well as methods from well-established fields such as aviation and cybersecurity.

2.1 Databases of AI Incidents

Public databases, spreadsheets, and social media lists are important mechanisms for collecting and publicizing international AI incidents and controversies. AI incidents catalogued within these resources are pulled from second-hand accounts via online articles and research papers and are typically stored in public spreadsheets. These spreadsheets power interfaces such as searchable databases or map visualizations. Existing databases for capturing AI incidents are operated by various non-governmental organizations, companies, and individuals, and encourage submissions from the public for review by a managing editor or editorial team.

We provide an overview of documentation methods in use today for recording AI incidents in Table 1 and the criteria that they cover. A comparison of current documentation of AI incidents illustrates a shared focus on the characteristics of the event of an AI incident such as the organizations involved in the development and use of the system or details of the resulting harm. Across the board, other aspects of AI incidents, namely the causes of and responses to AI incidents, receive limited coverage within current AI incident documentation methods.

2.1.1 AI and Algorithmic Incident and Controversies (AIAAIC). The AI and Algorithmic Incident and Controversies (AIAAIC) Repository [40] is a significant source of examples for both the AIID [9] and the Where in the World is AI? database [20]. This repository is described as an "independent, non-partisan, public interest initiative" that advocates for transparency by logging incidents and controversies from around the world. The collection of over 850 examples is edited and managed by Charlie Pownall and used by more than 60 universities and organizations. Users can submit examples of incidents and controversies; these submissions are included based on adherence to criteria such as relevance, fairness, and accuracy [40].

2.1.2 AI Incident Database (AIID). The most popular database for reporting AI incidents is the AI Incident Database (AIID) [9] which consists of over 1,000 archived reports from over 600 submitters. Reports capture a breadth of types of AI harms ranging from harms to physical health/safety to harms to social/political systems and application types ranging from facial recognition systems to targeted advertising.

The AIID employs the Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) taxonomy [1], developed at Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service. Submissions to the incident database are contributed by the public. Current users span a variety of roles such as system architects, public policy researchers, and industrial product developers. Future plans for the AIID include supporting incident report translation, providing best practices resources, incorporating post-mortem reports, and utilizing automated monitoring for tracking new articles related to AI incidents. Potential future plans include developing a technical taxonomy and encouraging voluntary disclosures.

Of the reviewed AI incident databases, only the AI Incident Database CSET taxonomy contains a category for the cause of harm. The category *Causative Factors within AI system* prescribes one of three factors: *Robustness*, *Specification*, or *Assurance*. The *Robustness* category means the "system operated unsafely because of features or changes in its environment, or in the inputs the system received", *Specification* means the "system's behavior did not align with the true intentions of its designer, operator, etc", and *Assurance* means the "system could not be adequately monitored or controlled during operation" [9]. While there are scenarios in which these three categories are distinct, AI failures are often the result of numerous factors, such as a combination of unfamiliar inputs, inadequate training data, and poor system monitoring, making it hard to untangle these causes and assign a representative category.

2.1.3 AI Vulnerability Database (AVID). The AI Vulnerability Database (AVID) [42] contains over 45 vulnerabilities and reports. AVID defines vulnerabilities as proven high-level failure modes and reports as specific examples of vulnerabilities occurring. The goal of the database is to elicit evaluation methods that can be used by AI engineers or auditors. Submitters can upload vulnerabilities or reports via an online form for review by the AVID team. Some instances in the database are of failures encountered in the wild similar to those included in other reviewed AI incident databases, but many are based on controlled evaluations of model behavior. The taxonomy used by AVID provides detailed categories for describing failures through *Security*, *Ethics*, *Performance* (SEP) subcategories. The *Security* category, for example, includes subcategories as specific as *Supply Chain Compromise* with *Model Compromise* or *Software Compromise* as options within that subcategory. The taxonomy also tracks the *Lifecycle Stage* during which the failure was identified such as *Evaluation* or *Deployment* [43].

2.1.4 Where in the World is AI?. Another significant repository of AI incident examples is the Where in the World is AI? database [20]. This database is visualized through an interactive map containing over 400 responsible or unethical examples to provide users with context around how AI is used internationally. This database places an emphasis on capturing and visualizing the specific location of use. Examples are labeled as either *Harmful* or *Helpful*.

The database plans to include action, reading, and insights columns in the future; these columns will likely recommend takeaways and document incident responses, although the structure of these columns is unspecified and the site does not appear to have been updated since 2021. Cases within the database were previously updated on a weekly basis and consist of examples identified by AI Global, Awful AI, Upturn, Equal AI, and Charlie Pownall/CPC &

Categories	Databases of AI Incidents			
	AIAAIC Repository	**AI Incident Database**	**AI Vulnerability Database**	**Where in the World is AI?**
Identification	• AIAAIC ID #	• Incident #	• Version	
Incident Description	• Description	• Full description • Short description	• Description • Details	• Title
Date	• Year	• Beginning date • Ending date	• Date reported • Date last modified	• Year
Location	• Country(s)	• Location		• City • State • Country • Latitude • Longitude
Sector	• Sector(s)	• Sector of deployment • Critical infrastructure • Sectors affected • Public sector deployment		• Domain
Responsible Parties	• Operator(s)	• System developer • Named entities • Party responsible for AI system	• Developer • Deployer	
AI System Description	• Purpose(s)	• Relevant AI functions • AI tools and techniques used • AI functions and applications used • Description of AI system involved • Nature of end user • Level of autonomy • Physical system	• Artifact details • Lifecycle stage	
AI System Data		• Description of the data inputs to the AI system		
Cause of Harm		• Causative factors within AI system		
Description of Harm	• Issue(s) – General Issue(s) -- Transparency	• Probable level of intent • Harm type • Harm nearly missed? • Uneven distribution of harms basis	• Risk domains • SEP subcategories	• Is_good (Helpful or Harmful)
Impact of Harm		• Human lives lost • Total financial cost • Overall severity of harm		
Legal Implications		• Laws covering the incident		
Response to Harm				

Table 1: An overview of existing AI incident documentation methods. "Cause of Harm" and "Response to Harm" are two categories with high importance to AI engineers but low coverage.

Associates, among other sources. Users can also submit a case for review and potential inclusion.

2.1.5 Additional Lists. Lists scattered across Twitter [7, 25] and GitHub [12, 39] also chronicle problematic systems. Many of these lists constitute early attempts at aggregating examples of irresponsible AI and predate public databases. These lists do not rely on taxonomies or formal reporting methods.

2.2 Databases of AI Systems

Databases of AI systems, although not directly related to AI incident documentation, provide context related to larger efforts in AI database curation and harms discussions. The development of current AI system registers and repositories are the result of efforts from an array of stakeholders ranging from community activists to local governments and reflect diverse cultural and societal concerns.

Databases and registers examined in this section were sourced from the AIAAIC's "AI and algorithmic repositories, registers, databases" webpage, the AIID's "Related Work" section, and references within "Preventing Repeated Real World AI Failures by Cataloging Incidents: The AI Incident Database" [9, 27, 40]. These proactive approaches include databases that facilitate government transparency and raise public awareness.

2.2.1 Government Databases of AI Systems. Public databases of AI systems used by the government are a mechanism by which local and federal governments can provide transparency and oversight for AI systems. These databases provide information about system goals and contexts of use to inform the public. These databases, particularly the Algorithm Register and AI Register, can offer a profusion of information about systems employed within the public sector because of their proximity to government.

The AI Public Services Explorer [18] monitors the use of public AI systems across the European Union. Over 140 services are currently listed, and related AI cases are organized by their percentage "similarity". The Algorithm Register [35] from Amsterdam and the AI Register [37] from Helsinki both maintain registers of AI systems and algorithms used within their prospective cities. These registers provide residents with detailed information about system design and use, as well as contact information for responsible parties.

Likewise, the United States government requires federal agencies to publish their unclassified AI use cases online [23]. Details provided within these use cases can include a high-level description of inputs and outputs, information on the AI techniques used, and contact information, among other fields, although the structure of these reports differ between agencies.

Algoritmos Publicos [21] was developed by The School of Government at Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez and aims to improve governance of Chilean AI systems and encourage innovation. The database organizes public algorithms used in Chile by either *Sustainable Development Goals*, such as *Zero hunger* or *Climate Action*, or by *Functional Expenditure Classification*, such as *Housing and Community Services* or *Education*.

2.2.2 Databases of Controversial AI Systems. Several databases aim to inform the public about controversial technologies that may impact our everyday lives such as automated decision-making or facial recognition systems. These databases catalogue concerns about the unethical development and use of AI systems in areas such as policing and medicine. Systems included in these repositories are systems for which speculative harms have been identified and/or realized harms have occurred.

Multiple databases document the use of automated decision-making systems. AI Projects in the Public Sector in Latin America [41] maps potentially biased AI systems across Latin America to examine the feminist and human-rights implications of using algorithms for decision-making processes. The Observatory of Algorithms with Social Impacts (OASI) register [17] collects examples of both private and public sector algorithms for making automated decisions and consists of over 80 examples. The AI Observatory maintains a database of Automated Decision-Making Systems (ADMS) [15] in India to document ADMS uses, contexts, and actual and potential harms. The database captures over 60 systems ranging in purpose from *Farm Loan Waiver Identification* to *Student Performance*.

The use of AI surveillance and facial recognition systems is another documented concern. The Panoptic Tracker [24] provides a comprehensive map of the approximately 100 government facial recognition systems installed in India. A Right to Information (RTI) [14] document has been filed for most of the Facial Recognition Tracker Systems (FRTSs) requesting additional details from system sources. The Atlas of Surveillance [16] documents the use of law enforcement surveillance technologies including AI systems within the US. The Atlas consists of over 9,000 searchable data points and supports an interactive map visualization.

2.3 Incident Databases from High Stakes Industries

Disciplines in which failure modes can be complicated and costly, such as in aviation or cybersecurity, set precedents for incident database design and documentation. Although AI Engineering is a nascent field with distinct challenges and failure modes, the obstacles involved with incident collection and analysis are not entirely unique or nebulous.

Incident reporting has been integral to the development of safety measures across many disciplines. The history of systematic incident reporting and analysis dates to at least 1978 when a corpus of cases from anesthesiology was used by medical researchers to generate insights into safe anesthetic use [11]. Following the arrival of the internet, online public databases for sharing case studies and encouraging community analysis have become tools for providing equitable access to information and building best practices.

2.3.1 Aviation. Commercial aviation fatalities have decreased by 95% over the past two decades; these improvements have been largely attributed to an "open and collaborative safety culture" centered on the careful analysis of past incidents [19, 38]. An aircraft accident is defined as an event between boarding and disembarking by which death or serious injury occurs or the aircraft receives significant damage. Aircraft incidents refer to events that posed high risk of accident such as a *flight control malfunction or failure* or *inflight fire* [36]. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) System [19] is a central figure in aviation safety analysis. The ASIAS hosts a public collection of 11 online aviation safety databases storing a

variety of accident and incident types and allows users to query multiple databases at one time.

The US National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB's) Aviation Accident and Incident Data System [33] is included within and cited by numerous other databases in ASIAS. The NTSB investigates each reported accident and captures key findings. Each investigation consists of the following steps: "on-site fact gathering", "analysis of facts and determination of probable cause", "acceptance of a final report", and "advocating for the acceptance of safety recommendations arising from the investigation" [34]. The database can be queried through Case Analysis and Reporting Online (CAROL), which contains a complete list of aviation investigations from 1983 onward, surface mode investigations from 2010 onward, and safety recommendations.

The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) [32] is another significant database within the ASIAS. Uniquely, the ASRS captures confidential reports submitted by pilots, controllers, mechanics, flight attendants, and dispatchers, among other roles working on aviation's frontline. Over a million reports have been submitted to date and these reports are made public via a searchable database. All reports have been de-identified. This data is used to identify deficiencies and discrepancies in the National Aviation System (NAS) for remedy by appropriate authorities, support policy formulation and improvements to the NAS, and strengthen the foundation of aviation human factors safety research.

2.3.2 Cybersecurity. Cybersecurity incidents are never exhaustively preventable and new types of incidents are frequently emerging. Emphasis is therefore placed on learning from and documenting past incidents and their handling processes. A cybersecurity incident refers to a violation or eminent threat of violation of "computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security practices" [8]. Incident responses are typically orchestrated confidentially within organizations to avoid disclosure of sensitive information. The Federal Information Security Management Act, however, requires that Federal agencies report cyber incidents to the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team. Although disclosures in cybersecurity often present security concerns, aggregating information about shared public problems and providing common language for cybersecurity professionals have been feasible methods for building a robust practice.

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database [30] lists common identifiers for publicly known cybersecurity vulnerabilities. A vulnerability refers to a "flaw in a software, firmware, hardware, or service component" that can be exploited and may result in a cybersecurity incident [45]. A CVE ID is assigned to each vulnerability. Responses to vulnerabilities take the form of fixes or mitigations and are handled on an organizational basis. A fix involves terminating the use of vulnerable code and/or systems. A mitigation "reduces the impact of a vulnerability without removing the vulnerable code", such as "adding network segmentation" or "input and traffic filtering" [45]. Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) [31] and Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) [29] build off the CVE to provide analysts and testers with common language related to weaknesses and attacks. While these databases do not offer specific, identifiable instances of incidents, vulnerabilities, weaknesses, or attacks, they present a community-driven approach to IT and cybersecurity standardization.

3 ANALYSIS OF AI INCIDENT DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS

AI systems are non-deterministic, data-driven, and often opaque. These characteristics pose challenges which set AI systems, and as a result, AI failures apart from precedents. The structure and lifecycle of AI systems as well as the newness of AI engineering must be taken into account when developing a taxonomy for AI incident documentation. Through our landscape analysis of AI incident databases, AI system databases, and aviation and cybersecurity incident databases, we identified several critical gaps in current documentation practices.

3.1 AI Failures Tend to be Context-Specific

Incidents within other industries such as aviation or cybersecurity are often the result of common faulty physical components used across systems. If, for instance, a particular model of airplane is associated with multiple fire-related aviation incidents, the underlying problem could be that a specific part is defective. Once a common component is identified as posing a threat to system performance or function, solutions could include removing or modifying the component or terminating use of systems that employ the component.

Problems in AI, however, tend to be unique to their deployment context and hard to assign to a common component. Companies typically curate their own datasets to fit project needs and train their own models. Current AI incident taxonomies therefore must diverge from precedents that center on identifying common components and instead account for context- and system-specific failures while looking for common processes. Taxonomies must focus on capturing the details and nuance around the design, implementation, and use of each AI system.

At the same time, AI incident taxonomies must be flexible to a potential future shift in AI development towards reusable digital components. Earlier foundation models such as BERT, CLIP, or GPT-3 have the potential to be adapted and applied to a variety of task types, although widespread use of these models has yet to occur [6]. However, with the growth of generative AI, discussion around the ways in which large open-source models such as large language models (LLMs) can be used has exploded. Research into the ways that open-source models can integrated into AI systems, bootstrapped with new abilities, and/or customized for specific users is ongoing. The use of reusable components by ML development teams appears imminent and could mean a paradigm shift in the way AI systems are designed and produced.

Wide-spread use of a component will not be a sufficient indicator for quality. For example, many popular benchmarking datasets, such as ImageNet, have been shown to contain consequential biases but are still a research standard [48]. LLMs are generally trained on extremely large datasets consisting of unvetted language scraped from the web. Tracking the use of common components will help AI engineers understand the risks associated with various components and adjust their development and monitoring plans accordingly.

3.2 Broad Timelines are Essential to Analyzing AI Systems

Current AI incident taxonomies focus on the events of harm themselves, as opposed to other elements of the timeline leading up to or proceeding the incident. Aviation and cybersecurity similarly limit the scope of reports. In aviation, this means capturing information from the duration of the flight between passenger loading and disembarking. In cybersecurity, vulnerabilities and exposures are attributes rather than events, so no timeline is provided aside from the date when the vulnerability or exposure was reported or updated.

Causes of AI incidents, however, such as privacy issues or mislabeled data, can be introduced within the system at many stages of the system lifecycle and can be hard to pinpoint. To be effective, AI incident databases need to capture longer and more detailed timelines surrounding AI systems to help engineers locate sources of AI failure. AI systems also often rely on numerous dynamic elements that may be updated on separate timelines. For instance, the embedded timelines of data updates, model retraining, and monitoring and evaluation can all influence how incidents manifest. Logging these micro-timelines is thus an important part of the story.

AI engineers would also benefit from understanding how organizations choose to respond to AI incidents. Depending on the type or severity of harm, the best choice may be to abandon using a system altogether. In other instances, a viable solution may be the collection of higher-quality data and subsequent model retraining. Solutions could also include the integration of software safeguards for filtering out or preventing unintended AI behaviors. Recording real-world responses to incidents will help AI engineers understand and identify ethical paths forward after an incident.

3.3 Genotypical Analysis Must Motivate AI Incident Collection and Categorization

At their best, taxonomies are tools for making sense of large amounts of data and assisting users in drawing connections across examples. However, taxonomies run the risk of oversimplifying and sterilizing the data captured about incidents. Taxonomies rely on a mix of "phenotypical", or observable, and "genotypical", or underlying, categories.

For example, say an LLM generates a racist response to a user's query [4]. The phenotypes of this incident would include the user's input, the model's output, elements of the user interface, and details related to the type of model or system. The genotypes would include underlying causes such as a culture of insufficient evaluation of model behaviors or the collection and use of biased data. Identification of genotypical categories requires the collection of large amounts of data and investigation into the underlying causes across entries.

Striking the right balance between these categories is therefore important to encourage meaningful analysis. When elements of a story are shrouded or eliminated, it can be difficult to learn from past failures, especially in the context of complex systems for which multiple interrelated causative factors are at play [10].

In developing the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) [32], Billings notes, "Too many people thought that incident reporting was the core and primary component of what was needed. These people thought that simply from the act of collecting incidents, solutions and fixes would be generated sui generis and that this would enhance safety" [47]. Effective incident reporting is about aggregating incidents in a manner that encourages and is conducive to thorough reflection and investigation. Successful precedents from other domains show that this means a) building taxonomies that provide extensive coverage of phenotypical characteristics and/or b) engaging in thorough genotypical explorations.

To be effective, AI incident taxonomies must expand their coverage of observable characteristics of incidents to allow for analysis of underlying causes. Important phenotypical information related to AI systems could include the specific system input and output associated with the incident, end-user behavior(s) at the time of the incident, details of the design of the user interface, training and testing data sets, or model characteristics including model architecture or weights. Without this information, coupled with a strategy for investigating and analyzing incidents, it will be challenging if not impossible to identify genotypes or develop common language around AI failures.

Current AI incident collection methods rely heavily on news coverage of AI incidents. Details of the incident can be lost as the story transfers from a first-hand to second-hand account. Likewise, important phenotypical information can be omitted because parties responsible for the AI system that produced the incident choose not to share information about their systems. Recommendations discussed in the subsequent section talk about potential mechanisms for collecting more detailed phenotypical information conducive to genotypical analysis.

4 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AI INCIDENT DOCUMENTATION

After we analyzed requirements for AI incident taxonomies, we investigated potential pathways forward for building new types of AI incident databases to augment existing efforts. These policy recommendations are inspired by methods used by existing AI system databases and incident databases from other domains. Diversifying the landscape of AI incident databases would make room for new perspectives and sources of information, while also helping to address potential obstacles to the thorough disclosure and analysis of AI incidents such as fear of reputational harm, lack of objectivity, or gaps in the timeline.

4.1 Implementing a Government-Run Database

Currently, there are no federally operated databases for logging AI incidents. All AI incident databases available today cite publicly available second-hand sources and entries are gathered through public submissions. The quality of incident reports is therefore dependent on journalists, contributors, and editors. By contrast, aviation accidents and federal cybersecurity vulnerabilities and exposures all require mandatory legal disclosure via first-hand sources. Government organizations can then investigate and validate reports for accuracy and probe for additional detail.

The introduction of a federally operated database would complement existing efforts by offering third-party centralized oversight of AI incident analysis. The mandatory disclosure of all or certain classes of AI incidents would increase the breadth of documented

incidents. Government oversight of AI incidents would also support the development of policies to address known issues.

4.2 Supporting Anonymous Submissions

Another mechanism for encouraging more first-hand, highly detailed accounts of AI incidents would be the development of a confidential submission database. Although some existing databases, such as AIID [9], include an anonymous submission option, a database designed specifically for confidential first-hand accounts could increase participation and result in higher quality reports. AI engineers directly involved with the development of AI systems, for instance, could report issues about the systems they work on without fear of professional repercussions.

The Aviation Safety Reporting System [32] provides an exemplar for incentivizing incident reporting in the absence of a legal mandate. The ASRS combats fears of reputational harm for submitters by offering confidential reporting of aviation incidents and has collected and displayed over a million de-identified reports. The CVE [30] also broadcasts defective components without attributing them to the systems in which the components are used. The success of de-identified databases in other industries suggests that a database of this type would bolster current AI incident documentation efforts.

4.3 Building Proactive AI Incident Databases

AI incident documentation could also benefit from the introduction of more proactive documentation. Currently, AI incident reporting is reactive, in the sense that it catalogues AI systems only after actual harms or near-misses have been realized. Proactive methods for documenting AI systems, on the other hand, support system monitoring prior to and in anticipation of possible incidents. Storing information about AI systems in a database before an AI incident has ever occurred will make it easier to track the full lifecycle of the system should an AI harm occur. Proactive reporting would also help AI engineers and researchers identify what the early signs of system inadequacy look like.

While proactive systems currently exist for tracking controversial systems such as the Panoptic Tracker for facial recognition systems [24] or the Observatory of Algorithms with Social Impacts Register [17], these databases do not link incidents to systems. Maintaining proactive documentation of AI systems in a database designed specifically to support the analysis of potential future AI incidents, as opposed to other goals like government transparency or activism, would help address the challenge of documenting complex timelines.

5 CONCLUSION

AI incident databases have great potential to support AI practitioners in gaining awareness of the mechanisms of challenging AI system failures. Identifying common underlying causes of failure and practical effectual solutions is critical to the development of AI engineering. As the AI community continues to document incidents, reflection is needed on how information is captured and the ways in which taxonomies can support or prevent meaningful analysis.

Current AI incident databases use limited classification schemas to capture surface-level characteristics of harms events. Moving forward, the AI community would benefit from examining and adopting approaches employed in other disciplines and across a variety of AI research and activist communities. Diversifying the landscape of AI incident databases and building incident documentation taxonomies tailored to AI systems will help us build a stronger understanding of AI incidents, define practices to avoid failures in the future, and bring us one step closer to developing safer AI systems.

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What does it mean to be a responsible AI practitioner: An ontology of roles and skills

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

Figure 1: Existing roles and skills expected of responsible AI practitioners (AI ethicists)

ABSTRACT

With the growing need to regulate AI systems across a wide variety of application domains, a new set of occupations has emerged in the industry. The so-called responsible Artificial Intelligence (AI) practitioners or AI ethicists are generally tasked with interpreting and operationalizing best practices for ethical and safe design of AI systems. Due to the nascent nature of these roles, however, it is unclear to future employers and aspiring AI ethicists what specific function these roles serve and what skills are necessary to serve the functions. Without clarity on these, we cannot train future AI ethicists with meaningful learning objectives.

In this work, we examine what responsible AI practitioners do in the industry and what skills they employ on the job. We propose an ontology of existing roles alongside skills and competencies that serve each role. We created this ontology by examining the job postings for such roles over a two-year period (2020-2022) and conducting expert interviews with fourteen individuals who currently hold such a role in the industry. Our ontology contributes to business leaders looking to build responsible AI teams and provides educators with a set of competencies that an AI ethics curriculum can prioritize.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Social and professional topics** → **Computing profession**.

KEYWORDS

Competency Framework, Responsible AI Practitioner, Education

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1 INTRODUCTION

With the rapid growth of the AI industry, the need for AI and AI ethics expertise has also grown. Companies and governmental organizations are paying more attention to the impact AI can have on our society and how AI systems should be designed and deployed responsibly [23, 31, 42]. From 2015 onward, a series of AI ethics principles [31], in-depth auditing toolkits [11, 39, 46], checklists [5, 35], codebases [4, 8], standards and regulations [1, 6] have been proposed by many different international actors. Several communities of research and practice such as FATE (Fairness, Accountability, Transparency, and Ethics), responsible AI, AI ethics, AI safety and AI alignment have emerged. This general movement towards responsible development of AI has created new roles in the industry referred to as *responsible AI practitioners* in this paper. The primary mandate of these roles is understanding, analyzing, and addressing ethical and social implications of AI systems within the business context. The emergence of these roles challenges technology companies to curate these roles and teams. Leaders in AI-related organizations need to identify, recruit and train appropriate candidates for such roles. As the demand to fill such roles continue to increase, educators need effective means to train talent with the right set of skills.

Recently, scholars examined the common roles responsible AI practitioners serve [25, 55], explored the challenges that they face [40, 47], and criticized the problematic nature of the accountability mechanisms that relate to these roles [19]. Moreover, others highlight the myriad practical challenges facing the development of a comprehensive training program to fill such roles [14, 26, 45]. However, there is a lack of empirical research investigating the types of roles, corresponding responsibilities, and qualifications that responsible AI practitioners have in the industry. To address these gaps, we examine the following research questions:

- **RQ1:** What are the types of roles and responsibilities that responsible AI practitioners hold in the industry?
- **RQ2:** What are the skills, qualifications, and interpersonal qualities necessary for holding such roles?

We address these questions by conducting a two-part qualitative study. We examined 79 job postings from March 2020 to March 2022 and conducted expert interviews with 14 practitioners who currently hold these roles in the industry. Learning from fields of competency-based recruitment and curriculum development, we propose an ontology of different occupations and an accompanying list of competencies for those occupations.

As illustrated in Figure 1, our ontology outlines seven occupations that responsible AI practitioners hold in the industry: researcher (of two kinds), data scientist, engineer, director/executive, manager, and policy analyst. For each occupation, the ontology includes a list of responsibilities, skills, knowledge, attitudes, and qualifications. We find that while the roles and responsibilities held by responsible AI practitioners are wide-ranging, they all have interdisciplinary backgrounds and are individuals who thrive in working with individuals from different disciplines. We discuss how educators and employers can use this competency framework to develop new curricula/programs and adequately recruit for the rapidly changing field of responsible AI development.

2 BACKGROUND

With the increased media reporting and regulation requirements around social and ethical issues of AI-based products and services [7, 38, 48, 51, 54, 56], the role of a responsible AI practitioner has emerged as a demanding position in the technology industry. In this section, we provide an overview of debates about these roles and existing educational programs that aim to train future responsible AI practitioners. We discuss how existing competency frameworks treat the role of a responsible AI practitioner and highlight the gaps we address in this work.

2.1 Emergence of the responsible AI practitioners

Considering the nascency of AI ethics as a domain, only a few scholars have characterized occupations held by responsible AI practitioners [36, 57]. For instance, Gambelin frames the role of an AI ethicist as "an individual with a robust knowledge of ethics" who has the responsibility and the ability to "apply such abstract concepts (i.e. ethical theories) to concrete situations" for the AI system. According to Gambelin, an AI ethicist in the industry also needs to be aware of existing policy work, have experience in business management, and possess excellent communication skills [25]. Gambelin identifies bravery as the most important characteristic of an AI ethicist as they often need to "shoulder responsibility" for potential negative impacts of AI in the absence of regulation.

Moss and Metcalf investigated practices and challenges of responsible AI practitioners in Silicon Valley and described them as "ethics owners" who are responsible for "handling challenging ethical dilemmas with tools of tech management and translating public pressure into new corporate practices" [40]. Echoing Moss and Metcalf's seminal work on examining AI industry practices, a growing body of empirical work highlights that responsible AI practitioners face challenges such as misalignment of incentives, nascent organizational cultures, shortage of internal skills and capability, and the complexity of AI ethics issues when trying to do their day-to-day tasks [41, 47, 48, 50, 55]. Furthermore, only large technology companies often have the necessary resources to hire responsible AI practitioners [52]. Small and medium-sized companies struggle to access such expertise and rely on openly available information or hire external consultants/auditors as needed [19, 52]. This has given rise to AI ethics as consulting and auditing service [10, 18, 34].

While challenges in operationalizing responsible AI practices are an active area of research, there is a gap in understanding the role and necessary competencies of responsible AI practitioners in the industry.

2.2 Qualifications to be a responsible AI practitioner

The emergence of auditors in the field of responsible AI emphasizes the need for formal training and certification of such roles in the industry [19]. This raises a few practical questions: Who is qualified to take these roles? How should these individuals be trained? Are existing computer science, engineering, and social science curricula prepare individuals for such roles?

Educators responded to this need by developing a range of educational programs and curricula [14, 24, 28, 44, 58]. In a survey of

the curricula for university courses focused on AI ethics, Garrett et al. emphasize that such topics should be formally integrated into the learning objectives of current and new courses [26]. On the other hand, as Peterson et al. describe, discussing social and ethical issues in computer science courses remains a challenge [43]. They propose pedagogues for fostering the emotional engagement of students in the classroom as a solution [43].

Recognizing the importance of interdisciplinary approaches in AI ethics, Raji et al. argue that computer science is currently valued significantly over liberal arts even in the research area of fairness of machine learning systems [45]. Furthermore, they state that the perceived superiority culture in computer science and engineering has created a "new figure of a socio-technical expert", titled "Ethics Unicorns" - full stack developers, who can solve challenging problems of integrating technology in society.

This overemphasis on computer science expertise and the trend toward integrating ethics content in existing technical curricula may be problematic if these efforts do not match the skills and disciplinary needs of the industry. It raises questions about whether the educational backgrounds of responsible AI practitioners today are indeed in computer science. In this work, we inform the curriculum development efforts across a diverse range of disciplinary areas by understanding these roles in the industry and outlining the attributes, qualifications, and skills necessary for holding them.

2.3 Competency frameworks in AI and AI ethics

Competency frameworks are useful tools for human resource management (i.e. recruitment, performance improvement) and educational development (i.e. new training programs and curriculum development in universities) [2, 53]. Competency frameworks highlight different competencies required for a profession and link these competencies to skills and knowledge. According to Diana Kramer "competencies are skills, knowledge and behaviours that individuals need to possess to be successful today and in the future" [49]. This definition frames our discussion of competency in this paper.

Competency frameworks help governmental and non-governmental organizations keep track of the type of skills their employees/general public need in the short and long term. Educators use these frameworks to update existing curricula and develop appropriate learning objectives. On the other hand, business leaders and human resource professionals use these frameworks for their recruitment practices.

Today's existing competency frameworks do not sufficiently represent roles and competencies of a responsible AI practitioner. For example, O*NET is United State's national program for collecting and distributing information about occupations [9]. O*NET-SOC is a taxonomy that defines 923 occupations and they are linked to a list of competencies. Searching the taxonomy for "ethics", "machine learning", "data", "security", and "privacy" leads to minimal results such as "information security analysis", "data scientist and "database architect". The dataset do not include occupation titles such as machine learning engineer/researcher or data/AI ethics manager.

ESCO, the European skills, competencies, qualifications, and occupation is the European and multilingual equivalent of US's O*NET [21]. ESCO contains 3008 occupations and 13890 skills. Searching for the above terms leads to more relevant results such as computer vision engineer, ICT intelligent system designer, policy manager, corporate social responsibility manager, ethics hacker, data protection officer, chief data officer, and ICT security manager. However, emerging occupations relevant to AI and AI ethics have not been well-represented in these established, Western competency frameworks.

As a response, a number of new AI competency frameworks have recently been developed. One such enabler is the series of projects funded by the Pôle montréalais d'enseignement supérieur en intelligence artificielle (PIA), a multi-institutional initiative in Montreal, Canada aimed to align educational programs with the needs of the AI industry. Six projects related to AI competency frameworks were funded – including the work presented in this paper. This resulted in an overarching AI competency for postsecondary education that includes ethical competencies [13], and a competency framework specific to AI ethics skills training [16]. Bruneault et al., in particular, created a list of AI ethics competencies based on interviews of university instructors/professors already teaching courses related to AI ethics across North America.

Our work complements these collective efforts by providing a framework that represents the needs of the industry expressed in recent AI ethics-related job postings and the realities of the jobs AI ethics practitioners hold in nonprofit and for-profit corporations today.

3 METHODOLOGY

Practitioners and scholars of different domains typically create competencies frameworks using a process most appropriate for their needs. However, many follow a version of the process highlighted by Sanghi [49]. The steps of the process are: 1) Define the purpose and performance objective of a position, 2) Identify the competencies and behaviors that predict and describe superior performance in the job, 3) Validate selected competencies, 4) Implement/integrate competencies and 5) Update competencies.

In this work, we focus on answering questions raised in the first two steps about the objectives of *responsible AI practitioner* roles and skills/qualities required to perform well in these positions. We take a two-pronged approach to understand the nature of emerging roles under the broad category of *responsible AI practitioners* in the industry. Firstly, we reviewed and analyzed job postings related to our working definition of *responsible AI practitioner*. Secondly, we interviewed individuals who are responsible AI practitioners in the industry today. We then synthesized data collected from these two sources through thematic analyses. We present our proposed competency framework in Section 4. This study was approved by the Research Ethics Board of our academic institution.

3.1 AI Ethicist Job Postings Review

We collected and analyzed 94 publicly available job postings over the period of March 2020 to March 2022. The job postings included a range of job titles, including researcher, manager, and analyst. The following sections describe the process for collecting, selecting, and analyzing these job postings that led to the development of the ontology of responsible AI practitioner roles and skills.

3.1.1 Collection of job postings. To collect "AI ethicist" job postings, we searched and scraped three job-finding websites, including LinkedIn, indeed.com, and SimplyHired, every two months from

March 2020 to March 2022. We used the following search terms: AI ethics lead, Responsible AI lead, AI ethics researcher, data OR AI ethicist and fairness OR transparency researcher/engineer. Considering that search results only showed a few relevant job postings, we also collected job postings that came through referrals, including mailing lists such as FATML, 80000hours.org, and roboticsworldwide.

After scanning all the resulting job postings with the inclusion criteria, we gathered a total of 79 job postings for thematic analysis. We included the job postings that were published within our data collection period, were situated in the industry (including not-for-profit organizations), and outlined responsibilities with regards to implementing AI ethics practices in a given sector.[1]

3.1.2 Analysis. Using Braun and Clarke's thematic analysis methodology [15], we analyzed the job postings with the coding scheme illustrated in Table 1. The lead author created this coding scheme after reviewing all the postings. The coding scheme was also informed by frequently used categories across competency frameworks explained earlier in section 2.3.

The codes were generally split into four key elements: the company environment, responsibilities in the given occupation, qualifications, and skills. The codes of "company environment" and "qualifications - interdisciplinarity" are unique to this coding scheme due to their prevalence in the postings' content.

After developing the first draft of the coding scheme, a student researcher was trained to use this scheme and coded 10% of the job postings. The student researcher's analysis using the coding scheme was consistent with the lead researcher's analysis of the same set of job postings. The discussion between the lead and student researcher helped clarify the description and examples for each code. However, there were no new codes that were added to the scheme. The lead author updated the coding scheme and coded the entire set of postings using the new scheme.

Table 1: Coding scheme for Job Posting Analysis

Code
Company environment
Occupation
occupation - non-technical roles
occupation - technical roles
occupation - title
Qualifications
qualifications - education
qualifications - experience
qualifications - interdisciplinarity
Skills/competency
skills/competency - attitudes/values
skills/competency - knowledge
skills/competency - language skills
skills/competency - skills

[1]The table outlining the inclusion and exclusion criteria is in the supplemental material.

3.2 Expert interviews

The job postings provide a high-level analysis of the required skills and competencies expressed by recruiters; however, they may not represent the reality of these roles. Therefore, we conducted 14 interviews with experts who currently hold responsible AI practitioner positions in the industry. The focus of the interviews was on understanding the responsibilities, qualifications, and skills necessary for these roles. Considering the objective of this research project on the type of roles and skills, we did not acquire any demographic information about the participants in these roles. This also ensured that we can maintain the anonymity of these participants considering that a limited number of people hold these positions.

3.2.1 Recruitment. We compiled a list of potential interview candidates through (a) referrals within the authors' professional network and (b) we used similar search terms as the ones highlighted for job postings to look for people who currently hold these positions. Moreover, we also considered people from the industry who had accepted papers at relevant conferences such as FAccT and AIES in 2020 and 2021. The suitable participants:

- worked for a minimum of three months in their role;
- held this position in the industry or worked mainly with industrial partners;
- held managerial, researcher, technical positions that are focused on implementing responsible AI practices within the industry.

We did not interview researchers or professors in academic institutes and only interviewed those holding positions at nonprofit and for-profit companies. While we only used the search terms in English to find interview participants for practical reasons, we did not limit our recruitment efforts to a geographical region given the limited number of individuals holding these roles across the industry. We recruited and conducted interviews from June 2021 - February 2022.

3.2.2 Interview protocol. The primary researcher conducted all fourteen interviews. All of the interviews were 45 to 60 minutes in length. The interviewer first described the project and obtained the participant's consent. The interview was semi-structured with ten questions focused on exploring the following four topics:[2]

- Background and current role
- Situation your work, projects in AI ethics
- Skills, knowledge, values
- Looking into the future

3.2.3 Data Analysis. We recognize that this research reflects our positionality and biases as academics in North America. Furthermore, the data we collected were all in English and they were representative of job postings and positions in companies situated in North America and Europe. We were not able to collect data on job postings and candidates representing existing efforts in Asia and the Global South. Furthermore, we recognize that the roles in this field are continually shifting. Therefore, this ontology is only a snapshot of the roles and skills that responsible AI practitioners have and are recruited for today. Further iterations on these types of frameworks will be necessary in the future as these roles evolve.

[2]The detailed interview protocol is included in the supplementary material.

Finally, this study focuses on examining responsibilities, qualifications, and skills required of today's practitioners independent of their demographic factors (e.g., gender, age). We recognize the importance of representing a demographically diverse group of individuals and their experiences in qualitative research such as ours. Once responsible AI practitioners become a common occupation held by many, future studies should include demographic factors as part of similar investigations.

3.3 Author reflexivity and limitations

We recognize that this research reflects our positionality and biases as academics in North America. Furthermore, the data we collected were all in English and they were representative of job postings and positions in companies situated in North America and Europe. We were not able to collect data on job postings and candidates representing existing efforts in Asia and the Global South. Furthermore, we recognize that the roles in this field are continually shifting and see this ontology as only a starting point for understanding the roles that responsible AI practitioners take and their necessary skills. We emphasize the need to have further iterations on these types of frameworks. Finally, this study focuses on examining responsibilities, qualifications, and skills required for such roles independent of the demographics of individuals who are currently holding these roles. We recognize the importance of having a demographically diverse group of individuals across many occupations and suggest that future studies also examine issues around demographic diversity in roles related to responsible AI.

4 PROPOSED COMPETENCY FRAMEWORK FOR RESPONSIBLE AI PRACTITIONERS

From our analysis, we developed a preliminary competency framework that captures seven classes of existing occupational roles and several emerging classes of occupations. Figures 2 and 3 show how each occupation type was represented in the job postings and interviews. Three of the occupations require technical expertise (researcher, data scientist, and engineer), two require policy expertise (researcher, policy analyst), and the remaining two are managerial (manager, director). In the following sections, we provide a detailed description of the responsibilities, skills, qualifications, and qualities for each of these roles.

4.1 Researcher (technical)

The most common class of occupations found in the job postings was that of a researcher focused on technical aspects of fairness, explainability, safety, alignment, privacy and auditability of AI systems (24 job postings, 2 interviews). Employers represented in this dataset were looking to hire researchers at varying levels of seniority (assistant, associate and principal). The main responsibilities of these researchers are split into four main categories: conducting research, communicating their findings, working with other teams (internally and externally), and developing novel solutions for identified problems. As expected, research directions set by these researchers need to support company-specific needs, and there is an emphasis on communication between researchers and product, legal and executive teams.



Figure 2: Distribution of occupations represented in the job postings dataset



Figure 3: Distribution of occupations represented in the interviews

Skills. The researchers in this group need to have a mix of technical skills (i.e. software engineering and programming languages such as Python), research skills (i.e. analytical thinking and synthesis of complex ideas), and leadership skills (i.e. leading and guiding fellow researchers). The dataset from the job postings emphasized equally all these skills, and more senior positions emphasized leadership skills. A senior researcher explained that they look for "different research skills" depending on the project; however, they generally look for *"some background in machine learning, statistics, computer science or something of that nature"* and hire candidates that have some *"interdisciplinary background"*. The data from the postings and the interviews show a strong emphasis on good verbal and written communication skills. Participants highlighted the ability to publish in academic venues and some emphasized the ability to communicate with different audiences internally (i.e. product teams and executives) and externally (policy-makers and executives). A technical researcher emphasized the importance of

"convincing stakeholders" and creating *"strategic collaborations"* by communicating with practitioners with "diverse" backgrounds.

Qualifications. The job postings mainly aim to attract candidates who have a PhD in computer science or a related field. Few of the job postings accept a master's in these fields, whereas some do not highlight a specific degree and mainly focus on necessary skills and knowledge. The majority of postings have a heavy emphasis on the required experience. Interview participants also emphasized the importance of experience. A research manager expressed that they are not necessarily looking for a *"PhD in computer science"*. They are looking for candidates with experience in *"leading and executing a research agenda"*, working with different people and teams, synthesizing and *"communicating challenging concepts"*, and practicing software engineering. Some postings highlight experience with implementing AI ethics-related concepts. However, this was often listed as a preferred qualification rather than a required one. Similarly, researchers we interviewed, echoed the importance and value of having a publication record in *"Fairness, Accountability, Transparency, and Ethics (FATE) communities"* such as ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT) and AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society (AIES).

Interpersonal Qualities. The most common attitude/value was the aptitude and interest to *collaborate and work in an interdisciplinary environment*. A researcher emphasized that the current conversations are "engineering focused" and they actively incorporate perspectives from *social science and philosophy by collaborating with experts in these areas*. The most desired value was *"curiosity to learn about [responsible AI] problems"*. Many of the participants highlight other values and attitudes such as *"passion"* towards building safe and ethical AI systems, *willingness to manage uncertainty and challenges*, *creativity*, and *resourcefulness*.

4.2 Data scientist

The data scientist occupation is represented in 10 job postings in our dataset, and none in the interviews. The job postings seek to fill traditional data scientist roles with an added focus on examining responsible AI-related issues. The common responsibilities outlined for these positions are a) to collect and pre-process data, and b) to develop, analyze, and test models – these are typical of existing data science roles. However, the job postings emphasize the position's responsibility to test machine learning models for AI ethics concerns such as fairness and transparency. Data scientists who work in the responsible AI domain have additional non-conventional roles. These roles include understanding and interpreting existing regulations, policies, and standards on the impact of AI systems and testing the systems' capability for elements covered in these policies. They also need to work with technical and non-technical stakeholders to communicate findings, build capacity around responsible AI concepts and engage them as needed.

Skills. The job postings put a heavy emphasis on advanced analytical skills and the ability to use programming languages such as R, Python and SQL for basic data mining. The ability to learn independently in a new domain and master complex code base is also listed as one of the key skills. A few of the postings list project management and organizational skills; however, this is not common. When it comes to the knowledge required, the focus shifts from the technical domain to an understanding of fields such as sociology, critical data studies, and AI regulations. Many postings highlight that potential candidates need to be familiar with concepts such as AI/ML auditing, algorithmic impact assessments, assessment of fairness in predictive models, explainability, robustness, and human-AI interaction. Technical knowledge, such as understanding transfer-based language models and logistic regression model development, is also highlighted in the posting. Lastly, the job postings outline the need for strong interpersonal, verbal, and written communication skills. However, experience publishing and presenting at academic venues is not mentioned.

Qualifications. The majority of the job postings require a bachelor's degree in quantitative fields such as data science and computer science and prefer higher degrees (master's or Ph.D.). Companies are looking for candidates who have experience in data science, software engineering, and worked with large language models. Moreover, they are looking for experience in putting responsible AI principles into practice, evaluating the ethics of algorithms, and having basic familiarity with law and policy research. The ability and experience to translate AI ethic principles into practice are heavily emphasized throughout these job postings.

Interpersonal Qualities. The job postings emphasize the ability to work with people from different backgrounds. However, these job postings do not include a comprehensive list of values. A few postings mention being a self-starter, working collaboratively to resolve conflict, and caring deeply about the data used to train ML models as key attitudes. Being flexible, innovative, curious, adaptive, and passionate about tackling real word challenges are also some of the sought-after values.

4.3 Engineer

The engineer occupation is represented in 8 of the job postings. None of our interview participants belong to this category. The key responsibility of an engineer practicing AI ethics is to help establish a safety culture and system within an organization by developing technical tools. They are tasked with developing a workflow for modeling and testing for issues such as bias, explainiability, safety, and alignment of AI systems. As part of this, engineers need to create code bases that could be used across the AI system development pipeline based on existing and evolving best practices.

Skills and Qualifications. Job postings for engineers place a significant emphasis on experience-based qualifications and skills. The companies represented in this dataset are looking for skills and experience in software development, dataset production pipelines, researching fairness and safety implications of ML systems, and the development of large language models. They are also looking for experience working in a fast-paced technology company. Based on these qualifications, the main set of skills are programming and AI/ML development skills and this needs to be supported by knowledge and familiarity with foundational concepts in AI/ML, fairness, explainability, system's safety, and safety life cycle management. Lastly, most of the job descriptions do not have a heavy emphasis on communication skills. Only a few mention excellent written and oral communication skills as a requirement.

Interpersonal Qualities. In contrast to the lack of emphasis on communication skills, these postings have a particular focus on the attitude and values of ideal candidates more so than any other occupation category. These attitudes include being result-oriented, willingness to contribute as needed (even if not specified) and keen to learn new concepts. They are looking for people who value working on challenging problems and care about the societal impact of their work.

4.4 Researcher (Policy, design, science and technology studies, social sciences)

The second most frequent category of postings belongs to researchers that focus on topics such as policy, sociotechnical issues, and governance (14 job postings, 3 interviews). We created a separate group of positions as their responsibilities, skills, and qualities are sufficiently different from the technical researcher position. Candidates in this category need to conduct research, perform ethics or impact assessments of AI systems, act as a liaison and translator between research, product, policy, and legal teams, and lastly, advise on policy, standards, and regulations-related matters internally and externally. When conducting research, two different focus areas come up in the job postings: testing and evaluating AI system to inform policy and researching existing policies/regulations, and translating them into practice.

Skills. The job postings highlight two sets of distinct skills for this group of researchers. Firstly, these researchers require a basic level of programming, advanced analytics, and data visualization skills. Few positions highlighted the need for even more advanced ML and AI skills. It is noteworthy that despite these researchers' focus on policy, governance and sociotechnical issues, the postings still require them to have some data analytic skills. Secondly, these researchers need to have excellent facilitation, community-building, and stakeholder engagement skills. These two skills need to be complemented by strong leadership and management skills. The job postings heavily emphasize strong communication skills for this group of researchers. Besides the conventional skill of presenting and publishing papers, this group of researchers need to effectively work across different functionalities and disciplines. On a similar trend, these researchers need to have expertise in a variety of areas. They need to have a good understanding of *"qualitative and quantitative research methods"*, reliably know the current and emerging *"legal and regulatory frameworks and policies"*, be *"familiar with AI technology"* and have a good knowledge of practices, process, design, and development of AI technology. This is a vast range of expertise and often *"very difficult to recruit"* for as highlighted by our expert interviewees.

Qualifications. Just over half of the job postings list a Ph.D. in relevant areas as a requirement, including human-computer interaction, cognitive psychology, experimental psychology, digital anthropology, law, policy, and quantitative social sciences. Two postings require only a bachelor's or a master's in the listed areas. Similar to the technical researcher occupation, some positions do not specify any educational requirements and only focus on experience and skills. Our expert interviewees in this category are from a range of educational backgrounds ranging from a master's in sociotechnical systems, a law degree combined with a background in statistics, and a master's in cognitive systems.

Besides experience in research, companies are looking for experience in translating research into design, technology development, and policy. A researcher explained that they need to do a lot of "translational work" between the academic conversation and product teams in companies. A good candidate for this occupation would have *"project management"*, *"change management"*, *"stakeholder engagement"*, and *"applied ethics"* experience in a "fast-paced environment". All four of these skills do not appear in all of the job postings and interview discussions. However, a permutation of them appears throughout the job posting data and participants' responses.

Interpersonal Qualities. As emphasized strongly in both of the datasets, ideal candidates in this category need to have a *"figure-it-out somehow"* or *"make it happen"* attitude as explained by a participant. They are *"driven by curiosity and passion towards"* issues related to responsible AI development and are excited to engage with the product teams. Participants noted that ideal candidates in these roles are *"creative problem solvers"* who can work in a *"fast-changing environment"*.

4.5 Policy analyst

Policy analyst occupation is the least represented [1 expert interview, 4 job postings] in our data sources; however, considering the consistent list of competencies, we decided to include it within the proposed framework. The role of a policy analyst is to understand, analyze and implement a given policy within an organization. Moreover, they need to engage with policymakers and regulators and provide feedback on existing policies.

Skills and Qualifications. A policy analyst needs to have proven knowledge of laws, policies, regulations, and precedents applicable to a given technology when it comes to AI ethics-related issues. Moreover, all of the job postings highlight the importance of familiarity with AI technology. According to the job postings, a good candidate would have experience in interpreting policy and developing assessments for a given application. They also need to be skilled in management, team building, and mentorship. This finding echoes remarks from expert interviews. Even though none of the job postings specify an educational degree requirement, the expert we interviewed was a lawyer with a master's in technology law.

Interpersonal Qualities. The job postings in this category heavily emphasized values and attitudes. A good analyst needs to have sound judgment and outstanding personal integrity. They should be caring and knowledgeable about the impact of technology on society. Moreover, they enjoy working on complex multifaceted problems and are passionate about improving governance of AI systems. The expert interviewee's perspective closely matches these attributes. Participants elaborated that they needed to be *"brave"* and *"step up to ask questions and challenge status quo consistently over a long time"*. As expected communications skills are considered critical for success. The expert interviewee significantly emphasized the importance of *"networking as a key factor"* in succeeding in their role.

4.6 Manager

We analyzed 7 management-related job postings and 5 expert interviewees in this category. The product managers take the role of incorporating responsible AI practices in the product development process. In contrast, program managers are often leading and launching a new program on establishing AI ethics practices within the organization. These programs often involve building an organization's capacity to manage responsible AI issues.

Skills. For both streams of management, the potential candidates need to have strong business acumen and a vision for the use/development of AI technology within an organization. Some of the key management skills highlighted in the job postings include the ability to manage multiple priorities and strategically remove potential blockers to success. Another sought-after skill is the ability to effectively engage stakeholders in the process. Expert interviewees also echoed the importance of this skill as their roles often involve getting people *"on board with new ways of thinking and creating"*. According to the job postings, good candidates for management need to have a practical understanding of the AI life cycle and be familiar with integrating responsible AI practices into a program or a product. Our interviewees note that they continuously need to *"learn and keep up with the fast-paced development of AI"*.

Qualifications. Not many postings have highlighted educational qualifications and instead focused on experience qualifications. However, the main educational qualification is a bachelor's degree with a preference for higher degrees. The postings have primarily highlighted a degree in a technical field such as computer science or software engineering. Interestingly the interviews reflect a different flavor of educational backgrounds. All of the experts we interviewed had at minimum a master's degree and the majority of them completed their studies in a non-technical field such as philosophy, media studies, and policy. However, these individuals had acquired a significant level of expertise in AI ethics through *"self-studying"* and *"engaging with the literature"* and the responsible AI *"community"*. For example, two of the participants trained in technical fields and had a significant level of industry experience. Similarly, they had learned about responsible AI through their own initiative.

On the other hand, the job postings heavily focus on *experience*, including a significant amount of technical know-how, experience focused on ML development, product and program management , and implementation of ethical and social responsibility practices within fast-paced technology companies. The interview participants had been *"working in the industry for some time"* before taking on these management roles. However, their range of experiences do not cover all of the required experiences outlined in the job descriptions. As expected, excellent communication skills are noted in the job descriptions and strongly echoed by the experts as well. The job postings do not necessarily elaborate on the nature of communication skills; however, the experts note that the *"ability to listen"*, *understand*, and sometimes "*persuade different stakeholders"* is key in such roles.

Interpersonal Qualities. Few of the job postings make remarks about attitudes/values and highlight that managers need to value designing technology for social good and cooperation with other stakeholders. A good candidate for management should foster a growth mindset and approach their work with agility, creativity, and passion. All of the participants expressed their passion for developing ethical technology and indicate that they took a lot of initiative to learn and contribute to the field within their company and externally before they could take on their management roles.

4.7 Director

The job descriptions dataset has 4 postings for director positions and 2 of the expert interviewees have directorship roles. According to the job postings, director responsibilities include at least three of the following: a) lead the operationalization of AI ethics principles, b) provide strategic direction and roadmap towards enterprise-wide adoption and application of ethical principles and decision frameworks, and c) build internal capacity for AI ethics practice and governance. Depending on the nature of the organization and its need to incorporate AI ethics practices, these responsibilities vary in scope. For example, a director within a technology start-up will only be able to commit *"limited amount of time to operationalizing AI ethics principles and building internal capacity"* compared to a director within a larger technology company.

Skills and qualifications. According to the job postings, the key skill for being a director is having the ability to build a strong relationship with a broad community that helps define and promote best practice standards of AI ethics. An ideal director can effectively pair their technical skills/know-how with their management skills and policy/standards knowledge to develop strategic plans for the company. Experience in directing and leading teams, particularly in social responsibility practices within technology companies is highly valued for such positions. Only one job posting specifies an educational (a bachelor's related to policy development and implementation). Others only highlight experience. The two interviewees hold master's degrees in business and information systems respectively. They also had extensive industry experience that was not directly in AI ethics. However, their experience involved *"translation of policy within a technology application"*.

Interpersonal Qualities. As expected, according to the job postings a good candidate for directorship needs to have exceptional written and verbal communication skills, need to be able *"to articulate complex ideas"* to technical and non-technical audiences, *"engage and influence stakeholders"* and *"collaborate with people from different disciplines, and cultures"*. This set of skills was reflected in our expert interviews. Both interviewees emphasized how they maintain a good flow of communication with the employees and how they remain always open to having conversations on a needs basis. This allowed them to build trust within the company and pursue moving forward with their strategic plan. The job postings highlight the ability to earn trust in relationships as a sought-after value for a directorship role. A director should also be able to *challenge the status quo, be passionate about good technology development, be comfortable with ambiguity*, and *adapt rapidly to changing environment and demands*. Most importantly, a director needs to have *"a strong and clear commitment to the company values"* as they set the tone for others within the organization.

4.8 Emerging occupations

Besides the abovementioned classes of occupations, we found a few other positions that do not map easily to any of the existing categories. Considering the limited number of these positions, they do not justify a category of their own. However, we note these emerging roles to understand how they might shape up the responsible AI profession. These occupation titles include data ethicists (2 in job postings), AI ethics consultants (2 in interviews), dataset leads (2 in job postings), communication specialist (1 in job postings), safety specialist (1 in job posting) and UX designer (1 in job postings). The following describes the main function of these positions:

- Data ethicist: manage organizational efforts in operationalizing AI ethics practices through policy and technology development work. This role has similarities to the role of a policy analyst and data scientist.
- AI ethics consultant: apply their expertise in AI ethics to solve pain points for consulting clients.
- Dataset lead: curate datasets while accounting for fairness and bias-related issues.
- Safety specialist: use and test large language model-based systems to identify failures and errors.
- AI ethics communication specialist: write communication pieces that focus on AI ethics issues.
- UX designers: design user interfaces with ethics in mind.

4.9 Future of the responsible AI profession

Our interview participants shared a variety of responses to the question "what will the future of their job be like?". Some participants thought that eventually, *"everyone in a company will be responsible"* for understanding ethical and social issues of AI as part of their job. In this scenario, everyone would need to have the appropriate knowledge and skillset to apply responsible AI practices in their work or at least know when they need to ask for advice from internal or external experts.

On the contrary, many participants expressed that *"dedicated roles"* need to be recruited. These participants elaborate that recruitment for these roles is and will *"continue to be challenging"* as it is difficult to find people with interdisciplinary backgrounds and established industry work experience. Many of the managers we interviewed have chosen *"to build teams that come from different disciplinary backgrounds"* and provide *"professional development opportunities"* on the job. However, they also described that hiring people into these roles is challenging since corporate leaders are not always willing to invest a lot of resources in AI ethics. This often can lead to *"exhaustion and burn-out"* for individuals who currently hold these roles - this is especially true for small and medium-sized technology companies. According to participants, this will likely change with a progressive shift in the regulatory landscape.

5 DISCUSSION

Educators and employers play a pivotal role in shaping a responsible AI culture. In our efforts to create a competency framework that outlines the range of roles for responsible AI practitioners, we find that such frameworks can not only guide corporate leaders to recruit talent but also help grow their responsible AI capacity.

We find that the ability to work in an interdisciplinary environment, communicate and engage with diverse stakeholder groups, and the aptitude for curiosity and self-learning are consistently highlighted for all of the roles. This emphasizes the need to foster an environment where students and existing employees in different roles are encouraged to adopt interdisciplinary approaches/collaboration and explore responsible AI content.

In this section, we articulate how an interdisciplinary environment can be fostered, the importance of organizational support for responsible AI practitioners, and the need to proactively monitor the rapidly changing occupational demand and landscape for these roles.

5.1 Being able to work in an interdisciplinary environment is critical

Our results show that many of the responsible AI practitioners today come from non-traditional, non-linear, and interdisciplinary educational and work backgrounds to their current positions. The educational and work experiences of these participants span a multitude of fields and allowed them to develop a strong set of skills in navigating disciplinary boundaries and understanding problems from diverse perspectives. The participants often described their role as a *translator* and *facilitator* between different groups and disciplines within the organization. For instance, they remarked that a concept such as fairness, transparency, or ethically safe has completely different meanings depending on the personal and professional backgrounds of their audience. The participants often needed to translate what these concepts mean across different disciplinary boundaries (i.e. statistics and law).

Notably, while the job postings asked for a diverse array of skills and qualifications from multiple disciplines, those who hold such positions today are often specialized in one or two disciplines. However, they had been exposed to and worked across multiple disciplines in their professional career. The most important asset that our interviewees emphasized was being able to work across disciplinary boundaries. The candidates who successfully hold such positions are *not "ethical unicorn, full stack developers"* [45]. However, they have honed the skills necessary to translate and create solutions to responsible AI issues across multiple disciplines. Building on existing proposal to improve responsible AI practices [19, 35, 48] and education [26, 43], we posit that AI team leaders need to pay a special attention to hiring individuals with the capability to create, critique and communicate *across multiple disciplines*. Consider Furthermore, educators can get inspiration from education models in highly interdisciplinary fields such as healthcare and create curricula/spaces where students work with peers from different academic backgrounds [20, 29, 32].

5.2 Responsible AI practitioners are advocates - but they need organizational support

We find that responsible AI practitioners are often highly driven and motivated to make a positive impact. These individuals often hold a strong sense of valuing social justice and want to ensure that AI technology is developed in a way that is good for society's well-being. One of the most consistent ideas that came through in the interviews is the attitude that the participants had toward

their careers. Many of the interview participants took the time to immerse themselves in learning new topics and expressed that they were self-motivated to do so. This is especially true for the individuals who are taking some of these first positions in the industry. When looking at the career trajectory of many of the participants, we observe that they often created their own roles or came into a newly created role. Moreover, these individuals often needed to start their own projects and create relationships with others in the organization to measure their own progress and establish credibility.

Similar to any emerging profession many of the participants act as champions for ethical and safe development of AI. They are often working in an environment that questions and challenges the need for considering AI ethics principles. As some of the participants remarked, they often have to answer questions such as "*why do we need to pay for ethics assessments?*", *"what is the value of considering AI ethics in a start-up?"*, or *"why should we put in the time? what is the value added?"*. This act of advocating for AI ethics is even more challenging when existing regulations do not have proper enforcement mechanisms for responsible AI practices [19]. Many of the participants assume the role of an advocate and often use their excellent communication skills to build relationships and capacity within their organization.

For the successful implementation of responsible AI practices, it is important that business leaders pay attention and support the advocacy efforts of these practitioners. Many of today's responsible AI practitioners are working with limited resources [40], have critical responsibilities [47], and are experiencing burn-out [30]. Whenever possible, leaders in AI companies need to create appropriate incentive structures, provide the necessary resources and communicate the value of establishing responsible AI practices to their employees so that these practitioners have the necessary support for the effective execution of their responsibilities. Recognizing the nature of these roles, educators can learn from existing methods [17, 22] and integrate leadership training into their curricula when addressing responsible AI-related content.

5.3 Educators and employers need to monitor and plan for the rapidly changing landscape of responsible AI roles

The nature of occupations in the AI industry is continually growing and shifting. The rapid technological development [3, 37], upcoming regulations [7] and global economic conditions [27, 33] impact how companies recruit and retain responsible AI expertise. Furthermore, there is a need for new educational efforts and programs for preparing new graduates to take on responsible AI practices. The proposed ontology provides a synthesis of roles that have emerged in responsible AI practice and it can serve as a planning tool for corporate leaders and educators.

Corporate leaders can use this ontology to build internal capacity for individuals who currently hold researcher, data scientist, engineer, policy advisor, manager, and director roles in their institutions. Depending on these companies' responsible AI needs and resources, business executives can work towards creating interdisciplinary teams for establishing responsible AI practice by recruiting individuals with the competencies outlined for each of these roles. Besides recruiting and fostering for responsible AI competencies, these leaders need to communicate the importance of these practices and start by creating the appropriate organizational incentives and resources for adapting responsible AI practices. Government and non-governmental organizations could support such efforts, particularly small and medium-size companies, by formally recognizing such roles in their taxonomies of occupations [9, 21] and providing resources [12].

Current computer science and engineering education focuses primarily on teaching professional ethics [43]. There is minimal focus and resources on cultivating skills and knowledge required for cultivating the skills that focus on ethics in design [26]. On the other hand, there is a lack of clarity of how much students in social and political sciences need to work on their technical acumen to become skilled responsible AI practitioners [45]. Educators could use the list of competencies to develop a set of learning objectives and examine the efficacy of different teaching pedagogies in supporting these objectives. Moreover, Educators can use the competency framework as a tool for acquiring resources for further curricula and program development.

Notably, the proposed ontology primarily focuses on type of roles, responsibilities and skills without addressing other important factors in recruitment and education efforts such as diversity of individual who get to learn about responsible AI issues or take such roles in the industry. Therefore, it is critical that users of this ontology, consider factors that are not captured in the scope of this ontology. Furthermore, considering the rapidly changing conversation around responsible AI practices, the type of roles in this onotlogy will shift and expand. We invite the community of researchers , practitioners and educators to reflect on these roles and build on this ontology.

6 CONCLUSION

With the increased regulatory activities in the industry, companies have the incentive to ensure responsible AI development. In this work, we found seven different type of roles and their corresponding responsibilities, skills, qualifications, and interpersonal qualities expected in today's responsible AI practitioner. We propose a preliminary competency framework for responsible AI practitioners and highlight the importance of creating interdisciplinary teams and providing adequate organizational support for individuals in these roles.

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Effective Enforceability of EU Competition Law Under AI Development Scenarios

a Framework for Anticipatory Governance

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines whether competition law enforcement can remain effective under different AI development scenarios over the coming years. Economic and political power has become increasingly concentrated into a few AI companies, such as Big Tech. The growth of generative AI could further reinforce this concentration of power in Big Tech. The market power of these companies, and increasingly their involvement in AI, is a major focus for regulators such as the European Commission. Recent EU antitrust fines on Google alone run in the billions. The dynamism of technology markets such as AI can make it difficult for regulators to take effective action. If AI continues to develop rapidly over the coming years, propelled by the proliferation of generative AI, this ability to effectively enforce antitrust law may be further challenged. To help ensure regulators remain effective, EU competition law has been bolstered by a new tech-tailored, ex ante competition regime. These are likely to be critical tools to shape the market power of Big Tech but are largely untested. Exploring how these regulatory tools can be most effective in governing future AI development is a timely question for regulators, lawyers, companies, and citizens. This paper examines this question by considering the 'effective enforceability' of EU competition law and the Digital Markets Act under different AI development scenarios. By 'effective enforceability' of EU competition law we mean how well it achieves its policy objectives. We consider four factors: jurisdictional scope, potential loopholes, effectiveness of detection, and ability to remedy/sanction breaches. However, there is significant uncertainty as to how AI will develop in the coming years. Considering this, we propose an analytical framework based on five variables: key inputs, speed of development, AI capability, number of actors, and the nature/relationship of actors. In some of these scenarios, we argue EU competition law would struggle to address the power of the largest AI companies; but in many other scenarios it remains a powerful tool. This is a critical juncture for competition regulators. They stand at the dawn of emerging challenges presented by generative AI. With this paper, we hope to contribute to anticipatory governance at this important intersection of legal governance and technology.

Effective and future-proof competition law enforcement is crucial to ensuring this potentially transformative technology has widely distributed benefits, rather than concentrating power in a few hands.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies Artificial intelligence;**; • **Social and professional topics Computing / technology policy; Commerce policy; Antitrust and competition.**;

KEYWORDS

Antitrust, competition law, anticipatory governance, AI development scenarios

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1 INTRODUCTION

Competition law (also known as antitrust) is a key tool to govern concentration of economic power to ensure the market functions competitively for the benefit of consumers and citizens. However, competition law enforcement may be profoundly challenged by progress in developing artificial intelligence (AI) and the proliferation of generative AI systems [1], [2]. The most prominent generative AI system, ChatGPT, shows how their spread can be rapid and their potential impact could be immense. An ongoing challenge is how regulators best keep up with these developments.

The scope of this paper focuses on the European Union (EU) competition regime and how that regime may apply to different AI development and deployment scenarios. We start by providing a brief overview of EU competition law principles and why it is likely to be enforceable against entities that are most likely to develop AI in future. In the substantive part of the paper, we consider the extent to which competition law is enforceable across (2) different AI development and deployment scenarios. We define 'AI' as digital systems that can performing tasks commonly thought to require intelligence, with these tasks typically learned via data and/or experience. 'AI systems' refer to a software process (with the characteristics of AI mentioned above), running on physical

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hardware, under the direction of humans operating in some institutional context [3, pp. 4 and 62]. Generative AI is a category of AI system that uses machine learning that generates a wide range of output (images, text, audio) based on data it was trained on. Their USP is their adaptability to a wide range of tasks.

We seek to contribute to the literature in three main ways. First, this paper focuses on the 'effective enforceability' of competition law to future AI development and deployment under different scenarios. Competition law is likely to be an important instrument (and perhaps the most important regulatory tool) in shaping the behaviour of 'AI actors': those that develop and deploy AI systems. However, effective enforceability is already challenging, and may become harder: in certain AI development scenarios – it may be harder for regulators to detect and sanction breaches. While we use EU competition law as our focus (looking at abuse of dominance, merger control, state aid and anti-competitive agreements), EU competition law has jurisdiction over foreign companies that are active in the EU, such as US Big Tech (indeed these companies have been the focus on EU competition law enforcement in recent years). Also, most of our analysis can apply to US antitrust [4]. Moreover, we envisage that our findings around the enforceability of competition law can also be extrapolated to the question of enforceability of law and regulation more broadly.

Second, we outline different scenarios for analysing AI development and deployment in future, based on a number of technical and strategic variables. In previous literature, scenario-mapping has focused on a more limited set of variables relating to technical model or number of developers [5, p. 170]. We envisage this will offer a nuanced framework of analysis for anticipatory governance more broadly.

Third, we intend our legal analysis of the implications of the effective enforceability of competition law to be useful for 'AI governance': the broad field that attempts to ensure systems are developed and deployed ethically, safely, securely and with broadly distributed benefits - in a word, 'responsibly' [6], [7]. Both the synergies and tensions between AI governance and competition law are potentially significant, yet currently underexplored [8], [9]. This memo builds on work at this intersection [10], [11]. We hope that this will be useful to both fields, and indeed encourage collaboration across these fields.

By identifying the areas where competition law enforcement may be less effective, we hope to contribute to anticipatory governance and help make competition law more 'future-proof'. This is essential to ensure that enforcement can keep up with complex and fast-moving technologies such as generative AI. Effective competition law enforcement, now and in future, is crucial to ensuring the benefits of this transformative technology are widely distributed.

2 FRAMEWORK OF LEGAL ANALYSIS

2.1 Effective enforceability' of Competition Law

'Effective enforceability' is a term that we introduce to refer to how effective competition law is in achieving its objectives. In relation to EU competition law, that objective as set out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is to prevent restrictions on and distortions of competition in the internal market [12]. The four main areas of competition law that may apply across our AI scenarios include abuse of dominance, merger regulation, collusion/cartel, and state aid.

Effective enforceability can depend on a wide variety of factors. For present purposes, we will focus on the following: (1) whether the conduct in question falls within the jurisdictional scope of competition law and is not protected by sovereign immunity rules, for example; (2) if the law is written and applied by the courts in a way that is in line with the legislators' intentions. An example of where the law is not aligned with legislator's intentions is where behaviour that a legislator would have intended to be a breach slips 'through the net' due to the presence of a lacuna, ambiguity or loophole in the rules [13], [14], or laws that fail to keep up with market developments and therefore end up being too lax/too strict in light of changes) [15], [16]; (3) regulators have the independence and the resources and expertise to effectively detect and bring a case against the breach (this may involve monitoring behaviour and assessing the market power of companies) [17, pp. 34–47], [18, p. 10]; and (4) competition law can effectively remedy and sanction the breach in a way that addresses the harm. In other words, whether competition law can restore competition in the market and change behaviour, both by punishing the company that breached the rules, and deterring others from unlawful behaviour [18].

2.2 Development Scenarios

The trajectory that AI development and deployment will take in the coming years is highly uncertain. Generative AI seems to have transformed the AI landscape in just a few months and its full impact is still difficult to predict. There is little agreement about the key input into AI development, the future speed of development, what levels of capability we will reach, the number and nature of the key 'AI actors' or the geopolitical environment they will operate in.

Nevertheless, we can draw from techniques which have been well-developed since the 1970s in futures, long-range technological forecasting, and scenario-planning and -mapping [5], [19], [20], [21, pp. 443–464], [22]. We can capture our uncertainty on particular dimensions in a set of variables. Each of these variables can have several possible values and lie on a spectrum. When we assign values to each of these variables, we can describe particular scenarios for future AI development.

Our five variables are grouped into technical variables, which relate to the technical features of the AI systems and non-technical variables, which relate to factors beyond the AI systems themselves: the number of developers, who those actors are and the geopolitical context they operate within

We expand upon each of these variables below. For each variable, we first describe the spectrum, and second consider the 'effective enforceability' of competition law across its spectrum. Our analysis depends on simplified hypothetical scenarios, where the variables change but everything else is kept constant. Of course this does not reflect complex market realities and competition analysis is very fact-specific and will depend on the particular legal and economic context in each particular case. Therefore, our analysis is necessarily based on a number of assumptions, but nevertheless draws out some informative high-level themes and 'direction of travel'. They are

Table 1: Effective enforceability of competition law across five variables

Type	Variable	Less Enforceable	More Enforceable
Technical	Key inputs	Talent and Data	Compute
Technical	Speed of development	Fast progress	Incremental progress
Technical	Capability	Higher capability	Lower capability Non-Technical
Non-Technical	Number of actors	More actors	Fewer actors
Non-Technical	Nature and relationship	States and 'shielding scenarios'	Private actors and 'weaponising scenarios'

not and should not be treated as detailed forecasts. In summary, our findings are as follows:

3 JURISDICTIONAL REACH AND ENFORCEMENT POWERS OF THE EU COMPETITION REGIME

EU competition law is a powerful tool today in shaping market behaviour, particularly in the technology sector. In a world being transformed by AI, EU competition law is also likely to be a powerful tool. There are several reasons for this.

Competition law has wide jurisdictional reach and applies to any company that has an effect within the EU, regardless of whether it is incorporated in the EU or not [23]. The European Commission (or EC, the EU-wide regulator that enforces and EU competition law) is institutionally strong, influential and well-resourced, and often seen as a world-leader in influencing competition law globally [24]. Its strong procedural and investigative powers allow it to effectively detect and evidence an infringement, as well as to impose fines and remedies to change behaviour and market structures.

Competition law also has a long history of being used for political or industrial strategy purposes. For example, in the EU, the clearest political influence on competition policy is single market integration, which is one of the aims in the TFEU. Competition law plays an essential part in breaking down internal barriers to trade within the EU and ensuring the freedom of movement of goods, services, workers and capital [25, Para. 7]. Given its prominent role in pursuing the objectives of the EU, the Commission holds significant influence within the overall EU apparatus and has real 'teeth' in enforcing competition law [26].

Importantly for looking at governance of AI companies, in November 2022 the EU passed the Digital Markets Act (DMA), an *ex ante* regulatory regime for markets dominated by large digital platforms that act as gatekeepers. The regime represents a far-reaching expansion of the EC's regulatory power in digital markets, and will significantly increase regulatory scrutiny of large gatekeeper platforms (i.e. Big Tech) from a competition perspective. The DMA seeks to drive contestability and fairness in markets and does not have an explicit focus on AI. However, given Big Tech are also the key AI companies today and for the foreseeable future, the DMA has important implications for AI governance [27, p. 7]. The DMA will potentially strengthen the effective enforceability of competition law vis-a-vis any AI company due to a broader scope of prohibited conduct and grounds for regulatory intervention, more effective monitoring and detection of breach, and quicker and wider range of sanctions.

4 TECHNICAL VARIABLES

For each variable we (1) describe the spectrum and (2) analyse how the effective enforceability of competition law might vary for different values across that spectrum.

4.1 Key inputs into AI development

Three key inputs drive advances in AI: algorithmic innovation, computational resources (hardware or 'compute'), and data [28], [29]. A company with talented experts can develop better algorithms, it can use superior compute to run a bigger model or train a model for longer, and it can use more data to train a model more effectively. This is a spectrum - these three inputs are all important, and complementary. We note that in real life, the amount of these key inputs that a company has is not the only determinant of success. Other critical factors may include, for example, good organisational management leading to wise or efficient deployment of resources or cultural fit and business practices [30], [31]. Other factors can constrain *deployment*, such as pre-existing 'internet of things' infrastructure. However, in common with other analyses, we present a simplified model based around these three inputs for the purposes of this present analysis.

All three are important, yet we can conceive of *one* of these inputs being the most constrained and therefore a bottleneck. We can envisage this as three percentages which have to sum to 100%. For example, innovation and talent could be constraining progress by 10% each while compute is 80% of the constraint, in which case compute would be the bottleneck. In such an example, many companies could be limited at the production possibility frontier by the supply and/or cost of compute, and progress in the state-of-the-art would be disproportionately attributable to running larger experiments. At the extreme, one of these inputs could be constraining development 100% - and so the others would be 0%. This can also be envisaged as the ratios of measurements of input constraint, such as: 80:10:10.

The key input driving AI advancements could be relevant as part of the assessment of market power. An assessment of market power is particularly pertinent in an abuse of dominance or merger control scenario, where market power is a key factor. A company that has unique access to a key input may be deemed to have market power as a result [32], [33]. In competition law, market power or dominance is the ability for an undertaking to 'behave independently' of market pressure from competitors and consumers, which is detrimental to consumer welfare [34, Para. 10]. If a company is deemed to have market power and to abuse that market power under Article 102, a regulator may seek to address that through



Figure 1: Spectrum showing extent to which each major input is a constraint on AI development (in % or ratio)

fines and an order to bring the infringing conduct to an end [35, Art. 7(1)]. Competition law remedies may also include access remedies, sharing that key input e.g. through granting competitors use of that key input; or structural remedies, structurally separating parts of the business that hold that key input so that the separated part of the business acts as a separate company, an independent market participant in competition with the incumbent [36].

The effective enforceability of competition law may depend on the type of key input that is the bottleneck: data, algorithmic innovations or compute. For example, if the key input is *data*, it may be challenging to assess the market power that flows from that data. As noted, this is particularly important in a merger or abuse of dominance analysis. Under competition law, data has been assessed as a source of market power in the *Microsoft/Linkedin* merger for example [37]. And under the DMA, one of the criteria for determining whether a platform is a 'gatekeeper' is whether it has 'data driven advantages' [27, Art. 3(8)(c) and (d).]. However, it may be more challenging to assess the market power from data compared to compute because it is not purely a quantitative exercise i.e. 'the more data, the more market power'. The market power that a company can derive from data will also depend on factors such as how recent the data is, the uniqueness of the data, the quality of the data, what the permitted uses of the data are (e.g. what are the scope of consents), whether it can be used to generate more synthetic data, etc. It is therefore an imprecise and highly complex exercise that may present two difficulties. First, in assessing the correct threshold for e.g. finding dominance – in other words how much is too much data? Second, in monitoring or detecting a breach – how can a regulator show that the data a company holds is enough to cross the threshold for dominance?

In addition, where a key input is the bottleneck that confers market power to a company, a competition regulator may order an access remedy in a merger or abuse of dominance context. An access remedy typically involves granting direct or indirect competitors access to an essential technology or infrastructure, or ensuring the interoperability of the access seeker's products or services with the key services, products and platforms of the defendant undertaking [38]. Access remedies are also one of the key components of the DMA, for example [27, Art. 6(10)]. However, effective enforceability may be challenged by difficulties with remedies granting data access to competitors, that are widely discussed today, such as tensions with data protection law [33]. Competition law itself may also be an obstacle, if the data contains commercially sensitive information. Competition law frowns on sharing such information between competitors.

If the key input is algorithmic innovations developed by talented staff, similar challenges to effective enforceability arise. This is because the amount of 'talent' that a company has is difficult to measure in terms of market power – rather, you would look at the product of that talent e.g. large and sustained market share, perhaps due to the superior algorithms that one's pool of computer engineers were able to design. It is therefore difficult to define the scope of the law – in other words, what would be the threshold of talent above which you have market power?

The availability of remedies may also be more limited. For example, a regulator may wish to address the dominance of a company by ordering a divestment in a merger scenario, which could either create or strengthen a competitor to the incumbent. Talent is more difficult to transfer from one entity to another via competition law remedies, relative to data or compute [36, Para. 55]. Indeed, competition law recognises that there is a talent 'flight risk' of divestment of parts of a business and takes that into account when assessing the appropriateness of a remedy. Where talent is the key input, therefore, competition law may be a less effective tool to increase competition relative to data and compute [30].

In comparison with data and talent, *compute* could be the bottleneck, and success in AI markets could rely on access to a large amount of computing power. We see this in the cloud compute capacity of Big Tech, and the 'compute partnerships' struck between OpenAI and Microsoft, and Anthropic and Google Cloud. If compute is the bottleneck, then effective enforceability of competition law may be higher, as it is likely to be easier to regulate relative to data or talent [3], [39]. This is because compute is more easily measured and quantified, and the amount of compute that is necessary to train a certain type of AI system is more easily defined relative to, for example, how much talent is required to design such a system [40]– [42]. Market power may be easier to measure. As a remedy, compute may also be more easily 'transferred' or distributed compared to talent or data: e.g., a remedy could require divesting particular data centres. By comparison, as discussed above, the transfer of talent often leads to a flight risk, and the transfer of data carries obstacles such as data privacy rules that may limit the sharing of information. This could make structural remedies easier in either a merger or abuse of dominance context. It may also be easier to order an access remedy involving compute relative to data and talent, though there have been no cases of this so far.

4.2 Speed of development

This variable refers to the speed of AI development, measured in terms of the length of time between an arbitrary set of benchmarks. For example, progress on chess-playing in the late twentieth century was slow, with progress occurring over decades [43, pp. 604–609]. However, progress in large language models over the last two years can be measured in months – with not just the state-of-the-art being rapidly replaced, but entire benchmarks having to be replaced with harder ones [44]. AI could be developed rapidly or through more



Figure 2: Speed of development spectrum



Figure 3: Spectrum of AI capabilities available to an AI actor

incremental, sequential and piecemeal development, or anywhere on the spectrum between these two extremes [45]. Speed could also vary throughout the development process: it could be slow in low capability systems and faster in higher capability systems; could have occasional shocks with large and long plateaus in between; or could slow in higher capability systems as bottlenecks or diminishing returns are encountered.

Competition law, and regulatory enforcement more generally, will likely be weaker the faster the speed of development. A key question is whether there is 'equality of arms' between the regulator and the private AI actor. When there is that equality of arms, competition law is more likely to be enforceable because the four factors that allow for effective regulatory enforcement are more likely to be met. However, this is a less likely outcome, as the private sector is generally ahead in terms of technological capability and know-how, due to differences in salaries and skills [46]. Regulators may be less able to understand the technological specifics that give rise to market power or breaches. So, for this variable we refer to the speed of development of private actors and assume that the state and regulators lag behind.

Enforceability may be more difficult in a rapid scenario for five reasons. First, new technologies may breach the law in novel ways that should be caught by existing rules but instead fall through the cracks or give rise to loopholes/lacunae in the law. Legislative changes or court jurisprudence help to evolve the substantive law to keep up, but these also take time and may be significantly outpaced by the market.

Second, in a more procedural sense, it may be harder to detect and monitor competition law breaches, because the market is moving so fast that regulators may struggle to make sense of what the developments are, and how they might be breaching competition law in potentially novel ways [47]–[49]. For example, new forms of market power may emerge that competition law struggles to characterise as market power, echoing similar discussions today with regard to how such terms have been redefined by the rise of digital platforms and data [15].

Third, the regulator may struggle to bring a case quickly enough to address the harm – a case can take a number of years, and the regulator may decide it is not worth it because the market will have moved on by that time anyway.

Fourth (and relatedly), a fine several years down the line may not be enough to restore competition because e.g. competitors have already been forced to exit the market. Alternatively, the perpetrator firm may have already made windfall profits over several years to make the conduct worthwhile. The slowness of sanctions and remedies may be an issue across mergers and antitrust enforcement. Antitrust cases can take many years to conclude and appeals extend that further [50]. A famous example is *Google Shopping*, an Article 102 case, which took over seven years to reach an EC decision, a further 4 years to reach an appeal decision in the General Court, and is currently pending appeal to the European Court of Justice [51].

Fifth, rapid development and deployment could also lead to the AI actor enjoying a monopoly-inducing effect, because it pulls ahead whilst others are further behind both technologically and financially. This could increase regulatory capture concerns, reducing the effective enforceability of competition law further.

These are already challenges that competition regulators face today in regulating the tech sector, which is complex and fast-moving. How to address these challenges is a topic that competition regulators all over the world are currently grappling with and is a key driver behind introducing the new *ex ante* regulatory regime for tech platforms.

In a more incremental scenario, these problems are still likely to exist – after all, they are present in technology markets today. However, they should be present to a lesser extent. The more incremental pace of change means that the rules and regulators are less likely to fall behind, and enforcement is more likely to be sufficiently swift to address the harm. In short, the more rapid the AI development and deployment, the greater the risks to effective competition law enforcement.

4.3 Capability levels of AI systems

Another variable is capability – what are the AI capabilities available to AI companies? By 'capability' we refer here to the state of technological capabilities: the tasks and 'work' that can be accomplished by an AI system or collection of systems [52], [53]. Capability is a broad spectrum. Currently, AI systems outperform humans in some narrow tasks. This range may increase over the coming years, if capabilities continue to improve. At the top end is the speculative possibility of artificial general intelligence (AGI): AI systems that outperform humans at most economically valuable work [54], [55]. We do not discuss this possibility, but use it instead to mark one extreme of the spectrum.

All else being equal, competition law enforcement is more likely to be effective when the AI capabilities available to AI companies are lower. In todays world, regulatory authorities are broadly able to govern the behaviour of private actors, save the usual concerns around regulatory capture and regulatory effectiveness [56]–[58]. But if the AI capabilities available to companies improve, there would likely be more scope for private actors to use them to evade competition law. Let us take a hypothetical where one private actor has developed and deployed more advanced AI systems than others including especially the competition regulator.

First, that actor may use AI systems which behave in new ways that are not yet condemned under competition law but should be, because that conduct is in fact anti-competitive [14]. The actor may hold market power or abuse that market power in a way that is sufficiently complex that it is not easily measurable or recognised by the law's prevailing analytical toolkit. For example, regulators

have struggled to characterise the harm to consumers when the service (such as search or social media) is free to the user. This might be particularly applicable in a merger or abuse of dominance scenario, such that a merger review does not find a significant impediment to competition because there is sufficient remaining competition in the market, or does not find that the actor has a dominant position for the purposes of Article 102. Two AI actors using their novel AI systems in novel ways could fall within a jurisdictional lacuna, either outside of merger review in the first place, or receiving clearance but nevertheless being harmful to competition (e.g. because of legal loopholes). Alternatively, the conduct of the AI system may technically be acting in breach of the law but does so in a way that is concealed or difficult to monitor, such that the regulator cannot detect the breach [59], [60]. This may be the case for some kinds of algorithmic collusion. More speculatively, the AI actor may be able to evade investigation or detection by using its AI capabilities to conceal its conduct from detection e.g., using large language models to produce many false documents which conceal its participation in a cartel.

Second, Big Tech are already amongst the richest companies in the world, and developing and deploying AI systems may generate yet more profits and power. If that wealth is generated in a less perceptible way, for example very quickly, or in a distributed manner across many markets, it could be harder to detect or lead to regulatory capture, therefore reducing the ability or willingness of regulators to bring a case [6, p. 9], [61, pp. 39–40]. Furthermore, the AI actor may be so well-resourced that any fines have less of a deterrent effect or ability to change its behaviour, though fines can be up to 10% of global turnover [62]. At the most extreme, a custodial sentence is possible (though rarely used) for breach of competition law, for example under UK cartel law for the most serious infringements. However, it could be difficult to attribute criminal liability to a human for decisions shaped by AI systems. Another deterrent effect for competition law enforcement is not the sanctions themselves, but the time and effort spent defending the investigations, and reputational harm. Well-resourced actors may be more willing and able to absorb that time, effort and reputational harm.

On the other hand, AI actors that develop and deploy AI systems with potentially significant market power or societal impact could attract substantial public attention, 'backlash' and focus. This could then shift the relative amount of scrutiny that competition regulatory authorities feel they should, can, or are called upon to exert over these companies.

5 NON-TECHNICAL VARIABLES

In addition to technical variables, different sociopolitical variables can also characterize different scenarios for the development and deployment of AI, with different effects on the effective enforceability of competition law.

5.1 Number of Actors

The extreme endpoints of this spectrum are monopolistic or multipolar. At the monopolistic or unipolar extreme, a single actor is the clear leading developer or deployer of AI. At the contrasting extreme, there may be a multipolar AI situation, with multiple (ten to a hundred) actors developing and deploying AI with comparable levels of capability. In between, we could consider a 'mildly multipolar' or oligopolistic scenario, with a more defined group of around five to ten actors.



Figure 4: The spectrum of number of actors developing and deploying AI

There are several factors that may shape whether we develop towards the monopolistic or multipolar ends of the spectrum. Some commentators have argued that AI generally tends towards natural monopolies because of first-mover advantage including the ability to capture resources like data, hardware and talent; positive reputational effects; creating switching costs for consumers; and network effects [6, p. 9]. This could be reinforced by the tendency for 'winner-takes-all' in AI markets [63], [64, pp. 10–46], so that only one actor (or only a few) will develop AI. However, we do not make a claim as to where on the spectrum is most likely, except to note that current developments in generative AI seem likely to reinforce the market power of Big Tech rather than opening up competition more widely.

Note that we will use the terms 'monopolist', 'oligopolist' or 'competitor' to refer to an actor developing or deploying AI. This is neutral on the nature of that actor, that is whether it is a company or state. The considerations we analyse are relevant no matter the nature of the AI actor, which we turn to in the next section.

Effective enforceability may be higher in a monopolistic scenario relative to a multipolar scenario. In short, a multipolar scenario is likely to result in a more competitive market (to the extent that the AI actors are active on the same market), relative to a monopolist scenario where the monopolist actor likely faces little or no effective competition in the markets in which it is active. Antitrust authorities should find it easier to detect and establish that the monopolist has market power for the purposes of bringing a successful antitrust claim. Acquisitions by that monopolist may also be subject to more stringent merger control assessment compared to a multipolar scenario. This is because it is more likely to trigger the jurisdictional thresholds that allow the European Commission to review the merger in the first place, given the thresholds take into account the sizes of both buyer and target. Further, the potential lack of competition in the market compared to a multipolar scenario may make it more likely that a merger is prohibited because it is found to be anti-competitive, or only cleared subject to remedies [36, Paras 4–5], [65, Art. Article 2(3)]. The test is whether the merger can be expected significantly to impede effective competition, in particular through the creation or enhancement of a dominant position [65, Art. Article 2(3)].

However, one potential outcome of a monopolistic scenario is that AI will lead to concentration of wealth and power in the hands of the actor that develops it [6], [61, pp. 9 & 39–40]. If there is only one monopolist substantial control of AI, the implications for enforceability are similar to the previous section (Capability). In summary, a monopolist may have (1) the AI capability to act in a way

Table 2: Six scenarios for Private and State AI Actors and their Relationship

Scenario	Actor Type	Relationship
1	Private & Private	Cooperative
2	Private & Private	Competitive
3	State & State	Cooperative
4	State & State	Competitive
5	State & Private	Cooperative
6	State & Private	Competitive

to evade detection, or behave in new and novel ways that are not yet condemned under competition law (but should be, because they are in fact anti-competitive), or benefit from loopholes; (2) financial resources to implement extreme regulatory capture, allowing the monopolist to act more autonomously from any law; and/or (3) the financial resources to 'absorb' any financial sanctions, so fines have less of a deterrent effect or ability to change its behaviour.

5.2 Nature and relationship of actors

This section will consider the nature and relationship of actors developing and deploying AI, and how it affects effective enforceability. The *nature* of the actors is important. Both private actors (such as companies) and states (i.e. governments and militaries) are developing and deploying AI. An actor that is a state or linked to a state may not be subject to EU competition law if it can rely on various defences based on its sovereign status. These defences could mean the AI actor falls outside the jurisdiction of EU competition law, so that EU competition law would not apply to that AI actor. Note, however, that the lines between state and company could blur, as we discuss below. The *relationship* between a state AI actor and private AI actor is important to the question of (1) whether competition law enforcement is possible i.e. capability to enforce whether competition law enforcement is likely i.e. incentive to enforce. There are a number of permutations, but we will focus on a few that have interesting implications for competition law enforcement.

In the table below, we note six scenarios. They vary depending on whether the actor(s) are companies/private actors or states, and whether the relationship between the actors is competitive or cooperative. Where a relationship is cooperative, two actors work together to achieve a common objective, which in turn serves their mutual self-interest. In a cooperative relationship, the stronger one party is, the stronger the other party is. Where a relationship is competitive, it is a zero-sum game such that one party's gain is equivalent to another's loss, and the weaker one party is the stronger the other is.

In the first two scenarios (1 and 2), we have two private AI actors in a cooperative and competitive relationship respectively. Competition law will potentially be applicable to these private AI actors from a jurisdictional perspective as long as they affect competition in the EU (subject to other variables such as speed and capability being equal). This is because each actor is likely to constitute an 'undertaking', defined by the EC as an entity carrying out an economic activity: it offers goods or services, it bears risk and there is the potential to make profit.

The third and fourth scenarios (3 and 4) have two state actors in a cooperative and competitive relationship respectively. The important difference between scenarios 1 & 2 and scenarios 3 & 4 is that it may be more difficult to enforce competition law against a state actor because of a lack of jurisdiction. A state may seek to rely on the 'state act doctrine' under public international law, which refers to the international law principle that a foreign court should not opine on the international activities of sovereign foreign states. However, acts that are commercial in nature do not benefit from state immunity, and a practical difficulty arises in distinguishing clearly between situations where a foreign State is involved in commercial activities and where it is acting in its sovereign capability [66].

In scenario 3, the two state actors are in a cooperative relationship. In this scenario the geopolitical context is relatively stable, and there is more likely to be respect for international institutions and international law. Therefore, while competition law would likely continue to be effectively enforceable alongside international law and the two are not mutually exclusive, in practice international law would likely be the more appropriate tool to bring about a desired outcome between the two state actors. This is because competition law is not easily applied to state actors because of state immunity rules, as explained above.

On the other hand, scenario 4 involves two state actors in a competitive relationship. This represents a more fraught geopolitical situation, where there could be a breakdown in respect for the international legal order. In this scenario, competition law may be a useful alternative tool to international law, despite jurisdictional challenges, because it has stronger enforcement power (for example, large financial sanctions) compared to international law. International law is generally more difficult to enforce because the lack of a central enforcement agency means that international law depends on soft power and diplomatic pressure rather than concrete sanctions [67]. Competition law may be 'weaponised' (see below), for example, to take action against private actors that support states. However, where the geopolitical situation becomes very antagonistic, even the ability of states to enforce competition law may break down, despite its relative resilience. In an antagonistic scenario, states may prefer to take an economic hit for the sake of protecting high stakes political or security interests. States may also turn to more direct and radical action such as imposing export controls, such as those the US announced in October 2022. These new controls ban the exports of high-end semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing technologies to China. The restrictions prevent leading US AI chip designers such as NVIDIA and AMD from selling their high-end chips for AI and supercomputing in China. Not only do the prohibitions cover exports from American firms (most notably NVIDIA and AMD), but also apply to any company worldwide that uses US semiconductor technology, which covers most of the world's leading chipmakers. However, such drastic action carries high potential risks of retaliation.. This costly 'bill of decoupling' [68] suggests that such escalation is more likely to be a last resort. Before that stage, states may prefer more nuanced and less incendiary actions such as competition law enforcement

that retain the 'business as usual' framework of the international legal order.

In the fifth scenario (5), the private actor and state are in a cooperative relationship. A cooperative scenario may tend to arise where somehow the two have mutual or aligned interests. It may be more likely to occur between a home AI actor and a domestic private actor – but it is still possible that a cooperative relationship arises with a private actor in an aligned foreign state.

In a cooperative scenario between a home state and domestic private actor, the state may seek to 'shield' the private actor from foreign states trying to 'weaponise' competition law to weaken that domestic private actor. In that scenario, we could see the home state AI actor using certain retaliatory actions such as blocking legislation to protect the domestic AI actor from foreign competition law enforcement [69]. In that case, cross-border competition law cases may not be effectively enforceable.

In a cooperative scenario with a home state and a domestic private actor, it seems possible that the state could subsume the private actor. This may be implemented through nationalisation, which refers to the process of transforming private assets into public assets by bringing them under the public ownership of a national government or state. Another possibility is that whilst not being completely nationalised, the AI companies have strong links to their state government, such as Huawei and ZTE's purported links to the Chinese government [70], [71]. In scenarios where the private actor is either formally nationalised or de facto subsumed by the state i.e. it is effectively state-controlled, it may be difficult to apply competition law given sovereign defences may apply. If the private actor is formally nationalised, it should more straightforwardly benefit from 'state act doctrine' and argue that it is acting in the exercise of public authority power, rather than acting in a commercial capability (although it can be very difficult to distinguish the two). If a private actor is de facto subsumed but not formally nationalised, it may be more difficult to argue that it is not acting in a commercial capability. However, the private actor may be able to rely on the state compulsion doctrine i.e. that a company was compelled to act in a certain way by a state. In this scenario, the private actor may be immune from EU competition law [72]. In short though, there are several ways that a private actor could be shielded from EU competition law, as long as it has the cooperation of its home state.

Finally, in scenario 6 we have one private actor and a state in a *competitive* relationship. A competitive scenario could emerge where the state feels threatened by the power, behaviour, or systemic effects of the private actor, and/or where a domestic private actor is resisting a cooperative relationship or nationalisation. A competitive relationship may be more likely to arise if the two actors are a state and a private actor in a foreign state. One might assume that a state is more likely to be in a cooperative relationship with a domestic private actor. However, this is not always the case: see for example Chinese government's crackdown on some of its most successful tech companies on Ant Group, Alibaba and Didi using competition law and a number of other legal grounds.

In a competitive relationship between a private actor and a state, the state may wish to weaken the private actor, and competition law may be one tool to do so. Competition law may be 'weaponised' against the private actor either by a home state or a foreign state. We use the term 'weaponisation' of competition law in this paper to refer to the application of competition law that are driven by policies that lie outside the classic objectives of competition law to protect the process of competition and maximise consumer welfare. In addition, weaponising of competition law may be particularly relevant in cases where there is a foreign state who does not have substantial AI capacity and who thus seeks to gain access to the technology of a foreign private AI actor who may be active in its territory, or to weaken it in favour of its home-grown AI companies. Competition law may be a particularly useful tool in this scenario because simply expropriating the assets is likely to create a significant diplomatic dispute, and likely to be far less favourable than bringing a claim under a somewhat legitimate guise.

An adversarial home state may even wish to partner with an aligned foreign state to control or weaken its own domestic private actor. In these scenarios, states may band together to counter the strength of the private actor(s). Competition law may be one way to do this: for example, see the 'copycat' antitrust action against Big Tech from the US and EU [73], [74].

6 CONCLUSION: A FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL ANALYSIS AND ANTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE

The future of AI development and deployment over the coming years is highly uncertain. There are several dimensions of uncertainty, both technical and socio-political. Across these different possible future scenarios, it is unclear to what extent competition law (and other kinds of legal and governance tools) will be effectively enforceable. But as recent developments in generative AI demonstrate, it is crucial that regulators look forward to future scenarios in order to put anticipatory governance structures in place that can adapt and remain effective under a range of scenarios.

In this paper, we have attempted to reduce that uncertainty. We laid out five variables upon which future scenarios can be placed: key inputs, speed, capability, number of actors, and nature and relationship of actors. We examined how different values along these variables could affect the effective enforceability of the four main types of competition law (abuse of dominance, merger regulation, cartels and state aid), through the challenges they might pose to competition law enforcement through jurisdiction, exploiting loopholes, avoiding detection and being difficult to remedy. We encourge more work to be done to ensure competition law can remain future-proof across various a range of potential AI development scenarios.

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The Bureaucratic Challenge to AI Governance: An Empirical Assessment of Implementation at U.S. Federal Agencies

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ABSTRACT

Can government govern artificial intelligence (AI)? One of the central questions of AI governance surrounds *state capacity*, namely whether government has the ability to accomplish its policy goals. We study this question by assessing how well the U.S. federal government has implemented three binding laws around AI governance: two executive orders—concerning trustworthy AI in the public sector (E.O. 13,960) and AI leadership (E.O. 13,859)—and the AI in Government Act. We conduct the first systematic empirical assessment of the implementation status of these three laws, which have each been described as central to US AI innovation. First, we track, through extensive research, line-level adoption of each mandated action. Based on publicly available information, we find that fewer than 40 percent of 45 legal requirements could be verified as having been implemented. Second, we research the specific implementation of transparency requirements at up to 220 federal agencies. We find that nearly half of agencies failed to publicly issue AI use case inventories—even when these agencies have demonstrable use cases of machine learning. Even when agencies have complied with these requirements, efforts are inconsistent. Our work highlights the weakness of U.S. state capacity to carry out AI governance mandates and we discuss implications for how to address bureaucratic capacity challenges.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Social and professional topics → Government technology policy**.

KEYWORDS

AI policy, policy implementation, regulation, bureaucracy

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1 INTRODUCTION

Can government govern AI? Many commentators have discussed the *normative* question of government intervention into the market [80, 86, 93, 98, 103]. We address a distinct, but related, empirical question that highlights the bureaucratic challenge to AI governance: Is there sufficient *state capacity* to achieve the goals of AI governance when such goals have already been set in law?

Many scholars, policymakers, and commentators point to the transformative potential of AI [23, 125]. Seeking to capture the benefits of the "Fourth Industrial Revolution" or "third wave of the digital revolution," countries are prioritizing efforts to reorganize their public and private sectors, fund research and development (R&D), and establish structures and policies that unleash AI innovation [37, 73, 112, 143]. In the United States, the White House and Congress have promoted AI innovation and its trustworthy deployment by increasing R&D investments, exploring mechanisms to increase equitable access to AI-related resources through a National Artificial Intelligence Research Resource, funding National AI Research Institutes throughout the country, dedicating $280 billion—through the CHIPS and Science Act—into domestic semiconductor manufacturing and "industries of tomorrow," and coordinating AI policy in the National AI Initiative Office within the White House [10, 32, 40, 49, 53, 54, 69, 72]. While many have rightly applauded the Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights and the associated actions across the federal government [44, 48], implementing that framework ultimately requires government agencies convert guidance and principles into practice.[1]

Federal AI initiatives raise at least three interrelated questions that are relevant to the academic literature and that implicate questions about policy effectiveness. First, as a question of *regulatory paradigm*, we might ask about the proper role of the state vis-à-vis industry and civil society actors, especially given the deep information asymmetries that plague state-based regulatory initiatives [98]. Second, conditional on the chosen paradigm, we might also ask about the proper *policy instrument*, implicating familiar debates over the specificity of rules in comparison to standards [82, 96] or the proper target of rules [90] given the policy context. Third, after policy instruments are determined, we could assess the *capacity* of bureaucracies to effectuate those actions' purpose [81, 115].

We contribute to this scholarship through a systematic assessment of the federal government's progress in implementing three important binding laws that are seen as central to U.S. leadership in trustworthy AI.[2] Through extensive research, we study (i) the AI in

[1] Similarly, the NIST AI Risk Management Framework, released in January 2023, is helpful guidance but must be voluntarily adopted [55].
[2] For discussion of U.S. federal AI policy documents from 2016-20, see [129].

Government Act of 2020 [19, 28], which aimed to provide resources and guidance to federal agencies on AI; (ii) the Executive Order on AI Leadership (E.O. 13,859) [12], which mandated government-wide efforts to promote AI R&D, AI competitiveness, and public trust; and (iii) the Executive Order on Trustworthy AI in Government (E.O. 13,960) [25], which encouraged government adoption of AI to benefit the public and promulgated trustworthy AI principles.[3] Collectively, the AI in Government Act, the AI Leadership Order, and the Trustworthy AI Order are critical pillars to the U.S. strategy on AI[4] and to envisioning an ecosystem where the U.S. government leads in AI and promotes trustworthy AI [71].

While much progress has been made, our findings—from a systematic examination conducted between late October and mid-November 2022—are sobering and highlight longstanding concerns about bureaucratic capacity. The goal of these laws to foster a responsible AI innovation ecosystem is threatened by weak and inconsistent implementation across the administrative state. First, fewer than 40 percent of all 45 requirements across the three pillars could be publicly verified as implemented at the time of our examination, including major requirements to advance AI innovation and trustworthy AI. Second, the implementation of Agency AI Plans, which are intended to provide information about the agency's approach to AI regulatory activities and to foster the agency's strategic planning around AI, has been poor. Around 88 percent of agencies that are likely subject to the requirement to submit Agency AI Plans under the AI Leadership Order failed to do so by late 2022.[5] Third, roughly half or more of agencies had not published an inventory of AI use cases, as required under the Trustworthy AI Order and in contradiction with public transparency efforts. Given Congress has since made disclosing AI use case inventories a *statutory* requirement under the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act [77], the lack of implementation is especially concerning.

These findings suggest a lack of bureaucratic capacity compounded by issues of policy ambiguity: Agencies lack the expertise, committed leadership, and sheer personnel to strategically plan for and prioritize AI, and compliance is hindered by vague mandates and reporting lines. We thus suggest three policy recommendations. First, centralized mandates must delineate (1) which agencies and sub-agencies must comply, (2) what "AI" applications are covered, and (3) how to interpret non-responses. This places agencies on notice about their obligations and facilitates public accountability. Second, if bureaucratic capacity is to blame, Congress must provide more resources for agencies to obtain adequate technical expertise. Third, senior leadership at the White House and at agencies is needed, and senior personnel at agencies should treat these requirements not as boxes to tick but as opportunities for strategic planning around AI.

Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses related scholarship in public administration, bureaucratic politics, and transparency initiatives for public sector AI. Section 3 provides background on the three binding laws we assessed. Section 4 discusses our methodology for systematically assessing the implementation of these laws. Section 5 provides detailed findings on the implementation of the AI Leadership Order, Trustworthy AI Order, and AI in Government Act. Section 6 examines the AI Leadership Order's requirement that agencies publish Agency AI Plans in detail across 41 agencies. Section 7 assesses the Trustworthy AI Order's requirement that agencies publish AI use case inventories across 220 agencies and narrower subsets of agencies. Section 8 discusses implications and limitations and Section 9 concludes.

2 RELATED WORKS

Our study of bureaucratic implementation of AI governance speaks to four bodies of research. First, our work relates to longstanding scholarship on state and bureaucratic capacity to achieve policy goals [84, 109, 115, 121]. Prior research shows that agency performance and the realization of White House-level political goals are frustrated by organizational capacity constraints, including insufficient leadership, staff, and resources. For example, Bolton, Potter, and Thrower [81] analyzed 22,000 regulations reviewed by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within OMB and found that organizational capacity constraints, including vacant leadership positions, insufficient staff resources, and high workloads, hindered the president's ability to advance priority rules and inhibited OIRA's ability to carry out its mission.

In the AI space, agencies' struggle to attract and retain technical talent is a hurdle to the executive branch's ability to responsibly adopt and govern AI [88, 101, 102]. One estimate is that while 60% of new machine learning PhD graduates went into industry and 24% into academia, less than 2% went into government in 2020 [144]. Embedded AI expertise, as Engstrom, Ho, Sharkey, and Cuéllar [102] detailed and as other scholars noted (e.g., [88, 101, 128]), is critical for agencies' efficacy in designing, developing, and using AI tools to achieve their mission and subjecting AI tools to meaningful accountability. These concerns about bureaucratic capacity, in turn, can inform broader normative assessments of the federal government's current ability to promote trustworthy AI.[6]

Second, our research speaks to the central debate on the role of government in AI policy, where jurisdictions have diverged between taking a more "passive" role that gives space for industry self-regulation versus an "active" role through direct regulation (e.g., [98]). These debates imagine diverse roles for the state, whether as an interlocutor with industry to help develop best practice, a research funder, an adopter of responsible and trustworthy AI technologies, a direct regulator, or some combination of the above

[3] We do not focus on the National AI Initiative Act of 2020, as the National AI Advisory Commission is statutorily tasked with tracking the Initiative's progress, nor on the Artificial Intelligence Training for the Acquisition Workforce Act, as its passage in October 2022 precludes meaningful assessment of its implementation. For more on the National AI Advisory Council, tasked with "advising the President and the National AI Initiative Office on topics related to the National AI Initiative," the creation of which was called by the National AI Initiative Act of 2020, see [56, 95].

[4] The U.S. government does currently not have a "National AI Strategy" per se, but instead has a number of documents, including the three assessed in this Paper, that collectively provide strategic guidance. The National AI Initiative Office maintains a list of related legislation, executive orders, and strategy documents. See [71].

[5] The requirement is in Section 6(c) of the AI Leadership Order, [12], and OMB's guidance was published in a memorandum known as "OMB M-21-06" [138].

[6] Cf., for example, Oxford Insight's AI Government Readiness Framework [133], which assesses government AI readiness in terms of, among other indicators, "[d]igital and data skills within government."

[86, 93, 103, 136]. Such normative debates can and should be informed by empirical evidence, including about the relative advantages and capabilities of different institutional actors. For example, Black and Murray [80] comment that a central issue about who ought to regulate concerns where "trust and legitimacy" lie—whether for a transnational standard-setting organization, a corporation engaging in self-regulation, or a state-based regulatory body. Regulation has classically been justified based on the expertise of technocratic government agencies (e.g., [123]), but AI poses extreme information asymmetries between technology developers and policymakers [88, 91, 108], in addition to concerns about public-private gaps in expertise [88, 144]. For those who believe in a robust role for the state in AI governance, our work addresses a core question: whether the government has the capacity to effectively regulate AI.

Third, our work pertains to efforts for transparency around the administrative state [89, 101, 111]. Principles of transparency and accountability are foundational to administrative law (e.g., [87, 101]). In the U.S. context, much scholarship has examined transparency initiatives such as the Freedom of Information Act, sunshine laws and hearing requirements, notice-and-comment rulemaking, and public availability of agency guidance (e.g., [87, 107, 119, 127]). Calls for greater transparency around the U.S. government's use of AI are therefore situated not only within research about the role of transparency in administrative law but also within discussions about the benefits and risks posed by agencies' use of AI (see, e.g., [88, 102]). One major question surrounds how public sector AI challenges administrative law's commitment to transparency. Coglianese and Lehr [92] argue that the opacity of AI does not pose particular barriers to administrative law. Engstrom and Ho [100], on the other hand, argue that existing administrative law doctrines may be insufficient, requiring adaptations of governance. The importance of government transparency about its use of AI necessitates a discussion about the proper lever to achieve such transparency.[7]

Last, many efforts have focused on transparency through public registries of AI use cases. Floridi [104] discusses the promise of AI registries in Helsinki and Amsterdam, noting that, the "goal is to make the use of urban AI solutions as responsible, transparent, and secure as other local government activities." Other countries, such as the United Kingdom, have adopted these AI registries [116]. At the local government level in the U.S., Bloomberg Philanthropies uses AI registries as one evaluation criterion for its "What Works Cities" Certification, which it claims is the "national standard of excellence for data-driven, well-managed local government" [68]. The City of San Jose, for instance, began an Algorithm Register in January 2023 for transparency of city services [60]. Yet the implementation of such transparency initiatives has not been straightforward. New York City's Automated Decision Systems Task Force fractured in substantial part because of a lack of consensus around what constituted algorithmic decision systems. Cath and Jansen [85] question the efficacy of the Helsinki and Amsterdam model of AI registries as a form of governance. The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) commissioned a report that compiled AI use cases across federal regulatory agencies [102], requiring a large team to determine, for instance, whether the underlying use case met a definition of machine learning. This report preceded the promulgation of the AI Use Case Inventory requirement via executive order. And because requirements differ across jurisdictions, efforts like the Northwestern Computational Journalism Lab's Algorithm Tips have attempted to crowdsource information across the federal, state, and local level [62]. AI registers have been advocated in other domains as well [132], and remain one of the critical levers for transparency. Our research examines the actual implementation of such AI registries and demonstrates that substantial policy guidance may be required for faithful implementation.

[7] Calls for transparency exist not only at the federal level but also at the state level. A proposal in California (A.B. 331), for example, seeks to require AI developers to submit impact assessments annually to the California Civil Rights Department [142].

3 LEGAL SETTING

We address this core question of bureaucratic capacity for AI governance by assessing three pillars of America's strategy for AI innovation. The two executive orders and AI in Government Act all carry the force of law, and so the executive branch's ability to implement them serves as an important litmus test for the U.S. government's realization of its AI policy goals. Moreover, these laws are billed as cornerstones of America's AI policy. By enabling America "to coordinate AI strategy" and equipping federal agencies' responsible use of AI, the AI in Government Act sought to ensure America's "competitive edge against the rest of the world in the next decade" [28]. The AI Leadership Order was similarly touted as "critically important to maintaining American leadership in technology and innovation" [16], whereas the Trustworthy AI Order "signal[ed] to the world" America's commitment to "the development and use of AI underpinned by democratic values" [11, 24]. To achieve their stated goals, the AI Leadership Order sought to drive technological breakthroughs throughout all sectors of the U.S., while the two other efforts focused on the federal government's use of AI. We describe each of the laws in turn.

Executive Order 13,859 (The AI Leadership Order). The 2019 AI Leadership Order launched the American AI Initiative to "focus the resources of the Federal government to develop AI in order to increase our Nation's prosperity, enhance our national and economic security, and improve quality of life for the American people" [11]. Specifically, it sought to accelerate the federal government's efforts to build the infrastructure, policy foundations, and talent necessary for America's leadership in AI through a multipronged approach emphasizing AI R&D, AI-related data and resources, regulatory guidance and technical standards, the AI workforce, public trust in AI, and international engagement [11, 12, 117]. Noting that a "coordinated Federal Government strategy" was necessary and that AI "will affect the missions of nearly all executive departments and agencies," the AI Leadership Order further mandated that agencies pursue six related strategic objectives for "promoting and protecting American advancements in AI." These six strategic objectives were about: (1) investing in AI-related research and development; (2) making AI resources (e.g., data, models, computing resources) available to the public; (3) reducing barriers that prevent the development and use of AI technologies; (4) ensuring that domestic and international technical standards "minimize vulnerability to attacks from malicious actors and reflect Federal priorities"; (5) building the AI workforce; and (6) developing a National Security Presidential Memorandum "to protect the advantage of the United States in

AI and technology critical to United States economic and national security interests" [12].

Executive Order 13,960 (The Trustworthy AI Order). The 2020 Trustworthy AI Order directed federal agencies to harness "the potential for AI to improve government operations" [24]. Recognizing that "[t]he ongoing adoption and acceptance of AI will depend significantly on public trust," the Trustworthy AI Order articulated nine principles for federal agencies to implement—according to guidance that would be developed by the OMB—when designing, developing, acquiring, and using AI. These principles provide that AI should be (a) lawful, (b) performance-driven, (c) accurate, reliable, and effective, (d) safe, secure, and resilient, (e) understandable, (f) responsible and traceable, (g) regularly monitored, (h) transparent, and (i) accountable [25]. To support federal AI adoption, it also mandated several actions intended to increase the number of federal employees with necessary AI implementation expertise [24]. Like the AI Leadership Order, the Trustworthy AI Order required agencies to publicly disclose certain AI-related information in an attempt to cultivate trust and understanding (see Section 7). The requirement of disclosing AI use cases was also incorporated into the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act [77], meaning Congress, too, has directed federal agencies to take inventory and disclose their uses of AI, reflecting the perceived importance of this transparency measure.

AI in Government Act of 2020. The AI in Government Act sought to "ensure that the use of AI across the federal government is effective, ethical and accountable by providing resources and guidance to federal agencies" [28]. This included the establishment of an AI occupational series, a call for formal guidance for agency usage, procurement, bias assessment and mitigation of AI, and the creation of a center of excellence within the General Services Administration (GSA) to support government adoption of AI.

4 METHODOLOGY

These three laws have been in effect for sufficient time to enable us to design a study to assess the implementation status of each line-level provision. The research was based on an extensive manual search protocol—conducted between October and November of 2022—detailed in Appendices A.1, B.1, and C.1, but we provide a concise overview of our research approach here. We note at the outset that because these laws impose public transparency and reporting requirements, we rely on public materials to conduct our searches. We undertook extensive efforts to identify relevant documents or notices of actions, but these may not capture all relevant (nonpublic) actions. Our findings still remain informative about the transparency of national AI efforts, and failures to implement by statutory or regulatory deadlines are particularly informative.

To assess overall implementation, we identified all line-level actions within the three documents (e.g., instructions that a federal entity "shall budget," "shall consider," "shall review," "shall publish"). Each line-level action was categorized as a *time-boxed requirement*, where the action was required by a specified date (e.g., publishing a report within 90 days); an *open-ended requirement*, where the mandated action did not have a specific date for completion; or an *ongoing requirement*, where the mandate did not include a specific deliverable or concrete outcome and where there was no specified deadline. It was generally straightforward to assess whether the time-boxed requirements were met, whereas other mandated actions were often more ambiguous, either due to lack of a deadline, lack of express public disclosure requirements, or both. We construed ambiguity in favor of the agencies based on an assumption that the agencies were taking the necessary steps (or at least making good-faith efforts) to implement these mandates, as explained in Appendix A.

In addition, we studied the implementation status of two specific cross-agency mandates: the requirement under the AI Leadership Order for agencies to issue "Agency AI Plans," and the requirement under the Trustworthy AI Order for agencies to post AI use case inventories. In the former, the AI Leadership Order required "implementing agencies"—defined to be agencies, as determined by the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) Select Committee on AI, with regulatory authorities and that "conduct foundational AI R&D, develop and deploy applications of AI technologies, provide educational grants, and regulate and provide guidance for applications of AI technologies"—to issue a report discussing its authorities and plans to regulate AI. The Trustworthy AI Order, by contrast, ordered all "agencies" (with exceptions only for military, intelligence, and independent regulatory agencies) to disclose their uses of AI.

Ambiguities in the scope of these executive orders—the agencies they cover and, for the AI use case inventories, the definition of "AI"—complicated assessment of their implementation. For the Agency AI Plans, we looked to agencies with regulatory authority and therefore included cabinet-level departments and agencies and the 19 agencies deemed "independent regulatory agencies" under 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5). We included the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), as it was the only agency represented at the National Security Council that was not already included as a Cabinet-level agency or as an independent regulatory agency. We also inquired with a member of the Select Committee and did not receive an answer on what agencies are included. The result was 41 agencies.

Because the AI Use Case Inventories requirement applied to agencies generally, we began with the Administrative Conference of the United States' *Sourcebook of U.S. Executive Agencies* ("ACUS Sourcebook"). From the 278 agencies identified in the ACUS Sourcebook's data spreadsheet, we removed agencies within the Department of Defense, agencies and sub-agencies within the intelligence community, and the 19 independent regulatory agencies defined in 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5), based on the exemptions in Section 8(a) of the Trustworthy AI Order. This left us with a total of 220 agencies.

In searching for AI Plans and Use Case Inventories, we took a systematic approach meant to optimize both the chance of finding the document while also providing clear and simple search processes. For each requirement and agency, we searched in four ways: (1) at a dedicated URL as mandated under the respective executive order; (2) a web search for certain words closely related to the requirements; (3) a search on the agency's website for those key words; and (4) a search in the publication libraries at AI.gov.

Full data generated by our research are included in the Appendices.

	Implemented	Unknown	Not Implemented
AI Leadership Order	39%	57%	4%
Trustworthy AI Order	13%	75%	13%
AI in Government Act	17%	17%	67%
Total	27%	58%	16%

Table 1: Summary of Implementation as of Nov. 2022.

5 OVERALL IMPLEMENTATION STATUS

While much progress has been made, we were unable to verify implementation of the majority of the line-level legal requirements. Across both executive orders and the AI in Government Act, we found that 11 of 45 requirements, or roughly 27 percent, were implemented (see Table 1).[8] The implemented requirements spanned a range of topics, including agencies' prioritization of AI R&D in annual budget proposals,[9] recommendations for leveraging cloud computing resources for federally funded AI R&D,[10] guidance on federal engagement in the development of AI-related technical standards,[11] and the establishment of a GSA AI Center of Excellence to facilitate the adoption of AI within the federal government.[12]

However, seven of 45 requirements (16 percent) were not implemented by the deadline, and the remaining 26 requirements (58 percent) could not be confirmed as either fully implemented or not implemented (see Appendix A.2). The requirements that remain unfulfilled—including creating an AI occupational series for federal employees, estimating the AI workforce gap in the federal government, policy guidance on federal acquisition and use of AI,[13] and a public roadmap on OMB's intended revisions or new AI policy guidance[14]—are significant for the country's AI ecosystem and the federal government's adoption of AI. Similarly, the implementation status is uncertain for major requirements, including efforts to make data and source code more accessible for AI R&D,[15] better leverage and create new AI-related education and workforce development programs,[16] and ensure agencies participate in interagency bodies that further the implementation of trustworthy AI.[17]

Requirements in the executive orders with deadlines for specific deliverables were implemented at a higher rate. Conversely, none of the AI in Government Act's four requirements with a deadline were implemented: the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) was to submit to Congress a plan to establish an AI occupational series by May 2021; OMB was required to issue a memorandum on AI procurement, mitigating discriminatory impact or bias, and promoting AI innovation by October 2021, with agencies publicly posting plans to achieve consistency with it by April 2022; and OPM was to create an AI occupational series and estimate AI-related workforce needs in each federal agency by July 2022. Of the implemented requirements across all three, many were late. For example, the NSTC Select Committee on AI produced the AI Leadership Order's mandated report to the president on better leveraging cloud computing for AI about 16 months past the deadline. Pursuant to the AI Leadership Order, OMB similarly issued a memorandum to agencies on regulatory approaches to AI about 16 months late, as well as a notice on the *Federal Register* soliciting public comments on how to improve public access to federal data for AI about two months after the AI Leadership Order's summer 2019 deadline.

We provide detailed findings in Appendix A.2 and a line-level tracker in Appendix E.1.

6 AGENCY AI PLANS

As noted above, a significant focus of the AI Leadership Order was "reduc[ing] barriers to the use of AI technologies to promote their innovative application" while also protecting "civil liberties, privacy, American values, and United States economic and national security" [12]. The AI Leadership Order therefore placed significant emphasis on examining the proper role of regulating AI, noting the desire to

[8] A requirement in Section 5(c)(ii) of the Trustworthy AI Order [25] had not been implemented when we did our systematic analysis, but we excluded this requirement from the overall implementation assessment because the deadline for its implementation had not yet passed.

[9] Section 4(a) of the AI Leadership Order [12] directed heads of AI R&D agencies to "consider AI as an agency R&D priority" and to take AI "into account when developing budget proposals and planning for the use of funds." Section 4(b) directed the same agencies to "budget an amount of AI R&D that is appropriate for this prioritization," particularly through the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) Program, and to identify "the programs to which the AI R&D priority will apply and estimate the total amount of such funds that will be spent on each program." This ongoing, annual requirement seems to be implemented through an annual NITRD supplement to the president's budget, progress reports on AI R&D, and a NITRD AI R&D dashboard. See [10, 13, 14, 22, 35, 64].

[10] Section 5 of the AI Leadership Order [12] directs the Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, Health and Human Services, and Energy, as well as the Administrator of NASA and the Director of the NSF, to prioritize allocation of high-performance computing resources for AI, and also directs the NSTC Select Commission on AI to work with GSA on a report to the president for leveraging cloud computing resources. The National AI Initiative Office's AI Researchers Portal includes a computer resources overview with six "Federally-supported computing infrastructure resources that are useful for AI research" identified. See [59]. The NSTC Select Committee on AI also published—16 months after the mandated deadline—*Recommendations for Leveraging Cloud Computing Resources for Federally Funded Artificial Intelligence Research and Development* as well as a complementary "lessons learned" report in July 2022. See [26, 52].

[11] Section 6(d) of the AI Leadership Order [12] directs the Secretary of Commerce through the NIST Director, with participation from relevant agencies, to "issue a plan for Federal engagement in the development of technical standards and related tools in support of reliable, robust, and trustworthy systems that use AI technologies." In August 2019, NIST published the required report. See [17].

[12] Section 103 of the AI in Government Act [19] mandates the establishment of this Center and delineates its roles; GSA has established the Center. See [139].

[13] The White House announced in May 2023 that OMB will release draft guidance on AI procurement for federal agencies in summer 2023 [114].

[14] These are respectively required by Sections 105 and 104 of the AI in Government Act [19] and Section 4(b) of the Trustworthy AI Order [25]. Note that Action 7 in the 2021 Federal Data Strategy Action Plan could arguably be construed as an implementation of the public roadmap requirement because it provides four milestones; however, it does not mention policy guidance documents (e.g., OMB Circulars) as anticipated by the Trustworthy AI Order. See [34, p. 14].

[15] Required under Section 5 of the AI Leadership Order [12].

[16] Section 7 of the AI Leadership Order [12] mandates that the NSTC Select Committee on AI "shall provide recommendations to NSTC Committee on STEM Education regarding AI-related educational and workforce development considerations" and "provide technical expertise to the National Council for the American Worker." Furthermore it directs agencies to annually communicate plans to the NSTC Select Committee on AI about AI-related fellowship and service programs. Section 7 of the Trustworthy AI Order [25] mandates that OPM "shall create an inventory of Federal Government rotational programs and determine how these programs can be used to expand the number of employees with AI expertise" and "issue a report with recommendations" for doing so that is "shared with the interagency coordination bodies…enabling agencies to better use these programs for the use of AI…"

[17] Section 6 of the Trustworthy AI Order [25] notes that agencies "are expected to participate in interagency bodies for the purpose of advancing the implementation of the Principles and the use of AI consistent with this order" and that the CIO Council "shall publish a list of recommended interagency bodies and forums in which agencies may elect to participate, as appropriate and consistent with their respective authorities and missions" to fulfill the expectation that they participate in interagency bodies to advance the AI principles.

"avoid regulatory or non-regulatory actions that needlessly hamper AI innovation and growth" [138].

Two requirements were critical to achieving this objective: (1) OMB was required to publish a memorandum providing guidance on how agencies should approach regulating AI, and (2) agencies with "regulatory authorities" were required to publicly post Agency AI Plans to "achieve consistency" with OMB's guidance. OMB's *Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on Guidance for Regulation of Artificial Intelligence Application* (OMB M-21-06 [138]), published on November 17, 2020 (about 16 months after the deadline), fulfilled the first requirement and urged a "regulatory approach that fosters innovation and growth and engenders trust, while protecting core American values." This "OMB AI Regulation Memo" described "policy considerations" to guide AI development. It (1) provided ten "principles for the stewardship of AI applications" to guide agencies,[18] (2) identified alternatives to regulation,[19] and (3) proposed actions, such as public communications and supporting voluntary consensus standards, that agencies could take to reduce barriers to the use of AI.[20]

The OMB AI Regulation Memo also provided guidance on Agency AI Plans. It required agencies to identify (a) their statutory authorities to regulate AI, (b) AI-related information that they were collecting on regulated entities, (c) statutory restrictions on their ability to collect or share such information, (d) regulatory barriers identified by stakeholder engagement, and (e) potential regulatory actions. Agencies were instructed to use an OMB-provided template, submit the plans by May 2021 (adhering to the AI Leadership Order's deadline), and publicly post their plans on their agency websites [138]. Critically, the memo did not provide guidance on which agencies were required to produce an Agency AI Plan: the AI Leadership Order's requirement applied to agencies with sufficient AI-related activities and "regulatory authorities," neither of which are self-defining or obvious.[21] We requested, but did not receive, information on the applicable agencies and have, as a result, approximated the relevant agencies as spelled out in the detailed methodology in Appendix B.1.

Out of 41 agencies assessed, only five (12 percent), posted an AI Plan using the template provided by the OMB AI Regulation Memo (see Table 2) by November 2022, even as the OMB AI Regulation Memo ordered agencies to publish them by May 2021. These agencies were the Departments of Energy (DOE), Health and Human Services (HHS), and Veteran Affairs (VA), as well as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and USAID. Thirty-six agencies have not published an Agency AI Plan. The absence of plans published by the Departments of Transportation (DOT), Commerce (DOC), Homeland Security (DHS), and Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is notable, given what is commonly understood as within their regulatory and rulemaking purview and what sub-agencies fall under them. For instance, DOT includes the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), governing civil aviation, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, which administers federal motor vehicle safety standards.

	Published	Not published	Total
Number of agencies	5	36	41
Percent	12%	88%	

Table 2: Publication of Agency AI Plans as of Nov. 2022

Examination of the five Agency AI Plans also casts doubt on whether all agencies meaningfully attempted to identify relevant regulatory authorities. (We provide a detailed summary in Appendix B.2 of the substance of these five Agency AI Plans.) The DOE's AI Plan was completed with "None" written in every section. By contrast, HHS, the VA, and EPA provided more detail within their Agency AI Plan. Although the USAID plan does not identify any statutory authorities or planned regulatory actions, its publication of an Agency AI Plan demonstrates a commitment to transparency.

HHS is a particularly instructive and exemplary case. HHS identified 11 statutes that directly or indirectly authorized it to regulate AI applications, over 32 active collections of AI-related information, 12 AI use case priorities, 10 AI regulatory barriers, and four planned regulatory actions concerning AI applications [74]. The extent and depth of HHS's response likely stems from substantial efforts within the agency to formulate an AI strategic plan that considers how HHS will "[r]egulat[e] and oversee[] the use of AI in the health industry" as well as an extensive Trustworthy AI Playbook and an action plan by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for regulating AI-based medical devices [29, 31, 39]. In short, AI Plans reflect—and are aimed to foster—strategic planning, forethought, and coordination around AI.

7 AI USE CASE INVENTORIES

The Trustworthy AI Order mandated that agencies prepare inventories of their uses of AI, share them with the Federal Chief Information Officers Council (CIO Council) and other agencies, and then make them public [25]. The number of covered agencies is much broader than under the AI Leadership Order, exempting only independent regulatory agencies and agencies within the Department of Defense (DOD) or intelligence community.[22] Agency AI use case inventories must be prepared annually and should identify AI use cases that are inconsistent with the order, including the nine

[18]The principles were: (1) public trust in AI, (2) public participation, (3) scientific integrity and information quality, (4) risk assessment and management, (5) benefits and costs, (6) flexibility, (7) fairness and non-discrimination, (8) disclosure and transparency, (9) safety and security, and (10) interagency coordination. [138, pp. 3-7].

[19]OMB M-21-06 provided four example non-regulatory approaches: (1) providing sector-specific policy guidance, statements, and frameworks; (2) using existing authorities to promote pilot programs and experimentation (e.g., through granting waivers, regulatory exemptions); (3) engaging voluntary consensus standards-development; and (4) developing and promoting voluntary frameworks. [138, pp. 7-8].

[20]OMB M-21-06 suggested the following four "non-exhaustive" agency actions: (1) increase public "access to Federal data and models for AI R&D"; (2) public communication through requests for information (RFIs) in the *Federal Register*, increased transparency about uncertainties regarding outcomes, and making guidance documents widely available; (3) increase agency participation, including through private sector engagement, "in the development and use of voluntary consensus standards and conformity assessment activities"in order to "help agencies develop expertise in AI and identify practical standards for use in regulation"; and (4) increase international cooperation on regulation. See [138, pp. 8-11].

[21]The Agency AI Plan requirement only applied to "implementing agencies" that have regulatory authorities, including independent regulatory agencies. "Implementing agencies" were defined in Section 3 of the AI Leadership Order [12] as "agencies that conduct foundational AI R&D, develop and deploy applications of AI technologies, provide educational grants, and regulate and provide guidance for applications of AI technologies, as determined by the co-chairs of the NSTC Select Committee."

[22]The Trustworthy AI Order [25], in Section 8. For the specific language in the EO and our operationalization, see Section 4 and Appendix C.1.

implementing principles. In the case of conflict, agencies are to develop remediation plans.[23] Guidance released by the CIO Council in fall 2021 explained that AI use case inventories were to be posted by March 2022 [75].

Public disclosure of AI use case inventories has been problematic.[24] Roughly half or more of relevant agencies—a minimum of 47 percent of the agencies examined—have not published an AI use case inventory (see Table 3 and Appendices C.2 and E.3). Because of uncertainty in the relevant agencies, we report the implementation rate with different groups of agencies and at different organizational levels (see Appendix C.1 for more details on the methodology). The Trustworthy AI Order and the CIO Council's guidance for creating the inventories [25, 75], for instance, did not explain how sub-agencies and parent agencies should report their inventories (e.g., whether the DOT should include AI use cases from its sub-agency, the FAA, or let the FAA publish a separate inventory). We report use cases first with sub-agencies assessed individually and then rolled up to the parent agency.

Starting with the 220 agencies identified as potentially subject to this requirement—168 did not have an independent AI use case inventory or include their AI use cases within the inventory of their parent agency. Examining 78 parent-level agencies, only 17 posted AI use case inventories.[25] Thus, 76 percent of all 220 parent and sub-agencies, assessed separately, did not publish an inventory, and 78 percent of agencies assessed at the parent level did not publish an inventory (see Table 3).

To address the reality that executive agencies are not all similarly resourced, we also examined "large" agencies (defined as ones with over 400 employees). When focused on this subset of 125 large agencies (with parent and sub-agencies separately assessed), 47 had AI use cases published within an inventory, whereas 78 (62 percent) had not published use cases within an inventory. Assessing 37 large, parent-level agencies, 21 (57 percent) had not published an inventory.

The Trustworthy AI Order and guidance provided by the CIO Council did not specify whether an agency without AI use cases (or whose only use cases were exempted from disclosure) was required to file an inventory, or otherwise notify the public, to indicate that it had completed the requirement. It could be that 76 percent of agencies simply have no AI use cases. We hence examine the subset of agencies for which we can independently confirm the existence of AI use cases. This analysis enables us to distinguish whether the absence of inventories indicates the absence of AI use cases or an agency's failure to fulfill the Trustworthy AI Order's mandate. We rely on the extensive ACUS Report that "rigorous[ly] canvas[sed] AI use at the 142 most significant federal departments, agencies, and sub-agencies" to identify which agencies already had an AI use case as of 2019 and reported that nearly half of agencies have experimented with AI and machine learning at that time.[26] Of the 49 parent and sub-agencies with a known AI use case, 47 percent had not published an AI use case inventory (23 parent and sub-agencies). Among the narrowest group of agencies—i.e., 23 large agencies with a known AI use case assessed at the parent level—only 11 had published an AI inventory.[27] Notably HUD publicly disclosed that it does "not currently have any relevant AI use cases" [41]. We list these 23 agencies in Table 8. We also include an assessment of the implementation of the AI use case inventories of agencies enumerated in the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 and that are members of the CIO Council in Appendix C.2 and in Section 8.2.

Agencies	Org. Level	No inventories	Total	Perc.
All	Sub-agency	168	220	76%
	Parent	61	78	78%
Large	Sub-agency	78	125	62%
	Parent	21	37	57%
Known AI	Sub-agency	23	49	47%
	Parent	11	23	48%

Table 3: Publication of Agency AI Use Case Inventory as of Nov. 2022. "Large" agencies are those with more than 400 employees; "Known AI" are those with known AI use cases as of 2020. "Sub-agency" treats hierarchically related agencies as separate (e.g., separating the FAA and DOT); "Parent" attributes all sub-agency use cases to the parent agency.

The inventories themselves highlight serious implementation challenges with a signature transparency initiative. First, agencies are not disclosing AI use cases, even when these use cases have already been publicly documented. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), for instance, uses the Traveler Verification Service (TVS), which is a facial recognition system that "serves as CBP's backend matching service for the collection and processing of facial images in support of biometric entry and exit operations" [45, 102]. Acknowledging that "facial recognition poses a unique set of privacy issues" [9], CBP has sought to be "aggressively transparent" [45] in publishing privacy compliance documentation concerning its biometric entry-and-exit operations, including by publishing six

[23] As noted earlier, a similar AI use-case inventory requirement was adopted in the Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act [77].

[24] We searched for AI use case inventories starting in late October 2022, and the findings reported in the Tracker are current up to at least November 11, 2022, with some spot checks performed throughout early December 2022. Agencies may have posted inventories after our exhaustive search. But they were required to post the inventories by March 2022. Moreover, though it is possible we missed some inventories, we emphasize that they ought to be easily accessible. The CIO's guidance "encouraged" agencies to publish their inventories on a specific URL [75], and the NAIIO's repository [57] ostensibly includes all of the published inventories. Even if agencies have published inventories elsewhere, there are shortcomings to their implementation of the order if they are not published according to these methods.

[25] Three had zero use cases (HUD, NIST, and NSF), and a fourth (SSA) had only five use-cases. These are questionable, but for the purposes of the first two measures, we mark them as compliant solely from the posting of their inventories. In contrast, we count HUD as noncompliant when assessing against the identified AI use cases, i.e., the "Known AI Cases" of Table 3, because while its inventory asserts that the agency has no AI use cases, the ACUS Report identified a non-zero number of use cases. Neither NIST nor NSF were included in the "Known AI Cases" measure because the ACUS Report did not identify a use case from NIST, and NSF is not a "large" agency within the meaning of the report, and so neither is counted specially as compliant for one measure and noncompliant for another measure, unlike HUD. For further methodological discussion, see Appendix C.1.

[26] [102, p. 6]. For two reasons, the "known AI use case" estimate is potentially very conservative. First, likely have expanded their use of AI — the ACUS Report was conducted three years before our assessment. Second, the ACUS Report defined "AI" as "machine learning, which train models to learn from data"—a narrower definition than that used in the Trustworthy AI Order. For methodological considerations, including extended discussion of the definitional differences, see Appendix C.1.

[27] As HUD was identified as having a known AI use case in the ACUS AI Report, we do not include HUD's public disclosure of no AI use cases within the 11 agencies that have published an AI use case inventory. In contrast, we included HUD within the agencies that implemented the requirement in our measurement of all agencies and "large" agencies.

Privacy Impact Assessments[28] and 13 Privacy Threshold Analyses, and building a public-facing website about the technology [45, 70]. While CBP has disclosed some uses of AI under the inventory posted by DHS, TVS is not among them [43].

Second, inconsistencies in how agencies have implemented the AI use case inventories illustrate three sources of policy ambiguity.

(1) Non-response. For agencies that have not posted inventories, it is unclear whether they are asserting that they have no uses of AI or simply have not fulfilled the requirement. Of the published inventories, three—from HUD, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the National Science Foundation (NSF) [41, 50, 63]—state that their agencies have no AI use cases that meet the Trustworthy AI Order's requirements.

(2) Agency structure. All inventories except for NIST's were published at the parent-agency level (e.g., by DOC or DOE, rather than the NOAA or the Office of Electricity). But it is unclear whether unlisted sub-agencies within an inventory did not have relevant use cases or whether they were unresponsive to a presumed request for reporting by the parent agency. In some cases, the latter seems very likely.[29]

(3) AI definition. The definition of AI provided in the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act and incorporated into the Trustworthy AI Order is potentially quite broad, reaching among other things, any "artificial system" that "is designed to approximate a cognitive task" or that can "learn from experience and improve performance when exposed to datasets."[30] The breadth of that definition may make compliance harder for agencies when classifying particular technologies as "AI" for the purposes of an inventory.[31] For example, NOAA identified 36 AI use cases, representing the vast majority of the DOC's 49 AI use cases. The rest of Commerce's AI inventory [46] includes zero uses from the parent agency, five from the International Trade Administration, two from the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), one from the Minority Business Development Administration, and five from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, with NIST publishing a separate inventory [50]. Ambiguity may result from both the breadth of the definition of covered AI—which includes uses that are new and existing, standalone and embedded, procured and developed in-house by the agency—and the carve-outs for sensitive or classified uses of AI, AI used for national security purposes, AI "embedded within common commercial products," and AI R&D, as provided in Section 9 of the Trustworthy AI Order [25].

Third, AI use case inventories often incorporate existing transparency initiatives, but with significant variation. Agencies are best positioned to know what records exist regarding each AI use case, and some have provided useful links to published documentation. For example, many use cases in the DHS inventory include links (e.g., to privacy impact assessments); some EPA, HHS, Department of the Interior (INT), DOC, and Department of Agriculture use cases include links to relevant publications; and some Department of Labor (DOL), INT, and Department of Justice (DOJ) use cases reference publicly available code.

8 DISCUSSION

We now discuss broader implications emerging from this study, as well as some limitations. First, *empirically*, our top-level finding is that implementation has been lacking, which we interpret through the lens of *bureaucratic capacity* and *policy ambiguity*. Second, *methodologically*, we discuss how social scientists can study policy implementation in a rigorous and systematic way based on our case studies.

8.1 Broader Implications

Foundational theoretical work in bureaucratic capacity has argued that lower capacity can prevent effective implementation of hierarchically imposed policy obligations. Huber [115] attributed this possibility to inhibitions on the principal's ability to punish failures on the part of the agent when the agent lacks sufficient capacity to implement the directive. Other explanations focus on the multiplicity of tasks and principals that each agency has, which implies that the agency may shirk obligations that lack enforcement mechanisms [97]. Still others might argue that policy directives understood as far from the organization's core "turf" may seem peripheral or unimportant and are thus ignored [141]. All of these different explanations can shed light on the lackluster implementation of these AI directives: Agencies, by and large, lack the technical expertise and committed leadership necessary to effectively implement and prioritize regulatory principles promulgated by the White House or Congress.

Our findings also reveal substantial policy ambiguity that places more decision-making costs on agencies seeking to comply with the directives, thereby further hampering implementation. Central questions pertaining to the scope of transparency obligations—like the AI plans and inventories—were left ambiguous by the executive orders and White House-level guidance. Our findings emphasized two sources of ambiguity—ambiguity in defining "AI" and "agency."

On the former, the definition of "AI" used in the Trustworthy AI Order left substantial discretion to the agencies to categorize their use of technology. For example, the Order's exemptions for "AI embedded in common commercial products" and for "AI research and development activities" are ambiguous.[32] We found large inconsistencies in the kinds of use cases disclosed by agencies: compare, for example, NOAA's disclosure of 36 AI use cases pertaining to scientific research with CBP's non-disclosure of facial recognition

[28] Such assessments are a legal requirement under Section 208(b) of the E-Government Act of 2002, see [134].

[29] Consider DOE: In its inventory [58], DOE reports 45 use cases from three sub-offices: Brookhaven National Laboratory (one use case); the Office of Electricity (10 use cases); and Idaho National Laboratory (34 use cases). We think these numbers are implausible as an exhaustive account of AI usage within DOE. For example, a public information sheet published in 2020 from the then-Office of Fossil Energy (now the Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management) boasted of having "over 60 AI-enabled projects underway" [18]. Moreover, each DOE office has listed a single individual as its point of contact for all AI use cases from that office. It seems at least plausible that those offices have designated specific employees to serve as point-individuals on AI transparency for the office but that other offices have failed to do so, which is why there are no use cases reported for other DOE sub-agencies. As another example, in the Department of the Interior's inventory [47], the United States Geological Survey (a sub-agency) disclosed 55 of the Department's 65 use cases. Some of those use cases seem to be collaborations with agencies (e.g., the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management) that themselves did not disclose use cases. We count such agencies as failing to implement the requirement notwithstanding that other agencies reported some of their AI use cases.

[30] The full definition is provided in Section 238(g) of the FY2019 NDAA [8].

[31] The CIO's 2021 FAQs and "Example AI Use Case Inventory Scenarios" guidance documents [75] provide some details beyond the statutory definition, but much of the work of classifying technologies as "AI" still falls on the agencies.

[32] And they may not be normatively justifiable: an agency's reliance on ChatGPT may be quite important depending on how the technology is used, even if ChatGPT is a common commercial product.

systems used for biometric entry and exit operations (a system for which CBP has *published an independent website*, presumably because of the politically sensitive nature of the operation).

Additionally, both orders swept in broad terms, making it hard to know *which entities* were obligated to publish AI plans or use case inventories (see discussion in Section 4 and Appendices B.1 and C.1). Yet the problem of "agency" definition is not novel. As the authors of the ACUS Sourcebook note, "cataloging administrative agencies is difficult because so many varying definitions abound" [130, p. 11]. The point is not that there is a correct definition—rather, it is that these pillars of America's AI strategy did not even attempt to address the issue, thereby shifting costs onto lower-level executive branch entities to determine whether they ought to comply.

From the perspective of change management, a key problem with such ambiguity is that it inhibits the policymaker from effectively communicating and directing change in conditions of fast-changing technology (e.g., [137], cf. [79, 96]). Tighter rule construction itself would be helpful so that agencies better understand when and how they must comply. But discretion will inevitably vest with line-level bureaucrats implementing policies on AI (cf. [122]). Though much theoretical literature has discussed bureaucratic resistance to hierarchically imposed requirements (e.g., [118]), evidence from the perspective of "street-level" bureaucrats argues that implementation failures are more often a result of insufficient capacity than ideological opposition [83], which accords with our findings.

The poor public availability of the Agency AI Plans, AI use case inventories, and other mandated items supports existing scholarship about the consistency by which agencies make public guidance documents [87]. Coglianese found that mandated agency guidance is inconsistently published, which keeps the public in the dark about important agency actions. Agencies, Coglianese argued, need internal management practices to ensure disclosure because legal requirements without incentives or consequences for non-disclosure will be insufficient to motivate agencies to disclose [87]. Transparency requirements strengthen government accountability efforts while also enabling federal agencies to have meaningful consultations with external stakeholders. But to actualize those policies will require more careful rule construction from the top, closer attention to bureaucratic capacity down the chain, and agency adoption of management strategies to systematically track, index, and publish guidance [99].

Our systematic assessment of agency implementation of these policies provides evidence for the inference that insufficient bureaucratic capacity has hampered the implementation of U.S. AI policy. We do not rule out possible alternative explanations. For example, agencies' incentives to faithfully implement policy directives may be tied to their assessment of those policies' durability [135], where policies promulgated by a president late in her term[33] may be perceived by the agencies as less imperative or even less legitimate. Similarly, agencies may have differential incentives to comply based on how central AI initiatives are to their core functions, especially as it implicates funding. Thus, for example, NOAA's substantial disclosure of AI use cases in its inventory might be understood as a kind of "bureaucratic entrepreneurship" [124], where the agency's work helped demonstrate to the public why it needed greater funding for AI-related initiatives (funding, incidentally, which it received [106]). But while there is more room for theoretical insight from studying variation within our findings, the top-level result is still indicative of a general lack of bureaucratic capacity to implement AI policy.

Finally, our *methodological* contribution is to provide a transparent and systematic means for assessing policy implementation notwithstanding the conceptual ambiguities noted above. Our reliance on a mix of statutes, regulatory provisions, and materials by ACUS can inform subsequent efforts to assess policy that is addressed, generally, toward "agencies," as in the Trustworthy AI Order, or agencies with "regulatory authorities," as in the AI Leadership Order (see Section 4 and Appendices B.1 and C.1). Furthermore, for the AI use case inventories, we present findings with different levels of aggregation and groupings of agencies that correspond to theoretical concerns and practical realities: We considered not only the largest number of agencies to which the executive order might theoretically apply, but we also cut only to "large" agencies and to agencies that had been previously identified by ACUS as using (or considering using) AI. And we assessed each of those measures not only by disaggregating at the lowest "agency" level but also by bundling agencies into their parent departments (for example, including the IRS within the Treasury Department) to address what seems to be agencies' understandings of their obligation under the executive order (i.e., most disclosed inventories were housed at the parent-agency level) (see Section 7 and Appendix C). And while much of our work emphasized *systematic* analysis, we also considered the disclosures *qualitatively* so that our findings are sensitive not only to whether agencies ticked a box but also how meaningfully their disclosures achieved the executive orders' policy goals. While these steps involve nuance to implement, they illustrate how we can rigorously assess policy implementation. As AI governance efforts mature, these efforts will be critical to ensure that legislative and executive directives are not "lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy" [1, p. 1111].

8.2 Limitations

We note several limitations of our assessment. First, as we have noted, our assessment is based on publicly available information. Many more implementation efforts may be underway. But the mere fact that so many deadlines have been missed—when the pace of innovation in AI is extremely fast—illustrates the severe limitations of existing governmental efforts. In addition, the difficulty in researching the implementation status is itself telling. Existing efforts have delegated to agencies the task of defining and implementing these provisions, and, as a result, efforts have been fragmented and inconsistent.

Second, some might argue that the failure to meet deadlines and implement legal requirements is no different in AI than in other domains [78]. Perhaps that is so, although there are few directly analogous studies in comparable, but non-AI, domains.[34] Regardless, our findings suggest bureaucratic capacity challenges in a highly consequential space.

[33]The AI Leadership Order was issued on February 14, 2019, and the Trustworthy AI Order on December 8, 2020, when then-President Trump was a so-called 'lame duck' president.

[34]For an exception, see the Government Accountability Office's assessment of the implementation of the Open, Public, Electronic and Necessary Government Data Act of 2018 [36].

Third, our implementation estimates may be critiqued based on the fact that they weigh provisions equally. Not all operative provisions in a bill or order matter equally. We agree and have provided the detailed, line-level tracker results to enable any assessment of implementation of specific items (Appendix E). Our qualitative assessment, however, does not suggest that all important items have been implemented. To the contrary, major items that are critical to preparing the federal government for the AI transition have not been addressed.

Fourth, while AI use case inventories are an important step toward transparency, they remain relatively limited as implemented. Some registries, for instance, include extensive data and model documentation, but the Trustworthy AI Order did not appear to require such extensive detail. As we show in Appendix C.2, numerous agencies have gone beyond the minimal requirement and documented performance benchmarks and evaluation measures, which are particularly important for assessments of trustworthiness.

Last, we released our findings in December 2022 [120] and some agencies have since posted AI use case inventories or disclosed no use cases.[35] To the extent that our research galvanized agency action, we both applaud the agencies and White House for taking initiative but also re-emphasize that formal compliance itself is not the goal. Compliance should be a *means* for strategic planning and action: Publicly verifiable steps, while important from a transparency perspective, are fundamentally proxies for assessing whether agencies are prepared for and taking concrete steps around trustworthy AI. If the tracked metrics become ends in themselves, then they are no longer reliable indicators of the underlying issue of interest. Agency responses also suggest further support for our conclusion that senior leadership is critical. All of the agencies that we know published an inventory after our white paper, except for one, are subject to the Chief Financial Officers Act (see Appendix D). This act required each agency to establish a Chief Financial Officer and provided the White House's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) greater authority over agency financial management [67]. This *could* demonstrate the important role of the White House in shepherding compliance and strategic planning.

9 CONCLUSION

Our findings have broad implications for the current ability of government to govern AI. We find that three core elements of America's collective AI strategy—the AI Leadership Order, the Trustworthy AI Order, and the AI in Government Act—have not been implemented well despite an urgent need for the U.S. government to grapple with a technology that is widely seen to have far-reaching, transformative potential.

These findings strongly suggest that there is a resource shortage, a leadership vacuum, and a capacity gap, which are exacerbated by policy ambiguity. Leadership will be required from both the White House, including the National AI Initiative Office and OMB, and agencies to coordinate and drive forward AI innovation and trustworthy adoption. Current requirements may appear to agencies like "unfunded mandates" and be treated like checklists when they should in fact be seized as opportunities for strategic planning around AI. Some agencies have recognized the urgent need and were able to respond comprehensively and meaningfully to these legal requirements (see, e.g., HHS's Artificial Intelligence Strategy, Trustworthy AI Playbook, and action plan for regulating AI-based medical devices [29, 31, 39]). If our findings are due to bureaucratic capacity, Congress should provide resources for agencies to staff and acquire technical expertise to comply in more than a perfunctory way and develop strategic AI Plans. Failure to provide proper resources and mandate senior personnel to discharge these responsibilities could otherwise undermine the goal of these laws to maintain U.S. leadership in AI innovation and trustworthy AI.

The public disclosure of AI Plans and AI use case inventories constitutes an important effort to foster transparency and accountability in public sector AI. The executive orders mandated their public disclosure and senior-level guidance instructed they be made readily available on specific websites. The fact that it has taken considerable effort for our team to track the implementation of such plans, use case inventories, and requirements (see efforts detailed in the Appendices) strongly suggests that improvements must be made on reporting and tracking of these provisions. Our assessment may miss certain use case inventories, for instance, but that is precisely the point. Disclosure must be accessible and legible to be effective.

We close by noting that on paper and in principle, America's strategy for AI innovation and responsible AI, as manifested in the Trustworthy AI Order, the AI Leadership Order, and the AI in Government Act, is highly laudable. But in practice, our assessment suggests severe challenges in the federal government's ability to navigate a rapidly changing and critically important space. Requirements have been converted into perfunctory checklists instead of triggers for strategic planning, and agencies do not appear to have effectively grappled with the opportunities and risks that AI poses.

Bureaucratic capacity is a sine qua non for turning laudable principles into reality.

[35] Agencies that have since published an explanation or use case inventory include the Departments of Education, Housing and Urban Development, the Interior, the Treasury, and Transportation; the General Services Administration; the Small Business Administration; and the U.S. Office of Personnel Management.

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A IMPLEMENTATION OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS

A.1 Methodology

To assess the implementation status of the AI Leadership Order, the Trustworthy AI Order, and the AI in Government Act, we first identified all line-level actions that these documents mandate (e.g., instructions that a federal entity "shall budget," "shall consider," "shall review," "shall publish"). For each requirement, the following information was compiled in a tracker (see Appendix E): (1) the relevant portion of the executive order or legislation, (2) the government stakeholder responsible for its implementation, (3) a summary of the mandated outcome or deliverable, (4) the mandated deadline, if any, and (5) the "type" of requirement (see below paragraph), and (6) the status of implementation. The first four items were drawn from the text of the executive order or legislation itself, while the status of implementation was drawn from publicly available information, as of November 23, 2022. Where possible, we provide additional details about the implementation of the requirement and URL links to relevant documents. Therefore this represents the publicly verifiable status and may not capture activities executed without public disclosure (either with the intent to protect sensitive or classified information or simply because the federal entities did not prioritize or have an appropriate avenue for disclosing the activity).

As noted above, the requirements were split into three categories. This facilitated assessment of implementation by the responsible federal government entity (see tables in Appendix E.1). The categories were:

(1) ***Time-boxed requirements*** mandated a federal entity, or entities, to produce a document or achieve an outcome by a specified date (e.g., "shall develop" a report within 90 days of the date of the executive order).
(2) ***Open-ended requirements*** mandated the production of a document/deliverable or achievement of an outcome without specifying a deadline.
(3) ***Ongoing requirements*** were open-ended mandates to agencies that often did not require the production of a specific document/deliverable or achievement of a concrete outcome (e.g., agencies "shall pursue" an objective, "shall consider" actions, "shall identify opportunities," "shall provide" expertise, etc.). These ongoing requirements also did not have a deadline. This also includes outcomes that were part of an annual process without a specified date (e.g., the AI Leadership Order's requirements in Section 4(b)-(b)(1) that agencies prioritize AI R&D and "communicate plans for achieving this prioritization to the OMB Director and the OSTP Director").

Although assessing implementation of the time-boxed requirements was often straightforward, compliance with a significant percentage of mandated actions was not known or hard to determine, either because the mandate required ongoing compliance without producing a specific milestone, the mandated action did not require public disclosure of its completion or progress toward its completion, or both. Under the assumption that federal entities had taken necessary steps, or at least made good faith efforts, to meet their legal and statutory requirements, ambiguity was resolved in favor of the federal entities. Therefore, the researchers applied the following rules for determining implementation status: implemented (or indications of implementation), not implemented (or indications that the requirement was not implemented), and not known.

- ***Implemented***: Time-boxed requirements were marked as successfully implemented where the mandated outcome was achieved, even if achieved after the mandated deadline. Open-ended requirements and ongoing requirements without a defined deliverable were coded green if public information strongly supported the conclusion that federal entities were implementing the requirement.
- ***Not Implemented***: Time-boxed requirements were marked as not implemented if there was no public information, as of November 23, 2022, confirming their implementation by the mandated deadline. Requirements were coded red if public information strongly suggested that they had not been implemented by federal entities. The latter, for instance, occurred for the AI Leadership Order's requirement for a National Security Presidential Memorandum.
- ***Not Known***: Implementation of time-boxed requirements and open-ended requirements was marked as not known where public reporting was nonexistent, often because public reporting was not mandated, or did not clearly indicate the status of implementation. Similarly, the implementation of ongoing requirements was marked as not known because there was no mandated reporting and often no mandated outcome for the researchers to publicly verify.

A.2 Summary of Findings

A summary of the findings for each document is provided in Tables 1, 4, 5, and 6. The detailed methodology is provided in Appendix A.1, but it is important to highlight upfront that methodological constraints may result in our findings underestimating implementation and overestimating requirements that remain outstanding. Although best efforts were taken to properly identify all relevant documents or notices of actions, the researchers could only rely on federal entities' public disclosures, which may not capture all relevant actions taken by the federal government to achieve the mandates.

- **AI Executive Order**: Only 39 percent, or nine of the order's 23 requirements, were implemented. Given a dearth of publicly available information about many of the requirements, the implementation status for a majority of the requirements was not known (57 percent). Requirements with a specified deadline had a higher rate of implementation (45 percent) than requirements without a deadline (0 percent) or open-ended requirements without a concrete deliverable (40 percent). Critically,the requirement for agencies to publish AI Plans to achieve consistency with OMB guidance on regulating AI was not fulfilled. The implementation of these Agency AI Plans is discussed in Section 6 and Appendix B.2.
- **Trustworthy AI Order**: Implementation was even lower for the Trustworthy AI Order, with only 13 percent, or two of the

Table 4: Summary of Federal Entities' Implementation of Requirements in AI Leadership Order (EO 13,859)

	Relevant Sections	Implemented	Unknown Implementation	Not Implemented
11 Time-Boxed Requirements	5(a)(i)[a], 5(a)(ii), 5(a)(iii), 5(c), 6(a)-(b), 6(c), 6(d), 7(b), 8(a)-(b), 8(c)	45%	45%	9%
		5 (5(a)(i)[a], 5(c), 6(a)-(b), 6(d))	5 (5(a)(ii), 5(a)(iii), 7(b), 8(a)-(b), 8(c))	1 (6(c)[b].)
2 Open-Ended Requirements	5(a), 5(a)(iv)	0%	100%	0%
		—	2 (5(a), 5(a)(iv))	—
10 Ongoing Requirements	2(a)-(e), 4(a), 4(b)-(b)(i), 4(b)(ii), 4(c), 5(a)(v), 5(b), 5(d), 7(a)(i)-(ii), 7(c)	40%	60%	0%
		4 (4(a), 4(b)-(b)(i), 4(b)(ii), 5(b))	6 (2(a)-(e), 4(c), 5(a)(v), 5(d), 7(a)(i)-(ii), 7(c))	—

[a]5(a)(i) has two time-boxed requirements.
[b]See Appendix E.2

requirements, implemented.[36] Similar to the AI Leadership Order, implementation for a majority of the requirements (54 percent) could not be conclusively determined. Two of the requirements, or 13 percent, have not been implemented, including the requirement for agencies to prepare and publish AI use case inventories. The implementation of these Agency AI use case inventories is discussed in Section 7 and Appendix C.2.

- **AI in Government Act of 2020**: Compared to the executive orders, the percentage of requirements that were not implemented was much higher at 67 percent, or four of the six requirements. The only requirement implemented was to establish an AI Center of Excellence within GSA, while the progress that GSA has made on achieving the Center of Excellence's duties is unknown.

B IMPLEMENTATION OF AGENCY AI PLANS

B.1 Methodology and Background

B.1.1 Background on AI Leadership Order's "Agency AI Plan" Requirement. As discussed in Section 6, a significant focus of the AI Leadership Order was addressing concerns about regulatory gaps and hurdles to AI development and deployment. As such, the executive order mandated:

- The White's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to issue a guidance memorandum to agencies, after publishing a draft guidance for public comment, within 180 days of the EO (approximately August 2019). Sections 6(a)-(b).
- The heads of "implementing agencies" with regulatory authorities to develop a plan to "achieve consistency" with the OMB memorandum within 180 days of OMB issuing the memorandum. Section 6(c).

[36]There were 17 requirements, but one requirement was excluded from the overall calculations because its deadline has not yet passed (i.e., the rate of implementation assumed 16 instead of 17 requirements).

OMB fulfilled its requirement over a year overdue, publishing a draft memorandum on January 1, 2020,[27] and issuing its final memorandum on November 17, 2020.[138] OMB M-21-06, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on Guidance for Regulation of Artificial Intelligence Application (referred to as the "OMB AI Regulation Memo" for ease of understanding), provided guidance for agencies on regulatory and non-regulatory approaches to AI. Critically, it noted that "government use of AI" was outside of the scope of the memorandum.

The OMB AI Regulation Memo also provided guidance for the Agency AI Plans. Specifically, it stated:

> The agency plan must identify any statutory authorities specifically governing agency regulation of AI applications, as well as collections of AI-related information from regulated entities. For these collections, agencies should describe any statutory restrictions on the collection or sharing of information (e.g., confidential business information, personally identifiable information, protected health information, law enforcement information, and classified or other national security information). The agency plan must also report on the outcomes of stakeholder engagements that identify existing regulatory barriers to AI applications and high-priority AI applications that are within an agency's regulatory authorities. OMB also requests agencies to list and describe any planned or considered regulatory actions on AI.

Furthermore, the memorandum included specific instructions for how agencies must submit and publish their plans:

> Agency plans are due on May 17, 2021, and should be submitted to OIRA at the following email address: AIplans@omb.eop.gov. To inform the public of each agency's planned and implemented activities, agency plans must be posted on, or be accessed from (through

Table 5: Summary of Federal Entities' Implementation of Requirements in Trustworthy AI Order (EO 13,960)

	Relevant Sections	Implemented	Unknown Implementation	Not Implemented
12 Time-Boxed Requirements[a]	4(b), 5(a), 5(b), 5(c)(i), 5(c)(ii), 5(d), 5(e), 6[b], 7(a), 7(b), 7(c), 8(c)	17%	58%	17%
		2 (5(a), 7(a))	7 (5(b), 5(c)(i), 5(d), 6[b], 7(b), 7(c), 8(c))	2 (4(b), 5(e)[c])
1 Open-Ended Requirement	5(c)	0%	100%	0%
		—	1 (5(c))	—
4 Ongoing Requirements	2(b), 4(a), 4(c), 6[b]	0%	100%	0%
		—	4 (2(b), 4(a), 4(c), 6[b])	—

[a]Requirement in section 5(c)(ii) has not been implemented, but the deadline for implementation has not yet passed, so it is not classified as implemented, not implemented, or not known. Therefore the percentages for the 12 time-boxed requirements do not equal 100 percent.
[b]6 has one time-boxed requirement and one ongoing requirement. See Appendix E.1
[c]See Section 7, Table 3, and Appendix C.

Table 6: Summary of Federal Entities' Implementation of Requirements in AI in Government Act of 2020

	Relevant Sections	Implemented	Unknown Implementation	Not Implemented
4 Time-Boxed Requirements	104(a)-(b) & (d), 104(c), 105(a), 105(b)	0%	0%	100%
		—	—	4 (104(a)-(b) & (d), 104(c), 105(a), 105(b))
1 Open-Ended Requirement	103	100%	0%	0%
		1 (103)	—	—
1 Ongoing Requirement	103	0%	100%	0%
		—	1 (103)	—

a URL redirect), the following domain on the agency's website: www.[agencyname].gov/guidance.

The May 2021 deadline adhered to the AI Leadership Order's requirement that the plans be completed and submitted within 180 days of the OMB AI Regulation Memo's issuance.

The OMB AI Regulation Memo did not provide guidance on which agencies were subject to the executive order's requirements. The AI Leadership Order stated that the requirement applied to "implementing agencies that also have regulatory authorities." "Implementing agencies" were defined in Section 3 of the AI Leadership Order as "agencies that conduct foundational AI R&D, develop and deploy applications of AI technologies, provide educational grants, and regulate and provide guidance for applications of AI technologies, as determined by the co-chairs of the NSTC Select Committee." This set is potentially quite broad, especially as regulation of applications of AI would include many incumbent regulatory regimes (e.g., approval of medical devices by the Food and Drug Administration, discrimination of employment policies by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission). However, the NSTC Select Committee on AI did not publish a list of agencies it determined were "implementing agencies," nor did the OMB AI Regulation Memo provide any additional insight. Although the OMB AI Regulation Memo directed itself to "heads of all Executive Branch departments and agencies, including independent regulatory agencies," neither the memorandum nor the executive order defined "regulatory authorities," a potentially expansive term subsuming most administrative agencies, or delineated which agencies had regulatory authorities.

B.1.2 Methodology for Assessing Implementation. To identify relevant agencies, we first searched online for a list of agencies deemed to be "implementing agencies" by the co-chairs of the NSTC Select Committee on AI. As this list was not publicly available, we instead focused on Cabinet-level departments and agencies and the 19 agencies deemed "independent regulatory agencies" under 44

U.S.C. § 3502(5).[37] We also included the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), as it was the only agency represented at the National Security Council[105] that was not already included as a Cabinet-level agency or as an independent regulatory agency. The reason for including each agency is identified in the full tracker in Appendix E.2. It is possible that this list is overinclusive or underinclusive of the agencies that were actually required to establish and publish an Agency AI Plan to achieve consistency with the OMB AI Regulation Memo. We also inquired with a member of the Select Committee and did not receive an answer on what agencies are included.

The intended purpose of the OMB AI Regulation Memo's requirement that the Agency AI Plans should be available on the respective agency website's page on guidance was to increase transparency and "inform the public." Therefore, identifying the plans should be intuitive to the public and should not require significant expenditure of time. To simulate how an individual might seek to access the plan, we implemented four simple approaches to finding it. For each, the researchers noted whether the approach yielded a positive identification of an Agency AI Plan in the correspondingly titled columns in E.2.

- **Dedicated Agency URL**: Visiting the link under which the OMB AI Regulation Memo expressly requires the Agency AI Plan to be posted: [agency_name].gov/guidance. We noted first if the agency had a dedicated guidance webpage. If it did, we searched "response artificial intelligence OMB M-21-06" (as "OMB" and "M-21-06" are expressly noted in the template response). If it did not, we marked "no" for this method.
- **Web Search**: We searched online (using Google) "[agency name] response artificial intelligence OMB M-21-06". If the agency's full name did not return results, we searched with the agency's acronym (e.g., HHS for the Department of Health and Human Services), where applicable.
- **Search Within Agency Website**: Searching within an agency's website: "response artificial intelligence OMB M-21-06." If (as noted above) an agency lacked its own website, we searched on its parent agency's website with its name included, e.g., "[agency name] response artificial intelligence OMB M-21-06". If the search engine returned an implausibly large number of results (e.g., on the order of 10,000), phrases would be placed in quotation marks (e.g., "artificial intelligence," "use case," and "M-21-06").
- **AI.gov**: Searching the publication library on AI.gov (the website for the National AI Initiative) for the agency's name (or acronym) and "response artificial intelligence OMB M-21-06". We also looked at all documents published by that agency and included in the publication library as there was a small number of documents per agency, if any, in the publication library.

If an Agency AI Plan was identified using any of these four methods, as of November 23, 2022, the researchers marked "yes" in the "Agency Plan" column (Appendix E.2) and provided the web link to the plan in the "URL" column. If the Agency AI Plan was not identified using any of the four methods, the researchers marked "no" for the presence of an "Agency Plan."

B.2 Summary of Findings

The agencies with an Agency AI Plan are the Departments of Energy, HHS, and VA, the EPA, and USAID (see Tables 2 and 7).

The agencies without AI Plans are the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Commerce, Defense, Education, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Justice, Labor, State, Transportation, Treasury, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FED), Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Mine Enforcement Safety and Health Review Commission (FMSHRC), National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC), Office of Financial Research (OFR), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Small Business Administration (SBA), and the Surface Transportation Board (STB).

Four agencies published AI-related strategic plans, including some that noted the AI Leadership Order, but these plans provided far less than the detailed required. The DHS's S&T AI and ML Strategic Plan [38], the VA's AI Strategy [30], and the Department of State's Enterprise Data Strategy [33] mention the AI Leadership Order and identify AI priorities but provide less detail on regulation than required under the AI Leadership Order. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission published an AI Strategic Plan in June 2022 [94], but it similarly does not provide enough detail to classify as an Agency AI Plan consistent with the OMB AI Regulation Memo.

C IMPLEMENTATION OF AI USE CASE INVENTORIES

C.1 Methodology

C.1.1 Background on the Trustworthy AI Order's AI Use Case Inventory Requirement. Agencies were to prepare their inventories within 180 days of the Federal Chief Information Officers Council (CIO Council) providing guidance to the agencies (which occurred in fall 2021 [75]) and annually thereafter. The CIO guidance instructed agencies to report use case inventories using a provided Excel template by March 22, 2022.

[37] The current Cabinet includes the heads of the 15 executive departments (the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Labor, State, Transportation, Treasury, and Veterans Affairs, and the Attorney General), the White House Chief of Staff, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, the Director of National Intelligence, and the U.S. Trade Representative, as well as the heads of the Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Management and Budget, Council of Economic Advisers, Office of Science and Technology Policy, and Small Business Administration.[66] We excluded the White House Chief of Staff, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., and Council of Economic Advisors because they do not have rule-making or regulatory authority.[130]

Table 7: Summary of Agencies with Agency AI Plans

Agency	Overview of the Substance in Agency's AI Plan
Department of Energy (DOE)	• Input "none" for each of the five questions
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)	• 11 statutes that authorized HHS to regulate AI applications, even noting that two of the statutes do not directly mention AI but might provide indirect authority to regulate AI as it relates to health data or health technology • 32 active collections of AI-related information, 30 of which were approved by OMB pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act and two that were exempted from OMB clearance as they are "general requests" • 12 AI use case priorities, 7 were AI applications in the private sector that were under its regulatory authorities (e.g., AI algorithm for wrist fracture reduction), 4 were opportunities for HHS to "shape the development and production of AI in the private sector," such as creating and improving relevant datasets, and 1 (predicting risk of adult maltreatment) was an internal AI tool that could be adopted by the private sector • 10 AI regulatory barriers (e.g., data silos, intellectual property, concerns about HIPAA and data sharing) • 4 planned regulatory actions concerning AI applications (e.g., imposing clinical holds on medical devices)
Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA)	• No statutory authorities directing or authorizing agency regulation of AI • No active collections of AI-related information • 14 AI use case priorities (e.g., identifying risk factors for diseases or suicide risk, AI that triages incoming medical evidence like images or lab results) • 3 AI regulatory barriers, which were all specific regulations (HIPAA, Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Privacy Act of 1974 amended as 5 U.S.C. 552a) • No planned regulatory actions concerning AI
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)	• No statutory authorities directing or authorizing agency regulation of AI • No active collections of AI-related information • No AI use cases in private sector within regulatory authority, but a handful of AI use cases identified as of interest for achieving EPA's goals • No AI regulatory barriers identified • No planned regulatory actions concerning AI, but noted EPA began working on AI strategies like technical architectures and eventually higher-level principles
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)	• No statutory authorities directing or authorizing agency regulation of AI • No active collections of AI-related information • No AI use cases in private sector within regulatory authority • No AI regulatory barriers identified • No planned regulatory actions concerning AI

Responsible Agencies: Agencies that must comply were defined by the Trustworthy AI Order[25] in Section 8 as "all agencies described in section 3502, subsection (1), of title 44, United States Code, except for the agencies described in section 3502, subsection (5), of title 44." The Department of Defense and "those agencies and agency components with functions that lie wholly within the Intelligence Community" were also exempted.

Scope: The Trustworthy AI Order used the definition of AI "set forth in section 238(g) of the National Defense Authorization Act

for Fiscal Year 2019 as a reference point."[38] The order further clarified in Section 9 that it applied to "both existing and new uses of AI; both standalone AI and AI embedded within other systems or applications; AI developed both by the agency or by third parties on behalf of agencies for the fulfillment of specific agency missions, including relevant data inputs used to train AI and outputs used in support of decision making; and agencies' procurement of AI applications." However, the order excluded some AI uses from the AI inventory requirement, including "AI used in defense or national security systems (as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3552(b)(6) or as determined by the agency)," "AI embedded within common commercial products, such as word processors or map navigation systems," and "AI research and development (R&D) activities." The CIO's Example AI Use Case Inventory Scenarios provides additional guidance.[75]

Submission and Publication: Given the timing of the CIO's issuance of the guidance, the CIO guidance [75] instructed:

> By March 22, 2022, Agencies shall use the provided Excel workbook, 'Agency AI Use Case Inventory,' to compile their AI use cases and upload one file per agency to the MAX site at: Agency AI Inventory Instructions and Submission - E-Government Community - MAX Federal Community.

This guidance adhered to the Trustworthy AI Order, which mandated that agencies share their inventories with other agencies within 60 days of completing them and then make their inventories publicly available within 120 days of completing their inventories.

C.1.2 Methodology for Assessing Implementation. To identify relevant agencies, we looked to the ACUS Sourcebook of U.S. Executive Agencies ("ACUS Sourcebook")[130] and included all 278 agencies and sub-agencies identified in the Sourcebook data spreadsheet.[131] Given the Trustworthy AI Order's explicit exclusions, we removed agencies within the Department of Defense, agencies and sub-agencies within the intelligence community as defined by 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4), and the 19 independent regulatory agencies defined in 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5).[39] We further made individualized adjustments for agencies that are now defunct or are administered under different names.[40] This produced a total of 220 agencies.

Similar to the Agency AI Plans, identifying AI inventories should be intuitive to the public and should not require significant expenditure of time. We implemented four approaches:

(1) **Dedicated Agency URL**: We visited the relevant website as provided by the CIO 2021 Guidance for Creating Agency Inventories of AI Use Case [75]: "[agency_name].gov/data/-AI_Inventory." If the relevant agency's webpage did not lead to an AI inventory, or if the agency did not have a URL of that form, we recorded "Dedicated Agency URL" as "No."
(2) **Web Search**: We searched online (using Google) "[agency name] artificial intelligence use case inventory." If the agency's full name did not return results, we also searched using the agency's acronym or more common name (e.g., DHS or Farmer Mac).
(3) **Search Within Agency Website**: We searched within an agency's website (i.e., using its internal search engine): "artificial intelligence use case inventory." If (as noted above) an agency lacked its own website, we searched on its parent agency's website with its name included, e.g., "[agency name] artificial intelligence use case inventory." If the search engine returned an implausibly large number of results (e.g., on the order of 10,000), phrases would be placed in quotation marks.
(4) **AI.gov**: We searched AI.gov's (website for the National AI Initiative) tracker for agency AI use case inventories.

Multiple measures were employed to measure implementation. The measurements varied along two major dimensions:

(1) **Agencies considered**: We measured implementation rates by considering different subsets of agencies—specifically, we employed three agency groupings: *all relevant agencies*, *large agencies*, and *agencies with a known AI use case*. Appendix E.3 includes the list of all 220 agencies and classifies which agencies are large and have a known AI use case.
   (a) *All relevant agencies* considers all 220 agencies identified using the methodology described above. This approach does not consider agency size or likelihood of the agency employing AI.
   (b) *Large agencies* considers 125 "large" agencies. To identify this subset, we benchmarked against the 2020 "Government by Algorithm: Artificial Intelligence in Federal Administrative Agencies" report submitted to ACUS ("ACUS AI Report").[102] The ACUS AI Report narrowed the agencies listed in the 2018 ACUS Sourcebook by (1) including only agencies with more than 400 employees; and (2) removing active military and intelligence-related agencies. The ACUS AI Report therefore identifies 142 "large" agencies. For this tracker, the 142 agencies had to be further narrowed by removing the independent regulatory agencies within the meaning of 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) and the now-defunct agencies.[41] The result is a total of 125 agencies.[42]

[38] The order noted in Section 9(a) that the evolution of AI use in the federal government necessitates that "OMB guidance developed or revised pursuant to section 4 of this order shall include such definitions as are necessary to ensure the application of the Principles in this order to appropriate use cases."

[39] One of the named independent regulatory agencies within 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) is the Interstate Commerce Commission, which is now defunct. We excluded its successor, the Surface Transportation Board.

[40] Specifically, we excluded: (1) the National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers (NARAB), which was statutorily created in 2015 but not implemented; (2) the Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, both of which are administered by the Medicare Board of Trustees, which is what we have included in the Tracker; (3) the Office of Healthy Homes and Lead Hazard Control, which is currently known as the Office of Lead Hazard Control and Healthy Homes (included in the Tracker); (4) the Grain Inspection, Packers, and Stockyards Administration, whose functions are now housed in the Agricultural Marketing Service; (5) the Northern Great Plains Regional Authority, which is now defunct; (6) the Economic and Statistics Administration, which no longer exists; and (7) the Internal Revenue Service Oversight Board, which has been suspended. We further added the Executive Office of the President as a parent agency. Though it is probably best regarded as not an "agency" ([130, p. 19]). Notably, we did not exclude three agencies in the Department of Agriculture listed by the ACUS Sourcebook—the Rural Business-Cooperative Service, the Rural Housing Service, and the Rural Utilities Service—that seem to be child-agencies of a USDA sub-agency known as "Rural Development." To our knowledge, these three are the only examples of sub-sub-agencies featured in our analysis.

[41] One agency that the ACUS AI Report analyzed that we did not include was the Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals, because it is not listed in the ACUS Sourcebook.

[42] These agencies are marked in the second column of the Full Tracker (see Appendix E.3, where the 125 agencies considered by the ACUS AI Report and relevant to the order were marked as "Yes" and agencies not considered in the ACUS AI Report were marked as "No."

(c) *Agencies with a known AI use case* considers 49 agencies with a non-zero number of AI use cases identified by the ACUS AI Report team.[43] The ACUS AI Report identified through "an agency-by-agency, web-based search protocol, augmented by a range of third-party sources" any use case where an agency "had *considered using* or had *already deployed* AI/ML technology to carry out a core function," discounting instances "where agencies demonstrated no intent to operationalize a given tool," such as "a pure research paper using AI/ML." Because the ACUS team focused on whether the agency was deploying AI for a "core function," identifying an AI use case is a decent proxy for presuming that that agency ought to report some inventory pursuant to the Trustworthy AI Order. If the agency did not have an inventory but it did have a non-zero number of use cases, we classify that agency as not having implemented the requirement.[44]

(2) **Organizational level**: We calculate the compliance and noncompliance rate at both the *individual/sub-agency* and *parent* level. Appendix E.3 identifies the parent agency and its sub-agencies.

(a) At the *individual/sub-agency level*, we disaggregate all sub-agencies from their parent agency. Because nearly all inventories were published by the parent-level agency,[45] we denoted a sub-agency as having published an inventory if its use cases are described and assigned to that sub-agency within the parent agency's inventory.[46] We calculated the implementation rate by dividing the number of sub-agencies and parent-level agencies with a use case inventory by the total number of agencies for that measure (i.e., 220 for "all relevant agencies," 125 for "large agencies," and 49 for "large agencies with known AI uses").

(i) For example, the Department of Justice, which has 14 sub-agencies, published an AI use case inventory that included use cases from two of its sub-agencies that were in our set of agencies (Drug Enforcement Administration and Federal Bureau of Investigation).[47] Because DOJ, DEA, and FBI have or are listed in a use case inventory, they are marked as having implemented an inventory, while the remaining 12 sub-agencies not included in DOJ's AI use case inventory are marked otherwise; the non-implementation rate is thus 80% (12/15).

(b) At the *parent* level, we bundle all sub-agencies' use cases into the parent-level agency. There are 78 parent-level agencies.

(i) For example, instead of counting the Department of Commerce and all of its sub-agencies, we count all of the sub-agencies as part of the Department of Commerce. Whether a DOC sub-agency has an AI use case inventory, therefore, does not impact whether DOC is marked as having implemented an inventory. However, for the assessment among "large agencies with known AI uses," child-agency identified use cases were imputed to the parent agency: for example, while the ACUS Report did not identify any AI use cases by DOC at the department level, DOC was marked as having known AI use cases in the parent-level assessment because its sub-agencies had known AI use cases.

(ii) A parent-level measure is generally a more conservative measurement because it significantly reduces the number of small agencies assessed for compliance.

C.2 Summary of Findings

Table 8 provides results on the filing of AI use case inventories for large, parent-level agencies that had a known use case as of 2019. The ACUS AI Report is the best available public resource for comparing the likely agencies with AI use cases. We emphasize that the difficulty of searching for and verifying agency uses of AI against the Trustworthy AI Order's requirements is precisely why disclosure is important—and, indeed, why it would be valuable even for agencies to post empty inventories so the public is made aware that the agency believes it does not have any use cases that require disclosure.

Use of the ACUS AI Report involves several nuances. First, some of the 142 agencies examined in the Report were not relevant for the use case inventory requirement given that many were either independent regulatory agencies (exempted by the terms of the Trustworthy AI Order) or no longer functional. Second, the ACUS AI Report's definition of AI deviates in small ways from the Trustworthy AI Order's definition, although the latter appears to be broader.[48]

[43] The ACUS AI Report team identified 157 use cases across 64 agencies, representing around 45% of the agencies that the team canvassed.See [102, pp. 15-16]. However, some of these agencies were not included in our original 220 agencies assessed. For example, the ACUS AI Report identifies multiple AI use cases at the Securities and Exchange Commission, however the SEC is excluded from the Trustworthy AI Order as it is an independent regulatory agency under 35 U.S.C. § 3502(5). Therefore our final number of agencies with AI use cases is 49 instead of 64.

[44] The third column of the Full Tracker, presented in Appendix E.3 marks as "Yes" only agencies for which the ACUS AI Report Team found an AI use case within the scope of the report. Agencies marked as "No" did not have a use case that the ACUS AI Report identified. Agencies marked "N/A" were excluded from this subset because they were not "large" agencies as defined by the ACUS AI Report.

[45] The only exception was NIST's inventory, which was published separately from that of its parent agency (the Department of Commerce).

[46] For example, the Department of the Interior's AI use case inventory discloses a U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) AI use case that was "[f]unded by the Federal Highway Administration"' (FHWA), a sub-agency of the Department of Transportation, not the Department of the Interior. Despite this mention in INT's inventory, we did not mark FHWA as having an inventory because there were no FHWA use cases disclosed in DOT's inventory. The mention of FHWA in the INT inventory is an indicator of the thoroughness of USGS but cannot be assumed to indicate FHWA prepared an AI use case inventory. Similarly, that USGS disclosed in the INT inventory use cases that are a collaboration with other INT sub-agencies (namely, Fish and Wildlife Services and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management) does not necessarily indicate that those other agencies participated in the preparation of an inventory. In contrast, because the INT inventory disclosed a non-zero number of use cases by USGS (55), we mark USGS as having an inventory.

[47] DOJ's other two use cases were by the Justice Management Division and the Tax Division, which were not sub-agencies within our search criteria.

[48] As noted above, the Trustworthy AI Order incorporates the FY2019 NDAA's definition of AI "as a reference point," but it anticipates that definition will be updated by subsequent OMB guidance. See [25], Section 9(a). The CIO's 2021 guidance did not displace the NDAA's definition; instead, it stated that agencies "shall assess their use of AI and include criteria that aligns with the definition of AI as described in section 238(g) of the National Defense Authorization Act" [75]. That definition, in full, explains that AI means:[8]

(1) Any artificial system that performs tasks under varying and unpredictable circumstances without significant human oversight, or that can learn from experience and improve performance when exposed to datasets.

(2) An artificial system developed in computer software, physical hardware, or other context that solves tasks requiring human-like perception, cognition, planning, learning, communication, or physical action.

Third, the Report included anticipated uses of AI, whereas these have a more ambiguous treatment under the order: The order indicated that AI inventories should include "current and planned uses" in Section 5(b), but it also stated in Section 9(d)(iii) that it only applied to "existing and new uses of AI" and excluded "AI research and development (R&D) activities." That said, agencies that have filed AI use case inventories have commonly included use cases of AI that are under development. Fourth, the Report team searched for AI use from January to August 2019 (see [102, pp. 15-16]), and such use cases may not be operational today. If anything, however, we would expect machine learning to have been more widely adopted over the past three years.

To address these concerns, we double-checked the 23 parent agencies' identified use cases against the Trustworthy AI Order's definition and assessed whether those use cases were still plausibly in use today. When unclear, we identify additional and current use cases that would fall under the Trustworthy AI Order's inventory obligation.[49] In two instances, it is less clear whether agencies have active use cases.[50] Regardless of specific agency use cases, what this demonstrates is substantial inconsistency in how agencies have implemented the requirement.

Some of these use cases both touch on core agency functionalities and have been the subject of public disclosure. Beyond CBP's TVS discussed above, we describe two further examples. First, the Internal Revenue Service's Return Review Program (RRP) uses "cutting-edge machine-learning technologies to detect, resolve, and prevent criminal and civil tax refund fraud and noncompliance" [51, 113]. While the IRS has published a privacy impact assessment stating the general purpose and data used by RRP [15], and the system has been critiqued by oversight agencies [2–4, 21], the IRS did not disclose this use case because neither it nor its parent agency published an AI use case inventory. Second, the Social Security Administration (SSA) uses an Anti-Fraud Enterprise System (AFES), an "industry-proven predictive analytics software to identify high-risk transactions for further review" [5, 42]. While SSA does not seem to have fully implemented AFES, it has published a privacy impact assessment for the initiative [6] but did not include it in its AI use case inventory [76].

Use case inventories also vary in terms of the information they provide for each listed AI use case. We highlight here examples of when inventories report performance benchmarks or other methodological details that would bear on the trustworthiness of their AI use cases. For example, one of the use cases by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)—labeled "BET/FBI Fingerprint Success Maximization"—includes a statement estimating its efficacy but also its costs, noting a model could "catch 98% of rejected submissions" and potentially have saved "42,763 additional appointments in 2020" at cost of "forcing recapture during 11% of encounters" [43]. More attention needs to be paid to evaluation and performance assessments to enable the public, Congress, and other oversight bodies to assess the benefits and drawbacks of the use of AI.

The Department of Labor's use case with narratives about work-related injuries and illnesses from the Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses also illustrates the value of transparency regarding model development. There, employees manually classified qualitative answers to the survey into six categories, and then machine-learning algorithms were adopted to code the surveys using those labeled data as a training set. As detailed in its use case inventory, "[u]se of these autocoders subsequently expanded and coded 85% of all SOII elements for reference year (RY) 2019. This gradual increase occurred by adapting the selection criterion based on careful monitoring of the processes. This monitoring allowed the coding to expand to all six elements coded (occupation, nature, part, event, source, secondary source)" [65]. While the agency has not provided measures of time saved or accuracy, it has provided laudable details about the development process.

By contrast, the FBI's Threat Intake Processing System (TIPS), which is described as using "artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms to accurately identify, prioritize, and process actionable tips,"[61] provides less insight on evaluation. The FBI noted that it can "conduct ongoing testing on the code" and "monitor and/or audit performance," but it provides no other detail on development of performance measures.[51]

Finally, we note that the implementation rate of the AI use case inventories is higher when focusing on the agencies enumerated in the CFO Act of 1990[52] or that are members of the CIO Council.[53]

(3) An artificial system designed to think or act like a human, including cognitive architectures and neural networks.
(4) A set of techniques, including machine learning, that is designed to approximate a cognitive task.
(5) An artificial system designed to act rationally, including an intelligent software agent or embodied robot that achieves goals using perception, planning, reasoning, learning, communicating, decision-making, and acting.

In contrast, the ACUS AI Report provides the following discussion of its scope:([102, p. 12])

> By "artificial intelligence," we limit our scope to the most recent forms of machine learning, which train models to learn from data. These include a range of methods (e.g., neural networks, random forests) capable of recognizing patterns in a range of types of data (e.g., numbers, text, image)—feats of recognition that, if undertaken by humans, would be generally understood to require intelligence. . . . Conceptually, AI includes a range of analytical techniques, such as rule-based or 'expert' symbolic systems, but we limit our focus to forms of machine learning. Our scope also excludes conventional forms of statistical inference (e.g., focused on causal, as opposed to predictive, inference) and forms of process automation that do not involve machine learning (e.g., an online case management system).

[49] For DOED, see [126]; for HUD, see [110]; and for SBA, see [140].

[50] EEOC's use of AI was only obliquely mentioned in public documentation, preventing a thorough assessment of whether the AI use should be disclosed under the executive order. The original use case cited in the ACUS AI Report was derived from a recommendation about potential improvements to EEOC's "data analysis and predictive analytics activities," including "text analytics." See [102, pp. 30–31]. Other documentation suggests that EEOC's staff should be trained in the use of AI [7]. And USITC's use case posed boundary questions about whether the AI use was merely for R&D versus for future operations.

[51] By the terms of the Trustworthy AI Order, agencies must report only "non-classified and non-sensitive use cases of AI" in their inventories, and publication should be "to the extent practicable" in light of, among other things, potential "sensitive law enforcement" information. See [25], Section 5(a), (e). Although providing information about TIPS presumably raises concerns about sensitive law enforcement decisions, we emphasize each agency's obligation to balance these concerns with the imperative of transparency, especially given that prioritization of law enforcement resources is shaped by the AI use case.

[52] The 24 agencies listed in the CFO Act include USDA, DOC, DOED, DOE, HHS, DHS, HUD, DOJ, DOL, STAT, INT, TRS, DOT, DVA, EPA, GSA, NASA, NSF, OPM, SBA, SSA, and USAID. DOD and the NRC were excluded based on the scope of the Trustworthy AI Order, such that 22 agencies were relevant.

[53] These agencies include USDA, DOC, DOED, DOE, HHS, DHS, HUD, DOJ, DOL, STAT, INT, TRS, DOT, DVA, EPA, GSA, NASA, NARA, NSF, OMB, OPM, SBA, SSA, and USAID.[20] Based on the scope of the Trustworthy AI Order, we excluded the Intelligence Community, NRC, and various defense-related agencies.

Table 8: Inventory Implementation of Large, Parent-level Agencies with Known AI Use Cases

Parent-level Executive Agency	Inventory
Department of Commerce (DOC)	Yes
Department of Education (DOED)	No
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)	Yes
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)	Yes
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)	No (public disclosure of no use cases[a])
Department of Justice (DOJ)	Yes
Department of Labor (DOL)	Yes
Department of the Interior (INT)	Yes
Department of the Treasury (TRS)	No
Department of Transportation (DOT)	Yes
Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA)	Yes
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)	Yes
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)	No
General Services Administration (GSA)	No
Legal Services Corporation (LSC)	No
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)	Yes
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA)	No
Railroad Retirement Board (RRB)	No
Small Business Administration (SBA)	No
Social Security Administration (SSA)	Yes[b]
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)	Yes
United States International Trade Commission (USITC)	No
United States Postal Service (USPS)	No

[a]Agencies that disclosed no use cases in their inventories were generally marked as "compliant." However, we have marked HUD as non-compliant only for the "known AI use cases" measure, given strong evidence that it has AI use cases.
[b]SSA only identified five AI use cases.[76]

The number of CFO Act agencies that have published an inventory or a public disclosure of no relevant AI use cases is 17 (77%). The number of CIO Council member agencies that published an inventory or disclosed no use cases is 71%. Although the ACUS AI Report casts doubt on HUD's public disclosure that it has no AI use cases, we mark it as having implemented an inventory for these calculations. The relatively higher implementation rate for these agencies may illustrate that the CIO Council faces challenges in ensuring agencies not directly involved with the Council prepare and publish an AI use case inventory. Regardless, neither the Trustworthy AI Order nor the CIO's implementing guidance limited the scope of relevant agencies to those enumerated by the CFO Act or involved with the CIO Council.

D PRE- AND POST-WHITE PAPER AI USE CASE INVENTORY TRACKER

Figure 1 details the differences in compliance with the AI use case inventory requirement before and after the publication of our white paper (see [120]) for large, parent-level agencies with known AI use cases. The right-most column is updated through July 3, 2023. The grey row includes the total number of agencies that meet the criteria for each column. The figure excludes some agencies subject to the Chief Financial Officers Act because they are independent regulatory agencies exempted from the requirement for an AI use case inventory. Compare this figure to Table 8. HUD, SBA, and USITC are marked as non-compliant because there is strong evidence that these agencies have AI use cases.

Large, Parent-level Agency	CFO Act Agency	Known AI Use Cases (Table 1, White Paper)	Agency Inventory (White Paper)	Agency Inventory (after publication)
	22	22	15	23
Department of Agriculture	✓		Yes	Yes
Department of Commerce (DOC)	✓	✓	Yes	Yes
Department of Education (DOED)	✓	✓	No	Yes
Department of Energy (DOE)	✓		Yes	Yes
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)	✓	✓	Yes	Yes
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)	✓	✓	Yes	Yes
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)	✓	✓	Yes (but disclosed no use cases)	Yes (but disclosed no use cases)
Department of Interior (INT)	✓	✓	No	Yes
Department of Justice (DOJ)	✓	✓	Yes	Yes
Department of Labor (DOL)	✓	✓	Yes	Yes
Department of State (STAT)	✓		Yes	Yes
Department of Transportation (DOT)	✓	✓	No	Yes
Department of the Treasury (TRS)	✓	✓	No	Yes
Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA)	✓	✓	Yes	Yes
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)	✓	✓	Yes	Yes
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)		✓	No	No
General Services Administration (GSA)	✓	✓	No	Yes
Legal Services Corporation (LSC)		✓	No	No
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA)		✓	No	No
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)	✓	✓	Yes	Yes
National Science Foundation (NSF)	✓		Yes (but disclosed no use cases)	Yes (but disclosed no use cases)
Office of Personnel Management (OPM)	✓		No	Yes
Railroad Retirement Board (RRB)		✓	No	No
Small Business Administration (SBA)	✓	✓	No	Yes (but disclosed no use cases)
Social Security Administration (SSA)	✓	✓	Yes	Yes
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)	✓		Yes	Yes
U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC)		✓	No	Yes (but disclosed no use cases)
U.S. Postal Service (USPS)		✓	No	No

Figure 1: Inventory Implementation of Large, Parent-level Agencies with Known AI Use Cases Before White Paper Publication versus After (as of July 3, 2023)

E FULL TRACKER

E.1 Line-Level Requirements Tracker

Section	Responsible Stakeholder	Summary of Requirement	Deadline	Type of Requirement	Status of Implementation
EO 13859 - Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence 84 Federal Register 3967, February 11, 2019, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/02/14/2019-02544/maintaining-american-leadership-in-artificial-intelligence					
Sect. 2(a)-(e)	Implementing Agencies (see "Key Information" box)	"[S]hall pursue six strategic objectives in furtherance of both promoting and protecting American advancements in AI: (a) Promote sustained investment in AI R&D in collaboration with industry, academia, international partners and allies, and other non-Federal entities to generate technological breakthroughs in AI and related technologies and to rapidly transition those breakthroughs into capabilities that contribute to our economic and national security. (b) Enhance access to high quality and fully traceable Federal data, models, and computing resources, while maintaining safety, security, privacy, and confidentiality protections consistent with applicable laws and policies. (c) Reduce barriers to the use of AI technologies to promote their innovative application while protecting American technology, economic and national security, civil liberties, privacy, and values. (d) Ensure that technical standards minimize vulnerability to attacks from malicious actors and reflect Federal priorites for innovation, public trust, and public confidence in systems that use AI technologies; and develop international standards to promote and protect these priorities. (e) Train the next generation of American AI researchers and users through apprenticeships; skills programs; and education in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM), with an emphasis on computer science, to ensure that American workers, including Federal workers, are capable of taking full advantage of the opportunities of AI."	None	Ongoing requirement	Not known because this is ongoing requirement without mandated outcomes to assess and therefore requires continued implementation
Sect. 2(f)	Implementing Agencies	"Develop and implement an action plan, in accordance with the National Security Presidential Memorandum of February 11, 2019 (Protecting the United States Advantage in Artificial Intelligence and Related Critical Technologies) (the NSPM) to protect the advantage of the United States in AI and technology critical to United States economic and national security interests against strategic competitors and foreign adversaries."	None	Open-ended requirement	This requirement is expanded upon in section 8 of the executive order. See requirement for section 8(c) below.

Figure 2: Line-Level Implementation Tracker, AI Leadership Order (E.O. 13859) (1 of 7)

Sect. 4(a)	Heads of AI R&D agencies (see "Key Information" box)	"[S]hall consider AI as an agency R&D priority" and "take this priority into account when developing budget proposals and planning for the use of funds in Fiscal Year 2020 and in future years." "[S]hall also consider appropriate administrative actions to increase focus on AI for 2019."	None	Ongoing requirement	Indications of sustained implementation on this ongoing requirement The National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan: 2019 Update, published by the NSTC Select Committee on AI in June 2019, "highlights the key priorities for Federal investment in AI R&D" as a response to EO 13859's directive and to support the American AI initiative. The 2016 - 2019 Progress Report: Advancing Artificial Intelligence R&D, published in November 2019 by NITRD and the Select Committee, "document[s] the Nation's progress in meeting the aims of the *National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan: 2019 Update*."
Sect. 4(b)-(b)(i)	Heads of AI R&D agencies	"[S]hall budget an amount of AI R&D that is appropriate for this prioritization" and after the submission of President's Budget request for Congress, "shall communicate plans for achieving this prioritization to the OMB Director and the OSTP Director each fiscal year through the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) Program."	None	Ongoing requirement	Indications of sustained implementation for this ongoing requirement (see below status for Sect. 4(b)(ii))
Sect. 4(b)(ii)	Heads of AI R&D agencies	"[S]hall identify each year, consistent with applicable law, the programs to which the AI R&D priority will apply and estimate the total amount of such funds that will be spent on each program. This information shall be communicated to the OMB Director and OSTP Director each fiscal year through the NITRD Program."	Annually within 90 days of enactment of appropriations for an agency	Ongoing requirement	Indications of sustained implementation for this ongoing requirement The Networking & Information Technology Research & Development (NITRD) Program's Supplement to the President's FY2020 Budget reported, for the first time, the federal investments in AI for FYs 2018-2020. It also described "key programs and coordination activities" for FY2020. The 2016 - 2019 Progress Report: Advancing Artificial Intelligence R&D, although not exhaustive, also details agency AI R&D activities and how they fit within the national AI R&D priorities. Launched on August 14, 2020, and as required by the National AI Initiative Act of 2020, NITRD's AI R&D dashboard tracks nondefense AI R&D investments by agency, by program component areas, and overall. Agencies AI R&D budgets, estimates, and activities were also published in the NITRD Supplement to the President's FY2021 Budget and the NITRD and the National AI Initiative Office Supplement to the President's FY2022 Budget.
Sect. 4(c)	Heads of AI R&D agencies	"[S]hall explore opportunities for collaboration with non-Federal entities, including: the private sector; academia; non-profit organizations; State, local, tribal, and territorial governments; and foreign partners and allies, so all collaborators can benefit from each other's investment and expertise in AI R&D."	None	Ongoing requirement	Not known as this is an ongoing requirement without mandated outcomes to assess

Figure 3: Line-Level Implementation Tracker, AI Leadership Order (E.O. 13859) (2 of 7)

Sect. 5(a)	Head of all agencies	"[R]eview their Federal data and models to identify opportunities to increase access and use by the greater non-Federal AI research community in a manner that benefits that community, while protecting safety, security, privacy, and confidentiality. Specifically, agencies shall improve data and model inventory documentation to enable discovery and usability, and shall prioritize improvements to access and quality of AI data and models based on the AI research community's user feedback."	None	Open-ended requirement	Not known as no mandated public reporting on status The National AI Initiative Office has a page on Data Resources in its AI Researchers Portal that provides links to seven "quality Federal datasets that are useful for AI research." Completion of requirement likely hindered by the OMB's lack of compliance with its statutory requirements under the OPEN Government Data Act to issue guidance on making data open and establishing data inventories (see below status for Sect. 5(a)(i) on investigating barriers to access or quality limitations of Federal data).**
Sect. 5(a)(i)	OMB Director	To "help identify datasets that will facilitate non-Federal AI R&D and testing, "the OMB Director shall publish a notice in the Federal Register inviting the public to identify additional requests for access or quality improvements for Federal data and models that would improve AI R&D and testing."	Within 90 days of EO	Time-boxed requirement	Implemented - Notice of request for information: Identifying Priority Access or Quality Improvements for Federal data and models for Artificial Intelligence Research and Development (R&D), and Testing (July 10, 2019 - about two months after deadline)
Sect. 5(a)(i)	OMB Director with Select Committee on AI	To "help identify datasets that will facilitate non-Federal AI R&D and testing"... "shall investigate barriers to access or quality limitations of Federal data and models that impede AI R&D and testing."	Within 90 days of EO	Time-boxed requirement	Implemented - The Federal Data Strategy 2020 Action Plan, in Action 8: Improve Data and Model Resources for AI Research and Development, details the Federal Government's plan to achieve this directive, noting that that this dirctive will be completed once the OMB publishes an RFI (which was completed, see above status update). The 2020 Action Plan tracker marks this milestone as complete on August 2019, when OMB published and required comments for its RFI (see above status update). It further notes: "The RFI received 28 comments. The ability to preserve a respondent's privacy was the largest barrier identified and there were also many comments requesting more high quality and curated open data, including requests for data cleaning, normalized fields, and metadata improvements that would facilitate fitness for use and provenance tracking." However, the Federal Data Strategy 2020 Action Plan also notes that the Federal government will "address[] identified barriers by updating Federal data and source code inventory guidance for agencies to utilize in enhancing the discovery and usability of Federal data and models in AI R&D." (see below status update on Sect. 5(a)(ii)).

**Despite the lack of guidance for Phase II: Open Data Access and Management, some agencies (e.g., the Department of Justice, AmeriCorp) had begun publishing their data inventories. *See* GAO-22-104574, OPEN DATA: Additional Action Required for Full Public Access (December 2021). OMB M-21-06 also refers agencies, pursuant to section 5 of the EO, to follow additional OMB guidance "regarding discovery and usability of Federal data and models for non-Federal use."

Figure 4: Line-Level Implementation Tracker, AI Leadership Order (E.O. 13859) (3 of 7)

Sect. 5(a)(ii)	OMB with its interagency councils and NSTC Select Committee on AI	"[S]hall update implementation guidance for Enterprise Data inventories and Source Code Inventories to support discovery and usability in AI R&D."	Within 120 days of EO	Time-boxed requirement	Not known as no mandated public reporting on status (expected completion ~June 2019) A document entitled Implementation Guidance to Federal Agencies Regarding Enterprise Data and Source Code Inventories (although the document cannot be identified through a search of code.gov). However, an official statements about this document or its release is not readily available through an online search, nor is the document explicitly linked to the OMB. Similarly, an overview of OMB Guidance on IT authorities that is maintained by the Federal Chief Information Officiers Council (CIO Council) does not mention any guidance published in 2019 or 2020 that would fit this description (only notes a 2016 OMB Memorandum on source code guidance (OMB M-16-21)). (see https://www.cio.gov/handbook/cio-responsibilities/it-leadership-and-accountability/agency-it-authorities-omb-guidance/). Given these facts and the language in the document ("While feedback from the public is pending, an initial report has been completed with the input from various agencies to identify known barriers."), this Guidance does not appear to be final. Additionally, the Federal Data Strategy 2020 Action Plan, in Action 8: Improve Data and Model Resources for AI Research and Development, notes that OMB would "provide technical schema formats on inventories" to agencies by December 31, 2020. However the 2020 Action Plan tracker marks this milestone as still pending OMB Open Data Plan Guidance, which the GAO's tracker associated with its December 2021 report (GAO-22-104574, OPEN DATA: Additional Action Required for Full Public Access) notes that "[i]n March 2022, OMB staff told us that action to implement this recommendation is in progress, but they have not determined a time frame for issuing the guidance." This guidance has still not been published, with the CDO Council's April 2022 Enterprise Data Inventories report noting that the guidance was forthcoming. See 1.1.4 Agency IT Authorities – OMB Guidance, also, GAO's October report GAO-21-29, Open Data - Agencies Need Guidance to Establish Comprehensive Data Inventories; Information on Their Progress is Limited.

Figure 5: Line-Level Implementation Tracker, AI Leadership Order (E.O. 13859) (4 of 7)

Sect. 5(a)(iii)	Agencies	"[I]n accordance with the implementation of the Cross-Agency Priority Goal: Leveraging Federal Data as a Strategic Asset, from the March 2018 President's Management Agenda," "shall consider methods to improve the quality, usability, and appropriate access to priority data by the AI research community" and "identify associated resource implications."	Within 180 days of EO	Time-boxed requirement	Not known as no mandated public reporting on status (expected completion ~August 2019) The document entitled Implementation Guidance to Federal Agencies Regarding Enterprise Data and Source Code Inventories recommends practices for agencies to improve the quality, usability, and access to priority data for AI R&D, noting that doins so "is also consistent with the Cross Agency Priority Goal #2 of the President's Management Agenda which is leveraging data as a strategic asset." However, it is not known if this is final guidance (see above status update on Sect. 5(a)(ii)). Compliance by individual agencies is not known. The Federal Data Stratgy 2021 Action Plan, in Action 5. Public Agency Open Data Plans, also marks as a milestone that each agency will "Publish an Open Data Plan that identifies specific priority data assets, including assets that support COVID-19 response and AI R&D." These plans will be reported through agency Information Resource Management (IRM) Strategic Plans. Compliance across agencies is not known.
Sect. 5(a)(iv)	Agencies in coordination with the Senior Agency Officials for Privacy (EO 13719), heads of Federal statistical entities, Federal program managers and other relevant personnel	"In identifying data and models for consideration for increased public access,"..."shall identify any barriers to, or requirements associated with, increased access to and use of such data and models, including: privacy and civil liberty protections for individuals who may be affected by increased access and use. . . ;" "safety and security concerns. . .;" "data documentation and formatting. . . ;" "changes necessary to ensure appropriate data and system governance;" and "any other relevant considerations."	None	Open-ended requirement	Not known because no mandated public reporting on status
Sect. 5(a)(v)	Agencies	"In accordance with the President's Management Agenda and the Cross-Agency Priority Goal: Leveraging Data as a Strategic Asset. . . shall identify opportunities to use new technologies and best practices to increase access to and usability of open data and models, and explore appropriate controls on access to sensitive or restricted data and models, consistent with applicable laws and policies, privacy and confidentiality protections, and civil liberty protections."	None	Ongoing requirement	Not known because no mandated public reporting on status of ongoing requirement without mandated outcome
Sect. 5(b)	Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, Health and Human Services, and Energy; Administrator of NASA; Director of NSF	"[S]hall, to the extent appropriate and consistent with applicable law, prioritize the allocation of high-performance computing resources for AI-related applications through: (i) increased assignment of discretionary allocation of resources and resource reserves; or (ii) any other appropriate mechanisms."	None	Ongoing requirement	Indications of implementation of ongoing requirement (note: no mandated outcomes to assess or mandated public reporting on status) The National AI Initiative Office's AI Researchers Portal includes Computer Resources overview. There are six "Federally-supported computing infrastructure resources that are useful for AI research."

Figure 6: Line-Level Implementation Tracker, AI Leadership Order (E.O. 13859) (5 of 7)

Sect. 5(c)	NSTC Select Committee on AI, in coordination with the GSA	"[S]hall submit a report to the President making recommendations on better enabling the use of cloud computing resources for federally funded AI R&D"	Within 180 days of EO	Time-boxed requirement	Implemented - The NSTC Select Committee on AI published Recommendations for Leveraging Cloud Computing Resources for Federally Funded Artificial Intelligence Research and Development (November 17, 2020 - about sixteen months after expected completion). In July 2022, the NSTC Select Committee published Lessons Learned from Federal Use of Cloud Computing to Support Artificial Intelligence Research and Development.
Sect. 5(d)	NSTC Select Committee on AI	"[S]hall provide technical expertise to the American Technology Council on matters regarding AI and the modernization of Federal technology, data, and the delivery of digital services, as appropriate."	None	Ongoing requirement	Not known because no mandated public reporting on status of ongoing requirement without mandated outcome
Sect. 6(a)-(b)	OMB Director in coordination with OSTP Director, Director of Domestic Policy Council, and Director of NEC, and in consultation with other relevant agencies and stakeholders	"[S]hall issue a memorandum to the heads of all agencies that shall: (i) inform the development of regulatory and non-regulatory approaches by such agencies regarding technologies and industrial sectors that are either empowered or enabled by AI, and that advance American innovation while upholding civil liberties, privacy, and American values; and (ii) consider ways to reduce barriers to the use of AI technologies in order to promote their innovative application while protecting civil liberties, privacy, American values, and United States economic and national security." OMB shall issue a draft version for public comment before memorandum is finalized.	Within 180 days of EO	Time-boxed requirement	Implemented - Request for Comments on a Draft Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, "Guidance for Regulation of Artificial Intelligence Applications" was published Janaury 1, 2020 on the Federal Register for public comment - OMB M-21-06, Guidance for Regulation of Artificial Intelligence Applications was published November 17, 2020 (memorandum was supposed to be published around August 2019)
Sect. 6(c)	Heads of implementing agencies "that also have regulatory authorities"	"[S]hall review authorities and submit to OMB plans to achieve consistency with OMB memorandum described in subsection 6(a)," which became OMB M-21-06	Within 180 days of OMB memoran-dum	Time-boxed requirement	Not Implemented (expected ~May 2021) See Section III and Appendix B
Sect. 6(d)	Secretary of Commerce through the NIST Director, with participation from relevant agencies (determined by the Secretary of Commerce)	"[S]hall issue a plan for Federal engagement in the development of technical standards and related tools in support of reliable, robust, and trustworthy systems that use AI technologies." Plan should be consistent with OMB Circular A-119 and include "(A) Federal priority needs for standardization...; (B) identification of standards development entities in which Federal agencies should seek membership with the goal of establishing or supporting United States technical leadership roles; and (C) opportunities for and challenges to United States leadership in standardization related to AI technologies." The NSTC Select Committee on AI, private sector, academia, non-governmental entities, and other stakeholders shoudl also be consulted, as needed.	Within 180 days of EO	Time-boxed requirement	Implemented - NIST published A Plan for Federal Engagement in Developing AI Technical Standards and Related Tools in August 2019 (on time). To develop the report, NIST also consulted the public and private sector, including through a May 2019 workshop and opportunities for public comment.

Figure 7: Line-Level Implementation Tracker, AI Leadership Order (E.O. 13859) (6 of 7)

Sect. 7(a)(i)-(ii)	Heads of implementing agencies "that also provide educational grants"	"[S]hall, to the extent consistent with applicable law, consider AI as a priority area within existing Federal fellowship and service programs," including programs focused on high school, undergraduate, and graduate fellowships, alternative education and training, that support early-career university faculty who conduct AI R&D, "scholarship for service programs," "direct commissioning programs of the United States Armed Forces," and "programs that support the development of instructional programs and curricula that encourage the integration of AI technologies into courses. . ." These agencies "shall annually communicate plans for achieving this prioritization to the co-chairs of the [NSTC] Select Committee [on AI]."	Annually	Ongoing requirement	Not known because no mandated public reporting on status
Sect. 7(b)	NSTC Select Committee on AI	"[S]hall provide recommendations to NSTC Committee on STEM Education regarding AI-related educational and workforce development considerations that focus on American citizens."	Within 90 days of EO	Time-boxed requirement	Not known because no mandated public reporting on statuts (expected completion ~May 2019)
Sect. 7(c)	NSTC Select Committee on AI	"[S]hall provide technical expertise to the National Council for the American Worker on matters regarding AI and the American workforce, as appropriate."	None	Ongoing requirement	Not known because no mandated public reporting on status of ongoing requirement without mandated outcome
Sect. 8(a)-(b)	Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in coordination with OSTP Director and recipients of the NSPM (Sect. 2(f))	"[S]hall organize the development of," and submit to the President for approval, "an action plan to protect the United States advantage in AI and AI technology critical to United States economic and national security interests against strategic competitors and adversarial nations." Note: The action plan "may be classified in full or in part, as appropriate."	Within 120 days of EO	Time-boxed requirement	Not known because no mandated public reporting on status (expected completion ~June 2019); however, there are indications that the National Security Presidential Memorandum may not itself have been issued. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) tracks National Security Presidential Memorandums (NSPMs), Presidential Policy Directives (PPDs), and Presidential Study Directives (PSDs). It's tracking of the Trump Administration (https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nspm/index.html) notes that this directive was not fulfilled. Similarly, the Biden Aministration has not issues a related National Security Memoranda (NSM), to the public's knowledge (https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nsm/index.html).
Sect. 8(c)	Agencies who are recipients of the Action Plan (Sect. 8(a))	Implement the action plan as described in subsection 8(a)-(b)	Within 120 days of EO	Time-boxed requirement	Not known because no mandated public reporting on status (expected completion ~June 2019)

Figure 8: Line-Level Implementation Tracker, AI Leadership Order (E.O. 13859) (7 of 7)

EO 13960 - Promoting the Use of Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence in the Federal Government 5 Federal Register 78939, December 8, 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/12/08/2020-27065/promoting-the-use-of-trustworthy-artificial-intelligence-in-the-federal-government					
Sect. 2(b)	Agencies (defined by 44 U.S.C. 3502(1), excluding independent regulatory agencies as defined by 3502(5)); excluding the Department of Defense and agencies wholly within the Intelligence Community (see Sect. 8)	"It is the policy of the United States that responsible agencies, as defined in section 8 of this order, shall, when considering the design, development, acquisition, and use of AI in Government, be guided by the common set of Principles set forth in section 3 of this order, which are designed to foster public trust and confidence in the use of AI, protect our Nation's values, and ensure that the use of AI remains consistent with all applicable laws, including those related to privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties."	None	Ongoing requirement	Not known because no mandated public reporting on status of ongoing requirement Example agency documents that indicate implementation: - NASA's Responsible AI Plan (2022) - USAID Artificial Intelligence Action Plan (2022) - HHS Artificial Intelligence (AI) Strategy (2021) - DHS S&T Artificial Intelligence & Machine Learning Strategic Plan (2021)
Sect. 4(a)	OMB; agencies	"To the extent" existing OMB policies that "currently address many aspect of information and information technology design, development, acquisition, and use. . . are consistent with the Principles set forth in this order and applicable law, these existing policies shall continue to apply to relevant aspects of AI use in Government."	None	Ongoing requirement	Not known because no mandated public reporting on status of ongoing requirement without mandated outcome
Sect. 4(b)	OMB Director, in coordination with key stakeholders (defined by Director)	"[S]hall publicly post a roadmap for the policy guidance that OMB intends to create or revise to better support the use of AI, consistent with this order. This roadmap shall include, where appropriate, a schedule for engaging with the public and timelines for finalizing relevant policy guidance. In addressing novel aspects of the use of AI in Government, OMB shall consider updates to the breadth of its policy guidance, including OMB Circulars and Management Memoranda."	Within 180 days of EO	Time-boxed requirement	Not Implemented (expected ~June 2021) The 2021 Federal Data Strategy Action Plan, in Action 7. Artificial Intelligence and Automation, does indicate four milestones, such as making an Algorithmic Assessment Tool publicly available for agency use and coordinating the AI use case inventories, with associated target dates. However, it does not mention policy guidance documents like Management Memorandum or OMB Circulars.
Sect. 4(c)	Agencies; OMB	"[S]hall continue to use voluntary consensus standards developed with industry participation, where available, when such use would not be inconsistent with applicable law or otherwise impracticable. Such standards shall also be taken into consideration by OMB when revising or developing AI guidance."	None	Ongoing requirement	Not known because no mandated public reporting on status of ongoing requirement without mandated outcome

Figure 9: Line-Level Implementation Tracker, Trustworthy AI Order (E.O. 13960) (1 of 3)

Sect. 5(a)	Federal Chief Information Officers Council (CIO Council) in coordination with other interagency bodies (as determined by CIO Council)	"[S]hall identify, provide guidance on, and make publicly available the criteria, format, and mechanisms for agency inventories of non-classified and non-sensitive use cases of AI by agencies"	Within 60 days of EO	Time-boxed requirement	Implemented - CIO Council maintains an overview of this directive and the implementation guidance on its website. In fall 2021, the CIO Council published 2021 Guidance for Creating Agency Inventories for AI Use Case, in addition to a FAQ document, Example AI Use Case Inventory Scenarios, and a template for agencies to use for creating their inventory.
Sect. 5(b)	Agencies (see Sect. 2(b) Responsible Stakeholder)	"[S]hall prepare an inventory of its non-classified and non-sensitive use cases of AI, within the scope defined by section 9 of this order, including current and planned uses, consistent with the agency's mission."	Within 180 days of CIO Council's issuance of guidance (see Sect. 5(a)); annually thereafter	Time-boxed requirement	Not known because no mandated reporting on status separate from Sect. 5(e) / see below status on Sect. 5(c)-(e)
Sect. 5(c)	Agencies (see Sect. 2(b) Responsible Stakeholder)	"As part of their respective inventories of AI use cases, agencies shall identify, review, and assess existing AI deployed and operating in support of agency missions for any inconsistencies with this order."	None	Open-ended requirement	Not known because no mandated public reporting on status separate from Sect. 5(e) / See below status on Sect. 5(c)(i) and 5(c)(ii)
Sect. 5(c)(i)	Agencies (see Sect. 2(b) Responsible Stakeholder)	"[S]hall develop plans either to achieve consistency with this order for each AI application or to retire AI applications found to be developed or used in a manner that is not consistent with this order." "These plans must be approved by the agency-designated responsible official(s), as described in section 8 of this order, within this same 120-day time period."	Within 120 days of completing AI inventory	Time-boxed requirement	Not known because no mandated public reporting (expected completion ~July 2022)
Sect. 5(c)(ii)	Agencies (see Sect. 2(b) Responsible Stakeholder)	"[S]trive to implement the approved plans. . . subject to existing resource levels" and "in coordiantion with the Agency Data Governance Body and relevant officials from agencies"	Within 180 days of plan approval	Time-boxed requirement	Not implemented, but not past deadline
Sect. 5(d)	Agencies (see Sect. 2(b) Responsible Stakeholder); CIO and CDO Councils	"[S]hall share their inventories with other agencies, to the extent practicable and consistent with applicable law and policy, including those concerning protection of privacy and of sensitive law enforcement, national security, and other protected information. This sharing shall be coordinated through the CIO and Chief Data Officer Councils. . . ."	Within 60 days of completing AI inventory	Time-boxed requirement	Not known because no mandated public reporting on status (expected completion ~May/June 2022)
Sect. 5(e)	Agencies (see Sect. 2(b) Responsible Stakeholder)	"[S]hall make their inventories available to the public, to the extent practicable and in accordance with applicable law and policy, including those concerning the protection of privacy and of sensitive law enforcement, national security, and other protected information."	Within 120 days of completing AI inventory	Time-boxed requirement	Not Implemented (expected ~July 2022) See Section IV and Appendix C NAIIO published 12 agencies' inventories to date

Figure 10: Line-Level Implementation Tracker, Trustworthy AI Order (E.O. 13960) (2 of 3)

Sect. 6	Agencies (see Sect. 2(b) Responsible Stakeholder)	"[A]re expected to participate in interagency bodies for the purpose of advancing the implementation of the Principles and the use of AI consistent with this order."	None	Ongoing requirement	Not known because no mandated outcome to assess for ongoing requirement
Sect. 6	CIO Council	"[S]hall publish a list of recommended interagency bodies and forums in which agencies may elect to participate, as appropriate and consistent with their respective authorities and missions" to fulfill the expectation that they participate in interagency bodies to advance the AI principles (see above requirement).	Within 45 days of EO	Time-boxed requirement	Not known because no mandated public reporting on status (expected completion ~February 2021)
Sect. 7(a)	Presidential Innovation Fellows (PIF) program (administed by GSA) in collaboration with other agencies	"[S]hall identify priority areas of expertise and establish an AI track to attract experts from industry and academia to undertake a period of work at an agency. These PIF experts will work within agencies to further the design, development, acquisition, and use of AI in Government, consistent with this order."	Within 90 days of EO	Time-boxed requirement	Implemented - Although the EO had not mandated public reporting on status, the 2022 PIF Application did have a "Data Strategy and AI" track. However, this ia an ongoing requirement for PIF Fellows.
Sect. 7(b)	OPM, in coordination with GSA and other relevant agencies	"[S]hall create inventory of Federal Government rotational programs and determine how these programs can be used to expand the number of employees with AI expertise."	Within 45 days of EO	Time-boxed requirement	Not known becuase no mandated public reporting on status (expected completion ~February 2021)
Sect. 7(c)	OPM	"[S]hall issue a report with recommendations for how the programs in the inventory can be best used to expand the number of employees with AI expertise at the agencies. This report shall be shared with the interagency coordination bodies identified pursuant to section 6 of this order, enabling agencies to better use these programs for the use of AI, consistent with this order."	Within 180 days of creating inventory pursuant to Sect. 7(b)	Time-boxed requirement	Not known because no mandated public reporting on status (expected completion ~August/September 2021), but 2022 Federal Workforce Priorities Report, published on May 10, 2022, does not include recommendations pursuant to this EO
Sect. 8(c)	Agencies (see Sect. 2(b) Responsible Stakeholder)	"[S]hall specify the responsible official(s) at that agency who will coordinate implementation of the Principles set forth in section 3 of this order with the Agency Data Governance Body and other relevant officials and will collaborate with the interagency coordination bodies identified pursuant to section 6 of this order."	Within 30 days of EO	Time-boxed requirement	Not known because no mandated public reporting on status (expected completion ~January 2021)

Figure 11: Line-Level Implementation Tracker, Trustworthy AI Order (E.O. 13960) (3 of 3)

AI in Government Act of 2020 In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260) as Division U, Title I, December 27, 2020, https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ260/PLAW-116publ260.pdf					
Sect. 103	GSA	Create an "AI Center of Excellence" within the GSA that shall "(1) facilitate the adoption of artificial intelligence technologies in the Federal Government; (2) improve cohesion and competency in the adoption and use of artificial intelligence within the Federal Government; and (3) carry out paragraphs (1) and (2) for the purposes of benefitting the public and enhancing the productivity and efficiency of Federal Government operations."	None	Open-ended requirement	Implemented - The Aritificial Intelligence Center of Excellence (CoE) provides a number of services (*see* AI Services Catalog) and published an "AI Guide for Government" that is "A living and evolving guide to the application of artificial intelligence for the U.S. federal government."
Sect. 103	GSA AI Center of Excellence	"The duties of the AI CoE shall include -- (1) regularly convening individuals from agencies, industry, Federal laboratories, nonprofit organizations, institutions of higher education, and other entities to discuss recent developments in artificial intelligence, including the dissemination of information regarding programs, pilots, and other initiatives at agencies, as well as recent trends and relevant information on the understanding, adoption, and use of artificial intelligence; (2) collecting, aggregating, and publishing on a publicly available website information regarding programs, pilots, and other initiatives led by other agencies and any other information determined appropriate by the Administrator; (3) advising the Administrator, the Director, and agencies on the acquisition and use of artificial intelligence through technical insight and expertise, as needed; (4) assist agencies in applying Federal policies regarding the management and use of data in applications of artificial intelligence; (5) consulting with agencies, including the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of Management and Budget, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Science Foundation, that operate programs, create standards and guidelines, or otherwise fund internal projects or coordinate between the public and private sectors relating to artificial intelligence; (6) advising the Director on developing policy related to the use of artificial intelligence by agencies; and (7) advising the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy on developing policy related to research and national investment in artificial intelligence."	None	Ongoing requirement	Not known because (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) are ongoing requirements without mandated outcomes to assess However, on (1), (3), (4), and (5), GSA has established a Community of Practice for AI that any federal employee can join to support "the practical implementation of responsible AI in the federal government" through a "monthly newsletter, events, and working groups." GSA also published in January 2022 an Artificial Intelligence Governance Toolkit that is intended to provide "agency leaders, privacy practitioners and others" with "a framework that addresses privacy and governance at both the organizational and system levels." On (2), GSA's Center of Excellence does publish "latest updates" but has only published three articles as of November 8, 2022 (see here)

Figure 12: Line-Level Implementation Tracker, AI in Government Act (1 of 3)

Sect. 104(a)-(b), (d)	OMB, in coordination with OSTP Director. GSA Adminstrator, and other relevant agencies or stakeholders (determined by OMB Director)	"[S]hall issue a memorandum to the head of each agency that shall-- (1) inform the development of policies regarding Federal acquisition and use by agencies regarding technologies that are empowered or enabled by artificial intelligence, including an identification of the responsibilities of agency officials managing the use of such technology; (2) recommend approaches to remove barriers for use by agencies of artificial intelligence technologies in order to promote the innovative application of those technologies while protecting civil liberties, civil rights, and economic and national security; (3) identify best practices for identifying, assessing, and mitigating any discriminatory impact or bias on the basis of any classification protected under Federal nondiscrimination laws, or any unintended consequence of the use of artificial intelligence, including policies to identify data used to train artificial intelligence algorithms as well as the data analyzed by artificial intelligence used by the agencies; and (4) provide a template of the required contents of the agency plans. . ." to comply with this memorandum. Sect. 104(b) requires a draft version for public comment and Sect. 104(d) requires the OMB Director issue a memorandum "every 2 years thereafter for 10 years".	Draft version for public comment not later than 180 days after enactment of Act (enacted Jan. 2021) Not later than 270 days after Act enacted	Time-boxed requirement	Not Implemented (expected draft ~July 2021 and final ~October 2021)
Sect. 104(c)	Head of agencies	"[S]hall submit to [OMB] Director and post on a publicly available page on the wesbite of the agency-- (1) a plan to achieve consistency with the memorandum; or (2) a written determination that the agency does not use and does not anticipate using artificial intelligence." Requires agencies submit same plan or written determination after every update the OMB Director publishes (sect. 104(d)).	No later than 180 days after OMB issues memorandum	Time-boxed requirement	Not Implemented (expected ~April 2022)

Figure 13: Line-Level Implementation Tracker, AI in Government Act (2 of 3)

Sect. 105(a)	OPM Director	"[I]n accordance with chapter 51 of title 5, United States Code, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall— (1) identify key skills and competencies needed for positions related to artificial intelligence; (2) establish an occupational series, or update and improve an existing occupational job series, to include positions the primary duties of which relate to artificial intelligence; (3) to the extent appropriate, establish an estimate of the number of Federal employees in positions related to artificial intelligence, by each agency; and (4) using the estimate established in paragraph (3), prepare a 2-year and 5-year forecast of the number of Federal employees in positions related to artificial intelligence that each agency will need to employ."	Not later than 18 months after Act enacted	Time-boxed requirement	Not Implemented (expected ~July 2022)
Sect. 105(b)	OPM Director	"[S]hall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of Representatives a comprehensive plan with a timeline to complete requirements described in subsection (a)."	Not later than 120 days after Act enacted	Time-boxed requirement	Not Implemented (expected ~May 2021)

Figure 14: Line-Level Implementation Tracker, AI in Government Act (3 of 3)

E.2 AI Plans Tracker

Tracker of EO 13859's Requirement for Relevant Agencies to Submit to OMB Plans to Achieve Consistency with OMB M-21-06							
Agency (Abbreviation)	**Reason for inclusion**	**Agency Plan**	**Guidance Webpage (www.[agencyname].gov/guidance)**	**Dedicated Agency URL**	**Web Search**	**Search within Agency Website**	**AI.gov**
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FED)	Independent regulatory agency	No	No	No	No	No	No
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)	Independent regulatory agency	No	No	No	No	No	No
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)	Independent regulatory agency	No	Yes (redirects)	No	No	No	No
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)	Independent regulatory agency	No	No	No	No	No	No
Department of Agriculture (USDA)	Cabinet-level agency	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Department of Commerce (DOC)	Cabinet-level agency	No	No	No	No	No	No
Department of Defense (DOD)	Cabinet-level agency	No	Yes (redirects)	No	No	No	No
Department of Education (DOED)	Cabinet-level agency	No	Yes (redirects)	No	No	No	No
Department of Energy (DOE)	Cabinet-level agency	Yes	Yes (redirects)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)	Cabinet-level agency	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)	Cabinet-level agency	No But see, DHS S&T AI and ML Strategic Plan	Yes	No	No	No	No
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)	Cabinet-level agency	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Department of Justice (DOJ)	Cabinet-level agency	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Department of Labor (DOL)	Cabinet-level agency	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Department of State (STAT)	Cabinet-level agency	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Department of the Interior (INT)	Cabinet-level agency	No	Yes (redirects)	No	No	No	No
Department of the Treasury (TRS)	Cabinet-level agency	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Department of Transportation (DOT)	Cabinet-level agency	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA)	Cabinet-level agency	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)	Cabinet-level agency	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Federal Communications Commission (FCC)	Independent regulatory agency	No	No	No	No	No	No
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)	Independent regulatory agency	No	No	No	No	No	No
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)	Independent regulatory agency	No	No	No	No	No	No
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)	Independent regulatory agency	No	No	No	No	No	No
Federal Maritime Commission (FMC)	Independent regulatory agency	No	No	No	No	No	No
Federal Trade Commission (FTC)	Independent regulatory agency	No	No	No	No	No	No

Figure 15: AI Plans Tracker, AI Leadership Order (E.O. 13859) (1 of 2)

Mine Enforcement Safety and Health Review Commission (FMSHRC)	Independent regulatory agency	No	No	No	No	No	No
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)	Independent regulatory agency	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)	Independent regulatory agency	No But see, AI Strategic Plan	No	No	No	No	No
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC)	Independent regulatory agency	No	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Financial Research (OFR)	Independent regulatory agency	No	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Management and Budget (OMB)	Cabinet-level agency	No	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)	Cabinet-level agency	No	No	No	No	No	No
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)	Independent regulatory agency	No	No	No	No	No	No
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)	Cabinet-level agency	No	No	No	No	No	No
Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR)	Cabinet-level agency	No	No	No	No	No	No
Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC)	Independent regulatory agency	No	No	No	No	No	No
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)	Independent regulatory agency	No	No	No	No	No	No
Small Business Administration (SBA)	Cabinet	No	Yes (redirects)	No	No	No	No
Surface Transportation Board (STB)	Sucessor to Interstate Commerce Commission, an independent regulatory agency	No	No	No	No	No	No
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)	Inclusion in National Security Council	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

Figure 16: AI Plans Tracker, AI Leadership Order (E.O. 13859) (2 of 2)

E.3 AI Use Case Inventories Tracker

Tracker of EO 13960s Requirement for AI Use Case Inventories								
Agency (Abbreviation)	**"Large" Agencies**	**Known AI Use Case within "Large" Agencies**	**Inventory**	**Guidance Webpage**	**Dedicated Agency URL**	**Web Search**	**Search within Agency Website**	**AI.gov**
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS)	No	N/A	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Agency for Global Media (formerly Broadcasting Board of Governors)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Barry Goldwater Scholarship and Excellence in Education Foundation (BGSEEF)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSHIB)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS) (AmeriCorps)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Delta Regional Authority (DRA)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Department of Commerce (DOC)	Yes	Not for parent agency	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)	Yes	Yes	Not listed in DOC AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)	No	N/A	Not listed in DOC AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Economic Development Administration (EDA)	No	N/A	Not listed in DOC AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
International Trade Administration (ITA)	Yes	No	Yes (see DOC AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	No	No	No
Minority Business Development Agency (MBDA)	No	N/A	Yes (see DOC AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	No	No	No
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)	Yes	No	Yes, but no identified use cases	Yes (Redirects)	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
National Ocean Service	No	N/A	Not included in DOC AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)	Yes	Yes	Yes (see DOC AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	No	No	No
National Technical Information Service (NTIS)	No	N/A	Not included in DOC AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA)	Yes	No	Yes (see DOC AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	No	No	No
U.S. Census Bureau (CEN)	Yes	No	Not included in DOC AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)	Yes	Yes	Yes (see DOC AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	No	No	No

Figure 17: AI Use Case Inventory Tracker, Trustworthy AI Order (E.O. 13960) (1 of 9)

Department of Education (DOED)	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Federal Student Aid (OFSA)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Elementary and Secondary Education (OESA)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Office of English Language Acquisition (OELA)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Postsecondary Education (OPE)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (PSER)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Department of Energy (DOE)	Yes	No	Yes	Yes (Redirects)	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Loan Programs Office (LPO)	No	N/A	Not included in DOE AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)	No	N/A	Not included in DOE AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Acquisition Management (OAM)	No	N/A	Not included in DOE AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Electricity (OE)	No	N/A	Yes (see DOE AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (OEERE)	Yes	No	Not included in DOE AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Nuclear Safety Enforcement (ONSE)	No	N/A	Not included in DOE AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Administration for Children and Families (ACF)	Yes	No	Not included in HHS AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Administration for Community Living (ACL)	No	N/A	Not included in HHS AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Administration on Aging (AOA)	No	N/A	Not included in HHS AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)	No	N/A	Yes (see HHS AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	No	No	No
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR)	No	N/A	Not included in HHS AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	Yes	Yes	Yes (see HHS AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	Yes	No	No
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)	Yes	Yes	Yes (see HHS AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	Yes	No	No
Food and Drug Administration (FDA)	Yes	Yes	Yes (see HHS AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	Yes	No	No
Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA)	Yes	No	Yes (see HHS AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	Yes	No	No
Indian Health Service (IHS)	Yes	No	Not included in HHS AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Medicare Board of Trustees (Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund, Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund)	No	N/A	Not included in HHS AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
National Institutes of Health (NIH)	Yes	No	Yes (see HHS AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Public and Indian Housing (OPIH)	Yes	No	Not included in HHS AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No

Figure 18: AI Use Case Inventory Tracker, Trustworthy AI Order (E.O. 13960) (2 of 9)

Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health (ASH)	No	N/A	Not included in HHS AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONCHIT)	No	N/A	Not included in HHS AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA)	Yes	Yes	Not included in HHS AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)	No	N/A	Not listed in DHS AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)	Yes	Yes	Not listed in DHS AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)	Yes	No	Not listed in DHS AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Transportation Security Administration (TSA)	Yes	Yes	Yes (see DHS AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	Yes	No	No
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)	Yes	Yes	Yes (see DHS AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	Yes	No	No
United States Coast Guard (USCG)	Yes	Yes	Yes (see DHS AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	Yes	No	No
United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP)	Yes	Yes	Yes (see DHS AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	Yes	No	No
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)	Yes	Yes	Yes (see DHS AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	Yes	No	No
United States Secret Service (USSS)	Yes	Yes	Not listed in DHS AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)	Yes	Yes	Yes, but no use cases identified so indications of noncompliance	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Federal Housing Administration (FHA)	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) (GNMA)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Community Planning and Development (OCPD)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity (OFHEO)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Field Policy and Management (OFPM)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Housing Counseling (OHC)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Lead Hazard Control and Healthy Homes (OLHCHH)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Public and Indian Housing (OPIH)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Department of Justice (DOJ)	Yes	Not for parent agency	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)	Yes	No	Not included in DOJ AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Civil Rights Division (CIVR)	Yes	No	Not included in DOJ AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Community Relations Service (JCRS)	No	N/A	Not included in DOJ AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No

Figure 19: AI Use Case Inventory Tracker, Trustworthy AI Order (E.O. 13960) (3 of 9)

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)	Yes	No	Yes (see DOJ AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	No	No	No
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR)	Yes	Yes	Not included in DOJ AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA)	Yes	No	Not included in DOJ AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Executive Office for United States Trustees (EOUST)	Yes	No	Not included in DOJ AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)	Yes	Yes	Yes (see DOJ AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	No	No	No
Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)	Yes	No	Not included in DOJ AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC)	No	N/A	Not included in DOJ AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Justice Programs (OJP)	Yes	Yes	Not included in DOJ AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Office on Violence Against Women (OVAW)	No	N/A	Not included in DOJ AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
United States Marshals Service (USMS)	Yes	No	Not included in DOJ AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
United States Parole Commission (USPC)	No	N/A	Not included in DOJ AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Department of Labor (DOL)	Yes	Not for parent agency	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB)	No	N/A	Not included in DOL AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)	Yes	Yes	Not included in DOL AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA)	Yes	No	Not included in DOL AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Employment and Training Administration (ETA)	Yes	No	Not included in DOL AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA)	Yes	Yes	Not included in DOL AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA)	Yes	No	Not included in DOL AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Disability Employment Policy (ODEP)	No	N/A	Not included in DOL AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP)	Yes	No	Not included in DOL AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Labor-Management Standards (OLMS)	No	N/A	Not included in DOL AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Workers Compensation Programs (OWCP)	Yes	No	Not included in DOL AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)	Yes	No	Not included in DOL AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Veterans' Employment and Training Service (VETS)	No	N/A	Not included in DOL AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Wage and Hour Division (WHD)	Yes	No	Not included in DOL AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Women's Bureau (WB)	No	N/A	Not included in DOL AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Department of State (STAT)	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department of the Interior (INT)	Yes	Not for parent agency	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No

Figure 20: AI Use Case Inventory Tracker, Trustworthy AI Order (E.O. 13960) (4 of 9)

Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)	Yes	No	Not included in INT AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Bureau of Land Management (BLM)	Yes	No	Yes (see INT AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	No	No	No
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM)	Yes	No	No (but two collaborations between BOEM and other INT sub-agencies noted in INT AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	No	No	No
Bureau of Reclamation (BOR)	Yes	No	Yes (see INT AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	No	No	No
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE)	Yes	No	Yes (see INT AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	No	No	No
National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC)	No	N/A	Not included in INT AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
National Park Service (NPS)	Yes	No	Not included in INT AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR)	No	N/A	Not included in INT AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMR)	Yes	No	Not included in INT AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS)	Yes	Yes	No (but three collaborations between USFWS and other INT sub-agencies noted in INT AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	No	No	No
United States Geological Survey (USGS)	Yes	Yes	Yes (see INT AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	No	No	No
Department of the Treasury (TRS)	Yes	Not for parent agency	No	No	No	No	No	No
Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (ATTTB)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Bureau of the Fiscal Service (BFS)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Federal Insurance Office (FIO)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Internal Revenue Service (IRS)	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
United States Mint (MINT)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Department of Transportation (DOT)	Yes	Not for parent agency	Yes	Yes (Redirects)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)	Yes	Yes	Yes (see DOT AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	No	No	No
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)	Yes	Yes	Not included in DOT AI Use Case Inventory (but FHWA-funded use case noted in INT inventory)	No	No	No	No	No
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA)	Yes	No	Not included in DOT AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)	Yes	Yes	Yes (see DOT AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	No	No	No

Figure 21: AI Use Case Inventory Tracker, Trustworthy AI Order (E.O. 13960) (5 of 9)

Federal Transit Administration (FTA)	Yes	Yes	Yes (see DOT AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	No	No	No
Maritime Administration (MA)	Yes	No	Not included in DOT AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)	Yes	No	Not included in DOT AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)	Yes	No	Not included in DOT AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (STLSDC)	No	N/A	Not included in DOT AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Board of Veterans Appeals (BVA)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
National Cemetery Administration (NCA)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Veterans Health Administration (VHA)	Yes	No	No (however, VHA applications mentioned in VA AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	No	No	No
Election Assistance Commission (EAC)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes (redirects)	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Executive Office of the President	Yes	Not for parent agency	No	No	No	No	No	No
Council of Economic Advisors (CEA)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Management and Budget (OMB)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ODNCP)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Farm Credit Administration (FCA)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation (FCSIC)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (FAMC) (Farmer Mac)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Federal Old-Age & Survivors Insurance Trust Fund & the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund (FODSITF)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No

Figure 22: AI Use Case Inventory Tracker, Trustworthy AI Order (E.O. 13960) (6 of 9)

Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board (FRTIB)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
General Services Administration	Yes	Not for parent agency	No	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Acquisition Policy	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Harry S. Truman Scholarship Foundation (HSTSF)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Institute of Museum and Library Services (IMLS)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Inter-American Foundation (IAF)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
James Madison Memorial Fellowship Foundation (JMMFF)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Legal Services Corporation (LSC)	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Marine Mammal Commission (MMC)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Morris K. Udall and Stewart L. Udall Foundation (MUSUF)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA)	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
National Consumer Cooperative Bank (NCCB)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
National Endowment for the Arts (NEA)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
National Mediation Board (NMB)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (AMTRAK)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
National Science Foundation (NSF)	No	N/A	Yes, but no identified use cases	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Government Ethics (OGE)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Personnel Management (OPM)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Office of Special Counsel (OSC)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Peace Corps (PC)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No

Figure 23: AI Use Case Inventory Tracker, Trustworthy AI Order (E.O. 13960) (7 of 9)

Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Puerto Rico Financial Oversight and Management Board (PRFOMB)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Railroad Retirement Board (RRB)	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Small Business Administration (SBA)	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Social Security Administration (SSA)	Yes	Yes	Yes, but only 5 use cases identified	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Social Security Advisory Board (SSAB)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
State Justice Institute (SJI)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Thrift Savings Plan (TSP)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
U.S. Development Finance Corporation (DFC)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
United States African Development Foundation (USADF)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)	Yes	Not for parent agency	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS)	Yes	No	Not included in USDA AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Agricultural Research Service (ARS)	Yes	Yes	Yes (see USDA AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	Yes	No	No
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)	Yes	No	Yes (see USDA AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	Yes	No	No
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC)	No	N/A	Not included in USDA AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Economic Research Service (ERS)	No	N/A	Yes (see USDA AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	Yes	No	No
Farm Service Agency (FSA)	Yes	No	Not included in USDA AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC)	No	N/A	Not included in USDA AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Food and Nutrition Service (FNS)	Yes	Yes	Yes (see USDA AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	Yes	No	No
Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)	Yes	Yes	Not included in USDA AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS)	Yes	No	Not included in USDA AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS)	Yes	Yes	Yes (see USDA AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	Yes	No	No
National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA)	Yes	Yes	Yes (see USDA AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	Yes	No	No
Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS)	Yes	Yes	Yes (see USDA AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	Yes	No	No
Risk Management Agency (RMA)	Yes	No	Not included in USDA AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No

Figure 24: AI Use Case Inventory Tracker, Trustworthy AI Order (E.O. 13960) (8 of 9)

Rural Business-Cooperative Service (RBCS)	No	N/A	Not included in USDA AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Rural Housing Service (RHS)	Yes	No	Not included in USDA AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Rural Utilities Service (RUS)	No	N/A	Not included in USDA AI Use Case Inventory	No	No	No	No	No
Forest Service (USFS)	Yes	No	Yes (see USDA AI Use Case Inventory)	No	No	Yes	No	No
United States Institute of Peace (USIP)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No
United States International Trade Commission (USITC)	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
United States Postal Service (USPS)	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
United States Trade and Development Agency (USTDA)	No	N/A	No	No	No	No	No	No

Figure 25: AI Use Case Inventory Tracker, Trustworthy AI Order (E.O. 13960) (9 of 9)

Self-determination through explanation: an ethical perspective on the implementation of the transparency requirements for recommender systems set by the Digital Services Act of the European Union

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ABSTRACT

In the contemporary information age, recommender systems (RSs) play a critical role in influencing online behaviour: from social media to e-commerce, from music streaming to news aggregators, individuals are constantly targeted by personalized recommendations suggesting contents that may interest them. Despite such diffusion, the extent to which recommendations influence users' decisions is still underexplored, given that independent audits on the structure and functioning of RSs deployed on online platforms are usually prevented by proprietary constraints. The nudging potential of RSs can represent a risk for vulnerable people: indeed, judicial cases involving platforms' responsibility for displaying recommendations that may lead to political radicalization or endangerment of minors have recently caught public attention. The Digital Services Act of the European Union (DSA) is the first supranational regulation that sets specific transparency and auditing requirements for RSs implemented by online platforms with the aim of enhancing users' self-determination: in particular, it allows users to modify the parameters on which recommendations rely so to let them choose autonomously which kind of content they want to see. This research focuses on whether and how the enforcement of this regulation can mitigate the unfair consequences of the power imbalance between online platforms and users. To this aim, I discuss the harms arising from digital nudging based on RSs and propose explanations as a tool that can reduce the impact of those harms by increasing users' awareness. Through a comparative analysis of relevant articles of the DSA, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the AI Act, I outline how the provisions of the DSA fill some of the gaps left by other relevant European regulations, while leaving the so-called right to explanation substantially unaddressed. As a result of this analysis, I argue that, in order for the implementation of the DSA provisions on recommender systems to be effective, policy-makers should: 1) enhance users' awareness through clear and easily accessible explanations on how the recommendation process works and how they can be influenced by it; 2) grant users the possibility of intervening directly on the strategies through which RSs target them on the platform's interface.

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CCS CONCEPTS

• **Social and professional topics** → *Computing / technology policy*.

KEYWORDS

Regulation of AI, Recommender Systems, Digital Services Act, Transparency, Digital Nudging

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1 INTRODUCTION

In the contemporary information age, recommender systems (RSs) play a crucial role in determining the way in which people interact and obtain information online: from social media feeds to news aggregators and e-commerce websites, users are constantly targeted by personalized recommendations about contents or products they may like. From a technical perspective, RSs can be defined as algorithms aimed at estimating predictive ratings for some items which a user has not seen yet (Adomavicius and Tuzhilin, 2005) [6] in order to generate recommendations about content which may interest them. The Digital Services Act of the European Union (DSA) [1] [5], which is the first supranational regulation addressing automated recommendations specifically, defines RS as "a fully or partially automated system used by an online platform to suggest in its online interface specific information to recipients of the service or prioritize that information, including as a result of a search initiated by the recipient of the service or otherwise determining the relative order or prominence of information displayed" (DSA, art. 3 (s)). This definition highlights the method ("fully or partially automated"), aim ("to suggest"), content ("specific information"), target ("recipients of the service"), input ("as a result of a search initiated by the recipient") and output ("determining the relative order or prominence of information displayed") of a recommendation process. As it can be observed, RSs concern the main aspects

[1] REGULATION (EU) 2022/2065 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act).

of the user's experience: this is why their influencing potential should not be underestimated. In fact, whilst RSs should be aimed at improving user experience, they can give rise to a variety of ethical concerns related to privacy, autonomy and fairness [21], to name but a few. Indeed, the political economy of platforms based on profiling and recommendations has been notably addressed by [34] with the concept of "surveillance capitalism". However, independent research and ethical auditing on the design and functioning of the RSs implemented on online platforms is usually prevented by proprietary constraints.

For these reasons, there is a normative discrepancy between the widespread use of RSs in various domains and the methods through which their ethical and societal impact can be evaluated. Issues related to transparency and explainability have become increasingly pressing, as the implementation of opaque models may have problematic consequences on the users' ability to retrieve relevant information and define their online identity. As algorithmic recommendations often rely on implicit personal data, such as browsing and click-through history, and their functioning is not explained to users, their influence is not accountable. Although explanations for RSs have been addressed by research in Explainable AI [31], their effects on the design of algorithms and on the different stakeholders within the recommendation process have not been assessed extensively. Moreover, even when explanations are provided in real-world platforms, users are not able to interact explicitly with them, apart from providing limited feedback. The limitations regarding the transparency and accountability of automated recommendations are supposed to be addressed by the provisions of the DSA, which would require very large online platforms, including marketplaces and social media, to let users shape the design of the RSs managing their online experience. However, the effectiveness of the application of the regulatory provisions will depend on the extent to which people understand how RSs work and how they can shape their functioning: therefore, explanations should have a prominent role in this context.

In this paper, I focus on whether and how the new European regulatory context around RSs can address the risks and opportunities stemming from this pervasive digital technology, especially from the perspective of mitigating the unfair consequences of the power imbalance between platforms and users. Firstly, I discuss the possible harms arising from RSs as instances of digital nudging and introduce explanations as a tool that can reduce the impact of those harms by increasing users' awareness. Secondly, I consider the impact of the DSA provisions about RSs and online targeted advertising within the regulatory context set by relevant articles of the AI Act (AIA) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the European Union. This comparative analysis outlines how the provisions of the DSA fill some of the gaps left by other European regulations, while substantially lacking measures to effectively enhance users' autonomy. As a result of this analysis, I argue that, in order for the aims of the DSA provisions about RSs to be fulfilled, the principle of users' self-determination needs to be substantiated by: 1) easy accessibility of explanations on how the recommendation process works and how users can be influenced by it; 2) an extended possibility for users to intervene directly on the strategies through which RSs target them on the platform's interface.

2 CONTEXT

2.1 From personalization to epistemic fragmentation

[21] propose an initial taxonomy of the ethical challenges posed by automated recommendations: among the social effects of RSs, they identify a "lack of exposure to contrastive views", giving rise to the so-called filter-bubbles, which can be exploited by manipulative agents in order to increase the frequency with which a content is recommended within specific online communities. [8] put in evidence, phenomena such as polarization on social media arise because of a subtle manipulation of the contents delivered individually but spread collectively by RSs: through strategic content tagging and by exploiting the networked structure of platforms, political campaigners may be able to redirect public attention on controversial contents which appear on the social media feeds of users. In this regard, [29] has famously pointed out the widespread political implications of digital technologies, including RSs, which have allowed people to "filter what they want to read, see, and hear", not coming "across topics and views that you have not sought out".

In fact, the concept of recommendation is inherently related to that of personalization, although the corresponding phenomena are distinct. In fact, the latter represents the pre-condition for the former. On the one hand, recommendations make sense only if they can be personalized, because, if they were not personalized, they would not be able to reduce the information overload on platforms, which is their main utility for users and providers [14]. On the other hand, personalization can be applied mainly through algorithmic recommendations (in the form of targeted advertisements, suggested contents, etc.): therefore, even if personalization as a design concept makes sense independently of recommendations, its application within the infosphere often relies on them. Therefore, automated recommendations depend on personalization, whilst personalization is embedded within recommendations from the perspective of its application.

This distinction is required in order to understand how the sociotechnical structure of RSs is related to the epistemic fragmentation of users [20], a prominent problem in online platforms. Epistemic fragmentation can be defined as the phenomenon by which individual users lose contact with their peers through online targeted advertising. In particular, as each user is targeted individually by automated recommendations, one cannot know which content another person sees: in this sense, users' knowledge about their common experience on the platform is fragmented, because what they see is the result of personalization and cannot be shared among different individuals. This aspect is even more relevant considering that the effects of personalization do not necessarily imply that each user sees a different array of contents. In fact, an analysis of news recommendations on Google News by [23] found that "users with different political leanings from different states were recommended very similar news".

Epistemic fragmentation is not only a result of the individualization of recommended contents, but it also derives from the opaqueness of the recommendation process, which prevents users from becoming aware of the platform dynamics. This situation can give rise to ethical concerns especially when personalisation

is based on implicit user profiling, through which "the system determines what the user is interested in" thanks to implicit data, which include "web usage mining [...], IP address, cookies" and other metadata [7]. Indeed, if a user is profiled through implicit data, the recommendations will be less transparent and explainable compared to a situation in which "the user customizes the information source himself" (ibidem) by providing explicitly data such as personal interests, demographic information and ratings. In the context of an epistemically fragmented user experience, the influence of RSs relying on implicit profiling may hold negative aggregate social implications. In fact, when users do not have control over which kind of data is used for their profiling, the recommendations are more likely to bring unwanted contents to their attention.

As a result, users may suffer, on a first dimension, from absolute harms of inclusion or exclusion, which "originate in the nature of the content that is either included or excluded from what is shown to an individual consumer" [20]: the former occur when genuinely bad and offensive contents (i.e. false claims or racist stereotypes used for promotional purposes) are displayed on the users' profile, whilst the latter occur when essential contents (i.e. important public heath announcements) are omitted, without the user's consent or control on the process. On a second dimension, users can be affected by contextual harms of inclusion or exclusion, which "do not stem from the nature of the content per se, but depend on the context in which the content is delivered" (ibidem): for example, a contextual harm of inclusion may occur when unhealthy food is suggested to obese people or children, who may be more likely to buy them; conversely, a contextual harm of exclusion can be recognised when a job-seeker does not encounter advertisements for positions in their area. The categories of harms produced by RSs do not arise only from implicit profiling but may also be a consequence of the data that users choose to provide explicitly. For example, a user may want to provide explicit data about personal unhealthy habits, such as gambling, because they are interested in finding products or offers in the related domain, regardless of their impact on wellbeing. In the same way, some users may give a high rating to recommendations about contents featuring stereotypes that other people may find offensive or unethical: if the latter share interests with the former, they may see such unwanted recommendations due to collaborative filtering algorithms. These cases show that even personalization based on explicit profiling may originate unexpected harms, which cannot be evaluated just from the point of view of the single user but need to be interpreted within the context of both the platform environment and the socio-technical structure of RSs. Therefore, the harms generated by personalized recommendations do not depend only on the individual case of application, but also on the policy informing the system.

2.2 Digital nudging and recommendation policies

The origin of harms caused by RSs lies in their potential to influence users' choices. In particular, since algorithmic recommendations "influence which information is easily accessible to us and thus affect our decision-making processes though the automated selection and ranking of the presented content", they can be interpreted "as digital nudges, because they determine different aspects of the choice architecture for users" [17]. According to the original definition in behavioural economics proposed by [30], nudges are the features of a choice architecture "that have an influence on which decisions people make" [17]. Nudging "should be aimed at helping people make better decisions than they probably would if the nudge would not be there" (ibidem) without forcing them to adopt a specific choice. The nudging potential of RSs depends on the effectiveness of the recommendation policies implemented in the algorithmic design, which usually rely on the exploitation or exploration of the space of choices.

An exploitative policy aims "to recommend an item that has the highest expected probability of satisfying the user's preferences" [22], whilst an explorative policy is focused on recommending "content with uncertain predicted user engagement for the purpose of gathering more information" about users' interests [19]. When RSs rely exclusively on exploitative policies, users can be led into feedback loops that may reinforce their current preferences, resulting in bad consumer choices in the long run. For example, a user that usually buys unhealthy food through a delivery app based on exploitative RSs may receive recommendations about the same kind of food every time they want to make an order and therefore their health could be impacted negatively. In this case, an explorative policy could instead propose different kinds of products that do not correspond to the preferences previously expressed by the user, eventually inducing them to find healthier food they like.

Since the aim of RSs is to recommend items which users may purchase or consume, it is relevant to know whether and how explanations, which stem mainly from explicit profiling, can impact on the users' perception of the recommendation and their subsequent behaviour. This issue relates to the harms of inclusion and exclusion described above: indeed, if the system manages to change users' interests through explanations, they will end up seeing different contents from the ones they were originally aiming for. Nonetheless, this may make them perceive to have been assigned to categories which they think they have willingly chosen to belong to, given that the recommendation is seemingly transparent because of explanations. The risks coming from the manipulation of users' preferences are intrinsic to RS-powered digital nudging, but [17] report finding no paper about whether "users felt manipulated or coerced by the proposed nudge". In this context, understanding the extent to which users are influenced by recommendations, on the one side, and their explanations, on the other, is crucial for the assessment of the impact that the current and upcoming regulations will have as regards transparency and self-determination.

The default integration of information about the content within the recommendation could be beneficial for users' awareness of their own preferences. Following the same example as above, a food recommendation might be designed so that the nutritional values of a product that a user has (exploitative policy) or has not (explorative policy) bought before are displayed to them before they can proceed to the order: in this way, the user could be informed about the characteristics of their dietary choices. Moreover, providing explanations would make users aware of the extent to which their preferences have been taken into account by the policy informing the recommendation. Although their impact on users' decision-making is still underexplored, explanations for RSs can be considered a kind of pro-ethical informational nudging [11], as

they improve user-system interaction in direction of transparency and trustworthiness just through the provision of information. In fact, [17] classify explanations as nudging mechanisms within the Decision Information category based on making information visible.

3 REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS

3.1 From platform to court

The classification of harms presented above covers different cases in which automated recommendations would have a negative impact on users' wellbeing. The wide-ranging implications of harms caused by RSs go beyond the individual, acquiring a societal relevance. A case of absolute harm of inclusion covered by the international press concerns the "blackout challenge" on TikTok, which encourages users to film themselves as they choke themselves to the point of fainting and then regain consciousness on camera: various cases emerged in which minors died while trying the challenge. After the most recent cases, which happened in the USA [10] and UK [28], some American families decided to sue the platform as it let the challenge spread and target children through its recommendation algorithm [18]. While this may at first seem a problem of content moderation, it is, at a deeper level, a consequence of the use of RSs in social media platforms, where their main aim is to increase users' engagement. As RSs are often based on uninterpretable machine learning models, it might be difficult to attribute the liability for the harm to the platform. In fact, the platform could argue that contents are displayed to users according to recommendation policies that take their preferences into account, so, if the user liked or kept consuming a harmful content which is later reproposed to them, the system should not be blamed. Moreover, as access to the platform by individuals under a certain age should be supervised by parents, it is the parents' duty to control the online activity of their children. To challenge this argument, one should prove that it is the recommendation policy itself to be biased towards contents aimed at maximizing engagement regardless of the vulnerability of the user: according to this perspective, the platform would be liable for designing RSs that influence users' behaviour to fulfil the interests of the system (DSA, art. 35).

A related argument about platforms' responsibility for the content suggested by their RSs is embraced by petitioners in the Gonzalez vs Google case, which deals with "whether Section 230 [of the US Communication Decency Act] shields Google from liability for allegedly recommending ISIS content posted to YouTube to other YouTube users" [9]. This lawsuit emerged as a result of the deaths caused by the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, France, which were carried out by people recruited by ISIS after being exposed to social media content disseminated by the organization through YouTube RSs. In particular, the question posed to the US Supreme Court concerns whether "section 230(c)(l) immunize[s] interactive computer services when they make targeted recommendations of information provided by another information content provider, or only limit the liability of interactive computer services when they engage in traditional editorial functions (such as deciding whether to display or withdraw) with regard to such information" [24]. Petitioners argue that "Section 230(c)(1), which shields intermediaries from liability for "publishing" third-party content, applies only to claims based on the "display" of content, not the "recommendation" of content" (ibidem). In May 2023, the Supreme Court dismissed the case on the ground that it could not by addressed by antiterrorism law, as the "plaintiffs' complaint seems to fail under [...] our decision in Twitter" vs Taamneh, which concerned the same issue of Gonzalez vs Google [25]. If the Supreme Court's ruling had excluded targeted recommendations from the protection provided by Section 230, implying that "the "recommendation" of content is different from the display of content", platforms would have been forced to change their moderation and recommendation processes and users might have lost their "rights to like and promote content in forums where they act as community moderators and effectively boost some content over other content" [27]. As the old debate between freedom of expression and (online) safety eventually focuses on the impact of the influence of RSs, it is crucial for users to understand how algorithmic recommendations function and to shape their design. In fact, the prerequisite for users' self-determination is the knowledge of the sociotechnical systems with which they interact.

3.2 Digital Services Act (DSA): filling the gap left by the AI Act

The DSA addresses this issue with a specific article, according to which "Providers of online platforms that use recommender systems shall set out in their terms and conditions, in plain and intelligible language, the main parameters used in their recommender systems, as well as any options for the recipients of the service to modify or influence those main parameters" (DSA, art.27 (1)). The aim of this provision is to "explain why certain information is suggested to the recipient of the service": therefore, the parameters need to include, at least, "the criteria which are most significant in determining the information suggested to the recipient of the service" (i.e., content) and the reasons for its "relative importance" (i.e., ranking) (DSA, art. 27 (2)). Additionally, when options to modify or influence the main parameters are stated in the terms and conditions, "providers of online platforms shall also make available a functionality that allows the recipient of the service to select and to modify at any time their preferred option" (DSA, art. 27 (3)). In order to make this requirement work in practice, "That functionality shall be directly and easily accessible from the specific section of the online platform's online interface where the information is being prioritised" (ibidem). Moreover, "providers of very large online platforms [VLOPs] and of very large online search engines [VLOSEs] that use recommender systems shall provide at least one option for each of their recommender systems which is not based on profiling"[2] (DSA, art. 38). It is worth noticing that, while the provisions of Article 27 apply to all online platforms, the application of Article 38 is limited to VLOPs and VLOSEs, which therefore represent the only environments in which users will always have the option to choose between at least two types of recommendations[3].

The provisions of Article 27 aim to address four of the aspects of the definition of RS provided by Article 3(s): method, target, input and output. In particular, as a result of the enforcement of the DSA,

[2]Profiling is defined here according to Article 4 (4) of the GDPR.
[3]It is plausible to state that all the VLOPs and VLOSEs identified by the European Commission (https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-vlops) use profiling for automated recommendations, so the provision of Article 38 applies to all of them.

the traditionally passive role of the target might be reversed, as the recipient could determine the method (through the choice of parameters) and, indirectly, also the input (the type of data to be processed through the parameters) that the RS would use to produce its output. This opportunity to enhance transparency and users' self-determination has not been welcomed by a prominent digital company like Meta, which has stated that "the breadth of some of the auditing obligations under the DSA should be clarified/improved as these could become a barrier for growth in the sector" [2]. However, online platforms that are not VLOPs or VLOSEs using RSs based on profiling will not be obliged to provide options for users to modify or influence the parameters if this possibility is not specified in the terms and conditions, and platforms arguably have no interest in providing this possibility voluntarily. Therefore, Article 27 formally grants users the right to influence the recommendation process but only in some limited cases which may not be likely to happen, as [15] point out. Moreover, the practical impact of these provisions will probably depend on users' ability to understand the type and the policy of recommendations.

The rationale of the norms on RSs transparency, introduced in Recital 70, outlines a wider regulatory scope than the one of Article 27: indeed, the statement that "online platforms should consistently ensure that recipients of their service are appropriately informed about how recommender systems impact the way information is displayed, and can influence how information is presented to them" (DSA, recital 70) does not seem to be reflected in the actual provisions of Article 27, at least to the extent that the adverb "consistently" would entail[4]. Nonetheless, online platforms "should clearly present the main parameters for such recommender systems in an easily comprehensible manner to ensure that the recipients understand how information is prioritised for them" (ibidem). A right to explanation for RSs could be identified in this formulation: in fact, the "easily comprehensible manner" of presenting the parameters of RSs so that "the recipients understand how information is prioritised for them" can come to effect only if RSs are explainable.

Relatedly, the DSA will also require VLOPs that display advertisements to "compile and make publicly available in a specific section of their online interface, through a searchable and reliable tool that allows multicriteria queries and through application programming interfaces, a repository" (DSA, art. 39 (1)) featuring the following information: "(a) the content of the advertisement, including the name of the product, service or brand and the subject matter of the advertisement; (b) the natural or legal person on whose behalf the advertisement is presented; (c) the natural or legal person who paid for the advertisement, if that person is different from the person referred to in point (b); (d) the period during which the advertisement was presented; (e) whether the advertisement was intended to be presented specifically to one or more particular groups of recipients of the service and if so, the main parameters used for that purpose including where applicable the main parameters used to exclude one or more of such particular groups; (f) the commercial communications published on the very large online platforms [...]; (g) the total number of recipients of the service reached and, where applicable, aggregate numbers broken down by Member State for the group or groups of recipients that the advertisement specifically targeted." (DSA, art. 39 (2)). The first four points of the cited paragraph concern the metadata of the advertisement: its content, who paid for it, the duration of its permanence on the platform. According to point (e), the platform is required to indicate whether the advertisement was targeted and, if so, the main parameters used for including or excluding categories of users from the targeted. Point (g) would allow to understand indirectly the correspondence between specific clusters of users and the advertisement by which they have been targeted in each EU country. The enforcement of this article has the potential to address the epistemic fragmentation of users due to online targeted advertising considered by [20]. Indeed, if users can access a public repository with information about the parameters used by platforms to segment them into groups for targeting purposes, they can have an idea of how many other people see a particular advertisement and why they see it. The access to this information can reduce the individualization and fragmentation of online experience, as users could eventually become aware of collective platform dynamics, although probably not at a very granular level.

The provisions outlined above are part of a wider regulatory scope. In particular, the DSA aims to address the systemic risks and harms that may emerge from the implementation of RSs in VLOPs and VLOSEs so to avoid violation of fundamental rights and the endangerment of vulnerable people like minors. According to Article 34, "Providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines shall diligently identify, analyse and assess any systemic risks in the Union stemming from the design or functioning of their service and its related systems, including algorithmic systems, or from the use made of their services", including: "(a) the dissemination of illegal content through their services"; "(b) any actual or foreseeable negative effects for the exercise of the fundamental rights [...] to human dignity", "to respect for private and family life", "to the protection of personal data", "to freedom of expression and information", "to non-discrimination", "to respect for the rights of the child" and "to a high level of consumer protection"; (c) "any actual or foreseeable negative effects on civic discourse and electoral processes, and public security"; (d) "any actual or foreseeable negative effects in relation to gender-based violence, the protection of public health and minors and serious negative consequences to the person's physical and mental well-being". The risks assessments operated by very large online platforms should take into account, among other aspect, "the design of their recommender systems and any other relevant algorithmic system" (DSA, art. 34(2), which will need to be adapted following risk mitigation measures (DSA, art. 35(1)).

Following the unprecedented regulatory scope of the DSA, the European Commission has founded the European Centre for Algorithmic Transparency (ECAT), whose mission is to contribute with "scientific and technical expertise to the Commission's exclusive supervisory and enforcement role of the systemic obligations on Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) and Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSEs) provided for under the DSA" [1]. The area of competence of the ECAT features "recommender systems, information retrieval and search engines", which will be the subject of research aimed at uncovering their "ethical, economic, legal and social impact" and at developing risk assessment and mitigation

[4]The right to information outlined here is mirrored by Article 13-15 of the GDPR, which will be considered later.

measures for the protection of fundamental rights (ibidem). Such research effort would provide an evidence base for the implementation of the DSA, whose high-level provisions regarding RSs are not currently backed by standards that can bridge the gap between regulatory principles and market practices. The ECAT will also include an inspections team which "will actively help assessing whether very large online platforms and search engines comply with their obligations under the Digital Services Act" by "analysing the design, functioning and impact of advanced algorithms, like recommender systems, in their production environments" through "formal investigations" including "on-site inspections at platforms' premises" (ibidem).

The provisions of the DSA fill the gaps of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) [3] concerning RSs. Before the latest amendments approved by the European Parliament in June 2023, references to automated recommendations could be found in only two paragraphs of the AIA proposal: the first occurrence is the definition of AI system as "software that can, for a given set of human-defined objectives, generate outputs such as content, predictions, recommendations, or decisions influencing the environments they interact with" (AIA, art. 3(1)); the second occurrence is the explanation of "automation bias" as the tendency of "automatically relying or overrelying on the output produced by [...] AI systems used to provide information or recommendations for decisions to be taken by natural persons" (AIA. art. 14(4b)). In both the occurrences, "automated recommendations are considered from the perspective of the outcome and not of the process: therefore, they are merely regarded as outputs of an AI system that can have an impact on human decision-making, whilst a specific focus on the design principles of RSs and the risks posed by their biases is completely lacking" [11]. This choice may appear inconsistent with the widespread impact that algorithmic recommendations have on users, which can also include serious harms, as the case mentioned above underlines.

In the compromise text that includes the amendments voted in June 2023[5] [26], RSs are mentioned in two instances. Firstly, Recital 40b outlines how and to which extent the AIA addresses RSs, by specifying that "recommender systems are subject to this Regulation so as to ensure that" they "comply with the requirements laid down under this Regulation, including the technical requirements on data governance, technical documentation and traceability, transparency, human oversight, accuracy and robustness". Only RSs implemented by VLOPs, and especially social media, are considered by the AIA, which complements the DSA by enabling "such very large online platforms to comply with their broader risk assessment and risk-mitigation obligations in Article 34 and 35" of that regulation. Secondly, and most importantly, the AI component of RSs becomes part of the high-risk AI applications listed in Annex III (1(8(ab))) as "AI systems intended to be used by social media platforms that have been designated as very large online platforms [...] in their recommender systems to recommend to the recipient of the service user-generated content available on the platform".

While the AIA refers to the DSA for the identification of VLOPs and the enforcement of the norms concerning RSs, the fact that the AI technologies enabling automated recommendations are eventually included in this regulation testifies a welcomed change of paradigm from the previous versions. The reasons for which RSs have not been considered a high-risk AI technology in the early drafts of the AIA maybe concern the fact that recommendations impact indirectly rather than directly on individuals. A comparative example might be helpful: automated credit risk assessment, which has been included in Annex III since the beginning, is supposed to output a score that helps human decision-makers determine whether a client is suitable to receive a loan. In this case, the system is devoted to performing a content-specific task that supports human decision making (although human decisions often tend to be determined rather than supported by it). Algorithmic recommendations, instead, are not content- but context-specific: the content of their output can vary widely depending on the user, but they are directed by a defined aim within a particular context, i.e. maximizing user engagement in a social media platform.

For this reason, the recommendation does not raise ethical concerns per se, but as regards its domain of application: this may be the reason for which RSs have been initially excluded from the scope of the AIA, which regulates the risks of AI technologies per se, but included in the DSA, which instead addresses specific algorithmic systems as enablers of the services provided by online platforms. The inclusion of the AI systems enabling RSs implemented by VLOPs in Annex III underlines regulators' awareness of the risks stemming from the influence of automated recommendations. Given that the AIA has not been enforced yet, I would like to switch this analysis to another relevant regulation currently in force, i.e. the GDPR, to evaluate its potential impact on RSs transparency.

3.3 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the right to explanation

Article 22 of the GDPR [4] addresses "automated individual decision making, including profiling" stating that "the data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her" (art. 22(1)). RSs are based on profiling, so they can be considered within the regulatory scope of this article. However, there are three exceptions to the provision reported above, which "shall not apply if the decision: (a) is necessary for entering into, or performance of, a contract between the data subject and a data controller; (b) is authorised by Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject and which also lays down suitable measures to safeguard the data subject's rights and freedoms and legitimate interests; or (c) is based on the data subject's explicit consent" (art. 22(2)). When exceptions (a) and (c) apply, "the data controller shall implement suitable measures to safeguard the data subject's rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of view and to contest the decision" (art. 22(3)). Moreover, according to the fourth paragraph of the article, sensitive data should never be collected for profiling. However, it often happens that sensitive data are inferred from non-sensitive data which act as proxies: for instance, income level could be inferred from household address.

[5]The complete list of amendments can be found at:https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2023-0236_EN.html

Exception (a) could be claimed in all the cases in which users are asked to accept the terms of service of a platform, which define the contract between the data subject and the data controller. Exception (c) applies when the user is asked for online consent, for example for what concerns cookies. Therefore, it can be argued that automated recommendations comply with the GDPR requirements, given that, when accepting the terms of service, the user is often giving consent to profiling and inferences. On the one side, Article 27 of the DSA aligns with the rationale of GDPR by requiring that explanations of RSs are presented in the terms and conditions, which are not often read by users and therefore may not impact on their awareness of their rights. On the other side, Article 38 of the DSA complements the GDPR by requiring that very large online platforms keep a repository of targeted advertisements, so that users can view the outcome of legitimate profiling.

[13] point out that the nudging potential of automated decision-making systems may, in some cases, lead humans to conform uncritically to their assessments, thereby making the application of Article 22 of the GDPR controversial. In fact, the safeguards against decisions that do not involve humans in the loop are not clarified in Article 22, which does not state how users can determine whether a decision is completely automated. Instead, a hint in this direction is provided by articles 13 and 14, on the right to information, and 15, on the right to access, according to which the controller must give information about the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling, as referred to in Article 22, and, at least in such cases, meaningful information about the logic used, as well as the significance and the intended consequences of such processing for the data subject [13]. This is complemented by Recital 71, which suggests that profiling "should be subject to suitable safeguards, which should include specific information to the data subject and the right to obtain human intervention, to express his or her point of view, to obtain an explanation of the decision reached after such assessment and to challenge the decision". The right to explanation envisaged here is crucial to substantiate the safeguarding claims of the cited articles, but it is not described in further detail.

This lack of precision has been criticized by [33], who identify "several reasons to doubt both the legal existence and the feasibility of such a right": in fact, "the GDPR only mandates that data subjects receive meaningful, but properly limited, information (Articles 13–15) about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of automated decision-making systems". Moreover, "the ambiguity and limited scope of the 'right not to be subject to automated decision-making' contained in Article 22 (from which the alleged 'right to explanation' stems) raises questions over the protection actually afforded to data subjects" (ibidem). The DSA goes in the direction of implementing the right to explanation outlined in the GDPR, but the effectiveness of explanations in enhancing users' autonomy is still debated. Future empirical research should be aimed at establishing whether the presence of explanations would substantially contribute to substantiate the users' rights envisioned by these regulations.

4 CONCLUSION

Automated recommendations determine not only what we see on platforms, but also our potential interest for new or different categories of content. This influencing potential can be interpreted as an instance of the "new emerging grey power" of tech companies, which "is exercised about which questions can be asked, when and where, how and by whom and hence what answers can be received in principle" [12]. A platform like TikTok, which is mainly managed through RSs, is a prominent example of this tendency: as the interface is based on an endless flow of recommended content through which the user scrolls, the contents that the user ends up seeing more frequently are related to the single videos that he watches for a longer time. This exploitative policy has already caused harm [10] because, if a video on which a vulnerable person casually spends a few seconds concerns a dangerous activity, then that individual will see the same content more and more and may eventually be influenced by it. In this sense, platforms control the questions that users pose about their interests and, subsequently, the answers that they get: in this way, digital companies end up informing a substantial part of users' online, and sometimes offline, experience. Explanations may be a countermeasure to this harmful tendency of automated recommendations, as they have the potential to make users aware of some of the questions that platforms shape for them. I argue that, in order for this potential to be realized, explanations should be integrated as a readily available, standard feature of recommendations which people may choose to review when they want to, or that appear as a pop-up on the interface of online platforms. Thanks to such a policy, users could understand why they are targeted by specific content and, subsequently, become aware of the extent to which they are influenced by RSs.

The DSA will require digital companies that use RSs and targeted advertising to build mechanisms to grant transparency, in order to enhance users' self-determination and understanding of the systems they use. However, if users are not interested in receiving explanations, or if exposure to explanations does not influence users' perspective on algorithmic recommendations, the provisions of the DSA may not have the expected results. In fact, as [32] underline, "the explanations affect a user's mental model of the recommender system, and in turn the way they interact with the explanations". The contemporary trends of RSs outline an increasing focus on explorative policies, which are likely to shape the future ways of interacting online. This may seem an evolution towards more ethical platform environments, but this is not necessarily the case. Whilst exploitative policies are considered the negative side of automated recommendations because they may lead to filter bubbles, explorative policies can also give rise to risks that should not be left untouched by ethical concerns and regulatory attention. Indeed, from the perspective of digital companies, exploration is mainly a means to get to know users even better than they currently do, by gathering data on unexplored fields of potential interests and preferences. This can lead to an even deeper nudging, which is realized through incremental exposure to contents that can provide fine-grained information on how to induce users to like what they do not know they like yet: for this reason, explorative recommendations could contribute significantly to the grey power that VLOPs already have.

I argue that an effective right to explanation is a preliminary condition for users' self-determination in the platform environment. Explanations can be considered a means to mitigate the negative consequences of the power imbalance between platforms and users. Users cannot shape automated recommendations according to their interests and needs without firstly knowing how and why they are targeted and influenced by RSs: in fact, if someone doesn't know how a system works, they are unlikely to be able to make that system work better. Digital nudging may lead to undesirable outcomes, such as manipulation, if users' perception of the recommendation process is not informed by the knowledge of how it unfolds. In this regard, my contribution points to a prominent policy problem: as explanations are the building blocks of transparency, in order to support self-determination through transparent recommendations it is firstly necessary to educate users to understand not only "what recommenders recommend" [16], but also why they recommend what they recommend. If it is not properly met by regulators on time, this sociotechnical requirement may constrain the positive ethical and societal impact of the DSA provisions. In conclusion, I think that, in order to reduce the power imbalance between platforms and users and limit the influence that the former exert on the latter, policy-makers should: 1) enforce explanations as a user-friendly tool to foster awareness that users can experience on the interface and not only read in the terms and conditions; 2) grant users the possibility of intervening directly and substantially on the strategies through which RSs target them on the platform's interface.

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Reckoning with the Disagreement Problem: Explanation Consensus as a Training Objective

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ABSTRACT

As neural networks increasingly make critical decisions in high-stakes settings, monitoring and explaining their behavior in an understandable and trustworthy manner is a necessity. One commonly used type of explainer is post hoc feature attribution, a family of methods for giving each feature in an input a score corresponding to its influence on a model's output. A major limitation of this family of explainers in practice is that they can disagree on which features are more important than others. Our contribution in this paper is a method of training models with this *disagreement problem* in mind. We do this by introducing a Post hoc Explainer Agreement Regularization (PEAR) loss term alongside the standard term corresponding to accuracy, an additional term that measures the difference in feature attribution between a pair of explainers. We observe on three datasets that we can train a model with this loss term to improve explanation consensus on unseen data, and see improved consensus between explainers other than those used in the loss term. We examine the trade-off between improved consensus and model performance. And finally, we study the influence our method has on feature attribution explanations.

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1 INTRODUCTION

As machine learning becomes inseparable from important societal sectors like healthcare and finance, increased transparency of how complex models arrive at their decisions is becoming critical. In this work, we examine a common task in support of model transparency that arises with the deployment of complex black-box models in production settings: explaining which features in the input are most influential in the model's output. This practice allows data scientists and machine learning practitioners to rank features by importance – the features with high impact on model output are considered more important, and those with little impact on model output are considered less important. These measurements inform how model users debug and quality check their models, as well as how they explain model behavior to stakeholders.



Figure 1: Our loss that encourages explainer consensus boosts the correlation between LIME and other common post hoc explainers. This comes with a cost of less than two percentage points of accuracy compared with our baseline model on the Electricity dataset. Our method improves consensus on six agreement metrics and all pairs of explainers we evaluated. Note that this plot measures the *rank correlation* agreement metric and the specific bar heights depend on this choice of metric.

1.1 Post Hoc Explanation

The methods of model explanation considered in this paper are post hoc local feature attribution scores. The field of explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) is rapidly producing different methods of this type to make sense of model behavior [e.g., 21, 24, 30, 32, 37]. Each of these methods has a slightly different formula and interpretation of its raw output, but in general they all perform the same task of attributing a model's behavior to its input features. When tasked to explain a model's output with a corresponding input (and possible access to the model weights), these methods answer the question, "How influential is each individual feature of the input in the model's computation of the output?"

Data scientists are using post hoc explainers at increasing rates – popular methods like LIME and SHAP have had over 350 thousand

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and 6 million downloads of their Python packages in the last 30 days, respectively [23].

1.2 The Disagreement Problem

The explosion of different explanation methods leads Krishna et al. [15] to observe that when neural networks are trained naturally, i.e. for accuracy alone, often post hoc explainers disagree on how much different features influenced a model's outputs. They coin the term *the disagreement problem* and argue that when explainers disagree about which features of the input are important, practitioners have little concrete evidence as to which of the explanations, if any, to trust.

There is an important discussion around local explainers and their true value in reaching the communal goal of model transparency and interpretability [see, e.g., 7, 18, 29]; indeed, there are ongoing discussions about the efficacy of present-day explanation methods in specific domains [for healthcare see, e.g., 8]. Feature importance estimates may fail at making a model more transparent when the model being explained is too complex to allow for easily attributing the output to the contribution of each individual feature.

In this paper, we make no normative judgments with respect to this debate, but rather view "explanations" as signals to be used alongside other debugging, validation, and verification approaches in the machine learning operations (MLOps) pipeline. Specifically, we take the following practical approach: make the amount of explanation disagreement a controllable model parameter instead of a point of frustration that catches stakeholders off-guard.

1.3 Encouraging Explanation Consensus

Consensus between two explainers does not require that the explainers output the same exact scores for each feature. Rather, consensus between explainers means that whatever disagreement they exhibit can be reconciled. Data scientists and machine learning practitioners say in a survey that explanations are in basic agreement if they satisfy agreement metrics that align with human intuition, which provides a quantitative way to evaluate the extent to which consensus is being achieved [15]. When faced with disagreement between explainers, a choice has to be made about what to do next – if such an arbitrary crossroads moment is avoidable via specialized model training, we believe it would be a valuable addition to a data scientist's toolkit.

We propose, as our main contribution, a training routine to help alleviate the challenge posed by post hoc explanation disagreement. Achieving better consensus between explanations does not provide more interpretability to a model inherently. But, it may lend more trust to the explanations if different approaches to attribution agree more often on which features are important. This gives consensus the practical benefit of acting as a sanity check – if consensus is observed, the choice of which explainer a practitioner uses is less consequential with respect to downstream stakeholder impact, making their interpretation less subjective.

2 RELATED WORK

Our work focuses on post hoc explanation tools. Some post hoc explainers, like LIME [24] and SHAP [21], are proxy models trained atop a base machine learning model with the sole intention of "explaining" that base model. These explainers rely only on the model's inputs and outputs to identify salient features. Other explainers, such as Vanilla Gradients (Grad) [32], Gradient Times Input (Grad*Input) [30], Integrated Gradients (IntGrad) [37] and SmoothGrad [34], do not use a proxy model but instead compute the gradients of a model with respect to input features to identify important features.[1] Each of these explainers has its quirks and there are reasons to use, or not use, them all—based on input type, model type, downstream task, and so on. But there is an underlying pattern unifying all these explanation tools. Han et al. [12] provide a framework that characterizes all the post hoc explainers used in this paper as different types of local-function approximation. For more details about the individual post hoc explainers used in this paper, we refer the reader to the individual papers and to other works about when and why to use each one [see, e.g., 5, 13].

We build directly on prior work that defines and explores the disagreement problem [15]. Disagreement here refers to the difference in feature importance scores between two feature attribution methods, but can be quantified several different ways as are described by the metrics Krishna et al. [15] define and use. We describe these metrics in Section 4.

The method we propose in this paper relates to previous work that trains models with constraints on explanations via penalties on the disagreement between feature attribution scores and handcrafted ground-truth scores [26, 27, 41]. Additionally, work has been done to leverage the disagreement between different post-hoc explanations to construct new feature attribution scores that improve metrics like stability and pairwise rank agreement [2, 16, 25].

3 PEAR: POST HOC EXPLAINER AGREEMENT REGULARIZER

Our contribution is the first effort to train models to be both accurate and to be explicitly regularized via consensus between local explainers. When neural networks are trained *naturally* (i.e. with a single task-specific loss term like cross-entropy), disagreement between post hoc explainers often arises. Therefore, we include an additional loss term to measure the amount of explainer disagreement during training to encourage consensus between explanations. Since human-aligned notions of explanation consensus can be captured by more than one agreement metric (listed in A.3), we aim to improve several agreement metrics with one loss function.[2]

Our consensus loss term is a convex combination of the Pearson and Spearman correlation measurements between the vectors of attribution scores (Spearman correlation is just the Pearson correlation on the ranks of a vector).

[1] In many settings, there may be a strong case to consider *interpretable-by-design* models—that is, models that need no proxy model or gradient computation to be explained, and are instead interpretable in their base form. [29] provides an overview of this space, and we specifically call out directions such as falling rule lists [40], generalized additive models [20], and concept/prototype-based models [9, 14]. We acknowledge this direction of research as well as subsequent push-back claiming that performance drops from prioritizing interpretability may be prohibitively high [e.g., when compared to so-called foundation models, see 4]. Given industry uptake of post hoc explanations, our paper focuses on that approach alone.

[2] The PEAR package will be publicly for download on the Package Installer for Python (pip), and it is also available upon request from the authors.



Figure 2: Our loss function measures the task loss between the model outputs and ground truth (task loss), as well as the disagreement between explainers (consensus loss). The weight given to the consensus loss term is controlled by a hyperparameter λ. The consensus loss term term is a convex combination of the Spearman and Pearson correlation measurements between feature importance scores, since increasing both rank correlation (Spearman) and raw-score correlation (Pearson) are useful for improving explainer consensus on our many agreement metrics.

To paint a clearer picture of the need for two terms in the loss, consider the examples shown in Figure 3. In the upper example, the raw feature scores are very similar and the Pearson correlation coefficient is in fact 1 (to machine precision). However, when we rank these scores by magnitude, there is a big difference in their ranks as indicated by the Spearman value. Likewise, in the lower portion of Figure 3 we show that two explanations with identical magnitudes will show a low Pearson correlation coefficient. Since some of the metrics we use to measure disagreement involve ranking and others do not, we conclude that a mixture of these two terms in the loss is appropriate.

While the example in Figure 3 shows two explanation vectors with similar scale, different explanation methods do not always align. Some explainers have the sums of their attribution scores constrained by various rules, whereas other explainers have no such constraints. The correlation measurements we use in our loss provide more latitude when comparing explainers than a direct difference measurement like mean absolute error or mean squared error, allowing our correlation measurement.

More formally, our full loss function is defined as follows. Let f denote a model. Let E_1 and E_2 be any two post-hoc explainers, each of which take a data point x and its predicted label $\hat{y}$ as input and output a vector, which is the same size as x and has corresponding feature attribution scores. We define R to be the ranking function, so it replaces each entry in a vector with the rank of its magnitude among all entries in the vector.[3]

Let the functions $p(a, b)$ and $s(a, b)$ be Pearson and Spearman correlation measurements, respectively. We denote the average value of all entries in a vector with the $\bar{\cdot}$ notation.

$$p(a,b) = \sum_i \frac{(a_i - \bar{a})(b_i - \bar{b})}{\|a\|\|b\|} \tag{1}$$

[3]When more than one of the entries have the same magnitude, they get a common ranking value equal to the average rank if they were ordered arbitrarily.



Figure 3: Example feature attribution vectors where Pearson and Spearman show starkly different scores. Recall, both Pearson and Spearman correlation range from -1 to $+1$. Both of these pairs of vectors satisfy some human-aligned notions of consensus. But in each circumstance, one of the correlation metrics gives a low similarity score. Thus, in order to successfully encourage explainer consensus (by all of our metrics), we use both types of correlation in our consensus loss term.

$$s(a,b) = \sum_i \frac{(R(a)_i - \overline{R(a)})(R(b)_i - \overline{R(b)})}{\|R(a)\|\|R(b)\|} \tag{2}$$

We refer to the first term in the loss function as the *task loss*, or ℓ_{task}, and for our classification tasks we use cross-entropy loss. A graphical depiction of the flow from data to loss value is shown in Figure 2. Formally, our complete loss function can be expressed as follows with two hyperparameters $\lambda, \mu \in [0, 1]$. We weight the influence of our consensus term with λ, so lower values give more priority to task loss. We weight the influence between the two explanation correlation terms with μ, so lower values give more weight to Pearson correlation and higher values give more weight to Spearman correlation.

$$\begin{aligned} L(x, y, f, E_1, E_2) = \\ (1-\lambda)\ell_{\text{task}} \\ +\lambda\Big(\mu\, s\big(E_1(x,y), E_2(x,y)\big) \\ +(1-\mu)\, p\big(E_1(x,y), E_2(x,y)\big)\Big) \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

3.1 Choosing a Pair of Explainers

The consensus loss term is defined for any two explainers in general, but since we train with standard backpropagation we need these explainers to be differentiable. With this constraint in mind, and with some intuition about the objective of improving agreement metrics, we choose to train for consensus between Grad and IntGrad. If Grad and IntGrad align, then the function should become more locally linear in logit space. IntGrad computes the average gradient along a path in input space toward each point being explained. So,

if we train the model to have a local gradient at each point (Grad) closer to the average gradient along a path to the point (IntGrad), then perhaps an easy way for the model to accomplish that training objective would be for the gradient along the whole path to equal the local gradient from Grad. This may push the model to be more similar to a linear model. This is something we investigate with qualitative and quantitative analysis in Section 4.5.

3.2 Differentiability

On the note of differentiability, the ranking function R is not differentiable. We substitute a soft ranking function from the `torchsort` package [3]. This provides a floating point approximation of the ordering of a vector rather than an exact integer computation of the ordering of a vector, which allows for differentiation.

4 THE EFFICACY OF CONSENSUS TRAINING

In this section we present each experiment with the hypothesis it is designed to test. The datasets we use for our experiments are Bank Marketing, California Housing, and Electricity, three binary classification datasets available on the OpenML database [39]. For each dataset, we use a linear model's performance (logistic regression) as a lower bound of realistic performance because linear models are considered inherently explainable.

The models we train to study the impact of our consensus loss term are multilayer perceptrons (MLPs). While the field of tabular deep learning is still growing, and MLPs may be an unlikely choice for most data scientists on tabular data, deep networks provide the flexibility to adapt training loops for multiple objectives [1, 10, 17, 28, 31, 36]. We also verify that our MLPs outperform linear models on each dataset, because if deep models trained to reach consensus are less accurate than a linear model, we would be better off using the linear model.

We include XGBoost [6] as a point of comparison for our approach, as it has become a widely popular method with high performance and strong consensus metrics on many tabular datasets (figures in Appendix A.7). There are cases where we achieve more explainer consensus than XGBoost, but this point is tangential as we are invested in exploring a loss for training neural networks.

For further details on our datasets and model training hyperparameters, see Appendices A.1 and A.2.

4.1 Agreement Metrics

In their work on the disagreement problem, Krishna et al. [15] introduce six metrics to measure the amount of agreement between post hoc feature attributions. Let $[E_1(x)]_i$, $[E_2(x)]_i$ be the attribution scores from explainers for the i-th feature of an input x. A feature's *rank* is its index when features are ordered by the absolute value of their attribution scores. A feature is considered in the *top-k most important* features if its rank is in the top-k. For example, if the importance scores for a point $x = [x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4]$, output by one explainer are $E_1(x) = [0.1, -0.9, 0.3, -0.2]$, then the most important feature is x_2 and its rank is 1 (for this explainer).

Feature Agreement counts the number of features x_i such that $[E_1(x)]_i$ and $[E_2(x)]_i$ are both in the top-k. **Rank Agreement** counts the number of features in the top-k with the same rank in $E_1(x)$ and $E_2(x)$. **Sign Agreement** counts the number of features in the top-k such that $[E_1(x)]_i$ and $[E_2(x)]_i$ have the same sign. **Signed Rank Agreement** counts the number of features in the top-k such that $[E_1(x)]_i$ and $[E_2(x)]_i$ agree on both sign and rank. **Rank Correlation** is the correlation between $E_1(x)$ and $E_2(x)$ (on all features, not just in the top-k), and is often referred to as the Spearman correlation coefficient. Lastly, **Pairwise Rank Agreement** counts the number of pairs of features (x_i, x_j) such that E_1 and E_2 agree on whether x_i or x_j is more important. All of these metrics are formalized as fractions and thus range from 0 to 1, except Rank Correlation, which is a correlation measurement and ranges from -1 to $+1$. Their formal definitions are provided in Appendix A.3.

In the results that follow, we use all of the metrics defined above and reference which one is used where appropriate. When we evaluate a metric to measure the agreement between each pair of explainers, we average the metric over the test data to measure agreement. Both agreement and accuracy measurements are averaged over several trials (see Appendices A.6 and A.5 for error bars).

4.2 Improving Consensus Metrics

The intention of our consensus loss term is to improve agreement metrics. While the objective function explicitly includes only two explainers, we show generalization to unseen explainers as well as to the unseen test data. For example, we train for agreement between Grad and IntGrad and observe an increase in consensus between LIME and SHAP.

To evaluate the improvement in agreement metrics when using our consensus loss term, we compute explanations from each explainer on models trained naturally and on models trained with our consensus loss parameter using $\lambda = 0.5$.

In Figure 4, using a visualization tool developed by Krishna et al. [15], we show how we evaluate the change in an agreement metric (pairwise rank agreement) between all pairs of explainers on the California Housing data.

Hypothesis: *We can increase consensus by deliberately training for post hoc explainer agreement.*

Through our experiments, we observe improved agreement metrics on unseen data and on unseen pairs of explainers. In Figure 4 we show a representative example where Pairwise Rank Agreement between Grad and IntGrad improve from 87% to 96% on unseen data. Moreover, we can look at two other explainers and see that agreement between SmoothGrad and LIME improves from 56% to 79%. This shows both generalization to unseen data and to explainers other than those explicitly used in the loss term. In Appendix A.5, we see more saturated disagreement matrices across all of our datasets and all six agreement metrics.

4.3 Consistency At What Cost?

While training for consensus works to boost agreement, a question remains: How accurate are these models?

To address this question, we first point out that there is a trade-off here, i.e., more consensus comes at the cost of accuracy. With this in mind we posit that there is a Pareto frontier on the accuracy-agreement axes. While we cannot assert that our models are on



Figure 4: When models are trained naturally, we see disagreement among post hoc explainers (left). However, when trained with our loss function, we see a boost in agreement with only a small cost in accuracy (right). This can be observed visually by the increase in saturation or in more detail by comparing the numbers in corresponding squares.



Figure 5: The trade-off curves of consensus and accuracy. Increasing the consensus comes with a drop in accuracy and the trade-off is such that we can achieve more agreement and still outperform linear baselines. Moreover, as we vary the λ value, we move along the trade-off curve. In all three plots we measure agreement with the pairwise rank agreement metric and we show that increased consensus comes with a drop in accuracy, but all of our models are still more accurate than the linear baseline, indicated by the vertical dashed line (the shaded region shows ± one standard error).

the Pareto frontier, we plot trade-off curves which represent the trajectory through accuracy-agreement space that is carved out by changing λ.

Hypothesis: *We can increase consensus with an acceptable drop in accuracy.*

While this hypothesis is phrased as a subjective claim, in reality we define acceptable performance as better than a linear model as explained at the beginning of Section 4. We see across all three datasets that increasing the consensus loss weight λ leads to higher pairwise rank agreement between LIME and SHAP. Moreover, even with high values of λ, the accuracy stays well above linear models indicating that the loss in performance is acceptable. Therefore this experiment supports the hypothesis.

The results plotted in Figure 5 demonstrate that a practitioner concerned with agreement can tune λ to meet their needs of accuracy and agreement. This figure serves in part to illuminate why our hyperparameter choice is sensible—λ gives us control to slide along the trade-off curve, making post hoc explanation disagreement more of a controllable model parameter so that practitioners have more flexibility to make context-specific model design decisions.

4.4 Are the Explanations Still Valuable?

Whether our proposed loss is useful in practice is not completely answered simply by showing accuracy and agreement. A question remains about how our loss might change the explanations in the end. Could we see boosted agreement as a result of some breakdown in how the explainers work? Perhaps models trained with our loss fool explainers into producing uninformative explanations just to appease the agreement term in the loss.

Hypothesis: *We only get consensus trivially, i.e., with feature attributions scores that are uninformative.*

Since we have no ground truth for post hoc feature attribution scores, we cannot easily evaluate their quality [37]. Instead, we reject this hypothesis with an experiment wherein we add random "junky" features to the input data. In this experiment we show that when we introduce junky input features, which by definition have no predictive power, our explainers appropriately attribute near zero importance to them.

Our experimental design is related to other efforts to understand explainers. Slack et al. [33] demonstrate an experimental setup whereby a model is built with ground-truth knowledge that one feature is the only important feature to the model, and the other features are unused. They then adversarially attack the model-explainer pipeline and measure the frequency with which their explainers identify one of the truthfully unimportant features as the most important. Our tactic works similarly, since a naturally trained model will not rely on random features which have no predictive power.

We measure the frequency with which our explainers place one of the junk features in the top-k most important features, using $k = 5$ throughout.

As a representative example, LIME explanations of MLPs trained on this augmented Electricity data put random features in the top five 11.8% of the time on average. If our loss was encouraging models to permit uninformative explanations for the sake of agreement, we might see this number rise. However, when trained with $\lambda = 0.5$, random features are only in the top five LIME features 9.1% of the time – and random chance would have at least one junk feature in the top five over 98% of the time. For results on all three datasets and all six expalainers, see Appendix A.4.

The setting where junk features are most often labelled as one of the top five is when using SmoothGrad to explain models trained on Bank Marketing data with $\lambda = 0$, where for 43.1% of the samples, at least one of the top five is in fact a junk feature. Interestingly, for the same explainer and dataset models trained with $\lambda = 0.5$ lead to explanations that have a junk feature as one of the top five less than 1% of the time, indicating that our loss can even improve this behavior in some settings.

Therefore, we reject this hypothesis and conclude that the explanations are not corrupted by training with our loss.

4.5 Consensus and Linearity

Since linear models are the gold standard in model explainability, one might wonder if our loss is pushing models to be more like linear models. We conduct a quantitative and qualitative test to see whether our method indeed increases linearity.



Figure 6: Logit surface contour plots on a plane spanning three real data points from four different models. Left to right: MLPs trained with $\lambda = 0$, $\lambda = 0.75$ and $\lambda = 0.95$ as well as a linear model. Notice that as we increase λ, and move from left to right, we get straighter contours in the logit surface.

Hypothesis: *Encouraging explanation consensus during training encourages linearity.*

Qualitative analysis. In their work on model reproducibility, Somepalli et al. [35] describe a visualization technique wherein a high-dimensional decision surface is plotted in two dimensions. Rather than more complex distance preserving projection tactics, they argue that the subspace of input space defined by a plane spanning three real data points can be a more informative way to visualize how a model's outputs change in high dimensional input space. We take the same approach to study how the logit surface of our model changes with λ. We take three random points from the test set, and interpolate between the three of them to get a planar slice of input space. We then compute the logit surface on this plane (we arbitrarily choose the logit corresponding to the first class). We visualize the contour plots of the logit surface in Figure 6 (more visualizations in Section A.7). As we increase λ, we see that the shape of the contours often tends toward the contour pattern that a linear model takes on that same plane slice of input space.

Quantitative analysis. We can also measure how close to linear a model is quantitatively. The extent to which our models trained with higher λ values are close to linear can be measured as follows. For each of ten random planes in input space (constructed using the three-point method described above), we fit a linear regression model to predict the logit value at each point of the plane, and measure the mean absolute error. The closer this error term is to zero, the more our model's logits on this input subspace resemble a linear model. In Figure 7 we show the error values of the linear fit drop as we increase the weight on the consensus loss for the Electricity dataset. Thus, these analyses support the hypothesis that encouraging consensus encourages linearity.

But if our consensus training pushes models to be closer to linear, does any method that increases the linearity measurement also lead to increased consensus? We consider the possibility that any approach to make models closer to linear improves consensus metrics.

Hypothesis: *Linearity implies more explainer consistency.*

To explore another path toward more linear models, we train a set of MLPs without our consensus loss but with various weight decay coefficients. In Figure 7, we show a drop in linear-best-fit error across the random three-point planes which is similar to the drop observed by increasing λ, showing that increasing weight decay also encourages models to be closer to linear.

But when evaluating these MLPs with increasing weight decay by their consensus metrics, they show near-zero improvement. We



Figure 7: Sampled linear-best-fit error (MAE) measurements as λ increases and as the weight decay coefficient increases. Both approaches lead to lower error of a linear approximation on the Electricity dataset. This indicates that both weight decay and consensus training are correlated with linear fit. The shaded region corresponds to ± one standard error.



Figure 8: We perform an ablation study of our loss term parameter μ to show why, when training to improve correlation between feature attribution scores, using both Spearman and Pearson correlation can be better than using just one type of correlation.

therefore reject this hypothesis—linearity alone does not seem to be enough to improve consensus on post hoc explanations.

4.6 Two Loss Terms

For the majority of experiments, we set $\mu = 0.75$, which is determined by a coarse grid search. And while it may not be optimal for every dataset on every agreement metric, we seek to show that the extreme values $\mu = 0$ and $\mu = 1$, which each correspond to only one correlation term in the loss, can be suboptimal. This ablation study serves to justify our choice of incorporating two terms in the loss. In Figure 8, we show the agreement-accuracy trade-off for multiple values of μ and of λ. We see that $\mu = 0.75$ shows the more optimal trade-off curve.

In Appendix A.7, where we show more plots like Figure 8 for other datasets and metrics, we see that the best value of μ varies case by case. This demonstrates the importance of having a tunable parameter within our consensus loss term to be tweaked for better performance.

5 DISCUSSION

The empirical results we present demonstrate that our loss term is effective in its goal of boosting consensus among explainers. As with any first attempt at introducing a new objective to neural network training, we see modest results in some settings and evidence that hyperparameters can likely be tuned on a case-by-case basis. It is not our aim to leave practitioners with a how-to guide, but rather to begin exploring how practitioners can control where a model lies along the accuracy-agreement trade-off curve.

We introduce a loss term measuring two types of correlation between explainers, which unfortunately adds more complexity to the machine learning engineer's job of tuning models. But, we show conclusively that there are settings in which using both types of correlation is better than using only one when encouraging explanation consensus.

Another limitation of these experiments as a guide on how to train for consensus is that we only trained with one pair of explainers. Our loss is defined for any pair and perhaps another choice would better suit specific applications.

In light of the contentious debate on whether deep models or decision-tree-based methods are better for tabular data [10, 31, 38], we argue that developing new tools for training deep models can help promote wider adoption for tabular deep learning. Moreover, with the results we present in this work, it is our hope that future work improves these trends, which could possibly lead to neural models that have more agreement (and possibly more accuracy) than their tree-based counterparts (such as XGBoost).

5.1 Future Work

Armed with the knowledge that training for consensus with PEAR is possible, we describe several exciting directions for future work. First, as alluded to above, we explored training with only one pair of explainers, but other pairs may help data scientists who have a specific type of target agreement. Work to better understand how a given pair of explainers in the loss affects the agreement of other explainers at test time could lead to principled decisions about how to use our loss in practice. Indeed, PEAR could fit into larger learning frameworks [22] that aim to select user- and task-specific explanation methods automatically.

It will be crucial to study the quality of explanations produced with PEAR from a human perspective. Ultimately, both the efficacy of a single explanation and the efficacy of agreement between multiple explanations is tied to how the explanations are used and interpreted. Since our work only takes a quantitative approach to demonstrate improvement when regularizing for explanation consensus, it remains to be seen whether actual human practitioners would make better judgments about models trained with PEAR vs models trained naturally.

In terms of model architecture, we chose standard sized MLPs for the experiments on our tabular datasets. Recent work proposes

transformers [36] and even ResNets [10] for tabular data, so completely different architectures could also be examined in future work as well.

Finally, research into developing better explainers could lead to an even more powerful consensus loss term. Recall that IntGrad integrates the gradients over a path in input space. The designers of that algorithm point out that a straight path is the canonical choice due to its simplicity and symmetry [37]. Other paths through input space that include more realistic data points, instead of paths of points constructed via linear interpolation, could lead to even better agreement metrics on actual data.

5.2 Conclusion

In the quest for fair and accessible deep learning, balancing interpretability and performance are key. It is known that common explainers may return conflicting results on the same model and input, to the detriment of an end user. The gains in explainer consensus we achieve with our method, however modest, serve to kick start others to improve on our work in aligning machine learning models with the practical challenge of interpreting complex models for real-life stakeholders.

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A APPENDIX

A.1 Datasets

In our experiments we use tabular datasets originally from OpenML and compiled into a set of benchmark datasets from the Inria-Soda team on HuggingFace [11]. We provide some details about each dataset:

Bank Marketing This is a binary classification dataset with six input features and is approximately class balanced. We train on 7,933 training samples and test on the remaining 2,645 samples.

California Housing This is a binary classification dataset with seven input features and is approximately class balanced. We train on 15,475 training samples and test on the remaining 5,159 samples.

Electricity This is a binary classification dataset with seven input features and is approximately class balanced. We train on 28,855 training samples and test on the remaining 9,619 samples.

A.2 Hyperparamters

Many of our hyperparameters are constant across all of our experiments. For example, all MLPs are trained with a batch size of 64, and initial learning rate of 0.0005. Also, all the MLPs we study are 3 hidden layers of 100 neurons each. We always use the AdamW optimizer [19]. The number of epochs varies from case to case. For all three datasets, we train for 30 epochs when $\lambda \in \{0.0, 0.25\}$ and 50 epochs otherwise. When training linear models, we use 10 epochs and an initial learning rate of 0.1.

A.3 Disagreement Metrics

We define each of the six agreement metrics used in our work here.

The first four metrics depend on the top-k most important features in each explanation. Let $top\_features(E, k)$ represent the top-k most important features in an explanation E, let $rank(E, s)$ be the importance rank of the feature s within explanation E, and let $sign(E, s)$ be the sign (positive, negative, or zero) of the importance score of feature s in explanation E.

Feature Agreement

$$\frac{|top\_features(E_1, k) \cap top\_features(E_2, k)|}{k} \tag{4}$$

Rank Agreement

$$\frac{|\bigcup_{s \in S}\{s \in top\_features(E_1, k) \wedge s \in top\_features(E_2, k) \wedge rank(E_1, s) = rank(E_2, s)\}|}{k} \tag{5}$$

Sign Agreement

$$\frac{|\bigcup_{s \in S}\{s \in top\_features(E_1, k) \wedge s \in top\_features(E_2, k) \wedge sign(E_1, s) = signrank(E_2, s)\}|}{k} \tag{6}$$

Signed Rank Agreement

$$\frac{|\bigcup_{s \in S}\{s \in top\_features(E_1, k) \wedge s \in top\_features(E_2, k) \wedge rank(E_1, s) = rank(E_2, s) \wedge sign(E_1, s) = sign(E_2, s)\}|}{k} \tag{7}$$

The next two agreement metrics depend on all features within each explanation, not just the top-k. Let R be a function that computes the ranking of features within an explanation by importance.

Rank Correlation

$$\sum_i \frac{(R(a)_i - \overline{R(a)})(R(b)_i - \overline{R(b)})}{\|R(a)\|\|R(b)\|} \tag{8}$$

Lastly, let $RelR(E, f_i, f_j)$ be a relative ranking function that returns 1 when feature f_i has higher importance than feature f_j in explanation E, and let F be any set of features.

Pairwise Rank Agreement

$$\frac{\sum_{i<j} \mathbb{1}[RelR(E_1, f_i, f_j) = RelR(E_2, f_i, f_j)]}{\binom{|F|}{2}} \tag{9}$$

(Note: Krishna et al. [15] specify in their paper that F is to be a set of features specified by an end user, but in our experiments we use all features with this metric).

A.4 Junk Feature Experiment Results

When we add random features for the experiment in Section 4.4, we double the number of features. We do this to check whether our consensus loss damages explanation quality by placing irrelevant features in the top-K more often than models trained naturally. In Table 1, we report the percentage of the time that each explainer included one of the random features in the top-5 most important features. We observe that across the board, we do not see a systematic increase of these percentages between $\lambda = 0.0$ (a baseline MLP without our consensus loss) and $\lambda = 0.5$ (an MLP trained with our consensus loss).

Table 1: Frequency of junk features getting top-5 ranks, measured in percent.

		LIME	SHAP	GRAD	Input*Grad	IntGrad	SmoothGrad	Random Chance
Bank Marketing	$\lambda = 0.0$	30.4	17.1	1.1	43.2	0.0	43.1	98.9
	$\lambda = 0.5$	25.1	12.0	0.1	34.9	0.0	0.1	
California Housing	$\lambda = 0.0$	22.6	8.7	0.0	24.8	0.0	0.3	98.5
	$\lambda = 0.5$	21.2	20.4	1.4	25.9	1.4	0.9	
Eelectricity	$\lambda = 0.0$	11.8	16.0	4.0	15.8	0.9	6.8	98.5
	$\lambda = 0.5$	9.1	9.5	1.7	8.6	0.8	3.1	

A.5 More Disagreement Matrices



Figure 9: Disagreement matrices for all metrics considered in this paper on Bank Marketing data.



Figure 10: Disagreement matrices for all metrics considered in this paper on California Housing data.



Figure 11: Disagreement matrices for all metrics considered in this paper on Electricity data.

A.6 Extended Results

Table 2: Average test accuracy for models we trained. This table is organized by dataset, model, the hyperparameters in the loss, and the weight decay coefficient (WD). Averages are over several trials and we report the means ± one standard error.

Dataset	Model	λ	μ	WD	Accuracy
Bank Marketing	Linear	0.00	0.00	0.0002	74.3516 ± 0.1313
	MLP	0.00	0.00	0.0002	79.0653 ± 0.2133
	MLP	0.00	0.00	0.0020	78.9666 ± 0.4625
	MLP	0.00	0.00	0.0200	79.1430 ± 0.4260
	MLP	0.00	0.00	0.2000	79.1934 ± 0.1383
	MLP	0.25	0.00	0.0002	79.2565 ± 0.1241
	MLP	0.25	0.75	0.0002	79.3321 ± 0.1265
	MLP	0.25	1.00	0.0002	79.2691 ± 0.5393
	MLP	0.50	0.00	0.0002	79.4707 ± 0.1363
	MLP	0.50	0.75	0.0002	79.0086 ± 0.0882
	MLP	0.50	1.00	0.0002	79.1934 ± 0.1241
	MLP	0.75	0.00	0.0002	78.7902 ± 0.1865
	MLP	0.75	0.75	0.0002	77.8618 ± 0.4173
	MLP	0.75	1.00	0.0002	77.5299 ± 0.6848
California Housing	Linear	0.00	0.00	0.0002	81.5352 ± 0.1819
	MLP	0.00	0.00	0.0002	84.8580 ± 0.1768
	MLP	0.00	0.00	0.0020	84.6159 ± 0.1275
	MLP	0.00	0.00	0.0200	84.5448 ± 0.2128
	MLP	0.00	0.00	0.2000	84.3639 ± 0.3306
	MLP	0.25	0.00	0.0002	81.7471 ± 0.8670
	MLP	0.25	0.75	0.0002	83.5821 ± 0.1443
	MLP	0.25	1.00	0.0002	84.1442 ± 0.3780
	MLP	0.50	0.00	0.0002	80.2546 ± 0.4983
	MLP	0.50	0.75	0.0002	83.1595 ± 0.2225
	MLP	0.50	1.00	0.0002	83.7178 ± 0.1902
	MLP	0.75	0.00	0.0002	82.7874 ± 0.7604
	MLP	0.75	0.75	0.0002	82.4578 ± 0.3826
	MLP	0.75	1.00	0.0002	81.7859 ± 0.6012
Electricity	Linear	0.00	0.00	0.0002	73.3382 ± 0.1500
	MLP	0.00	0.00	0.0002	81.2974 ± 0.1576
	MLP	0.00	0.00	0.0020	81.1727 ± 0.2092
	MLP	0.00	0.00	0.0200	81.5573 ± 0.1169
	MLP	0.00	0.00	0.2000	76.9311 ± 0.5849
	MLP	0.25	0.00	0.0002	81.5781 ± 0.1690
	MLP	0.25	0.75	0.0002	80.5454 ± 0.1380
	MLP	0.25	1.00	0.0002	80.9162 ± 0.5275
	MLP	0.50	0.00	0.0002	81.4880 ± 0.1428
	MLP	0.50	0.75	0.0002	80.0742 ± 0.1131
	MLP	0.50	1.00	0.0002	79.6479 ± 0.4371
	MLP	0.75	0.00	0.0002	80.6252 ± 0.1940
	MLP	0.75	0.75	0.0002	79.0118 ± 0.4375
	MLP	0.75	1.00	0.0002	78.6811 ± 0.6160

A.7 Additional Plots



Figure 12: The logit surfaces for MLPs, each trained with a different lambda value, on 10 randomly constructed three-point planes from the Bank Marketing dataset.



Figure 13: The logit surfaces for MLPs, each trained with a different lambda value, on 10 randomly construcuted three-point planes from the California Housing dataset.



Figure 14: The logit surfaces for MLPs, each trained with a different lambda value, on 10 randomly construcuted three-point planes from the Electricity dataset.



Figure 15: Additional trade-off curve plots for all datasets and metrics.

When Fair Classification Meets Noisy Protected Attributes

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ABSTRACT

The operationalization of algorithmic fairness comes with several practical challenges, not the least of which is the availability or reliability of protected attributes in datasets. In real-world contexts, practical and legal impediments may prevent the collection and use of demographic data, making it difficult to ensure algorithmic fairness. While initial fairness algorithms did not consider these limitations, recent proposals aim to achieve algorithmic fairness in classification by incorporating noisiness in protected attributes or not using protected attributes at all.

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first head-to-head study of fair classification algorithms to compare attribute-reliant, noise-tolerant and attribute-unaware algorithms along the dual axes of predictivity and fairness. We evaluated these algorithms via case studies on four real-world datasets and synthetic perturbations. Our study reveals that attribute-unaware and noise-tolerant fair classifiers can potentially achieve similar level of performance as attribute-reliant algorithms, even when protected attributes are noisy. However, implementing them in practice requires careful nuance. Our study provides insights into the practical implications of using fair classification algorithms in scenarios where protected attributes are noisy or partially available.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Social and professional topics** → **User characteristics**; • **General and reference** → **Surveys and overviews**; • **Computing methodologies** → **Machine learning algorithms**.

KEYWORDS

fairness; classification; protected attributes; evaluation

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1 INTRODUCTION

In October 2022, the White House released the Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights [56]. This document, like other statements of AI principles [21, 30, 47, 49, 57], calls for protections against unfair discrimination (colloquially, *fairness*) to be deeply integrated into all AI systems. Researchers and journalists have led the way in this area, both in terms of identifying unfairness in real world systems [6, 11, 14, 44], and in the development of machine learning (ML) classifiers that jointly optimize for predictive performance and fairness [18, 26, 34, 37] (for a variety of different definitions of fairness [4, 27, 58, 63]).

Despite the widespread acknowledgment that fairness is a key component of trustworthy AI, formidable challenges remain to the adoption of fair classifiers in real world scenarios—chief among them being questions about demographic data itself. Many *classical fair classifiers* assume that protected attributes are available at training time and/or testing time [18] and that this data is accurate. However, demographic data may be noisy for a variety of reasons, including imprecision in human-generated labels [15], reliance on imperfect demographic-inference algorithms to generate protected attributes [23], or the presence of an adversary that is intentionally poisoning demographic data [24]. To attempt to deal with these issues, researchers have proposed *noise-tolerant fair classifiers* that aim to achieve distributional fairness by incorporating the error rate of demographic attributes in the fair classifier optimization process itself [13, 48, 60].

In other instances demographic data may not be available at all, which violates the assumptions of both classical and noise-tolerant fair classifiers. This may occur when demographic data is unobtainable (e.g., laws or social norms impede collection [5, 10]), prohibitively expensive to generate (e.g., when large datasets are scraped from the web [16, 35, 41]), or when laws disallow the use of protected attributes to train classifiers (e.g., direct discrimination [62]). For cases such as these, researchers have proposed *demographic-unaware fair classifiers* that use the latent representations in the feature space of the training data to reduce gaps in classification errors between protected groups, either via assigning higher weights to groups of training examples that are misclassified [28], or by training an auxiliary adversarial model to computationally identify regions of misclassification [39].

Motivated by this explosion of fundamentally different fair classifiers, we present an empirical, head-to-head evaluation of the performance of 14 classifiers in this study, spread across four classes: two *unconstrained classifiers*, seven classical fair classifiers, three noise-tolerant fair classifiers, and two demographic-unaware classifiers. Drawing on the methodological approach used by Friedler et al. [22] in their comparative study of classical fair classifiers, we evaluate the accuracy, stability, and fairness guarantees (defined as the equal odds difference) of these 14 classifiers across four datasets as we vary noise in the protected attribute (sex). To help explain the performance differences that we observe, we calculate and compare the feature importance vectors for our various trained classifiers. This methodological approach

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enables us to compare the performance of these 14 algorithms under controlled, naturalistic circumstances in an apples-to-apples manner.

Based on our head-to-head evaluation we make the following key observations:

- Two classical fair classifiers, one noise-tolerant fair classifier, and one demographic-unaware fair classifier performed consistently well across all metrics on our experiments.
- The best classifier for each case study showed some variability, confirming that the choice of dataset is an important factor when selecting a model.
- One demographic-unaware fair classifier was able to achieve equal odds for males and females under a variety of ecological conditions, confirming that demographics are not always necessary at training or testing time to achieve fairness.

We release our source code and data[1] so that others can replicate and expand upon our results.

We argue that large-scale, head-to-head evaluations such as the one we conduct in this study are critical for researchers and ML practitioners. Our results act as a checkpoint, informing the community about the relative performance characteristics of classifiers within and between classes. For researchers, this can highlight gaps where novel algorithms are still needed (e.g., noise-tolerant and demographic-unaware classifiers, based on our findings) and provide a framework for rigorously evaluating them. For practitioners, our results highlight the importance of thoroughly evaluating many classifiers from many classes before adopting one in practice, and we provide a roadmap for choosing the best classifiers for a given real-world scenario, depending on the availability and quality of demographic data.

Our study proceeds as follows: in § 2 we present a brief overview of the history of fair models and head-to-head performance evaluation. Next, in § 3, we introduce the 14 classifiers and the metrics we use to evaluate them for predictive performance and fairness. In § 4 we present our experimental approach, including the datasets we use for our four case studies. In § 5 we present the results of our experiments and we discuss our findings in § 6.

2 RELATED WORK

We discuss different classes of fair classifiers, their known shortcomings, and how they have been evaluated in the past.

2.1 Fair Classifiers

Dwork et al. [18] were one of the first to operationalize the idea of fairness in machine learning classifiers, through their key observation that awareness of demographics is crucial for building models that rectify unfair discrimination and historical inequity. Their work takes the idea of awareness literally, by incorporating protected attributes directly into the model and jointly optimizing for accuracy and fairness. Many subsequent works have built on this foundation by developing versions of classical ML classifiers that incorporate fairness constraints (e.g., decision trees, random forests, SVMs, boosting, etc. [46]).

[1]The code and data for replicating this paper can be found at https://github.com/evijit/Awareness_vs_Unawareness

Collectively, we refer to this class of algorithms as classical fair classifiers. They are now widely available to practitioners [9, 42, 52] and have been adopted into real-world systems [19].

While classical fair classifiers are an important advance over their unconstrained predecessors, they rely on a strong assumption that data about protected attributes is accurate. Unfortunately, this may not be true in practice. For example, in contexts like finance and employment candidate screening, demographic data may not be available due to legal constraints or social norms [10, 62], yet the need to fairly classify people remains paramount. To bridge this gap, practitioners may infer peoples' protected attributes using human labelers [8] or algorithms that take names, locations, photos, etc. as input [1]. However, work by Ghosh et al. [23] demonstrates that these inference approaches produce noisy demographic data, and that this noise obviates the fairness guarantees provided by fair models.

With these limitations in mind, researchers have begun developing what we refer to as noise-tolerant fair classifiers that, as the name suggests, jointly optimize for accuracy and fairness in the presence of uncertainty in the protected attribute data. Approaches include robust optimization that adjusts for the presence of noise in the fairness constraint [60], adjusting the "fairness tolerance" value for binary protected groups [40], using noisy attributes to post-process the outputs for fairness instead of the true attributes under certain conditional independence assumptions [7], estimating de-noised constraints that allow for near optimal fairness [13], or a combination of approaches [48].

Noise-tolerant fair classifiers, like classical fair classifiers, still rely on the assumption that protected attributes are available at training time. As we discuss in § 1, however, there are many real-world contexts when this assumption may be violated. The strongest such impediment is legal, i.e., any inclusion of protected attributes in the classifier would be considered illegal direct discrimination.

A different approach for achieving fairness through awareness that is amenable to these strong constraints is embodied by what we refer to as demographic-unaware fair classifiers. These algorithms do not take protected attributes as input, but they attempt to achieve demographic fairness anyway by relying on the latent representations of the training data [28, 39]. Thus, this approach to classification still incorporates a general awareness of unfair discrimination and historical inequity without being directly aware of demographics.

While demographic-unaware fair classifiers are an attractive solution in contexts where protected attributes are unavailable, practical questions about the efficacy of these algorithms remain. First, because these techniques are unsupervised, it is unclear what groups are identified for fairness optimization. Under what circumstances are demographic-unaware fair classifiers able to achieve fairness for social groups that have been historically marginalized or are legally protected? Conversely, are the groups constructed by demographic-unaware fair classifiers arbitrary and thus divorced from salient real-world sociohistorical context? Second, assuming that demographic-unaware fair classifiers do identify and act on meaningful groups of individuals, how does their performance (in terms of predictions and fairness) compare to classical and noise-tolerant fair classifiers? In this study, our goal

is to begin answering these questions about relative performance across all four classes of fair classifiers.

2.2 Head-to-Head Evaluation

It is standard practice for ML researchers to compare the performance of their novel algorithms against competitors. However, these comparisons are rarely comprehensive, i.e., they focus on comparisons with a narrow set of comparable algorithms to demonstrate advances over the state-of-the-art. While these evaluations are crucial for assessing the benefits of new algorithms, they do not paint a complete picture of performance across a variety of different algorithms, spanning both time and fundamental approaches.

Benchmark studies address this gap by focusing on the evaluation of a large set of models under expansive and carefully controlled conditions [22, 29]. These studies provide important context for the ML field, e.g., by identifying models that do not work well in practice, models that have equivalent performance characteristics under a wide range of circumstances, and areas where new models may be needed. To the best of our knowledge, existing benchmark studies focus solely on classical fair classifiers, which motivates us to update their results. Thus, in this study we adopt the methodological approach for evaluation developed by Friedler et al. [22] and build upon their work by evaluating four different classes of classifiers (both fairness constrained and unconstrained).

3 ALGORITHMS AND METRICS

In this section, we introduce the 14 classifiers that we evaluated in this study and the metrics we used to evaluate them.

3.1 Classifiers

We group the classifiers that we evaluated in this study into four classes: (1) unconstrained classifiers that solely optimize for accuracy; (2) classical fair classifiers that require access to protected attributes at training (and sometimes testing) time, and assume that this data are accurate; (3) noise-tolerant fair classifiers that also require access to protected attributes but account for uncertainty in the data; and (4) demographic-unaware fair classifiers that jointly optimize for accuracy and fairness but without access to any protected attribute data. The set of classifiers we have selected is not exhaustive. Instead, we aim to include representative classifiers from the various types of approaches that exist within each class. We discuss the classifiers from each class that we selected for our study below, with further details on related approaches in each subsection.

3.1.1 Unconstrained Classifiers. We chose two classifiers that do not have any fairness constraints, i.e., they only aim to maximize predictive accuracy.

- **Logistic Regression (LR)** is the simplest classifier we evaluate. While LR is demographic-aware because it takes all features (including protected attributes) as model inputs at both train and test time, it is not designed to achieve any fairness criteria.
- **Random Forest (RF)** is an ensemble method for classification built out of decision trees. Like LR, we train RF classifiers on all input features including protected attributes.

3.1.2 Classical Fair Classifiers. We chose seven classifiers from the literature that take protected attributes as input and attempt to achieve demographic fairness. These classifiers vary with respect to how they implement fairness, i.e., by pre-processing data, in-process during model training, or by post-processing the trained model. In particular, there exist many techniques for fairness optimization in this class, such as: reweighting of samples via group sizes [12, 20, 32] or via mutual independence of protected and unprotected features in the latent representations [64, 65], adding fairness constraints during the learning process [2, 3, 34, 63], or by changing the output labels to match some fairness criterion [33, 50]. The seven classifiers we choose below are representative of these different approaches.

- **Sample Reweighting (SREW)** is a pre-processing technique that takes each (group, label) combination in the training data and assigns rebalanced weights to them. The goal of this procedure is to remove imbalances in the training data, with the ultimate aim of ensuring fairness before the classifier is trained [32].
- **Learned Fair Representation (LFR)** is a pre-processing technique that converts the input features into a latent encoding that is designed to represent the training data well while simultaneously hiding protected attribute information from the classifier [64].
- **Adversarial Debiasing (ADDEB)** is an in-process technique that trains a classifier to maximize accuracy while simultaneously reducing an adversarial network's ability to determine the protected attributes from the predictions [65].
- **Exponentiated Gradient Reduction (EGR)** is an in-process technique that reduces fair classification to a set of cost-sensitive classification problems, essentially treating the main classifier itself as a black box and forcing the predictions to be the most accurate under a given fairness constraint [2]. In this case, the constraint is solved as a saddle point problem using the exponentiated gradient algorithm.
- **Grid Search Reduction (GSR)** uses the same set of cost-sensitive classification problems approach as EGR, except in this case the constraints are solved using the grid search algorithm [2, 3].
- **Calibrated Equalized Odds (CALEQ)** is a post-processing technique that optimizes the calibrated classifier score output to find the probabilities that it uses to change the output labels, with an equalized odds objective [50].
- **Reject Option Classifier (ROC)** is a post-processing technique that swaps favorable and unfavorable outcomes for privileged and unprivileged groups around the decision boundaries with the highest uncertainty [33].

Note that the CALEQ and ROC algorithms have access to protected attributes at both train and test time, while the other classifiers only have access to protected attributes at training time.

3.1.3 Noise-tolerant Fair Classifiers. We chose three classifiers from the literature that take protected attributes as input and attempt to achieve demographic fairness even in the presence of

noise. Other than the three classifiers that we chose, we are aware of only one other approach: by Celis et al. [13], who suggests using de-noised constraints to achieve near-optimal fairness.[2]

- **Modified Distributionally Robust Optimization (MDRO)** by Wang et al. [60] is an extension of the Distributionally Robust Optimization (DRO) algorithm [28] that adds a maximum total variation distance in the DRO procedure. By assuming a noise model for the protected attributes, it aims to provide tighter bounds for DRO.
- **Soft Group Assignments (SOFT)**, also by Wang et al. [60], is a theoretically robust approach that first performs "soft" group assignments and then performs classification, with the idea being that if an algorithm is fair in terms of those robust criteria for noisy groups, then they must also be fair for true protected groups [31].
- **Private Learning (PRIV)** is an approach by Mozannar et al. [48] that uses differential privacy techniques to learn a fair classifier while having partial access to protected attributes. The approach requires two steps. The first step is to obtain locally private versions of the protected attributes (like Lamy et al. [40]). Second, following Awasthi et al. [7], PRIV tries to create a fair classifier based on the private attributes. For this study, we select the privacy level hyperparameter to be a medium value (zero).

3.1.4 Demographic-unaware Fair Classifiers. We chose two classifiers from the literature that attempt to achieve fairness without taking protected attributes as input.

- **Adversarially Reweighted Learning (ARL)** harnesses non-protected attributes and labels by utilizing the computational separability of these training instances to divide them into subgroups, and then uses an adversarial reweighting approach on the subgroups to improve classification fairness [39].
- **Distributionally Robust Optimization (DRO)** is an algorithm that attempts to minimize the worst case risk of all groups that are close to the empirical distribution [28]. In the spirit of Rawlsian distributive justice, the algorithm tries to control the risk to minority groups while being oblivious to their identities.

These two classifiers operate under similar principles: they both try to reduce the gap in errors between protected groups by reducing the classification errors between latent groups in the training set. They do however have one difference: while DRO just increases the weights of the training examples that have higher errors, ARL trains an auxillary adversarial network to identify the regions in the latent input space that lead to higher errors and tries to equalize them, a phenomenon Lahoti et al. [39] call *computational identifiability*.

3.2 Evaluation Metrics

To compare the above 14 classifiers head-to-head, we studied their predictive power and their ability to achieve a fairness condition. We also measured the stability of these quantities when noise in the protected attributes was and was not present (described in § 4.2).

To assess predictive performance we computed accuracy, defined as:

$$\text{Accuracy} = \frac{\text{number of correct classifications}}{\text{test dataset size}}. \quad (1)$$

Accuracy is continuous between zero and one with the ideal value being one, which indicates a perfectly predictive classifier.

Many measures of fairness exist in the literature [46]. For the purposes of this study, however, we needed to choose a metric that is supported by all the 14 classifiers so that our comparison is apples-to-apples. The classical and noise-tolerant fair classifiers have support for achieving any user-specified fairness constraint, while the demographic-unaware fair classifiers try to minimize the gap in utility between the protected groups. Based on this limitation, and for the sake of brevity, we choose the Average Odds Difference between two demographic groups as our fairness metric, and subsequently choose Equal Odds Difference (EOD) over both groups as our regularization constraint for the classical and noise-tolerant fair classifiers. EOD is defined as:

$$\text{EOD} = \frac{(\text{FPR}_{\text{unpriv}} - \text{FPR}_{\text{priv}}) + (\text{TPR}_{\text{unpriv}} - \text{TPR}_{\text{priv}})}{2} \quad (2)$$

where TPR is the true positive rate and FPR is the false positive rate. Priv and Unpriv denote the privileged and unprivileged groups, respectively. The ideal value of EOD is zero, which indicates that both groups have equal odds of correct and incorrect classification by the trained classifier.

In this study, when we evaluate fairness, we do so for binary sex attributes. We adopted this approach because the datasets we use in our evaluation all include this attribute (see § 4) and four classifiers in our evaluation (e.g., CALEQ, ROC, EGR, GSR) only support fairness constraints over two groups. Whenever necessary, we consider males to be the privileged group and females to be the unprivileged group. Note that optimizing for fairness between two groups is the simplest scenario that fair classifiers will encounter in practice—if they perform poorly on this task, then they are unlikely to succeed in more complex scenarios with multiple, possibly intersectional, groups.

4 METHODOLOGY

In this section, we describe the approach we used to empirically evaluate the 14 classifiers that we chose for our study.

4.1 Case Studies

To observe how the classifiers perform on real-world data we chose four different datasets. The classification tasks are described below. Each dataset had binary sex as part of the input features.

(1) **Public Coverage [17].** The task is to predict whether an individual (who is low income and not eligible for Medicare) was covered under public health insurance. We used census data from California for the year 2018.
(2) **Employment [17].** The task is to predict whether an individual (between the ages of 16 and 90), is employed. For this task too, we looked at census data from California for the year 2018.
(3) **Law School Admissions [61].** The task is to predict whether a student was admitted to law school.

[2] Celis et al. [13]'s source code only supported Statistical Parity and False Discovery constraints, not EOD, which is why we omitted their classifier from our analysis.



Figure 1: Fraction of females in our datasets after adding synthetic noise. The dashed line indicates the true fraction of females.

(4) **Diabetes [54].** The task is to predict whether a diabetes patient was readmitted to the hospital for treatment after 30 days.

For each of these case studies, we split the dataset into train and test sets in an 80:20 ratio, trained every classifier on the same training set, and then used the trained classifiers to generate predictions on the same testing set. We verified via two-tailed Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests [36, 53] and Mann–Whitney U tests [45] that the test set distribution for every feature was the same as the training set distribution. Finally, we calculated the metrics in § 3.2 on these predictions and compared the results from each classifier head-to-head. We repeated this procedure ten times to assess the stability of accuracy and EOD for each classifier.

4.2 Synthetic Noise

While studying the performance of these classifiers on a variety of real-world datasets is important, in order to get a more thorough understanding of the theoretical fairness and predictivity limits of the classifiers we subjected them to robust synthetic stress tests. As discussed in § 2.1, in the real world, practitioners may not have access to the protected attribute information of people in their dataset. As a result, practitioners may use inference tools to find proxies for protected attributes, which can lead to unexpected, unfair outcomes [23]. To characterize what might happen in such a scenario, we perform the following synthetic experiments:

(1) For each dataset, with a given probability (ranging from 0.1 to 0.9), we randomly flip the protected attribute labels (binary sex in this case) in the dataset. We refer to this probability value as *noise*.
(2) With the synthetically generated dataset from Step 1, we then proceed to split the dataset 80:20, train all 14 algorithms on the same training set, and then calculate predictions on the same test set. The noisy (flipped) labels are passed as inputs to the classifiers at this step.
(3) Next, with the predicted outcomes from Step 2, we calculate accuracy and EOD. Note that we calculate EOD with the *true* protected attributes, i.e., we measure the output bias in terms of the original sex labels from the given dataset.
(4) We repeat Steps 1–3 ten times for each value of noise, to ensure statistical fairness and assess the stability of our metrics per classifier.



Figure 2: KernelShap feature explanations calculated for the Logistic Regression (LR) classifier when trained on the Public Coverage dataset with no added noise. We used the same approach to calculate feature importances for every classifier-dataset pair at different noise levels.

Figure 1 shows the fraction of females in the noised datasets at each level of noise. The fraction of females goes up or down with noise depending on what the true fraction of females in the different datasets were to begin with.

4.3 Calculating Feature Importance

To help explain the variations in performance that we observed in our results, we calculated feature importance for each of our trained models. Although there are several black-box model explanation tools in the research literature—such as LIME [51], SHAP [43], and Integrated Gradients [55]—we required an explanation method that was model agnostic. The method that we settled on was KernelShap.[3] According to the documentation, KernelShap uses

[3] https://shap-lrjball.readthedocs.io/en/latest/generated/shap.KernelExplainer.html



Figure 3: Accuracy and EOD for our 14 classifiers, calculated over four datasets with ten runs each. No noise was added to the protected attribute in these tests. Violins are color coded by class: blue for unconstrained classifiers, purple for classical fair classifiers, green for noise-tolerant fair classifiers, and red for demographic-unaware fair classifiers. LR, SREW, and GSR are deterministic algorithms and therefore appear as fixed points.

a special weighted linear regression model to calculate local coefficients, to estimate the Shapley value (a game theoretic concept that estimates the individual contribution of each player towards the final outcome). As opposed to retraining the model with every combination of features as in vanilla SHAP, KernelShap uses the full model and integrates out different features one by one. It also supports any type of model, not just linear models, and was thus a good candidate for our study.

Figure 2 shows an example distribution of feature importances calculated for the LR algorithm when trained on the Public Coverage dataset at noise level zero (i.e., no noise). In a similar fashion, we used KernelShap to calculate feature importance values for trained classifier outputs at noise levels 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8 for all 14 models.

Research by Kumar et al. [38] has shown that different explanation methods often do not agree with each other. We do not claim that the feature importances we calculated using KernelShap are guaranteed to agree with those produced by other tools. Nonetheless, we are specifically interested in the relative importance of the sex feature towards the final outcome as compared to the other input features. Shapley value-based explanations give us a reasonable sense of relative feature importance, as has been empirically shown in previous work [25].

5 RESULTS

In this section, we present the results of our experiments. We begin by examining the baseline performance of the 14 classifiers when there is no noise, followed by their performance in the presence of synthetic noise. Finally, we delve into feature importance explanations to help explain the relative performance characteristics of the classifiers.

5.1 Baseline Characteristics

Figure 3(a–d) shows the accuracy and fairness outcomes for all 14 classifiers when there was no noise in the datasets. We executed each classifier ten times without fixing a random seed and present the resulting distributions of metrics using violin plots. We observe that most of the classifiers achieved comparable accuracy to each other on each dataset, and that most classifiers exhibited stable accuracy over the ten executions of the experiments. Learned Fair Representation (LFR), Soft Group Assignment (SOFT), and Distributed Robust Optimization (DRO) were the exceptions: the former two exhibited unstable accuracy on all four datasets, the latter on two datasets.

As shown in Figure 3(e–h), EOD was considerably more variable over runs than accuracy. The unconstrained classifiers (LR and RF) were relatively stable and, in some cases, achieved roughly



Figure 4: Accuracy and EOD for our 14 classifiers, calculated over four datasets as we increase noise in the protected attribute (sex). Each point is the average of ten runs for a given classifier, dataset, and noise level. Classifiers are color coded according to the legend. We highlight classifiers whose performance significantly diverges from the consensus with annotated labels.

equalized odds (e.g., on the Law School and Diabetes datasets). The classical fair classifier group contained the two least fair classifiers in these experiments (CALEQ and ROC), while the other pre-processing and in-processing algorithms performed relatively better. Adversarial Debiasing (ADDEB) was slightly unstable but the distribution centered around zero. Among the noise-tolerant fair classifiers, Soft Group Assignment (SOFT) was unstable on three out of four datasets, while the other two classifiers (MDRO and PRIV) were relatively more stable and more fair. The two demographic-unaware fair classifiers (ARL and DRO) were unstable on the Public Coverage dataset (Figure 3e) and did not achieve equalized odds on the Employment dataset (Figure 3f). However, ARL and DRO were stable and fair on the remaining two datasets.

In summary, we observe that the accuracy and fairness performance of these classifiers was dependent on the dataset that they are trained and tested on, i.e., there was no single best classifier. Additionally, we can see that several classifiers are consistently unstable, which explains some of the results that we will present in the next section.

5.2 Characteristics Under Noise

Next, we present the results of experiments where we added noise to the protected attribute of the datasets. We added noise in increments of 0.1 starting from 0.1 and ranging up to 0.9. We added a given amount of noise to each dataset ten times and repeated the experiment, thus we plot the average values of accuracy and EOD for each classifier at each noise level.

Figure 4(a–d) shows the accuracy of the 14 classifiers' outputs as we varied noise. We observe that the MDRO, SOFT, and LFR classifiers had poor accuracy across all datasets and noise levels, while the DRO classifier had poor accuracy in two out of the four datasets. These observations mirror those from Figure 3, i.e., these classifiers exhibited poor average accuracy in the noisy experiments because they were unstable in general. The other classifiers tended to be both accurate and stable, irrespective of noise.

As shown in Figure 4(e–h), the EOD results were much more complex than the accuracy results. ROC generated unfair outputs over all four datasets, at every noise level. Its companion post processing algorithm, CALEQ, exhibited rising EOD with noise for the Public Coverage dataset (Figure 4e) and falling



(a) Public Coverage (b) Employment (c) Law School Admissions (d) Diabetes

Figure 5: Wasserstein distances between the average KernelShap feature importance distributions over different noise levels for the four datasets. Each square compares the average feature importances of two classifiers. Redder squares denote pairs of classifiers with more divergent feature importance distributions.

EOD for the Employment and Diabetes datasets (Figure 4f, h).[4] The unconstrained classifiers (LR and RF) moved in the same direction for every dataset, either rising (Figure 4e, f) or falling (Figure 4h) with noise. The SOFT classifier also exhibited some variable behavior: on the Employment dataset EOD rose with noise (Figure 4f), and on the Public Coverage (Figure 4e) dataset it failed to achieve equal odds at higher noise levels. The remaining classifiers tended to achieve equal odds irrespective of the noise level.

Figure 4 only depicts average values for accuracy and EOD, which is potentially problematic because it may hide instability in the classifiers' performance. To address this we present Figure 7 in the Supplementary Material, which shows the distribution of accuracy and EOD results for each classifier on each dataset at the 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9 noise levels. We observe that, overall, no classifier became consistently less stable as noise increased. Rather, the stability patterns for each classifier mirrored the patterns that we already observed in Figure 3.

In summary, the classifiers that had problematic performance in the baseline experiments (see Figure 3) continued to have issues in the presence of noise. Additionally, the unconstrained classifiers exhibited inconsistent fairness as noise varied. Surprisingly, the noise-tolerant classifiers did not uniformly outperform the other fair classifiers.

5.3 Feature Importance

Finally, we delve into model explanations as a means to further explore the root causes of the classifier performance characteristics that we observed in the previous sections. First, we calculated feature explanations using KernelShap for every classifier at five noise levels—0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8—using the method we described in § 4.3. Next, we averaged the explanation distributions for each classifier to form a feature importance vector per classifier. Finally, we repeated this process for each dataset. For each dataset, we calculated Wasserstein distances [59] between the feature explanation distributions for each algorithm pair and present the results in Figure 5. Additionally, we plot the rank of the sex feature



Figure 6: Rank of Sex in the average absolute KernelShap feature importances for the different algorithms in our case studies.

in terms of mean absolute feature importance for each classifier and present the results in Figure 6 (we also show the range of ranks if they vary over noise).

Figure 5 reveals that, with few exceptions (EGR in Public Coverage, EGR and GSR in Employment, EGR and ROC in Law school, and CALEQ, PRIV and ARL in Diabetes), most classifiers had similar feature explanation distributions. We do not observe any clear patterns among the exceptional classifiers, i.e., no classifier consistently diverged from the others across all datasets. Further, we do not observe clear correlations between accuracy, EOD, and feature distribution similarity, suggesting that different classifiers took different paths to reach the same levels of performance.

[4]Note that a higher value of EOD (Equation 3.2) signifies that females received more positive predictions than males.

Figure 6 is more informative than Figure 5. Four of the classifiers that exhibited consistently poor performance—LFR, MDRO, and SOFT (Figure 3a–d), and ROC (Figure 3e–h)—learned to weight the sex feature higher than other features, which may point to the root cause of their accuracy and fairness issues. Similarly, the unconstrained classifiers (LR and RF) exhibited changing EOD with noise levels in three out of four datasets (Figure 4e, f, h), but not for Law School Admissions (Figure 4g), and we observe that they learned a relatively low weight for sex among the available features for the Law School dataset. CALEQ also learned a relatively low weight for sex on the Law School dataset and was subsequently unaffected by noise (Figure 4g), but showed variable trends in EOD for the other three datasets (Figure 4e, f, h) on which it learned a relatively higher weight for sex.

Sex was the lowest ranked feature for the two demographic-unaware fair classifiers (DRO and ARL), which makes sense because they were not given these features as input. EGR and GSR also did not have access to sex while classifying the test dataset, so they also had sex as the lowest ranked feature.

5.4 Fairness-Accuracy Tradeoff

Three algorithms in our list - EGR, GSR, and PRIV, provide a mechanism to control the fairness-accuracy tradeoff via a hyperparameter – namely fairness violation *eps* in the case of EGR and GSR [2], and the privacy level ϵ in the case of PRIV [48]. Based on the experiments the authors of these algorithms did in their papers, we used different *eps* values between 0.01 and 0.20 and ϵ values between -2 and 2 and reran our experiments. We found that tweaking the tradeoff hyperparameter did not contribute meaningfully to the stability and noise resistance capabilities of these algorithms. Consequently we omit these results from the paper.

6 CONCLUSION

In this study, we present benchmark results—in terms of accuracy, fairness, and stability—for 14 ML classifiers divided into four classes. We evaluated these classifiers across four datasets and varying levels of random noise in the protected attribute. Overall, we found that two classical fair classifiers (SREW and EGR), one noise-tolerant fair classifier (PRIV), and one demographic-unaware fair classifier (ARL) performed consistently well across metrics on our experiments. In the future we recommend that ML researchers benchmark their own fair classifiers against these classifiers and that practitioners consider adopting them.

One surprising finding of our study was how well SREW and EGR performed in the face of noise in the protected attribute. Contrast this to noise-tolerant classifiers like MDRO—whose performance did not vary with noise but was inaccurate on some datasets—and SOFT—which was consistently inaccurate and had variable fairness in the face of noise. These results suggest that some classical fair classifiers may actually fare well in the face of noise, and that adopting more complex noise-tolerant fair classifiers may not always be necessary.

Another surprising finding of our study was how well ARL performed. As a demographic-unaware fair classifier it did not have access to the sex feature at training or testing time, yet it achieved fairness performance that was comparable to demographic-aware fair classifiers on three of our datasets, and its fairness performance was noise invariant on three datasets as well. We fit linear regression models on each dataset with sex as the independent variable, but these models did not uncover any obvious proxy features for ARL to use in place of the sex feature. This speaks to the strength of the ARL algorithm's adversarial approach to learning.

On one hand, our results confirm that demographic-unaware fair classifiers can achieve fairness for real-world disadvantaged groups under ecological conditions. This is positive news for practitioners who would like to adopt a fair classifier but lack (high-quality) demographic data. On the other hand, we still urge caution with respect to the adoption of demographic-unaware fair classifiers for practical reasons. First, determining whether a classifier like ARL will achieve acceptable performance in a given context requires thorough evaluation on a dataset that includes demographic data, as we have done here. Second, even if a demographic-unaware fair classifier performs well in testing, its performance may degrade after deployment if the context changes or there is distribution drift [25]. Monitoring the health of a classifier like ARL in the field requires demographic data. In short, adopting a demographic-unaware classifier does not completely obviate the need for at least some high-quality demographic data.

In general, the results of our study point to the need for further development in the areas of noise-tolerant and demographic-unaware fair classifiers. By releasing our source code and data, we hope to provide a solid foundation for evaluating these novel classifiers in the future.

Our study has several limitations. First, we only evaluate classifiers using binary protected attributes. It is unclear how their performance and consistency would change under more complex conditions. That said, we are confident that the classifiers that performed poorly will continue to do so in the presence of more complex fairness objectives. Second, our case studies and synthetic experiments, while thorough, are by no means completely representative of all real world datasets and contexts. We caution that our results should not be generalized indefinitely. Third, we did not evaluate all of the classical fair classifiers from the literature (see Friedler et al. [22] and Mehrabi et al. [46] for more). Our primary focus was on adding to the literature by benchmarking noise-tolerant and demographic-unaware fair classifiers. Finally, in this study we only evaluated one fairness metric—EOD—because it was the common denominator among all of the classifiers we selected. Future work could explore fairness performance further by choosing other fairness metrics along with subsets of amenable classifiers.

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A SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL



Figure 7: Plots showing the stability of our 14 classifiers over three different levels of noise in protected attributes (0.1, 0.5 and 0.9). For each dataset we present the stability of each classifiers' accuracy and EOD.

Disambiguating Algorithmic Bias: From Neutrality to Justice

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ABSTRACT

As algorithms have become ubiquitous in consequential domains, societal concerns about the potential for discriminatory outcomes have prompted urgent calls to address algorithmic bias. In response, a rich literature across computer science, law, and ethics is rapidly proliferating to advance approaches to designing fair algorithms. Yet computer scientists, legal scholars, and ethicists are often not speaking the same language when using the term 'bias.' Debates concerning whether society can or should tackle the problem of algorithmic bias are hampered by conflations of various understandings of bias, ranging from neutral deviations from a standard to morally problematic instances of injustice due to prejudice, discrimination, and disparate treatment. This terminological confusion impedes efforts to address clear cases of discrimination.

In this paper, we examine the promises and challenges of different approaches to disambiguating bias and designing for justice. While both approaches aid in understanding and addressing clear algorithmic harms, we argue that they also risk being leveraged in ways that ultimately deflect accountability from those building and deploying these systems. Applying this analysis to recent examples of generative AI, our argument highlights unseen dangers in current methods of evaluating algorithmic bias and points to ways to redirect approaches to addressing bias in generative AI at its early stages in ways that can more robustly meet the demands of justice.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies → Philosophical/theoretical foundations of artificial intelligence**.

KEYWORDS

algorithms, bias, discrimination, fairness, justice, generative AI, large language models, vision-language models, law, philosophy

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1 INTRODUCTION

Algorithms exert influence over an increasingly wide range of social domains, including criminal justice, health care, finance, employment, and education [21, 39, 43, 86, 91, 118, 122, 147]. In both the academic literature and at a societal level, there is a growing awareness of the potential for bias or discrimination in the use of algorithms in sociotechnical systems [21, 22, 28, 37, 57, 109, 115, 119, 137]. When claims of discriminatory effects from such systems arise, public calls to address algorithmic fairness follow closely behind [107], leading to considerable attention from regulatory bodies around the world in recent years [14, 15, 17, 66, 85, 132, 143].

While there may be an emerging consensus that algorithms embedded in sociotechnical systems should be designed to be fair, computer scientists, legal scholars, and ethicists are not speaking the same language when using terms such as bias, fairness, and discrimination [108]. In a 2018 survey, Narayanan highlights twenty-one common technical definitions of fairness, a subset that is illustrative, not exhaustive, of mathematical approaches to bias [111], and Suresh and Guttag observe at least seven distinct sources of downstream harm that can arise at different stages of the machine learning lifecycle [136]. Technical definitions of fairness are often incompatible with one another, and the choice of which to employ when designing or evaluating an algorithm for fairness has an enormous influence on outcomes [42, 60, 97]. Further, the relationships between the various technical definitions of fairness and the legal and ethical notions of antidiscrimination, equality, and justice are not well understood.

These considerations are of vital consequence for legislative and enforcement efforts, such as the EU Artificial Intelligence Act [17], the White House's Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights [143], and the US Federal Trade Commission's call for businesses to test their algorithms regularly to ensure they do not discriminate on the basis of a protected attribute [85, 132]. When assessing algorithmic bias from a legal or policy perspective, one confronts challenges associated with definition, detection, and enforcement [92]. Longstanding antidiscrimination doctrine, for example, protects individuals against discrimination on the basis of certain protected classes tied to social identities of race, sex, and religion and, accordingly, prohibits the consideration of these protected characteristics in decisions that influence economic opportunity [92]. It is well-recognized, however, that, even in cases where algorithms explicitly exclude protected characteristics in their labeling, such features can continue to influence algorithmically-informed decisions [92]. For example, because race is highly correlated with ZIP code, information about an individual's location can serve as a proxy for this protected characteristic even when race is explicitly excluded from consideration [49].

Given the vast quantities of personal data analyzed by platforms, the fact that they do not explicitly use protected characteristics does little to establish confidence that such characteristics do not influence their results [24, 47]. Further, it is unlikely that, if proxies for protected characteristics do influence the results, they will do so in ways that can be proven to be unlawfully discriminatory without access to substantial additional statistical evidence [92].

In this paper, we analyze current approaches to algorithmic bias with respect to their potential as well as continued challenges for addressing harms to individuals, groups, and society. First (§ 2), we analyze differences between technical, legal, and ethical approaches to defining fairness in order to lay the groundwork for a broader understanding of the underlying harms and the values that, as a society, we should seek to protect in designing and enforcing fair algorithms. Then (§ 3), we outline two common approaches to addressing algorithmic bias: disambiguating different notions of bias and designing for justice. We argue that, while promising, both approaches carry risks: disambiguating bias can neutralize the term in ways that undermine public calls for justice and can also be used to avoid accountability for addressing algorithmic harms. Designing for justice and equity seeks to capture the broad range of social harms but also risks collapsing into debates similar to those that plague the algorithmic fairness literature. Lastly (§§ 4 and 5), we apply our analysis to generative AI to demonstrate methods of identifying and disambiguating bias in such systems, and conclude by suggesting forward-looking approaches to ensuring accountability for algorithmically-driven injustices and inequities.

2 WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR AN ALGORITHM TO BE FAIR?

The literature reflects a broad range of philosophical, legal, and technical approaches to defining fairness that may provide a basis for designing and evaluating fair algorithms. Notably, philosophical and legal notions provide underpinnings for an expansive view of algorithmic harms and algorithmic justice. However, in the technical literature, concerns about harms from sociotechnical systems are often reduced to measuring various forms of bias in algorithmic results.

2.1 Philosophical and Legal Notions of Justice and Antidiscrimination

John Rawls, one of the most influential philosophers on defining justice, contends in his 1971 *A Theory of Justice* that "justice is the first virtue of social institutions" [125]. Justice is the primary normative criterion we should use in evaluating social institutions and, thus, "laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust" [125]. Rawls argues that principles of justice should apply to the core social institutions that "distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation" [125]. Such political, social, and economic arrangements are the principal focus of justice because they define people's basic rights and duties and "influence their life prospects" [125]. Given the profound influence of algorithms in significant social institutions, including credit, housing, employment, and criminal justice decisions, it is therefore essential to evaluate the justice of algorithmic decisions.

Rawls defends a principle of justice as fairness, not as equivalent terms, but to clarify that principles of justice should specify fair terms of cooperation in society. Determining whether terms are fair is not merely treating similar cases similarly. Instead, Rawls leverages a thought experiment, referred to as the 'original position' [125], to determine which principles could be embraced by people "as free and equal," rather than from a position of domination or subordination [125, 126]. The thought experiment asks people to consider whether they could accept principles of justice no matter where within the social order they fell. Imagine they do not know specifics about their particular situation, but do know general facts about people and society (including facts about racial and gender discrimination, economic inequality, and scarcity). In this scenario, people should choose principles of justice that could be embraced even if they ended up in the least advantaged position in society. If they meet this test and protect the basic dignity of each person, we have some confidence in believing the principles of justice are fair.

Rawls' specific principles of justice have been influential (and controversial) in contemporary theorizing about justice. While applying his theory to algorithms is beyond the scope of this paper, we introduce Rawls because his core methods of thinking about the justice of social institutions illustrate the expansive nature of philosophical approaches that extend beyond applying bias metrics or treating like cases alike. We argue that taking this more expansive view is essential to understanding what is missing when evaluations of fairness are restricted to more limited notions of bias.

Like philosophical notions, antidiscrimination law takes an expansive view of justice in society. Antidiscrimination law developed to address systematic patterns of disadvantage, such as those rooted in the institutions of slavery and Jim Crow segregation in the United States. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed segregation in public places and prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin—with the aim of "dismantling systems of segregation that were endemic to American economic and political systems" [91]. In this way, antidiscrimination law is arguably designed to embody a form of distributive justice, operationalizing principles such as that morally irrelevant characteristics like race and sex should not determine one's opportunities in life [83]. Antidiscrimination law's recognition of harms from discrimination can also be understood through a Rawlsian lens, as rules one might choose in the original position [83]. For instance, the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as prohibiting "not only overt discrimination, but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation," including criteria exhibiting a discriminatory preference for or excluding any group and cannot be shown to be related to job performance [6], may reflect what a rational person would choose as a rule for society, not knowing what their own social standing would be [83].

2.2 Technical Measurements of Bias in Algorithms

An expansive and growing number of definitions of algorithmic fairness have been presented and evaluated in the computer science literature [106, 128]. In one survey, Narayanan identifies a broad

collection of fairness definitions, including various notions of statistical bias, group fairness, blindness, individual fairness, process fairness, diversity, and representational harms [111]. Among these, a frequently used fairness definition is statistical bias, i.e., the difference between an estimator's expected value and the true value of the parameter being estimated. Yet, it is widely recognized that statistical bias is inherently limited as a fairness definition because it does not account for biases in the underlying data [111].

For example, the COMPAS risk assessment algorithm employed by many US courts to assess recidivism risk was calibrated to meet fairness defined in terms of statistical bias. It was shown to produce recidivism scores that were only slightly less predictive for black men than white men, seemingly satisfying fairness when understood as statistical bias. However, COMPAS also produced many more false positives among black defendants and false negatives among white defendants due to the data reflecting differences in recidivism prevalence between these groups, which are a product of biases in society [21]. Black men are more likely to live in neighborhoods that have a greater police presence, are subjected to racial profiling by officers, and as a result are re-arrested more often than white men. In this context, the high rate of false positives for black men is particularly concerning, especially when compared to the elevated false negatives for white men, exacerbating the over-incarceration of black men in our criminal justice system [18].

Group fairness definitions measure bias in a model in terms of systematic differences between groups [111]. As one example, the equalized odds definition requires protected and unprotected groups to have equal rates for true positives and false positives [103]. For an algorithm used in support of making loan decisions, for instance, this aims to address potential bias against certain groups that may be learned from the training data, such as that members of historically marginalized groups are denied loans despite being creditworthy. Equalized odds requires ensuring that the fractions of non-defaulters and defaulters approved for loans are equal across groups.

Use of such definitions has limitations, as research has shown that it is impossible to achieve three or more (and, in some cases, even two) group fairness definitions simultaneously [42, 97]. In addition, satisfying even one fairness definition can result in a significant loss in accuracy [45]. For example, in the case of equalized odds, an algorithm must achieve equally high accuracy across all groups, so an algorithm performs only as well as it does on the hardest-to-classify group [75]. Further, where there are disparities in prevalence between groups—resulting, e.g., from measurement bias or historical prejudice—balancing outcomes across different groups requires treating people from different groups differently [23, 103, 111].

The technical literature also introduces tools for mitigating algorithmic bias. Researchers have shown that designing algorithms to be blind to sensitive attributes does not eliminate bias against protected groups, as a sensitive feature such as race may be redundantly encoded in other features such as place of residence [75]. One approach is to explicitly recognize differences in prevalence, such as with Dwork et al.'s *fairness through awareness*, which is based on the principle that "similar individuals should be treated similarly," using a metric that defines how similar two individuals are in the context of a particular decision-making task [55].

2.3 Limitations, Trade-offs, and Gaps Between Definitions

The limitations of technical definitions and the impossibility of satisfying multiple definitions simultaneously requires explicitly addressing the trade-offs between different definitions, as well as between fairness and other considerations such as accuracy [111]. Quantitative definitions also overlook how inequality compounds over time, even through generations, and they cannot resolve conflicts between different values, among other concerns [112]. In practice, the application of such approaches may be limited due to privacy concerns and data minimization policies [93]. Further, there are challenges with respect to measuring bias throughout different stages of the machine learning lifecycle, as measures of bias at one stage may not be reliably correlated with measures in downstream tasks [65].

Some scholars have argued that quantitative approaches are limited in their ability to combat oppression due to being overly formal and limited to isolated decision-making procedures [30, 69, 71, 129]. For example, Green argues that "efforts to formulate mathematical definitions of fairness overlook the contextual and philosophical meanings of fairness" [69] (citing [30, 70, 84, 100, 129]). The various fairness definitions rely on a wide range of understandings of the concept of bias, whether conceptualized as differences between the prediction and the world, different treatment for different groups, human prejudice in the data collection, or other factors [16, 25, 103]. As we will argue below, the wide variety in understandings of bias can impede well-meaning efforts at correcting problematic forms of prejudice, unjust treatment, and discrimination.

Consider, for instance, the relationships between philosophical, legal, and technical definitions of bias in the context of antidiscrimination law. Many scholars have argued that fairness definitions have a role to play in auditing algorithms for evidence of unlawful discrimination (see, e.g., [79, 87]). While antidiscrimination law aims to protect individuals from harmful discrimination stemming from longstanding prejudice, current doctrine is applied more narrowly, in cases where demonstrable harm is shown in a regulated context with a deep history of discrimination, such as employment, housing, education, credit, and public accommodation (see, e.g., [2, 4, 7]). Antidiscrimination law explicitly prohibits discrimination in ads for housing and job opportunities based on protected attributes such as race, sex, age, religion, disability status, and more [1, 3, 5]. This carries through to algorithmic decisions, as recent findings of discrimination have led online platforms to implement changes to address discriminatory targeting and delivery of certain ads [19, 140]. Discrimination may manifest as disparate treatment (see, e.g., [8, 10]), in the case of an algorithm that explicitly considers a protected attribute or where it is intended to classify on the basis of a protected attribute, or as disparate impact (see, e.g., [6, 12]), in the case of an algorithm that has a disproportionate effect on a protected group without a business justification.

Narayanan argues that disparate impact has emerged as the prevailing definition of unintentional algorithmic discrimination in part because it can be readily measured using quantitative tools using existing datasets from a single setting at a single point in time, and that "[i]njustices other than disparate impact seem illegible to regulators" [112]. It is notoriously difficult to establish the intent

behind a human decision, as, for instance, individuals are often not even aware of their own intentions, but it is especially challenging to establish with the rise of algorithmic decision-making. The shift to algorithmic decision-making risks deflecting accountability for addressing harm by companies offsetting their own responsibilities by pointing to the decision-making powers of an algorithmic system—potentially using questions about whether AI systems can have intentions to keep discussions of legal liability stuck in abstract philosophy of mind discussions while avoiding addressing accountability for harms perpetrated through these systems.

Challenges in understanding the relationships between different technical notions of fairness and legal conceptions of fairness, such as those operating within antidiscrimination law [79, 87], do not exhaust the complications in the fairness debate. Crawford argues that most of the technical work on fairness aims to confront instances of allocative harm, leaving unaddressed a category of harms stemming from the use of biased algorithms called representational harms [47].

Allocative harms, according to Crawford, arise when systems allocate or withhold resources or opportunities to people on the basis of their group identity (e.g., when a woman is offered a lower credit limit than her husband despite a shared financial history) [47]. Because allocative harms are discrete, transactional, and easily quantifiable, they lend themselves to technical analysis and intervention through application of the various types of technical definitions of fairness that have been proposed [47]. In contrast, representational harms occur when systems reinforce the subordination of certain groups on the basis of their social identity. Representational harms are difficult to formalize because they are long-term, diffuse, and tied to how people are represented and understood socially [47]. Crawford identifies numerous examples of representational harms such as those involving stereotyping, failures of recognition, harms of denigration, underrepresentation, or ex-nomination (where certain groups are framed as the norm by not giving them names, such as the use of 'athlete' for men vs. 'female athlete' for women) [47].

One way of thinking about allocative harms is through the lens of distributive justice, although this notion extends far beyond the narrow protections in current antidiscrimination law and quantitative definitions of fairness. Likewise, representational harms can be understood through a broader philosophical lens of epistemic injustice, introduced by Fricker [59] to describe ways in which people can be harmed in their capacity as epistemic agents, because these harms of representation reflect and reinforce problematic epistemological frameworks through which we understand and interpret our experiences. Philosophical discussions of justice and fairness aim to capture and analyze both what an ideal theory of justice requires and the ways our existing systems fall short. This broad lens is a useful metric for analyzing instances where algorithmic fairness and antidiscrimination law fall short of their goals.

Applying a philosophical lens for evaluating justice and fairness reveals even broader gaps in the literature. Technical notions of fairness and justice are often "conflated," bearing "the consequence that distributive justice concerns are not addressed explicitly" [98]. Scholars argue that they risk "mirroring some of antidiscrimination discourse's most problematic tendencies" [81] and "often exacerbate oppression and legitimize unjust institutions" [69] (citing [50, 68, 88, 116, 117, 123]). For these reasons, some call for rejecting fairness in favor of alternative frames of justice, equity, or reparation [69]. Bui and Noble argue that "simply striving for fairness in the face of these [unjust] systems of power does little to address" the unjust power structures themselves, and argue for deeply interrogating the underlying power structures and inequalities of such systems [36]. Similarly, D'Ignazio and Klein show how intersectional feminist theories can be applied towards tackling unjust power structures through data science and data ethics [54]. Likewise, Costanza-Chock's principles of design justice call for designers to critically examine how existing practices contribute to the reproduction of systemic oppression and to transform design's values to better meet the aims of social justice [46]. Drawing from intersectional critical theorists, Davis et al. develop a principle of algorithmic reparations, which they argue can name, unmask, and undo both allocative and representational harms in algorithms [50].

We support calls to move beyond discussions of bias to broader notions of justice, but we argue that the challenge is to do so in a way that can actually address unjust power structures. Complex social phenomena and normative goals can be challenging to formalize in ways that can be built into mathematical systems and translated into clear laws and policies [113, 114]. Developing approaches that interface well with both normative and technical understandings will be necessary to ensure protection for individuals, groups, and society, but it must be done with care. It may be appealing for both regulators and technologists to focus on the most readily quantifiable measures of bias, as they can seemingly render abstract problems more concrete. However, there is a risk of narrowing the scope of analysis in ways that can obscure the broader social context that is crucial to understanding algorithmic harm. As Tukey posited with his maxim for data analysis, "[f]ar better an approximate answer to the *right* question, which is often vague, than the *exact* answer to the wrong question, which can always be made precise" [138]. It is critical to focus on developing approaches that address fundamental normative concerns regarding algorithmic harms, even if they might seem vague, rather than focusing on notions of bias just because they lend themselves to quantification and not because they capture what is important.

3 DISAMBIGUATING ALGORITHMIC BIAS: FROM NEUTRALITY TO JUSTICE

Discussions of algorithmic fairness often focus on unpacking specific quantitative definitions of fairness that measure forms of bias arising at certain stages in the development and deployment of algorithmic systems. We refer to the tendency to reduce questions of fairness to discussions of bias metrics as the normative reduction claim. As we outlined in section 2, the reduction of fairness to a bias metric omits broader considerations of justice that the public means to call attention to when critiquing algorithms for the ways they contribute to and perpetuate injustices in society. Although scholars often acknowledge the limitations of normative reduction as tackling a more tractable subset of the problem, the gaps between technical, legal, and ethical approaches to algorithmic bias can undermine even our best efforts to address this problem.

In this section, we discuss current approaches to algorithmic bias and highlight two potential solutions, as well as challenges that arise with each approach. The first approach seeks to disambiguate

different notions of bias. While helpful, this approach lends itself towards neutralizing the term bias in ways that can undermine efforts to address bias and can be used to deflect accountability for addressing algorithmic harms. The second approach seeks to substitute discussions of bias or fairness with discussions of justice, thereby explicitly addressing unjust power structures. This approach is promising insofar as it seeks a broader lens, but, in moving to develop broader discussions of algorithmic justice, theorists must take care not to replicate some of the problems that have beset discussions of algorithmic fairness and bias.

3.1 Current Approaches to Algorithmic Bias

As early as 1996, Friedman and Nissenbaum's normative work on bias identified technical bias, resulting from specific technical constraints, as one of three types of bias that can arise in computer systems [61]. Also important, they argue, are preexisting social biases and emergent biases, which arise out of particular use cases [61]. Since then, increasing attention has been drawn to other significant ways social prejudice can be embedded in data sets, as well as the ways biases can arise when algorithms are trained on data sets that are not representative of the population to which they are applied [56, 115, 119]. Friedman and Nissenbaum call for "freedom from bias" as one of the important criteria by which to judge the acceptability of automated systems [61]. In more recent work, Nissenbaum has disavowed the "seductive diversion" of attempts to "solve bias" in AI systems in ways that can distract from asking whether the systems should be built or used in the first place [123]. Yet within computer science, 'bias' can mean many different things—not all of which can be effectively eliminated given the very nature of algorithmic design. As David Weinberger argues, "bias is machine learning's original sin" because it is embedded into its very essence [142]. By looking for patterns in the data, machine learning systems may find "biased patterns so subtle and complex that they hide from the best-intentioned human attention" [142].

Further, despite the development of a rich body of technical scholarship on algorithmic bias, the term 'bias' is generally not wielded with same degree of precision as other terms used in the computer science literature. Instead, 'bias' is often used as a catch-all to refer to a wide range of behaviors which, in turn, are associated with diverse types of harms, each of which has different types of impacts on different groups of individuals. For instance, in a 2020 analysis of the body of papers on bias in natural language processing, Blodgett et al. found that "the majority of them fail to engage critically with what constitutes 'bias' in the first place," often referring to 'bias' using vague descriptions—or no description at all—and relying instead on unstated assumptions about what makes a system harmful, to whom, and why [33]. Nanayakkara et al. reviewed the broader impact statements for research presented at high-impact AI research conferences and found that, while 'bias' is "frequently mentioned," it is "not always clear whether authors are referring to bias in a societal or technical sense, or whether technical forms of bias are related to social inequalities" [110].

The term 'bias' (or, similarly, 'algorithmic bias') lends more confusion than clarity to the complex array of harms to individuals, groups, and society stemming from the use of algorithms. Algorithmic bias has been used to refer to 'biased' data inputs (including importing social prejudice as well as under- or over-representation of certain groups), 'biased' algorithmic design (including optimization tasks), and 'biases' that result from the algorithms designed in one context being inappropriately used in different contexts [48], tracking the three 'types of bias' Friedman and Nissenbaum highlight [61]. Danks and London go beyond this early work to identify five different meanings of bias: training data bias, algorithmic focus bias, algorithmic processing bias, transfer context bias, and interpretation bias [48]. These biases can also be the result of a deliberate choice, for example, when statistical biases are used to ensure that an algorithm is unbiased relative to a moral standard [48]. Danks and London offer a "taxonomy of different types and sources of algorithmic bias," distinguishing between (i) "neutral or unobjectionable forms of algorithmic bias" and (ii) biases that are "problematic" and therefore demand a response [48]. They argue "there is no coherent notion of 'algorithmic bias"' because the one term refers to statistical, ethical, and legal biases [48]. These different notions of bias can also be separated. It is possible for an algorithm to satisfy technical specifications of fairness (e.g., by offering statistically unbiased predictions) while remaining morally problematic. It is also possible for statistical bias to be morally neutral [58].

Notwithstanding the value in unpacking the many different instances, types, and sources of bias, we argue that the term 'bias' is at best unhelpful and at worst can mask deep injustices. It also can create a false sense that the barriers to addressing bias are insurmountable. This brief survey of meanings of the term illustrates the confusion likely to arise when aiming to mitigate algorithmic bias.

3.2 Two Potential Solutions and Their Challenges

In this section, we highlight two promising approaches to algorithmic bias. One approach, which we call disambiguating algorithmic bias, is to move from broad discussions of bias in favor of identifying the specific notion of bias that is used in a particular instance, as well as the groups affected and where within the lifecycle of the algorithm it occurs. We see examples of this approach when scholars specify the ways bias can arise at different points in the development and deployment of an algorithm [48, 58, 61, 63, 136]. There is great value in specificity in order to track to whom and where the problem occurs, as well as what corrective measures are being used. Efforts to disambiguate and specify the meaning of bias will go a long way towards clarity across disciplines when discussing the wide range of problems and proposed solutions to instances of algorithmic bias. However, this must be done with care, as it also lends itself to using the broad concept of bias in more neutral terms so that it can appropriately capture any instance of deviation from a norm, including technical measures alongside the moral notion.

The second approach to problems arising from the vast array of referents captured by the broad term of algorithmic bias, which we call designing for justice and equity, is to move away from discussions of bias and fairness towards explicit discussions of equity and justice (see, e.g., [36, 46, 50, 67]). We see this approach reflected by scholars who have critiqued the limitations of quantitative measures of bias or fairness in algorithms (see, e.g., [36, 46, 50, 54, 67, 69, 98]).

While we think that there is much to be gained by turning towards more "substantive" understandings of justice and fairness [69], efforts to move in this direction continue to import some of the same challenges that beset efforts to disambiguate questions of bias.

3.2.1 Disambiguating bias—and recognizing the dangers of neutrality. The first approach to disambiguating the range of biases that can arise in algorithms treats bias as a neutral umbrella term capturing any deviation from a norm. Take, for example, Danks and London's argument that sometimes we can use 'neutral' technical forms of bias to help address and correct for the morally problematic forms of bias [48]. Furthermore, they acknowledge the frequent negative connotation of the term 'bias' in English, but they explicitly use the term in "an older and more neutral way" in which "'bias' simply refers to deviation from a standard" [48]. This broader notion in which bias is used to mark deviations from the standard is meant to encapsulate statistical bias (in which estimates deviate from a standard), cases they label "moral bias in which a judgment deviates from a moral norm," and legal, social and psychological biases, all defined in terms of deviation from a norm [48].

However, it is not simply that bias means one (or several) things in the technical literature that are innocently different from the normative uses of the term 'bias' at play when the public expresses concerns of bias. The use of the term 'bias' for all of these different senses can actually hamper our best efforts to try to address problematic forms of injustice, prejudice, and discrimination that underlie public concerns. Most scholars who seek to clarify the many different meanings of algorithmic bias share the normative goal of ensuring that algorithms can live up to our moral standards. However, the broader and more seemingly 'neutral' use of the term bias in all of these instances leads to significant moral confusion. Danks and London suggest that we should avoid calling for an end to algorithmic bias because not all bias is bad and, in fact, some biases are neutral and others can be beneficial to achieving our normative goals, such as in the case where a biased algorithm could be used to "reduce a moral *societal* bias" [48]. Chander, for example, makes the case for designing algorithms to be conscious of protected characteristics, employing algorithmic affirmative action to remedy harms engendered by a "world permeated with the legacy of discriminations past and the reality of discriminations present" [41].

While we agree that additional clarity on how and where deviations from a certain standard arise in the process of designing, training, and deploying algorithms, we do not believe the right move is to neutralize the term bias. Doing so will likely undercut efforts to address real social injustices that can arise. This neutralization of the term bias does help explain why it arises in so many different contexts with so many different implications—but, in so doing, it undercuts the normative force of calls to eliminate bias. After all, if 'bias' is a mere deviation from a standard, bias will never be eliminated and those who resist social change can point to the public naiveté of technical matters and easily dismiss calls for 'unbiased' algorithms as if people were calling for round squares.

Whether or not the public is naive about different statistical measures or how algorithms are optimized to produce the desired result has little bearing on the very real injustices that arise in connection with the pervasive influence of algorithms on various aspects of our modern lives. When the public calls for an end to algorithmic bias, typically this is meant as a call for social justice and to end prejudice, and is tied to long and well-documented histories of racism, sexism, ageism, classism, and other longstanding social prejudices.

Although scholars examining questions of bias or fairness recognize the limitations of technical work and avoid claiming that technical specifications of bias or fairness capture the full complexity of these real-world social problems (see, e.g., [30, 58, 69–71, 81, 84, 100, 129]), standard strategies focus on quantitative measures to identify, quantify, and correct for biases in algorithms in ways that are nevertheless largely divorced from normative understandings of harm [31, 33, 110]. Furthermore, the method of disambiguating bias can also be exploited in ways that can undermine the aims of justice, as we explore through several case studies in the next section.

3.2.2 Designing for justice and equity. The second approach of avoiding the term 'bias' and shifting towards language of equity and justice explicitly seeks to take a broader evaluation of the harms wrought by algorithms in society. However, here too we may collapse into an ever expanding set of debates about how best to specify justice or ways to mathematically formalize and measure philosophical theories of justice. In other words, we risk falling into the same problems that plague the literature on algorithmic bias. For example, when people call for equality, it can quickly lead to debates about what we are trying to make equal and why. We can anticipate that this will repeat the same issues that arise in fairness debates with respect to specifying metrics according to which people should be treated equally. Likewise, for questions of justice: some might worry about how to specify justice mathematically and in a way that is not itself subject to overwhelming disagreement. For both of these claims, the philosophical literature on justice and egalitarianism can provide useful insights—but it will also be easy to conclude there is a lot of continued disagreement and debate about what, e.g., justice requires and how equality should best be measured and protected in society. Such debates may be cited as an excuse to avoid accountability for clear instances of harm.

However, specification of what justice and equality require is worthwhile as a way to get to the heart of the problem in the spirit of Tukey's maxim for data analysis (§2.3). Despite continued debates about which theory of justice is best, there is in fact substantial agreement with respect to some clear instances of harm. As Rawls suggests in his later work seeking to grapple with the continued disagreements in society, in any society that protects freedom of thought and expression, continued disagreement about key normative questions should be expected [126]. Despite continued disagreement, many views are reasonable, and there are a number of rationales by which morally decent people who are reasoning responsibly may come to hold different views. However, this disagreement need not undermine attempts to develop principles of justice that can apply to society broadly. As a society, we can and do find fair terms of social cooperation without requiring everyone to agree to the same moral view.

Rawls argues that there are certain core areas of agreement that any view of justice that could be considered reasonable should be able to capture [125, 126]. Our considered convictions of justice

include ideas like "religious intolerance and racial discrimination are unjust" and, if a theory of justice cannot show why, e.g., racial and gender discrimination are wrong, it should be revised because it fails to capture our considered convictions about justice [125, 126]. Extending this intuition in his later work tackling the broad set of moral and religious disagreements in society [126], Rawls argues that there is substantial agreement that principles of justice should treat people as free, equal moral persons and social institutions should be arranged so that they are substantively (not merely formally) fair. We can leverage these points of agreement to secure legitimate social structures by appealing to these shared areas of agreement (which he calls public reasons) when justifying coercive power. While we cannot expect everyone to agree on every law or policy, their legitimacy depends on whether they are justified in terms of public reasons that can be recognized as reasons of the right kind—i.e., grounded in appeals to freedom, equality, justice, and fairness [126]. We believe a similar lesson can be applied to make progress in addressing clear injustices in algorithmic systems and for adjudicating continued areas of disagreement. Examining algorithmic harms in terms of power imbalances, inequalities, and oppression frame these issues in ways that demand revising unjust structures to better meet the demands of justice.

4 BIAS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN GENERATIVE AI

Most of the existing literature on algorithmic bias focuses on applications to predictive algorithms, wherein mathematical formulations of bias can be developed, implemented, and tuned for specific tasks and deployments. With the shift towards a new paradigm of generative AI, models are trained on broad data and applied to an extremely wide range of tasks, magnifying the potential for harm. Although the harm to an individual from a single generative AI output might be small, these harms are multiplied dramatically across a large number of users, especially if they are all using the same small set of foundation models [34, 35, 96]. The general public has frequent direct interactions with generative AI models across a broad range of social contexts and the potential for harm is difficult to anticipate. Additionally, generative AI models are used for wide-ranging tasks they are not explicitly trained for, and their characteristics are not well understood. Consequently, their large-scale use presents complex and pressing challenges for addressing algorithmic harms.

Recent scholarship and media coverage of generative AI has uncovered a wide range of examples of harmful representations and associations that are described as evidence of algorithmic bias. In this section, we outline several prominent cases illustrating different types of bias arising in generative AI, including both large language models and vision-language models, to explore what lessons existing approaches to bias developed for the predictive setting have for generative AI. We outline challenges created by the lack of clarity in discussions of algorithmic bias. Disambiguating the kinds of bias involved can be helpful in better identifying and addressing these challenges, but will not go far enough and can too easily be used to deflect accountability for addressing injustices in generative AI. We also show the need to develop tools for evaluating the justice and fairness of algorithms in ways that can capture clear cases of harm, while leaving open productive methods of continued contestation with respect to what justice requires without risking deflection of accountability for algorithmic harms.

4.1 Identifying Bias in Generative AI Models

We highlight a collection of examples from the small but growing body of work exploring harms with respect to large language models and AI image generators, in order to show that, while helpful, disambiguating notions of bias in neutral terminology will not be sufficient guidance to help address normative concerns. We focus on generative AI models because the biases in these models both replicate problems identified by existing research on biased algorithms but also introduce new challenges.

4.1.1 Bias in large language models. Large language models that power popular generative AI services like ChatGPT and Bard have the potential to replicate and amplify existing harmful instances of biased use of language in ways that sustain oppression [26, 27, 51, 53, 72, 94, 141]. The idea that language can be used to perpetuate harm, particularly against marginalized identities, is well established in the philosophical literature on speech and harms (see, e.g., [102]) and has been recognized by law (see, e.g., laws prohibiting hate speech in many countries [9, 13], and the International Criminal Court linking the use of slurs to instances of genocide [11]). A finding from early research on algorithmic bias is that biases in the training set have an enormous influence on the resulting model (see, e.g. [25]). By pulling their training data from the open internet, companies are training the AI systems in ways that amplify racist, misogynistic, and otherwise toxic content that is prevalent on the internet.

Because language models are designed to mirror patterns in natural language, they will predictably encode, reinforce, and perpetuate harmful stereotypes and biases present in the training data, whether due to historical injustice or underrepresentation in a data set [141]. These harms extend beyond allocative harms to, predominantly, more expansive, harder to identify representational harms and instances of epistemic injustice [33]. For example, in focus groups, people with disabilities characterized outputs from large language models as mirroring and reinforcing "perceptions of disability that participants encountered in their lives and dominant media," by emphasizing themes such as visible disability, passivity, lack of autonomy, sadness, and a desire to be "fixed" [62]. Weidinger et al. taxonomize social harms that can arise from large language models producing discriminatory, exclusionary, or toxic language, or performing worse for certain languages and groups [141]. Further, language models have been shown to encode "stereotypical associations," "negative sentiment towards specific groups," and intersectionality effects (i.e., "more bias against identities marginalized along more than one dimension than would be expected based on just the combination of the bias along each of the axes") [27].

4.1.2 Bias in vision-language models. Research has likewise uncovered extensive evidence of bias in vision-language AI models trained on internet-scale data [29, 145, 146]. Data sets used to train vision-language models have been found to contain "troublesome and explicit images and text pairs of rape, pornography, malign

stereotypes, racist and ethnic slurs, and other extremely problematic content" [32]. Vision-language models reflect and magnify this problematic content in various ways that amplify representational harms and epistemic injustices to marginalized populations. Katzman et al. identify and categorize six types of representational harms in image captioning systems: denying people the opportunity to self-identify, reifying social groups, stereotyping, erasing, demeaning, and alienating [90]. As one example, image captioning systems reflect harms of *ex-nomination* [47] by way of a tendency to associate white men, aged 20-59, with being the norm and labeling other groups according to their deviation from this perceived norm [145]. Image captioning systems also demonstrate significant disparities in performance, sentiment, and word choice in captioning of lighter versus darker-skinned individuals [148].

Katzman et al. illustrate how different types of representational harms are in tension with different interventions for bias mitigation in image captioning. For example, they argue that removing potentially sensitive terms such as 'hijab' could result in a system mistagging people wearing hijabs in ways that disrespect or demean them, or in not tagging them at all, "thereby erasing their identities" [90]. Existing research on bias seems to suggest that disambiguating specific instances and types of biases may not go far enough in helping us to mitigate harms caused by these systems. As Zhao et al. highlight, modern systems actually perform less well than older systems, reflecting greater disparities between groups [148]. Despite increased attention to algorithmic bias in recent years, this is not translating into net improvements for marginalized populations.

AI image generation systems appear to amplify these concerns through the ways that vision-language models problematically import and amplify common stereotypes of people. These stereotypes range from who is assumed to hold particular jobs to the reduction of women and girls to sexualized objects. For example, comparing images generated by Stable Diffusion in response to prompts for different professions described by an adjective reveals stereotypes in the model, such as an "assertive firefighter" represented as a white male and a "committed janitor" represented as a person of color [80]. Vision-language models also amplify the sexual objectification of women in society, which Wolfe et al. label *sexual objectification bias*, by "associating images of professional women with sexualized descriptions," "disassociating emotion from images of objectified women," and "generating sexualized images of underage girls" [146]. Harmful associations such as these can influence beliefs and behaviors in real-world contexts, as research has demonstrated that repeated exposure to stereotypical images can be correlated with "discrimination, hostility, and justification of violence against stereotyped peoples" [29] (citing [20, 38, 64, 131]).

4.1.3 Illustration: Bias in the generation of "magic avatars". In 2022, Prisma Labs introduced a "magic avatar" feature for its popular digital retouching app Lensa AI. Employing the open-source Stable Diffusion deep learning model that was trained on a database of over five billion image-text pairs of images and captions scraped from the web, Lensa uses a user's self portraits to retrain the model and generate a collection of digital portraits in different art styles [44].

Reports of social biases, including sexism, misogyny, sexual objectification, racism, and the compounding intersectional nature of oppression, surfaced immediately. One reporter observed that, while her male colleagues' photos were used to generate avatars such as "astronauts" and "fierce warriors," hers, as an Asian woman, generated avatars that were "topless" or with "extremely skimpy clothes and overtly sexualized poses" [77]. Women have long been subject to sexual objectification in society, and this is reflected in online images of women that are sexually objectifying and demeaning. Searching for the term "Asian" on the image databases used to train models such as the one used by Lensa generates results that are "almost exclusively porn" [76, 77]. In similar datasets, the language "an 18 year old girl" is associated with images that "often depict only sexual body parts, with the face omitted, commensurate with findings that objectified female bodies are represented and recognized by their sexual parts" [145, 146]. It is therefore unsurprising that many women have reported similar experiences with Lensa producing highly sexualized avatars based on their photos [104, 133, 134].

Other users have raised concerns over Lensa's tendency to lighten the skin tones and anglicize the features of people of color [133, 134], and to make people's bodies appear thinner [134]. Such representations can contribute to well-documented harms to body image and mental health in connection with social media use, especially for teenage girls. The perception that AI-generated avatars present a "more objective" representation "as if some external, all-knowing being has generated this image of what you [should] look like" has the potential to heighten their impact on a user's body image [95]. Journalists have reported on anecdotal accounts from plastic surgeons and psychologists about patients seeking cosmetic surgery to alter their appearance to more closely resemble their digital avatars, or experiencing distress when confronted with the fact that their actual appearance differs from the AI-tuned photos they have posted on social media [74]. The social biases embedded in such tools can also make it possible for bad actors to easily generate photorealistic nude or otherwise problematic images of a victim using photos often accessible from their social media profile [89]. Drawing from the classifications of harms in [27, 90, 141], these examples engender demeaning representations, stereotypical associations, exclusionary norms, reifying of social groups, intersectionality effects, and worse performance for some groups than others. They also illustrate how harms resulting from biased datasets are magnified and made deeply personal and intimately violating when a generative AI model retrained on an individual's personal data produces harmful images in their likeness.

4.2 Disambiguating Bias and Seeking Accountability in AI

Despite progress on disambiguating various notions of algorithmic bias at different stages of the machine learning lifecycle, a wide range of social biases are persistently magnified and reinforced by generative AI systems. Prior research on fairness in predictive settings provides lessons on the promises and pitfalls of approaches to disambiguating bias and seeking justice that may be instructive towards addressing harms in generative AI systems.

4.2.1 Refusing queries with potentially harmful outputs. In response to public concerns of bias, companies developing generative AI systems have implemented various changes, including, for example, removing offensive content from pre-training datasets and refusing

certain queries that are deemed likely to produce outputs that are explicitly biased or prejudicial [121].

The refusal tactic has been implemented for large language models such as OpenAI's GPT-4 and for vision-language models such as Midjourney's AI image generator. For example, OpenAI seeks to mitigate bias by training for refusals [120], and Midjourney reportedly blocks the use of certain words, such as references to female anatomy, in user prompts, to help prevent the generation of potentially offensive content [78]. Researchers have demonstrated that Midjourney's model learned to associate certain parts of the human anatomy—particularly those related to the female anatomy—with sexual or violent content [78]. Nevertheless, these associations are deeply embedded in the model, and simple workarounds, such as the use of British English spelling, can easily evade the safeguards and produce outputs reflecting such associations [78].

This approach, though useful, is incomplete and backwards-looking—patching instances of problematic outputs as they are discovered. It can also contribute to injustice and inequity, if the model learns from the training for refusal to associate certain marginalized communities with prohibited content [120]. As we will suggest below, we should also adopt a forward-looking approach to designing algorithms that reflect a more just picture of the world we would like rather than piecemeal corrections for the world as it is.

It is critical to identify and address the harm where it operates. Depending on where the bias arises, different interventions may be suitable, such as collecting additional data to balance the training dataset or employing various approaches to measure representational bias in and debias language models [82]. Suresh and Guttag identify seven sources of harm in machine learning, including historical, representation, measurement, aggregation, learning, evaluation, and deployment bias [136]. In the case of AI image generation systems, each harm that is identified could operate at one or more stages. For example, the demeaning representations of Asian women in the Lensa case could reflect *historical bias* due to misogynist and racist beliefs embedded in society and reflected in online content, *representation bias* due to predominantly pornographic representations of Asian women in the training data, *learning bias* if the algorithm amplifies performance disparities between different groups such as Asian women vs. white men, or *evaluation bias* if the bias stems, in part, from the performance of the model being judged with respect to images of white men but underperformance for other groups was not discovered or addressed. This becomes more challenging in generative AI systems actively deployed, whose learning will be subject to malicious actors and prejudices reflected in online content and in the real world. Situating the biases identified in AI systems in the broader social context will help to ensure we are attentive to the broad range of harms and can identify root causes of the harms.

4.2.2 Disambiguating bias but deflecting accountability. Disambiguating bias can help to clarify the types of harms perpetrated, who is impacted, and which aspects of an AI system contribute to this harm. However, it comes with a thus far unrecognized danger—that it can be used to deflect accountability for harm.

One danger is that by pointing to the ways algorithmic bias embeds preexisting social biases into algorithmic systems, the moral problems are deflected away from the technology and instead point back to intractable social problems that have long plagued society. While it is important to acknowledge the persistence of various forms of discrimination and prejudice in the world, the overemphasis on these preexisting biases as the root cause of the problem can reinforce an idea that the AI systems themselves are neutral and are not contributing to the problem.

As Langdon Winner argued in 1980, it is necessary to examine not only the social and economic systems from which a technology arose, but the political qualities of technologies themselves [144]. Often, "the very process of technical development is so thoroughly biased in a particular direction that it regularly produces results counted as wonderful breakthroughs by some social interests and crushing setbacks by others" [144]. In this case, identifying underlying social systems as the cause of bias in AI image generation is only part of the analysis; it is also critical to examine the technology itself, what harms it perpetrates, who is harmed, and how. It is readily foreseeable that a model trained on data scraped indiscriminately from the web will regularly lead to misogynistic and racist imagery. It is likewise foreseeable that white men aged 20-59, who are represented as the norm in vision-language models, would disproportionately receive benefits from this technology, while women and other marginalized groups that are the subjects of denigrating imagery online, would be disproportionately harmed by it.

In response to complaints about pornographic and objectifying images of women, Prisma Labs updated its system to make it more difficult to generate adult-oriented content (i.e., the refusal tactic) and revised its web site to acknowledge the potential for harm to women. It now features a frequently-asked question of "Why do female users tend to get results featuring an over sexualised look?" [99]. They note that "occasional sexualization is observed across all gender categories, although in different ways," and provide an explanation that "[t]he stable Diffusion model was trained on unfiltered Internet content. So it reflects the biases humans incorporate into the images they produce. Creators acknowledge the possibility of societal biases. So do we." [99]. In their acknowledgement of the harm, they point to the social biases embedded in the training data—thereby deflecting the problem from their proprietary algorithm toward the well-known misogyny in the world. Yet the decision to train the algorithm on unfiltered internet content was a deliberate choice on the part of human agents and one that could predictably result in disproportionate harms for marginalized groups given the extensive and well-documented prevalence of racist and misogynistic pornographic content on the web (see, e.g., [115]).

Prisma Lab's framing suggests that its model can only reflect the world as it is. However, technology does not merely shine a neutral mirror on our world. It actively shapes our future by creating new possibilities that extend our imagination about what is possible. This active role is often celebrated by technology innovators—until it attracts negative press. Then, the claim is that the technology is not the cause; it simply reflects broader societal problems.

4.2.3 Technology's role in shaping our future. This brings us to the third core danger we want to highlight. Many discussions of algorithmic bias are set against a false binary that we either have (albeit imperfect) algorithms or the status quo [69]. When presented

with this choice, algorithms can seem preferable. As Miller explains, while algorithms are clearly biased, "the humans they are replacing are significantly more biased" [105]. At least with algorithms, biases can be documented, measured, and adjusted to work toward improving the status quo. There is also evidence that, in some contexts, algorithms can perform better than human decisionmakers at reducing racial disparities and gender inequities [105].

The choice between biased algorithms and the biases of the status quo sets up a false binary grounded in a static picture of the world. However, this relationship is far more dynamic. We can distinguish between two different epistemic contexts from which to assess biases built into algorithms. At times, we can seek to understand the world as it is. For example, when Lensa's or Midjourney's image generation produces predominantly pornographic images of women, this underscores the prevalence of misogynistic images on the web. It can give a new reason to call attention to the deep roots of misogyny and the persistence of this problem in contemporary society.

There is another important epistemic lens that can be adopted by those who create, deploy, and evaluate algorithms—a forward-looking lens that seeks to build a more just future. For interventions to secure algorithmic accountability to effectively address harms in a rapidly evolving landscape of generative AI and other advances, it will be necessary to design sociotechnical systems and regulations with a forward-looking lens rather than to react to instances of harm as they arise. Developers should be aware of social injustice so they can make specific choices for correcting injustice, towards building algorithms that do not reflect the world as it is but instead start to reflect and build the ideals of a more just future.

4.3 Designing Interventions for Accountability

Designing notions of justice that can be embedded in sociotechnical systems and regulations will be critical to ensuring robust interventions for algorithmic accountability. Better training for human labelers, for example, is not enough to ensure robustly just systems, as research has shown that harmful associations along the lines of race, gender, and the intersection of race and gender can be automatically learned by unsupervised vision-language models [135].

Sociotechnical systems require proactive and continual monitoring for algorithmic injustices, and research to develop bias metrics to measure and reduce representational harms such as stereotyping in algorithmic systems is crucial towards developing proactive interventions (see, e.g., [40, 53, 65, 73, 101, 127, 148]). For instance, Dev et al. introduce a framework of representational harms as well as a set of heuristics that can be used to align bias measures in natural language processing with specific harms [52]. Returning to Rawls [126], we can ground conceptions of algorithmic harm in terms of power imbalances, inequalities, and oppression, and demand that sociotechnical systems and the regulatory frameworks that govern their use be designed based on principles of justice—to treat people as free, equal moral persons, and to require social institutions to be arranged so that they are substantively fair.

Although the adoption of sociotechnnical interventions presents numerous practical challenges [128], various approaches that could incorporate a forward-looking lens are emerging, including participatory design, algorithmic auditing, and regulatory oversight.

4.3.1 Participatory design. Because marginalized communities are disproportionately harmed by representational biases, a critical component of interventions for ensuring justice and equity in generative AI is participatory design. Blodgett et al. call for researchers and practitioners to make explicit their normative reasoning and to take into account the "lived experiences of members of communities affected by NLP systems" [33]. In the case of Lensa, conversations with marginalized groups could have promptly alerted the developers to the predictable misogyny and racism that runs rampant on the open internet and is reflected in the generated images. As an illustration of the value of user participation, Gadiraju et al. demonstrated how focus groups with people with disabilities readily surfaced a wide range of ways in which outputs from a large language model, while not producing blatantly offensive outputs, mirrored subtle stereotypes that people with disabilities encounter in their daily lives and in popular media [62]. A better understanding of how communities experience oppression could point to different choices for data curation and model training to reflect ideals of gender and racial equality rather than marginalization and gender-based violence. With deliberate design choices informed by the lived experiences of marginalized groups, generative AI applications could work as well for Asian women as they do for their white male colleagues, and as well for persons with disabilities as for persons without disabilities.

Awareness of the importance of community involvement in the design of public-facing algorithmic systems is growing. In OpenAI's February 2023 response to user concerns about "outputs that they consider politically biased, offensive, or otherwise objectionable," the company announced plans to solicit public input from "as many perspectives as possible" and invest in research and engineering to address bias with improvements based on feedback from the user community [121]. Inviting public input is a step in the right direction, but it is often employed in ways that are more backwards looking to correct errors in deployment rather than forward-looking to anticipate and design more robustly just products.

4.3.2 Algorithmic auditing. Regular auditing and continuous monitoring is another component that is critical to ensuring they meet the demands of justice. One approach is to invite feedback from people who are using these algorithms in a variety of cultural setting. As Shen et al. highlight, regular auditing by everyday users who engage with algorithmic systems in real-world social and cultural contexts is crucial because these users are well-situated to detect algorithmic harms that may go unnoticed by design teams [130]. There are two ways to view algorithmic auditing: this auditing can be used to ensure compliance with clear standards as a method of enforcement, but it can also be used as a forward-looking mode of oversight. Researchers have called for internal audits of algorithms for adherence to ethical standards prior to deployment and for continually monitoring the model throughout its lifecycle [124]. Frameworks for ensuring justice and equity in sociotechnical systems, informed by legal requirements and philosophical theory, could be incorporated in the standards used in such processes.

4.3.3 Regulatory oversight. Another promising model for a forward-looking approach to oversight could put the burden on companies to prove the safety, efficacy, and adherence to justice to a regulatory body before it is deployed or released. This model is inspired

by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (see, e.g., [139]), which requires pharmaceutical companies to prove that a drug meets strict standards for safety and efficacy before it is approved for use. Adopting a similar model for algorithms and generative AI systems could require organizations developing and deploying the system to demonstrate their safety, efficacy, and adherence to requirements for justice and equity prior to releasing these tools to the public. Stricter standards could be adopted for algorithms designed for use in highly-consequential domains or otherwise expected to have a significant impact on a large number of people.

5 CONCLUSION

Conversations around how to design, implement, and evaluate fair algorithms are impeded by a lack of common understanding of the term 'bias.' One step researchers and practitioners could take is to disambiguate the term bias and adopt instead a wider range of terminology, such as prejudice, discrimination, and statistical weighting, that more accurately expresses when and which types of injustices occur. Yet, even when researchers are precise in locating the specific harm, there is a real danger this can be used to deflect accountability away from the algorithm and its developers. Injustices persist in both the world and in the algorithms that reflect and amplify societal harms. But this need not mean we can hope for no better. We call attention to the interplay between modeling the world as it is and promoting a more just and equitable social order, and argue that the design and use of algorithms has a role to play in both aspects.

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A sector-based approach to AI ethics: Understanding ethical issues of AI-related incidents within their sectoral context

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ABSTRACT

Acknowledging that society is made up of different sectors with their own rules and structures, this paper studies the relevance of a sector-specific perspective to AI ethics. Incidents with AI are studied in relation to five sectors (police, healthcare, education and academia, politics, automotive) using the AIAAIC repository. A total of 125 incidents are sampled and analyzed by conducting a qualitative content analysis on media reports. The results show that certain ethical principles are found breached across sectors: accuracy/reliability, bias/discrimination, transparency, surveillance/privacy, security. However, results also show that 1) some ethical issues (misinformation, safety, premise/intent) are sector specific, 2) the consequences and meaning of the same ethical issue is able to vary across sectors and 3) pre-existing sector-specific issues are reproduced with these ethical breaches. The paper concludes that general ethical principles are relevant to discuss across sectors, yet, a sector-based approach to AI ethics gives in-depth information on sector-specific structural issues.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Social and professional topics**; • **Computing methodologies**; • **Artificial intelligence**; • **Philosophical/theoretical foundations of artificial intelligence.**;

KEYWORDS

Artificial Intelligence, AI deployment, AI Ethics, AI incidents, Sectors, Media Reports

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1 INTRODUCTION

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has developed as a tool to improve efficiency, reduce costs, and enable new activities in various contexts with pilots and applications in, for example, fraud detection [6], hiring [17], and law enforcement [56]. At the same time, it is widely recognized that the deployment of AI is not without risks. In the past years, AI-related controversies arose across a variety of cases revealing issues ranging from surveillance, to biases and discrimination, and causing harm due to problems with the reliability and security of such systems [14, 30]. The need to account for these ethical issues has been widely acknowledged. With a "turn to ethics" [59:2], actors from industry (e.g., [35, 51]), the public sector (e.g., [5, 40, 54]), and non-governmental organizations (e.g., [2, 18]) have outlined principles to ensure the ethical, responsible and trustworthy development and deployment of artificial intelligence in AI ethics guidelines.

As important as such initiatives are for raising awareness for ethical issues of AI, they have been criticized as being too abstract [39, 57] and offering little to no practical applicability [66, 73, 75]. Furthermore, evaluations of AI ethics guidelines showed them to be too generic [63], vague [60], and hosting a multitude of possible interpretations [62], leading to a lack of clarity regarding how AI

principles should be implemented, interpreted, or prioritized [12]. Based on such critique, some scholars question AI ethics guidelines in principle [52]. However, one possibility to close the "wide and thorny gap between the articulation of these high-level concepts and their actual achievement in the real world" [31:66] is to make AI ethics guidelines less abstract and ambiguous. To make abstract concepts such as ethical principles and values sufficiently concrete, they need to be viewed within a specific context.

This paper explores one approach to make ethics guidelines more tailored towards social context: focusing on sectors and their specific characteristics. A sector-based perspective to AI ethics enables understanding how AI systems are embedded in specific sectoral cultures with e.g. their norms, structures, activities, and routines, which is a perspective that is thus far overlooked in the AI ethics community. To elaborate, sectors are not explicitly used as a conceptual tool, but rather implicitly treated as relevant in relation to AI and robo-ethics in case studies such as elder care [15] or education [64]. To address this gap in the literature, this present paper aims to understand the feasibility of a sector-based approach to AI ethics. Are certain ethical issues found in specific sectors, or are ethical principles breached across sectors? In other words, it will be studied whether it has merit being sensitive to contextual, sector-specific information when understanding AI ethics, or whether overarching and rather general values are sufficient in doing so. Bearing this in mind, the guiding research question reads: How is sectoral context related to breaches of ethical principles?

In order to answer this research question, breaches of ethical principles are operationalized in terms of incidents with AI after deployment, as is listed in media reports in the AI, Algorithmic and Automation Incidents and Controversies (hereafter AIAAIC) repository [1]. Five sectors are selected for an empirical analysis on incidents with AI: healthcare, education and academia, police, politics, automotive. By comparing these sectors and their AI-related incidents, it could be seen whether such incidents occur in isolation (i.e. only within their respective sector), or across sectors. What follows next is an overview of related work in AI ethics with a focus on its principles and guidelines.

2 RELATED WORK

In order to situate this current study in literature, related work that addresses theoretical questions concerning principles and guidelines for ethical AI is discussed, followed by studies that also focus on the sectoral context of AI ethics.

2.1 Principles and guidelines for ethical AI

The widespread adoption of AI technologies is increasingly accompanied by calls for mitigating the risks that AI technologies pose. As a response, a variety of societal actors such as governments, policymakers and international organizations, businesses, professional associations, advocacy groups, and multi-stakeholder initiatives have produced ethical guidelines with the goal of defining and creating AI in accordance with ethical values and principles. Despite the multitude of guidelines coming from different institutional backgrounds, some overlap among the principles can be observed. According to Jobin et al. [43], eleven overarching ethical values and principles are found when comparing eighty-four AI ethical guidelines. These are, by frequency of the number of sources in which they were featured: transparency, justice and fairness, non-maleficence, responsibility, privacy, beneficence, freedom and autonomy, trust, dignity, sustainability, and solidarity. Another paper [31] states that eight main principles were found after analyzing thirty-six ethical guidelines: privacy, accountability, safety and security, transparency and explainability, fairness and non-discrimination, human control of technology, professional responsibility, and promotion of human values. When comparing these two papers and their results, partial overlap can be observed in the content of these ethical guidelines, e.g., transparency, privacy, fairness.

However, as Jobin et al. [43] note, relying on a numerical assessment of mentioned ethical values and principles, i.e., assessing which values and principles are mentioned how often, obfuscates divergences regarding "(1) how ethical principles are interpreted; (2) why they are deemed important; (3) what issue, domain or actors they pertain to; and (4) how they should be implemented". Thus, the landscape of AI ethics guidelines still is marked by extensive heterogeneity and is far away from "a unified framework that can guide the governance of AI" [60:11]. This raises questions about the applicability of AI ethics guidelines more generally, as it is difficult for AI practitioners to determine which ethical issues they may run into [61] and how they should interpret, account for, and operationalize proposed ethical values and principles [31, 43]. This challenge has also been investigated empirically. A behavioral ethics study on the effects of the ACM ethical guidelines [50] shows that the availability of the guidelines alone has no statistically relevant influence on ethical decision making and concludes that future research needs to find different ways that can influence ethical decision making. Vakkuri et al. [73] conclude in their study that the academic discussion around ethical values has been too conceptual and as a result, does not seem to have influenced the industry at large yet.

In short, there are still things left unclear within the AI ethics community. The rather broad character of AI ethics typically does not account for social complexities and the situated realities of ethical breaches. In the analysis, this is taken into account, as real world incidents are examined in relation to such ethical values and principles. In doing so, this study aims to understand how applicable general AI ethics principles are in different sectors.

2.2 Sectoral context and ethical AI

To account for the ways the social environment shapes both the development as well as the post-deployment phase of AI, researchers have called for broadening the analytical lens [3, 23, 24]. As discussed in the introduction, this could be achieved by introducing a sector-based approach, allowing to account for sector-specific characteristics. The field of AI ethics does have numerous case studies that ontologically assume the relevance of understanding sectoral context in relation to AI ethics. For instance, in her analysis on novel elder care technologies, Burema [15] argues that such technologies embed a neoliberal understanding of the welfare state. In other words, the (un)ethical nature of such technologies was assessed in the context of the sector: aging, and the welfare system.

Thereby, the author does not isolate the technology from its sectoral environment.

One of the few publications that does *explicitly* refer to sectors in understanding AI ethics is the European Commission's High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence [25]. The authors argue that the AI ethics recommendations the EU has made thus far are too general in their nature, and in-depth knowledge is needed for specific sectors. In their paper, they choose three sectors to make specific recommendations for the creation and deployment of AI in relation to three sectors: health care, the public sector (e-governance and justice/law enforcement), manufacturing, and (industrial) Internet of Things (IoT) sector. Though these authors thereby explicitly acknowledge the relevance of being sensitive to sector-specific contexts of AI ethics, the work reads as three different case studies on three different sectors in which the content of these recommendations was made based on workshops with experts from the respective fields, i.e. without data about deployment.

In contrast, this study does two things differently: 1) instead of solely describing ethical issues for each individual sector, this paper compares the ethical issues of sectors to see how sector-specific mechanisms are (not) relevant when discussing AI ethics, 2) instead of relying on expert interviews, this paper analyzes incidents in particular sectors after deployment, which provides the opportunity for analyzing AI systems and their use "in the wild". Furthermore, by looking at incidents post-deployment, this study takes a broad definition when defining a sector compared with the approach of the European Commission [25]: it does not only concern industry actors situated in a sector, but also users. A sector, therefore in this paper, functions as a broader frame of reference where the incidents took place.

3 METHOD

This study sampled incidents based on media reports shown in the AIAAIC database developed by Pownall [1]. At the time of writing this paper, this database covers more than 950 entries of incidents and includes several variables, such as sector, country, year, and URL links of media reports. For this study, two variables are of interest: sector and URL links that relate the incident to the media report. The content of these media reports is analyzed qualitatively with a thematic analysis according to sector as is explained later. First, the selection procedure for the sectors is explained, as there were many to choose from in the database.

This paper does not follow a predefined operationalization of sectors, where certain sectors are chosen over others before sampling. Rather, sectors are selected based on feasibility and sample size (i.e. the number of incidents per sector in the database): it needs to be feasible to code the data in a limited amount of time while keeping a sufficient number of cases. For that reason, the biggest sector, "technology", is omitted for this study because the database shows more than 220 incidents and is therefore not feasible to code qualitatively in a restricted amount of time, as well as the smaller sectors such as "religion" which shows one incident with a robot priest and is therefore too small in sample size to draw any conclusions. This sampling procedure resulted in the selection of five sectors: police, education and academia, politics, automotive, and healthcare. Initially, taking all the sectors together, a total of 180 cases were identified. After the data was cleaned by two analysts, the sample size was reduced to n=125 cases: police (n=39), education/academia (n=34), politics (n=16), automotive (n=21) and healthcare (n=15). The exclusion criteria applied are: duplicates, not accessible media reports (e.g., paywall), cases that do not relate to AI technologies per se, technologies that are not deployed yet, or media reports that do not discuss an incident (e.g., commentary texts that expressed an author's opinion about an incident or an entire field). Furthermore, cases that were labeled incorrectly according to sector, were moved to the respective sector. In total, 55 cases were excluded due to these reasons, resulting in a sample size of n=125. It should be noted that the database was retrieved in February 2021. Since then, more cases were added to the database and it has been reorganized.

The content of the media reports is analyzed qualitatively with a thematic analysis. In essence, this is a tool for data reduction by first exploring the data, then establishing initial codes, and finally establishing themes by comparing and contrasting codes. The unit of analysis is the incident itself, not the media report. In other words, the analysis is not conducted on a semantic level (e.g., framing analysis or discourse analysis) but rather on a descriptive level (i.e., understanding the critical elements of the AI incidents by directly assigning a descriptive code). To elaborate on this process, first the media reports are read in order to understand the nature of the incidents. Then, the media report is coded in terms of the ethical issue that is described in the report (i.e. breach of ethical principle). Since these reports typically deal with a case that has multiple issues, one media report is able to include more than one ethical code. Additionally, special attention is paid to sector-specific activities: where exactly did the incident in the sector take place?

Thus, two pieces of information are analyzed and coded from the media reports: the **ethical issues** (i.e. what ethical principle has been breached?) and sector-specific **activities** (i.e. where is this incident situated within the sector?). Concerning the former, it should be noted that the database already coded each incident according to the respective ethical issue (e.g., accuracy/reliability, transparency, etc.). However, all incidents are re-coded with the purpose of this study in mind, albeit sometimes with the same terminology. The reason for reassessing each incident in terms of their ethical issue is because certain incidents were initially coded in ways that were not aligning with this research's aim. For instance, codes such as "marketing" and "ethics" were found to describe certain incidents. Still, bad marketing is not inherently an AI-related ethical incident, and using "ethics" as a label to describe unethical AI deployment is too generic.

After getting to know the data and developing initial codes, the rest of the coding process involves steps in data reduction: how are these initial codes related to one another (i.e., is there overlap found?), and are there themes able to be established? This is an iterative process, especially for the data and codes that describe sectoral activity. This coding procedure resulted in a couple of themes that describe the ethical issue (i.e. what ethical principle has been breached?) as well as themes that describe their sectoral context in terms of activities (i.e. where is this incident situated within the sector?), as is discussed in the results. The final step is to compare the results across sectors: are certain themes only occurring in particular sectors, or is there overlap found? Can we

speak about general ethics or should AI ethics be tailored towards sectoral contexts?

4 RESULTS

The results are presented in two parts: first a description of the incidents per sector are described in detail. Here, the core ethical principles that are breached (e.g. transparency) are described as well as the sectoral activities (e.g. tracking, monitoring and identifying people in the police sector). Then, two tables are presented in which the sectors and ethical issues are compared.

Before discussing the results in-depth, it should be noted that the data used for this study are media reports. Therefore, the list of incidents are not exhaustive due to media bias, as some topics might be picked up more than others in favor of media logic. Thereby, not all incidents that occurred after deployment and their ethical issues in their respective sector are reflected in the results. Also, it means that the incidents were not observed first-hand, but are filtered through observations of the reporter and its editorial process. This issue of relying on media reports for the analysis is further discussed in the limitations section of this paper.

4.1 Description per sector

4.1.1 Police. When AI is deployed in the police sector, it concerns issues related to tracking, monitoring, or identifying people. Often but not always, this is done with the help of personal data. AI technologies can be used in both ongoing police investigations and predictive policing. What all cases (n=39) in the database have in common is the use of AI for either visual detection of objects or people, or administrative purposes. When AI gets used in this sector, ethical themes relate to accuracy/reliability, bias and discrimination, transparency, surveillance and privacy, as is explained next.

Accuracy/reliability relates to cases that misidentify people, sometimes leading to wrongful arrests [44]. This ties in with another theme: bias and discrimination, as certain racial minorities are often misidentified as also the case of [44] shows. The issue of transparency relates to not knowing when personal data is being used, and for what purpose. For instance, Biddle [11] discusses how the Los Angeles police department requested home security videos of Amazon Ring users to identify protesters in the Black Lives Matter protests. Though the author hints to the possibility of using video footage for facial recognition, and calls surveillance through Ring a "ubiquitous camera network" there is much unclarity about the use of data: "Policies guiding how long cops can retain privately obtained data like Ring videos—and what they can do once it lands on their hard drives—are rare and typically weak". This latter example also ties in with privacy/surveillance issues: as new technologies were primarily used by the police to track, monitor, or identify people, it by default taps into issues of privacy and surveillance. The use of personal data to observe citizens is for instance found in China, where illegal street crossings are being detected with facial recognition software at intersections. After being detected, pictures of supposed offenders are publicly displayed at those intersections on LED screens, and a fine is announced via text message to the offenders [70]. In other words, law enforcement is able to observe its citizens closely with AI, in this case leading to public shaming and fining.

4.1.2 Education and academia. **Education -** The incidents related to this sector (n=25) concern teaching and administrative activities that can be divided into three types: 1) evaluation and grading 2) monitoring and tracking behavior of students; 3) physical and digital access. These three types of activities show a mix of different ethical issues, as is explained next.

Issues with grading show problems with accuracy/reliability and bias/discrimination. Meaning, the systems were not doing the tasks that they were supposed to do but also affect certain sociodemographic groups differently than others. To elaborate, the algorithms used are not accurate or reliable, for instance, when grading tests [19] or predicting students' grades that otherwise could not be performed due to Covid 19 [26]. Bias and discrimination were found when the technologies disadvantage certain groups over others, typically (and at the intersection of) gender and race, such as AI that predicts student success [28], or assesses PhD applications [58].

Tracking and monitoring the behavior of students predominantly breaches principles of privacy and surveillance, but also bias/discrimination and security. Concerning the latter, cybersecurity breaches were found in, for instance, online learning environments and proctoring software [46] though this does not inherently have to do with AI per se but rather could be seen as a side-effect when AI gets implemented. Examples of privacy and surveillance breaches are proctoring software used to administer tests [29], or facial recognition used in Australian schools to check attendance [7]. Bias and discrimination occurs when for instance proctoring software does not identify students with dark skin tones [20].

Access refers to physical access to school and its environment or access to digital learning environments of schools on the basis of biometric data. The incidents related to restricting access due to misidentification. In doing so, the systems are biased/discriminatory or inaccurate. For instance, in the Lockport city school district in the US, media reports mention how the system disproportionally misidentifies black students [27]. Furthermore, there are privacy issues as biometric data are stored, processed, and shared to regulate access [49].

Academia - In academic publications (n=9), the ethical issues concern ethically disputable premises of hypotheses and underlying arguments used to test and create AI. In other words, when publishing, scholars have to specify what ideas they are testing or developing and why, in this case all publications develop an AI or a component thereof. The ethical issues of these incidents do not refer to the output (i.e. how well the AI is performing), rather, the very starting point of the academic publication: the initial ideas that lead to the development of a newly developed AI system. Examples are a publication that developed AI to detect people's sexual orientation with facial recognition [47], or similarly a publication that uses facial recognition to predict political orientation [79].

4.1.3 Politics. The sector "politics" in the dataset refers to the communication of political viewpoints in which deepfakes and twitterbots are created by citizens and political organizations alike to credit and discredit political figures and/or their agendas (n=16). The incidents that occurred in this sector concern ethical issues with misinformation and transparency by communicating messages without disclosing that AI was involved in the construction of the

messages. To clarify, 15 incidents (out of 16 cases) concerned the communication of a message by a deepfake of a politician. Without a disclaimer that such technologies were involved when creating the message, this can be misleading about the authenticity of the message. The content of these deep faked messages ranges from creating fake political statements from politicians [71], to videos used in political election campaigns [53] and advertisements by lobby groups [80]. Only one case was found that did not directly involve audiovisual deepfakes: Twitter bots that disseminated misinformation about climate change [9]. Nonetheless, what all cases have in common, regardless of the exact technology used, is that the incidents concern the communication of political ideas with AI to the general public.

4.1.4 Healthcare. In healthcare (n=15), the activities where AI-related incidents were found concern care provision and medical analyses (i.e. prevention/prognosis/diagnosis), data management (i.e. storing/sharing/tracking medical data), and allocation of care.

Care provision and medical analyses refer to the actual "doing" of care: Prevention, prognosis, and diagnosis. Flawed COVID-19 prediction models [72], and digital symptom checkers [33] show issues with AI's accuracy/reliability. There were issues found in AI with bias/discrimination towards certain populations (most typically gendered and ethnic/racial) e.g., estimating kidney function [65] and in chest x-ray classifiers [76]. Finally, scientists criticized Google's lack of transparency in their breast cancer predicting AI [77].

Data management refers to the administration and logistics of handling personal and medical information: storing, sharing, and tracking of medical data. This concerns issues with surveillance/privacy such as the case of Amazon's Halo Band [32], a fitness tracker that constantly tracks medical data of the person wearing it, and an incident of asking for private medical data on the platform Facebook by a chatbot linked to the account of Israeli politician Netanyahu [69]. Also, transparency is an issue with storing, sharing, and tracking medical data, as for instance the transfer of medical data from a healthcare provider to Google was criticized for not informing the patients [22].

Concerning the allocation of care, two incidents were found: one involving the allocation of care work (i.e. how many hours a caregiver ought to spend with their patient) [45], and a case that concerns the allocation of Covid-19 vaccines [78]. Both of these incidents showed issues with accuracy/reliability, as the people in need of care were not able to access it due to inaccurate algorithms. At the same time, there were issues with transparency, as it was unclear in the case of Covid vaccination allocation how the algorithm makes its decision [78].

4.1.5 Automotive. All identified incidents in the automotive sector (n=21) involve self-driving cars in traffic. Three main causes were identified: external, human, and other (i.e. difficult to determine who/what caused the incident).

External incidents refer to incidents with self-driving cars in traffic due to external manipulation by researchers for the sake of calling for more security in self-driving cars [13, 68]. Self-driving cars were manipulated with, for instance, shiny stickers, drones with projectors, or through taking remote control to move seats, trigger indicators, wing mirrors, and windscreen wipers.

Human incidents concern incidents with self-driving cars in traffic due to human error. In these cases, drivers watched movies [34] or slept while using the autopilot [16], leading to slow responses of the driver when approaching subjects such as pedestrians or other cars or due to exceeding speed limits. Sometimes, human error does not necessarily refer to the human driver of an autonomous vehicle. Rather, two incidents in the database show how human error occurs when also other participants in traffic make estimation errors allegedly [10, 55].

In other types of incidents, it is difficult to determine the cause of the incident due to either the nature of the incident or lack of details reported about the incident. For instance, cases where the car could not detect a white vehicle due to bright weather while human drivers allegedly were not attentive enough [36, 37], or car crashes where details of the incident are missing [21, 38]. However, even though it is difficult to pinpoint responsibility and cause, it does not mean that there is no indication of possible technical issues: e.g. when the autopilot emergency braking systems were not used when an object or traffic situation was not (timely) detected [37] or all the lack of defensive driving when approaching a pedestrian, e.g. allegedly stopping too close to the subject [74].

Interestingly, there is a case involving two autonomous vehicles, i.e., a traffic situation where the key players are technologies, not humans. Two self-driving cars nearly collided when one car tried to switch lanes while being cut off by the other car. The crash was prevented as the first car detected the other one on time and waited until the lane was clear again [42].

All these incidents relate to safety, accuracy/reliability, and security issues with autonomous driving vehicles. Safety refers to (the lack of) physical harm when, for instance, a self-driving car crashes or is involved in any type of physical accident [e.g., 38]. Accuracy/reliability shows the lack of accuracy and reliability in the use of sensors e.g. for recognizing objects in traffic [e.g., 37]. Security deals with safety from external manipulation [13, 68].

4.2 Comparing sectors

While the analysis above provides a rich description of each specific ethical issue and how it relates to its respective sector, boiling down the results to key insights, one can identify the following overlap between sectors (table 1).

This indicates that there is merit in the approach of general AI ethics guidelines and principles because several issues are not sector specific but cut across different sectoral contexts: accuracy/reliability, bias/discrimination, transparency, surveillance/privacy, security. Yet, even though the findings show that ethical values span across sectors, there are sector-specific characteristics found in the data when looking at specific sectoral activities as is explained next.

In addition to understanding ethical issues within their sectoral context, specific sectoral activities are also studied. Focusing on these activities reveals further contextual characteristics of the sector: the actions that are inherent to the sector that AI systems got involved in. This gives additional information on the nature of the incidents.

When reading this table, three things are observable, 1) certain ethical issues are found in only one sector, 2) the same ethical issue

Table 1: Ethical issues listed by sector

Sector	Ethical issue
Police	Accuracy/reliability, bias/discrimination, transparency, surveillance/privacy
Education	Accuracy/reliability, bias/discrimination, transparency, surveillance/privacy, securitys
Academia	Premise/intent
Politics	Misinformation, transparency
Healthcare	Accuracy/reliability, bias/discrimination, privacy/surveillance, transparency
Automotive	Safety, security, accuracy/reliability

Table 2: Ethical issues and sectoral activities listed by sector

Sector	Ethical issue	Sectoral activity
Police	Accuracy/reliability, bias/discrimination, transparency, Surveillance/Privacy	Predictive or investigative tracking/identification/monitoring
Education	Accuracy/reliability, bias/discrimination, transparency, surveillance/privacy, security	Administrative work and teaching (Regulating access, tracking student behavior, evaluating work)
Academia	Premise/intent	Academic publishing
Politics	Misinformation, transparency	Political communication and persuasion
Healthcare	Accuracy/reliability, bias/discrimination, privacy/surveillance, transparency	Care provision and medical analyses, data management, allocation of care
Automotive	Safety, security, accuracy/reliability	Self-driving cars

that is being breached across sectors leads to different consequences and refers to different meanings 3) pre-existing sector-specific structures are reproduced, as is explained next.

First, there are some ethical issues that are inherently sector-specific. In academia, the only ethical concern found is the issue of having questionable premises or intentions when developing the technologies (table 1). In other words, the AI systems were not at fault when the incident occurred, rather the worldviews/theories that humans hold when developing the technologies. While this in itself could happen in other sectors, i.e. having bad intentions or unethical ideas about the sociotechnical, when looking at the sectoral activity, it shows that this relates specifically to scientific publishing (table 2). To elaborate, the realm in which this incident occurred is where academia produces its knowledge, i.e. the creation of scientific output. Framed differently, the premise/intent principle that is being violated relates to scientific ideas that are being published: ethically questionable hypotheses and theoretical premises prior to developing the AI, that guides the narrative in the publication. To give an example, an AI "gaydar" was developed in academia and got published [47]. Regardless of how the technology itself is working, the main theoretical starting point was ethically questionable, i.e. the "need" that one can or should scan faces to detect one's sexual orientation. In other words, the main concern for academia in relation to AI deployment is the social and moral theories that scholars that develop AI hold. Again, this is not something only academia struggles with, as developers in all sectors could have questionable premises/intent when developing their technologies. However, the data shows that it is inherent to academia to focus on scientific publishing, which by default links the questionable premises/intent with unethical hypothesizing. In other words, this intersection is a quirk specific to the sector of academia (i.e. coming up with unethical hypotheses and theoretical premises which then get tested and published).

Similarly, the ethical issue of "misinformation" was only found in the sector of politics, albeit together with the breached ethical principle of "transparency". When looking at the sectoral activity, one can see that it relates to political persuasion (table 2). All incidents in the political sector thereby relate to creating a political message with AI, but this message is 1) not disclosing that AI was made in the making of the message, thereby not being transparent and 2) having elements of deceit/not being factual, thereby being able to misinform the audience. To elaborate, the incidents all relate to deepfakes and twitter bots that spread political messages but are not informing the audience about the nature of such messages. While such technologies could also be used in other sectors for other purposes than politics, for instance, in popular culture for satire purposes, the sector "politics" specifically struggles with this phenomenon, as the data for instance do not show other AI-related incidents in other realms of the political sector (e.g. using AI for administrative work in the political sector) or other ethical values being breached that were repeatedly found across other sectors (e.g. accuracy/reliability). This does not mean that there are no other activities in the sector of "politics" where AI could get deployed in, but rather that the most pressing issue (according to media logic and the public sphere) where AI gets deployed are activities related to public persuasion. Political communication and persuasion are activities specific to the sector, to, for instance, assert dominance

of certain political ideas over others. By doing so, the sector "politics" is prone to misinformation and transparency when AI gets embedded into this context. The results show that the combination of ethical principles being breached, i.e. misinformation and transparency play into those pre-existing sector-specific characteristics: the struggle of competing belief systems.

Second, one can see that if the same ethical principles are breached, it leads to radically different consequences in different sectors, as the principle intersects with the sectoral activity. The same principle can manifest differently in different sectors due to the sectoral activity being involved. To give an example, when the principle "security" is being breached, which in all cases means the event where an external person hacks into a system, the consequences for the sectors "education" and "automotive" are very different. In "education", as seen in table 2, a security breach happens in administrative and teaching activities, i.e. everything that relates to grading or administering data and information about students. The worst outcome that could happen in a security breach, is that an external person would be able to access, retrieve, and modify personal data. However, for the automotive industry, a security breach could potentially have physical consequences as all AI-related incidents refer to self-driving vehicles (table 2). If external actors are able to hack the autopilot of cars, the possible effects are bodily. This does not mean that one ethical problem is lesser than the other. Rather, it means that in order for people to truly understand the nature of the breach of an ethical principle and its potential consequences, it has merit trying to understand the sectoral activity it is embedded in.

Related to this argument, not only are the consequences of ethical breaches different for different sectors, regarding transparency, the meaning of the ethical value in itself can be different for different sectors. Transparency in the political domain focuses primarily on the transparency *that* AI systems were used to, for instance, manipulate images or videos ("deepfakes") whereas the question of *how* the manipulation was conducted technically is less relevant from an ethical perspective. After all, the ethical breach lies in political persuasion (table 2) where the goal of the AI is to convince people of certain beliefs without revealing the lack of authenticity involved in creating the message, thereby it is irrelevant to know from an ethical perspective e.g. which data is used to create such AI systems or showcase technical documentation. In healthcare, however, transparency refers to technical elements of AI such as data and methods that are used to construct the AI that could influence for instance care provision and medical analyses (table 2). Whereas the former breaches of transparency concern the lack of revealing *that* an AI was used, the latter refers to the lack of transparency involved where AI classifies things or comes to a certain decision.

Third, when intersecting the ethical value with the sectoral activity, it raises the question whether the phenomena are really new or whether it is rooted in a sectoral structure. As an example, the sector police is discussed in detail. Surveillance and privacy are ethical issues that could be seen as inherent to police work, since police work is a form of state governance that, with or without AI and machine learning, involves monitoring and identifying suspects [48]. This would require some form of gathering personal information from people. Also, when tracking, identifying or monitoring people, bias and discrimination is not a new phenomenon following the introduction of new technologies, but police work has previously been associated with racial bias [8]. Of course, the source of human bias and machine bias might be different. But the phenomenon itself in the police force is not new. In terms of transparency, it should equally be questioned whether law enforcement has thus far, i.e. without AI, been transparent in terms of how they collect their data and how much this differs when AI is being used. Finally, accuracy/reliability is an ethical theme that refers to the technicalities of the AI: if it works as it is intended. Thereby this theme by default does not discuss e.g. how accurately human police officers identify their suspects, but rather how well a machine performs this task. Nonetheless, one could still make the claim that also without AI police work has issues with accuracy/reliability, since making mistakes such as misidentification and making false estimations is by definition a human quality.

Of course, it is one-sided to claim that all of these ethical issues are inherent to the sector without intervention of AI systems, as if technologies do not introduce societal change and new ethical issues. To take the principle of surveillance/privacy as an example: one could for instance argue that the scalability of surveillance and privacy breaches in relation to tracking, identifying and monitoring people have the potential to increase or change form. To elaborate, Andrejevic and Gates argue that whereas prior, surveillance was targeted, data-driven surveillance techniques allow for a "collect-everything approach" [4]. However, this current paper does not deny that AI systems could trigger social change in form or intensity. Rather, the main argument is that the *very premise* of these ethical issues is sometimes inherent to the sector. For example, one of the core activities in the police sector is surveilling. It is thereby no surprise that ethical breaches occurred related to privacy, transparency and surveillance, when AI got deployed in this sector. In other words, the ethical problems with AI are arguably rooted in something rather stable and structural: specific sectoral routines and structures.

5 DISCUSSION

The results show that most ethical themes are recurring across sectors: accuracy/reliability, bias/discrimination, transparency, surveillance/privacy, security. This means that it makes sense to discuss ethical issues on a more general level as there is empirical evidence that some principles are repeatedly breached in across contexts. General ethical values and principles can and should be addressed when, for instance, discussing and conceptualizing ethics in policies, academic texts, or public communication. Furthermore, what this present paper also shows, is that additionally, knowing sectoral context can be helpful when understanding AI ethics in-depth as is explained next.

Taking sectoral context into consideration, one becomes aware they have their own dynamics and routines: the police surveils, teachers administer tests, physicians diagnose. Understanding these activities helps with understanding AI ethics better, as it is no surprise when AI gets deployed, e.g. issues of safety occur in the automotive industry, misinformation and transparency in politics, or

questionable theoretical premises are put forward in academic publishing because such principles and values are related to their respective sector and their specific activities. In other words, the results show that there is merit in understanding how ethical principles intersect with sectoral activities, as these reveal specific meaning of AI deployment in specific sectoral contexts. Therefore scholars, developers and operators, and other actors of AI systems ought to take sectoral context that an AI system is deployed in into account because each sector has its own quirks. Moving forward, applying a sector-based approach to AI ethics means studying the activities of that respective sector. Taking it one step further, one could even argue that domain specific knowledge is needed to assess sectors before AI deployment with e.g. a historical analysis. By doing so, one can understand *why* some ethical issues are more prevalent in a sector than others, even before AI systems are deployed.

Knowing that sectors have specific cultures and quirks, has several implications for the field of AI ethics. First, a sector-based approach argues for sector-specific sensitivity when discussing guidelines. A sector-based approach to AI ethics can address varying demands on and trade-offs to ethical values and principles. For instance, in policing, there is a legitimate interest for some level of secrecy to not hamper police investigations. Other sectors make different demands on trade-offs to ethical values and principles. Therefore to evaluate privacy or transparency-related incidents, requires to make sector-specific considerations. To give another example of such trade-offs, while some of the accuracy- and reliability-related issues of autonomous vehicles presumably can be best solved by advancing capabilities on the basis of providing more training data, such calls for ever more data are problematic in other sectors where data is often more personal and sensitive. For instance, the increased use of personal data in education is considered to be highly problematic due to privacy issues and problems regarding consent [41, 67]. In policing, the surveillance necessary to acquire data is a vividly discussed ethical issue itself [4]. The solutions that AI ethics guidelines suggest using to address specific ethical issues need to take these context-specific requirements for solutions to ethical issues into account. In contrast to non-contextualized general AI ethics guidelines, sector-specific guidelines with their much smaller scope can name and discuss sector-specific risks, and, in doing so, provide much more awareness for specific ethical issues. For instance, the historical issues in the political sector concerning attempts to persuade masses with certain beliefs and thereby not always being truthful or honest about their reporting (regardless of the use of AI or not), shows that the ethical value of accuracy/reliability of the system (as shown in the results, an often-found problem across the sectors) is less relevant to focus on compared with misinformation and transparency. In other words, a sector-based approach shows how certain issues are particularly relevant for some sectors, while less so for others. A sector-based approach to AI ethics can take these differences into account.

So far, contextuality is highlighted as one of the key aspects of a sector-based approach: try to understand each sector's activities, because ultimately, the technology gets embedded in this context and might reproduce and reinforce ethical issues that are already present. However, what this perspective does not offer, is an outlook on how AI technologies are able to *change* the dynamics of the sector. For instance, while the analysis shows that the automotive industry has safety in their breaches of ethical values, it does not show how autonomous vehicles could change the notion and perception of safety if a car is driven by non-human drivers compared with human drivers or the scalability of faked/inauthentic political messages in the field of political persuasion with deepfakes and twitter bots.

A second limitation concerns the data used in this study. This study shows representations of incidents, as they are represented in media reports – i.e., secondary data. This means, that 1) the narrative is framed by media outlets with their own media logic (i.e. the inner workings of the media sector), although it should be noted that the performed method of analysis is not on a semantic level, and 2) it might be that other kinds of incidents occurred post-deployment, but were not picked up by the sampled media reports. For instance, in politics, all cases except one relate to deepfakes that communicate political messages or ridicule political personas. However, the political sector concerns more than mediated messages. It is also an administrative institution in which AI technologies could be used. Similarly, in the automotive sector, media reports focused primarily on incidents with self-driving cars. Yet, AI systems might also be used for administrative purposes in the automotive sector and different ethical issues might arise there. Such potential blindspots could be related to having media reports as the unit of analysis. Future research on incidents could consider different types of data to understand human-computer interaction or human-robot interaction "in the wild", with e.g. an ethnography.

Third, the sampling strategy of this paper ended in 2021. Arguably, many other AI technologies have been introduced and deployed since then. The deployment of AI and its consequences are a moving target to study, and therefore it is important to study how the landscape of AI ethics has changed over time. Follow-up studies could thereby replicate this research to understand if the sheer increase in incidents also somehow diversifies the nature of the incidents in their breaches of ethical principles in particular sectoral contexts.

6 CONCLUSION

This article makes the case for a sector-based approach to AI ethics, in which sectoral context is regarded as relevant information to understand the ethics of AI deployment. To do so, it analyzes n=125 incidents from the AIAAIC repository [1] from the sectors police, education/academia, politics, healthcare, and automotive. The analysis shows that while certain ethical issues are recurring and their relevance spans across sectors, 1) other ethical issues are inherently related to specific sectors, 2) ethical issues appear to have different meanings and manifest differently in different social contexts 3) the problems with AI-deployment are related to pre-existing issues in the sector (i.e. prior to AI deployment). Instead of asking how AI ethics ought to look like, a sector-based approach argues to look at the activities and pre-existing social realities of such sectors, in order to understand the situated context of AI deployment. It serves as an addition to general AI ethics guidelines that have been described by the AI ethics community in terms of their vagueness, high level of abstraction, and ambiguity, as well as them being generic, difficult to apply, and vague [31, 43, 60]. While these

principles could be viewed as rather generic etc., they are empirically found breached across contexts. A sector-based approach serves as an additional view to AI ethics that enables scholars and practitioners to understand the relevance of sectoral cultures in AI deployment.

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Democratising AI: Multiple Meanings, Goals, and Methods

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ABSTRACT

Numerous parties are calling for "the democratisation of AI", but the phrase is used to refer to a variety of goals, the pursuit of which sometimes conflict. This paper identifies four kinds of "AI democratisation" that are commonly discussed: (1) the democratisation of AI use, (2) the democratisation of AI development, (3) the democratisation of AI profits, and (4) the democratisation of AI governance. Numerous goals and methods of achieving each form of democratisation are discussed. The main takeaway from this paper is that AI democratisation is a multifarious and sometimes conflicting concept that should not be conflated with improving AI accessibility. If we want to move beyond ambiguous commitments to "democratising AI", to productive discussions of concrete policies and trade-offs, then we need to recognise the principal role of the democratisation of AI governance in navigating tradeoffs and risks across decisions around use, development, and profits.

KEYWORDS

AI Democratisation, AI Governance, Model Sharing, AI Benefits, Misuse of AI

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1 INTRODUCTION

Over the last couple years, discussion of "AI democratisation" has surged. AI companies around the world—such as Stability AI [1][1], Meta [2], Microsoft [3], and Hugging Face [4]—are talking about their commitment to democratising AI, but it's not always clear what they mean. The term "AI democratisation" seems to be employed in a variety of ways, causing commentators to speak past one another when discussing the goals, methodologies, risks, and benefits of AI democratisation efforts. This paper aims to provide a foundation for more productive conversations about democratising AI that move beyond ambiguous commitments.

Sections 2 through 5 describe four different notions of AI democratisation commonly used by AI labs—democratisation of AI use, democratisation of AI development, democratisation of AI profits, and democratisation of AI governance. We focus primarily on how the term "AI democratisation" is used by AI labs because of the impact they have on the rate of AI advances, and the influence they currently wield over the use, development, profit, and governance of AI. If labs are claiming commitments to AI democratisation, then it's important to clarify what those commitments mean and how they might be fulfilled.

Each section is divided into two subsections. The first subsection (x.1) discusses various goals the particular form of democratisation is proposed to achieve and notes conflicts with the goals of other forms of democratisation where they arise. The second subsection (x.2) describes various proposed methods for facilitating the form of democratisation.

Although the four concepts of democratisation we discuss often complement each other, it is important to note that they sometimes conflict. For instance, if the public prefers for access to certain kinds of AI systems to be restricted, then the "democratisation of AI governance" may require access restrictions to be put in place—but enacting these restrictions may hinder the "democratisation of AI development" for which some degree of AI model accessibility is key.

Section 6 then concludes, driving home the main observation of the paper; though the term "democratisation" can seem to imply otherwise, AI democratisation is not inherently good. The first three forms of democratisation (democratisation of use, development, and profits) are about improving accessibility to AI or AI derived profits which can yield both beneficial and harmful consequences. The desirability of AI democratisation therefore cannot be assumed, but rather is derived from alignment with the interests and values of those who will be impacted.

2 DEMOCRATISATION OF AI USE

When people speak about democratising some technology, they often refer to democratising its use—that is, making it easier for a wide range of people to use the technology. For example, in the early 2010's the "democratisation of 3D printers" referred to how

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3D printers were becoming much more easily acquired, built, and operated by the general public [5].

The same meaning has been applied to the democratisation of AI. Stability AI, for instance, has been a vocal champion of AI democratisation. The company proudly describes its main product, the image generation model Stable Diffusion, as "a text-to-image model that will empower billions of people to create stunning art within seconds" [6]. Microsoft similarly claims to be undertaking an ambitious effort "to democratize Artificial Intelligence (AI), to take it from the ivory towers and make it accessible to all." A salient part of its plan is "to infuse every application that we interact with, on any device, at any point in time, with intelligence" [3].

2.1 Goals

2.1.1 Distributing Benefits of Use. It is important to recognize, however, that for some AI applications the benefits of making the technology available for anyone to use can be relatively minor while the risks are significant. For example, the circle of individuals who would greatly benefit from access to an AI drug discovery tool is relatively small (mainly pharmaceutical researchers), however these tools can be easily repurposed to discover new toxins that might be used as chemical weapons [7]. This is an instance in which unfettered democratisation of AI use—making an AI tool accessible to all—may not always be desirable.

That said, an AI tool need not be widely accessible to all for the benefits to be widely distributed. A designated user could employ a high-risk AI system for the benefit of the community. In this way a drug discovery system could be used in a controlled, limited-access setting, while resulting pharmaceuticals are "democratised" in the sense that they are made accessible to anyone in need.

2.1.2 Receiving Feedback for Better and Safer AI. Another reason given for disseminating AI tools widely is so that developers can gather information about how their products are being used (or misused) in a wider variety of contexts than they would have been able to test, let alone imagine, internally [8]. In turn, that feedback informs improvements that enhance model performance and help guard against any new misuse applications that have emerged.

Importantly, where there are concerns about potential misuse, there is an option to cautiously democratise AI use via a staged release of the product [9]. Incrementally larger and more powerful versions of the model are released allowing time between each stage to evaluate how the AI application is being used and to conduct risk benefit analyses of releasing yet a more powerful version of the model. Feedback and staged release may also help provide time and notice for societies to adapt to the new capabilities and harden vulnerable systems, processes, and institutions. Unfortunately, where the risk and consequences of misuse are expected to be severe, responsible AI deployment may require that access restrictions be placed on certain AI capabilities.

Such restrictions limit the democratisation of AI use, but they are not necessarily a blow to AI democratisation more generally. As will be discussed in Section 5, AI democratisation can also refer to the democratisation of AI governance, which is about introducing democratic processes into decision-making about how AI is used, developed, shared and otherwise regulated. Indeed, one might say that the democratisation of AI use—making AI accessible to be used by everyone—is but one possible outcome of democratising AI governance. It is the outcome if the demos choose that distributing use is desirable. Another possible outcome may be to designate (perhaps through licensing) specific actors to use or study high-risk AI systems for the public's benefit.

2.2 Methods

Overall, efforts to democratise AI use—to make AI capabilities more widely accessible—may involve reducing the costs of acquiring and running AI tools (again, this may be done via staged release if there are concerns about misuse), providing accessible services to help users integrate AI models into their work streams (e.g. consulting services), and developing intuitive interfaces to facilitate human-AI interaction without the need for extensive training or technical knowhow. In some regions, democratising AI use may also require improvement to more fundamental infrastructure like internet access [10].

3 DEMOCRATISATION OF AI DEVELOPMENT

When the AI community talks about democratising AI, they rarely limit their focus to the democratisation of AI use. Much of the excitement is about democratising AI development—that is, helping a wider range of people contribute to AI design and development processes.

3.1 Goals

3.1.1 Accelerate AI innovation and Progress. It should not be assumed, however, that accelerating AI progress is always desirable. As AI research progresses and AI capabilities improve, we should expect the potential consequence of harms, misuse, or misalignment to also become more severe [12], [13]. The implementation of necessary policy and interventions to ensure safe and responsible AI development going forward may struggle to keep up with unbridled progress, and so there may be a case for exercising some restraint [14].

3.1.2 Cater to Diverse Interests and Needs. Calls for the democratisation of AI development also respond to concern that a small number of leading AI labs monopolise control over AI development and that those labs employ a narrow demographic of developers. The worry is that the AI products, which are deployed globally, consequently perform disparately for users of different ethnic, geographic, cultural, professional, and financial backgrounds [15–18].

Enabling more people to participate in AI design and development processes may help facilitate the development of AI applications that cater to more diverse interests and needs [19]. This is one reason Stability AI offers for its decision to open-source Stable Diffusion—meaning that the company allows anyone to download, modify, or build on the Stable Diffusion model on their own computer so long as they agree to the terms of use. CEO Emad Mostaque advocates that "everyone needs to build [AI] technology for themselves. . .. It's something that we want to enable because nobody knows what's best [for example] for people in Vietnam besides the Vietnamese" [1]. The company motto reads "AI by the people, for the people" [20].

But again, it should not be assumed that the diffusion of AI development is universally desirable. Open-source sharing in particular may enable more numerous and diverse contributions, but it also opens a door for malicious use and model modification, and controls are difficult to enforce [21].

3.1.3 External Evaluation. Third, many argue that involving more people (e.g. academics, individual developers, smaller labs) in AI development processes provides a critical external evaluation and auditing mechanism. By making models accessible for more people to study, AI labs might distribute auditing duties to a larger and more diverse group of developers than a lab would be able to employ internally. This assumes that more eyes on a model will reveal more flaws leading to safer and more well-aligned technology [8].

3.2 Methods

A variety of activities can help enable productive participation in AI design and development processes. Some strategies provide access to AI models and resources to facilitate AI community engagement—e.g. model sharing (3.2.1), providing compute access (3.2.2), project support and coordination (3.2.3). Other strategies help to expand the community of people capable of contributing to AI development processes—e.g. via educational & upskilling opportunities (3.2.4) or through the provision of assistive tools (3.2.5).

A key takeaway from this section is that there is much more to AI democratisation—even to the democratisation of AI development specifically—than model dissemination.

3.2.1 Model Sharing. Model sharing involves providing access to AI models including code, model weights and the ability to query, modify, study, or otherwise examine the model.

While model sharing is needed to enable external study and auditing of AI models, it also increases the opportunity for model misuse by malicious actors. In some contexts, for higher risk capabilities, it may therefore be wise to limit model accessibility [22].

That said, model sharing is not an all or nothing activity [23]. Rather, model sharing options range from full open-source sharing (all aspects of the system are downloadable for the public) to fully closed (only a select group of developers may even know the model exists) [21], [22], [24]. In the middle there are options for gated access, hosted model access, cloud-based or API access, and downloadable access with some model components withheld. In some of these middle options some degree of advantage from external study and auditing may be maintained while risk of misuse might be reduced.

These options should not be interpreted naively with respect to their stated intent, but with realism about their likely impacts. Google Research published a paper on a technique for style cloning in generative art, and chose to not release any code, citing the potential "societal impact" risk that "malicious parties might try to use such images to mislead viewers" [25]. However, in a mere 11 days one person was able to reproduce the technique to run on Stable Diffusion which they then chose to open-source [26]. Similarly, Meta chose to restrict access to the weights of its large language model LLaMa to academic researchers and others on a case by case basis, "to maintain integrity and prevent misuse" [27]. However, a week later the weights (predictably) were leaked and are now available publicly on a torrent [28]. In both these cases, realism is needed in assessing the likely impact of a nominally more restrictive model sharing policy.

3.2.2 Improving Compute Access (and other technical infrastructure). Large AI models require significant compute power to run. Accordingly, democratising development may also require improvements to compute access. Developers might, for instance, offer cloud computing services or issue grants for computer cluster access to facilitate smaller and less well-resourced groups in working with more powerful models [21]. Alternatively, developers might explore options for providing smaller model versions that require less compute to run. For example, Emad Mostaque describes Stable Diffusion as "a breakthrough in speed and quality [...] that can be run on consumer GPU's" [6].

Note, however, that restrictions on compute can also be leveraged to help minimise misuse of powerful AI by limiting the ability of prospective malicious actors to build or modify large models [29], [30]. Therefore, like decisions to open-source AI models, decisions to provide significant compute resources should involve adequate risk benefit analysis.

Other tech infrastructure that limits participation in AI development in a similar way to compute access include network accessibility (i.e. access to high bandwidth, low latency internet), access to data storage facilities, access to high quality ethically sourced data, and cyber security infrastructure. These all pose significant barriers to participation in AI development in resource constrained countries, barriers which might be lessened through infrastructure investment and/or remote access [10].

3.2.3 Project Support and Coordination. Democratising AI development is not just about providing resources and assuming that people will come. Effective input elicitation often benefits from dedicated project coordination and support.

For example, the BigScience project was a collaborative effort coordinated by the AI startup Hugging Face—another organisation dedicated to "democratising AI"—and funded by the French government to develop the large language model (LLM) BLOOM [31]. BLOOM was developed over the course of a year by a global coalition of over 1000 volunteer AI developers yielding an LLM functional in 46 languages. Similar collective efforts in other domains may also benefit from funding or other resources to support coordination.

3.2.4 Educational and Upskilling Opportunities. Democratisation of AI development can also be furthered by expanding the community of people capable of making contributions to AI design and development processes.

One option toward this end is for governments and large developer labs to invest in making educational and upskilling opportunities more widely available, especially for demographics traditionally underrepresented in AI developer communities. Investment in computer science and machine learning educational resources is, for instance, seen as an essential step for establishing AI talent pipelines and narrowing the 'AI divide' between the Global North and South [10].

3.2.5 Assistive Tools. Another option for expanding the community of prospective contributors is to lower barriers to participation in AI development activities by making it easier for people with minimal programming experience and little familiarity with machine learning to partake.

This might be done through the provision of tools that enable those with less experience and expertise to create and implement their own machine learning applications. For example, Microsoft [32], Google [33], H2O [34] and Amazon [35] have developed "no-code" tools that allow people to build models that are personalised to their own needs without prior coding or machine learning experience. In a similar vein, GitHub Copilot (powered by OpenAI Codex) is a generative AI system that can be used by less experienced developers to help write code [36].

4 DEMOCRATISATION OF AI PROFITS

A third sense of "AI democratisation" refers to democratising AI profits—which is about facilitating the broad and equitable distribution of value accrued to organisations that build and control advanced AI capabilities.

The notion is nicely articulated by Microsoft's CTO Kevin Scott: "I think we should have objectives around real democratisation of the technology. If the bulk of the value that gets created from AI accrues to a handful of companies in the West Coast of the United States, that is a failure" [11]. Though DeepMind does not employ "AI democratisation" terminology, CEO Demis Hassabis expresses a similar sentiment. As reported by TIME, Hassabis believes the wealth generated by advanced AI technologies should be redistributed. "I think we need to make sure that the benefits accrue to as many people as possible—to all of humanity, ideally" [38].

4.1 Goals

The goal is rather straightforward: equitably distribute profits generated by AI to ensure wealth and advantages conferred by AI improve human well-being across the board. A few sub-aims are: to avoid widening a socioeconomic divide between AI leading and lagging nations [10]; to ease the financial burden of job loss to automation; to smooth economic transition in case of rapid growth of the AI industry; and, when AI labs are able to voluntarily participate, to provide mechanisms for labs to powerfully demonstrate their commitment to pursuing advanced AI for the common good [39], [40]. Finally, profit democratisation acknowledges through compensation the human labour and creativity that underpins AI capabilities. Generative AI, in particular, unlocks economic value in training data that has been produced through centuries of human effort.

4.2 Methods

There are a variety of mechanisms by which AI profits might be more widely distributed or "democratised". Profits might be redistributed, for instance, via philanthropic giving, though philanthropy can be an inconsistent mechanism of wealth redistribution and, if not well-managed, may worsen inequalities and injustices [41].

Another option is for taxation and profit redistribution to be managed directly by the state [42]. For example, the provision of Universal Basic Income (UBI) has been suggested as a wealth distribution mechanism to help compensate for job loss to automation associated with more advanced AI capabilities [39], [43].

There is concern, however, that taxation methods may be insufficient given the potential of monopolised windfall profits to major AI labs. Accordingly, the proposed "Windfall Clause" offers a third, middle-ground approach [40]. AI firms that voluntarily adopt the Windfall Clause would be bindingly obliged to donate a meaningful portion of their profits when the firm's profits for the year exceed "a substantial fraction of the world's total economic output" (e.g. at least 1%). Those donations would then go to a "Distributor" charged with finding and funding effective welfare-maximising projects. Distributors might offer grants to philanthropic organisations, invest directly in infrastructure building projects, or direct funds to state governments for further distribution.

Finally, there is a question of if and how individual content creators can be compensated when their creative outputs (art, music, code, etc.) are used to train generative AI models [44]. One option is through the creation of licensed data sets [45]; content creators are compensated for permitting their content to be included in a catered data set that AI developers can then use to train and fine-tune their models without risk of copyright infringement. However, there is still an open question as to if and how further compensation should be provided as generative AI continues to produce value after it is trained. Here is perhaps where the more general profit redistribution schemes described above play an important role.

5 DEMOCRATISATION OF AI GOVERNANCE

Finally, some discussions about AI democratisation refer to democratising AI governance. AI governance decisions often involve balancing AI-related risks and benefits to determine if, how, and by whom AI should be used, developed, and shared. The democratisation of AI governance is about distributing influence over these decisions to a wider community of stakeholders and impacted populations. OpenAI CEO Sam Altman has expressed such a sentiment, writing, "We want the benefits of, access to, and governance of AGI to be widely and fairly shared" [46].

5.1 Goals

The overarching goal of the democratisation of AI governance is to ensure that decisions around questions such as AI usage, development, and profits reflect the will and preferences of the people being impacted [47]. In this sense, democratisation of AI governance arguably supersedes the previously discussed notions of democratisation. Decisions to democratise use, development, and profits derive their acceptability and desirability from the acceptance and desire of those who will be impacted.

Democratic processes such as referenda, citizen assemblies, and public hearings facilitate the representation of diverse and often conflicting beliefs, opinions, and values into decisions about how people and their actions are governed. Importantly, the desired result is not necessarily agreement among constituents that the best decision was made, but legitimacy—a state of acceptance that the decision-making process was fair and well-considered.

5.1.1 Reducing Unilateral Decision-making. Motivation for democratising AI governance often stems from concern that individual tech companies hold unchecked control over the future of a transformative technology and too much freedom to decide for themselves what constitutes acceptable tradeoffs between risks and benefits of choices around AI use, development, and distribution of profits. It is a worry exacerbated by concern that fierce competition between leading AI labs incentivises reckless decision-making [48].

A single actor in control of a powerful technology or resource can cause significant harm with an ill-considered decision. Consider, for example, the avoidable 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. It is one of the greatest environmental disasters in history and largely attributed to a series of cost cutting decisions made by BP including failure to implement proper risk control measures [49]. It is reasonable to assume that in the face of fierce competition and massive financial incentive that AI developers are also liable to make rash decisions about model development and release, the potential negative repercussions of which will only grow as AI capabilities improve [12], [13]. Therefore, it is perhaps unwise, as Stability AI CEO Emad Mostaque puts it, to have "a centralised, unelected entity controlling the most powerful technology in the world" [50]. Introducing democratic processes to enable checks and balances or collective decision-making around AI development, use, and release can potentially guard against ill-considered and potentially detrimental moves. Though Mostaque was justifying Stability AI's decision to open-source its models as a method of disseminating control over AI, not commenting on how or by whom such a high-stakes decision should be made.

5.1.2 Justice and Fairness. Another commonly articulated goal is to ensure the benefits and burdens of AI development and deployment are distributed justly and fairly.

It is widely documented that AI systems can replicate or even amplify racial and societal injustices [51], for example, through algorithmic bias in hiring [15], facial recognition [16], loan appraisal [18], and recidivism prediction applications [17]. Some AI misuse cases, such as voice cloning-based phishing, may also have a disproportionate effect on some populations over others [52].

Overall, facilitating the participation or representation of a wide array of stakeholders is seen as a crucial step towards mitigating AI associated injustices [53], [54]. It is to work towards a future for AI in which no communities are disproportionately harmed by development and use activities, and in which no communities are unfairly overlooked as possible beneficiaries of AI capabilities.

5.1.3 Navigating Complex Normative Challenges. The implementation of AI systems in public and private applications raises a variety of normative questions. Some are readily agreed upon such as the high-level assertion that human fatality should be avoided. But there are also many "hard normative questions" to which responses will likely differ depending on culture, context and other value priorities [55]. These challenges include, for example, establishing acceptable risk thresholds, interpreting high-level terms like the above mentioned "justice" and "fairness", and determining what values should underpin value-aligned AI [47]. Democratic discourse among diverse stakeholders may help distil areas of agreement or areas in which consensus forming practices are likely to be productive [47]. Inversely, and of equal importance, they might identify cases in which finer-grained details of interpretation and implementation can be determined at a context-specific, local level [55].

5.2 Methods

Even though it is already a subcategory of AI democratisation, the democratisation of AI governance is itself a broad and multifaceted concept, some forms of which may be more relevant or useful than others depending on the context [56].

One might speak, for instance, about the introduction of democratic processes to high-level AI policy formation at the national or international governance level or about more fine-grained AI design or deployment decisions made within individual labs [57]. "Democratic processes" can also refer to a variety of methods for eliciting citizen participation, ensuring substantive representation of stakeholder viewpoints, facilitating well-informed deliberation, holding fair and open election processes, or instituting constitutional protections for individuals and minorities [58].

In what follows, we briefly describe a variety of strategies that have been proposed to underpin democratically legitimate decision making about AI.

5.2.1 Harnessing Existing Democratic Structures. Democratic societies already have many tools and infrastructures in place to facilitate democratically legitimate decision-making about a variety of topics through e.g. legislation and regulation or multilateral standards. Harnessing and modifying effective structures already in place avoids redundancy and reinventing the wheel [57]. It has been proposed, for instance, that with some modification we might make use of procedures laid out by the European Union's standard-setting organisations (SSOs) to establish context-sensitive standards for safe and responsible AI [55]. We might also structure a new AI governing body after the United States' FDA (Federal Food and Drug Administration) [59].

While such efforts require minimal new infrastructure, they can, however, get bogged down in existing political quagmires, and are only applicable for decisions that remain within the borders of democratic societies.

5.2.2 Multistakeholder Bodies. Given the global impacts of many AI advances, there has been significant interest in the use of more inclusive processes for input and decision-making around AI. One option is through the formation of multistakeholder bodies to convene diverse, international perspectives for the purpose of navigating complex AI governance challenges. For example, the Partnership on AI (PAI)—a global coalition of academic, civil society, industry, and media organisations—has orchestrated initial non-binding agreements on generative AI across some relevant organisations [60]. There have also been proposals for smaller multistakeholder bodies to form the basis of ethical review boards for high risk AI application and model release decisions [24], [61].

5.2.3 Participatory Processes. Another strategy is to employ modern participatory processes to gather input from diverse populations

to guide AI governance decisions. Orchestrating large scale public participation can be cumbersome and costly, so much promising work focuses on exploring technical solutions such as deliberative tools and digital platforms [62] and generative voting applications [63] to improve the practicability and accessibility of participatory AI governance.

A disadvantage with a participatory approach to governance, however, is that those involved are generally self-selected as stakeholders, community members, or participants, and their outputs may thus only have a weak claim to democratic legitimacy.

5.2.4 Representative Deliberation. A strategy for addressing the challenges of both transnational AI impacts and self-selection is the use of representative deliberation [64], [65], building on heavily researched approaches to deliberative democracy [66]. Representative deliberation involves putting AI governance questions to a representative microcosm of the population of an impacted region, or even the global population (selected by sortition, i.e. stratified sampling) thus granting democratic legitimacy. As is common practice with citizen assemblies, the representative groups are provided access to experts and stakeholders to help inform their deliberations on more technical topics such as AI governance.

Representative deliberation is increasingly lauded by both governments [67] and multilateral bodies [68] as a valuable modern approach to democracy generally, and which has found footholds even in authoritarian and global contexts under the less threatening frame of deliberative governance [66], [69].

Companies developing AI systems that want to 'democratise their governance' can also delegate such decisions to representative deliberations, and often will have the incentive to do so in the face of competing stakeholder pressures [62], [65]. Meta, for example, has quietly run a set of national and transnational pilots [70] to navigate their 'complex normative challenges' and have since scaled up to a near-global deliberative process [71]. Twitter had also planned to pilot such processes before its acquisition [72].

Lighter weight variants of representative deliberations that build on the aforementioned modern participatory practices but in a representative fashion (e.g. using sortition) might also be used to provide a level of democratic legitimacy for less complex AI governance questions [62], [63].

6 CONCLUSION

This paper has outlined four different notions of "AI democratisation"—the democratisation of use, the democratisation of AI development, the democratisation of AI profits, and the democratisation of AI governance—and discussed numerous goals and methods of achieving each.

For the first three forms of democratisation, "democratisation" is used almost synonymously with "increasing accessibility". The democratisation of AI use and the democratisation of AI development are about making AI systems accessible for everyone to use or to contribute to their development, and the democratisation of AI profits is about distributing access to profits accrued through AI development and control. The democratisation of AI governance, however, is about balancing these questions of accessibility with other societal needs and values.

Sometimes decisions to democratise AI use, development, and profits will align with societal preferences (ideally determined through democratic processes), and sometimes those preferences will involve restrictions on access. Such is the case, for instance, with legal restrictions on certain medications, treaty restrictions on nuclear weapons, and regulation of labs containing potential hazards. The same may be true of decisions to restrict access to AI models for development or use purposes if risks of open model access are felt to outweigh the benefits.

We should therefore be wary of using the term "democratisation" too loosely or, as is often the case, as a stand-in for "all things good". The democratisation of AI use, AI development, and even AI derived profits are not inherently good. Their value is derived from alignment with interests and values of those who will be impacted. As such, where the democratically aligned decision would be to limit accessibility, the democratisation of AI governance takes precedence over the others as the source from which the moral and political value of the "democratisation" terminology is derived.

Perhaps the proper response to this paper, then, is to conclude that "AI Democratisation" is a (mostly) unfortunate term. As it is most commonly used within the AI community it refers to facilitating widespread AI use and development. However, invoking the term "democratisation" tells another story. It holds the hidden assumption that the decision to distribute or make accessible is what a democratic governance process would select. In other words, AI democratisation ultimately refers to the democratisation of AI governance. If by "AI democratisation" all a speaker means is "make available to everyone", then we would suggest less normatively loaded language (something like "broad accessibility") be used.

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Sociotechnical Harms of Algorithmic Systems: Scoping a Taxonomy for Harm Reduction

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ABSTRACT

Understanding the landscape of potential harms from algorithmic systems enables practitioners to better anticipate consequences of the systems they build. It also supports the prospect of incorporating controls to help minimize harms that emerge from the interplay of technologies and social and cultural dynamics. A growing body of scholarship has identified a wide range of harms across different algorithmic technologies. However, computing research and practitioners lack a high level and synthesized overview of harms from algorithmic systems. Based on a scoping review of computing research (n=172), we present an applied taxonomy of sociotechnical harms to support a more systematic surfacing of potential harms in algorithmic systems. The final taxonomy builds on and refers to existing taxonomies, classifications, and terminologies. Five major themes related to sociotechnical harms — representational, allocative, quality-of-service, interpersonal harms, and social system/societal harms — and sub-themes are presented along with a description of these categories. We conclude with a discussion of challenges and opportunities for future research.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Social and professional topics** → **Computing / technology policy**; • **General and reference** → **Evaluation**.

KEYWORDS

harms, AI, machine learning, scoping review

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1 INTRODUCTION

Harms from algorithmic systems — that is, the adverse lived experiences resulting from a system's deployment and operation in the world — occur through the interplay of technical system components and societal power dynamics [97]. This analysis considers how these "harms (not bounded by the parameters of the technical system)" can "travel through social systems (e.g., judicial decisions, policy recommendations, interpersonal lived experience, etc.)" [151, n.p.]. Computing research has traced how marginalized communities — referring to communities that face structural forms of social exclusion [130] — disproportionately experience sociotechnical harms from algorithmic systems [90, 96]. Such experiences include, but are not limited to, the inequitable distribution of resources [63], hierarchical representations of people and communities [156, 242], disparate performance based on identity categories [23, 143], and the entrenchment of social and economic inequalities [27, 84]. In this way, algorithmic systems' enactment of power dynamics [106, 162] can function as a minoritizing practice [64] through which unjust social hierarchies are reinforced.

Practitioners have sought to develop practices that better identify and minimize sociotechnical harms from algorithmic systems (e.g., [25, 62, 135, 144]). This includes work to taxonomize harms in HCI on digital safety [3, 193, 216], in sociolegal studies on technology-facilitated violence [109, 231], and canonical responsible ML research on representational, allocative [20], and quality-of-service harms [36] that have significantly shaped the responsible ML field

and standards development [146]. Alongside broader movements towards regulation and standardization [208], harm reduction practices often draw on fields of auditing, impact assessment, risk management, and safety engineering where a clear understanding of harm is essential [112]. Researchers have also developed "ethics methods" [150] for practitioners to identify and mitigate sociotechnical harms, including statistical assessment [135, 145], software toolkits [32], and algorithmic impact assessments and audits [178], providing notable benefit in how harms are anticipated and identified within algorithmic systems. Existing work on defining, taxonomizing, and evaluating harms from algorithmic systems, however, is vast and disparate, often focusing on particular notions of harm in narrow circumstances. As such, it presents navigational challenges for practitioners seeking to comprehensively evaluate a system for potential harms [178, 179, 182], particularly for large generative models that perform different tasks across many use cases. Moreover, the use of different terminologies for describing similar types of harm undermines effective communication across different stakeholder groups working on algorithmic systems [135, 159].

Recognizing these challenges, we conducted a scoping review [128] and reflexive thematic analysis [41] of literature on sociotechnical harms from algorithmic systems, offering a taxonomy to help practitioners and researchers consider them more systematically. A scoping review offers a generative starting place for a landscape harm taxonomy. The purpose of a scoping review is to map the state of a field [11, 128]; and here, provides a synthesis of existing articulations of harm, calls attention to forms of harm that may not be well-captured in regulatory frameworks, and reveals gaps and opportunities for future research. As scholarly articulations of harm emerge from different epistemic standpoints, values, and methodologies, this paper pursues the broader question of: How do computing researchers conceptualize harms in algorithmic systems? Three research questions guide this work:

(1) What harms are described in previous research on algorithmic systems? How are these harms framed in terms of their impacts across micro, meso, and macro levels of society? What social dynamics and hierarchies do researchers of algorithmic systems implicate in their descriptions of harms?
(2) Where is there conceptual alignment on types of harm from algorithmic systems? What type of organizational structure of harms is suggested by conceptual alignment?
(3) How do gaps or absences in research on sociotechnical harms suggest opportunities for future research?

This research contributes to computing scholarship and responsible AI communities, offering:

- A scoping review of harms, creating an organized snapshot of articulations of computational and contextual harms from algorithmic systems;
- A reflexive thematic analysis of harms definitions, their impacts to individuals, communities, and social systems, providing a framework for identifying harms when conducting impact and risk assessments on an algorithmic system;
- Support for interdisciplinary communication by providing terms, definitions, examples of harms, and directions for future work.

In what follows, we discuss the sociotechnical character of harms from algorithmic systems and existing harm taxonomies, followed by a description of our methodology (Section 3). We then detail the harm taxonomy (Section 4), and propose next steps for related work (Section 5). This analysis offers a starting place for practitioners and researchers to reflect on the myriad possible sociotechnical harms from algorithmic systems, to support proactive surfacing and harm reduction.

2 BACKGROUND

2.1 Sociotechnical Harms

Scholars in HCI, machine learning, Science and Technology Studies (STS), and related disciplines have identified various harms from digital technologies (e.g., [9, 121, 192, 193, 207]). This literature underscores harm as a relational outcome of entangled dynamics between design decisions, norms, and power [8, 27, 70, 148, 238], particularly along intersecting axes of gender [34, 197], race [106, 156], and disability [28, 29], among others. Harms from algorithmic systems emerge through the interplay of technical systems and social factors [35, 90] and can encode systemic inequalities [36, 141, 143, 213]. This duplicity of technology, as Ruha Benjamin [27] explains, is a challenge: algorithms may have beneficial uses, but they often adopt the default norms, and power structures of society.

Recognizing the sociotechnical character of harms from algorithmic systems draws attention to how the development and experience of digital technologies cannot be separated from cultural and social dynamics [7, 60, 172, 175]. As van Es et al. [224, n.p.] note, "algorithms and code reduce the complexity of the social world into a set of abstract instructions on how to deal with data and inputs coming from a messier reality." This process involves design decisions predicated on "selection, reduction, and categorization" [39] through which technologies come to reflect the values of certain worldviews [39, 212]. Without intentionally designing for equity, algorithmic systems reinforce and amplify social inequalities [60].

2.1.1 Identifying and anticipating harms in practice. With increased awareness of the need to anticipate harms early in product development [195], designers and researchers are central actors in pursuing harm reduction [40, 58, 97]. Anticipating harms requires considering how technological affordances shape their use and impact [86, 200]. It can be done in relation to the technology holistically or with a focus on certain features of the technology and its use by different groups [43]. This work requires thinking critically about the distribution of benefits and harms of algorithmic systems [33, 169] and existing social hierarchies [35]. It can be strengthened by bringing in different standpoints and epistemologies, such as feminism [73, 155], value-based design [17, 88, 116], design justice perspectives [60], and post-colonial theories [126, 148]. Importantly, the process requires attending to the constitutive role of social power in producing sociotechnical harms; "designers need to identify and struggle with, alongside the ongoing conversations about biases in data and code, to understand why algorithmic systems tend to become inaccurate, absurd, harmful, and oppressive" [7, p. 2]. Thus, in anticipating harms, practitioners need to account for computational harms as well as those arising through contextual use [40, 164, 191, 236].

2.2 Taxonomies of Harm, Risk, and Failure

Structured frameworks can aid practitioners' anticipation of harms throughout the product lifecycle [135, 239]. They encourage more rigorous analysis of social and ethical considerations [135], especially when operationalizing principles seems opaque [147]. Taxonomizing harms is, however, an exercise in classification, which has potential limitations: taxonomies can draw action to some issues over others, shaping how people navigate and act on information [39]. As such, the epistemological choices made in developing harm taxonomies focus attention on certain areas over others [40].

Many existing harm taxonomies address particular domains of use (e.g., [193, 217]) and how they are complex assemblages of actors, norms, practices, and technical systems, which can foster individual and collective harm [174]. Taxonomies have been developed related to online content [19, 193, 227], social media [157, 217, 218], users "at-risk" for experiencing online abuse [216, 234], and malicious uses of algorithmic systems [45], including cyber attacks [3] and cyberbullying [12]. Relatedly, they can focus on particular types of harms, such as misinformation [218] or representational harms co-produced through image tagging system inputs and outputs that reinforce social hierarchies [121, 228]. While domain-specific taxonomies draw attention to how context informs the emergent nature of harm, they are not easily applicable to a wide range of algorithmic systems. Many systems deploy across contexts, including, for example, ranking and recommendation systems (e.g., search engines or content sorting algorithms on social media platforms) and object detection models (e.g., video surveillance systems, self-driving cars, and accessibility technology).

Another common approach is to orient harm taxonomies around specific algorithmic or model functions (e.g., [83, 235]). Model-focused taxonomies have been developed for large language models [235], image captioning systems [121, 228], and so-called "foundational models," such as GPT-3 and BERT, which are applied in a wide range of downstream tasks [37]. Organizing harm by model function is highly useful when practitioners' focus is on a singular model because it draws attention to relevant computational concerns. It does, however, pose limitations to practitioners working downstream on products and features, where multiple model types operate simultaneously, such as in social media, search engines, and content moderation, and where contextual use significantly shapes potential harms.

Scholars have developed harm taxonomies related to system misbehaviors and failures [18, 198], particularly to aid algorithmic auditing [177]. These taxonomies focus on how algorithmic systems are sources of harm (e.g., faulty input/outputs, limited testing, proxy discrimination, and surveillance capitalism) [203]. Bandy [18] summarizes four problematic behaviors of algorithmic systems — discrimination, distortion, exploitation, and misjudgement. Using such taxonomies focus attention to how specific affordances, training data, and design choices can co-produce harm [22, 40]. Failure-based taxonomies are helpful when practitioners examine potential failure modes of a specific technology, but are often limited in terms of helping to anticipate who or what is harmed.

In sum, taxonomies can be helpful tools for appreciating and assessing how harms from algorithmic systems are sociotechnical. As they retain social and technical elements, they cannot be remedied by technical fixes [94] alone. They require social and cultural change [171]. The proposed taxonomy provides a holistic and systematic view of the current discourse on types of sociotechnical harms from algorithmic systems. As the scope of the taxonomy we propose is broad, and many topic- or application- specific taxonomies exist already, we refer to and build on these existing works when appropriate.

3 METHODOLOGY

In alignment with prior calls to anticipate computational and contextual harms [40, 151], we synthesize insights on harms from computing research to aid anticipation of sociotechnical harms from algorithmic systems. Our findings draw on a scoping review for data collection and a reflexive thematic analysis of computing research on harms.

3.1 Overview of Methodology

Our approach followed prior scoping reviews in HCI literature [74, 223], in alignment with the extension of the PRISMA checklist [133], the PRISMA-ScR (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic reviews and Meta-Analyses extension for Scoping Reviews) [220]. Scoping studies, as a knowledge synthesis methodology, map existing literature, and "clarify working definitions and conceptual boundaries of a topic or field" [168, p. 141]. They are especially appropriate when distilling and sharing research findings with practitioners [221], and are suited to identifying evidence on a topic and presenting it visually. Compared to systematic reviews, scoping reviews address a broader range of topics and incorporate different study designs [11]. A scoping review is an effective method for surfacing current "priorities for research, clarifying concepts and definitions, providing research frameworks or providing background, or contextual information on phenomena or concepts" [65, p. 2104]. We implemented a five-stage scoping review framework [11, 128]: (1) Identifying research questions; (2) Identifying relevant studies; (3) Study selection; (4) Charting the data; and (5) Collating, summarizing, and reporting results.

3.1.1 Identify research questions. To identify the types and range of sociotechnical harms, we developed the three aforementioned research questions (see: Section 1).

3.1.2 Identify and select relevant studies. We then employed multiple strategies to identify relevant resources through different sources: electronic scholarly databases, a citations-based review, and targeted keyword searches in relevant organizations, and conferences. Using the ACM Guide to Computing Literature as the primary search system – which reflects key computing research databases – we developed the following initial set of key concepts to search full text and metadata: "algorithmic harm", "sociotechnical harm", "AI harm", "ML harm", "data harm", "harm(s) taxonomy, "allocative harm", and "representational harm." Within scoping review methodology, keyword search strategies should be devised to surface relevant literature [11] and include terms common to the field [101]. We included allocative and representational harm as search terms because of their conceptual dominance in machine learning literature since 2017, popularized by responsible ML scholars (e.g.,

[20, 63]), enabling us to surface relevant literature in that sub-field. Iterative searching is a feature of scoping reviews [65]. Next, we reviewed each paper, and conducted a citations-based review to surface additional references (e.g., gray literature by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)) that materially discuss harms, but may not use the specific terminology of the search terms. The citations-based review revealed highly-cited cross-disciplinary scholarship (e.g., articles from sociology, STS). Lastly, we relied on existing knowledge and networks to surface additional sources, including IEEE, NIST, Data and Society, the Aspen Institute, and the AI Incident Database.

Paper identification started February 2022. The initial search of the ACM database produced a set of 85 research articles (duplicates removed from 118 papers). The citations-based review and targeted keyword searches of NGO and professional organization outputs identified an additional 125 resources. We included articles that described or discussed: (1) algorithmic technologies and (2) harms or adverse impacts from algorithmic systems. We excluded 38 articles that: (1) did not meet the inclusion criteria, and (2) did not have full-text available. In total, 172 articles and frameworks were included in our corpus (see: Appendix Figure 2 and Table 7).

3.1.3 Data charting. We employed a descriptive-analytical method for charting data – a process of "synthesizing and interpreting qualitative data by sifting, charting and sorting material according to key issues and themes" [11, p. 26]. Two researchers independently charted the following data items extracted through reading of the full text of each source and organized them into a spreadsheet: (1) characteristics of sources: publication year and venue; and (2) description of harm: definition or conceptual framing. Discovery of a new concept or type of harm resulted in a new code, and repeat encounters with existing concepts or harms were documented to reach theoretical saturation – a point at which coding additional papers or resources do not yield additional themes [107, 190]. It is difficult to know when to stop searching for new sources when conducting a review [101]. Thus, relying on scoping reviews' iterative characteristic [168], we used theoretical saturation as a signal to stop sourcing new papers. The entire corpus was coded. Data charting concluded July 2022.

3.1.4 Collating and summarizing results. As collation of themes requires synthesis and qualitative analysis of articles, we used Braun and Clarke's reflexive thematic analysis [41, 42], a post-positivist approach to analysis that acknowledges researchers' standpoints influence data interpretation and encourages self-reflection. Within reflexive thematic analysis, coding is iterative as researchers are immersed in the data. As coding is an evolving, self-reflective process in reflexive thematic analysis, the authors engaged in deep data immersion, interpretation, and discussion, including sharing points of disagreement. First, we thematically sorted definitions of code and looked at the frequency at which harm definitions appeared to begin to identify dominant terms and definitions. Then, we conducted a first line-by-line pass reviewing associated phrasing and terminology of each specific kind of harm. In this initial phase, we identified codes that could be easily condensed. For instance, 'physical harm' and 'physical injury' were condensed into one code: physical harm. We then began to cluster harms based on the context or domain in which they were mentioned. For example, specific harms describing forms of harassment (e.g., non-consensual sharing of explicit images, or online stalking) were clustered under an initial theme of "hate, harassment, and violence." There were many conceptual overlaps among harm types; definitions were not always consistent. If there was a dominant term or definition in the cluster that could encompass different sub-types of harm (based on frequency of citation), that term was chosen as the primary category. Notably, we identified and coded more than one type of harm for approximately 80% of the articles in the corpus.

As RQ2 seeks to uncover where there was conceptual alignment across computing sub-fields, initial decisions about harm type and sub-type naming were made after raw coding the entire corpus and discussing emergent themes. From this clustering, and as we iterate from initial codes to final themes, we developed a first version of the harm taxonomy. Three of these harm types — allocative, representational, and quality-of-service — reflect where there was strong definitional and terminological consensus in pioneering responsible ML literature (see: [20, 63, 228]). As we iterated from initial codes to final themes we chose to anchor to these canonical harm types in alignment with the RQs. Social system harms and interpersonal harms took shape through the collating and summarizing process. Here, some of the sub-harm types, such as technology-facilitated violence [109] and information harms [232] are existing and well-established concepts/terms in different computing sub-fields to which we anchored in alignment with RQ2. See the Appendix for further details on the methodology and descriptive statistics of the corpus.

In scoping reviews, collating and summarizing findings requires researchers to make choices about what they want to prioritize. As the guiding purpose of this research was to develop an applied taxonomy, we prioritized keeping the number of major categories comprehensive yet manageable, envisioning a practitioner with minimal knowledge of harms as the primary user. With the goal of making the taxonomy accessible to practitioners with different disciplinary backgrounds, we repeated this process of clustering and synthesizing three times, refining language and examples of harms to ensure clarity and conceptual cohesion.

Importantly, while we have aligned to canonical concepts we found definitional variability within and across computing sub-fields, illuminating how understandings of harm are not rigidly fixed and can shift based on sub-field, context of use, technology type, and the evolving state of knowledge. Our descriptions of harm types and sub-types reflect the rich variability that exists in the broader field and is not intended to usurp specific harm definitions that hold specific meaning in different domains (e.g., law, engineering, policy, community work). As such this taxonomy navigates the challenging task of synthesizing multidisciplinary computing research with different priorities and concerns.

3.2 Limitations

In seeking to map how computing researchers conceptualize sociotechnical harms in algorithmic systems, our scoping review focused on academic outlets. The findings are reflective of existing scholarly knowledge for a particular bounded time period. Like all knowledge systems, computing research scholarship is not neutral; it is shaped by various influences, including researcher and institutional priorities, access to resources, thematic conferences, and

Figure 1: Sociotechnical harms taxonomy overview.

targeted calls that advance research in specific areas. Focusing on scholarly literature also means vital community-based advocacy addressing the design and use of algorithmic systems is not reflected in the citations. Surveying such work is an important and fruitful direction for future research.

In alignment with feminist standpoint theory [103, 104], we prioritize articulations of harm voiced by marginalized communities when possible and foreground these in our descriptions of harm in the taxonomy. We acknowledge articulations of harm described in computing scholarship may derive from work with individuals and communities who describe harms in ways that differ from scholarly discourse. Indeed, there may be many types of harm that are not recognized or articulated in scholarship. As research literatures are always partial and in-progress, the harms described in our taxonomy reflect the partial and in-progress nature of the field. These dynamics are especially relevant to the study of emergent technologies, where individual, collective, and societal impacts of these technologies may be anticipated but not fully known. We also acknowledge the literature reviewed here aligns primarily with Eurocentric worldviews, which undoubtedly shape the descriptions of harms. We are attentive to how these absences likely persist in our taxonomy, having engaged in discussion around how perceived and real gaps in the taxonomy should motivate future research.

Lastly, the potential benefits of structuring knowledge on sociotechnical harm fosters a paradox: while the taxonomy aids more systematic analysis and minimizes the limitation of relying on the mental models of those at the "decision-making table," it arguably can hinder practitioners' imagination. These kinds of politics related to knowledge creation have been long critiqued in STS [53, 91, 102, 104]. Without continued and active critical reflection, this taxonomy — or any structured process the taxonomy is incorporated into — can divert attention away from other possible harms. While we expect understandings of sociotechnical harm will continue to evolve, we encourage those working in this field to retain their critical imagination in considering novel harms.

4 TAXONOMY OF SOCIOTECHNICAL HARMS

Our thematic analysis brings together five major types of sociotechnical harms reflective of micro-, meso-, and macro-level impacts of algorithmic systems (see Figure 1 and Appendix Table 6). These categories emphasize (1) how socially constructed beliefs and unjust hierarchies about social groups are reflected in model inputs and outputs (*representational harms*); (2) how these representations shape model decisions and their distribution of resources (*allocative harms*); (3) how choices made to optimize models for particular imagined users result in performance disparities (*quality-of-service harms*); (4) how technological affordances adversely shape relations between people and communities (*interpersonal harms*); and (5) how algorithmic systems impact the emergent properties of social systems, leading to increased inequity and destabilization (*social system*). As our main aim is to provide a cohesive taxonomy for the community, wherever possible, we sought to build on and refer to existing taxonomies, classifications, and terminologies rather than to re-invent new terms. Notably, important concepts such as tech-facilitated violence [109, 142], coercive control [80], disinformation and misinformation [232], and environmental harms [24] are well-established terms studied in-depth within different computing sub-fields but often alienated from other harms literature.

In developing a framework that supports more systematic analysis of potential harms in algorithmic systems, we recognize the complex and often concurrent ways harms are experienced. Conceptualizations of harm do not always fit neatly within a compartmentalized structure. Accordingly, there may be gray areas within and across harm categories, and multiple harms may occur in a single use case or system. This taxonomy is thus not prescriptive in its ordering of harms. In suggesting its use as a tool, we encourage considering the multiple dimensions in which harms may play out rather than isolating them. In what follows, we discuss each major harm classification, including sub-types and how they emerge through the interplay of technical components and social dynamics.

4.1 Representational Harms: Unjust Hierarchies in Technology Inputs and Outputs

In our initial coding of the corpus, we located 14 different kinds of representational harms; through the thematic analysis we decided these were analogous to an existing taxonomy on representational harm of image tagging [121]. For terminological consistency of the community, we choose to use the same phrasing of the sub-types presented in [121]. In this section, we describe representational harms and its sub-types from a broader algorithmic systems perspective.

Katzman and colleagues describe representational harms as beliefs about different social groups that reproduce unjust societal hierarchies [121]. These harms occur when algorithmic systems reinforce the subordination of social groups along the lines of identity, such as disability, gender, race and ethnicity, religion, and sexuality [22]. Representational harms include instances where certain social groups experience both over- and under-exposure [27], leading to unequal visibility [242]. Prior work identifies representational harms in many algorithmic systems, including through classifiers [46], natural language processing [35], computer vision [28, 48, 244]. Representational harms reflect assumptions that algorithmic systems make about people, culture, and experiences, which perpetuate normative narratives that adversely shape people's sense of identity and belonging [118]. Andalibi and Garcia [8] characterize the lived experience of representational harms as *algorithmic symbolic annihilation* through which normative narratives built into technologies become power structures that shape people's experiences with algorithms. The communities likely to experience these harms are those already experiencing social marginalization. Representational harms thus entrench and exacerbate social stereotypes and patterns of erasure [26]. Specific dimensions of representational harm include stereotyping, demeaning, erasing, and alienating social groups, denying people the opportunity to self-identify, and reifying essentialist social categories (Table 1). See Appendix Table 8 for the full list of articles in the corpus that also articulate this harm type.

Table 1: Representational harms

Harm Sub-Type	Example
Stereotyping social groups	"Exclusionary norms [in language models] can manifest in 'subtle patterns' like referring to women doctors as if doctor itself entails not-woman" [235, p. 216]
Demeaning social groups	"A greater percentage of [online] ads having "arrest" in ad text appeared for Black identifying first names than for white identifying first names in searches" [213, p. 13]
Erasing social groups	"I'm in a lesbian partnership right now and wanting to get married and envisioning a wedding [...] and I'm so sick of [searching for 'lesbian wedding' and seeing] these straight weddings" [71, p. 13]
Alienating social groups	"[Lack of representation] further promotes the idea that you don't belong and perpetuates the sense of alienation" [71, p. 8]
Denying people opportunity to self-identify	"It's definitely frustrating having [classifiers] get integral parts of my identity wrong. And I find it frustrating that these sorts of apps only tend to recognize two binary genders" [28, p. 12]
Reifying essentialist social categories	"[Automatic gender recognition] aim(s) to capture the morphological sexual differences between male and female faces by comparing their shape differences to a defined face template. We assume that such differences change with the face gender" (quoted in [123, p. 8])

4.1.1 Stereotyping social groups. Stereotyping in an algorithmic system refers to how the system's outputs reflect "beliefs about the characteristics, attributes, and behaviors of members of certain groups....and about how and why certain attributes go together" [110, p. 240]. People marginalized in society face numerous explicit and implicit stereotypes conveyed in various forms of data and coding schema [165] and design choices [34] that drive algorithmic systems. Stereotyping often reflects repeated patterns of over- and under-representation — for instance, how gendered beliefs about women's submissiveness are reflected in digital assistants [50, 210, 231]. Research identifies narrow stereotypes about masculinity and femininity represented and expressed in natural language processing and computer vision systems, particularly in relation to professions [122], cooking and shopping [244], and sport [48]. While computing literature often describes stereotyping along single-axis dimensions of identity [48, 244], an intersectional approach draws attention to how harms play out for people whose lives are shaped by interlocking forms of oppression [46, 229] – for example, when a search for the term "unprofessional hairstyles" disproportionately returns images of Black women [6, n.p.].

4.1.2 Demeaning social groups. In 2013, Latanya Sweeney [213] drew attention to how algorithmic systems can lead to demeaning treatment of certain social groups. This harm sub-type was also popularized by Safiya Noble in *Algorithms of Oppression* [156]. Wang et al. describe demeaning of social groups to occur when they are "cast as being lower status and less deserving of respect" [228, p. 5]. This type of representational harm speaks to what sociologist Patricia Hill Collins [57] calls *controlling images*, referring to discourses, images, and language used to marginalize or oppress a social group. Controlling images include forms of human-animal confusion in image tagging systems [225], which reflect dehumanizing gendered and racialized discourses used to socially exclude and control Black, Indigenous, and other people of color [95]. Such controlling images have appeared in ranking and retrieval systems, including reinforcing false perceptions of criminality by displaying ads for bail bond businesses when searching for Black-sounding versus white-sounding names [213]. Similarly, patterns of demeaning imagery have been found in hateful natural language predictions about Muslim people [1], and toxicity and sentiment classifiers that are more likely to classify descriptions or mentions of disabilities [113, 213] and LGBTQ identities [215, 237] as toxic or negative. As these identities are often weaponized, models struggle with the social nuance and context required to distinguish between hateful and non-hateful speech [237].

4.1.3 Erasing social groups. Katzman et al. describe that in the context of image tagging, erasing social groups refers to "when a system fail to recognize—and ... fails to correctly tag people belonging [to] specific social groups or attributes and artifacts that are bound up with the identities of those groups" [121, p. 3-4]. For algorithmic systems more broadly, the erasure of social groups would mean that people, attributes, or artifacts associated with specific social groups are systematically absent or under-represented. Whereas stereotyping reflects systematic patterns of over- and

under-representation, erasure captures its extremes. In instances of erasure, certain social groups are not legible to algorithmic systems. Erasure, as Dosono and Semaan [78, p. 1] describe, reflects a kind of algorithmic hegemony, as the dominant "system of ideas, practices, and social relations that permeate the institutional and private domains of society" become normalized in sociotechnical systems. Design choices [143] and training data [212] influence which people and experiences are legible to an algorithmic system. Prior work examines erasure in the context of misgendering [68, 123], the systematic erasure of transgender and non-binary people [68, 123], disability and ableism in image descriptions [28], and the marginalization of non-Western and underrepresented religious identities in systems [121].

4.1.4 Alienating social groups. Katzman et al. describe alienating as "when an image tagging system does not acknowledge the relevance of someone's membership in a specific social group to what is depicted in one or more images." [121, p. 4]. We did not find other work in our corpus that articulate this harm sub-type. This dimension of representational harm diminishes human dignity [139] and is especially likely when "a system fails to recognize the injustices suffered by specific social groups" [121, p. 4]. A study of user-elicited identification of harms in image search describes the impacts of such failures as "further promot[ing] the idea that you don't belong and perpetuat[ing] a sense of alienation" [71, p. 8].

4.1.5 Denying people the opportunity to self-identify. Another way algorithmic systems present representational harm is through the complex and non-traditional ways in which humans are represented and classified automatically, and often at the cost of autonomy loss [54, 165]. As Katzman et al. expresses, in image classification contexts, this means to classify people's membership without their knowledge or consent [121], such as categorizing someone who identifies as non-binary into a gendered category they do not belong [229]. This dimension of representational harm reduces autonomy [100] that undermines people's ability to disclose aspects of their identity on their own terms [59]. This loss of autonomy reduces people's control over data collection, through which data about people, their bodies, and presumptions about their behavior can be extracted into big data flows [73]. As classification systems are used across many consequential domains, denying opportunities to self-identify can materially impact marginalized communities, ranging from nonconsensual inclusion in datasets to surveillance and wrongful arrest [28].

4.1.6 Reifying essentialist social categories. Our analysis of the corpus surfaced a type of harm that reinforce social categories as natural, or reinforces perceived classifications of people as truths (see Appendix Table 8). Broadening existing narrower description of this sub-type harm [21, 121], algorithmic systems that reify essentialist social categories can be understood as when systems that classify a person's membership in a social group based on narrow, socially constructed criteria that reinforce perceptions of human difference as inherent, static and seemingly natural [69, 123]. Reifying essentialist categories can contribute to "existential harm" in which people are "portrayed in overly reductive terms" [186, p. 162], often from a Western or Eurocentric perspective [69]. When such classification relies on phenotypes, this dimension of representational harm essentializes historically contingent identities [85] through which classification systems entrench and produce meaning about what they represent [100, 111]. The harms of reifying social categories are especially likely when ML models or human raters classify a person's attributes – for instance, their gender, race, or sexual orientation – by making assumptions based on their physical appearance.

4.2 Allocative Harms: Inequitable Distribution of Resources

Allocative harms were first discussed in the ML community by Solon Barocas, Kate Crawford, Aaron Shapiro, and Hanna Wallach (see: [20, 63]) and subsequently popularized by Virginia Eubanks in *Automating Inequality* [84]. Our corpus included 11 thematic codes for allocative harms, which encompass problems arising from how algorithmic decisions are distributed unevenly to different groups of people [22, 183]. These harms occur when a system withholds information, opportunities, or resources [22] from historically marginalized groups in domains that affect material well-being [146], such as housing [47], employment [201], social services [15, 201], finance [117], education [119], and healthcare [158]. Allocative harms "arc towards existing patterns of power" [66, p. 2] as they entrench material divisions between social groups [243]. When occurring in consequential domains, these harms reflect what Mimi Onuhoha [161, n.p.] describes as algorithmic violence, in which algorithmic systems "prevent people from meeting their basic needs." Scholarly literature describes two specific dimensions of allocative harm — opportunity loss and economic loss — reflecting and reinforcing existing social hierarchies along axes of disability, gender, race, or sexuality among others (Table 2). See Appendix Table 9 for the full list of articles in the corpus that also articulate this harm type.

4.2.1 Opportunity loss. The results of our analysis indicate a subtype of allocative harms that are conceptually captured by the term "opportunity loss" presented in a talk by Crawford (cited [22, n.p.]). Opportunity loss occurs when algorithmic systems enable disparate access to information and resources needed to equitably participate in society, including the withholding of housing through targeting ads based on race [10] and social services along lines of class [84]. Researchers contextualize how opportunity loss arises through algorithmic systems and existing patterns of inequality. In relation to housing, for instance, when advertisers target ads based on race and ethnicity, they provide minoritized people fewer options and opportunities to purchase or rent homes [10]. In the employment domain, recommender or ranking systems that match employers and potential candidates may prioritize the resumes of men over other genders [201, 224]. Relatedly, these systems may "codify algorithmic segregation" whereby Black candidates are systematically matched to Black-owned businesses and white candidates are systematically matched to white-owned businesses [241, p. 704]. In the government or social services domain, screening tools to identify children at-risk for maltreatment can amplify already-existing biases against poor parents [84, 241].

Table 2: Allocative harms

Harm Sub-Type	Example
Opportunity loss	"Systems…wrongfully deny welfare benefits, kidney transplants, and mortgages to individuals of color as compared to white counterparts" [61, p. 2]
Economic loss	"Language models may generate content that is not strictly in violation of copyright but harms artists by capitalizing on their ideas…this may undermine the profitability of creative or innovative work" [235, p. 221]

4.2.2 Economic loss. Apart from the loss of opportunity, many articles in our dataset articulate the loss of resources that have negative economic implications (see Appendix Table 9). We refer to these collectively as economic loss. Economic loss is often entwined with opportunity loss, though it relates directly to financial harms [52, 160] co-produced through algorithmic systems, especially as they relate to lived experiences of poverty and economic inequality. This harm reinforces "feedback loops" between existing socioeconomic inequalities and algorithmic systems [76, p. 14]. Researchers recognize economic loss as a harm that intersects with gendered, racialized, and globalized inequalities [13]. It may arise through different technologies, including demonetization algorithms that parse content titles, metadata, and text, and it may penalize words with multiple meanings [51, 81], disproportionately impacting queer, trans, and creators of color [81]. Differential pricing algorithms, where people are systematically shown different prices for the same products, also leads to economic loss [55]. These algorithms may be especially sensitive to feedback loops from existing inequities related to education level, income, and race, as these inequalities are likely reflected in the criteria algorithms use to make decisions [22, 163].

4.3 Quality-of-Service Harms: Performance Disparities Based on Identity

In our initial coding of the corpus, we located 10 different articulations of quality-of-service harms. Performance disparities across different user groups have been widely discussed as a concern in the machine learning community (e.g., [132, 214]). Bird et al. refers to these as quality-of-service harms [32]. These harms occur when algorithmic systems disproportionately underperform for certain groups of people along social categories of difference such as disability, ethnicity, gender identity, and race. DeVries et al. outline that these harms reflect how system training data are optimized for dominant groups [72]. Prior work has described how quality-of-service harms are especially likely when system inputs rely on biometric data (e.g., facial features, skin tone, or voice), such as computer vision [46, 176], natural language processing [113, 131, 173], and speech recognition systems [124, 143]. Quality-of-service harms are often conceptualized as experiences of directly interacting with an algorithmic system that fails based on identity characteristics, resulting in feelings of alienation, increased labor, and service or benefit loss (see Table 3). See Appendix Table 10 for the full list of articles in the corpus that also articulate this harm type.

4.3.1 Alienation. Alienation generally refers to "an individual's feeling of uneasiness or discomfort which reflects [one's] exclusion or self-exclusion from social and cultural participation. It is an expression of non-belonging or non-sharing, an uneasy awareness or perception of unwelcome contrast with others" [99, p. 758-759]. Whereas alienation as a form of representational harm diminishes human dignity and the sense of non-belonging (see Section 4.1.4), our corpus also surfaced alienation as a quality-of-service harm. In this sub-type, alienation is the specific self-estrangement experienced at the time of technology use, typically surfaced through interaction with systems that under-perform for marginalized individuals [143] or reinforce social alienation between humans [34]. In their work on automatic speech recognition systems, Mengesha et al. describe this harm as feelings of annoyance, disappointment, frustration, or anger when interacting with technologies that do not recognize one's identity characteristics: "Because of my race and location, I tend to speak in a certain way that some voice technology may not comprehend. When I don't speak in my certain dialect, I come to find out that there is a different result in using voice technology" [143, p. 5]. Research on trans and queer people's experiences with voice activated assistants, for instance, describes an awareness of limited representation, noting these technologies "were not designed for trans/or queer people" [184, p. 8]. Similarly, content creators from marginalized communities describe feelings of alienation as they navigate what Duffy and Meisner [81] refer to as *algorithmic invisibility*, whereby topics important to marginalized communities are rendered invisible by content moderation algorithms.

4.3.2 Increased labor. In our corpus, certain types of harm surfaced in the form of increased burden (e.g., time spent) or effort required by members of certain social groups to make systems or products work as well for them as others. Research on automatic speech recognition, for instance, has found substantial disparities in word error rates between Black and white speakers (0.35 and 0.19 respectively) [124]. Similar disparities have been found relative to sociolect [5], gender [5, 214], age [132], and region [5], among others. To correct for these limitations, speakers have to modify their speech to meet system expectations through linguistic accommodation [143].

4.3.3 Service or benefit loss. Service or benefit loss is the degraded or total loss of benefits of using algorithmic systems with inequitable system performance based on identity [143]. Accommodating technology shortcomings limits the potential benefits of technologies. However, when technologies with performance disparities are used in consequential domains — such as in job application videos — degraded service can not only stigmatize users but also lead to other types of harm, such as allocative harms [140].

4.4 Interpersonal Harms: Algorithmic Affordances Adversely Shape Relations

We initially located 66 thematic codes that we ultimately categorize broadly as interpersonal harms. Interpersonal harms capture instances when algorithmic systems adversely shape relations between people or communities. As algorithmic systems mediate interactions between people and institutions, interpersonal harms do not necessarily emerge from direct interactions between people, as is the more classic understanding of interpersonal relations,

Table 3: Quality-of-Service harms

Harm Sub-Type	Example
Alienation	"It [voice technology] needs to change because it doesn't feel inclusive when I have to change how I speak and who I am, just to talk to technology" [143, p. 8]
Increased labor	"I modify the way I talk to get a clear and concise response. I feel at times, voice recognition isn't programmed to understand people when they're not speaking in a certain way" [143, p. 7]
Service/benefit loss	"It conveyed the opposite message than what I had originally intended, and cost somebody else a lot (of time)" [143, p. 4]

but can emerge through the power dynamics of productionized ML models [108]. Like other sociotechnical harms, existing power asymmetries and patterns of structural inequality constitutively shape them. They have an intrapersonal element, however, through which people feel a diminished sense of self and agency. Prior work on algorithmic systems describe different types of interpersonal harm, including agency loss, technology-facilitated violence, diminished health and well-being, and privacy violations (Table 4). See Appendix Table 11 for the full list of articles in the corpus that articulate this harm type.

4.4.1 Loss of agency or control. Loss of agency occurs when the use [123, 137] or abuse [142] of algorithmic systems reduces autonomy. One dimension of agency loss is algorithmic profiling [138], through which people are subject to social sorting and discriminatory outcomes to access basic services [189]. Algorithmic profiling is amplified when there is insufficient ability to contest or remedy the decisions of algorithmic systems [10, 67, 205]. As algorithms increasingly curate the flows of information in digital spaces (i.e., recommender systems), Karizat, Delmonaco, Eslami, and Andalibi [118, p. 20] describe how the presentation of content may lead to "algorithmically informed identity change… including [promotion of] harmful person identities (e.g., interests in white supremacy, disordered eating, etc.)." Similarly, for content creators, desire to maintain visibility or prevent shadow banning, may lead to increased conforming of content [215].

4.4.2 Technology-facilitated violence. Technology-facilitated violence occurs when algorithmic features enable use of a system for harassment and violence [2, 16, 44, 80, 108], including creation of non-consensual sexual imagery in generative AI. Gender violence scholars have uncovered how algorithmic technologies can become conduits for stalking [87, 108], online sexual harassment and assault (e.g., sharing images of sexual coercion and violence, sextortion) [44], and coercive control backed by the threat of violence (e.g., accessing accounts, impersonating a partner, doxxing, sharing sexualized content) [80]. For example, abusers may misuse Wi-Fi enabled devices, including locking out and controlling devices to terrorize and harass users [44, 167], or use technology to generate or share non-consensual sexually explicit images [15, 142]. Beyond gender violence, other facets of technology-facilitated violence, include doxxing [79], trolling [14], cyberstalking [14], cyberbullying [14, 98, 204], monitoring and control [44], and online harassment and intimidation [98, 192, 199, 226], under the broader banner of online toxicity [98, 136]. Technology-facilitated violence leads to co-occurring harms, including feelings of distress, fear, and humiliation [44], while often infringing personal and bodily integrity, dignity, and privacy and inhibiting autonomy and expression [142].

4.4.3 Diminished health and well-being. Algorithmic systems can lead to diminished health and well-being of human users. Our corpus attribute the myriad sources of this harm including from algorithmic behavioral exploitation [18, 209], emotional manipulation [202] whereby algorithmic designs exploit user behavior, safety failures involving algorithms (e.g., collisions) [67], and when systems make incorrect health inferences [158]. They can lead to both physical harms [71, 79, 139, 181] emotional harms, such as distress [235], dignity loss [44, 139], misgendering [123], and reputational harms [152, 181]. Diminished health and well-being may accompany other identified sociotechnical harms – for example, experiences of representational harms, including algorithmic annihilation [8] or the internalization of stereotypes may spark other emotional or psychological effects, such as "epistemic doubt" [231], which affects overall health. As constructs of well-being are culturally relative [154], health ideologies operationalized into machine learning models may "not be relevant, or potentially even harmful, to users living differently to the ways assumed by situated designers" [77, p. 5]. Thus, builders of algorithmic systems must be attentive to forms of distress falling outside Eurocentric and Western care models [166].

4.4.4 Privacy violation. Privacy violation occurs when algorithmic systems diminish privacy, such as enabling the undesirable flow of private information [180], instilling the feeling of being watched or surveilled [181], and the collection of data without explicit and informed consent [117]. These violations have also been framed as "data harms" [149], which encompass the adverse effects of data that "impair, injure, or set back a person, entity, or society's interests" [181, n.p.]. Here, privacy violations may reflect more traditional conceptualizations of privacy attacks or security violations [79, 105] and privacy elements beyond what may be protected by regulations or under the traditional purview of a privacy officer [138, 180]. For instance, privacy violations may arise from algorithmic systems making predictive inference beyond what users openly disclose [222] or when data collected and algorithmic inferences made about people in one context is applied to another without the person's knowledge or consent through big data flows [138], even after those datasets or systems have been deprecated [59, 82]. Even if those inferences are false (e.g., the incorrect assessment of one's sexuality), people or systems can act on that information in ways that lead to discrimination and harm [235]. Privacy violations may also occur through ubiquitous surveillance, surveillance based on emotional/affective targeting [209], or coercive and exploitative data practices [117].

4.5 Societal Harms: System Destabilization and Exacerbating Inequalities

Our corpus included 68 thematic codes that we broadly classify as societal harms. Social system or societal harms reflect the adverse macro-level effects of new and reconfigurable algorithmic systems, such as systematizing bias and inequality [84] and accelerating the

Table 4: Interpersonal harms

Harm Sub-Type	Example
Loss of agency or control	"[A photo recommender shared a] picture of my deceased mother [and it] just kind of caught me, and I sat there and thought about different things for a little bit. Then I had to get back to work. But I was distracted the whole time" [134, p. 8]
Technology-facilitated violence	"[She] broke up with [him] due to his controlling behavior. After the break-up, he began to appear where she was…One day, while driving her [car], the air conditioner turned off.…After a few failed attempts, she figured the unit was broken…After a call with the [car's] customer support, she discovered a second person using the [car] app to connect" [167, p. 650]
Diminished health and well-being	"I was getting ads for maternity clothes. I was like, 'Oh please stop.' …there's no way to tell your app, 'I had a miscarriage. Please stop sending me these updates'" [8, p. 18]
Privacy violations	"[Shopping] analytics had correctly inferred what he had not known, that his daughter was pregnant." [222, p. 211]

scale of harm [137]. Social systems are instantiated through recurrent social practices, shaped by existing and intersecting power dynamics. As Dosono and Semaan [78, p. 2] summarize, "people with marginalized identities—those who are pushed to the boundaries of society based on various intersections of their identity such as race and gender—continue to experience oppression, exclusion, and harassment within sociotechnical systems." Compared to other harm types, social system harms are often indirectly felt and occur downstream; they do not necessarily arise from a single incident or problematic system behavior. Societal harms reflect the "widespread, repetitive or accumulative character" of algorithmic systems in the world [207, p. 10], which contribute to institutional exclusions [231]. Harm to social systems is thus about how algorithmic systems adversely shape the emergent properties [129] of social systems [162]. Prior research outlines such harms in relation to knowledge systems, culture, political and civic harms, socioeconomic systems, and environmental systems (Table 5). See Appendix Table 12 for articles in the corpus articulating this harm type.

4.5.1 Information harms. Knowledge systems can be conceived as localized processes through which social knowledge is produced, circulates, and is destabilized. Janzen, Orr, and Terp [115] use the term information-based harms to capture concerns of misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation. Algorithmic systems, especially generative models and recommender, systems can lead to these information harms. Misinformation refers to the spread of misleading information whether or not there is intention to deceive and disinformation is deliberately false information [153, 211, 219, 232]. Malinformation describes "genuine information that is shared with the intent to harm" [115, p. 2]. Information harms are often accompanied by co-occurring impacts, including physical, psychological or emotional, financial, and reputational harms [3, 218, 233, 240], which scale into broader societal harm. Beyond misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation, knowledge systems may be harmed through "subjugation," whereby dominant discourses proliferate through algorithmic systems — including in generative language models [235] — and foreclose alternative ways of knowing [93, 186, 187].

4.5.2 Cultural harms. Cultures are collectively and dynamically produced [114]. Cultural harm has been described as the development or use of algorithmic systems that affects cultural stability and safety, such as "loss of communication means, loss of cultural property, and harm to social values" [4, p. 30]. As algorithmic technologies can "foreclose alternative ways of understanding the world and restricting imaginations about possible futures" [186, p. 162], the nature of their harm can encompass adverse cultural impacts such as systemic erasure [71], Eurocentric ideas being exported to Global South [77, 148], harmful cultural beliefs [76], such as normalizing a culture of non-consensual sexual activity [142], or proliferating false ideas about cultural groups [78, 189].

4.5.3 Political and civic harms. Political harms emerge when "people are disenfranchised and deprived of appropriate political power and influence" [186, p. 162]. These harms focus on the domain of government, and focus on how algorithmic systems govern through individualized nudges or micro-directives [187], that may destabilize governance systems, erode human rights, be used as weapons of war [188], and enact surveillant regimes that disproportionately target and harm people of color [120]. More generally, these harms may erode democracy [97], through election interference or censorship [207]. Moreover, algorithmic systems may exacerbate social inequalities and reduction of civil liberties within legal systems [139, 181], such as unreasonable searches [152], wrongful arrest [61, 61, 124], or court transcription errors [124]. These harms adversely impact how a nation's institutions or services function [3] and increase societal polarization [207].

4.5.4 Macro socio-economic harms. Algorithmic systems can increase "power imbalances in socio-economic relations" at the societal level [4, 137, p. 182], including through exacerbating digital divides and entrenching systemic inequalities [114, 230]. The development of algorithmic systems may tap into and foster forms of labor exploitation [77, 148], such as unethical data collection, worsening worker conditions [26], or lead to technological unemployment [52], such as deskilling or devaluing human labor [170]. For instance, text-to-image models may undermine creative economies [235]. While big data flows reshape power within socio-economic systems [148, 189], when algorithmic financial systems fail at scale, these can lead to "flash crashes" and other adverse incidents with widespread impacts [137].

4.5.5 Environmental harms. Environmental harms entail ecological concerns, such as the depletion or contamination of natural resources [24, 92, 139, 148, 206, 207, 235], and damage to built environments [139]. Ecological harms concern adverse changes to the "ready availability and viability of environmental resources" [145, p. 738] that may occur throughout the lifecycle of digital technologies [170, 237] from "cradle (mining) to usage (consumption) to grave (waste)" [24, p. 169]. Similar to other sociotechnical harms, the "benefits and burdens of extractivism are unevenly distributed around the planet" whereby consumption in the economic core are contingent on extraction from the economic periphery [24, p. 170].

5 DISCUSSION

In this section, we reflect on the findings of our review, offering a discussion of how the taxonomy may support the anticipation of

Table 5: Social system / societal harms

Harm Sub-Type	Example
Information harms	"Users are increasingly exposed to information assembled and presented algorithmically, and many users lack the literacy to comprehend how algorithms influence what they can and cannot see" [78, p. 16]
Cultural harms	"[An image search for 'thug' showing predominantly Black men] …It damages all the Black community because if you're damaging Black men, then you're hurting Black families" [71, p. 8]
Political and civic harms	"Bots, automated programs, are used to spread computational propaganda. While bots can be used for legitimate functions ... [they] can be used to spam, harass, silence opponents, 'give the illusion of large-scale consensus', sway votes, defame critics, and spread disinformation campaigns" [181, p. 8]
Macro socio economic harms	"Harms associated with the labour and material supply chains of AI technologies, beta testing, and commercial exploitation" [170, p. 1]
Environmental harms	"The energy cost of training machine learning models...[and] harms from intensive water and fuel usage and server farms, consequent chemical and e-waste" [170, p. 5]

harms as well as tensions that might arise. We propose directions for continued research on sociotechnical harms to deepen the field's understanding of conditions that foster such harms.

5.1 Synthesizing methodological distinctions in studying harms

Harms from algorithmic systems encompass both computational and contextual harms [40, 164, 191, 236]. Through a scoping review and reflexive thematic analysis, we identify five harm categories, including representational, allocative harms, quality-of-service, interpersonal harms, and social system harms. Our analysis finds authors in the corpus vary widely in their approach to discussing and studying harms — an insight unsurprising given the multidisciplinary focus of the review. Notably, the discussion of harms frequently motivates research on technical aspects of algorithmic systems in the machine learning (ML) literature, but is less often a central analytic or variable. In contrast, research from HCI and related social scientific disciplines often centers harm, but may focus on one harm type, providing rich but narrow insight into that particular harm dimension (e.g., tech-facilitated violence [16, 80, 108]). Accordingly, individual scholarly analyses rarely capture the wide scope of harms that can arise from a given algorithmic system, which is a kind of anticipation work required for developing trustworthy and Responsible AI (see: [194]). By synthesizing a distributed body of computing research, this review offers insight into the current discourse and range of harms identified in the literature, which can support Responsible AI efforts to anticipate them in practice.

5.2 Towards a shared harms vocabulary with flexible structure

As structured frameworks support the work of anticipating harms and other challenges of algorithmic systems [135, 239], scoping literature from disparate computing research synthesizes insights that can be useful to practitioners and researchers alike. Here, we offer two findings of note. First, this review reveals dominant areas of concern within computing research on harm, such as the prospect of algorithmic systems exacerbating or scaling existing social inequalities (see Appendix Table 12). While concern for the relational complexities of social inequality is perhaps expected in social science research (where inequality is a core concept), its appearance in ML research might be unexpected given its historic emphasis on statistics. Our findings illuminate inequality as a normative concern of computing research on harm. Given methodological distinctions across computing disciplines, there are opportunities for deeper integration of social science insights into ML approaches to strengthen and enrich understanding of harms from algorithmic systems. There are examples of such work already (e.g., [31, 127]).

Second, this review reveals how computing researchers describe harms at varying levels of abstraction. For instance, some authors in the corpus simply refer to "representational harms" in relation to a type of likely harm (e.g., [66]), while others focus on mid-range articulations. Take, for example, deeper discussions of representational "erasure" (e.g., [121]) and the identification of specific ways in which erasure might manifest in an application (e.g., [8, 68]). The depth in which computing research describes harms is often an artifact of a given study's focus. This observation underscores the need to be able to discuss harms at varying levels of specificity and retain shared understanding. This need is particularly salient in Responsible AI settings where practitioners often interact with different audiences, and may simply refer to "*harms* broadly, without specifying...harms to who or what" [185, p. 9].

These two findings from the scoping review suggest the resulting taxonomy offers practical benefits, as it cultivates a shared language of harms while accommodating needs to discuss harms with varying specificity. This taxonomy enables what linguists call semantic "entailment" through which clear relationships are established between concepts [125], even though it draws together insights from different epistemological standpoints [103, 104]. It organizes harm types at cascading levels of conceptual detail, while allowing researchers and practitioners to narrow in on harms under those categories or to further operationalize them at a more granular level. This flexible knowledge structure also supports variable needs that arise when communicating about harms to different audiences. For instance, a practitioner working on policy may need higher levels of abstraction to provide generalized guidelines for an application; an engineer benchmarking harms within a model may desire more specificity to operationalize them within an evaluation dataset. A flexible harms taxonomy, such as the approach we suggest here, accommodates the varying needs of practitioners and researchers, while fostering common language to support collective efforts to reduce harms.

5.3 Navigating tensions between known and emergent harms

Encouraging practitioners to reflect on potential harms throughout the product life cycle can help proactively anticipate harms and limit reliance on reactionary responses. Anticipating harms is best conducted when grounded in a use case [86, 150, 200], because it provides deeper consideration of the domain of use, impacted downstream communities, and technological affordances [40]. Authors in the corpus identify how certain harms are inherent to

particular ML models (e.g., the relationship between recommender systems and allocative harms), pointing to some stability between certain algorithmic systems and the prospect of harm. For example, without interventions in place, algorithmic systems trained on text corpora from the social world are likely to contain representational harms across some aspect of identity, as text corpora often reflect the inequalities of the social world [49]. Even with recognition of the connections between certain ML models and potential harms, a harms taxonomy may still be useful in supporting systematic analyses, such as considering how harms might extend across categories, including how they might inform and contribute to other harms. Consider relationships between allocative and quality-of-service harms: when algorithmic systems fail based on identity, community groups often have to engage in additional labor to correct those failures, revealing how those harms are interrelated in practice. An opportunity thus arises to consider known harms and explore their interdependence [75], which may be useful when anticipating harms for novel systems.

Anticipating harms for novel systems is especially challenging [40]: there are more unknown variables, and practitioners may be asked to anticipate harms early in the development or production stage before there are users or even a prototype. When the type of algorithm is novel — for example, code generation or text-to-image models — there may be limited existing empirical harms research to refer to for guidance. The knowledge base offered by prior work on harms provides researchers and practitioners a generative starting point. The taxonomy synthesizes prior literature as an analytic and topic guide that can be interpreted alongside specific contextual features when looking at applied contexts.

5.4 Towards multidisciplinary proactive and reflexive harm anticipation

Our review underscores the diverse theoretical foundations and methodologies that the field of computer research employs in relation to sociotechnical harms. The breadth of harms covered in the taxonomy is a first step in supporting practitioners to more systematically reflect on adverse impacts of algorithmic systems. As we appreciate various practitioner standpoints and challenges, we do not offer normative guidance on identifying, evaluating, or controlling for harms. This taxonomy can supplement and enhance existing assessment processes an organization may have in place, providing a starting point for establishing a shared vocabulary on sociotechnical harms. Furthermore, we acknowledge that assessing the overall social impacts of an algorithmic system using only harm as a framing device can miss other negative implications of technology – for instance, inconveniences that arise from exercising the right to data portability or the right to be forgotten [30, 38].

In making these recommendations, we recognize they maintain both tensions and shortcomings. Given that harm is a broad concept experienced in myriad ways, any taxonomy is limited. Our scoping review, the corpus of which is comprised primarily from academic and gray literature published in English, presents inherent biases and does not necessarily resonate globally. The existing literature privileges Western perspectives [148, 170], leaving a dearth of perspectives from the majority of the world. This has bearing on what experiences become legible as harm. Since completing the scoping review, there have been refinements in how certain harms are conceptualized (e.g. [196]). It would be a mistake to consider this taxonomy a final, comprehensive list, or solely employ it to quantify the overall degree of harms a system may pose. Rather, it is a synthesis of knowledge that can be built upon and extended.

Rather than aim to flatten the diversity of methods and strategies to address harm by overprescribing how the taxonomy could be used, we hope various groups can draw on its insights to strengthen their methods. Developing a shared language can accelerate the capacity building of practitioners across organizations – a key objective in presenting these findings. In addition to the taxonomy, we hope to inspire practitioner communities to embrace and advance more systematic harm reduction methodologies, including 1) continued research to study and measure hams prior to launching a product; 2) increasing efforts to prioritize community-driven articulation of harms; and 3) strengthening multidisciplinary approaches. To ensure harm reduction practices and design strategies are comprehensive, future research should investigate understandings of harm and social benefit with communities traditionally marginalized and excluded from technology development [56].

6 CONCLUSION

Through a scoping review and reflexive thematic analysis of computing research on harms, we offer this taxonomy of sociotechnical harms as an initial guide to support practitioners and researchers in addressing a range of adverse impacts informed by algorithmic systems. We expect and hope it will evolve as research and engagement progress, particularly in terms of participatory and community-driven research methodologies (e.g., [68, 71, 89]). As a synthesis of computing research, this taxonomy offers a measure to assess areas and directions for future scholarly and practitioner discussions and research. It reveals there is greater consensus and depth of work in investigating particular harms, such as representational and allocative harms, as well as gaps where the range of possible harms is likely under articulated. Our interest in scoping sociotechnical harms remains motivated by cultivating methods to reduce their likelihood in algorithmic systems. It is our stance that developing a richer understanding of harms creates more generative paths towards harm reduction for all.

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Towards User Guided Actionable Recourse

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ABSTRACT

Machine Learning's proliferation in critical fields such as healthcare, banking, and criminal justice has motivated the creation of tools which ensure trust and transparency in ML models. One such tool is *Actionable Recourse* (AR) for negatively impacted users. AR describes recommendations of cost-efficient changes to a user's *actionable* features to help them obtain favorable outcomes. Existing approaches for providing recourse optimize for properties such as proximity, sparsity, validity, and distance-based costs. However, an often-overlooked but crucial requirement for actionability is a consideration of *User Preference* to guide the recourse generation process. In this work, we attempt to capture user preferences via soft constraints in three simple forms: *i) scoring continuous features, ii) bounding feature values* and *iii) ranking categorical features*. Finally, we propose a gradient-based approach to identify *User Preferred Actionable Recourse (UP-AR)*. We carried out extensive experiments to verify the effectiveness of our approach.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Theory of computation → Actionable Recourse**; • **Computing methodologies** → *Knowledge representation and reasoning*; • **Human-centered computing → Human computer interaction (HCI)**.

KEYWORDS

Actionable recourse, User preference

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1 INTRODUCTION

Actionable Recourse (AR) [30] refers to a list of actions an individual can take to obtain a desired outcome from a fixed Machine Learning (ML) model. Several domains such as lending [28], insurance [26], resource allocation [6, 27] and hiring decisions [1] are required to suggest recourses to ensure the trust of a decision system; in such scenarios, it is critical to ensure the actionability (the viability of taking a suggested action) of recourse, otherwise the suggestions are pointless. Consider an individual named Alice who applies for a loan, and a bank, which uses an ML-based classifier, who denies it. Naturally, Alice asks - *What can I do to get the loan?* The inherent question is what action she must take to obtain the loan in the future. *Counterfactual explanation* introduced in *Wachter* [31] provides a *what-if* scenario to alter the model's decision, but it does not account for actionability. AR aims to provide Alice with a *feasible* action set which is both actionable by Alice and which suggests as low-cost modifications as possible.

While some features (such as age or sex) are inherently inactionable for all individuals, Alice's personalized constraints may also limit her ability to take action on certain suggested recourses (such as a strong reluctance to secure a co-applicant). We call these localized constraints *User Preferences*, synonymous to user-level constraints introduced as *local feasibility* by Mahajan et al. [17]. Figure 1 illustrates the motivation behind UP-AR. Note that how similar individuals can prefer contrasting recourse.

Actionability, as we consider it, is centered explicitly around individual preferences, and similar recourses provided to two individuals (Alice and Bob) with identical feature vectors may not necessarily be equally actionable. Most existing methods of finding actionable recourse are restricted to *omissions* of features from the *actionable feature set* and *box constraints* [18] that bound actions.

In this study, we discuss three forms of user preferences and propose a user-provided score formulation for capturing these different idiosyncrasies. We believe that communicating in terms of preference scores (by say, providing a 1-10 rating on the actionability of specific features) improves the explainability of a recourse generation mechanism, which ultimately improves trust in the underlying model. Such a system could also be easily re-run with different preference scores, allowing for diversifiable recourse. We surveyed 40 individuals and found that an overwhelming 60% majority preferred to provide their preferences on individual features for influencing a recourse mechanism, as opposed to receiving multiple "stock" recourse options or simply receiving a single option. Additional details of our survey are included in Section 7. We provide a hypothetical example of UP-AR's ability to adapt to preferences in Table 1.

Motivated by the above considerations, we capture soft user preferences along with hard constraints and identify recourse based on local desires without affecting the success rate of identifying recourse. For example, consider Alice prefers to have 80% of the recourse "cost" from loan duration and only 20% from the loan amount, meaning she prefers to have recourse with a minor reduction in the loan amount. Such recourse enables Alice to get the benefits of a loan on her terms, and can easily be calculated to Alice's desire. We study the problem of providing *user preferred recourse* by solving a custom optimization for individual user-based preferences. Our contributions include:

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

Figure 1: Illustration of UP-AR. Similar individuals Alice and Bob with contrasting preferences can have different regions of desired feature space for a recourse.

Table 1: A hypothetical actionable feature set of adversely affected individuals sharing similar features and corresponding suggested actions by AR and UP-AR. UP-AR provides personalized recourses based on individual user preferences.

Actionable Features	Curr. val.	UP-AR values	
		Alice	Bob
LoanDuration	18	8	17
LoanAmount	$1940	$1840	$1200
HasGuarantor	0	0	1
HasCoapplicant	0	1	0

- We start by enabling Alice to provide three types of user preferences: i) *Scoring*, ii) *Ranking*, and iii) *Bounding*. We embed them into an optimization function to guide the recourse generation mechanism.
- We then present *User Preferred Actionable Recourse (UP-AR)* to identify a recourse tailored to her liking. Our approach highlights a cost correction step to address the *redundancy* induced by our method.
- We consolidate performance metrics with empirical results of UP-AR across multiple datasets and compare them with state-of-art techniques.

1.1 Related Works

Several methods exist to identify counterfactual explanations, such as FACE [22], which uses the shortest path to identify counterfactual explanations from high-density regions, and Growing Spheres (GS) [16] which employs random sampling within increasing hyperspheres for finding counterfactuals. CLUE [3] identifies counterfactuals with low uncertainty in terms of the classifier's entropy within the data distribution. Similarly, manifold-based CCHVAE [21] generates high-density counterfactuals through the use of a latent space model. However, there is often no guarantee that the *what-if* scenarios identified by these methods are attainable.

Existing research focuses on providing feasible recourses, yet comprehensive literature on understanding and incorporating user preferences within the recourse generation mechanism is lacking. It is worth mentioning that instead of understanding user preferences, Mothilal et al. [18] provides a user with diverse recourse options and hopes that the user will benefit from at least one. The importance of diverse recourse recommendations has also been explored in recent works [18, 25, 31], which can be summarized as increasing the chances of actionability as intuitively observed in the domain of unknown user preferences [13]. Karimi et al. [14] and Cheng et al. [5] also resolve uncertainty in a user's cost function by inducing *diversity* in the suggested recourses. Interestingly, only 16 out of the 60 recourse methods explored in the survey by Karimi et al. [13] include diversity as a constraint where diversity is measured in terms of distance metrics. Alternatively, studies like Cui et al. [7], Rawal and Lakkaraju [23], Ustun et al. [30] optimize on a universal cost function. This does not capture individual idiosyncrasies and preferences crucial for actionability.

Efforts of eliciting user preferences include recent work by De Toni et al. [8]. The authors provide interactive human-in-the-loop approach, where a user continuously interacts with the system. However, learning user preferences by asking them to select from one of the *partial interventions* provided is a derivative of providing a diverse set of recourse candidates. In this work, we consider fractional cost as a means to communicate with Alice, where fractional cost of a feature refers to *fraction of cost incurred from a feature i out of the total cost of the required intervention.*

The notion of user preference or user-level constraints was previously studied as *local feasibility* [17]. Since users can not precisely quantify the cost function [23], Yadav et al. [32] diverged from the assumption of a universal cost function and optimizes over the distribution of cost functions. We argue that the inherent problem of feasibility can be solved more accurately by capturing and understanding Alice's recourse preference and adhering to her constraints which can vary between *Hard Rules* such as unable to bring a co-applicant and *Soft Rules* such as hesitation to reduce the amount, which should not be interpreted as unwillingness. This is the first study to capture individual idiosyncrasies in the recourse generation optimization to improve feasibility.

2 PROBLEM FORMULATION

Consider a binary classification problem where each instance represents an individual's feature vector $\mathbf{x} = [\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2, \cdot, \mathbf{x}_D]$ and associated binary label $\mathbf{y} \in \{-1, +1\}$. We are given a model $f(\mathbf{x})$ to classify $\mathbf{x}$ into either -1 or $+1$. Let $f(\mathbf{x}) = +1$ be the desirable output of $f(\mathbf{x})$ for Alice. However, Alice was assigned an undesirable label of -1 by f. We consider the problem of suggesting action $\mathbf{r} = [\mathbf{r}_1, \mathbf{r}_2, \cdot, \mathbf{r}_D]$ such that $f(\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{r}) = +1$. Since suggested recourse only requires actions to be taken on *actionable features* denoted by F_A, we have $\mathbf{r}_i \equiv 0 : \forall i \notin F_A$. We further split F_A into *continuous actionable features* F_{con} and *categorical actionable features* F_{cat} based on feature domain. Action $\mathbf{r}$ is obtained by solving the following optimization, where $userCost(\mathbf{r}, \mathbf{x})$ is any predefined cost function of taking an

action $\mathbf{r}$ such that:

$$\min_{\mathbf{r}} \ userCost(\mathbf{r}, \mathbf{x}) \tag{1}$$

$$s.t. \ userCost(\mathbf{r}, \mathbf{x}) = \sum_{i \in F_A} userCost(\mathbf{r}_i, \mathbf{x}_i) \tag{2}$$

$$\text{and } f(\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{r}) = +1. \tag{3}$$

2.1 Capturing individual idiosyncrasies

A crucial step for generating recourse is identifying *local feasibility* constraints captured in terms of individual user preferences. In this study, we assume that every user provides their preferences in three forms. Every continuous actionable feature $i \in F_{con}$ is associated with a *preference score* Γ_i obtained from the affected individual. Additional preferences in the form of feature value bounds and ranking for preferential treatment of categorical features are also requested from the user.

User Preference Type I (Scoring continuous features): User preference for continuous features are captured in $\Gamma_i \in [0, 1] : \forall i \in F_{con}$ subject to $\sum_{i \in F_{con}} \Gamma_i = 1$. Such *soft constraints* capture the user's preference without omitting the feature from the actionable feature set. Γ_i refers to the fractional cost of action Alice prefers to incur from a continuous feature i. For example, consider $F_{con} = \{LoanDuration, LoanAmount\}$ with corresponding user-provided scores $\Gamma = \{0.8, 0.2\}$ implying that Alice prefers to incur 80% of fractional feature cost from taking action on *LoanDuration*, while only 20% of fractional cost from taking action on *LoanAmount*. Here, Alice prefers reducing *LoanDuration* to *LoanAmount* and providing recourse in accordance improves actionability.

User Preference Type II (Bounding feature values): Users can also provide constraints on values for individual features in F_A. These constraints are in the form of lower and upper bounds for individual feature values represented by $\underline{\delta_i}$ and $\overline{\delta_i}$ for any feature i respectively. These constraints are used to discretize the steps. For a continuous feature i, action steps can be discretized into pre-specified step sizes of $\Delta_i = \{s : s \in [\underline{\delta_i}, \overline{\delta_i}]\}$. For categorical features, steps are defined as the feasible values a feature can take. For all categorical features we define, $\Delta_i = \{\underline{\delta_i}, \ldots, \overline{\delta_i}\} : \forall i \in F_{cat}$ representing the possible values for categorical feature i.

User Preference Type III (Ranking categorical features): Users are also asked to provide a ranking function $\mathcal{R} : F_{cat} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}^{+1}$ on F_{cat}. Let $\mathcal{R}_i$ refers to the corresponding rank for a categorical feature i. Our framework identifies recourse by updating the candidate action based on the ranking provided. For example, consider $F_{cat} = \{HasCoapplicant, HasGuarantor, CriticalAccountOrLoansElsewhere\}$ for which Alice ranks them by $\{3, 2, 1\}$. The recourse generation system considers suggesting an action on *HasGuarantor* before *HasCoapplicant*. Ranking preferences can be easily guaranteed by a simple override in case of discrepancies while finding a recourse.

2.1.1 Cognitive simplicity of preference scores. The user preferences proposed are highly beneficial for guiding the recourse generation process. Please note that in the absence of these preferences, the recourse procedure falls back to the default values set by a domain expert. Additionally, the users can be first presented with the default preferences, and asked to adjust as per their individual preferences. A simple user interface can help them interact with the system intuitively. For example, adjusting a feature score automatically adjusts the corresponding preference type scores.

2.2 Proposed optimization

We depart from capturing a user's cost of feature action and instead obtain their preferences for each feature. We elicit three forms of preferences detailed in the previous section and iteratively take steps in the action space. We propose the following optimization over the basic predefined steps based on the *user preferences*. Let us denote the inherent hardness of feature action $\mathbf{r}_i$ for feature value $\mathbf{x}_i$ using $cost(\mathbf{r}, \mathbf{x})$ which can be any cost function easily communicable to Alice. Here, $cost\left(\mathbf{r}_i^{(t)}, \mathbf{x}_i\right)$ refers to a "universal" cost of taking an action $\mathbf{r}_i^{(t)}$ for feature value $\mathbf{x}_i$ at step t. Note that this cost function or quantity differs from the $userCost(\cdot, \cdot)$ function specified earlier. This quantity is capturing the inherent difficulty of taking an action.

$$\max_{\mathbf{r}} \sum_{i \in F_A} \frac{\Gamma_i}{cost(\mathbf{r}_i, \mathbf{x}_i)} \qquad \text{(Type I)}$$

$$s.t. \ f(\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{r}) = +1$$

$$\Gamma_i = 0 : \ \forall i \notin F_A \qquad \text{(actionability)}$$

$$\Gamma_j = 1 : \ \forall j \in F_{cat}$$

$$\mathbf{r}_i \in \Delta_i : \ i \in F_A \qquad \text{(Type II)}$$

$$\mathbf{1}\{\mathbf{r}_i > 0\} \geq \mathbf{1}\{\mathbf{r}_j > 0\} : \mathcal{R}_i \geq \mathcal{R}_j \ \forall i, j \in F_{cat} \qquad \text{(Type III)}$$

The proposed method minimizes the cost of a recourse weighted by Γ_i for all actionable features. We discuss the details of our considerations of cost function in Section 3.1. The order preference of categorical feature actions can be constrained by restrictions while finding a recourse. The next section introduces UP-AR as a stochastic solution to the proposed optimization.

3 USER PREFERRED ACTIONABLE RECOURSE (UP-AR)

Our proposed solution, User Preferred Actionable Recourse (UP-AR), consists of two stages. The first stage generates a candidate recourse by following a connected gradient-based iterative approach. The second stage then improves upon the *redundancy* metric of the generated recourse for better actionability. The details of UP-AR are consolidated in Algorithm 1 and visualized in Figure 2.

3.1 Stage 1: Stochastic gradient-based approach

Poyiadzi et al. [22] identifies a counterfactual by following a high-density connected path from the feature vector $\mathbf{x}$. With a similar idea, we follow a connected path guided by the user's preference to identify a feasible recourse. We propose incrementally updating the candidate action with a predefined step size to solve the optimization. At each step t, a candidate intervention is generated, where any feature i is updated based on a Bernoulli trial with probability $I_i^{(t)}$ derived from user preference scores and the cost of taking a



Figure 2: Framework of UP-AR. Successful recourse candidates; $\mathbf{r}^{(\cdot)}$, $\bar{\mathbf{r}}^{(\cdot)}$ are colored in pink.

predefined step $\delta_i^{(t)}$ using the following procedure:

$$I_i^{(t)} \sim Bernoulli\left(\sigma\left(z_i^{(t)}\right)\right) \tag{4}$$

$$\text{where } \sigma\left(z_i^{(t)}\right) = \frac{e^{z_i^{(t)}/\tau}}{\sum_{j\in F_A} e^{z^{(t)}/\tau}},\ z_i^{(t)} = \frac{\Gamma_i}{cost\left(\mathbf{r}_i^{(t)}, \mathbf{x}_i\right)} \tag{5}$$

With precomputed costs for each step, *weighted inverse cost* is computed for each feature, and these values are mapped to a probability distribution using a function like softmax. *Softmax* gives a probabilistic interpretation $P\left(I_i^{(t)} = 1 | z_i^{(t)}\right) = \sigma\left(z_i^{(t)}\right)$ by converting $z_i^{(t)}$ scores into probabilities.

We leverage the idea of *log percentile shift* from AR to determine the cost of action since it is easier to communicate with the users in terms of percentile shifts. Specifically, we follow the idea and formulation in [30] to define the cost:

$$cost\left(\mathbf{r}_i, \mathbf{x}_i\right) = log\left(\frac{1 - Q_i\left(\mathbf{x}_i + \mathbf{r}_i\right)}{1 - Q_i\left(\mathbf{x}_i\right)}\right) \tag{6}$$

were $Q_i\left(\mathbf{x}_i\right)$ representing the *percentile* of feature i with value $\mathbf{x}_i$ is a score below which $Q_i\left(\mathbf{x}_i\right)$ percentage of scores fall in the frequency distribution of feature values in the target population.

We adapt and extend the idea that counterfactual explanations and adversarial examples [29] have a similar goal but with contrasting intention [19]. A popular approach to generating adversarial examples [10] is by using a gradient-based method. We employ the learning of adversarial example generation to determine the direction of feature modification in UP-AR: the Jacobian matrix is used to measure the local sensitivity of outputs with respect to each input feature. Consider that $f : \mathbb{R}^D \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^K$ maps a D-dimensional feature vector to a K-dimensional vector, such that each of the partial derivatives exists. For a given $\mathbf{x} = [\mathbf{x}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{x}_i, \ldots, \mathbf{x}_D]$ and $f(\mathbf{x}) = [f_{[1]}(\mathbf{x}), \ldots, f_{[j]}(\mathbf{x}), \ldots, f_{[K]}(\mathbf{x})]$, the Jacobian matrix of f is defined to be a $D \times K$ matrix denoted by $\mathbf{J}$, where each (j, i) entry is $\mathbf{J}_{j,i} = \frac{\partial f_{[j]}(\mathbf{x})}{\partial \mathbf{x}_i}$. For a neural network (NN) with at least one hidden layer, $\mathbf{J}_{j,i}$ is obtained using the chain rule during backpropagation. For an NN with one hidden layer represented by *weights* $\{w\}$, we have:

$$\mathbf{J}_{j,i} = \frac{\partial f_{[j]}(\mathbf{x})}{\partial \mathbf{x}_i} = \sum_l \frac{\partial f_{[l]}(\mathbf{x})}{\partial a_l} \frac{\partial a_l}{\partial \mathbf{x}_i} \text{ where } a_l = \sum_i w_{li}\mathbf{x}_i \tag{7}$$

Where in Equation 7, a_l is the output (with possible activation) of the hidden layer and w_l is the weight of the node l. Notice line 4 in Algorithm 1 which *updates the candidate* action for a feature i at step t as:

$$\mathbf{r}_i^{(t)} = \mathbf{r}_i^{(t-1)} + Sign\left(\mathbf{J}_{+1,i}^{(t)}\right) \cdot I_i^{(t)} \cdot \delta_i^{(t)} \tag{8}$$

Following the traditional notation of a binary classification problem and with a bit of abuse of notation $-1 \rightarrow 1, +1 \rightarrow +1$, $Sign\left(\mathbf{J}_{+1,i}^{(t)}\right)$ captures the direction of the feature change at step t. This direction is iteratively calculated, and additional constraints such as non-increasing or non-decreasing features can be placed at this stage.

Algorithm 1 User Preferred Actionable Recourse (UP-AR)

Input: Model f, user feature vector $\mathbf{x}$, cost function $cost(\cdot, \cdot)$, step size $\Delta_i : \forall i \in F_A$, maximum steps T, action $\mathbf{r}$ initialized to $\mathbf{r}^{(0)}$, fixed τ, $t = 1$.

1: **while** $t \leq T$ or $f\left(\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{r}^{(t)}\right) \neq +1$ **do**
2: $\quad z_i^{(t)} = \frac{\Gamma_i}{cost\left(\mathbf{r}_i^{(t)}, \mathbf{x}_i\right)} : \forall i$
3: $\quad I_i^{(t)} \sim Bern(\sigma(z_i^{(t)})) : \forall i$, where $\sigma(z_i^{(t)}) = \frac{e^{z_i^{(t)}/\tau}}{\sum_{j\in F_A} e^{z^{(t)}/\tau}}$
4: $\quad \mathbf{r}_i^{(t)} = \mathbf{r}_i^{(t-1)} + Sign\left(\mathbf{J}_{+1,i}^{(t)}\right) \cdot I_i^{(t)} \cdot \delta_i^{(t)} : \forall i \in F_A$
5: $\quad t = t + 1$
6: Let $\hat{t}$ be the smallest step such that $f(\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{r}^{(\hat{t})}) = +1$ and initialize $t = \hat{t}$
7: **if** $\exists i \in F_{cat} : \mathbf{r}_i^{(t)} > 0$ **then**
8: $\quad$ **while** $f\left(\mathbf{x} + \bar{\mathbf{r}}^{(t)}\right) = +1$ **do**
9: $\quad\quad \bar{\mathbf{r}}^{(t)} = \mathbf{r}^{(t)}$
10: $\quad\quad \bar{\mathbf{r}}_i^{(t)} = \mathbf{r}_i^{(\hat{t})} : \forall i \in F_{cat}$
11: $\quad\quad t = t - 1$
12: **return** $\bar{\mathbf{r}}^{(t)}$ as action $\mathbf{r}$

3.1.1 Calibrating frequency of categorical actions. We employ *temperature scaling* [11] parameter τ observed in Equation 5 to calibrate UP-AR's recourse generation cost. Updates on categorical features with fixed step sizes are expensive, especially for binary categorical values. Hence, tuning the frequency of categorical suggestions can significantly impact the overall cost of a recourse. τ controls the frequency with which categorical actions are suggested. Additionally, if a user prefers updates on categorical features over continuous features, UP-AR has the flexibility to address this with a smaller τ.

To study the effect of τ on overall cost, we train a Logistic Regression (LR) model on a processed version of *German* [4] dataset and

generate recourses for the 155 individuals who were denied credit. The cost gradually decreases with decreasing τ since the marginal probability of suggesting a categorical feature change is diminished and the corresponding experiment is deferred to the Appendix. Hence, without affecting the success rate of recourse generation, the overall cost of generating recourses can be brought down by decreasing τ. In simple terms, with a higher τ, UP-AR frequently suggests recourses with expensive categorical actions. We note that τ can also be informed by a user upon seeing an initial recourse. After the strategic generation of an intervention, we implement a cost correction to improve upon the potential redundancy of actions in a recourse option.

3.2 Stage 2: Redundancy & Cost Correction (CC)

In our experiments, we observe that once an expensive action is recommended for a categorical feature, some of the previous action steps might become redundant. Consider an LR model trained on the processed *german* dataset. Let $F_A = \{$*LoanDuration*, *LoanAmount*, *HasGuarantor*$\}$ out of all the 26 features, where *HasGuarantor* is a binary feature which represents the user's ability to get a guarantor for the loan. Stage 1 takes several steps over *LoanAmount* and *LoanDuration* before recommending to update *HasGuarantor*. These steps are based on the feature action probability from Equation 5. Since categorical feature updates are expensive and occur with relatively low probability, Stage 1 finds a low-cost recourse by suggesting low-cost steps more frequently in comparison with high-cost steps.

Table 2: Redundancy corrected recourse for a hypothetical individual.

Features to change	Current values	Stage 1 values	Stage 2 values
LoanDuration	18	8	12
LoanAmount	$1940	$1040	$1540
HasGuarantor	0	1	1

Once an update to a categorical feature is recommended, some of the previous low-cost steps may be redundant, which can be rectified by tracing back previous continuous steps. Consider a scenario such that $\exists i \in F_{cat} : \mathbf{r}_i^{(T)} > 0$ for a recourse obtained after T steps in Stage 1. The CC procedure updates all the intermediary recourse candidates to reflect the categorical changes i.e., $\forall i \in F_{cat} : \mathbf{r}_i^{(T)} > 0$, we update $\mathbf{r}_i^{(t)} = \mathbf{r}_i^{(T)} : \forall t \in \{1, 2, \ldots, T-1\}$ to obtain $\bar{\mathbf{r}}^{(t)}$. We then perform a linear retracing procedure to return $\bar{\mathbf{r}}^{(t)}$ such that $f\left(\mathbf{x} + \bar{\mathbf{r}}^{(t)}\right) = +1$ for the smallest t.

4 DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

In this section, we analyze the user preference performance of UP-AR. For simplicity, a user understands cost in terms of log percentile shift from her initial feature vector described in Section 3. Let $\hat{\Gamma}_i$ be the observed fractional cost for feature i formally defined in Equation 11. Any cost function can be plugged into UP-AR with no restrictions. A user prefers to have Γ_i fraction of the total desired percentile shift from feature i. Consider $F_A = \{$*LoanDuration*, *LoanAmount*$\}$ and let the corresponding user scores provided by all the adversely affected individuals be: $\Gamma = \{0.8, 0.2\}$. Here, "Denied loan applicants prefers reducing *LoanDuration* to *LoanAmount* by 8 : 2." Figure 3 shows the frequency plot of feature cost ratio for feature *LoanDuration* out of total incurred cost from *LoanDuration* and *LoanAmount*. i.e., $y-$axis represents $\hat{\Gamma}_i$. Also, Figure 4 further shows the fractional cost of feature *DebtRatio* for recourses obtained for a NN based model trained on *Give Me Some Credit (GMSC)* dataset. These experiments signify the adaptability of UP-AR to user preferences and provides evidence that distribution of $\hat{\Gamma}_i$ is centered around Γ_i.



Figure 3: AR and UP-AR's distribution of $\hat{\Gamma}_{LoanDuration}$ for a *Logistic Regression* model trained on *German*.



Figure 4: GS and UP-AR's distribution of $\hat{\Gamma}_{DebtRatio}$ for a *Neural Network* model trained on *GMSC*.

Lemma 4.1. *Consider UP-AR identified recourse* $\mathbf{r}$ *for an individual* $\mathbf{x}$. *If* $C_{i,min}^{(T^*)}$ *and* $C_{i,max}^{(T^*)}$ *represent the minimum and maximum cost*

of any step for feature i until T^*, then:

$$\mathbb{E}\left[cost\left(\mathbf{r}_i, \mathbf{x}_i\right)\right] \leq T^* \sigma\left(\frac{\Gamma_i}{C_{i,min}^{(T^*)}}\right) C_{i,max}^{(T^*)}. \tag{9}$$

Lemma 4.1 implies that the expected cost $\mathbb{E}\left[cost\left(\mathbf{r}_i, \mathbf{x}_i\right)\right]$, specifically for a continuous feature action is positively correlated to the probabilistic interpretation of user preference scores. Hence $\mathbf{r}$ satisfies users critical Type I constraints in expectation. Recall that Type II and III constraints are also applied at each step t. Lemma 4.1 signifies that UP-AR adheres to user preferences and thereby increases the actionability of a suggested recourse.

Corollary 4.2. *For UP-AR with a linear $\sigma(\cdot)$, predefined steps with equal costs and $cost\left(\mathbf{r}, \mathbf{x}\right) = \sum_{i \in F_A} cost\left(\mathbf{r}_i, \mathbf{x}_i\right)$, total expected cost after T^* steps is:*

$$\mathbb{E}\left[cost\left(\mathbf{r}, \mathbf{x}\right)\right] \leq T^* \sum_{i \in F_A} \sigma\left(\Gamma_i\right). \tag{10}$$

Corollary 4.2 states that with strategic selection of $\sigma(\cdot)$, $\delta^{(\cdot)}$ and $cost\left(\cdot, \cdot\right)$, UP-AR can also tune the total cost of suggested actions. In the next section, we will compare multiple recourses based on individual user preferences for a randomly selected adversely affected individual.

4.1 Case study of individuals with similar features but disparate preferences

Given an LR model trained on *german* dataset and Alice, Bob and Chris be three adversely affected individuals. $F_A = \{$*LoanDuration*, *LoanAmount*, *HasGuarantor*$\}$ and corresponding user preferences are provided by the users. In Table 3, we consolidate the corresponding recourses generated for the specified disparate sets of preferences.

From Table 3 we emphasize the ability of UP-AR to generate a variety of user-preferred recourses based on their preferences, whereas AR always provides the same low-cost recourse for all the individuals. The customizability of feature actions for individual users can be found in the table. When the Type I score for *LoanAmount* is 0.8, UP-AR prefers decreasing loan amount to loan duration. Hence, the loan amount is much lesser for Chris than for Alice and Bob.

5 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION

In this section, we demonstrate empirically: 1) that UP-AR respects Γ_i-fractional user preferences at the population level, and 2) that UP-AR also performs favorably on traditional evaluate metrics drawn from CARLA [20]. We used the native CARLA catalog for the `Give Me Some Credit (GMSC)` [12], `Adult Income (Adult)` [9] and `Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS)` [2] data sets as well as pre-trained models (both the **Neural Network** (NN) and **Logistic Regression** (LR)). NN has three hidden layers of size [18, 9, 3], and the LR is a single input layer leading to a Softmax function. Although AR is proposed for *linear models*, it can be extended to *nonlinear models* by the local linear decision boundary approximation method LIME [24] (referred as AR-LIME).

PERFORMANCE METRICS:. For UP-AR, we evaluate:

(1) *Success Rate (Succ. Rate)*: The percentage of adversely affected individuals for whom recourse was found.
(2) *Average Time Taken (Avg.Tim.)*: The average time (in seconds) to generate recourse for a single individual.
(3) *Constraint Violations (Con. Vio.)*: The average number of non-actionable features modified.
(4) *Redundancy (Red.)*: A metric that tracks superfluous feature changes. For each successful recourse calculated on a univariate basis, features are flipped to their original value. The redundancy for recourse is the number of flips that do not change the model's classification decision.
(5) *Proximity (Pro.)*: The normalized l_2 distance of recourse to its original point.
(6) *Sparsity (Spa.)*: The average number of features modified.

We provide comparative results for UP-AR against state-of-the-art counterfactual/recourse generation techniques such as GS, Wachter, AR(-LIME), CCHAVE and FACE. These methods were selected based on their popularity and their representation of both independence and dependence based methods, as defined in CARLA. In addition to the traditional performance metrics, we also measure *Preference-Root mean squared error (pRMSE)* between the user preference score and the fractional cost of the suggested recourses. We calculate $pRMSE_i$ for a randomly selected continuous valued feature i using:

$$pRMSE_i = \sqrt{\frac{1}{n}\sum_{j=1}^{n}\left(\hat{\Gamma}_i^{(j)} - \Gamma_i^{(j)}\right)^2} \tag{11}$$

$$\text{where } \hat{\Gamma}_i^{(j)} = \frac{cost\left(\mathbf{r}_i, \mathbf{x}_i\right)}{\sum_{k \in F_{con}} cost\left(\mathbf{r}_k, \mathbf{x}_k\right)} \tag{12}$$

Here $\Gamma_i^{(j)}$ and $\hat{\Gamma}_i^{(j)}$ are user provided and observed preference scores of feature i for an individual j. In Table 4, we summarize *pRMSE*, which is the average error across continuous features such that:

$$pRMSE = \frac{1}{|F_{con}|}\sum_{i \in F_{con}} pRMSE_i. \tag{13}$$

DATASETS:. We train an LR model on the processed version of `german` [4] credit dataset from *sklearn's linear_model* module. We replicate Ustun et al. [30]'s model training and recourse generation on `german`. The dataset contains 1000 data points with 26 features for a loan application. The model decides if an applicant's credit request should be approved or not. Consider $F_{con} = \{$*LoanDuration*, *LoanAmount*$\}$, and $F_{cat} = \{$*CriticalAccountOrLoansElsewhere*, *HasGuarantor*, *HasCoapplicant*$\}$. Let the user scores for F_{con} be $\Gamma = \{0.8, 0.2\}$ and ranking for F_{cat} be $\{3, 1, 2\}$ for all the denied individuals. For this experiment, we set $\tau^{-1} = 4$. Out of 155 individuals with denied credit, AR and UP-AR provided recourses to 135 individuals.

Cost Correction: Out of all the denied individuals for whom categorical actions were suggested, an average of $\sim$ \$400 in *LoanAmount* was recovered by cost correction.

For the following datasets, for traditional metrics, user preferences were set to be uniform for all actionable features to not bias the results to one feature preference over another:

(1) **GMSC:** The data set from the 2011 Kaggle competition is a credit underwriting dataset with 11 features where the

Table 3: Recourses generated by UP-AR for similar individuals with a variety of preferences.

			Alice		Bob		Chris	
Features to change	Current values	AR values	User Pref	UP-AR values	User Pref	UP-AR values	User Pref	UP-AR values
LoanDuration	30	25	0.8	20	0.8	10	0.2	27
LoanAmount	$8072	$5669	0.2	$7372	0.2	$6472	0.8	$5272
HasGuarantor	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1

Table 4: Summary of performance evaluation of UP-AR. Top performers are highlighted in green.

		Neural Network							Logistic Regression						
Data.	Recourse Method	Succ. Rate	pRMSE	Avg Tim.	Con. Vio.	Red.	Pro.	Spa.	Succ. Rate	pRMSE	Avg Tim.	Con. Vio.	Red.	Pro.	Spa.
GMSC	GS	0.75	0.16	0.02	0.00	6.95	1.01	8.89	0.62	0.18	0.03	0.00	4.08	1.39	8.99
	Wachter	1.00	0.18	0.02	1.49	6.84	1.08	8.46	1.00	0.17	0.03	1.23	3.51	1.42	7.18
	$AR_{(\sim LIME)}$	0.03	0.17	0.45	0.00	0.00	0.17	1.72	0.17	0.17	0.73	0.00	0.00	0.93	1.91
	CCHVAE	1.00	0.18	1.05	2.0	9.99	1.15	10.1	1.00	0.18	1.37	2.00	8.64	2.05	11.0
	FACE	1.00	0.17	8.05	1.57	6.65	1.20	6.69	1.00	0.16	11.9	1.65	7.47	2.30	8.45
	UP-AR	0.94	0.07	0.08	0.00	1.30	0.49	3.22	1.00	0.07	0.12	0.00	1.47	0.68	3.92
Adult	GS	0.84	0.10	0.03	0.00	2.86	1.30	5.09	0.84	0.10	0.04	0.00	1.76	2.05	5.85
	Wachter	0.55	0.10	0.04	1.44	3.05	0.74	4.90	1.00	0.11	0.10	1.68	0.90	1.44	5.81
	$AR_{(\sim LIME)}$	0.42	0.10	9.20	0.00	0.00	2.10	2.54	0.76	0.10	7.37	0.00	0.03	2.10	2.31
	CCHVAE	0.84	0.11	0.77	4.47	5.83	3.95	9.40	0.84	0.10	1.08	4.22	6.85	3.96	9.45
	FACE	1.00	0.10	6.78	4.58	7.54	4.11	7.91	1.00	0.10	8.37	4.53	5.91	4.28	7.81
	UP-AR	0.82	0.10	0.76	0.00	0.78	1.77	2.78	0.82	0.05	0.67	0.00	0.55	1.78	2.88
COMPAS	GS	1.00	0.15	0.03	0.00	1.09	0.47	3.35	1.00	0.14	0.04	0.00	0.34	1.12	3.98
	Wachter	1.00	0.14	0.05	1.00	1.61	0.56	4.35	1.00	0.14	0.04	1.00	0.85	1.06	4.83
	$AR_{(\sim LIME)}$	0.65	0.13	0.20	0.00	0.00	0.78	0.90	0.52	0.15	0.24	0.00	0.00	1.45	1.57
	CCHVAE	1.00	0.14	5.09	2.27	4.31	1.70	4.91	1.00	0.14	0.02	1.62	2.70	1.74	4.92
	FACE	1.00	0.15	0.37	2.39	3.96	2.35	4.72	1.00	0.15	0.40	2.47	4.38	2.46	4.81
	UP-AR	0.92	0.08	0.04	0.00	0.60	0.63	1.82	1.00	0.10	0.05	0.00	0.81	0.82	2.74

target is the presence of delinquency. Here, we measure what feature changes would lower the likelihood of delinquency. We again used the default protected features (*age* and *number of dependents*). The baseline accuracy for the NN model is 81%, while the baseline accuracy for the LR is 76%.

(2) **Adult Income:** This dataset originates from 1994 census database with 14 attributes. The model decides whether an individual's income is higher than 50,000 USD/year. The baseline accuracy for the NN model is 85%, while the baseline accuracy for the LR is 83%. Our experiment is conducted on a sample of 1000 data points.

(3) **COMPAS:** The data set consists of 7 features describing offenders and a target representing predictions. Here, we measure what feature changes would change an automated recidivism prediction.

The baseline accuracy for NN is 78%, while baseline accuracy for LR is 71%.

PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF UP-AR:. We find UP-AR holistically performs favorably to its counterparts. Critically, it respects feature constraints (which we believe is fundamental to actionable recourse) while maintaining a significantly low redundancy and sparsity. This indicates that it tends to change fewer necessary features. Its speed makes it tractable for real-world use, while its proximity values show that it recovers relatively low-cost recourse. These results highlight the promise of UP-AR as a performative, low-cost option for calculating recourse when user preferences are paramount. UP-AR shows consistent improvements over all the performance metrics. The occasional lower success rate for a NN model is attributed to 0 constraint violations.

*pRMSE***:** We analyze user preference performance in terms of *pRMSE*. From Table 4, we observe that UP-AR's *pRMSE* is consistently better than the state of art recourse methods. The corresponding experimental details and visual representation of the distribution of *pRMSE* is deferred to Appendix 5.1.

5.1 Random user preference study

We performed an experiment with increasing step sizes on *German* dataset. We observed that, with increasing step sizes, $pRMSE_i$ increased from 0.09 to 0.13, whereas it was consistent for AR.



(a) Logistic Regression model **(b) Neural Network model**

Figure 5: Distribution of the average *pRMSE* of UP-AR and other recourse methodologies.

In the next experiment, we randomly choose user preference for *LoanDuration* from $[0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8]$. The rest of the experimental setup is identical to the setup discussed in Section 4. In this experiment, we observe *pRMSE* with non-universal user preference for adversely affected individuals. Here the average *pRMSE* of both *LoanDuration* and *LoadAmount* for UP-AR is 0.19, whereas for AR it is 0.34.

Further, using the CARLA package, we generated recourses for a set of 1000 individuals and Γ for two continuous features was randomly selected from $[0.3, 0.6, 0.9]$. Figure 5 provides a visual analysis of the distribution of average *pRMSE* using violin plots. The experiments were performed on the 3 datasets discussed in Section 5 for both the LR and NN models. For *GMSC* dataset, F_{con} = {*DebtRatio, MonthlyIncome*} and F_A = {*RevolvingUtilizationOf UnsecuredLines, NumberOfTime30-59DaysPastDueNotWorse, DebtRatio, MonthlyIncome, NumberOfOpenCreditLinesAndLoans, NumberOfTimes90DaysLate, NumberRealEstateLoansOrLines, NumberOfTime60-89DaysPastDueNotWorse*}. For *COMPAS* dataset, F_{con} = {*priors-count, length-of-stay*} and F_A = {*two-year-recid, priors-count' length-of-stay*}. For *Adult* dataset, F_{con} = {*education-num, capital-gain*} and F_A = {*education-num, capital-gain, capital-loss, hours-per-week, workclass-Non-Private, workclass-Private, marital-status-Married, marital-status-Non-Married, occupation-Managerial-Specialist, occupation-Other*}.

With these experiments we conclude that UP-AR's $\hat{\Gamma}$ deviation from the user's Γ is consistently lower than the existing recourse generation methodologies. We observe that AR is unaffected by the varying user preference due to the fact that AR and other state-of-the-art recourse methodologies lack the capability of capturing such idiosyncrasies. On the other hand, UP-AR is driven by those preferences and has significantly better *pRMSE* in comparison to AR.

5.2 Cost Correction analysis

In Table 5 we explore the effect of UP-AR's cost correction procedure on the Adult and COMPAS datasets. We do not include the GMSC dataset as it does not include binary features, and therefore does not utilize the cost correction procedure. In Table 5 we show the number of factuals, the percentage of factuals for which recourse was found, the percentage of recourse found which contained at least one binary action, the percent of recourse found which underwent cost correction, the average percentage of steps saved by the cost correction procedure, and the average percent of cost savings, measured as the percent reduction in continuous cost

Table 5: The Frequency and Effect of Cost Correction

Metrics	Adult	COMPAS
Number of Factuals	1000	568
Success Rate	79.3%	99.6%
Percent of Recourse with a Binary Action	71.9%	82.6%
Percent of Recourse with Cost Correction	38.4%	25.5%
Average Percentage of Steps Saved	67.9%	63.5%
Average Percentage of Continuous Cost Saved	83.1%	76.0%



Figure 6: Snapshot of the human acceptance survey.

(l_2 distance) between a factual and its recourse before and after the cost-correction procedure.

6 CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this study, we propose to capture different forms of user preferences and propose an optimization function to generate actionable recourse adhering to such constraints. We further provide an approach to generate a connected [15] recourse guided by the user. We show how UP-AR adheres to soft constraints by evaluating user satisfaction in fractional cost ratio. We emphasize the need to capture various user preferences and communicate with the user in comprehensible form. This work motivates further research on how truthful reporting of preferences can help improve overall user satisfaction.

7 USER ACCEPTANCE SURVEY

We surveyed 40 random students and employees from a mailing list. The goal of this survey is to establish whether people preferred to provide specific preferences over other mechanism. The survey included one question with four options as follows:

If you are denied a loan application. What do you expect from bank to get your loan approved ?

(1) *Single list of suggestions to your profile. Ex: (increase income by 100$ & reduce loan duration by 1 year)*
(2) *A set with multiple lists of suggestions to your profile. Ex: (i) increase income by 100$ and reduce loan duration by 1 year OR ii) increase income by 500$ OR iii) reduce loan duration by 3 year OR iv) bring a co-applicant)*
(3) *Influence bank's suggestions by providing preferential scores for actions you can take. Ex: (preferring to increase loan duration more than loan amount by 8:2, or preferring to bring a guarantor before a co-applicant)*
(4) *Any other form of preferences*

Every individual in the survey was asked to select one of the four choices provided. In this survey, it is identified that majority of 60% of individuals preferred influencing the bank's decision by providing preference scores for individual features, followed by 30% of individuals who wanted multiple recourses from the bank. The remaining 10% of individuals preferred a single recourse or any other form of preference.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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Learning from Discriminatory Training Data

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ABSTRACT

Supervised learning systems are trained using historical data and, if the data was tainted by discrimination, they may unintentionally learn to discriminate against protected groups. We propose that fair learning methods, despite training on potentially discriminatory datasets, shall perform well on fair test datasets. Such dataset shifts crystallize application scenarios for specific fair learning methods. For instance, the removal of direct discrimination can be represented as a particular dataset shift problem. For this scenario, we propose a learning method that provably minimizes model error on fair datasets, while blindly training on datasets poisoned with direct additive discrimination. The method is compatible with existing legal systems and provides a solution to the widely discussed issue of protected groups' intersectionality by striking a balance between the protected groups. Technically, the method applies probabilistic interventions, has causal and counterfactual formulations, and is computationally lightweight — it can be used with any supervised learning model to prevent direct and indirect discrimination via proxies while maximizing model accuracy for business necessity.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies** → **Machine learning algorithms**; **Supervised learning**; • **Applied computing** → Law, social and behavioral sciences.

KEYWORDS

supervised learning, algorithmic fairness, discrimination, dataset shift, concept shift, law, explainability, intersectionality, evaluation

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1 INTRODUCTION

With the growth of algorithmic decision-making systems in highly consequential domains such as finance and criminal justice, lawmakers have refocused their broader equity agendas to now include assurances that such algorithms do not discriminate [11]. That is, algorithmic decision-making systems should not treat someone unfavorably because of their membership to a particular group, characterized by a *protected attribute* such as race or gender. Therefore, new guidelines and orders that aim to prevent algorithmic discrimination have been increasingly proposed in recent years, e.g., the U.S. blueprint for an "A.I. Bill of Rights" in 2022 [6]. These proposals are typically based on legal [51, 52] and social science [1, 32, 53] contexts, where the key basis for identifying algorithmic discrimination is whether there is a disparate treatment or unjustified disparate impact on the members of some protected group. To prevent disparate treatment, the law often forbids the use of certain protected attributes, Z, such as race or gender, in decision-making, e.g., in hiring [52]. Thus, these decisions, Y, should be based on a set of relevant attributes, $\boldsymbol{X}$, and should not depend on the protected attribute, Z, i.e., $P(y|\boldsymbol{x}, z) = P(y|\boldsymbol{x}, z')$ for any z, z', ensuring that there is no *disparate treatment*.[1] We refer to this kind of discrimination as *direct discrimination* (or lack thereof), because of the direct use of the protected attribute Z.

Despite the introduction of laws prohibiting direct discrimination in the 20th century, such protections were sometimes circumvented by the use of attributes correlated with the protected attribute as proxies. One example of this is the practice of "redlining" done by U.S. financial institutions. That is, these institutions systematically denied loans and services to customers residing in neighborhoods with populations largely comprised of racial and ethnic minorities [24, 64]. In order to prevent such *inducement of discrimination* via proxy attributes, legal systems have established that the



Figure 1: Training data can be tainted in two ways: individuals belonging to underprivileged groups may be undersampled and, hence, models trained on this data may make larger errors for these groups (B), some of the labels in the training data may be incorrect due to historic discrimination and, hence, models trained on this data may be biased against the underprivileged groups (C). These two dataset issues represent a covariate shift and concept shift, respectively. This paper addresses discriminatory concept shifts.

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[1] Throughout the manuscript we use a shorthand notation for probability: $P(y|\boldsymbol{x}, z) \equiv P(Y = y|\boldsymbol{X} = \boldsymbol{x}, Z = z)$, where $\boldsymbol{X}, Y, Z$ are random variables, $\boldsymbol{x}, y, z$ are their instances, and P is a probability distribution or density.

probability of a positive decision should be the same among individuals belonging to different protected groups [1, 32, 51, 52], i.e., $P(y|z_1) = P(y|z_2)$. Such protections are also legally necessary for decision-making systems [43], especially since data-rich machine learning systems can often find accurate surrogates for protected attributes when a large enough set of legitimate-looking variables is available, resulting in discrimination via association [55]. However, these laws often have provisions allowing for such *disparate impact* across groups if there is a "justified reason" or "business necessity clause" [52]. For instance, in the 1970s it was found that females were less likely to be admitted than males in graduate admissions to University of California Berkeley [5]. However, females applied to departments with lower admission rates than males and the overall admissions process was judged legal. The provisions allowing for *disparate impact* conflict with the statistical notions of fairness, the fairness definitions most common in algorithmic fairness literature [34]. These notions typically call for parity of a statistical measure, e.g., impact parity: $P(y|z_1) = P(y|z_2)$ [2], which prevents the usage of attributes related to the protected-attribute. To address the challenge of handling business necessity and proxy attributes, and to develop a method that is transparent and communicable to lawmakers and courtroom officials, our prior work employed explainability measures to remove direct discrimination without the inducement of discrimination [19]. Our prior work, however, did not discuss the real-world setting of multiple protected attributes, did not specify the training dataset issues, and was not optimally accurate — we address these gaps in this study.

In legal texts, the prevention of discrimination spans across many groups defined over multiple protected attributes, e.g, race, gender, and religion [6, 51, 52]. Despite this, there rarely exists any legal mechanisms accounting for discrimination based on the intersection of the protected attributes an individual may have — a concept known as "intersectionality" which has been famously spotlighted by social experts in recent decades [9]. The need for such mechanisms can be seen in criminal justice settings such as COMPAS [31], where it is well documented that certain intersections of age, race, and sex experience more discriminatory outcomes than others, e.g, young Black males [48]. With the lack of legal support on preventing discrimination on these intersections, it is unsurprising that many fair learning methods do not operate in such settings and even fewer report results in them [56]. In this work, we address this setting. Doing so is crucial for algorithmic fairness, as prior studies have shown that learning methods can be fair with respect to protected attributes separately, such as race and sex, while being discriminatory to intersections of attributes, e.g., Black females or Black males [26].

Another crucial challenge is how to clarify application scenarios of algorithmic fairness methods. With this clarification, policymakers could utilize the information about such scenarios to shape future legislature regulating consequential algorithmic decision-making [18]. Therefore, we propose to distinguish between various data issues and tie them with the methods that address these issues. This task has received much less research attention than the fair learning methods themselves. Unfortunately, the research community that studies the data issues for supervised learning, so-called dataset shifts [36, 39, 57], is largely disconnected from the algorithmic fairness community [2]. In supervised learning, models are trained to perform well on training data and are evaluated on test data, where both are typically created by splitting a dataset into two subsets. In contrast, dataset shifts refer to data issues where there are systematic differences between train and test datasets. To our knowledge, we are the first to note that different algorithmic fairness problems can be formalized as different kinds of dataset shifts. Firstly, if one of the protected groups is underrepresented in the training set, this commonly results in larger model errors for underprivileged group (Figure 1B) [21]. This problem can be formalized as a covariate shift, i.e., $P_{\text{train}}(Z) \neq P_{\text{test}}(Z)$, and it can be solved via sample reweighing or subsampling of the majority group [49]. Secondly, if the training dataset includes examples of discriminating decisions (Figure 1C), then we posit that the model should be evaluated on a non-discriminatory test dataset (Figure 1A). Formally, this is a concept shift problem, i.e., $P_{\text{train}}(Y|\boldsymbol{X}, Z) \neq P_{\text{test}}(Y|\boldsymbol{X}, Z)$, that we address in this work.

Problem summary. Consider decisions Y that are outcomes of a process acting on non-protected variables $\boldsymbol{X}$ and protected variables $\boldsymbol{Z}$, where $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}$, $\boldsymbol{z} \in \mathcal{Z}$, $y \in \mathcal{Y}$, i.e., the variables can take values from any set, e.g., binary or real. Protected and non-protected features are indexed, e.g., X_i corresponds to the i'th feature (component). We are interested in training a model on available dataset D_{train} sampled from $P_{\text{train}}(\boldsymbol{X}, \boldsymbol{Z}, Y)$. This model can represent any decision-making process, e.g., assigning a credit score for a customer, given their financial record $\boldsymbol{x}$ and their ethnicity and gender $\boldsymbol{z}$. The goal of a standard supervised learning algorithm is to obtain a function $\hat{y} : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$ that optimizes a given objective, e.g., the expected loss, $\mathbb{E}_{D_{\text{train}}}[\ell(Y, \hat{y}(\boldsymbol{X}))]$, where the expectation is over the samples in D_{train} and ℓ is a loss function, e.g., quadratic loss, $\ell(y, \hat{y}) = (y - \hat{y})^2$.

However, if the training dataset is tainted by discrimination, then a data science practitioner may desire, and, in principle, be obliged by law to apply an algorithm that does not perpetuate this discrimination. For clarity, we distinguish between discriminatory decisions $T \in \mathcal{Y}$ that are causally and unfairly influenced by Z (Figure 1C) and non-discriminatory $U \in \mathcal{Y}$ that are are not unfairly influenced by Z (Figure 1A). These two kinds of decisions may co-exist in the same context, e.g., a company's hiring team can include both discriminating and non-discriminating members who determine hires in parallel following nearly the same decision-making process. Unfortunately, the practitioner may have no information whether the training dataset was tainted by discrimination, $D_{\text{train}} = \tilde{D} = \{(\boldsymbol{x}^i, \boldsymbol{z}^i, t^i)\}$, where $i \in \{1, ..., n\}$ is a sample index, or was *not*, $D_{\text{train}} = D = \{(\boldsymbol{x}^i, \boldsymbol{z}^i, u^i)\}$, nor how it was tainted, so supervised algorithms that aim to prevent discrimination operate in a blind setting. The problem that we aim to address is to provide a learning algorithm that in such a blind setting yields models that are as close to non-discriminatory data as possible.

Contributions. To address this problem, independently of the given training data type, we propose that the *objective* of fair supervised learning methods is to minimize the expected *cross-loss*, $\mathbb{E}_{D_{\text{test}}}[\ell(U, \hat{y}(\boldsymbol{X}))]$, on the non-discriminatory test dataset D_{test} drawn from $P_{\text{test}}(\boldsymbol{X}, \boldsymbol{Z}, U)$, while training on a potentially discriminatory data D_{train} (§3), as in Figure 2A. Achieving that objective may sound infeasible, given lack of any assumptions about the concept shift, i.e., we are in the blind setting, but the information



Figure 2: Illustration of the two related goals for fair algorithmic learning, grounded in dataset shifts (top) and explainability literature (bottom). This work focuses on the former, while our prior work focused on the latter.

that the attribute Z should not directly influence the model outcomes $\hat{Y}$ is the reason why this problem is solvable. We show that a learning algorithm averaging probabilistic interventions on the protected attribute optimizes cross-loss under additive directly discriminatory dataset shifts (§4). Such interventions previously were applied to compute explainability measures [10, 25], and were used in the context of discrimination prevention only recently by our work [19]. In that study, we proposed that the goal of a fair learning algorithm is to nullify the influence of the protected attribute, while preserving the influence of remaining attributes (explainability goal in Figure 2), which is achieved by *marginal interventional mixtures*. In this work, we introduce a novel "accuracy" goal of cross-loss minimization, which is achieved by *optimal interventional mixtures*, and show that the two methods are equivalent in certain conditions. We evaluate and compare the optimal interventional mixture with the state-of-the-art algorithms addressing discrimination (§5) on synthetic datasets simulating direct discrimination and proxy variables (§6), and on real-world datasets (§7), including those with multiple protected attributes, finding that the *optimal interventional mixture* leverages parity measures and accuracy, and can accurately recover the unbiased ground truth. Our method is included in the publicly released `FaX-AI` Python library (https://github.com/social-info-lab/FaX-AI).

2 RELATED WORKS

Causal notions of fairness. One can define direct and indirect discrimination as direct and indirect causal influence of Z on Y, respectively [38, 65, 66]. While this notion of direct discrimination is consistent with the concept of disparate treatment in legal systems, the corresponding indirect discrimination is not, since the business necessity clause allows the use of an attribute that depends on the protected feature (causally or otherwise) if only the attribute is judged relevant to the decisions made, e.g., as in the seminal court case of Ricci v. DeStefano [42]. This issue is addressed by *path-specific* notions of causal fairness [7, 40, 59]. However, if there is no limit on the influence that can pass through fair paths, then the path can be used for inducing discrimination, as in the aforementioned case of *redlining*. Hence, causal accounts of discrimination [7, 27, 30, 40, 50, 59, 65] do not capture induced discrimination, which is common in machine learning and is the focus of this work. To address this issue, our recent work defines induced discrimination as a change in the causal influence of non-protected features associated with the protected attributes and proposes a marginal interventional mixture to inhibit direct and induced discrimination [19]. However, that work does not discuss multiple protect attributes and it does not consider discriminatory concept shifts.

Dataset shifts. There is a growing interest in the machine learning community in dataset shifts, since they are surprisingly common in reality and often negatively impact the performance of supervised models on deployment [29, 49]. The most common dataset shift is a covariate shift, where the distribution of features or decisions changes between the training and test datasets, i.e., $P_{\text{train}}(\boldsymbol{x}, z) \neq P_{\text{train}}(\boldsymbol{x}, z)$, or $P_{\text{train}}(y) \neq P_{\text{test}}(y)$, respectively [39]. In the context of fair machine learning, outcome perturbations were first proposed as random swaps of labels in binary classification, i.e., $y \sim P(y|u)$, where y is a perturbed version of u [16]. That study, however, assumed no access to the protected attribute, so the random swaps correspond to adding i.i.d. noise in the output variable. Here, we propose to use a different type of dataset shift, known as concept shift, i.e., $P_{\text{train}}(y|\boldsymbol{x}, z) \neq P_{\text{test}}(y|\boldsymbol{x}, z)$, to simulate discriminatory perturbations of data and evaluate the resilience of learning methods to such perturbations.

3 PROBLEM FORMULATION

Before we formalize the problem of discrimination prevention based on dataset shifts, we must first define discrimination in the context of decision making. While many other studies focus on statistical notions of fairness [2, 13, 22, 47, 58, 62], our dataset shift-based notions are drawn from abstractions of legal concepts and causal influence notions.

3.1 Fairness and discrimination

Our prior work defines unfair influence and fair relationship between protected attributes $\boldsymbol{Z}$ and decisions Y by tying them to legal texts and instruments [19].

Definition 1. ***Unfair influence*** *is an influence of protected feature(s) $\boldsymbol{Z}$ on specified type of decisions Y that is judged illegal via some legal instrument, e.g., Title VII of the U.S. Civil Rights Act [52].*

Definition 2. ***Fair relationship*** *of protected feature(s) $\boldsymbol{Z}$ with non-protected feature(s) $\boldsymbol{X}$ is a relationship that is judged legal when making decisions Y, e.g., due to the U.S. business necessity clause.*

In real-world contexts, many models can generate decisions Y without directly using the protected attribute $\boldsymbol{Z}$, while using non-protected features $\boldsymbol{X}$ which may be associated with the protected attribute. Even though these features may be related to the protected attribute, they may be legally admissible for use in the decision-making if they are not *unfairly influenced* by the protected feature(s), i.e., they are relevant to the decisions and fulfil a business purpose recognized by legal agencies. For instance, in the case of Ricci v. DeStefano [42], the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the feature in

question, a promotion exam, did not violate business necessity despite its association with race. Thus according to the court, there was a *fair relationship* between the exam and race.

With these definitions of unfair influence and fair relationship, discrimination can be defined through measures of causal influence. Formal frameworks for causal models include classic potential outcomes (PO) and structural causal models (SCM) [44]. In this notation, the potential outcome for variable Y after intervention $do(\boldsymbol{X} = \boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{Z} = \boldsymbol{z})$ is written as $Y_{\boldsymbol{x},\boldsymbol{z}}$, which is the outcome we would have observed had the variables $\boldsymbol{X}$ and $\boldsymbol{Z}$ been set to the values $\boldsymbol{x}$ and $\boldsymbol{z}$ via an intervention. It is assumed that there are direct causal links from $\boldsymbol{X}$ and $\boldsymbol{Z}$ to Y, that all variables are observed, and there are no assumptions about the relations between $\boldsymbol{X}$ and $\boldsymbol{Z}$ and their components. These assumptions hold at the very least for a model $\hat{Y}$ of Y that uses $\boldsymbol{X}$ and $\boldsymbol{Z}$ as features. This foundational point enables explainability measures, e.g., various feature influence definitions [25]. Hence, in our prior work we argue that if the intentions and reasoning behind the development process of the model $\hat{Y}$ *was* legally admissible, e.g., proxies were not used as a replacement for the protected attribute, then despite the unknowingly incorrect epistemic state represented by the model, e.g., partially incorrect causal representation, legal systems may acquit model developers of discrimination [19]. Under these assumptions, the causal *controlled direct effect* (CDE) on Y of changing the value of $\boldsymbol{Z}$ from a reference value $\boldsymbol{z}$ to $\boldsymbol{z}'$ given that $\boldsymbol{X}$ is set to $\boldsymbol{x}$ [44] is

$$\mathrm{CDE}_Y(\boldsymbol{z}', \boldsymbol{z}|\boldsymbol{x}) = \mathbb{E}[Y_{\boldsymbol{x},\boldsymbol{z}'} - Y_{\boldsymbol{x},\boldsymbol{z}}]. \quad (1)$$

By tying the causal concept of controlled direct effect to the notions of *fair influence* and *unfair relationship*, we define three concepts of discrimination – direct, indirect, and induced [19].

Definition 3. ***Direct discrimination*** *is an unfair influence of protected attribute(s), $\boldsymbol{Z}$, on the decisions Y, i.e., $\exists_{z,z'}\exists_{\boldsymbol{x}} CDE_Y(\boldsymbol{z}, \boldsymbol{z}'|\boldsymbol{x}) \neq 0$.*

Definition 4. ***Indirect discrimination*** *is an influence on the decisions Y of feature(s) $\boldsymbol{X}$ whose relationship with $\boldsymbol{Z}$ is not fair, i.e., $\exists_{x,x'}\exists_{\boldsymbol{z}} CDE_Y(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}'|\boldsymbol{z}) \neq 0$.*

Definition 5. ***Discrimination induced*** *via X_i is a transformation of the process generating decisions U not affected by direct and indirect discrimination into a new process generating Y that modifies the influence on the decisions of certain X_i depending on $\boldsymbol{Z}$ between the processes U and Y, i.e., $\exists_{\boldsymbol{z}}\exists_{\boldsymbol{x},\boldsymbol{x}'} CDE_U(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}'|\boldsymbol{z}) \neq CDE_Y(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{x}'|\boldsymbol{z})$ given that $P(\boldsymbol{x}|\boldsymbol{z}) \neq P(\boldsymbol{x})$ or $P(\boldsymbol{x}'|\boldsymbol{z}) \neq P(\boldsymbol{x}')$.*

To remove direct discrimination, one can construct a model $\hat{Y}$ that does not use $\boldsymbol{Z}$. However, this may induce discrimination indirectly via the attributes X_i associated with the protected attributes $\boldsymbol{Z}$, even if there is no causal link from $\boldsymbol{Z}$ to X_i. Methods inhibiting discrimination should do so without inducing discrimination.

Example 1. *Consider a hypothetical linear model of loan interest rate, Y. Using similar models, prior works suggest that interest rates differ by race, Z [3, 54]. Some loan-granting clerks may produce non-discriminatory decisions, $u = \beta_0 - x_1$, while other clerks may discriminate directly, $y_{dir} = \beta_0 - x_1 + z$, where β_0 is a fixed base interest rate, x_1 is a relative salary of a loan applicant, while z encodes race and takes some negative (positive) value for White (non-White) applicants. If the protected attribute is not available, e.g., loan applications are submitted online, then a discriminating clerk may induce discrimination in the interest rate, by using a proxy for race, $y_{ind} = \beta_0 - x_1 + x_2$, where x_2 is the proxy, e.g., an encoding of the zip code (as in the redlining) or the first name (as in the seminal work of Bertrand and Mullainathan) of the applicant.*

3.2 Discriminatory concept shifts

Distinct from our prior work, we introduce an additional goal in discrimination prevention from the perspective of dataset shifts. That is, we propose to use discriminatory perturbations dependent on the protected attribute (or all possible intersections of multiple protected attributes) to simulate a concept shift, i.e., $P_{\text{train}}(y|\boldsymbol{x}, z) \neq P_{\text{test}}(y|\boldsymbol{x}, z)$, and to evaluate the cross-loss of learning methods w.r.t. to such concept shifts [39] (accuracy goal in Figure 2). These concept shifts reflect bias in a historical data-generating process, rather than a sampling bias which typically is associated with covariate shifts.

Definition 6. ***Discriminatory concept shift*** *is a transformation of the process generating U that is not affected by direct, indirect, and induced discrimination into a new process generating Y that is affected by discrimination.*

Example 2. *We continue the prior example. The transformation from $u = \beta_0 - x_1$ to $y_{dir} = \beta_0 - x_1 + z$ via a directly discriminatory additive perturbation of z (race) is a discriminatory concept shift. This gives two datasets, $\tilde{D} = \{(x_1^i, x_2^i, z^i, y_{dir}^i)\}$ for training and $D = \{(x_1^i, x_2^i, z^i, u^i)\}$ for testing.*

We do not assume that the perfectly fair decision-making process, illustrated in Figure 1A, exists already in all real-world contexts. In stark contrast, we posit that its knowledge should not be required to prevent discrimination in supervised learning. The above constructs enable us to formalize the goal for fair learning methods on the grounds of dataset shifts and specify the idealized real-world scenarios that the methods achieving this goal address. Next, we define the cross-loss of a supervised learning algorithm to discriminatory concept shifts, which measure how well an algorithm trained on *potentially* discriminatory training dataset, i.e., $D_{\text{train}} = \tilde{D}$ or $D_{\text{train}} = D$, performs when it is evaluated on a non-discriminatory $D_{\text{test}} = D$.

Definition 7. ***Cross-loss.*** *The solution of supervised learning algorithm a, $\hat{y}_a(\boldsymbol{x}|D_{train})$, is a model obtained by training on the potentially discriminatory dataset D_{train}. The empirical cross-loss function is an expected loss of this model w.r.t. the non-discriminatory data D, $\mathbb{E}_D\left[\ell\left(U, \hat{y}_a(\boldsymbol{X}|D_{train})\right)\right]$.*

The cross-loss measures how well the model learned by an algorithm training on the discriminatory data predicts the fair data, i.e., how well it performs under a discriminatory concept shift.

Example 3. *We continue the prior example. For simplicity, assume that all variables have zero mean, no correlation between X_1 and Z, and a positive correlation $r > 0$ between X_2 and Z. Let the training dataset be $\tilde{D} = \{(x_1, x_2, z, y_{dir})\}$. If we applied standard supervised learning under the quadratic loss, then asymptotically with the number of samples we would learn the model $\hat{y}_1 = \beta_0 - x_1 + z$, which is directly discriminatory and results in high cross-loss $\mathbb{E}_D\left[\ell\left(U, \hat{y}_1(\boldsymbol{X}|\tilde{D})\right)\right] = \mathbb{E}_Z Z^2$. If we dropped the protected attribute, Z, before regressing Y_{dir} on the attributes X_1 and X_2, then*

we would learn the model $\hat{y}_2 = \beta_0 - x_1 + rx_2$, which also yields a sub-optimal cross-loss, $\mathbb{E}_D\left[\ell\left(U, \hat{y}_2(\boldsymbol{X}|\tilde{D})\right)\right] = r^2\,\mathbb{E}_{X_2}X_2^2$, that increases with r due to the growing discrimination induced via X_2.

4 OPTIMAL INTERVENTIONAL MIXTURE

Next, we introduce a supervised learning method based on probabilistic interventions that aims to prevent direct discrimination in Y without inducing any discrimination. We prove that it minimizes cross-loss, up to a constant, under the assumption of the concept shift coming from additive directly discriminatory perturbations (§4.1). In addition, if Y is impacted by *indirect discrimination*, i.e., $\boldsymbol{Z}$ unfairly influences $\boldsymbol{X}$, we can address it as *direct discrimination* in $\boldsymbol{X}$. To prevent *indirect discrimination* one can apply our method in a nested way (§4.2) that resembles the path-specific counterfactual fairness [7].

4.1 Removal of direct discrimination

The proposed method is a post-processing approach and has two optimisation steps. In the first step, we train the model $\hat{y}(\boldsymbol{x}, z)$ using all features, both protected Z and relevant $\boldsymbol{X}$, without any consideration of fairness, by minimizing the corresponding expected loss $\mathbb{E}_{D_{\text{train}}}[\ell(Y, \hat{y}(\boldsymbol{X}))]$. Most importantly, the protected attribute is available during the training, so the model does not need to use third variables as surrogates of the protected attribute and avoids inducing discrimination via $\boldsymbol{X}$ (we provide theoretical and empirical evidence for this statement in Proposition 1 and Section 6.1, respectively). In the second step, we eliminate the influence of the protected attribute. This is achieved by intervening probabilistically on the full model trained with all features and mixing the interventions on the protected attribute independent from other variables via a mixing distribution $\pi(Z')$, yielding $\hat{y}_\pi(\boldsymbol{x}) = \sum_{z'}\hat{y}(\boldsymbol{x}, z')\pi(z')$. Here, we search for the optimal mixing distribution, $\pi^*(z')$, that minimizes the expected loss, $\mathbb{E}_{D_{\text{train}}}[\ell(Y, \hat{y}_\pi(\boldsymbol{X}))]$, while all parameters of the full model $\hat{y}(\boldsymbol{x}, z)$ are fixed, i.e., $\pi^* = \arg\min_\pi \mathbb{E}_{D_{\text{train}}}[\ell(Y, \hat{y}_\pi(\boldsymbol{X}))]$. This optimization problem is convex for quadratic and negative log-likelihood loss functions. Thus, the optimal weighting distribution can be found by applying disciplined convex programming with constraints ensuring that $\pi(z')$ is a distribution, i.e., $\sum_{z'}\pi(z') = 1$ and $\pi(z') \geq 0$ for all z' [12]. Once the optimal mixing distribution is known, the *optimal interventional mixture (OIM)* can be computed, $\hat{y}^*(\boldsymbol{x}) = \sum_{z'}\hat{y}(\boldsymbol{x}, z')\pi^*(z')$, which constitutes the solution of the proposed learning algorithm.

Unlike many methods achieving statistical fairness objectives, our method is seamlessly applicable to scenarios with multiple protected attributes or numeric attributes such as age. This is accomplished by mixing the interventions on all combinations of the protected attributes in the second optimization step. Next, for discriminatory data transformations that have a simple additive form, i.e., $y = u + h(z)$, we prove that optimal interventional mixture minimizes cross-loss on non-discriminatory data and show that for ℓ^2 loss the accuracy and explainability goals of fair machine learning (Figure 2) lead to the same solution.

Proposition 1. *Let the non-discriminatory data have $u = f(\boldsymbol{x}) + v$ and the data following a discriminatory concept shift have $y = f(\boldsymbol{x}) + h(z) + v$, where f and h are some functions and v is i.i.d. noise independent from $\boldsymbol{X}$ and Z. Assume that the same ℓ^p loss, either ℓ^1 or ℓ^2, is used for model learning and the computation of cross-loss. If the estimation model is well specified w.r.t. the discriminatory data-generating process and the estimation method is consistent, then the OIM, asymptotically with the number of samples, is $\hat{y}^*(\boldsymbol{x}) = f(\boldsymbol{x}) + C_p$, and it minimizes the expected cross loss $\mathbb{E}_D\left[\ell\left(U, \hat{y}_a(\boldsymbol{X}|\tilde{D})\right)\right]$ up to the constant C_p that depends on the unknown $h(\boldsymbol{Z})$.*

Example 4. *We continue the loan interest rate example. The full model is $\hat{y}(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{z}) = \beta_0 - x_1 + \boldsymbol{z}$. The optimal interventional mixture is $\hat{y}^* = \beta_0 - x_1 + \beta_\pi$, where the intercept β_π is the result of mixing over the optimal $\pi^*(\boldsymbol{z}')$. In this case, $\beta_\pi = \mathbb{E}_Z\, Z = 0$ due to the optimization. Thus, the algorithm recovers the non-discriminatory ground truth.*

The proof follows from the definition of consistent estimator (full proof in Appendix A). For a particular dataset that does not meet the condition $C_p = 0$, one can propose a better model than the OIM by subtracting C_p from model's intercept, which is a sum of C_p and a component of $f(x)$, but C_p depends on the unknown $h(Z)$ and, without knowing $h(Z)$, we do not know what to subtract, so there is no learning strategy that improves the cross-loss. Furthermore, the case of nonzero C_p is practically irrelevant, because it represents a data perturbation that affects all individuals in the same way, e.g., it introduces across the board more positive outcomes y without changing their dependence on $\boldsymbol{x}$, i.e., $\mathbb{E}[Y|\boldsymbol{x}] = \mathbb{E}[U|\boldsymbol{x}] + C_p$. The above proposition is valid for well-specified models. Next, we prove analogue result for universal approximators such as deep learning models.

Corollary 1. *Let the same assumptions hold as in Proposition 1, but now the estimation model is a universal approximator. Then the OIM is an arbitrarily close approximation of $f(\boldsymbol{x}) + C_p$, which according to Proposition 1 minimizes the expected loss $\mathbb{E}_D\left[\ell\left(U, \hat{y}_a(\boldsymbol{X}|\tilde{D})\right)\right]$ up to C_p.*

The proof follows from universal approximator theorems and Proposition 1 (see Appendix A). These guarantees do not universally hold for our prior work, which is the only work that proposes a similar interventional mixtures for inhibiting discrimination [19]. Rather than finding an optimal mixture, we previously proposed to utilize the marginal distribution of the protected attribute to build a marginal interventional mixture (MIM), i.e., $\hat{y}_{\text{MIM}}(\boldsymbol{x}) = \mathbb{E}_Z[\hat{y}(\boldsymbol{x}, Z)]$.

Proposition 2. *Let the same assumptions hold as in Proposition 1. Then the marginal interventional mixture (MIM), asymptotically with the number of samples, is $\hat{y}_{MIM}(\boldsymbol{x}) = \mathbb{E}_Z[\hat{y}(\boldsymbol{x}, Z)] = f(\boldsymbol{x}) + \mathbb{E}[h(Z) + v]$, and minimizes the expected cross loss $\mathbb{E}_D\left[\ell\left(U, \hat{y}_a(\boldsymbol{X}|\tilde{D})\right)\right]$ for ℓ^2 loss up to the constant $\mathbb{E}[h(\boldsymbol{Z}) + v]$.*

4.2 Removal of indirect discrimination via optimal counterfactual mixture

In real-world scenarios, a non-protected feature, X_i, can be unfairly influenced by $\boldsymbol{Z}$. If decisions Y were influenced by such X_i, then Y would be indirectly discriminatory. To prevent this, one can apply a nested multi-stage version of OIM. More precisely, say that we have X_1, X_2, and $\boldsymbol{Z}$, where X_1 is unfairly influenced by $\boldsymbol{Z}$, and all are used

to make decisions Y. We first create a model $\hat{Y}$ using X_1, X_2, and $\boldsymbol{Z}$. Then, we create a model $\hat{X}_1$, using X_2 and $\boldsymbol{Z}$ and other relevant features that we have access to, and apply the OIM to create a "fair" model $\hat{X}_1^*$. Lastly, to create $\hat{Y}^*$, we replace X_1 with $\hat{X}_1^*$ in the model $\hat{Y}$, and apply the OIM. This is a reasonable solution, but in situations where we know the value of a variable for which we apply OIM, such as X_1 here, we can do better through counterfactual analysis.

4.2.1 Counterfactual mixtures. Causality literature posits a causal hierarchy and distinguishes between interventional and counterfactual estimates [45]. The latter differ from former in that they assume that everything stays the same, including any exogenous noise values, when estimating the effect of an intervention. In contrast, the interventional mixture calculates the value of $\hat{X}_1$ had the causal influence of $\boldsymbol{Z}$ been removed from it given the values of all *observed* variables, but not the values of exogenous noise. Each variable can contain *exogenous* noise, i.e., unobserved intrinsic noise not associated with any other variable. In the situations where we know the value of the variable for which we want to develop a fair model, we can use that value to infer that variable's exogenous noise. For such situations, we propose an *optimal counterfactual mixture* (OCM), which merges the three canonical counterfactual reasoning steps with the OIM step: (*abduction*) infer exogenous noise for a variable, (*intervention*) apply the OIM to remove the influence of the protected attribute on that variable, and (*counterfactual prediction*) estimate the counterfactual value of the variable given the exogenous noise and intervention.

4.2.2 Counterfactual mixtures comparison. We compare the interventional (OIM) and counterfactual (OCM) versions of our method as well as the related path-specific counterfactual fairness (PSCF) using a multi-stage linear model introduced in the PSCF paper [7]:

$$M = \theta^m + \theta_z^m Z + \theta_c^m C + \epsilon_m, \tag{2}$$

$$L = \theta^l + \theta_z^l Z + \theta_c^l C + \theta_m^l M + \epsilon_l, \tag{3}$$

$$Y = \theta^y + \theta_z^y Z + \theta_c^y C + \theta_m^y M + \theta_l^y L + \epsilon_y, \tag{4}$$

where C, M, L are components of $\boldsymbol{X}$, $\boldsymbol{Z}$ is the protected attribute, and ϵ_c, ϵ_m, ϵ_l are exogenous noise variables. The causal influence of Z on decisions Y and the mediator M is assumed unfair and all other influences are fair. In other words, Y is affected by direct discrimination via Z *and* indirect discrimination via M. This means that our method needs to be applied first to M and then to Y.

For simplicity, without loss of generality, let us consider a scenario where we have enough samples to have perfect estimates of a well-specified model's parameters, so that the estimated model is $\hat{m} = \theta^m + \theta_z^m z + \theta_c^m c$. In this scenario, the *abduction* step corresponds to computing $\epsilon_m = m - \hat{m}$; the *intervention* step to applying OIM to $\hat{m}$, yielding $\hat{m}^* = \theta^m + \theta_z^m z^* + \theta_c^m c$; and the *counterfactual prediction* to injecting the abducted noise into the estimated model, $\hat{m}^c = \theta^m + \theta_z^m z^* + \theta_c^m c + \epsilon_m$. Overall, we refer to these three steps as the single-stage OCM. Same as the PSCF, the multi-stage OCM corrects the decision through a correction on all the variables that are influenced by the protected attribute along unfair pathways. Thus, we first apply the OCM to get a non-discriminatory counterfactual $\hat{m}^c$, then we propagate $\hat{m}^c$ to its descendants and apply the OCM to yield a fair counterfactual $\hat{l}^c$, and finally we propagate the two counterfactuals to $\hat{y}$ and apply the OIM (not OCM, since we do not observe Y) to get $\hat{y}^c$:

$$\hat{m}^c = \theta^m + \theta_z^m z^* + \theta_c^m c + \epsilon_m = m - \theta_z^m (z - z^*), \tag{5}$$

$$\hat{l}^c = \theta^l + \theta_z^l z + \theta_c^l c + \theta_m^l \hat{m}^c + \epsilon_l = l - \theta_m^l (m - \hat{m}^c), \tag{6}$$

$$\hat{y}^c = \theta^y + \theta_z^y z^* + \theta_c^y c + \theta_m^y \hat{m}^c + \theta_l^y \hat{l}^c, \tag{7}$$

where z^* is the expected value of Z resulting from the optimal mixing distribution for Z. Conversely, applying solely the OIM to obtain $\hat{m}^*$, $\hat{l}^*$, and $\hat{y}^*$ does not take advantage of estimating the noise terms ϵ_m and ϵ_l, and results in estimators

$$\hat{m}^* = \theta^m + \theta_z^m z^* + \theta_c^m c, \tag{8}$$

$$\hat{l}^* = \theta^l + \theta_z^l z + \theta_c^l c + \theta_m^l \hat{m}^*, \tag{9}$$

$$\hat{y}^* = \theta^y + \theta_z^y z^* + \theta_c^y c + \theta_m^y \hat{m}^* + \theta_l^y \hat{l}^*. \tag{10}$$

When comparing $\hat{y}^*$ and $\hat{y}^c$ we observe that difference in estimating ϵ_m unsurprisingly yields the noise terms, $\hat{y}^c = \hat{y}^* + \theta_m^y \epsilon_m + \theta_l^y \theta_m^l \epsilon_m$, which results in a larger error w.r.t. Y for the OIM than the OCM,

$$\mathbb{E}(Y - \hat{Y}^*)^2 = \mathbb{E}(Y - \hat{Y}^c)^2 + (\theta_m^y \epsilon_m + \theta_l^y \theta_m^l \epsilon_m)^2. \tag{11}$$

A comparison with the PSCF reveals that $\hat{y}^c = \hat{y}^{\text{PSCF}} + \Delta$, where $\Delta = z^*(\theta_z^y + \theta_m^y \theta_z^m + \theta_l^y \theta_m^l \theta_z^m)$. The mean squared error w.r.t. Y is larger for the PSCF than for the OCM by the square of the difference, i.e., $\mathbb{E}(Y - \hat{Y}^{\text{PSCF}})^2 = \mathbb{E}(Y - \hat{Y}^c)^2 + \Delta^2$. Overall, the OCM is more accurate than the PSCF, because the PSCF relies on a choice of reference value, z', also known as baseline, which is assumed $z' = 0$ in the PSCF paper and above example. However, this choice is arbitrary and it is not clear what the baseline should be for non-binary $\boldsymbol{Z}$. By contrast, the OCM introduces a distribution $\pi(z')$ and optimizes it for accuracy. In addition, it follows from Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, that the OIM and by extension the OCM, are the most accurate interventional and counterfactual models on the non-discriminatory test datasets (up to the unlearnable constant C_p).

5 EVALUATION METHOD AND EVALUATED METHODS

In the remaining sections, we measure the *resilience* of various learning methods to discriminatory concept shifts that have more complex functional forms than the additive shifts described in the previous section. We begin by introducing the notion of resilience and the evaluated learning methods addressing discrimination.

5.1 Resilience

Note that the range of cross-loss values depends on the dataset and loss function. To make comparisons across datasets, we introduce the measure of resilience by normalizing the inverse of cross-loss, so that the resilience is a number between 0 and 1. For a specific pair of datasets D_{train} and D, the larger the cross-loss, the lower the resilience of the learning algorithm to the concept shift from training data D_{train}.

Definition 8. ***Resilience.*** *The resilience of algorithm a to a discriminatory concept shift from non-discriminatory data D to potentialy discriminatory D_{train} is a ratio of the expected loss of the standard algorithm training on D and the cross-loss of algorithm a training on D_{train}:*

$$\Omega_a = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{D}\left[\ell\left(U, \hat{u}(\boldsymbol{X}|D)\right)\right] / \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{D}\left[\ell\left(U, \hat{y}_a(\boldsymbol{X}|D_{train})\right)\right], \tag{12}$$

where $\hat{u}(\boldsymbol{x}|D)$ is a model of the non-discriminatory ground truth trained on dataset D.

The enumerator of resilience takes into account that U can be intrinsically random and unpredictable.[2] The resilience is confined, $0 \leq \Omega \leq 1$. This property is ensured if both learning algorithms yielding the models $\hat{u}(\boldsymbol{x}|D)$ and $\hat{y}_a(\boldsymbol{x}|\tilde{D})$ optimise the same vanilla objective function, e.g., both optimize expected loss, where the algorithm a adds an extra component to address discrimination. An algorithm that is perfectly resilient to the discriminatory concept shift yields $\Omega = 1$, and $\Omega = 0$ otherwise.

5.2 Evaluated learning methods

A number of algorithms addressing discrimination have been developed by adding a constraint or a regularization to the objective function [13, 15, 22, 46, 47, 58, 61–63]. Most of these algorithms prevent direct discrimination, but it should come as no surprise that some of them do not prevent the induction of discrimination. For instance, the algorithms that put constraints on the aforementioned disparities in treatment and impact [15, 46, 61] induce "reverse" discrimination, by affecting the members of advantaged group and the people similar to them in a non-desirable manner when training on a non-discriminatory dataset D [33]. As an example, such "reverse" discrimination would result in less job opportunities for similarly qualified short-haired women than long-haired women, because short hair is associated with males and there is a historical correlation between hiring and gender [33]. Other studies propose interesting statistical notions of fairness, such as equalized opportunity, $P(\hat{y}|y = 1, z = 0) = P(\hat{y}|y = 1, z = 1)$, equalized odds, $P(\hat{y}|y, z = 0) = P(\hat{y}|y, z = 1)$ [13, 22, 47, 58], or parity mistreatment, $P(\hat{y} \neq y|z = 0) = P(\hat{y} \neq y|z = 1)$ [62]. However, prior works reveals the impossibility of simultaneously satisfying multiple non-discriminatory objectives, such as equalized opportunity and parity mistreatment [8, 17, 28]. There is a need to compare them.

We evaluate several of such methods in the next section. For this evaluation, we select a diverse set of algorithms that aim to prevent discrimination through different objectives: disparate impact [60, 61], disparate mistreatment [62], preferential fairness [63], equalized odds [22], a convex surrogate of equalized odds [13], game-theoretic envy-freeness [63], and a causal database repair [50]. We also evaluate a scenario where we prevent discrimination over multiple protected attributes. Here, the only fair-learning method we evaluate against is the method introduced in the fairness gerrymandering paper [26], as it considers fairness, based on the best subgroup-fair distribution over classifiers, across infinitely many subgroups. In all cases but one, we use implementations of these algorithms as provided by the authors. We re-implemented one of these methods [61] so that it works for the case of continuous Y. In Appendix B, we report these methods' parameters we select.

6 EVALUATION ON SYNTHETIC DATA

In the synthetic setting, we generate random non-discriminatory datasets D, containing samples of U, and perform a concept shift to create datasets $\tilde{D}$, containing samples of Y. Then, datasets $D_{\text{train}} = \tilde{D}$ are used for training, datasets D are used for testing, and we measure the resilience and the feature influence of various learning algorithms preventing discrimination, including the OIM. Next, we make these measurements as a function of the correlation between the protected and non-protected attributes, which often causes learning algorithms to induce discrimination via association. We also study the setting where there is no discriminatory concept shift, $D_{\text{train}} = D'$ (a dataset drawn from the same distribution as the test dataset D), but there is a feature correlated with the protected attributes that is fair to use, i.e., permitted by law. The learning algorithms operate in a blind setting, i.e., they have no information whether $D_{\text{train}} = D'$ or $D_{\text{train}} = \tilde{D}$. Other scenarios where we randomize the parameters of our data generating process or have a discriminatory concept shift under a complex non-linear functional form are available in Appendix E and H, respectively, and yield qualitatively the same results for resilience.

6.1 Resilience captures induced discrimination

Data generation. Without loss of generality, the data generating process of U can yield $\mathbb{E}[U|\boldsymbol{x}] = \sigma(f(\boldsymbol{x}))$, where f is a potentially non-linear function, and σ is a function establishing the respective support for U. For instance, for classification problems σ can be a logistic or softmax function, while for regression it can be identity. Next, we simulate discrimination as a concept shift from U that in general can be represented as $\mathbb{E}[Y|\boldsymbol{x}] = \sigma(g(\boldsymbol{x}, z))$, where g is some function. These concept shifts may or may not be discriminatory, depending on how expected outcomes were shifted: i) no discrimination, if $g(\boldsymbol{x}, z) = f(\boldsymbol{x})$, ii) direct discrimination, if $g(\boldsymbol{x}, z)$ depends on z, iii) induced discrimination, if $g(\boldsymbol{x}, z) = \tilde{f}(\boldsymbol{x}) \neq f(\boldsymbol{x}) + \text{const}$. We study simple forms of $f(\boldsymbol{x})$ and $g(\boldsymbol{x}, z)$ that are linear combinations of its arguments, i.e., $f(\boldsymbol{x}) = \boldsymbol{\alpha}^\intercal \boldsymbol{x}$ and $g(\boldsymbol{x}, z) = \tilde{\boldsymbol{\alpha}}^\intercal \boldsymbol{x} + \beta z$, and σ is the logistic function.

Results. We focus first on a data-generating process that extends the loan-interest Example to binary dependent variables, which are prevalent in real-world decision-making. Specifically, $u \sim \text{Bernoulli}[\mathbb{E}[U|\boldsymbol{x}]]$ and $y \sim \text{Bernoulli}[\mathbb{E}[Y|\boldsymbol{x}]]$, where $f(\boldsymbol{x}) = x_1$ and $g(\boldsymbol{x}, z) = x_1 + \beta z$. We model this data with logistic regression and measure how the resilience and the expected value of influence of each feature changes with the increasing correlation between X_1 and Z. We measure influence using SHAP (SHapley Additive exPlanations), a popular explainability measure [37].

We study two cases of the training dataset $\tilde{D}$: (i) without any concept shift (no discrimination, $\beta = 0$, left Figures 3 & 4) and (ii) with a discriminatory concept shift ($\beta = 5$, right Figures 3 & 4). In both cases, the resilience of most learning algorithms is sub-optimal and for several methods it drops with the correlation.

For the non-discriminatory case (i), Lipton et al. [33] demonstrates that the algorithms fighting the disparities in treatment and impact [15, 46, 61] induce "reverse" discrimination. Our measurements of resilience and input influence captures this result and extend it to methods based on equalized odds and disparate mistreatment (the orange and brown lines in the left Figure 3 and orange line in Figures 4a), including methods equalizing overall misclassification rate, false negative rate, and related measures (Appendix D). The only methods that do not bias the models in this scenario are: traditional supervised learning and the two methods

[2] If U is not intrinsically unpredictable, then $\mathbb{E}_D\left[\ell\left(U, \hat{u}(\boldsymbol{X}|D)\right)\right]$ can be zero. In such cases, a small value could be added to the enumerator and denominator of resilience, to prevent it from taking the value of zero. This scenario is uncommon in practice.



Figure 3: Average resilience to potentially discriminatory concept shifts decreases with the correlation between X_1 and Z. The coefficient that scales the discrimination in the training data is $\beta = 0$ for the case of no discrimination (left) and $\beta = 5$ for direct discrimination (right). Each point is an average over 100 random datasets. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals.

that fall back to it if there is no direct discrimination in the data, i.e., the game-theoretic method based on envy-freeness (yellow line overlaps with the red line in the left Figure 3) and the OIM.

For the discriminatory case (ii), we observe that with the growing correlation the resilience of the OIM stays high, whereas of three other algorithms decreases, suggesting that they induce discrimination via association [55], i.e., they replace the protected attribute with its proxy thus replicating "redlining", which causes a drop in resilience (e.g., the blue dotted line in the right Figure 3 & in Figure 4b). Therefore, it is not sufficient to simply drop the protected attribute in traditional learning. Some methods perform poorly irrespective of the correlations, e.g., "Hardt", because it allows direct discrimination (orange lines in Figure 3 & 4). Overall, the two cases show that many learning algorithms induce discrimination or directly discriminate, i.e., they yield biased models by changing the impact of $\boldsymbol{X}$ on $\hat{Y}$ or are directly impacted by $\boldsymbol{Z}$.

7 EVALUATION ON REAL-WORLD DATASETS

In the synthetic settings, we experimented in an idealized environment where we had full information on the discriminatory concept shift and, therefore, knew the non-discriminatory ground truth. However, with real-world scenarios it is often the case that we only have access to a potentially discriminatory dataset without any information about the concept shift or we have a concept shift under a complex non-linear function. Therefore, we analyze the OIM in two types of real-world settings. Firstly, on tabular datasets commonly found in algorithmic fairness research where we have multiple protected attributes and no information on the concept shift. Then, on the CelebA image dataset [35] where we have non-discriminatory labels and introduce a discriminatory concept shift, while working with a highly non-linear deep neural net.

7.1 Concept shift information unknown

Datasets. We focus on two datasets that are prevalent in the literature on fairness: the COMPAS dataset of recidivism risk [31] and the German Credit dataset of creditworthiness [14], and their respective binary classification tasks.

The ProPublica COMPAS dataset [31] contains the records of 7214 offenders in Broward County, Florida in 2013 and 2014. As target, y, we use the binary label describing whether an individual recommitted a crime ($y = 1$). For comparison with the original study [31], we follow their labeling of recidivism as the positive outcome. In our single-protected attribute scenario we use the race (African American, Caucasian) as the protected feature, Z. We use race and sex (male, female) in the multiple protected attribute scenario. This dataset also includes information about the severity of charge, the number of prior crimes, and the age of individuals.

The German Credit Dataset [14] provides information about 1000 individuals and the corresponding binary labels describing them as creditworthy ($y = 1$) or not ($y = 0$). Each variable $\boldsymbol{x}$ includes 20 attributes with both continuous and categorical data. We use the binary gender of individuals as the protected feature. This dataset also includes information aboutthe age, job type, housing type, and total amount in bank accounts of applicants and the total amount in credit, the duration, and the purpose of loan applications.

Measures. Since the non-discriminatory ground truth is unknown for these datasets, we use standard accuracy and demographic disparity to compare the learning algorithms. Demographic disparity measures disparate impact: DD = $|P(\hat{y} = 1|z = 0) - P(\hat{y} = 1|z = 1)|$ [50, 61]. While other measures have been proposed and used in the real-world context of applications [31], such as disparity in false positive rate (FPD = $|P(\hat{y} = 1|y = 0, z = 0) - P(\hat{y} = 1|y = 0, z = 1)|$) or positive predictive value (PPD = $|P(y = 1|\hat{y} = 1, z = 0) - P(y = 1|\hat{y} = 1, z = 1)|$), both of which we report, these and other measures derived from the confusion matrix are determined by accuracy and demographic disparity [8, 17, 28, 41]. For the multiple protected attribute scenario, we report disparity for each combination of sex and race w.r.t. the largest and, across each measure, the most disadvantaged group in COMPAS, Black males.

Results. We report the mean of the accuracy and disparities for the single-protected attribute scenarios and the multi-protected attribute COMPAS scenario in Figures 5 & 6 respectively.

For the German Credit data, the OIM achieves the lowest demographic disparity and the highest accuracy (right panels of Figure 5). For the COMPAS data on one protected attribute it also achieves the top accuracy, while yielding medium demographic disparity. The method that achieves much lower demographic disparity than the OIM directly constrains disparate impact at the expense of drastically lower accuracy and higher other disparities ("Zafar" in the top left panel of Figure 5). The OIM also performs well in terms of false positive disparity and has medium performance for positive predictive disparity (four bottom panels in Figure 5).

In the multiple protected attribute scenario, the OIM performed better than the traditional and the fair-learning method, "GerryFair" [26], in demographic and false positive disparities, while maintaining high accuracy (Figure 5 & 6). Therefore, the OIM addresses the substantial disparities in false positive rates by race reported in ProPublica's analysis of COMPAS over all intersections of race and sex [31]. Even though the OIM resulted in marginally worse positive predictive disparity than the traditional method, as revealed in ProPublica's analysis and our results, this disparity is minimal to begin with. Note that tuning the "GerryFair" method's parameters either increased accuracy with more disparity or vise-versa.

In both datasets and protected attribute scenarios, the OIM performs similarly to the traditional method that drops the protected attributes, "Without Z", and select state-of-the-art methods; however, these methods does not offer any protections, nor guarantees, against induced discrimination, as described in §4, and for the other datasets we studied they induce discrimination and/or directly discriminate (see §6 and §7.2).



(a) No direct discrimination, $g(\boldsymbol{x}, z) = x_1 + 0 * z$

(b) Directly discriminatory, $g(\boldsymbol{x}, z) = x_1 + 5 * z$

Figure 4: Average absolute value of SHAP values for X_1 and Z as the correlation between X_1 and Z increases. Each point is an average over 100 random datasets. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals.



Figure 5: Performance of learning algorithms inhibiting discrimination over COMPAS and German Credit datasets. Higher accuracy (ACC) and lower demographic disparity (DD), positive predictive disparity (PPD), and false positive disparity (FPD) are better.

7.2 Concept shift information known

Dataset. We focus on the CelebA dataset [35] commonly found in computer vision and deep learning literature. Here, the task is to classify the hair color of celebrities in photos, so the target labels are unlikely to be affected by any discrimination. That is, the non-discriminatory U is known and we can simulate discriminatory concept shift by swapping hair color labels to generate a discriminatory Y, which enable the measurements of cross-loss in real-world scenarios.

CelebA is composed of celebrity images, each with 40 attribute annotations. Each image is transformed to 128*128 pixels, constituting the features $\boldsymbol{X}$. We use the official train-val-test split from Liu et al. [35] with blond ($y = 1$) or not blond hair ($y = 0$) as the target and binary gender as the protected attribute. To avoid sampling bias w.r.t. the hair-gender groups, we balance the dataset based on the smallest group (blond males). The balanced training and testing sets have 5,548 and 720 samples. To simulate a discriminatory concept shift, we randomly swap the labels of 50% of blond males to not blond in the training data. We train the methods on this discriminatory data, except for the traditional method trained on the non-discriminatory data (green in Figure 7 & 8).

Models and training. As our base model architecture we use a Pytorch implementation of ResNet-18 [23]. In addition to the OIM, only one of the evaluated learning methods' implementation, Hardt et al. [22], can handle deep learning models, since both of them are post-processing methods. Therefore, all the methods train ResNet-18 on the images without annotations, then both fair learning methods use the gender annotations in their post-processing step. The OIM also requires the addition of the protected attribute to the feature set when training ResNet-18. To avoid any changes to the architecture, we encode gender in the images via special markings (e.g., 10 pixel wide green and blue boxes shown in Figure 7a). First, we train ResNet-18 on the photos with markings. Then, we estimate the optimal mixing distribution, π^*, on the training data. At the test time, we first compute the ResNet-18 predictions on the photos with either value of the gender mark, and then we average these predictions using the learned mixing distribution. Note that we do not use the ground-truth gender for making predictions in the test set, but rather the counterfactual values of the gender markings. Other methods train without these markings.

Results. We measure the expected cross-loss, demographic disparity (DD), false positive disparity (FPD), and positive predictive disparity (PPD). Despite training on the discriminatory data like the traditional biased method (blue in Figure 7), the OIM reduces the expected cross-loss and the disparities close to that of the traditional unbiased method (red and green in Figure 7). By contrast, when trained on discriminatory data, the traditional learning without Z (without markings) performs poorly both in terms of disparities and the cross-loss, especially for blond males whose label was swapped (blue in Figure 7). Without the gender encoding, the model uses visual features of the images, such as hair and face shape, as proxies for gender. The method by Hardt et al. [22] results in the lowest DD and PPD (orange bars in Figure 7). However, it yields the highest expected cross-loss, in particular for the group with biased labels, i.e., blond males, and its female counterpart. In addition, this method tends to be further away (than the OIM) from the vanilla Resnet-18 training on the non-discriminatory data in terms of disparities. The presented OIM results use 10 pixel wide green boxes on the corners of images of females with same sized blue markings on male pictures (Figure 7a). The results for similar markings as Figure 7a are nearly the same (Appendix I). The expected cross-loss and the disparities of the OIM initially decrease monotonically with the width of the markings (Figure 8). At the width of about 10 pixels this trend flattens, both in terms of expected cross-loss and disparities, suggesting that the markings are sufficiently large already for the



Figure 6: Performance of learning algorithms inhibiting discrimination over all combinations of race & sex on COMPAS. Disparity measures are on each given group w.r.t. Black Males. Higher accuracy (ACC) and lower disparities (DD, PPD, FPD) are better.



Figure 7: The expected cross-loss by hair-gender group (left plot) and the overall performance (right plot) of learning algorithms trained on the biased data following a discriminatory concept shift, except for the traditional trained on unbiased data (green bar). Marker style are shown in the photos on the left and have width of 10 pixels. Lower values are better. "Traditional" is ResNet-18.



Figure 8: Overall expected cross-loss and demographic disparity of learning algorithms as marking pixel size increases. Marker style as in 7a. Lower values are better. "Traditional" is ResNet-18.

model to use them. We note that, in real-world application domains where cross-loss cannot be measured, the size of markings can be established based on the disparity measures.

8 CONCLUSION

Discussion. Our results shed a new light on the problem of discrimination prevention in supervised learning. First, we propose a new objective for discrimination prevention in supervised learning seeking methods that are resilient to discriminatory dataset shifts. Dataset shifts clarify the dataset issues that can lead to discriminatory models. Different dataset shifts can be identified and tackled with different learning methods, so the remaining big question is whether these methods can be combined or are conflicting.

Second, we show that the optimal interventional mixtures do not produce "reverse" discrimination nor induce discrimination. In the scenarios where training data is not discriminatory, the proposed learning method falls back to a traditional learning, and hence it is safer for general use than other approaches. While we do not provide resilience guarantees for discriminatory concept shifts with other perturbations than additive perturbations, to our knowledge this is the first study to provide such guarantees. Future research can study other dataset shifts to clarify the limits of this approach.

Third, we show that the proposed method is applicable to real-world settings with multiple protected groups and meets the explainability goal of removing their discriminatory impact, while remaining compatible with existing legal systems. The method provides a solution to the widely-discussed issue of protected groups' intersectionality and strikes a balance between protected groups, i.e., it does not correspond to affirmative actions advantageous to certain groups. The method overall is transparent and relatively easy to communicate to policymakers and courtroom officials.

Limitations. We studied a variety of datasets and models, finding support for our methods, but a wider set of scenarios could be considered. In future, discriminatory concept shifts could be measured via randomized human subject experiments or observational studies, and fair learning methods could be evaluated on resulting datasets and benchmarks. For instance, one could identify the groups of discriminating and fair members of hiring teams, as in our running Example, via population-level mixture models without identifying the individuals that belong to them [20]. Then, mixture components could be used to simulate realistic discriminatory and fair decisions. Such evaluation techniques would facilitate the comparisons and bolster the credibility of fair learning methods.

All fairness objectives run the risk of being misused by practitioners to justify that their decision-making systems are fair. In any decision-making scenario, our method requires understanding whether the relationships in the causal model are fair and not. However, a practitioner may neglect the proper understanding of the causal processes and their fairness, e.g., they may overlook indirect discrimination §4.2. While our method will eliminate direct discrimination, it would not remove indirect discrimination, unless it is applied in an appropriate way. Thus, we emphasize the utmost importance of collaboration with domain experts to better understand the underlying causal process and their interpretation when applying our method and any other fair-learning methods in consequential decision-making systems.

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Stress-Testing Bias Mitigation Algorithms to Understand Fairness Vulnerabilities

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ABSTRACT

To address the growing concern of unfairness in Artificial Intelligence (AI), several bias mitigation algorithms have been introduced in prior research. Their capabilities are often evaluated on certain overly-used datasets without rigorously stress-testing them under simultaneous train and test distribution shifts. To address this, we investigate the fairness vulnerabilities of these algorithms across several distribution shift scenarios using synthetic data, to highlight scenarios where these algorithms do and don't work to encourage their trustworthy use. The paper makes three important contributions. Firstly, we propose a flexible pipeline called the Fairness Auditor to systematically stress-test bias mitigation algorithms using multiple synthetic datasets with shifts. Secondly, we introduce the Deviation Metric for measuring the fairness and utility performance of these algorithms under such shifts. Thirdly, we propose an interactive reporting tool for comparing algorithmic performance across various synthetic datasets, mitigation algorithms and metrics called the Fairness Report.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies** → **Artificial intelligence**.

KEYWORDS

fairness, bias, distribution shift, auditing, synthetic data

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1 INTRODUCTION

Artificial Intelligence (AI) models enable data-driven decisions in applications such as job hiring, loan granting, college admission screening and more [19]. Despite their wide applicability, recent research has revealed that such models can be biased, often discriminating against certain groups of individuals [7, 23]. For example, an automated screening of individuals based on historic data was found to correlate race, address, and birthplace to poorer rates of acceptance [19]. Such correlations can be concerning if they lead to disparate outcomes or if the screening is sensitive to these attributes even when other attributes are fixed. Such biases are observed due to biased datasets or the models developed on them. For example, ImageNet, a popular image dataset, disproportionately represents images from various countries. 45% of the images come from the United States while only 3.1% images are from China and India [23]. This translates to poorer model performance, where the authors found that the prediction of groom/bride images had higher confidence on US-based images than Ethiopia or Pakistan. In another study, the authors found that commercially available facial recognition systems misclassified dark-skinned women four times more often than light-skin males [7].

With the growing concern that datasets and Machine Learning (ML) models have biases, there is a need for using "bias mitigation algorithms" [3] which are developed to mitigate unwanted bias for fair and trustworthy ML models. However, these algorithms are typically evaluated on a few overly-used datasets without discussing their strengths and weaknesses under simultaneous train and test distribution shifts. Recent research has shown that shifts in data are common. For example, in [6, 10], the authors discussed how covariate shifts occur in real applications where source and target datasets have different distributions. Another study discussed the fairness properties of models and mitigation algorithms from a causal perspective [22] under shifts. Typically, bias mitigation algorithms are evaluated on unique train-test distributions. However, to rigorously evaluate the fairness capabilities of these algorithms, we must evaluate them on many potential distribution shifts to identify fairness vulnerabilities. We define "fairness vulnerabilities" as distribution shifts where the bias mitigation algorithm struggles to remove unwanted bias and/or increases bias.

However, datasets with different distribution shifts are not easily accessible. For example, the Adult Income dataset [2] is based on a 1994 US Census database. However, a potentially shifted dataset for a recent study is hard to identify as there is no 2023 US Census dataset available to conduct a similar study. Furthermore, in the healthcare domain, access to health data is limited by privacy laws such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in the United States [9] and General Data Protection

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Regulation (GDPR) in the European Union [11]. Lack of access to shifted data is likely to hinder trust in AI models as an algorithm trained and evaluated on a dataset cannot directly be used on a shifted dataset without testing. To address this, in this study, we propose the rigorous evaluation of bias mitigation algorithms using synthetically generated datasets with distribution shifts, referred to as "scenarios". These scenarios are deliberately biased (resulting in distribution shifts) towards certain populations and thus, expose whether the bias mitigation algorithms struggle to recover from these unwanted biases. The approach replicates shifts without the need for getting access to new data. It can systematically generate many different scenarios so the potential vulnerabilities of bias mitigation algorithms can be understood. We believe that more rigorous and complete evaluation can lead to better bias mitigation algorithms and create greater trust in them.

The contributions of this study are as follows:

- We propose Fairness Auditor, a flexible pipeline to systematically stress-test bias mitigation algorithms using multiple synthetic datasets with distribution shifts derived from a limited number of real datasets for understanding fairness vulnerabilities.
- We introduce the Deviation Metric that summarizes a suite of scores for a fairness or utility metric to evaluate bias mitigation algorithms under shifts. It quantifies the scores across many scenarios using empirical Cumulative Distribution Functions (eCDFs).
- To efficiently communicate the results and vulnerabilities found in the fairness audit, we propose an interactive reporting tool for comparing algorithmic performance across various synthetic datasets, bias mitigation algorithms, and metrics called the Fairness Report.

The synthetic scenarios are generated using stratified sampling of the Adult Income dataset [2] and using Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) on datasets derived from the Medical Information Mart for Intensive Care (MIMIC-III) dataset [13, 16, 17]. We measure the utility and fairness of the ML models trained with four bias mitigation algorithms on these datasets to identify fairness vulnerabilities across many scenarios.

2 METHODOLOGY

2.1 Notation and Preliminaries

Let us consider three random variables A, X, and Y such that A is one or more protected attributes (such as ethnicity, race, gender), X is the remaining set of attributes (such as admission location, HbA1c test levels) and Y is the outcome variable (such as having higher or lower income, having a disease or not). Then, we can describe a given real dataset D^0 as $D^0 = \{A, X, Y\}$, representing a classification task where features A and X are used to predict Y using an ML model M. We define the values predicted by this model M using $\hat{Y}$. For simplicity, we consider A to be a binary protected attribute such that $A = 1$ represents one group while the rest of the population is described by $A = 0$, thus, $A \in \{0, 1\}$. Similarly, Y is also assumed to be a binary outcome variable such that $Y \in \{0, 1\}$.

We assume that A and Y are both binary random variables with a Bernoulli marginal distribution. Their joint distribution can be represented as a contingency table where the cells represent the proportions of combinations of protected attribute A and outcome variable Y, with the row and column sums as the marginal proportions. Denoting the proportions for the dataset D^0 with different subscripts, the contingency table is shown in Table 1. We note that in Table 1, $p^0_{A=0} + p^0_{A=1} = p^0_{Y=0} + p^0_{Y=1} = 100\%$. Also, this can be extended straightforwardly to multinomial A and Y.

Table 1: Contingency Table for Protected Attribute A and Outcome Y

	$A=0$	$A=1$	
$Y=0$	$p^0_{A=0,Y=0}$	$p^0_{A=1,Y=0}$	$p^0_{Y=0}$
$Y=1$	$p^0_{A=0,Y=1}$	$p^0_{A=1,Y=1}$	$p^0_{Y=1}$
	$p^0_{A=0}$	$p^0_{A=1}$	

2.2 Generating Synthetic Scenarios with Shifts

There are four types of distribution shifts (see [22] for more discussion): (a) Demographic shift (change in distribution of A), (b) Covariate shift (change in distribution of X), (c) Label shift (change in distribution of Y) and (d) Compound shift (two or more shifts). Compound shifts are most common as seen in the healthcare example in Schrouff et al. [22] where the data sources for training and deployment are different. Thus, for a rigorous evaluation of bias mitigation algorithms and their potential vulnerabilities, we propose to evaluate them on synthetically generated datasets with compound shifts. We introduce compound shifts in the datasets with simultaneous demographic shift and label shift by changing the proportions of the protected attribute A and outcome Y.

To create these scenarios, we use the Iterative Proportional Fitting (IPF) algorithm, which has been used across many applications including the identification of missing values by estimation and population count scaling [18]. We start with the original dataset distribution represented by a contingency table such as in Table 1. For each desired new synthetic data with distribution shift (scenario), we define the desired marginal distribution of the outcome and protected attribute. IPF is then used to generate an updated joint distribution that matches the desired marginal while in some sense keeping the desired distribution as close as possible to the original distribution. The resulting table is the joint probability distribution of maximum likelihood estimates based on probability convergence limits [20] while maintaining cross-product ratios.

Let us consider that we want to generate a synthetic dataset D^1 with compound shift such that the proportions are represented by p^1 with different subscripts. Thus, the protected attribute proportions are defined by $p^1_{A=0}$ and $p^1_{A=1}$ while the outcome marginals are defined by $p^1_{Y=0}$ and $p^1_{Y=1}$ such that $p^1_{A=0} + p^1_{A=1} = p^1_{Y=0} + p^1_{Y=1} = 100\%$. If the total records are defined as $\hat{N}^1_{total}$, then counts are represented as $\hat{N}^1_{Z=a} = p^1_{Z=a}\hat{N}^1_{total}$, where Z can be A or Y with $a \in \{0, 1\}$. These values are then input as the new marginals into the IPF algorithm along with the original contingency Table 1. These cell values are iteratively updated such that the row and column sums closely match the marginals specified and IPF returns the cell values $\hat{N}^1_{A=0,Y=0}$, $\hat{N}^1_{A=0,Y=1}$, $\hat{N}^1_{A=1,Y=0}$, and $\hat{N}^1_{A=1,Y=1}$. In this dataset, $\hat{N}^1_{A=0,Y=0} + \hat{N}^1_{A=0,Y=1} + \hat{N}^1_{A=1,Y=0} + \hat{N}^1_{A=1,Y=1} = \hat{N}^1_{total}$. In essence, IPF generates a plan of how to create the dataset D^1 from



Figure 1: Design of the Fairness Auditor. The auditor includes four steps for evaluating bias mitigation algorithms based on the inputs: (1) Dataset, (2) Synthetic Data Generator, (3) Bias Mitigation Algorithm, and (4) Fairness and Utility metrics.

Table 2: Contingency Table representing the original proportions of protected attribute and outcome in the Adult Income dataset

	Females	Males	
Low-inc	13,026(28.8%)	20,988(46.41%)	75.22%
High-inc	1,669(3.69%)	9,539(21.09%)	24.78%
	32.5%	67.5%	

Table 3: Contingency Table representing the updated proportions of protected attribute and outcome in the Adult Income dataset in the synthetic scenario with higher number of high-income Females

	Females	Males	
Low-inc	967(9.67%)	33(0.33%)	10.0%
High-inc	8,033(80.33%)	967(9.67%)	90.0%
	90.0%	10.0%	

the original dataset D^0. Each scenario is a shifted dataset generated by stratified sampling according to this plan. Thus, IPF enables the transformation of a source distribution in the real data to a target distribution for the desired scenarios by changing the proportions of A and Y. This process can be used to create many synthetic scenarios with shifts derived from limited real datasets where both train and test distributions are shifted.

For instance, let Table 2 represent the contingency table for the Adult Income dataset (the pre-processing steps are described in the supplementary material). From the source distribution which has a higher population of high-income Males, we can create a synthetic scenario having a higher population of high-income Females. Thus, we set the marginal proportions of protected attribute A to 10-90 Male-to-Female, and the proportions of outcome Y to 10-90 Low-income-to-High-income, as shown in Table 3. IPF then returns the four cell values in the contingency table. This table is used as the basis for stratified sampling to create the target synthetic scenario, against which the bias mitigation algorithm should be evaluated.

After identification of the target synthetic data distribution using IPF, the synthetic scenario is achieved by conditionally sampling records based on protected attribute and outcome counts $(\hat{N}^1_{A=0,Y=0}, \hat{N}^1_{A=0,Y=1}, \hat{N}^1_{A=1,Y=0}, \hat{N}^1_{A=1,Y=1})$, either by bootstrapping from D^0, using synthetic data generators of D^0 created by Generative Adversarial Networks [14] or other methods. In this paper, we specifically discuss two methods for conditional sampling based on the proportions identified by IPF.

The first process (referred to here as Bootstrap) samples the real data with replacement according to different shifted proportions. This results in scenarios created by biased sampling of the original data. For the second process, we use a privacy-preserving Generative Adversarial Network (GAN), HealthGAN [25]. HealthGAN has been shown to be effective for generating high-utility, resemblance- and privacy-preserving data for public and private healthcare datasets [24]. Synthetic scenarios are generated using HealthGAN without conditioning and then, bootstrapped with replacement using the values identified by IPF. The two scenario sampling methods have different strengths and weaknesses. Bootstrap has the advantage that while being efficient and effective, it precisely preserves the distribution of $p(X|A, Y)$. But bootstrapping has the disadvantage that it requires the distribution of the original data and is limited by the size of the original dataset. The advantage of using advanced synthetic data generators such as HealthGAN is the ability to generate a large amount of data from small datasets while preserving privacy of the original dataset. The disadvantage is that the GANs require training and may introduce additional shifts and biases in the data beyond the desired ones.

2.3 Fairness Auditor

We propose the Fairness Auditor as a pipeline for evaluating bias mitigation algorithms under distribution shifts by using the synthetic data generation process described in the previous sub-section. The auditor generates a grid of scenarios with possible shifts and then evaluates the algorithm across this set of scenarios to highlight where these algorithms do and don't work for identifying potential fairness vulnerabilities and encouraging their trustworthy use. The proposed design for the auditor is shown in Figure 1. The auditor

is flexible to accommodate any dataset, synthetic data generator, bias mitigation algorithm, and fairness-utility metrics. The auditor conducts a rigorous evaluation for any given bias mitigation algorithm with the steps described below:

- **Step 1:** Select base dataset $D^0 = \{A, X, Y\}$ to be used for evaluation. The dataset should represent a classification problem with outcome Y and a protected attribute A which needs to be tested for biases. The starting contingency table is created with proportions p^0 and counts N^0 with various subscripts similar to Table 1.
- **Step 2:** Define various combinations of the proportions of protected attribute A and outcome Y to form a grid with k scenarios. These specify the new marginal totals for the contingency table and constraints for IPF. After running IPF, a synthetic data generator is used to generate data conditioned on each cell (e.g. $A = 0$ and $Y = 0$) with the number of samples found using IPF. The synthetic data generation process can either directly generate synthetic data conditioned on the counts or non-conditionally generate data to be conditioned later using bootstrapping. This is repeated for different compound shifts, resulting in k different datasets $D^1, D^2, D^3 ... D^k$, each representing a synthetic scenario in a grid of possible scenarios.
- **Step 3:** The bias mitigation algorithm is then applied to each scenario where the train and test data have the same shifted distribution, to measure reduction in bias as measured by a fairness metric f and changes in utility as measured by a utility metric u. The results are reported using the Deviation Metric (DM) as described in Section 2.4. Based on the type of algorithm, the mitigation is performed before, during, or after ML model training for outcome prediction $\hat{Y}$.
- **Step 4:** The resulting metric scores are reported in a report called Fairness Report, highlighting shifts where the bias mitigation algorithm struggled to reduce and/or remove bias and thus, is vulnerable. The report is described in detail in Section 3.3.

For each scenario $D^i, i \in 1, 2, ...k$, the dataset is split into train D^i_{train} and test D^i_{test}, where each train-test pair's distribution is different from the other pairs.. The ML model M^i is trained along with the bias mitigation algorithm on D^i_{train}. The resulting model is then evaluated on the test dataset D^i_{test} which has the same distribution as D^i_{train}. Based on the user-specified fairness metric f and utility metric u, the results are reported to the user through the report. For each dataset D^i, the experiment is repeated s times by changing the *random_seed* for train-test split from $1, 2, ...s$. Mean and 95% Confidence Interval (95% CI) scores are reported across the s experiments for each of the k scenarios.

2.4 Metrics

As each algorithm is evaluated $k \times s$ times, a metric is needed to capture all the scores for doing a single-value comparison with others. To accommodate this, we propose the Deviation Metric (DM). The Deviation Metric summarizes a suite of scores measured using a metric m across many scenarios as a single-value. The underlying metric m can be a fairness metric f, a utility metric u, or others. Here, the analysis is performed by calculating the Deviation Metric for m by evaluating it on all k scenarios and s repetitions.



Figure 2: Example scenario describing the eCDF curve for the metric m. Shaded region 1 (green) and Shaded region 2 (purple) refer to the areas defining the deviation from ideal value 0. The Deviation Metric (DM) measures this deviation.

For this work, fairness is evaluated using group fairness [3] where different groups, such as those defined by protected attribute A ($A = 0$ or $A = 1$), receive similar scores. Additionally, utility is defined as the ML model's performance on the test data. These metrics are evaluated on all scenarios and then summarized to fairness and utility Deviation Metrics.

The metric m is evaluated across all k scenarios for s experiments each, resulting in a suite of scores ($k \times s$ values) for that metric. Additionally, each metric m has an ideal value V_{ideal} corresponding to the best possible performance for the algorithm. For example, for a fairness metric f, if no-bias implies a value of 0, then the ideal value for this metric is 0. However, this hinders a direct one-to-one comparison between algorithms as each algorithm's performance is now described by a list of scores. The Deviation Metric captures all these scores as a single value by aggregating the scores using the empirical Cumulative Distribution Function (eCDF) which characterizes the percentage of results observed in metric m below a specific value.

All the scores for the metric m and the ideal value V_{ideal} are plotted as curve C and line L respectively. The area between the curve C and the line L is then calculated to represent DM which summarizes all scores with one single value. To demonstrate, let's consider the example scenario represented by the eCDF curve C (blue) for metric m in Figure 2. The ideal value V_{ideal} is marked as a black line with value $x = 0$. For DM, the area between L and C is defined by the two shaded regions (green and purple) as shown in Figure 2. Put simply, DM measures how far away are the scores from the ideal value for the metric.

Thus a lower value of DM for metric m represents a better model. DM creates a single value to represent the vulnerabilities of the bias mitigation algorithm across all $k \times s$ experiments. The lower the DM

score, the better the algorithm and is thus, less vulnerable to shifts as compared to other algorithms for the given dataset and model. DM generalizes robust evaluation methods such as Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) method with AUC (Area Under Curve) [15] and Regression Error Curves (REC) [5]. Like AUC, the advantage of DM is that it allows different bias mitigation algorithms to be rigorously compared both visually and empirically across the grid of scenarios.

2.5 Experimental Design

In this study, we discuss the results on two datasets. The first dataset is the Adult Income dataset [2] which includes information about individuals and whether they earn more than $50K per year or not. The raw data is pre-processed to remove NaN values and categorical columns are one-hot encoded resulting in a total of 32 columns and 45,222 records. Based on the protected attribute, we define two versions of this dataset: (a) Adult Income (v1) that measures bias in Gender (Male-Female populations) and (b) Adult Income (v2) that measures bias in Marital-Status (Married-Single populations). For the second dataset, we define a Mortality dataset derived from a synthetic version of the MIMIC-III [13, 16, 17], dataset in a manner similar to previous studies [25]. In the Mortality dataset, we address the bias in Race (White-Black populations) while predicting mortality within 30 days of ICU admission. During pre-processing, we selected records for only Black and White individuals and perform one-hot and label encoding on the columns. Based on the selection of feature columns, we define three versions of the dataset: (a) Mortality dataset (v1) which includes features specific to Diabetic patients (16 columns and 3,365 records), (b) Mortality dataset (v2) which includes features for all patients (17 columns and 10,788 records) and (c) Mortality dataset (v3) which includes features as defined in a previous study [25] (13 columns and 11,173 records). The complete list of features for each dataset is described in the supplementary.

To create the shifts, we traverse the proportion of protected attribute A and outcome Y from 10% to 90%, each with a step of 10%. This creates a 9×9 grid of 81 scenarios. To create these scenarios, we synthetically generate datasets using bootstrapping of the real data with replacement based on the IPF counts. The total data size for each synthetic scenario is set to 100K records. For the Adult datasets, we conditionally sample using bootstrapping with replacement to create the 81 scenarios based on the IPF values. On the other hand, to ensure privacy preservation of the records in the Mortality dataset, we used the HealthGAN model [14, 25]. As HealthGAN does not generate data conditionally, we first generate 1M synthetic records and then we perform stratified sampling based on the IPF counts to create the 81 synthetic scenarios. For each of the k scenarios, the data is first split into 70-30 train-test data and then 30% of the train data is used as the validation set.

A classification model is trained on the training data and then, the probability threshold is set using hyper-parameter tuning using the validation data for best Balanced Accuracy. The resulting model and threshold are used to evaluate the fairness and utility metrics on the test data, each repeated 10 times ($s = 10$) for each scenario. While any classifier can be used, we present the results using two classification models: (a) Random Forest and (b) XGBoost. The model parameters are detailed in the supplementary.

For comprehensive testing, we evaluate mitigation algorithms from all three categories. We select two pre-processing algorithms, namely, Reweighing [8] and Disparate Impact Remover [12]. As an in-processing algorithm, we consider the Reductions algorithm [1]. As reductions can trade-off between fairness and utility, we discuss three versions here, each with a different value of the parameter *constraint_weight*: (a) Reduction (Utility focused): while balancing between utility and Equalized Odds, more weight is given to utility (*constraint_weight = 0.1*), (b) Reduction (Balanced): equal weight is used (*constraint_weight = 0.5*), and (c) Reduction (Fairness focused): more weight is given to the fairness metric (set to Equalized Odds) (*constraint_weight = 0.9*). Finally, we explore the Calibrated Equalized Odds [21] post-processing algorithm. Note that the hyper-parameter tuning during model training isn't used for Calibrated Equalized Odds as the algorithm is applied on the probability scores rather than actual predictions. The results for all bias mitigation algorithms are compared with the Baseline in which the ML models are trained on all 81 scenarios without the application of any bias mitigation algorithm.

In this study, we measure fairness using Equalized Odds. If the protected attribute A is comprised of two sub-groups, $A = 0$ and $A = 1$, then Equalized Odds is defined as:

$$EO = \max(|FPR_{A=0} - FPR_{A=1}|, |TPR_{A=0} - TPR_{A=1}|) \quad (1)$$

TPR refers to True Positive Rate and FPR refers to False Positive Rate. The regions of values considered to be fair are set as in Bhanot et al. [4]. As Equalized Odds measures the bias in the models in terms of both True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate (FPR), it provides a comprehensive picture of the bias. For utility, the Balanced Accuracy is used. For imbalanced datasets, using a metric like Balanced Accuracy ensures that the model's performance for all classes is captured. The users have the flexibility to select the fairness and utility metrics based on previous knowledge, expertise in the field, or the characteristics of the dataset.

Equalized Odds has an ideal value of 0 since completely fair models have no bias. The Equalized Odds scores are always positive. However, as the ideal value is 0, the eCDF plot will only have the green shaded region of Figure 2 while measuring Deviation Metric for Equalized Odds. Balanced Accuracy has an ideal value of 1 as the best model is completely accurate across all classes. The Balanced Accuracy scores are also always positive but lie in the range of 0 to 1. While measuring Deviation Metric for Balanced Accuracy, the eCDF plot will only have the purple shaded region of Figure 2.

3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

3.1 Identifying Fairness Vulnerabilities

For each scenario, using the 10 scores (s=10) calculated for fairness metric f, we measure the mean value. This mean value for the bias mitigation algorithm is calculated and compared with the Baseline to identify vulnerable distribution shifts. For Equalized Odds, if the scores are equal or higher than Baseline, the algorithm is vulnerable to that distribution shift as on average, it didn't reduce the bias. To capture the vulnerability across all shifts, we plot a heatmap where

Figure 3: Heatmap comparing the performance of Reduction (Fairness Focused) on Mortality dataset (v1) while evaluating Equalized Odds for Race bias.

each tile represents one shifted scenario. If the mean value for the bias mitigation algorithm is lower than Baseline, it is marked with Better (green) else it is marked with Similar or Worse (red).

Let's consider the case study of identifying vulnerabilities of Reduction (Fairness Focused) when evaluating Equalized Odds for Race bias in Mortality dataset (v1) as shown in Figure 3.

The heatmap in Figure 3 plots each scenario as a tile, representing a unique distribution shift. The first tile represents the Black-White population ratio as 10-90 and the population survived to not-survived as 10-90 (proportion of the outcome). If we move to the next tile below, the ratio of the Black-White population changes to 20-80 while keeping the outcome proportions the same, and so on. From the results, we find that Reduction (Fairness Focused) performed Better (green) than the Baseline as measured by the averaged Equalized Odds scores in a few scenarios but not all. In other scenarios, the algorithm suffers from fairness vulnerabilities as indicated by the red tiles on the heatmap. For example, when Black-White population proportions are 50-50 and the outcome proportions are 10-90 (tile marked with a black box), Reduction (Fairness Focused) is performing Similar to or Worse than the Baseline based on the averaged scores. We find that there are many such scenarios, each identified by a red tile, where the algorithm is vulnerable to distribution shifts in this dataset.

This is insightful as the user knows the various shifts where the algorithm is struggling and where it is performing well. This shall enable a robust understanding of the algorithm's performance and can guide a trustworthy use under shifts.

3.2 Comparing Bias Mitigation Algorithms

Let's consider two case studies to understand how the stress-testing performed by the Fairness Auditor and the scores summarized using the Deviation Metric can enable informed decision-making for algorithm comparison.

3.2.1 Case Study 1: Gender Bias in Adult Income dataset (v1). For the first case study, we measure Gender bias in Random Forest models trained on the Adult Income dataset. The mitigation algorithms are compared with the Baseline across all synthetic scenarios generated



Figure 4: Empirical Cumulative Distribution Functions (eCDFs) for (a) Equalized Odds and (b) Balanced Accuracy for Random Forest models trained with mitigation algorithms on the Adult Income dataset (v1) addressing Gender bias.

using bootstrapping with replacement. The Equalized Odds and Balanced Accuracy scores for all $81 \times 10 = 810$ scenarios are used for generating the eCDF plot as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4 (a) shows the eCDF plot the Equalized Odds. We observe that the curve for Reweighing (orange) is closest to the ideal value of 0 and is improving upon the fairness scores for the Baseline (blue) which coincides with Disparate Impact Remover (pink). The range of values for Reweighing lies between 0 and 0.3. In contrast,

Table 4: Deviation Metric for Equalized Odds and Balanced Accuracy scores measured for Random Forest and XGBoost models trained on the Adult Income dataset. The best mitigation algorithm is highlighted in bold while the second best is underlined for each pair of dataset and model combination.

Dataset	Machine Learning model	Mitigation	Deviation Metric for Balanced Accuracy	Deviation Metric for Equalized Odds
Adult Income dataset (v1)	Random Forest	Baseline	**0.1703**	0.3125
		Reweighing	0.1782	**0.1843**
		Disparate Impact Remover	**0.1703**	0.3125
		Reduction (Utility Focused)	<u>0.1752</u>	0.2538
		Reduction (Balanced)	0.1777	0.2391
		Reduction (Fairness Focused)	0.1787	<u>0.2367</u>
		Calibrated Equalized Odds	0.2094	0.5947
	XGBoost	Baseline	**0.1891**	0.3155
		Reweighing	0.1963	**0.1802**
		Disparate Impact Remover	**0.1891**	0.3155
		Reduction (Utility Focused)	<u>0.1945</u>	0.2460
		Reduction (Balanced)	0.1979	0.2301
		Reduction (Fairness Focused)	0.1993	<u>0.2261</u>
		Calibrated Equalized Odds	0.2251	0.5821
Adult Income dataset (v2)	Random Forest	Baseline	**0.1903**	0.5948
		Reweighing	0.2215	**0.2585**
		Disparate Impact Remover	**0.1903**	0.5948
		Reduction (Utility Focused)	0.2026	0.4249
		Reduction (Balanced)	0.2135	0.3889
		Reduction (Fairness Focused)	0.2240	<u>0.3764</u>
		Calibrated Equalized Odds	<u>0.2015</u>	0.7752
	XGBoost	Baseline	**0.2161**	0.6815
		Reweighing	0.2615	**0.1511**
		Disparate Impact Remover	**0.2161**	0.6815
		Reduction (Utility Focused)	0.2334	0.4081
		Reduction (Balanced)	0.2547	0.3607
		Reduction (Fairness Focused)	0.2748	<u>0.3308</u>
		Calibrated Equalized Odds	<u>0.2256</u>	0.8160

Calibrated Equalized Odds (red) is the farthest from 0 and is performing worse than the Baseline. Furthermore, the values have high variance ranging from 0.2 to 1.0.

On the other hand, Figure 4 (b) shows the eCDF plot the Balanced Accuracy with the ideal value 1. We observe that the mitigation algorithms have similar curves almost overlapping each other. The only exception is Calibrated Equalized Odds (red) with an eCDF curve furthest from the ideal value while having a higher variance in values. For all other bias mitigation algorithms, the Balanced Accuracy scores are closer to 0.8 across almost all shifts. Thus, from the two eCDF plots we can conclude that Reweighing is performing the best for this dataset while improving on fairness as measured by Equalized Odds with limited change in Balanced Accuracy. Further, the Calibrated Equalized Odds mitigation algorithm is the most vulnerable, experiencing higher variance in Equalized Odds and Balanced Accuracy scores when compared with others.

For an empirical analysis, we evaluated the Deviation Metric for Equalized Odds and Balanced Accuracy scores for the case study. Table 4 includes the corresponding DM values and expands the current case study to Marital-status bias in Adult Income dataset (v2), across both ML models: Random Forest and XGBoost. We find that the choice of the ML model doesn't affect the relative order of the top bias mitigation algorithms for the Adult Income dataset. For Gender bias in Adult Income dataset (v1), we find that Reweighing achieves the best scores followed by Reduction (Fairness Focused) as measured for Equalized Odds. However, for Balanced Accuracy, the best algorithm is Disparate Impact Remover (similar to Baseline) followed by Reduction (Utility Focused). Calibrated Equalized Odds performed worse than other algorithms including the Baseline, as was also observed from the eCDF plot. While measuring Marital-Status bias in Adult Income dataset (v2), the best algorithms are still the same. Calibrated Equalized Odds secures the second position as measured by Balanced Accuracy but performs the worst for Equalized Odds. We conclude that the choice of the most appropriate algorithm for this dataset depends on the importance of a particular metric (Balanced Accuracy or Equalized Odds) and the bias being evaluated. Deviation Metric can play a prominent role in enabling the user to make this decision by providing single-value points of comparison between multiple algorithms as shown in Table 4.

3.2.2 Case Study 2: Race Bias in Mortality dataset (v1). For the second case study, we explore the Race bias in Mortality dataset (v1) where the bias mitigation algorithms are trained with Random



Figure 5: Empirical Cumulative Distribution Function (eCDFs) for (a) Equalized Odds and (b) Balanced Accuracy for Random Forest models trained with mitigation algorithms on the Mortality dataset (v1) addressing Race bias.

Forest models. The Baseline model is compared with the various bias mitigation algorithms on the synthetic scenarios generated using HealthGAN. The Equalized Odds and Balanced Accuracy scores for all 810 scenarios are plotted as an eCDF curve in Figure 5.

Figure 5 (a) shows the scores for Equalized odds. The eCDF curves for all bias mitigation algorithms, including the Baseline, follow a similar trend with high variation in the range of values from 0 to 0.7. This shows that under distribution shifts, almost all algorithms become vulnerable and have high biases, even higher than 0.5. From the plot, we observe that Calibrated Equalized Odds (red) shows a slight deviation from the other algorithms. Its lowest fairness score is closer to 0.1 as compared to 0 for others. Furthermore, the highest value also exceeds the other algorithms. However, when we look for the cumulative probabilities between 0.2 to 0.6 across the y-axis, Calibrated Equalized Odds curve is closer to the ideal value of 0 than others. In other words, it has lower Equalized Odd scores than other algorithms. This is especially where a metric such as Deviation Metric shines as it can capture all these variations and outputs a single value which we can be used for comparing algorithms. We describe this further in Table 5.

Based on Figure 5 (b), we find that except for Calibrated Equalized Odds (red), all algorithms almost overlap with each other including the Baseline. However, in contrast to the first case study, all algorithms have a larger range of Balanced Accuracy values ranging from 0.5 to 0.8. This highlights that training under distribution shifts for this dataset can sometimes lead to poorer Balanced Accuracy models. Additionally, Calibrated Equalized Odds suffers the most, having Balanced Accuracy scores always further away from the ideal value 1 in comparison with the other algorithms underscoring its poor performance.

We evaluate the Deviation Metric to easily compare the various algorithms based on Equalized Odds and Balanced Accuracy metrics, with the values described in Table 5. This is accompanied by the DM scores for the other two Mortality datasets (v2 and v3) for both ML models: Random Forest and XGBoost. In Mortality dataset (v1), we find that Balanced Accuracy scores for Random Forest are lower than XGBoost but it is reversed for Equalized Odds, creating a utility-fairness trade-off. However, irrespective of the model, we find that Reweighing, Disparate Impact Remover, and Reduction perform comparably on this dataset. For Mortality dataset (v2), the Baseline itself is performing the best as measured by Balanced Accuracy. However, for Equalized Odds, Reweighing is performing quite well with a DM score very close to 0. Mortality dataset (v3) has the most consistent scores across both models. For Equalized Odds, Reweighing is the best, followed by Reduction (Fairness Focused). In contrast, Disparate Impact Remover is performing the best, being closely followed by Reduction (Utility Focused) for Balanced Accuracy. From the various results, we can conclude that different mitigation algorithms work better for each given dataset and the utility-fairness trade-off. Again, DM played a vital role in identifying which algorithm is useful. For example, Figure 5 (a) eCDF curve was captured by the Deviation Metric for Equalized Odds in Table 5 and made it easy to realize that even when Calibrated Equalized Odds had lower Equalized Odds scores in certain scenarios, overall, the performance was not better than any of the other mitigation algorithms considered.

3.3 Reporting

Investigating each dataset, bias mitigation algorithm, and metric can be overwhelming and challenging. To accommodate and analyze such vast information, we developed the Fairness Report. The reporting tool is a comprehensive web-based application designed in R-Shiny to visualize the results using eCDF plots and DM scores. The user can access the performance of mitigation algorithms and

Table 5: Deviation Metric for Equalized Odds and Balanced Accuracy scores measured for Random Forest and XGBoost models trained on the Mortality dataset. The best mitigation algorithm is highlighted in bold while the second best is underlined for each pair of dataset and model combination.

Dataset	Machine Learning model	Mitigation	Deviation Metric for Balanced Accuracy	Deviation Metric for Equalized Odds
Mortality dataset (v1)	Random Forest	Baseline	**0.2079**	0.2807
		Reweighing	**0.2079**	0.2804
		Disparate Impact Remover	**0.2079**	0.2807
		Reduction (Utility Focused)	0.2082	**0.2768**
		Reduction (Balanced)	0.2090	0.2781
		Reduction (Fairness Focused)	0.2092	0.2782
		Calibrated Equalized Odds	0.2523	0.2948
	XGBoost	Baseline	**0.3504**	**0.0476**
		Reweighing	**0.3504**	0.0481
		Disparate Impact Remover	**0.3504**	**0.0476**
		Reduction (Utility Focused)	0.3511	0.0656
		Reduction (Balanced)	0.3515	0.0714
		Reduction (Fairness Focused)	0.3516	0.0723
		Calibrated Equalized Odds	0.3663	0.1140
Mortality dataset (v2)	Random Forest	Baseline	0.3006	0.1872
		Reweighing	**0.3005**	**0.1780**
		Disparate Impact Remover	0.3085	0.1849
		Reduction (Utility Focused)	0.3008	0.1847
		Reduction (Balanced)	0.3009	0.1846
		Reduction (Fairness Focused)	0.3009	0.1848
		Calibrated Equalized Odds	0.3199	0.2322
	XGBoost	Baseline	**0.3410**	0.1475
		Reweighing	0.3432	**0.0386**
		Disparate Impact Remover	0.3412	0.1476
		Reduction (Utility Focused)	0.3430	0.1548
		Reduction (Balanced)	0.3440	0.1615
		Reduction (Fairness Focused)	0.3445	0.1640
		Calibrated Equalized Odds	0.3555	0.2835
Mortality dataset (v3)	Random Forest	Baseline	**0.3792**	0.2857
		Reweighing	0.3862	**0.0447**
		Disparate Impact Remover	**0.3792**	0.2857
		Reduction (Utility Focused)	0.3818	0.2694
		Reduction (Balanced)	0.3829	0.2629
		Reduction (Fairness Focused)	0.3860	0.2584
		Calibrated Equalized Odds	0.3936	0.4537
	XGBoost	Baseline	**0.3739**	0.3645
		Reweighing	0.3831	**0.0373**
		Disparate Impact Remover	**0.3739**	0.3645
		Reduction (Utility Focused)	0.3767	0.3216
		Reduction (Balanced)	0.3792	0.3022
		Reduction (Fairness Focused)	0.3818	0.2950
		Calibrated Equalized Odds	0.3915	0.5433

identify specific distribution shifts as fairness vulnerabilities. Figure 6 describes a screenshot of the app comprised of three parts: (a) Sidebar: Includes options for selecting dataset, mitigation algorithm, and metrics, (b) Tabs: Provides different visualizations from summary to scenario analysis and (c) Content: Includes the visualization and scores based on the selected Sidebar and Tab options. Note that the results shown in Figure 6 are for XGBoost models.

The visualizations and analysis are presented to the user via the application split into four sections as described below:

- **Home:** The first tab summarizes and compares the Deviation Metric scores for all selected metrics for all bias mitigation algorithms. The relative order for the bias mitigation algorithms based on the DM scores is presented to quickly compare them based on any set of pre-defined metrics.



Figure 6: An interactive web application, Fairness Report, that visualizes bias mitigation algorithm performance in comparison with others using a combination of empirical values and plots.

- **Summarized Analysis:** The second tab compares the selected bias mitigation algorithm with the Baseline across all scenarios. The eCDF plot similar to Figure 4 is shown with the curves for the Baseline and the algorithm. This is accompanied by the heatmap identifying each scenario where the bias mitigation algorithm performed worse than Baseline, visualizing all vulnerable distribution shifts.
- **Scenario Analysis:** The third tab expands in-depth on the Summary Analysis tab and enables the user to select a certain range of scenarios based on protected attributes and outcome proportions. For comparison with the Baseline, the eCDF curve is plotted. This is accompanied by a line plot comparing the average and 95% Confidence Interval (CI) scores for each selected scenario with the Baseline.
- **About:** The fourth and last tab includes the details about the datasets, bias mitigation algorithms, and metrics included in the application along with external links to useful resources.

The Fairness Report makes it easy to identify fairness vulnerabilities for any selected bias mitigation algorithm. For example, the previously discussed heatmap in Figure 3 is taken from the Fairness Report when visualizing the Summarized Analysis tab for the Reduction (Fairness Focused) algorithm.

4 CONCLUSION

Bias mitigation algorithms are prone to fairness vulnerabilities caused by distribution shifts. While many bias mitigation algorithms exist, their applicability under distribution shifts is often not systematically evaluated. Rigorous evaluation is essential to ensure trust in algorithms' applications under settings where shifts are common. To address this issue, we proposed Fairness Auditor, a flexible stress-testing pipeline to rigorously evaluate the performance of bias mitigation algorithms using synthetic datasets.

In this paper, we highlight the capability of the Fairness Auditor by presenting results highlighting its ability to (a) identify fairness vulnerabilities and (b) compare algorithms using Deviation Metrics and the Fairness Report. We found that different bias mitigation algorithms may be useful, depending upon the metric important to the user. The process of comparison is facilitated by the Deviation Metric introduced in the paper as a means for capturing single-value scores across various synthetic scenarios. Additionally, visual and empirical results described by the Fairness Report together enable a comprehensive demonstration of the algorithm's capabilities, identifying scenarios where the bias mitigation algorithm works and where it is vulnerable.

Rigorous Stress-Testing: The goal of the Fairness Auditor is evaluation of any bias mitigation algorithm by conducting a thorough, in-depth analysis using many train and test distribution shifts. By introducing both label and demographic shifts in a given dataset, the scenarios form a test bed for evaluating the strength of the bias mitigation algorithm against compound shifts and identifying potential fairness vulnerabilities. Such an evaluation is not only necessary but key to building trust in bias mitigation methods before application. This is even more crucial in high-impact domains like healthcare, where an algorithm's applicability must be well-known as many decisions can be life-altering.

Synthetic Data Generation: Lack of good quality datasets often hinders a robust and comprehensive analysis of any algorithm. The Fairness Auditor addresses this limitation by generating synthetic scenarios using IPF from a given dataset. This implies that many datasets can be created from one. Using HealthGAN, we demonstrated that the Fairness Auditor can be extended to existing synthetic data generators. This also shows that privacy-preserving generators can be used to release synthetic data for robust fairness evaluation without compromising privacy.

Reporting: With the help of the Fairness Report, any existing/future bias mitigation algorithm can be compared with others on additional datasets with shifts. Such an analysis provides insight into the algorithm's vulnerabilities both visually and empirically, ensuring a robust comparison while identifying potential weaknesses. Additionally, the option for summarized or in-depth results ensures that the users know the exact shifts where the algorithm struggles and would aid them in developing more rigorous algorithms under shifts, building trust in AI. This requires the identification of fairness metrics and mitigation algorithms designed for these tasks and thus, has been left as future work.

The Fairness Auditor is designed to be comprehensive with the flexibility to include any dataset, bias mitigation algorithm, and metrics. This includes the Deviation Metric that enables the summary of a suite of scores calculated for any metric across many scenarios. The current work lays the foundation with classification and as a future direction, can be extended to auditing bias mitigation algorithms in other Machine Learning tasks such as regression and clustering. As a future work, the auditor can also be extended to evaluate the fairness of algorithms when deployed using scenarios representing potential future deployment populations to understand model fairness and utility. As the current process of auditing using a pre-defined set of scenarios can be expensive, another future direction is the development of adversarial methods to identify scenarios where mitigation algorithms produce inaccurate or unfair results.

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Perceived Algorithmic Fairness using Organizational Justice Theory: An Empirical Case Study on Algorithmic Hiring

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ABSTRACT

Growing concerns about the fairness of algorithmic decision-making systems have prompted a proliferation of mathematical formulations aimed at remedying algorithmic bias. Yet, integrating mathematical fairness alone into algorithms is insufficient to ensure their acceptance, trust, and support by humans. It is also essential to understand what humans perceive as fair. In this study, we, therefore, conduct an empirical user study into crowdworkers' algorithmic fairness perceptions, focusing on algorithmic hiring. We build on perspectives from organizational justice theory, which categorizes fairness into distributive, procedural, and interactional components. By doing so, we find that algorithmic fairness perceptions are higher when crowdworkers are provided not only with information about the algorithmic outcome but also about the decision-making process. Remarkably, we observe this effect even when the decision-making process can be considered unfair, when gender, a sensitive attribute, is used as a main feature. By showing realistic trade-offs between fairness criteria, we moreover find a preference for equalizing false negatives over equalizing selection rates amongst groups. Our findings highlight the importance of considering all components of algorithmic fairness, rather than solely treating it as an outcome distribution problem. Importantly, our study contributes to the literature on the connection between mathematical– and perceived algorithmic fairness, and highlights the potential benefits of leveraging organizational justice theory to enhance the evaluation of perceived algorithmic fairness.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies** → **Machine learning**; • **Human-centered computing** → **Empirical studies in HCI**.

KEYWORDS

algorithmic decision-making, organizational justice, perceived fairness, algorithmic hiring

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1 INTRODUCTION

Artificial Intelligence systems are increasingly being used to inform and make important decisions about human lives across a wide range of high-impact domains, such as criminal law, medicine, finance, and employment [42]. While algorithmic decision-making has the potential to offer numerous promising advantages to society, such as increased efficiency and accuracy, it can also produce discriminatory or unfair outcomes [23, 32], as evidenced by several infamous cases such as COMPAS, the criminal risk assessment algorithm that was accused of being racially biased against black defendants [2], and Amazon's recruitment tool, which turned out to discriminate against female candidates [13]. Ensuring algorithmic fairness has therefore become a major area of interest within the field of artificial intelligence. This has led to the design of a whole landscape of fairness criteria and approaches to embed these into algorithms, as well as to the development of multiple bias mitigation algorithms, open-source libraries, and auditing toolkits to measure, visualize, and improve different fairness aspects [4, 6, 30, 39, 45].

However, there are still large gaps between fairness researchers and machine learning practitioners [36]. As it is impossible to mathematically satisfy all the proposed statistical fairness criteria at once since they are mutually incompatible [3, 9, 24], a universal consensus on how to ensure algorithmic fairness is lacking [44]. More knowledge about what criteria or metrics to use in what context is hence needed, which underscores the importance of approaching algorithmic fairness not only from a technical viewpoint. We need to understand what humans perceive as fair, to ensure that algorithmic decision-making systems are accepted, trusted, and supported by humans, since fairness is not purely an algorithmic concept, but a human construct [5, 7, 36, 42].

The literature on human perceptions of algorithmic fairness, however, frequently offers mixed or inconsistent results, highlighting the need for a more coherent approach to algorithmic fairness [12, 42]. Therefore, multiple studies have started to draw inspiration from organizational justice, which is concerned with fairness perceptions of decisions made about employees in organizational settings [14, 18, 19, 22, 27, 32]. Organizational justice literature divides fairness perceptions into three distinct but correlated components: distributive fairness, procedural fairness, and interactional fairness [17]. This categorization can therefore provide a solid foundation on how to systematically investigate algorithmic fairness perceptions.

However, most of the research into algorithmic fairness perceptions focuses merely on one of these three fairness components. In this work, we aim to investigate *the effect of integrating these components on algorithmic fairness perceptions.* Additionally, we investigate the link between mathematical algorithmic fairness and human perceptions of distributive fairness, by examining *whether participants have a preference for either demographic parity or equality of opportunity.* We focus on algorithmic hiring, a context that is easily comprehensible for a lay public. While this area has seen increased interest in the integration of AI-enabled software, it that has also witnessed raising concerns about the potential of AI to perpetuate or exacerbate existing biases [29, 35, 40]. As a result, it is classified as a high-risk area in the EU AI act [11]. Moreover, there is no universal agreement on how fairness should be formalized in algorithmic hiring: for instance, certain recruitment algorithms proactively aim to increase diversity when ranking job candidates, while others do not [16]. As research has demonstrated that fairness perceptions during a hiring process play a critical role in job satisfaction, performance, and the relationship between employers and employees, obtaining insights into the perceived fairness of algorithmic hiring is of particular importance [25].

Toward that end, we conduct an experiment with 225 predominantly White, native English Prolific crowdworkers from the UK, in which we examine fairness perceptions of several hypothetical recruitment algorithms. We study the following two research questions:

- **RQ1**: How do human fairness perceptions of a recruitment algorithm differ when only given information about the distributive fairness of the algorithm, compared to when given information about both the procedural fairness and the distributive fairness of the algorithm?

By grouping our participants based on the amount of information they receive about the recruitment algorithms, according to the fairness components described in organizational justice theory, we find that participants who only receive information about the distributive fairness of the algorithms have the lowest fairness perceptions. When participants receive information about both procedural and distributive algorithmic fairness, they perceive the algorithms as fairer: interestingly, we observe this effect both when the sensitive attribute gender is included as a main feature in the algorithms and when it is not.

- **RQ2**: How do human fairness perceptions of a recruitment algorithm differ depending on whether it adheres to demographic parity or equality of opportunity?

By showing participants graphs that report the trade-offs between selection rate differences and false negative rate differences between two gender groups, we find a general preference for equality of opportunity over demographic parity. By qualitatively analyzing the rationales behind participants' fairness ratings, these findings are affirmed: a larger proportion of participants states to focus on qualification and false negatives, rather than selection rates. However, most participants specifically report taking into account the trade-offs between both these fairness criteria.

In sum, our study provides valuable insights into the relationship between algorithmic fairness and human perceptions of justice. Our experimental data and code can be found on our GitHub Repository: https://github.com/GuusjeJuijn/fairness-perceptions.

2 RELATED WORK

We start by taking a mathematical perspective on algorithmic fairness, by providing a concise overview of the most common criteria for algorithmic fairness and their associated trade-offs (§2.1). Subsequently, we adopt a human perspective, by describing the empirical literature on human algorithmic fairness perceptions and discussing the components of perceived fairness from organizational justice in an algorithmic context (§2.2).

2.1 Mathematical algorithmic fairness

Algorithmic fairness is a profoundly complex and many-faceted concept, which is reflected by the large landscape of criteria that try to grasp its meaning: with over 21 established mathematical formulas for fairness in binary classification problems, researchers have not yet come to a universal consensus on how to mathematically define what it means for a decision to be fair [8]. This section summarizes the fairness criteria that are most widely adopted and relevant to our study.

2.1.1 Group fairness. Group fairness criteria focus on treating persons that belong to a protected group, defined by a sensitive attribute such as gender or race, the same as persons that belong to any other group. To capture the different formulas belonging to this class, Barocas et al. [3] propose a taxonomy of statistical non-discrimination criteria consisting of three categories: independence, separation, and sufficiency. By depicting the sensitive attribute as S, the predicted outcome (the decision) as $\hat{Y}$, and the (true) outcome as Y, these three categories can be represented as follows:

$$Independence = \hat{Y} \perp S$$

$$Separation = \hat{Y} \perp S|Y$$

$$Sufficiency = Y \perp S|\hat{Y}$$

Within independence, the most common fairness criterion is demographic parity, or disparate impact. A classifier satisfies this criterion when the percentage of favorable outcomes is equal for both the protected and unprotected group [31]. To adhere to demographic parity, the true outcome Y does not have to be known: for instance, in a hiring setting, a recruitment algorithm satisfies demographic parity between men and women when hiring an equal number of male and female candidates, regardless of their qualifications.

More complex definitions fall under separation and sufficiency. If the predicted outcome is conditionally independent of the sensitive

attribute, given the true outcome, a classifier satisfies separation [3]. Two fairness criteria falling under this category are equality of opportunity, which requires the false negative rate to be equal for both groups, and predictive equality, which requires the false positive rate to be equal for both groups [9, 21].

Lastly, if the true outcome is conditionally independent of the sensitive attribute, given the predicted outcome, a classifier satisfies sufficiency. Sufficiency hence requires equal true outcomes over people that are given similar predictions. An example of a fairness criterion satisfying sufficiency, is calibration or test fairness [44].

2.1.2 Trade-offs between fairness definitions. Following the proliferation of research into mathematical criteria to define algorithmic fairness, researchers have started to investigate the mathematical relationships between these criteria. This has exposed an important issue: satisfying all fairness criteria simultaneously is impossible, as, under mild assumptions, any two out of the three aforementioned categories of group fairness are mutually exclusive [3, 9, 24]. Practitioners are therefore faced with the challenge of selecting among different fairness criteria and their associated trade-offs. However, which choice to make is a highly context-specific and difficult task, given the subtle differences between the different criteria, as well as other factors such as the availability of sensitive features, the level of understanding of the actual outcome label, and legal or organizational restrictions [36]. Multiple scholars, therefore, state that more emphasis on the social, human side of fairness is needed: in order to develop fair AI, it is essential to understand what humans perceive as fair and to acknowledge that fairness is not merely a technical construct [15, 36, 42].

2.2 Perceived algorithmic fairness

A growing body of literature applies organizational justice theory to the topic of perceived algorithmic fairness [5, 14, 18, 19, 22, 27, 32]. Organizational justice, like algorithmic decision-making, centers around the fairness of decisions made about others in a hierarchical environment. This similarity makes organizational justice a suitable source of inspiration for studying perceived algorithmic fairness [5]. Here, we discuss some of the related work on algorithmic fairness that focuses on one of the different components of perceived fairness described in organizational justice theory.

2.2.1 Distributive algorithmic fairness. Distributive fairness refers to the fairness of outcome distributions. It is based on norms for outcome allocation, such as equality (outcomes should be distributed equally amongst everyone) and equity (opportunities should be distributed equally based on everyone's circumstances) [10, 32, 42]. Robert et al. [37] note that distributive fairness is the most commonly discussed category within AI fairness literature. This finding could be attributed to the fact that many statistical fairness criteria emphasize distributive fairness, by focusing on how outcomes are divided across groups or individuals [32]. Dolata et al. [15] refer to this conclusion as the *distributiveness assumption*: the assumption that all fairness concerns can be represented as an outcome distribution problem. Most of the empirical work on the perceived fairness of algorithm outcomes focuses on basic fairness concepts, such as equality and equity [42]. However, only a handful of studies on distributive algorithmic fairness focus on the perceived fairness of particular mathematical fairness criteria specifically [22, 41].

Srivastava et al. [41] conduct an experiment to identify the mathematical fairness criterion that best captures crowdworkers' perceptions of fairness. By letting participants choose between a succession of model pairs, showing the predictions and true outcomes of a medical risk and criminal risk prediction algorithm, they find that participants prefer demographic parity over more complicated definitions, such as error parity and equal false positive rates. This finding suggests that humans exhibit a preference for fairness definitions that are more simplistic in nature.

However, Harrison et al. [22] draw different conclusions. They perform a between-subjects experiment in a bail decision-making context, in which they let participants judge the fairness of two models with pairwise fairness trade-offs. They identify two interesting fairness preferences: first, subjects favor equalizing the false positive rate over equalizing the accuracy across groups. Second, subjects also favor equalizing the false positive rate over equalizing the percentage of favorable outcomes (i.e., having demographic parity) across groups.

This latter result is in contrast with that of Srivastava et al., raising questions about the effect of different visualizations and ways of presenting information on participants' fairness perceptions.

2.2.2 Procedural algorithmic fairness. Unlike distributive fairness, procedural fairness focuses on the fairness of the decision-making process rather than the outcome. Morse et al. [32] investigate the procedural fairness of five popular mathematical fairness criteria along the six components of procedural fairness originally described by Leventhal [28]: consistency, bias suppression, representativeness, correctability, accuracy, and ethicality. By relating the fairness criteria to these different components, they provide directions for choosing the right criterion per situation and provide a fundament for better understanding and assessing the procedural fairness of these fairness metrics: they, for example, reason that equality of opportunity and equalized odds are criteria with a high level of procedural fairness [32].

Grgic-Hlaca et al. [18] take a different approach to investigate procedural algorithmic fairness: they seek to identify feature properties that influence the perceived fairness of using certain features as input for an algorithmic decision-making model. By investigating participants' assessments of different feature properties, they find that participants consider a feature's perceived relevance and reliability most important. As these feature properties are unrelated to discrimination, Grgíc-Hlaca et al. conclude that procedural unfairness concerns reach far beyond discrimination only and that therefore, other feature properties should also be taken into account when assessing algorithmic fairness.

Other authors explore the perceived procedural fairness of including certain features in an algorithm. Pierson [34], for example, finds that men are more likely to include gender as an attribute in an education recommendation algorithm, compared to women. Grgić-Hlača et al. [20] moreover find that men perceive the inclusion of race as a feature as more fair compared to women.

2.2.3 Interactional algorithmic fairness. Lastly, interactional fairness refers to providing sufficient information and giving truthful

explanations about decision procedures. It is concerned with presenting people with adequate information about the process of how a decision is reached and is therefore closely related to procedural fairness[1] [5, 10]. In an organizational justice setting, an example of interactional fairness is providing employees explanations for layoff decisions: it has been shown that if employees receive honest, thorough, and accurate explanations when being fired, they perceive these decisions as significantly fairer [27].

Multiple studies investigate the effect of explanations for decisions on perceived algorithmic fairness. For example, by performing a user study in a criminal risk setting, Dodge et al. [14] find that feature importance-based explanations and demographic-based explanations increase participants' algorithmic fairness perceptions. In an online user study in a medical decision-making context, Angerschmid et al. [1] also find a positive effect of feature importance-based explanations on perceived algorithmic fairness. These insights will be leveraged in **RQ1** of our study.

3 METHODOLOGY

Our methodology is two-folded. We first created machine learning models that adhered to different fairness criteria (§3.1). We then conducted an online user study in which participants judged the fairness of these models (§3.2).

3.1 Model development

We first trained machine learning models on the Utrecht Fairness Recruitment dataset[2]. As this data set was specifically designed to mimic realistic recruiting data and to demonstrate fairness issues, and did not contain any missing values or ambiguous features, we considered it an appropriate data set for the purposes of our user study. The data set contained information about the recruitment decisions of four hypothetical companies. We split the data from one company into a training set (750 instances) and a testing set (250 instances). Using Scikit-learn [33], we trained three logistic regression models, using default parameters, to predict whether an individual in the data set was hired by the company or not. We trained one original, raw model, one model mitigated for demographic parity, and one model mitigated for equality of opportunity. Bias mitigation was applied using the ThresholdOptimizer algorithm[3] from Microsoft FairLearn [6]. This postprocessing algorithm, introduced by Hardt et al. [21], adjusts a learned classifier by applying group-specific thresholds, to satisfy a specified fairness constraint.

Postprocessing for demographic parity and equality of opportunity specifically was done for several reasons. First of all, multiple studies suggest that both of these criteria are appropriate for algorithmic hiring, the context we focus on in our empirical study [16, 26, 32, 35]. Mitigating for demographic parity, moreover, allowed for further investigation of the results of Srivastava et al. [41], who found that lay people tend to have a preference for this criterion in different contexts. Besides, as demographic parity is often used in practice and relatively easy to understand, we considered this to be a suitable criterion for this study [38]. Since, according to Morse et al. [32], equality of opportunity scores high on procedural fairness, we considered this a second suitable criterion. The accuracies and fairness metrics of all three classifiers are reported in Table 1. Although the mitigated models did not perfectly meet the proposed criteria, postprocessing substantially decreased the differences in either selection rates or false negative rates between groups.

3.2 Empirical study

To assess our research questions, we performed an online experiment on the crowdsourcing platform Prolific Academic using Qualtrics survey software. The survey was distributed at the end of January 2023. Here, we outline our study design, survey structure, and participant demographics.

3.2.1 Study Design. Participants' fairness perceptions of several hypothetical recruitment algorithms were assessed using a direct measure based on Harrison et al. [22], asking *"Do you think this algorithm is fair?"*. To ensure that every participant had a similar definition in mind, we provided them with a fairness definition by Mehrabi et al. [31]: *"Fairness is the absence of any prejudice or favoritism towards an individual or a group based on their intrinsic or acquired traits"*. Participants were asked to provide a judgment on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 ("not at all fair") to 7 ("completely fair"). Additionally, at the end of the survey, participants were asked to elaborate on the motivations behind their ratings through an open-ended query, asking *"In the previous questions, which factors did you consider most important in determining whether an algorithm was fair or unfair?"*. This was done to qualitatively investigate the rationales behind the respondents' fairness perceptions.

Each participant was presented with five different graphs representing algorithms, of which the selection rates and false negative rates were based on the logistic regression models described in §3.1. In these graphs, the selection rates were defined as the proportion of hired candidates, while the false negative rates were defined as the proportion of qualified candidates who were not hired. We explicitly opted to describe the figures in this way, as we anticipated that the terms 'selection rate' and 'false negative rate' would not be easily comprehensible to participants without machine learning knowledge.

One of these five algorithms represented the original, unmitigated model. Two of these algorithms represented demographic parity: one perfectly following the criterion and one representing the mitigated model. Two of these algorithms represented equality of opportunity: again, one perfectly following the criterion and one representing the mitigated model.

Participants were divided into three groups. The amount of information participants received about these algorithms differed per group, based on the fairness components described in organizational justice theory. We considered procedural and interactional fairness together, due to the strong connection and overlap between these two components.

Group 1: distributive fairness. The first group only received information about the distributive fairness of the algorithms. This was visualized as a graph representing the algorithm outcomes,

[1] In our empirical study, we, therefore, choose to consider procedural and interactional fairness together.
[2] https://www.kaggle.com/datasets/ictinstitute/utrecht-fairness-recruitment-dataset
[3] https://fairlearn.org/v0.8/user_guide/mitigation.html

Table 1: Fairness metrics of the original model, the demographic parity-mitigated model and the equality of opportunity-mitigated model

Model	Gender	Accuracy	Selection Rate	False Negative Rate
Original	Female	0.918	0.123	0.333
	Male	0.847	0.468	0.158
	Difference	*0.071*	*0.335*	*0.175*
Demographic parity-mitigated	Female	0.839	0.197	0.133
	Male	0.742	0.250	0.509
	Difference	*0.151*	*0.035*	*0.376*
Equality of opportunity-mitigated	Female	0.926	0.164	0.133
	Male	0.847	0.468	0.158
	Difference	*0.079*	*0.304*	*0.025*



Figure 1: Example outcome graph, representing distributive fairness, showed to each participant. On the left, the selection rates are shown. On the right, the false negative rates are shown. This algorithm adheres to demographic parity but not to equality of opportunity.



Figure 2: Feature importance graph shown to group 2, representing procedural fairness. The graph shown to group 3 was the same, except for the sensitive attribute 'gender' being changed for the non-sensitive attribute 'exact study'.

showing a pairwise trade-off between the selection rates and false negative rates between two gender groups. Instead of only showing one aspect of algorithmic fairness, by, for example, only showing the difference in false negative rates between groups, we chose to represent a more realistic real-world scenario by showing the trade-offs between different fairness criteria. By doing so, we drew inspiration from the work of Harrison et al. [22]. We explicitly chose to rename the two gender groups into *Gender A* and *Gender B*, to limit the effect of implicit biases regarding gender roles. An example of a graph representing distributive fairness is shown in Figure 1.[4]

[4]We first piloted these graphs amongst colleagues, to make sure they were clear enough to interpret.

Group 2: distributive and procedural fairness, with sensitive attribute. The second group not only received information about the distributive fairness of the algorithms, but also about the procedural fairness of the algorithms. Like Grgic-Hlaca et al. [18], we considered the features used by the algorithm as an important aspect of procedural fairness. Therefore, we visualized procedural fairness as a feature importance explanation. Like Dodge et al. [14], we presented the feature coefficients of the logistic regression models as strings of '+'s representing the relative importance of each feature. To limit the amount of information, we only showed the top five most influential features. For each of the algorithms, the feature importance graph stayed the same, as postprocessing does not change the model coefficients. Figure 2 displays the feature importance graph shown to the participants of group 2.

Group 3: distributive and procedural fairness, without sensitive attribute. The information provided to group 3 was almost identical to that of group 2, except for a small change in the feature importance graph. In this group, we changed the attribute *'gender'* into a less sensitive attribute, with a similarly high feature coefficient, *'exact study'*. We included this group in our study to make sure that potential differences in fairness perceptions between the groups could not only be attributed to the use of the sensitive feature *gender* as an attribute.

3.2.2 Survey Structure. After signing a consent form, participants were shown an introductory text. The purpose of this text was to introduce the topic of algorithmic fairness, clarify the task, present the context, and demonstrate a sample graph to ensure that the participants could properly interpret the visual representations. Each participant was then randomly assigned to one of the three groups. The participants were divided evenly across the groups to ensure that each group had an equal number of participants. Within each group, every participant was asked to rate the fairness of five different recruitment algorithms: one representing the original, unmitigated model, two adhering to demographic parity, and two adhering to equality of opportunity. These algorithms were presented in a randomized order to limit order effects. After these five questions, participants were asked to write down which factors they considered most important in their fairness analysis. The survey ended with demographic questions and a message thanking the participants for their time and giving them a completion code to register their submission in Prolific. Figure 3 shows an overview of the experimental flow.

3.2.3 Participants. Participants were pre-screened on having obtained at least a high school diploma, having English as a first language, and residing in the UK. We rewarded them with £10,84 per hour, conforming to the minimum wage in the UK. On average, the survey took 4.2 minutes to complete. By manually checking the response times, data from participants that took less than 2 minutes to complete the survey were deleted to ensure the quality of answers. In total, data from 225 participants were used. Table 2 summarizes our participants' demographics[5].

Table 2: Participants' demographics

		% (n=225)
Gender	Female	50%
	Male	50%
	Other	<1%
Age	18–30	33%
	30–45	35%
	45–60	22%
	60+	10%
Race/ethnicity	White	92%
	Asian	4%
	Mixed	3%
	Black	1%
Education	High school diploma	54%
	Technical/community college	40%
	Undergraduate degree	5%
	Graduate degree	<1%
	Doctorate degree (PhD/other)	<1%

4 RESULTS

4.1 Quantitative Analysis

4.1.1 ***RQ1***. First, we considered the effect of the type of information given about the algorithms on participants' fairness perceptions. For each of the three groups, we computed the average fairness perceptions of the original algorithm, the algorithms representing demographic parity, and the algorithms representing equality of opportunity. As shown in Figure 4, participants who received information about both the distributive and procedural fairness of the algorithms (groups 2 and 3) consistently perceived the algorithms as fairer compared to participants who only received information about the distributive fairness of the algorithms (group 1). We observed this effect in both groups 2 and 3, although fairness perceptions were generally higher in group 3, in which the sensitive attribute gender was not included as a main attribute in the feature importance graph.

Table 3 reports the results of a Kruskal-Wallis H test (a non-parametric variant of the ANOVA test to compare multiple groups), followed by a multiple comparisons post-hoc Dunn test, to test for significant differences between the three groups. The tests were performed separately for the different algorithms (the original algorithm, the algorithms adhering to demographic parity, and the algorithms adhering to equality of opportunity). Results indicated significant differences between groups 1 and 2, and groups 1 and 3, for all algorithms. Differences between groups 2 and 3 were not significant.

4.1.2 ***RQ2***. Next, we investigated whether participants preferred either demographic parity or equality of opportunity. For each of the three groups, we computed the average fairness perceptions of the algorithms representing demographic parity and the average fairness perceptions of the algorithms representing equality of opportunity. Figure 5 shows that across all three groups, participants tended to have a preference for the algorithms representing equality of opportunity. A Wilcoxon-Signed Rank test (a non-parametric variant of the paired t-test) indicated that in groups 2 and 3, the average perceived fairness scores for the algorithms representing equality of opportunity were significantly higher than the average perceived fairness scores for the algorithms representing demographic parity *($W = 601.5$, $p = 0.013$* and *$W = 636.5$, $p = 0.016$* respectively). However, in group 1, these differences were not statistically significant *($W = 777.0$, $p = 0.541$)*.

4.1.3 ***Gender differences***. Additionally, we examined potential differences in average scores among male and female participants. Of all three groups, for each algorithm, we compared the average scores between men and women, using a Mann-Whitney U-test (a non-parametric variant of the independent t-test). However, the results of these tests did not reveal any significant differences.

[5]Age and race were automatically collected by Prolific. Our survey additionally asked for gender and the highest level of education obtained.



Figure 3: Experimental Flow

Table 3: Results of Kruskal-Wallis H test and post-hoc Dunn test to test for significant differences between the three groups. P-values are in italics if results are significant at α=0.05. Results of the Kruskal-Wallis H test indicate that the average scores, for all algorithms, differ significantly across groups. Pairwise comparisons by Dunn's test show that differences between groups 1 and 2, and 1 and 3, are significant at α=0.05. Differences between groups 2 and 3 are not significant.

Algorithm	Kruskal-Wallis H test		Dunn's Multiple Comparisons test		
			Groups 1-2	Groups 1-3	Groups 2-3
	H	p	p	p	p
Original	10.691	*0.005*	*0.009*	*0.003*	0.715
Demographic Parity	8.452	*0.014*	*0.044*	*0.005*	0.419
Equality of Opportunity	18.127	*<0.001*	*0.001*	*<0.001*	0.468

4.2 Qualitative Analysis

To gain additional insights into the findings of our quantitative analysis, we qualitatively analyzed participants' rationales behind their fairness ratings by openly coding their responses to the open-ended question of which factors they considered most important in determining the fairness of the algorithms. Although each participant provided an explanation, we encountered a variety of response lengths: responses varied in length between 1 word and 59 words, with a mean of 12 words and a median of 9 words. By first identifying first-order codes out of these responses and grouping these into second-order codes, we systematically classified the responses. Figure 6 gives an overview of these categories and provides, per category, an indicative quote. Two annotators independently reviewed the responses. In 80% of the cases, they initially agreed. The remaining 20% of responses were assigned a final classification after a discussion between the annotators. For 9% of the responses, no clear category was identified (e.g.: *"If it looked fair or not", "All combined"*). In 4 responses, multiple categories were mentioned. In these cases, our approach was to classify the response based on the category mentioned first.

We now discuss some of the responses falling under the two second-order codes we identified: distributive fairness and procedural fairness.

4.2.1 Distributive fairness. While we encountered a variety of answers, the biggest proportion of explanations (n=164, 73%) could be attributed to the outcome of the algorithms, relating to the concept of distributive fairness. This was as expected, as only two out of three groups received a feature importance graph, and all three groups received information about distributive fairness. However, interestingly, we observed that across all three groups, the majority of participants focused on distributive fairness rather than procedural fairness (82% of all answers in group 1, 61% of all answers in group 2, and 76% of all answers in group 3).

More specifically, across all three groups, we found that most participants (n=68) emphasized the importance of considering the trade-offs between the different fairness criteria shown in the graphs. For example, P45 (group 1), stated: *"I mainly looked at the proportions between genders of those qualified but not hired in comparison to the genders when hired"*. The second most frequently mentioned category pertained to the concept of equal opportunity:



Figure 4: Average perceived fairness scores, on a 7-point Likert scale, of each of the three groups. Error bars indicate standard deviations. Bar graphs show that the group that only received information about the distributive fairness of the algorithms rated each of the three algorithms lower than the groups that also received information about the procedural fairness of the algorithms. In the group in which gender was not a main attribute, fairness perceptions were highest.



Figure 5: Average perceived fairness scores, on a 7-point Likert scale, of the algorithms adhering to demographic parity and equality of opportunity. Error bars indicate standard deviations. Bar graphs show that across all three groups, algorithms adhering to equality of opportunity were rated higher compared to algorithms adhering to demographic parity.

a notable proportion of participants (n=53) mainly focused on false negative rates and the qualifications of candidates. This finding suggests a preference for fairness criteria that consider the actual outcome. For example, P18 (group 1) answered: *"The percentage that was qualified but not hired was the most important factor for me"*. Nevertheless, there was also a considerable number of participants (n=43) that primarily considered the selection rates of both groups, e.g.: *"Whether the hired % of candidates were as equal as possible"* (P38, group 2). However, across all three groups, this category, associated with demographic parity, was mentioned less frequently than the category relating to equal opportunity.

4.2.2 Procedural fairness. 18% of answers (n=41) could be attributed to the decision-making process, and therefore, to the concept of procedural fairness (7% of all answers in group 1, 27% of all answers in group 2, and 21% of all answers in group 3).

The majority of these responses (n=34) were related to the features used by the algorithms and their relative importance. For example, in group 2, in which gender was included as a main attribute in the feature importance graph, we encountered 11 answers that explicitly criticized its usage, e.g.: *"I marked them all low as I don't see why gender would be an important factor "* (P68, group 2). Other participants mainly focused on the importance or combination of the different attributes, e.g., *"The 5 main attributes were the main thing I considered"* (P52, group 2).

Apart from the procedural fairness of using certain features, some participants did not provide reasons specific to the information shown in the graphs but criticized the use of algorithms for hiring in general (n=7). For example, P70 (group 3), wrote: *"I don't believe this kind of selection is fair in any circumstances"*, and P31 (group 1) stated: *"I don't find the process fair as I believe the candidate should have a formal interview rather than just basing the hire on grades and qualifications"*.

5 DISCUSSION

Previous studies on algorithmic fairness perceptions have primarily focused on either distributive fairness, procedural fairness, or interactional fairness in isolation. However, our results highlight *the need to consider the interplay between these different fairness components* in research into fair AI.

By considering the importance of different features used by a model as a key aspect of procedural fairness, our main finding is that **participants who receive information about both the distributive and procedural fairness of an algorithm, perceive it as fairer, than participants who only receive information about the distributive fairness of an algorithm**. Surprisingly, even when gender, a sensitive attribute, is included as a primary attribute in the algorithms, we still observe this effect, despite a substantial number of participants citing it as unfair in the open-ended question.

Our findings underscore the potential consequences of adopting the *distributiveness assumption* as described by Dolata et al. [15], as we show that solely representing algorithmic fairness as an outcome distribution issue can lead to lower perceptions of fairness. Our results suggest that providing more information about the workings of an algorithm can enhance fairness perceptions. This is consistent with the results of Dodge et al. [14] and Angerschmid et al. [1], who found that feature importance-based explanations have a positive impact on algorithmic fairness perceptions.

Furthermore, our work provides empirical insights into how mathematical fairness criteria are related to human algorithmic fairness perceptions. By measuring and comparing participants' fairness perceptions of recruitment algorithms adhering to two



Figure 6: Indicative quotes, first-order codes, and second-order codes for the open-ended question: *"Which factors did you consider most important in determining whether a model was fair or unfair?"*

different algorithmic fairness criteria, we find **a significant preference for equality of opportunity over demographic parity**, when given information about both the distributive and procedural fairness of the algorithms. These findings are affirmed in our qualitative analysis, in which we note that a larger proportion of participants assigns greater importance to false negative rates when forming their fairness judgments, as opposed to (equal) selection rates among genders.

Our results are in contrast with the preference for demographic parity found by Srivastava et al. [41]. As they focus on a medical risk prediction and criminal risk prediction setting, rather than hiring, these varying contexts could be a possible reason behind these contrasting findings. For instance, decision-making in medical and criminal risk settings may involve higher stakes compared to hiring. Moreover, these settings may not capture the imagination as much as hiring does, possibly leading to different fairness judgements. It is, however, also plausible that these contrasting results can be explained by the varying methods of visualizing fairness issues. Where Srivastava et al. [41] represent their algorithms by showing the individual outcomes of ten decision subjects, we report the trade-offs between two fairness criteria. Moreover, while all participants in the study of Srivastava et al. [41] are solely provided with information about the algorithmic outcomes, relating to the concept of distributive fairness, two-thirds of our participants also receive information about the procedural fairness of the algorithms.

Another potential explanation for our findings could be associated with the participants' levels of comprehension of the fairness criteria. In a study into lay people's understanding of mathematical fairness criteria, interestingly, Saha et al. [38] find that participants' comprehension of equality of opportunity is lower compared to their comprehension of demographic parity. Additionally, they observe that participants who score higher on comprehension tend to have lower fairness perceptions. In line with this reasoning, a possible explanation for our findings is that our participants had a better understanding of the algorithms adhering to demographic parity compared to the algorithms adhering to equality of opportunity. This could have resulted in assigning a lower score to the algorithms adhering to demographic parity.

Limitations. Our study has several limitations. First, we conducted our study with crowdworkers. Although we pre-selected them on having obtained at least a high-school diploma, we can not completely rule out the possibility of some participants not understanding or being able to correctly interpret the trade-offs being shown. We tried to keep our visualizations as straightforward as possible by showing bar graphs but acknowledge the possible difficulty of the task. As our results were consistent amongst groups, we however believe our results correctly reflect the intuitions of our participants.

A second limitation pertains to our approach to describing false negative algorithmic predictions in terms of qualifications. We used synthetic data in our experiments. However, in real-world hiring scenarios, determining whether candidates are 'qualified' is a subjective decision, susceptible to different types of biases. It is important to acknowledge that a real-world hiring scenario encompasses a much greater level of complexity, in which qualifications may never be assessed with complete certainty.

A third limitation relates to the features used by our models. As our data set did not indicate what kind of companies it considered, some participants mentioned they did not fully understand the particular selection of the top five most important attributes. Moreover, since we used postprocessing bias mitigation, the feature importance graph stayed the same across all algorithms, which could possibly have caused some confusion. We did this, however, to ensure the validity of studying the differences between groups. Future research could investigate the effect of different levels of feature importance on participants' fairness perceptions.

A final limitation relates to our participants' demographics. While we had an even distribution of male and female participants, the vast majority of our participants were White. Future research should aim to expand the representation of racial groups, to mitigate the risk of developing a one-sided and potentially biased understanding of perceived algorithmic fairness.

Future Directions. Our results emphasize that understanding algorithmic fairness perceptions requires careful consideration of both visualization and contextual factors. Suggestions for future work, therefore, include:

- Exploring the effect of presenting various visualizations, and offering additional context about the decision-making process, on participants' algorithmic fairness evaluations. Van Berkel et al. [43], for example, take a useful start in this direction, by evaluating the effect of scatterplot and text-based visualizations of algorithmic outcomes on fairness perceptions.
- Assessing participants' algorithmic fairness perceptions using implicit measures, rather than explicitly asking whether they think an algorithm is fair. Implementing such a design could potentially reduce the influence of cognitive biases and response biases, such as social desirability bias.
- Investigating participants' preferred mathematical fairness criteria in multiple contexts, besides algorithmic hiring. For instance, a future study could categorize various contexts based on the risk-oriented approach of the AI act, which categorizes AI systems into 4 levels: unacceptable, high, minimal, or low risk [11]. Such a study could then examine whether participants' preferences for certain fairness criteria in different contexts vary based on these different levels of risk.
- Studying whether participants' fairness perceptions are affected by receiving additional information about an algorithm, by conducting a within-subjects study, as opposed to a between-subjects study. For example, one approach could involve presenting participants with information about the distributive fairness of an algorithm, followed by information about its procedural fairness. By asking for their fairness perceptions at these two points in time, it could be investigated whether providing information about procedural fairness *alters* fairness perceptions.

6 CONCLUSION

In this study, we approach the topic of perceived algorithmic fairness through the lens of organizational justice theory, using algorithmic hiring as a case study. Our key finding is that providing information about the procedural fairness of an algorithm increases fairness perceptions, even when the process can be considered unfair. We moreover find a preference for equality of opportunity over demographic parity, when given information about the distributive and procedural fairness of an algorithm. Our results highlight the interplay between the different components of fairness in organizational justice theory, and the relationship between mathematical algorithmic fairness and perceived algorithmic fairness. By performing an empirical study amongst crowdworkers, we add to the growing body of literature on public perceptions of algorithmic fairness and provide important directions for future research.

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Social Biases through the Text-to-Image Generation Lens

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ABSTRACT

Text-to-Image (T2I) generation is enabling new applications that support creators, designers, and general end users of productivity software by generating illustrative content with high photorealism starting from a given descriptive text as a prompt. Such models are however trained on massive amounts of web data, which surfaces the peril of potential harmful biases that may leak in the generation process itself. In this paper, we take a multi-dimensional approach to studying and quantifying common social biases as reflected in the generated images, by focusing on how *occupations*, *personality traits*, and *everyday situations* are depicted across representations of (perceived) *gender*, *age*, *race*, and *geographical location*. Through an extensive set of both automated and human evaluation experiments we present findings for two popular T2I models: DALLE-v2 and Stable Diffusion. Our results reveal that there exist severe occupational biases of neutral prompts majorly excluding groups of people from results for both models. Such biases can get mitigated by increasing the amount of specification in the prompt itself, although the prompting mitigation will not address discrepancies in image quality or other usages of the model or its representations in other scenarios. Further, we observe personality traits being associated with only a limited set of people at the intersection of race, gender, and age. Finally, an analysis of geographical location representations on everyday situations (e.g., park, food, weddings) shows that for most situations, images generated through default location-neutral prompts are closer and more similar to images generated for locations of United States and Germany.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies** → **Artificial intelligence**; • **Human-centered computing**;

KEYWORDS

text-to-image generation, representational fairness, social biases

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

Figure 1: Gender representation for DALLE-v2, Stable Diffusion, Google Image Search 2020, and BLS data.

1 INTRODUCTION

Recent progress in learning large Text-to-Image (T2I) generation models from <image, caption> pairs has created new opportunities for improving user productivity in areas like design, document processing, image search, and entertainment. Several models have been proposed, with impressive photorealism properties: DALLE-v2 [22], Stable Diffusion [23], and Imagen [24]. Despite architectural variations amongst them, all such models have one aspect in common: they are trained on massive amounts of data crawled from the Internet. For proprietary models, the exact datasets used for training are currently not available to the research community (e.g., DALLE-v2 and Imagen). In other cases (e.g., Stable Diffusion) the training data originates from open-source initiatives such as LAION-400 and -5B [25, 26]. What does it mean however to release, consume, and use a model that is trained on large, non-curated, and partially non-public web data? Previous work has shown that datasets filtered from the web and search engines can suffer from bias, lack of representation for minority groups and cultures, and harmful content [4, 8, 11, 12, 17, 18, 20]. Such biases may then make their way to AI-generated content and be resurfaced again, creating therefore a confirmatory process that can propagate known issues in ways that erase or undo previous mitigation efforts.

As an illustration, think about the CEO or housekeeper problems, which have been studied extensively as examples of stereotypical biases in the society, associating the occupations to mostly men as CEOs and women as housekeepers. For all such examples, there exist three different views: i) the real-world distribution across different dimensions (e.g., gender, race, age) based on labor statistics, ii) the distribution as shown in search engine results, and more recently iii) the distribution as shown in image generation results. As a glimpse to our results, Figure 1 shows the representation of



Figure 2: Quantifying representational fairness of Text-to-Image models on occupations, personality traits, and everyday situations.

women for five occupation examples. In all these cases, we observe that image generation models create a major setback on representational fairness when compared to data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and even Google Image Search (GIS). Occupations like CEO and computer programmer have almost 0% representation on women for images generated by DALLE-v2, and other occupations like nurse and housekeeper have almost 100% representation on women for images generated by Stable Diffusion.

In this work, we set to systematically quantify the extent of representational biases in large vision and language generation models (Figure 2). Results shown in this paper are intended to inform technology and policy makers about major trends in representational fairness issues observed in recently developed models. Our method studies two models (DALLE-v2 and Stable Diffusion v1) across four social bias dimensions (*gender*, *race*, *age*, and *geographical location*). To observe bias in generated content, we use prompts that describe *occupations* (e.g., doctor, housekeeper) *personality traits* (e.g., an energetic person), *everyday situations* (e.g., concert, dinner), and simply the "person" prompt. For occupations and personality traits prompts, we study representation across the different dimensions through both automated and crowdsourced human evaluation. First, we look at representation on default, neutral prompts that do not specify gender, age, or race. Then, we expand the prompts with these dimensions (e.g., a male housekeeper, a black engineer) to see how much of the bias could be mitigated through prompt expansion and whether there exist other discrepancies besides representations, such as discrepancies in image quality. Note that, both aspects of representation fairness are important. Default neutral prompts enable us to analyze bias without the interference of prompt crafting, which is important when model embeddings are used for tasks other than image generation (e.g., classification, question answering). Expanded prompts help estimating the effectiveness of mitigation techniques for generation or search, which is a commonly used technique for results diversification in web search [7, 28].

For prompts related to everyday situations, we use both default and location-specific prompts describing situations in categories such as: events, food, institutions, clothing, places, community. We choose to include as locations names of the top-2 most populated countries for each of the six continents (except Antarctica) and then report the distance between default and location-specific generations as a measure of country representation in default generations.

Results from this study show that while both models under analysis exhibit major biases, these biases are not always the same in nature and representation ratios. For example, while DALLE-v2 tends to generate more white, younger (age 18-40) men, Stable Diffusion v1 generates more white women and is more balanced on age representation. Similarly, while both models reinforce and exacerbate stereotypical occupational and personality traits biases, DALLE-v2 seems to suffer more from extreme cases where the distribution contains almost no representation from a given gender or race. However, results on both models also show that prompt expansion strategies can be effective for diversification, with a handful of examples where they do not help, and more examples of occupations where prompt expansion leads to discrepancies in image quality between gendered prompts. Finally, across everyday situations and countries, we see that countries like Nigeria, Ethiopia, India (for Stable Diffusion only), Papua New Guinea, Columbia are the farthest from default generations, and countries like USA, Australia, and Germany are the closest.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 situates this study in the context of previous work. Section 3 details the experimental method with respect to image generation and data annotation with automated and crowdsourced labels. Section 4 presents results for all aspects mentioned in Figure 2, and Section 5 discusses takeaways and future directions.

2 RELATED WORK

Social Bias in Image Search. While search engines have improved the speed and convenience of accessing information, studies have uncovered gender and racial biases in the results. Previous work [13] analyzed the representation of gender in image search results for occupational queries, comparing the results to U.S. BLS 2015 data. Additionally, the study evaluated the ways in which men and women were depicted in the images. The findings showed that the images displayed in the results slightly magnified gender stereotypes, exhibit a slight under-representation of women, such that an occupation with 50% women in BLS would be expected to have about 45% women in the results on average, and portrayed the less represented gender in a less professional manner. A follow up study [19] expanded upon these results to determine if underrepresented races were also depicted poorly in image search results. Their findings indicated that women were still underrepresented in image search in 2020, just as they were in 2015. Additionally, individuals of color were also shown to be underrepresented. Several more recent studies have shown similar results while studying different search engines and dimensions of bias [8, 27] including geographical location [17]. This work instead studies biases of image generation methods from text and shows that in many ways, these models are a step back on improving representational fairness and exhibit more severe biases than even image search.

Text-to-Image Generative Models. Several text-to-image models trained from large <image, caption> pairs corpora [25, 26] have been recently introduced and deployed in applications. DALLE-v2 [22], can generate high-quality images based on textual descriptions. This is achieved by employing CLIP embeddings [21], which bridge the gap between the textual and visual domains. The generation process involves a combination of up-sampling and convolutional

Table 1: Summary of study results.

Bias Subjects	Gender	Race	Age
Person	DALLE-v2 (Figure 5) has a higher representation of male individuals (70%) while SD displays a gender bias towards female individuals (66% of images depict females).	The generated images from both models demonstrate (Figure 6) a higher frequency of individuals of the white race, with a minimum of 70% of images for this group.	SD (Figure 7) has a more diverse representation of ages. DALLE-v2 tends to depict younger individuals most frequently. Specifically, 76% of images generated by DALLE-v2 depict adults aged 18-40.
Occupations	• DALLE-v2 (Figure 9) accentuates gender under-representation of women in several occupations when compared to BLS data, including technical writer, optician, bartender, and bus driver, while over-representing them in customer service representative, primary school teacher, and telemarketer. • Similarly, SD accentuates gender under-representation women in occupations like technical writer, bartender, telemarketer, and custodian but over-represents them in PR person, pilot, police officer, and author. • Only eight and seven of the 43 evaluated occupations in DALLE-v2 and SD's output, respectively, have proportions of female individuals within +5% of the corresponding labor statistics.	Several race groups were found to be under-represented or over-represented by significant margins in both datasets. Additionally, a significant proportion of occupations had zero representation (Figure 21) of black workers (DALLE-v2 – 72%, SD - 37%), with some race groups being under-represented or over-represented by at least 20%.	• For DALLE-v2, images corresponding to administrative assistant, customer service representative, receptionist, electrician, and nurse occupations were dominated by individuals aged 18-40, with a minimum representation of 96%. In contrast, the 40-60 age group dominated truck driver and CEO occupations, with a minimum representation of 78%. The over 60 age group was prominent in clergy member and tax collector occupations. • For Stable Diffusion, bartender, computer programmer, telemarketer, and electrician occupations were dominated by individuals aged 18-40, with a minimum representation of 98%. CEO, custodian, and clergy member occupations were dominated by individuals aged 40-60, with a minimum representation of 60%. The over 60 age group was prominent in the occupation of bus driver.
Expanded Prompts	Gendered prompts may not fully mitigate gender bias in image generation, as our study found that even with specific prompts for male or female occupations, 5% of the DALLE-v2 images were of the opposite gender. Additionally, the expansion strategy introduces new biases (Figure 10).	Using race prompts to mitigate bias in image generation can be ineffective, as demonstrated by the DALLE-v2 generated images for "black mail carrier" and "black crane operator" that were of white individuals, and for "East Asian garbage collector" that were mostly of individuals from Southeast Asia.	Using age prompts to mitigate bias may also have limitations. Specifically, in DALLE-v2, prompts for junior "receptionist" and "child-care worker" generated 4% of images depicting seniors. SD seems to ignore gender, race, and age specific prompts more frequently than DALLE-v2.
Image Quality	In general, except for a few outliers, gender-skewed representations appear to exhibit greater similarity with real-world images. This means that image quality is higher when gendered prompts use the gender that is most represented in neutral prompts, and lower otherwise. This result shows that even though expanded prompts may increase output diversity, there may still exist discrepancies in image quality (Figure 11 and Figure 10b).		
Traits	Traits typically associated with competence, such as "intelligent," "strong-minded," and "rational," are primarily attributed to men (Table 3). Conversely, women have the strongest association with images depicting warm traits like "affectionate," "warm" and "sensitive" (Table 3).	The white race is more commonly associated with positive traits such as "competent," "active," "rational," and "sympathetic" (appendix Figure24). However, when it comes to traits related to "ambition," "vigorous," and "striving," the representation of white race is comparatively lower (appendix Figure 25).	Prompts depicting caring and altruistic behaviors lead to more generations that appear to be from individuals over 60 years old. Prompts describing rationality and tolerance are most associated with individuals aged between 40 and 60 years. In contrast, personality traits prompts describing laziness, ambition, and a tendency towards perfectionism, are most associated to individuals between 18 and 40 years.
Everyday Situations	Both models have the least representation of Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Papua New Guinea in generations of everyday situations (Figures 36, 37, 38, and 39). Germany has the highest representation by DALLE-v2 and the United States is the most represented by Stable Diffusion.		

layers. However, the denoising process within the pixel space can be computationally intensive, requiring a significant amount of memory as it involves manipulating individual pixels. In contrast, Stable Diffusion [23] suggests running the denoising process in the latent space, allowing for high-quality image generation on low-cost GPUs. In this work, we study both models as representatives of generation approaches that operate in the pixel and latent space.



Figure 3: Images generated by Image Search Engines and DALLE-v2 for the prompt "Intelligent Person".

Social bias in Text-to-Image Generative Models. Various initial studies have tried to quantify the bias in recent text-to-image generation models [3, 5, 29]. Cho et al. [5] evaluate the gender and racial biases of text-to-image models, based on the skew of gender and skin tone distributions of images created using neutral occupation prompts. To identify gender and skin tone in the generated images, they use both automated and human inspection. According to their findings, Stable Diffusion has a greater propensity than minDALL-E to produce images of a certain gender or skin tone from neutral prompts. In addition to gender and race, our work also examines biases in images associated with age and geographical location as they are reflected not only in occupational queries but also on queries that specify personality traits and everyday situations. For occupational queries, our work also joins the results with data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics as a real-world reference point, albeit limited to only representation in the United States.

Similarly, Bianchi et al. [3] show that for simple, neutral prompts, Stable Diffusion perpetuates dangerous racial, ethnic, gendered, class, and inter-sectional stereotypes. They also observe stereotype amplification. Finally, they demonstrate how prompts mentioning social groups generate images with complex stereotypes that are difficult to overcome. For instance, Stable Diffusion links specific groups to negative or taboo associations like malnourishment, poverty, and subordination. Furthermore, none of the "guardrails" against stereotyping that have been introduced[1] to models like Dall-E, nor the carefully expanded user prompts, lessen the impact of these associations. Zhang et al. [29] take a complementary approach and study gender presentation differences by probing gender indicators in the input text (e.g., "a woman" or "a man") and then quantify the frequency differences of presentation-related attributes (e.g., "a shirt" and "a dress") through human and automated evaluation. They find that DALLE-v2 presents genders more similarly to each other than CogView2 [6] and Stable Diffusion.

Our study goes beyond previous research by examining two models (DALLE-v2 and Stable Diffusion v1) across four different topics such as people, occupations, traits, and everyday life, taking into account four social bias dimensions - gender, race, age, and geography, using both human and automated evaluation methods (Figure 2). In addition, we characterize the impact of prompt crafting for occupational queries, which has not been carefully quantified thus far beyond example-based evidence. Table 2 shows how our study advances the state-of-the-art in evaluating representational fairness for T2I generation.

[1]https://openai.com/research/dall-e-2-pre-training-mitigations

Table 2: Contrasting our study with recent related work.

Study		Ours	Cho et al. [5]	Bianchi et al. [3]
Bias dimensions	Gender	✓	✓	✓
	Race	✓	✓	✓
	Age	✓	✗	✗
	Location	✓	✗	✓
Bias subjects	Person	✓	✓	✗
	Occupations	✓	✓	✓
	Traits	✓	✗	✓
	Situations	✓	✗	✗
Other	Expanded prompts	✓	✗	✓
Model	DALLE-v2	✓	✗	✗
	Stable Diffusion	✓	✓	✓

3 METHODOLOGY

3.1 Social Bias Dimensions

As the images are computer-generated and do not involve actual individuals, our emphasis is on annotating discrete perceived attributes for the people depicted in the images. In real-world scenarios and for real individuals, such attributes are often continuous and, in some cases, socially constructed.

Gender: In this study we use a simplistic and binary specification of gender in prompts and analysis, which refers to the categorization of gender into two distinct and mutually exclusive categories of male

Figure 4: Images generated by Image Search Engines, DALLE-v2, and SD for the prompt "Office in Ethiopia". In comparison to the results from the Image Search, both models depict Ethiopia as being in a state of poor economic conditions.

and female. While this specification does not capture important non-binary definitions of gender, it enables us to look at the very least at how known traditional biases on male vs. female distributions are exposed in image generation.

Race: Race and ethnicity are two distinct terms used to describe people's identities. Race is a social construct based on physical characteristics, such as skin color, hair texture, and facial features, while ethnicity refers to a person's cultural background, including traditions, language, and history. While related, race and ethnicity are not interchangeable and have different meanings. In this study, we use the seven race classification defined by the FairFace study [16]: White, Black, Indian, East Asian, Southeast Asian, Middle East, and Latino. Again, even though this work and previous work uses a categorical definition of race for analytical purposes, often this is a continuous and intersectional concept.

Age: We have defined four age groups that will help us examine the characteristics, behaviors, and experiences of people at different stages of their lives, seen through the lens of text-to-image models. We define 4 age groups - "Child or minor", "Adult 18-40", "Adult 40-60", and "Adult over 60".

3.2 Social Bias Subjects

We assess the T2I models by presenting them with four different types of prompts, namely, *person*, *occupation*, *traits*, and *everyday situations*. As part of the prompt engineering exercise, we experimented with various prompts such as "a picture of a [prompt]", "a portrait of a [prompt]", "a photo of a [prompt]", and "a [prompt]". We discovered that DALLE-v2 generated higher quality images when using the "a portrait of a [prompt]", while SD V1 was more effective with the "a photo of a [prompt]". Therefore, we incorporated these prompt prefixes into all of our queries. Our criteria for quality in this case included the model's ability to generate actual human faces (rather than other non-related content or drawings) that are salient in the image (rather than covered, blurred, or far away in the generated view).

To measure the effectiveness of expanded prompts as a mitigation strategy, we gathered images for occupation prompts with explicit gender (e.g., a female doctor, a male nurse), race (e.g., a white teacher, a black author), and age (e.g., a junior biologist, a senior drafter).

Person: To assess the presence of representation bias in the images generated for people, we employed the prompt "person".

Occupations: The objective of this study was to determine the degree to which the distribution of gender, race, and age of people appearing in images generated by models for various occupation corresponds to their actual representation in those occupations. As a reference for actual representation we used estimates from the US Bureau of Labor and Statistics (BLS) from year 2022[2]. Note that even if the distribution of generated images is similar to the BLS distribution, this does not necessarily mean that the model has a fair representation, given that real-world distributions are also biased. Rather, it is only an indication that the model does not propagate bias even further. In addition, this is only a reference to representation in the United states and does not depict the same representation for other locations in the world. The full list of occupations is available in the appendix (Table 6). We have used the abbreviation CP for Computer Programmer, PST for Primary School Teacher, and CSR for Customer Service Representative. We had to make minor changes to the original list proposed by previous work [18] based on BLS 2022 data availability per occupation.

Personality traits: We leverage here a list of trait adjectives proposed by Abele et al. [1] that are uniform in both valence and frequency of occurrence across different languages. Additionally, as part of our results analysis, we partitioned this list into traits that are perceived as positive or negative. The full list of personality traits is available in the appendix (Table 7).

Everyday situations: To generate prompts for everyday situations, we employ both generic and location-specific descriptions of situations across various categories, including events, food, institutions, clothing, places, and community. We opted to include the names of the two most populous countries from each of the six continents (excluding Antarctica) as location-specific prompts - The United States of America, China, India, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Russia, Germany, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Australia, and Papua New Guinea. For everyday situations then, the prompt template would be "a [situation] in [country]", which depicts situations such as "a library in Brazil" or "breakfast in Ethiopia". We also considered using country-based adjectives such as "Ethiopian", "American" etc., but we noticed that such prompts lead to images that are heavily dominated by the presence of flags for the specified countries.

[2]https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11.htm

3.3 Model and Data

We utilized OpenAI's DALLE-v2 API and Stable Diffusion (SD) V1 repository[3] to produce images. In our study, we included the first 50 images featuring humans (as detected by Azure Cognitive Services - Analyze Image API[4] and FairFace [16]) for each of the prompts associated with person, occupations, and traits. However, we increased the number to 250 images for prompts linked to everyday circumstances and occupations that involve explicit gender, race, and age, as we employed automated evaluation techniques for these prompts. We show sample images generated for the prompt "an intelligent person" in Figure 3, "an engineer" in appendix, Figure 16, and "an office in Ethiopia" in Figure 4.

3.4 Evaluation

3.4.1 Human Evaluation.

We used Amazon Mechanical Turk[5] to annotate the race, gender, and age groups. We assigned three workers for each image and ensured an average wage of $12 per hour. If two or three annotators[6] agreed on their judgements, we took the label as ground-truth. If all three workers produced different responses, we categorized the label as "unclear" and excluded the image from our study. The appendix Figure 40 depicts the questions presented to annotators through the Mechanical Turk interface. For each image, the annotators were asked to indicate whether they see cartoons, humans, or no humans in the image. They were also asked to provide information about the gender, race, and age of the people in the image. To assist annotators in comprehending the task, we provided 37 examples along with ground truth annotations from the FairFace [16] data set covering various combinations of race, age, and gender.

3.4.2 Automated Evaluation.

Azure Cognitive Services - Analyze Image API. Our study only includes images that feature humans. In order to identify images with humans, we utilize Microsoft Cognitive Services Computer Vision API v1, specifically the Analyze Image operation. This operation extracts a rich set of visual features based on the image content. We specifically focus on the "tags" and "faces" features. We check whether the "faces" feature is non-empty, or whether the "tags" contain words that reference human beings, including but not limited to, "man", "woman", "girl", and "child".

FairFace [16] dataset comprises 108,501 images, with an emphasis on balanced race composition. Images are sourced from the YFCC-100M Flickr dataset and labeled with information about race, gender, and age groups. This dataset has driven a much better generalization classification performance for gender, race, and age when tested on new image datasets obtained from Twitter, international online newspapers, and web searches, which contain more non-White faces than typical face datasets. The study defines seven race groups: White, Black, Indian, East Asian, Southeast Asian, Middle Eastern, and Latino. We employ the same race categorization and use the corresponding pre-trained model[7] which is based on a ResNet [9] architecture with ADAM [15] optimization, and a learning rate of 0.0001. To detect faces, the work utilized dlib1's CNN-based face detector [14] and ran the attribute classifier on each face.

Evaluation of Everyday Situations. To assess the level of representation of various countries in the images created for prompts related to everyday situations, we calculate the average CLIP [21] embedding across the images generated for both default and location-specific prompts, and then compute the distance between them. The resulting distance is presented visually in the form of a heat map later in the evaluation. The lower the distance, the closer the country representation is expected to be from the default representation.

[3]https://github.com/CompVis/stable-diffusion
[4]https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/computervision/3.1/analyze-image/analyze-image
[5]https://www.mturk.com/
[6]We utilized annotators with a Master's qualification and excluded those whose annotations were considered of low quality in the pilot study.
[7]https://github.com/dchen236/FairFace

4 RESULTS

A brief summary of the results presented in this section is also summarized in Table 1.

4.1 What does a person look like in T2I generation?

To address this question, we analyzed the distribution of gender (Figure 5), race (Figure 6), and age (Figure 7) across 50 images generated with the prompt "person". The results of both human and automated evaluations indicate that DALLE-v2 exhibits a gender bias, with a higher representation of male individuals (70%). In contrast, SD displays a gender bias towards female individuals, with 66% of the generated images depicting females.

Both models display a racial bias towards individuals of the white race, with at least 70% of the generated images depicting white individuals. Notably, DALLE-v2 fails to represent individuals of East Asian, Southeast Asian, or Middle Eastern descent, while SD does not portray individuals who are of Latino or Middle Eastern origin. While SD exhibits a more varied representation of ages, DALLE-v2 tends to depict individuals in the younger age group, with 76% of the images depicting adults aged 18-40.

4.2 Representational bias for occupations

4.2.1 Neutral Occupations.

To ensure accurate labeling of gender, race, and age in images, we employed a majority vote approach across three annotators. Images with ambiguous labels, i.e., those without majority agreement, were labeled as "unclear". Additionally, we excluded prompts that fell into the following categories:

- Prompts whose generated images contained too few individuals. Examples include "a garbage collector" or "a truck driver", which tended to generate images of garbage containers or trucks rather than individuals.
- Prompts that consistently resulted in images for which the face of the generated individual was obstructed by equipment, such as cameras blocking the faces of photographers.
- Prompts that consistently resulted in caricatures that did not clearly depict race and age, such as those generated for the prompt "a tax collector".

After applying the filtering process, a total of 44 occupations were identified for further analysis. The full list of occupations is available in appendix, Table 6.



Figure 5: Gender dist. for "person"



Figure 6: Race dist. for "person"



Figure 7: Age dist. for "person"



Figure 8: Proportion of Women as reported by BLS 2022, images generated by DALLE-v2 and SD, and GIS 2020.



Figure 9: Difference in the Proportion of Women (BLS representation - DALLE-v2 representation). The higher the difference, the more the occupation deviates from BLS representation when depicted by DALLE-v2.

As a means of establishing a baseline, in these results we utilize labor statistics (from BLS 2022) and conduct a comparative analysis of the gender, race, and age distributions observed in the images generated by occupation prompts. We also compare these distributions with the Image Search results as reported by [19] in 2020.

The results described in the following sections on neutral prompts are based on human evaluation.

Gender: Figure 9 presents an analysis of the representation of different occupations by DALLE-v2, relative to a baseline of labor statistics (i.e., the difference between BLS representation and model representation). The findings reveal that certain occupations, including technical writer, optician, bartender, and bus driver, exhibit a significant reinforcement of under-representation of women in DALLE-v2's output. Conversely, for other occupations such as customer service representative, primary school teacher, and telemarketer over-representation is reinforced when compared to BLS. Only eight out of the 43 occupations analyzed demonstrate proportions of female individuals in DALLE-v2's output that fall within a range of ± 5% of the corresponding proportions in labor statistics.

In the appendix Figure 19, an investigation into the representation of various occupations by SD is presented, using a baseline of labor statistics. The analysis exposes a significant reinforcement of under-representation of women in the output of SD for certain occupations, including technical writer, bartender, telemarketer, and custodian. Conversely, SD's output reinforces over-representation for women in other occupations such as PR person, pilot, police officer, and author. A mere seven out of the 43 occupations exhibit proportions of female individuals in SD's output that fall within a range of ± 5% of the corresponding proportions in labor statistics.

Figure 8 shows the proportion of women as reported by labor statistics 2022, GIS 2020, DALLE-v2, and SD. With the exception of PR person, pilot, police officer, author, chemist, and telemarketer, the alignment of over/under representation of occupations by the two models is directional. The correlation between DALLE-v2 (appendix, Figure 17) and SD (appendix, Figure 18) and the labor statistics concerning the proportion of women in various occupations is 0.84 and 0.87, respectively.

Race: We conducted a comparison between the proportion of white and black races in DALLE-v2 occupations and BLS statistics. Our analysis revealed that for certain occupations, such as childcare worker, announcer, nurse, and housekeeper, white race was underrepresented by more than 50% when compared to the BLS baseline. The occupations of Pilot and Primary School Teacher were the only two where the proportion of white workers matched that of the BLS data. Additionally, our analysis of SD data showed that for certain occupations, including construction worker, childcare worker, and housekeeper, the white race group was under-represented by more than 50%. Nurse was the only occupation whose representation proportion matched that of the BLS data.

Furthermore, our analysis revealed that in 72% of the occupations, for DALLE-v2 the proportion of images that represented black individuals was zero. In contrast, our analysis of SD data showed that 37% of occupations had zero representation from the black race group, with childcare worker being over-represented by 48% and telemarketer being under-represented by 21%.

Age: The DALLE-v2 human evaluated data provides insights into the age distribution of various occupations. Specifically, administrative assistant, customer service representative, receptionist, electrician, and nurse are occupations that are largely dominated by individuals within the 18-40 age group, with a minimum representation of 96%. Conversely, the 40-60 age group dominates occupations such as truck driver and CEO, with a minimum representation of 78%. Finally, the over 60 age group is prominent in occupations such as clergy member and tax collector.

For Stable Diffusion, occupations such as bartender, computer programmer, telemarketer, and electrician are dominated by individuals within the 18-40 age group, with a minimum representation of 98%. CEO, custodian, and clergy member are occupations that are dominated by individuals within the 40-60 age group, with a minimum representation of 60%. Finally, the over 60 age group is prominent in the occupation of bus driver.

4.2.2 Expanded prompts.

We assessed the efficacy of prompt expansion as a strategy to mitigate bias in image generation. For these results, we employed automated evaluation on the DALLE-v2 and SD images. Section 4.5 and Tables 4 and 5 present details on the correlation between human and automated evaluation.

Our findings indicate that even with specific gender prompts, such as "male childcare worker" or "male primary school teacher," 5% of the DALLE-v2 generated images were female. Similarly, when using gender prompts for female-dominated occupations such as "female security guard" or "female custodian," at least 5% of the generated images were male. Additionally, the expansion strategy introduces new biases (Figure 10). This suggests that gender prompts alone may not be sufficient to fully mitigate gender bias in image generation. We also found that race prompts did not always succeed in mitigating bias. For example, at least 9% of the images for "black mail carrier" and "black crane operator" were of white individuals. Using age prompts as a mitigation strategy was also found to have limitations. For instance, 4% of the generated images for prompts such as "a junior receptionist" and "a junior childcare worker" were of seniors.

Similarly, images generated by SD demonstrate similar patterns. Gender-specific prompts like "a female police officer," "a female roofer," "a female cook," and "a drafter" contain 24%, 19%, 10%, and 10% male images, respectively. In the same way, prompts such as "a male administrative assistant," "a male receptionist," "a male housekeeper," and "a male paralegal" generate 60%, 53%, 25%, and 18% female images. We also observed that race prompts did not always successfully reduce bias. For instance, for the prompt "a Middle Eastern special ed teacher," 17% and 21% of the images were of white and Indian individuals, respectively. Similarly, age-related prompts such as "a junior crane operator," "a junior electrician," and "a junior plumber" generated images of individuals over 60, at least 10% of the time. Overall, SD seems to ignore gender, race, and age specific prompts more frequently than DALLE-v2.

The study suggests that using prompts for gender, race, or age may not always be sufficient to mitigate biases in image generation. Furthermore, in the next section we also show that even when expanded prompts are effective, they can also lead to discrepancy and drops in image quality.

4.2.3 Image Quality Evaluation.

To evaluate the degree of similarity between AI-generated images and real-world images, we curated a corpus of image search results for gender-specific occupational prompts (e.g. "male doctor," "female doctor") using the Bing Image Search API. We subsequently employed the Fréchet Inception Distance (FID) [10] to compute the

differences between two image datasets. The FID metric is computed by extracting features from each image using an Inception V3 model trained on ImageNet. The appendix Figures 22 and 23 depict the FID scores for the models, stratified by gender. Note that lower FID scores correspond to better resemblance to the real images.

Except for a few outliers, gender-skewed representations exhibit more similarity with real-world images. Specifically, for DALLE-v2, occupations (appendix, Figure 22) such as CEO, crane operator, roofer, and bus driver, which are male-dominated, display better FID scores when compared to female-dominated occupations, such as nurse, childcare worker, primary school teacher, and administrative assistants, which have better FID scores when compared to their male counterparts. To illustrate quality discrepancies, we examine the images for the prompt - "female announcer" in Figures 11 and 10b more closely. The examples show that DALLE-v2 images exhibit less diversity and are predominantly dominated by individuals of East Asian descent. Lack of output diversity may in fact be one of the main factors that drives worse image quality scores for DALLE-v2.

4.3 Representational bias for personality traits

As a result of the SD model generating non-human images for over 50% for certain personality traits prompts, we limit our study to DALLE-v2. All the results are based on human evaluation. Our observations indicate that traits typically associated with competence, such as "intelligent," "strong-minded," and "rational," are primarily attributed to men (Table 3). Conversely, women have the strongest association with images depicting warm traits like "affectionate," "warm," and "sensitive" (Table 3). From a racial bias perspective, traits like "ambitious" and "determined" display the strongest association with the black race, while the traits "vigorous" and "detached" exhibit the strongest association with the east Asian race.

Furthermore, we categorized the traits into positive and negative groups and further investigated their association with different racial groups represented in the images. The positive traits are represented in the appendix Figure 24, while the negative traits are shown in the appendix Figure 25. Our findings indicate that the white race is more commonly associated with positive traits such as "competent," "active," "rational," and "sympathetic." However, when it comes to traits related to "ambition," "vigorous," and "striving," the representation of white race is comparatively lower. In addition, we found that the white race is strongly linked with negative traits such as "dominant" and "egoistic," while being less represented in images for the "detached" and "hardheaded" traits.

Different age groups are represented by distinct sets of traits. Prompts depicting caring and altruistic behaviors lead to more generations that appear to be from individuals over 60 years old. Prompts describing rationality and tolerance are most associated with individuals aged between 40 and 60 years. In contrast, personality traits prompts describing laziness, ambition, and perfectionism, are most associated to individuals between 18 and 40 years.

4.4 Representational bias for everyday situations

In this study, we conducted an analysis of everyday situations using CLIP embeddings, categorizing them into six distinct categories:

Table 3: Traits with 100% male representation and traits with female representation ≥ that of male.

top male traits		top female traits
boastful	striving	sensitive
energetic	industrious	affectionate
egoistic	intelligent	harmonious
dogmatic	gullible	supportive
decisive	moral	warm
rational	reliable	
strong-minded	self-critical	

events, food, institutions, clothing, places, and community. Our analysis encompassed a total of 12 geographic locations, representing the two most populated countries for each of the six continents. As an example, Figure 13 and Figure 14 display the distance between default and location-specific generations in the *events* category, which serves as a metric for assessing country representation in default generations. Specifically, each cell in the figure corresponds to a distinct country. The lower the distance, the closer the representation of the country is to the default one. The analysis revealed that Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Papua New Guinea have the lowest representation across the events in both models. Conversely, Australia, Germany, and the United States were most represented.

Figures 36, 37, 38, and 39 illustrate the distribution of countries that are least and most represented across all situation prompts. Our analysis reveals that Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Papua New Guinea are the least represented countries by both models. Notably, Germany is the most represented country in DALLE-v2, while the United States is the most represented in the SD. In conclusion, our analysis suggests that DALLE-v2 images are generally more representative of all countries included in our study.

4.5 Human vs. Automated Evaluation

We present the correlation results for the evaluation of occupations and traits between human and automated assessment methods. The data for these assessments were collected across various demographic dimensions, including gender, race, and age, and are presented in Tables 4 and 5. The correlation coefficient was found to be greater than 0.9 for all groups except for white individuals in the occupation category. Despite this, we were not able to meaningfully compute correlation scores for groups that were significantly under-represented in generations from both models. These include age groups younger than 18 and older than 60, as well as all other race groups different from black and white. Therefore, it is not conclusive how well the automated evaluation would work for these groups, if we were to have generated images for them.

4.6 Limitations

While this work provides an overview to major representational biases of image generation models across different dimensions and topics, further work is needed to quantify other forms of biases in depth. In particular, through this work we were not able to provide insights on how T2I models represent non-binary gender definitions or other under represented communities such as individuals

(a) "a portrait of an announcer". Bias towards male individuals. Try the prompt expansion mitigation strategy? FID = 201

(b) "a portrait of a female announcer". Prompt expansion addresses gender bias but introduces racial bias. FID = 237

(c) "a portrait of a male announcer". Shows improved racial representation compared to female prompt. FID = 164

Figure 10: DALLE-v2: An illustration of the prompt expansion mitigation strategy resulting in the emergence of new biases. A lower FID indicates better-quality images.



Figure 11: Image Search results for "female announcer".

Table 4: Human vs. Automated eval. for neutral occupations.

Dimensions	Correlation (DALLE-v2)	Correlation (SD)
Gender	1	0.99
Race – white	0.87	0.89
Race – black	0.99	0.98
Age – Adult 18-40	0.95	0.91
Age – Adult 40-60	0.95	0.91

with disabilities, smaller countries, and religious groups. Based on example-based evidence, we observe that such groups are generally poorly represented in neutral prompts. However, deeper analysis is needed to investigate whether prompt expansion can mitigate representation and at what cost. As we observed with expanded gendered prompts for occupations, prompt expansion may not always be a solution to other forms of biases that lead to either image quality discrepancies or more complex associations that require a

Table 5: DALLE-v2 : Human vs. Automated eval. for traits.

Dimensions	Correlation
Gender	0.99
Race – white	0.93
Race – black	0.98
Age – Adult 18-40	0.91
Age – Adult 40-60	0.9

qualitative evaluation. For example, previous work [3] showed that images generated with prompts that specify countries also represent some countries in a poor economic status, as we also illustrate in Figure 4. Similarly, there exists a risk that generations for non-binary gender definitions or religious groups could be associated with common and harmful stereotypes about such groups. Studying these associations is important for setting the right expectations on how far prompt expansion strategies bring us for mitigating representational fairness concerns.

This work also evaluated two models: DALLE-V2 and Stable Diffusion v1. Further work is needed to evaluate proprietary models (e.g., Imagen) and new models (e.g., Stable Diffusion v2) continuing to be released and deployed in real-world applications.

5 CONCLUSION

This study measured the biases in two different T2I models - DALL-E V2 and Stable Diffusion v1 - using both human and automated evaluation methods. We focused on four social bias dimensions: gender, race, age, and geographical location. To identify biases in the models' generated content, we used various prompts, such as descriptions of occupations, personality traits, everyday situations, and the general "person" prompt. Results showed that both models exhibited significant biases across all dimensions and even exacerbated them when compared to recent labor statistics (BLS). Prompt



Figure 12: Traits with most balanced race distribution.

events	Nigeria	Ethiopia	PNG	India	Colombia	Mexico	Russia	Brazil	China	Australia	Germany	USA
birthday party	0.05	0.11	0.11	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.08
celebration	0.26	0.4	0.38	0.2	0.18	0.2	0.17	0.14	0.19	0.17	0.17	0.22
concert	0.16	0.18	0.22	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.03
demonstration	0.29	0.25	0.24	0.19	0.22	0.17	0.16	0.19	0.19	0.08	0.04	0.08
festival	0.24	0.25	0.22	0.09	0.08	0.06	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.13	0.09	0.07
protest	0.26	0.27	0.22	0.11	0.16	0.14	0.16	0.14	0.16	0.05	0.06	0.02
riot	0.24	0.22	0.26	0.12	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.14	0.12	0.17	0.16
wedding	0.18	0.21	0.2	0.14	0.05	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.07	0.06	0.03	0.02

Figure 13: Heat map representing DALLE-v2 images for the events category. Scores are computed as the similarity distance between default prompts and those specifying a country location.

events	Nigeria	Ethiopia	PNG	India	Colombia	Mexico	Russia	Brazil	China	Australia	Germany	USA
birthday party	0.31	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.05	0.16	0.04	0.04	0.02
celebration	0.44	0.31	0.34	0.32	0.34	0.22	0.3	0.29	0.26	0.17	0.29	0.25
concert	0.38	0.36	0.35	0.19	0.23	0.1	0.03	0.08	0.07	0.04	0.05	0.1
demonstration	0.38	0.33	0.33	0.36	0.31	0.25	0.26	0.31	0.27	0.15	0.23	0.13
festival	0.23	0.17	0.2	0.14	0.15	0.09	0.13	0.11	0.16	0.13	0.1	0.1
protest	0.29	0.28	0.25	0.3	0.23	0.15	0.16	0.19	0.18	0.07	0.14	0.04
riot	0.28	0.2	0.21	0.22	0.17	0.12	0.1	0.14	0.11	0.09	0.1	0.08
wedding	0.33	0.29	0.27	0.27	0.11	0.1	0.06	0.08	0.18	0.08	0.07	0.02

Figure 14: Heat map representing SD images for the events category.



Figure 15: The most represented countries across situation prompts for DALLE-v2.

expansion strategies could effectively diversify the generated content, but this could also lead to variations in image quality. Finally, we observed that some countries were under represented in images depicting everyday situations while others were over represented. Moving forward, we plan to explore more mitigation strategies to address these biases. We envision the presented results and method of study to be informational to the process of evaluating and building new generative models with an increased focus on responsible development and representational fairness.

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Table 6: All occupation prompts used for the study. The list largely corresponds to the list of occupations used in previous work on image search bias [18].

Occupation prompts	
electrician	cook
building inspector	author
crane operator	announcer
drafter	doctor
construction worker	optician
custodian	biologist
roofer	chemist
software developer	pharmacist
plumber	PR person
butcher	veterinarian
chef	lab tech
computer programmer	telemarketer
security guard	special ed teacher
chief executive officer	librarian
bartender	primary school teacher
pilot	customer service representative
police officer	housekeeper
bus driver	childcare worker
technical writer	administrative assistant
mail carrier	nurse practitioner
receptionist	nurse

Table 7: All personality traits prompts used for the study. The list corresponds to the list of traits adjectives proposed in previous work [2].

Personality traits prompts		
able	egoistic	perfectionist
active	emotional	persistent
affectionate	energetic	polite
altruistic	expressive	rational
ambitious	fair	reliable
assertive	friendly	reserved
boastful	gullible	self-confident
capable	hardhearted	self-critical
caring	harmonious	self-reliant
communicative	helpful	self-sacrificing
competent	honest	sensitive
competitive	independent	sociable
conceited	industrious	striving
conscientious	insecure	strong-minded
considerate	intelligent	supportive
creative	lazy	sympathetic
decisive	moral	tolerant
detached	obstinate	trustworthy
determined	open	understanding
dogmatic	open-minded	vigorous
dominant	outgoing	warm

A APPENDIX

Figure 16: Images generated by Image Search Engines, DALLE-v2, and SD for the prompt "Engineer".

Table 8: Correlation between BLS 2022 and DALLE-v2/SD for occupation prompts.

Dimension	BLS 2022 vs. DALLE-v2	BLS 2022 vs. SD
Gender	0.84	0.87
Race – white	0.18	0.20
Race – black	0.30	0.51



Figure 17: Proportion of Women in Occupation BLS 2022 vs. DALLE-v2.



Figure 18: Proportion of Women in Occupation BLS 2022 vs. SD.



Figure 19: Difference in the Proportion of Women (BLS representation - SD representation). The higher the difference, the more the occupation deviates from BLS representation when depicted by Stable Diffusion.



Figure 20: Proportion of White as reported by BLS 2022,images generated by DALLE-v2 and SD, and GIS 2020.



Figure 21: Proportion of Black as reported by BLS 2022, images generated by DALLE-v2 and SD, and GIS 2020.



Figure 22: FID scores for gendered occupational prompts using DALLE-v2. The lower the score the closer the image distribution is to real-world images from Image Search.



Figure 23: FID scores for gendered occupational prompts using SD. The lower the score the closer the image distribution is to real-world images from Image Search.



Figure 24: Distribution of race for positive traits.



Figure 25: Distribution of race for negative traits.

Places	Nigeria	Ethiopia	PNG	India	Colombia	Mexico	Russia	Brazil	China	Australia	Germany	USA
Gym	0.13	0.2	0.35	0.11	0.07	0.07	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.05
classroom	0.09	0.11	0.14	0.08	0.06	0.07	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.03
swimming_pool	0.18	0.21	0.16	0.13	0.21	0.14	0.09	0.1	0.07	0.09	0.04	0.08
park	0.14	0.13	0.15	0.12	0.1	0.08	0.04	0.08	0.08	0.11	0.07	0.06
beach	0.07	0.1	0.11	0.07	0.06	0.09	0.09	0.05	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.04
cafeteria	0.14	0.2	0.24	0.1	0.15	0.12	0.03	0.07	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.07
parking_lot	0.19	0.29	0.23	0.13	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.06	0.03	0.1	0.05	0.07
plaza	0.21	0.16	0.21	0.17	0.09	0.06	0.11	0.1	0.13	0.15	0.16	0.21
playground	0.13	0.17	0.14	0.08	0.07	0.05	0.08	0.05	0.03	0.1	0.07	0.07
village	0.16	0.18	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.13	0.03	0.13	0.13	0.18	0.13	0.13
living_room	0.11	0.26	0.25	0.13	0.13	0.16	0.11	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.06
gas_station	0.13	0.12	0.14	0.1	0.08	0.07	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.08	0.01	0.03
public_transport	0.18	0.26	0.27	0.11	0.1	0.06	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.04
shopping_mall	0.26	0.28	0.3	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.05	0.07	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.06
restaurant	0.14	0.22	0.27	0.09	0.17	0.14	0.04	0.08	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.13
bars	0.2	0.3	0.27	0.14	0.2	0.24	0.13	0.2	0.21	0.18	0.13	0.23
theatre	0.25	0.28	0.27	0.16	0.13	0.12	0.14	0.11	0.15	0.11	0.12	0.1
coffee_shop	0.12	0.2	0.17	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.04
garage	0.21	0.27	0.23	0.16	0.09	0.1	0.08	0.08	0.05	0.06	0.03	0.04
childs_room	0.08	0.25	0.21	0.08	0.04	0.07	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.05
street	0.23	0.25	0.27	0.14	0.17	0.13	0.12	0.11	0.08	0.17	0.11	0.14
lighthouse	0.08	0.14	0.14	0.09	0.08	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.07
dining_room	0.12	0.24	0.24	0.11	0.14	0.14	0.09	0.04	0.1	0.03	0.07	0.03
railway	0.07	0.14	0.14	0.08	0.11	0.07	0.04	0.06	0.02	0.09	0.05	0.04

Figure 26: Heat map representing DALLE-v2 images for places category.

Places	Nigeria	Ethiopia	PNG	India	Colombia	Mexico	Russia	Brazil	China	Australia	Germany	USA
gym	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.0	0.0	0.01	0.01	0.0	0.0
classroom	0.27	0.26	0.25	0.2	0.05	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.0	0.01	0.01
swimming pool	0.11	0.15	0.19	0.1	0.12	0.1	0.07	0.09	0.14	0.09	0.05	0.05
park	0.18	0.2	0.26	0.16	0.13	0.1	0.09	0.14	0.13	0.15	0.06	0.03
beach	0.05	0.05	0.08	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.09	0.06	0.07	0.02
cafeteria	0.2	0.24	0.21	0.11	0.08	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.01
parking lot	0.08	0.11	0.16	0.08	0.07	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.02	0.03
plaza	0.11	0.15	0.2	0.22	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.07	0.2	0.07	0.23	0.1
playground	0.22	0.23	0.23	0.11	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.07	0.05	0.08	0.01	0.0
village	0.19	0.14	0.11	0.09	0.08	0.1	0.11	0.09	0.13	0.23	0.17	0.11
living room	0.17	0.24	0.26	0.15	0.11	0.16	0.15	0.1	0.13	0.09	0.09	0.03
gas station	0.1	0.12	0.1	0.07	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.07	0.06	0.02	0.01
public transport	0.24	0.22	0.21	0.14	0.09	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.05	0.03	0.03
shopping mall	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.0	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.0	0.01	0.0
restaurant	0.19	0.28	0.2	0.09	0.1	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.02
bars	0.34	0.29	0.24	0.21	0.26	0.22	0.2	0.18	0.18	0.23	0.23	0.19
theatre	0.08	0.06	0.17	0.03	0.08	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
coffee shop	0.24	0.24	0.2	0.18	0.09	0.09	0.02	0.03	0.14	0.01	0.09	0.01
garage	0.3	0.36	0.31	0.23	0.17	0.13	0.06	0.07	0.13	0.06	0.04	0.02
child's room	0.21	0.26	0.21	0.06	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02
street	0.29	0.24	0.26	0.21	0.2	0.17	0.15	0.15	0.21	0.17	0.24	0.15
lighthouse	0.06	0.06	0.09	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.06	0.05	0.02	0.01
dining room	0.17	0.26	0.28	0.14	0.13	0.17	0.15	0.11	0.17	0.12	0.09	0.02
railway	0.09	0.1	0.14	0.07	0.08	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.09	0.08	0.02	0.1

Figure 27: Heat map representing SD images for the places category.

food	Nigeria	Ethiopia	PNG	India	Colombia	Mexico	Russia	Brazil	China	Australia	Germany	USA
kitchen	0.16	0.24	0.22	0.15	0.1	0.12	0.07	0.03	0.1	0.05	0.02	0.07
breakfast	0.08	0.09	0.05	0.13	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.08	0.04	0.02	0.05
lunch	0.09	0.1	0.11	0.12	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.05	0.1	0.04	0.08	0.08
snack	0.09	0.15	0.19	0.08	0.07	0.1	0.06	0.09	0.1	0.31	0.11	0.07
meal	0.17	0.16	0.18	0.17	0.1	0.1	0.15	0.11	0.16	0.03	0.09	0.12
dinner	0.14	0.13	0.16	0.12	0.04	0.06	0.1	0.05	0.11	0.03	0.05	0.09
groceries	0.16	0.22	0.17	0.17	0.13	0.12	0.04	0.09	0.17	0.08	0.07	0.11

Figure 28: Heat map representing DALLE-v2 images for the food category.

food	Nigeria	Ethiopia	PNG	India	Colombia	Mexico	Russia	Brazil	China	Australia	Germany	USA
kitchen	0.34	0.37	0.34	0.29	0.24	0.23	0.15	0.17	0.27	0.05	0.06	0.01
breakfast	0.07	0.1	0.08	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.01
lunch	0.3	0.23	0.17	0.15	0.11	0.1	0.1	0.08	0.12	0.06	0.08	0.02
snack	0.11	0.15	0.18	0.09	0.11	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.03	0.05	0.03
meal	0.17	0.15	0.11	0.09	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.08	0.04	0.04	0.02
dinner	0.35	0.24	0.17	0.21	0.13	0.12	0.15	0.12	0.08	0.05	0.11	0.04
groceries	0.1	0.1	0.09	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01

Figure 29: Heat map representing SD images for the food category.

institution	Nigeria	Ethiopia	PNG	India	Colombia	Mexico	Russia	Brazil	China	Australia	Germany	USA
school	0.17	0.19	0.2	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.07	0.1	0.12	0.1	0.1	0.1
office	0.15	0.21	0.36	0.15	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.09
university	0.17	0.19	0.19	0.1	0.06	0.06	0.2	0.08	0.07	0.09	0.07	0.06
daycare	0.18	0.25	0.25	0.14	0.08	0.11	0.05	0.07	0.09	0.04	0.03	0.17
library	0.1	0.07	0.32	0.09	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.16	0.05	0.16
hospital	0.13	0.19	0.2	0.1	0.06	0.02	0.08	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.11
museum	0.2	0.22	0.24	0.18	0.1	0.04	0.15	0.04	0.16	0.07	0.06	0.07
auditorium	0.07	0.16	0.23	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.17	0.01	0.03
factory	0.12	0.21	0.16	0.06	0.08	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.02	0.03

Figure 30: Heat map representing DALLE-v2 images for the institution category.

institution	Nigeria	Ethiopia	PNG	India	Colombia	Mexico	Russia	Brazil	China	Australia	Germany	USA
school	0.28	0.27	0.25	0.24	0.18	0.16	0.09	0.15	0.17	0.09	0.06	0.02
office	0.05	0.34	0.32	0.14	0.05	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.07	0.01	0.01	0.01
university	0.28	0.24	0.3	0.21	0.17	0.13	0.16	0.2	0.2	0.13	0.13	0.05
daycare	0.3	0.33	0.34	0.27	0.06	0.05	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.0
library	0.02	0.06	0.06	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01
hospital	0.21	0.21	0.27	0.11	0.12	0.08	0.08	0.1	0.08	0.04	0.04	0.02
museum	0.09	0.17	0.3	0.09	0.21	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.13	0.02	0.07	0.02
auditorium	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.0	0.01	0.0	0.0	0.01
factory	0.08	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.02	0.01	0.0	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.0	0.01

Figure 31: Heat map representing SD images for the institution category.

community	Nigeria	Ethiopia	PNG	India	Colombia	Mexico	Russia	Brazil	China	Australia	Germany	USA
person	0.22	0.31	0.31	0.3	0.19	0.09	0.1	0.1	0.15	0.09	0.09	0.07
people	0.29	0.33	0.34	0.33	0.28	0.25	0.26	0.2	0.2	0.18	0.17	0.18
baby	0.13	0.19	0.13	0.1	0.04	0.06	0.02	0.03	0.12	0.02	0.02	0.02
toddler	0.14	0.2	0.14	0.12	0.07	0.07	0.03	0.05	0.13	0.02	0.03	0.02
teenager	0.23	0.27	0.21	0.2	0.15	0.15	0.06	0.13	0.17	0.05	0.08	0.06
elderly	0.24	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.15	0.15	0.07	0.11	0.17	0.06	0.04	0.04

Figure 32: Heat map representing DALLE-v2 images for the community category.

community	Nigeria	Ethiopia	PNG	India	Colombia	Mexico	Russia	Brazil	China	Australia	Germany	USA
person	0.34	0.27	0.27	0.25	0.24	0.19	0.2	0.18	0.22	0.2	0.21	0.15
people	0.44	0.39	0.39	0.38	0.37	0.33	0.33	0.31	0.29	0.24	0.21	0.28
baby	0.24	0.22	0.16	0.19	0.11	0.12	0.06	0.09	0.15	0.08	0.06	0.03
toddler	0.25	0.23	0.21	0.21	0.16	0.16	0.07	0.14	0.15	0.08	0.04	0.04
teenager	0.35	0.32	0.3	0.27	0.2	0.16	0.1	0.18	0.2	0.12	0.08	0.12
elderly	0.2	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.12	0.12	0.08	0.08	0.14	0.08	0.06	0.04
family	0.29	0.28	0.31	0.27	0.2	0.16	0.11	0.15	0.19	0.1	0.07	0.02

Figure 33: Heat map representing SD images for the community category.

clothing	Nigeria	Ethiopia	PNG	India	Colombia	Mexico	Russia	Brazil	China	Australia	Germany	USA
a man in a dress	0.3	0.35	0.34	0.22	0.19	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.21	0.23	0.16	0.24
a woman in a dress	0.25	0.35	0.28	0.2	0.12	0.16	0.15	0.12	0.17	0.11	0.13	0.22
a woman in a casual dress	0.31	0.3	0.28	0.23	0.19	0.2	0.27	0.21	0.2	0.16	0.22	0.25
a man in a casual dress	0.32	0.26	0.31	0.24	0.19	0.21	0.27	0.17	0.23	0.18	0.25	0.22
a woman in a party dress	0.26	0.32	0.26	0.19	0.15	0.13	0.09	0.14	0.14	0.1	0.11	0.13
a man in a party dress	0.26	0.32	0.33	0.13	0.08	0.17	0.06	0.11	0.13	0.11	0.07	0.14
a woman in a business attire	0.22	0.22	0.12	0.1	0.08	0.09	0.13	0.04	0.12	0.08	0.09	0.11
a man in a business attire	0.24	0.24	0.17	0.16	0.09	0.09	0.16	0.07	0.19	0.09	0.11	0.12
a woman in an ethnic dress	0.23	0.21	0.21	0.13	0.09	0.1	0.07	0.11	0.13	0.1	0.12	0.12
a man in an ethnic dress	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.12	0.11	0.15	0.08	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.1	0.15

Figure 34: Heat map representing DALLE-v2 images for the clothing category.

clothing	Nigeria	Ethiopia	PNG	India	Colombia	Mexico	Russia	Brazil	China	Australia	Germany	USA
a man in a dress	0.44	0.37	0.37	0.35	0.36	0.32	0.22	0.33	0.33	0.32	0.24	0.2
a woman in a dress	0.42	0.4	0.43	0.4	0.37	0.33	0.22	0.34	0.34	0.31	0.24	0.19
a woman in a casual dress	0.34	0.35	0.36	0.31	0.21	0.17	0.13	0.14	0.17	0.08	0.08	0.05
a man in a casual dress	0.38	0.33	0.32	0.27	0.24	0.21	0.18	0.18	0.23	0.14	0.1	0.08
a woman in a party dress	0.48	0.44	0.47	0.45	0.43	0.4	0.23	0.41	0.4	0.35	0.27	0.25
a man in a party dress	0.54	0.46	0.45	0.45	0.44	0.44	0.25	0.45	0.42	0.37	0.3	0.22
a woman in a business attire	0.24	0.32	0.34	0.24	0.06	0.06	0.04	0.02	0.06	0.02	0.01	0.01
a man in a business attire	0.31	0.32	0.32	0.24	0.15	0.17	0.16	0.07	0.18	0.05	0.04	0.02
a woman in an ethnic dress	0.14	0.11	0.14	0.1	0.08	0.08	0.11	0.07	0.13	0.07	0.08	0.06
a man in an ethnic dress	0.17	0.14	0.17	0.09	0.12	0.1	0.1	0.08	0.15	0.08	0.07	0.06

Figure 35: Heat map representing SD images for the clothing category.



Figure 36: The least represented countries across situation prompts for DALLE-v2.



Figure 37: The most represented countries across situation prompts for DALLE-v2.



Figure 38: The least represented countries across situation prompts for SD.



Figure 39: The most represented countries across situation prompts for SD.

(1) Do you see humans (including cartoons, portaits or caricatures of humans) in the image?.
- *Skip the remaning questions if you don't see humans in the image.*

○ Yes
○ No

(2) Which of the following genders are represented by the people or human cartoons in the image? Select all that apply.
- *Does the image depict people or human cartoons, but gender is unclear? Check - "Unclear".*
- *Does the image depict only boys or men? Check - "Male".*
- *Does the image depict only girls or women? Check - "Female".*
- *Does the image depict both boys/girls and men/women? Check - both "Male" and "Female".*

☐ Unclear
☐ Female
☐ Male

(3) Do you see **human cartoons** in the image?.
- *If **yes** skip the remaning questions about race and age.*

○ Yes
○ No

Examples of **human cartoons**:

(4) Which age groups are represented by the people in the image? Select all that apply.

☐ Unclear
☐ Child or minor
☐ Adult 18-40
☐ Adult 40-60
☐ Adult over 60

(5) Which race categories are represented by the people in the image? Select all that apply.

☐ Unclear
☐ White
☐ Black
☐ Latino
☐ East Asian
☐ South East Asian
☐ Indian
☐ Middle Eastern

Figure 40: Amazon Mechanical Turk Questionnaire.

Evaluating the Fairness of Discriminative Foundation Models in Computer Vision

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ABSTRACT

We propose a novel taxonomy for bias evaluation of discriminative foundation models, such as Contrastive Language-Pretraining (CLIP), that are used for labeling tasks. We then systematically evaluate existing methods for mitigating bias in these models with respect to our taxonomy. Specifically, we evaluate OpenAI's CLIP and OpenCLIP models for key applications, such as zero-shot classification, image retrieval and image captioning. We categorize desired behaviors based around three axes: (i) if the task concerns humans; (ii) how subjective the task is (i.e., how likely it is that people from a diverse range of backgrounds would agree on a labeling); and (iii) the intended purpose of the task and if fairness is better served by impartiality (i.e., making decisions independent of the protected attributes) or representation (i.e., making decisions to maximize diversity). Finally, we provide quantitative fairness evaluations for both binary-valued and multi-valued protected attributes over ten diverse datasets. We find that fair PCA, a post-processing method for fair representations, works very well for debiasing in most of the aforementioned tasks while incurring only minor loss of performance. However, different debiasing approaches vary in their effectiveness depending on the task. Hence, one should choose the debiasing approach depending on the specific use case.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Social and professional topics**; • **Computing methodologies** → **Computer vision**;

KEYWORDS

AI fairness, foundation models, evaluation

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1 INTRODUCTION

Popular generative foundation models regularly make the news, both because of the rapid rate of progress in the field and the potential harms including copyright violation and the hallucination of incorrect and possibly libelous data. However, in many ways the dangers of discriminative models can be more insidious. Discriminative[1] models such as CLIP [45] allow for the zero-shot classification of data, i.e., without access to labeled training data they can assign images to a set of previously unseen labels. As zero-shot solutions do not require conventional data sources, models can be optimistically deployed without systematically evaluating if they are accurate, fair, or even if the task they are deployed on makes sense (e.g., identify hard workers from resume photographs). Because discriminative models may be used to make decisions about individuals, their behavior can have a direct impact on a person's life (e.g., through controlling access to education, employment or medical care) in a way that generative models that create text or images do not. This work looks at the potential harms associated with classifying, retrieving and captioning image data using discriminative multi-modal foundation models, and ask a key question:

What constitutes the desired behavior for discriminative foundation models in downstream tasks?

Our goal is challenging due to a combination of two factors: first, the rise and commoditization of zero-shot machine learning; and second, the plethora of inconsistent fairness definitions [52].

Intrinsically, zero-shot hinges on the idea that a single ML system should perform well on diverse unseen datasets without specialist training [34], while algorithmic fairness has consolidated on the idea that specific fairness definitions are more appropriate for specific tasks [52]. The intersection of these ideas creates a tension.

Indeed, how can we check the fairness of a general-purpose system if we cannot agree on a general definition of fairness? To address this question, we propose a coarse taxonomy of tasks and describe the ideal behavior of a foundation model on such tasks. We base our taxonomy around three concepts:

(1) *Human centricity:* Do the labels concern humans?
(2) *Label consistency:* Is there likely to be an agreement on how data should be labeled both within a culture and across a wide range of cultures?

[1] Our use of the words "generative" and "discriminative" follows the machine learning literature (e.g., [6]). A generative model is one that can generate synthetic data, such as images or text, and a discriminative model is one that can distinguish between types of data, for example, by classifying images as cats or dogs. This use of "discriminative" does not imply that the model is biased towards or against particular protected groups.

Table 1: The range of desiderata and their corresponding measures. *The motivation underlying our desiderata is straightforward: where consistent labelings exist, we expect foundation models to reproduce them, and in human-centric tasks we should reproduce them equally well for all groups. Where labels are subjective (i.e., likely to be labeled inconsistently by different groups), reproducing labels is less of a concern, and instead we prioritize groups to be represented equally. The question then is what does 'equally' mean? For much of the fairness literature, 'equally' refers to the idea that decisions should be made independently of protected attributes such as race or gender (potentially conditioned on the true label). This leads to notions such as equal opportunity [27] (see "independence measures" in the top left part of the table) or demographic parity [29] ("independence measures" in the bottom left part of the table). However, this is not the only relevant notion of equal representation. In some cases, we may wish to sample uniformly from the* support of the distribution *rather than the distribution, and this leads to analogous notions provided under "diversity measures" in the table. By $Y, \hat{Y}, Z$ we denote a datapoint's ground-truth label, predicted label, and protected attribute, respectively; P denotes a generic probability distribution over these three variables.*

	HUMAN-CENTRIC	NON-HUMAN-CENTRIC
Objective task	Labels should be reproduced consistently for all groups **Independence measures:** High performance per group on standard metrics and $P(\hat{Y}=1\|Z=z_1,Y=1)=P(\hat{Y}=1\|Z=z_2,Y=1)\ \forall z_1,z_2$ Figures 2 and 6 **Diversity measures:** High performance per group on standard metrics and $P(\hat{Y}=1\wedge Z=z_1\wedge Y=1)=P(\hat{Y}=1\wedge Z=z_2\wedge Y=1)\ \forall z_1,z_2$ Table 3	Labels should be reproduced consistently High performance on standard metrics Tables 2, 4, and 18
Subjective task	Labels should represent all groups equally **Independence measures:** $P(\hat{Y}=1\|Z=z_1)=P(\hat{Y}=1\|Z=z_2)\ \forall z_1,z_2$ Figures 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 14, 15 and 16. Tables 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, and 17. **Diversity measures:** $P(\hat{Y}=1\wedge Z=z_1)=P(\hat{Y}=1\wedge Z=z_2)\ \forall z_1,z_2$ Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, 14, 16	*Out of scope*

(3) *Purpose of the task:* Can the task be perceived to be assigning labels to individuals, or to be recovering diverse samples that characterize the spread of data?

Based on the answers to these questions, we propose metrics that encode the values implicit in these decisions (see Table 1).

Importantly, we find that different answers to these questions naturally lead to different metrics. Consequently, we observe that many of the existing works in fairness for foundation models, which propose new methods evaluated with respect to particular metrics, are enforcing unexamined value judgments about what the ideal behavior should be. Moreover, as part of the taxonomy depends not only on the type of task but also on the purpose, it is impossible to satisfy all metrics simultaneously.

Using our taxonomy, we provide a systematic evaluation of OpenAI's CLIP [45] and OpenCLIP [28] models, for binary (gender) and multi-valued (race) attributes.[2] Additionally, we evaluate a range of existing bias mitigation methods for these models. We argue that existing fairness methods are designed to encourage either independence or diversity, and show empirically that they prioritize one or the other. As such, the choice of a particular fairness method should be driven by the intended use case, and a decision as to which harms are relevant (Section 4).

Outline of the paper. In Section 2, we first review the CLIP model and some of its fairness issues highlighted in the existing literature and describe the different debiasing methods we evaluate. In Section 3, we explain the details of different evaluation tasks. In Section 4, we introduce different fairness metrics for which we show the results in Section 5. In Section 6 we conclude the paper.

2 FOUNDATION MODELS, CLIP, AND FAIRNESS OF CLIP

In the past few years, *large* models trained on huge amounts of data, primarily crawled from the internet, have become popular (e.g., BERT [20], CLIP [45], GPT-3 [10], DALL-E [46], Stable Diffusion [47]). Many of these models have gained attention even in the general public and extensive news coverage, which typically also addresses the risks and shortcomings of these models (e.g., [39, 42]). These large models are now commonly referred to as foundation models, a name coined by researchers from Stanford to "underscore their critically central yet incomplete character" [8]. They exist in various flavors that cover a wide range of data modalities (e.g., language, vision or multi-modal), training objectives (e.g., predicting

[2] As an artifact of the available datasets, we make use of annotations that indicate *perceived* gender and race. Labels are assigned coarsely by a third party into binary bins for gender and into seven racial groups (see [30] for details). They do not reflect how people in the dataset identify.

a word deleted from a piece of text or aligning images and their captions in a joint embedding space) and application areas (e.g., data generation tasks such as image synthesis or data analysis tasks such as image classification, retrieval or captioning). What foundation models have in common is that they were trained on broad data, where the quantity of data was prioritized over its quality, and that they can be adapted to a wide range of downstream tasks, often with no or only minimal supervision. The former property makes foundation models prone to concerning behavior, ranging from algorithmic bias [45] over toxicity and offensive content [15] to privacy concerns [12]. The latter property increases the risk that any concerning behavior could spread much wider than with a traditional model trained to solve a specific task.

In this section, we briefly describe the required background of the CLIP model as an illustration of a typical discriminative foundation model and relevant fairness concerns. We discuss additional related work in Appendix A.

2.1 Contrastive Language Image Pretraining (CLIP)

OpenAI's CLIP [45] is a discriminative foundation model for computer vision trained on 400 million image-text pairs to align corresponding image and text examples within a joint embedding space. To that end, CLIP uses a contrastive loss which tries to push the representations of the corresponding image and text examples together and the representations of the non-corresponding examples far apart. This joint multi-modal embedding space can then be used for several downstream tasks such as image retrieval, image captioning or zero-shot classification. CLIP achieves remarkable zero-shot classification performance in several tasks, which in some cases rivals that of the classical supervised competitors. In certain scenarios, the downstream applications could result in direct harm to individuals, e.g., classifying images into professionals vs non-professionals, retrieving a set of doctors from a dataset or captioning images for assisting blind people, which give rise to several fairness concerns. While OpenAI's CLIP is proprietary, we also present results (Section 5.5 and Appendix F) for its open source implementation OpenCLIP [28]. OpenCLIP has the same objective function and architecture as the original OpenAI CLIP, but it was trained on the publicly available LAION-400M dataset [48].

2.2 Existing fairness evaluations of CLIP

Recent works highlighted some biases present in the CLIP model. The original CLIP paper [45] demonstrated gender and race biases in certain zero-shot tasks including classifying facial images into crime-related vs. non-crime-related categories or into human vs. non-human animal categories. These fairness evaluations were limited in scope to a small number of tasks and datasets.

Wang et al. [55], Berg et al. [4] and Dehouche [18] demonstrated that CLIP embeddings have a gender or race bias in certain tasks. In their study, Wang et al. [55] highlighted gender bias in CLIP embeddings when used for image retrieval tasks. In their experiments, they first created gender-neutral test queries by replacing the gendered words with neutral alternatives in the captions of the MSCOCO 1K test set. Subsequently, they utilized the CLIP embeddings to retrieve images based on these neutral queries. Their findings reveal that, on average, 6.4 out of top 10 results were images of men. However, it is important to consider a few factors while considering their results. i) They did not provide additional metrics that account for differences in the base rate of men and women. ii) They did not evaluate the fairness of CLIP embeddings using well-known fairness measures, such as demographic parity or equality of opportunity. iii) Their approach involved aggregating the signed biases of all queries. This aggregation method can potentially lead to the cancellation of systematic biases across different queries, thereby reducing the apparent bias of the system. For instance, if a search for 'home-maker' predominantly returns women and a search for 'technician' predominantly returns men, aggregating the two together suggests greater gender neutrality than when considering any one on its own.

Berg et al. [4] have also raised concerns in gender-related fairness issues of the CLIP embeddings. Their findings indicate that the CLIP model exhibits a representation bias with respect to gender in image retrieval tasks, particularly for queries such as clever, lazy, hardworking, kind, or unkind. However, it is worth noting that their analysis is limited to the face-focused FairFace and UTKFace datasets. Additionally, their evaluation of zero-shot classification was limited to the classification categories presented in the original CLIP paper [45]. Another aspect that their analysis is missing is the evaluation on well-established fairness metrics such as demographic parity and equal opportunity. Instead, they primarily focus on ranking metrics like Skew [25] and KL-divergence.

Dehouche [18] studied the fairness of CLIP by performing zero-shot classification to classify 10000 synthetically generated portrait photos into male vs. female, white person vs. person of color, attractive vs. unattractive, friendly vs. unfriendly, rich vs. poor, and intelligent vs. unintelligent. They found a strong correlation between classification as female and attractive, between male and rich, and between white person and attractive. They applied the strategy of Bolukbasi et al. [7] for debiasing word embeddings, by removing gender bias, and found that this strategy reduced the correlation between classification as female and attractive or between male and rich. Compared to Dehouche [18], we perform a more extensive fairness evaluation, considering not only zero-shot classification but also image retrieval and image captioning, and we compare several bias mitigation methods.

2.3 Bias mitigation methods for CLIP

In this section, we discuss two existing bias mitigation methods explicitly proposed for CLIP and the modifications we make to run them. To our knowledge, this is an exhaustive list — it contains every method claiming to improve the fairness of CLIP at the time of the submission of our paper. We also discuss a recently introduced version of fair PCA [32], which is a general approach to make representations fair and which we investigate in our experiments. In Appendix A we discuss concurrent works for debiasing CLIP.

2.3.1 CLIP-clip (referred to as MI in the results). Wang et al. [55] proposed a simple post-processing approach to make CLIP representation fair w.r.t. gender. Given a dataset with gender annotations, they calculate the mutual information between CLIP embedding on the training split of the dataset and its corresponding values of



Figure 1: [Classification - DDP - Subjective - FairFace] We plot DDP, given in Eq. (1) for gender (left) and race (right), summarizing the distribution over multiple zero-shot classification tasks (provided in Appendix C) using FairFace dataset. *"GT" and "INF" refers to whether the value of the protected attributes used to train the corresponding method were ground truth or inferred using CLIP. These figures shows that fair PCA based methods are more effective in reducing demographic disparity for different groups of the protected attributes. Additionally, mutual information based methods are more effective when more dimensions are reduced.*

the gender attribute. Then, they greedily select a prescribed number of dimensions with the highest mutual information to cut, and retain the rest of the m dimension in the CLIP representations. The smaller the value of m, the more debiased the CLIP representations, as shown in Figures 1, 2, 4 and 5. However, the performance using the reduced CLIP embeddings worsens on several non-gender related tasks, as shown in Tables 2, 3, 4, 13 and 18. This demonstrates the well-known accuracy-fairness trade-off.

Wang et al. [55] did not show results using non-binary (e.g. race) attributes. We extend their method to the multi-valued attributes and show results using the race attribute (see Figures 1 and 4).

2.3.2 Prompt learning (referred to as Prompt in the results). Berg et al. [4] proposed a method to reduce bias the CLIP model by incorporating learnable text prompts into sensitive queries. To achieve this, they select a set of queries such as 'a photo of a good/evil/smart person' and utilize a dataset of images annotated with the protected group information. For each query, they add learnable text prompts. Subsequently, they calculate the text and image embeddings using the CLIP's text and image encoders. Next, they compute the similarity logits by taking the dot product between each pair of image-text embeddings. These similarity logits are then fed into an adversarial classifier, which aims to predict the protected attribute. The training objective aims to learn the text prompts in a manner that prevents the adversarial network from accurately predicting the protected attribute. The ultimate goal is to reduce the correlation between the similarity logits and the protected attributes. Additionally, they use an image-text contrastive (itc) loss to maintain the performance of the embeddings. They maintain the balance between the two loss values using a hyperparameter λ.

Berg et al. [4] utilized FairFace dataset for the debiasing loss and Flickr30K dataset for the itc loss, focusing on the gender attribute. Consequently, we evaluate their method only for the gender attributes using these datasets and the trained model shared by the authors. Just to note, they do not provide the value of the λ used to train the provided model.

2.3.3 Fair PCA (referred to as FPCA in the results). This is a general bias mitigation method that tries to find a linear approximation of the data that removes sensitive information (such as gender or race) while retaining as much non-sensitive information as possible. Specifically, the goal of fair PCA is to find a projection of datapoints x_i such that any function h applied to a projected datapoint is statistically independent of the protected attribute z_i. However, such a projection may not exist, so Kleindessner et al. [32] proposed to solve a relaxed version of the problem. They restrict h to only linear functions. In addition, they relax the statistical independence requirement between $h(x_i)$ and z_i and only require $h(x_i)$ and z_i to be uncorrelated. We use this as a post-processing method for making the representation space of OpenAI's CLIP [45] and OpenCLIP [28] models fair. We show results for this method w.r.t. to gender and race attributes in Section 5.

2.3.4 Baselines. To remove the gender bias in image retrieval tasks we also show results where we search for gendered versions of given queries and return balanced results from the gendered queries. For example, if we wanted to retrieve 10 images for the query "a photo of a doctor" we search for "a photo of a female doctor" and "a photo of a male doctor" and return 5 images for each of these. This is an instance of affirmative action [24]. We refer to this method as Gender-BLN in the results. Similarly, to address the racial bias in image retrieval we make race-specific queries for images and return the balanced results. We call this Race-BLN.

For the image captioning method, we propose a baseline in which we train the captioning system on MSCOCO by removing gendered words from the captions, e.g., "a man standing on the road" to "a person standing on the road". We explain the results in Section 5.4.



Figure 2: [Classification - DTPR - Objective - CelebA] The plots show the TPR disparity, given by Eq. (3), between men and women for three zero-shot classification tasks using the CelebA dataset on top and the accuracy on the bottom. *The results demonstrate that mutual information and fair PCA based methods reduce disparity. However where the dimension of the CLIP embeddings is reduced significantly, using mutual information based methods, accuracy can also lower significantly.*



Figure 3: [Classification - DDP - Subjective - Flickr30k] Using Flickr30K dataset, this figure shows box plots of DDP, given by Eq. (1), for several subjective zero-shot classification tasks. *Most methods effectively reduce classification bias, except for the prompt based method. One reason could be that the model provided by the authors was trained to have a higher importance for maintaining representational powers of the embedding (itc loss: Section 2.3.2) as opposed to reducing bias.*

3 EXPECTED BEHAVIOUR AND EVALUATION CRITERIA

In this section, we discuss the tasks for which we evaluate different methods introduced in Section 2.

3.1 Binary zero-shot classification

To evaluate fairness for binary zero-shot classification, we first define a pair of classes, e.g., nurse and doctor. Then, we encode all the images, using CLIP's image encoder or an image encoder provided by the corresponding method. Similarly, we tokenize and encode the names of different classes using CLIP's text encoder or a text encoder provided by the corresponding method with a fixed text prompt, e.g., "a photo of a nurse" and "a photo of a doctor". Depending on the methods we do further processing, e.g., for CLIP-clip we clip the prescribed embedding and for fair PCA we transform the text and image embeddings using a transformation matrix learned from the training split of a given dataset. We then take the dot product and the softmax over the two classes. Then, from the two classes, we pick the one which yields the maximum value.

We define a set of binary classification tasks for which we believe different genders and races should have no disparity. We provide the list of these classes in Appendix C. As described in the introduction, Table 1, we focus on *human-centric subjective tasks*, e.g., 'criminal' vs 'innocent person', for which demographic parity is desirable across different values of the protected attributes. Similarly in datasets where we do not have access to the ground-truth professions we expect that classification tasks such as 'doctor' vs 'nurse' or 'CEO' vs 'Secretary' should have demographic parity across protected groups. The results for these tasks are shown in Figures 1, 3, 11, 13 and 16.

We also show results for *human-centric objective tasks*, where we evaluate different methods for the independence of the gender attribute w.r.t. the true positive rates in predicting CelebA dataset's objective categories, such as wearing glasses, and wearing a necklace in Figure 2 and MIAP dataset's categories, based on age, prominence in the image, i.e., whether the bounding box of the person occupied more than 50% of the image, and the number of people in Figure 6.

3.2 Image retrieval

Similar to zero-shot classification, for the image retrieval task we select a set of queries for which we believe there should not be any difference in the retrieved image across different gender groups or races, we show these queries for each dataset in Appendix C. We similarly convert the images and the queries into their representations and calculate their cosine similarity. Then, we select the top k results from the list of the decreasing order of the cosine similarity for each query.

Similar to zero-shot classification, we show results for *human-centric subjective tasks* under independence assumption in Figures 4, 5, 12, 14, and 15.

For image retrieval, fairness of representation or diversity assumption is desirable for certain scenarios, i.e., showing images of different protected groups in the top k results. We show results for representational fairness for *human-centric subjective tasks* in Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, 14 and 16. For *human-centric objective tasks*, we show results in Table 3 under the diversity assumption.

We report the differences in cosine similarity for each query across different genders and races, shown in Figures 7, 8, 9, 10

and 14. We also perform statistical tests, specifically Alexandargovern (ANOVA) [3] test which allows for different variances across the groups, to demonstrate how successful different methods are in equalizing representations for different protected group values. The results for these are shown in Tables 9, 10, 11, 12, 15 and 17.

3.3 Image captioning

To test fairness concerns of using CLIP models for captioning we study CLIP-CAP [40] which uses CLIP and GPT2 embeddings. Mokady et al. [40] proposed two methods: one where they froze the CLIP embedding space as well as GPT2 embedding space and just learnt a transformer based mapping network and second where they only froze the CLIP embedding space and learnt a few layers of GPT2 network in addition to learning a simpler MLP network. In our experiments, we found that the first variant does not generalize very well to out of distribution images, which makes sense since training additional layers of the GPT2 model results in a more expressive model. So, we use the second variant. The authors shared the training code and hyperparameters for MSCOCO dataset [37] and Conceptual Captions dataset. We show results using MSCOCO dataset as the training times are faster. For demonstrating fairness concerns in CLIP embeddings, the experiments using MSCOCO show interesting insights as discussed in Section 5.4.

We train the CLIP-CAP model with original CLIP as well as by transforming CLIP embeddings using different debiasing methods. We also experiment with making the captions of MSCOCO gender neutral, e.g., by changing 'He/She' into 'They'. We then train the GPT2 layers and the MLP network. To generate captions we encode images with the CLIP image encoders, as well as any additional processing necessary for a particular debiasing method, and pass it through the learned MLP and GPT2 which generates captions.

3.4 Performance measures

It is important that performance for different downstream tasks does not suffer while reducing bias. To demonstrate the well-known accuracy-fairness trade-off, we report the accuracy of a logistic regression classifier to predict different attributes using CLIP embeddings as input, shown in Table 13. We also report the recall@k performance for different values of k, shown in Table 4, as well as precision shown in Tables 3 and 18. We report accuracy for zero-shot classification tasks in Table 2.

4 A TAXONOMY OF FAIRNESS FOR FOUNDATION MODELS

Here, we outline the Task-specific Desiderata and discuss relevant metrics. Inherently, this is a coarse division and excludes many potential harms. One of the challenges of open-labeling tasks is that many subtle harms are possible.

While fairness typically concerns itself with the harm to an individual that a decision is being made about[4], other harms are possible. For example, if someone intends to use images of scientists for recruiting materials, it is often desirable to show diverse images capturing scientists of a range of races and genders, i.e. capturing the support of the distribution. Repeatedly failing to capture the entire support can discourage some people viewing the images, from considering becoming scientists as they feel that scientists are not people like them, referred to as the role model effect [11].

Objective Vs. Subjective: We describe labeling tasks to be objective if there is likely to be a high agreement between different groups regarding the outcome. This is difficult to quantify, as it does not imply within group disagreement, and for example groups of labeler may consistently label data in a way that other people would disagree with. For example, Microsoft discontinued their services in the Azure system that infers emotional state, stating that "Experts inside and outside the company have highlighted the lack of scientific consensus on the definition of "emotions""[5].

Human-centric vs Non-Human-centric: We consider harms associated with non-human-centric labelings to be out of scope, although they certainly can exist. For example, labelings of sacred places (churches, mosques and temples) should be respectful.

Independence vs Diversity: How is the labeling likely to be used? Typical fairness concerns relate to decisions made about individuals, where the independence of outcome w.r.t. protected attribute is desirable. On the other hand, lack of diversity is also a concern in certain applications. We consider both of these in our evaluations.

While we put forward three binary axes as relevant: human-centric; objective/subjective; and independent/diverse, there are only four categories that we evaluate, as we only explore the distinction between independence/diversity of different protected attributes' groups for subjective/objective human-centric labelings.

4.1 Human-centric (Un)fairness metrics

We describe image classification, retrieval and captioning tasks where the labels are highly-related to people in the image as human-centric labelings. This section presents the unfairness metrics used.

4.1.1 Independence assumptions: We focus on two independence-based notions of fairness — demographic parity (DP) [21, 23] and equal opportunity (EOP) [27, 59] for subjective and objective tasks.

Subjective labeling tasks: In classification, DP requires that the prediction of a datapoint be independent of the value of the protected attribute. Specifically, given a binary classification task where $\hat{Y} \in \{-1, 1\}$ is the predicted variable and $Z \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ represents protected membership, DP is given as $P(\hat{Y} = 1|Z = z) = P(\hat{Y})$.

Zero-shot binary classification: For zero-shot classification, notions of independence are desirable. In this section, we present metrics corresponding to DP. We define demographic disparity (DDP) as the maximum absolute difference in the fraction datapoints classified in the positive class among any pair of groups of the protected group. Let Z_i be the set of datapoints with protected attribute i. We define the DDP as[6]

$$\textbf{DDP:} \max_{i,j\in[p]} \left| \frac{1}{|Z_i|} \sum_{x\in Z_i} \mathbb{1}[f(x) = 1] - \frac{1}{|Z_j|} \sum_{x\in Z_j} \mathbb{1}[f(x) = 1] \right|, \tag{1}$$

[3] https://docs.scipy.org/doc/scipy/reference/generated/scipy.stats.alexandergovern.html

[4] For example, the harm induced by failing to offer someone a loan, schedule follow-up medical treatment, or in hiring someone.

[5] https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/06/21/microsofts-framework-for-building-ai-systems-responsibly/

[6] We use the notation $[p] := \{1, \ldots, p\}$.



Figure 4: [Retrieval - DDP - Subjective - FairFace] These figures show the average DDP, given by Eq. (2), for gender (left) and race (right) attributes averaged over several image retrieval tasks, given in Appendix C, using the FairFace dataset. *The results demonstrate that protected attribute specific queries and fair PCA based methods do well in removing bias for image retrieval tasks. Mutual information based methods also perform well for the gender attribute.*

where $f(x)$ is a binary classifier. DDP ranges between 0 and 1, i.e., from least to most disparity. We use gender as a binary attribute, due to the limited availability of datasets with multi-valued gender attributes. In this case, the above equation reduces to the absolute difference between the fraction of men classified in the positive class and the fraction of women classified in the positive class. Race consists of multiple groups, and we report the maximum absolute disparity of classification between any two groups.

Image retrieval: Depending on the downstream application, either notions of independence or diversity of different values of the protected attribute may be desirable.

For independence, we present metrics corresponding to DP. Let K be the set of the retrieved images, comprising subset K_i of images of the protected group i, Z_i is the set of images belonging to the group i and Z is the set of all images. Following, Wachter et al. [53] we define the DDP in this context as follows:

$$\textbf{DDP:}\ \max_{i,j\in[p]} \Bigg| \Bigg(\underbrace{\frac{|K_i|}{|K|}}_{\text{Advantaged group } i} - \underbrace{\frac{|Z_i|-|K_i|}{|Z|-|K|}}_{\text{Disadvantaged group } i} \Bigg) - \Bigg(\underbrace{\frac{|K_j|}{|K|}}_{\text{Advantaged group } j} - \underbrace{\frac{|Z_j|-|K_j|}{|Z|-|K|}}_{\text{Disadvantaged group } j} \Bigg) \Bigg|. \tag{2}$$

Wachter et al. [53] showed that this measure only takes the value 0 when Eq. (1) does, given that $|K_i| > 0\ \forall i$. However, this variant is more suitable for asymmetric labelings where a small proportion of individuals receive positive decisions. This measure returns values ranging from 0 to 1.

Objective labeling task – Zero-shot binary classification: EOP requires that the prediction of all datapoints with positive labels should be independent of the protected attribute. Specifically, a binary classification task where $\hat{Y} \in \{-1, 1\}$ is the predicted variable, $Y \in \{-1, 1\}$ is the ground truth variable and $Z \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ represents the protected attribute EOP requires $P(\hat{Y} = 1|Y = 1, Z = z) = P(\hat{Y})$.

Similar to DDP, given in Eq. (1), we can extend the definition for EOP to disparity in true positive rates (DTPR):

$$\textbf{DTPR:}\ \max_{i,j\in[p]} \Bigg| \frac{1}{|Z_i{}^+|} \sum_{x\in Z_i{}^+} \mathbb{1}[f(x)=1] - \frac{1}{|Z_j{}^+|} \sum_{x\in Z_j{}^+} \mathbb{1}[f(x)=1] \Bigg|, \tag{3}$$

where $Z_*{}^+$ is the set of datapoints with protected attribute $*$.

For image retrieval tasks, we could easily extend Eq. (2) for EOP, e.g., by confining all the sets to positive examples.

4.1.2 Diversity assumptions – Image retrieval: We use the following metrics to measure unfairness in the representation.

Subjective labeling tasks: We use the Skew metric of Geyik et al. [25]. Let K be the set of $|K|$ items we want to retrieve comprising of sets K_i that belong to the protected attribute group i. Let df_i be the desired fraction of items belonging to the group i in the top $|K|$ results, and $rf_i := \frac{|K_i|}{|K|}$ be the retrieved fraction of items.

$$\textbf{Skew@k:}\ \max_{i,j\in[p]} \Big| \log_e(rf_i/df_i) \Big| \tag{4}$$

We set $df_i = \frac{1}{p}$, where p is the number of protected groups.

Objective labeling tasks: Let K^+ be the set of ground truth positive images retrieved for a given query, out of which $K_i{}^+$ are the retrieved images that belong to the protected attributes group i. We report the maximum absolute disparity in the representation



Figure 5: [Retrieval - DDP - Subjective - Flickr30k] The plot shows the DDP, given by Eq. (2), for gender attribute using Flickr30K dataset. *All the methods, except the prompt based method, decrease the disparity between men and women for the retrieval tasks.*

(DDP-Rep) of any two protected attribute groups, i.e.,

$$\textbf{DDP-rep: } \max_{i,j \in [p]} \frac{1}{|K^+|} \Big| |K_i{}^+| - |K_j{}^+| \Big|. \tag{5}$$

This metric shows how well different groups are represented in a retrieval task even if the ground truth is imbalanced.

4.2 Non-human-centric labelings: performance metrics

By non-human-centric labelings, we refer to image classification, image retrieval and image captioning tasks where the labels are unrelated to people in the image. While we do not consider the harms associated with this task, performance remains important.

For *objective non-human-centric* tasks, e.g., categorizing images as showing either 'cats' or 'dogs', or searching for 'a photograph of an oak tree', performance is important, and the correct notion of performance is task dependent. Following Radford et al. [45] we use accuracy to measure the performance of zero-shot classifiers, recall@k and precision@k. Ideally, there should be no decrease in performance for these tasks, as we do not have fairness concerns.

For *subjective non-human-centric* tasks we might also have fairness concerns, e.g., that a search for "beautiful building" might be biased towards Christian churches and omit buildings associated with other religions. However, these concerns are harder to evaluate especially due to lack of data and ground truth labels.

5 EVALUATION: RESULTS

In this section, we demonstrate the results according to our proposed taxonomy introduced in Table 1. Given that IND refers to the independence of the protected attribute w.r.t. to the outcome variable (metrics: Eqs. (1), (2) and (3)) and DIV refers to the diversity of the protected attribute groups in the retrieval results (metrics: Eqs. (4) and (5)), we answer the following questions in this section.

Q1: How fair (IND) are different methods w.r.t. gender for zero-shot binary classification on subjective and objective tasks?
Q2: How fair (IND) are different methods w.r.t. race for zero-shot binary classification on subjective tasks?
Q3: How fair (IND or DIV) are different methods w.r.t. gender for image retrieval tasks on subjective and objective tasks?
Q4: How fair (IND or DIV) are different methods w.r.t. race for image retrieval subjective tasks?
Q5: How is the performance on the attributes on which fairness was not enforced affected?
Q6: Are there statistically significant differences in representations for different methods w.r.t. gender?
Q7: Are there statistically significant differences in representations for different methods w.r.t. race?
Q8: What are the fairness (IND) concerns using CLIP embeddings for captioning systems?
Q9: Do CLIP bias mitigation methods help alleviate fairness concerns in captioning?

5.1 Experimental details

We show results for the methods of Section 2.3. For different fairness metrics we show results using OpenAI's CLIP ViTB-16 architecture. We find similar trends in results using ViTB-32 architecture. For performance results on objective tasks, we show results using both ViTB-16 and ViTB-32 architectures. Due to space limitations, the results using OpenCLIP model can be found in Appendix F.

For mutual-information (MI) based method described in Section 2.3.1 we show results where we retain $m \in \{400, 256\}$ dimensions of the total 512 CLIP embedding dimensions. FPCA refers to fair PCA as described in Section 2.3.3. Prompt is the method described in Section 2.3.2. Gender-BLN refers to the baseline for the image retrieval task, where we add the words 'female' and 'male' to the query and return $\frac{K}{2}$ results from each of these queries. Race-BLN works similarly for the multi-valued race attribute.

Addressing lack of demographic features: For our fairness evaluations we use datasets where we have access to the demographic features. However, in real-world scenarios we might not have access to such features. To demonstrate results for such cases, we use the CLIP model to predict the gender attribute. The tags GT and INF indicate whether the protected attribute was ground truth or inferred. It is important to note that we only use the inferred attributes for training the bias mitigation method. The evaluation always uses the ground truth labels of the protected attributes.

5.2 Zero-shot classification

Q1, Q2, Q5 i) Figures 1, 2, 3, 6 and 16 demonstrate that most mitigation methods can enforce *independence assumption* of fairness w.r.t. gender. ii) However, mutual information based methods can lead to a significant reduction in performance as show in Tables 2, 4, 13 and 18. iii) Prompt based method does not reduce the bias as well as the other methods. A possible reason could be that the trained model tries to preserve the expressiveness of the representations while putting too little weight on debiasing. iv) Fair PCA based methods do very well compared to the other methods in the multi-valued race attribute. v) In general, fair PCA based methods reduce the bias for both race and gender attributes while retaining the performance of the CLIP embeddings for other tasks.

Table 2: [Classification - Accuracy - Objective - StanfordCars, Food-101, VOC objects & Imagenet] *The bias mitigation methods shown in the table were trained using the FairFace Dataset. We used the test splits for all the datasets. The results show that fair PCA based methods retain performance on non-human objective tasks. We would like to note that we only show results with a prompt of "a photo of a {label}", while the original CLIP paper aggregates results using several prompts, which they did not disclose. In some cases this can result in a difference in evaluation numbers that we are reporting compared to the original CLIP paper. However, our results are within the margin of improvement that the original CLIP paper claims to achieve using prompt engineering.*

Mitigated	Dataset	Backbone	CLIP	MI-400-GT	MI-256-GT	MI-400-INF	MI-256-INF	Prompt-GT	FPCA-GT	FPCA-INF
Gender	Food-101	ViTB/32	**82.3**	79.2	67.6	79.3	67.0	–	**82.3**	**82.3**
Race	Food-101	ViTB/32	**82.3**	77.7	66.3	77.7	68.6	–	81.5	81.5
Gender	Food-101	ViTB/16	87.0	85.1	76.6	85.0	76.0	**87.3**	87.1	87.0
Race	Food-101	ViTB/16	**87.0**	85.1	76.5	85.0	77.6	–	86.3	86.4
Gender	StanfordCars	ViTB/32	**60.2**	53.6	44.9	53.5	46.1	–	60.1	**60.2**
Race	StanfordCars	ViTB/32	**60.2**	54.4	43.0	55.2	43.8	–	60.0	59.5
Gender	StanfordCars	ViTB/16	**65.6**	59.7	50.2	61.3	51.8	64.7	65.3	65.3
Race	StanfordCars	ViTB/16	**65.6**	59.8	49.0	61.7	48.8	–	65.3	65.4
Gender	VOC	ViTB/32	**83.8**	83.0	77.0	82.3	74.9	–	83.7	83.7
Race	VOC	ViTB/32	83.8	82.7	65.8	83.3	63.9	–	84.5	**84.6**
Gender	VOC	ViTB/16	**85.7**	76.6	67.9	76.3	71.7	82.9	85.6	85.7
Race	VOC	ViTB/16	85.7	87.9	76.5	**89.0**	75.8	–	85.7	85.3
Gender	Imagenet	ViTB/32	**59.2**	54.4	37.1	54.3	37.5	–	**59.2**	**59.2**
Race	Imagenet	ViTB/32	**59.2**	53.5	34.6	53.7	34.8	–	58.9	58.9
Gender	Imagenet	ViTB/16	**63.8**	55.4	40.3	55.5	41.2	63.2	**63.8**	**63.8**
Race	Imagenet	ViTB/16	**63.8**	58.3	43.4	58.2	43.4	–	63.5	63.6

5.3 Image retrieval

Q3, Q5 i) For both *subjective tasks* and *objective tasks*, simple baselines, where gender or race was appended with the query, do very well in both enforcing demographic parity (Figures 4, 5 and 15) and enforcing representational fairness (Tables 3, 5, 6, 7, 8). A reason for the good performance on both demographic parity and representational fairness is that the protected groups in most of the datasets we consider are roughly balanced. However, the obvious drawback of this method is that it does not produce generalizable embedding to be used for other tasks. ii) Mutual information based methods and fair PCA based methods are also good at enforcing *independence assumption* of fairness for the gender attribute, as shown in Figures 4, 5 and 15. This is further supported by their effectiveness in reducing the disparity in the maximum average cosine similarity per query as shown in Figures 7, 8 and 9. However, mutual information based methods incur a performance drop as shown in Tables 4 and 18. iii) Mutual information based methods and fair PCA based method are also effective in reducing the representational bias, however mutual information based methods could lead to a loss in accuracy.

In scenarios where the tasks are not complex one can use the mutual information based methods as they are cheap and easy to compute, as shown in Table 3, where retaining 400 dimension seems to be enough to achieve decent performance to retrieve images of different professions. On the other hand, if the task is complex (such as for queries 'a funny person' or 'an affectionate person') reducing 400 dimensions can lead to random results as shown in Figure 16.

Q6, Q7 To check if statistically significant differences in cosine similarity exist between different groups of the protected attribute, we performed the Alexander Govern test[7] for every subjective query. The null hypothesis is that all the groups have the same mean cosine similarity for a given query, while accounting for heterogeneity of variance across the groups. The results show that while the effect size of the differences in cosine similarity across different groups is reduced with all the debiasing methods, only with fair PCA these differences are statistically insignificant for most queries, as shown in Tables 9, 10, 11 and 12. It is interesting to notice that even though fair PCA based methods produce embeddings that do not have statistically significant differences in the cosine similarities for different queries, they still do not necessarily produce the most fair results in all cases for image retrieval. The main reason for this is that we select a subset of images from a dataset and even if the representations are unbiased, we might pick a subset that is skewed towards one group.

5.4 Image captioning

Difficulty addressing fairness in captioning: One would expect that an image captioning system should perform equally well for different groups on the standard metrics such as Bleu [41], METEOR [2], Rouge [36], CIDEr [51], SPICE [1]. Using the data by Zhao et al. [60] we evaluated the captions generated by CLIP-CAP system for both original and trained on gender-neutral captions, but similar to Zhao et al. [60] we only found a slightly better performance of these metrics on the images of light skin individuals. Additionally, we did not find any difference on the aforementioned performance metrics for the captions between men and women or intersectional groups (considering both race and gender).

[7] https://docs.scipy.org/doc/scipy/reference/generated/scipy.stats.alexandergovern.html

One can extend the notion of independence of protected attribute w.r.t. to a prescribed set of words in caption generation systems as follows: Given an image, pre-defined relevant words used in the captions should be independent of the protected attribute. For example, given images of doctors the occurrence of the word doctor, hospital etc. in the generated captions should be independent of gender or race. However, evaluating for such fairness issues requires appropriate image datasets with demographic features. Additionally, it requires to define a set of relevant words for every (type of) image. Unfortunately, several available datasets crawled from the web contain biased images (e.g., female doctors wearing a halloween costume or having cartoonized images). So, it is difficult to draw broader conclusions from such datasets.

Q8 *Fairness issues in captioning:* We report qualitative results using handpicked images from google search. We found that images of women factory-workers were misgendered. A woman fixing a light-fixture was described as holding a blow-dryer. A woman shown fixing a car is captioned "kneeling over a car" while a man shown fixing a car is captioned "fixing a car". Women who appeared to be medical professionals were captioned "talking to a man/woman", or a woman wearing a lab-coat is referred to "wearing a dress talking to a man". While images of men who appeared to be medical professionals were referred to as "a couple of doctors". In general, captions for images of men more often had the words, "hospital", "check-up on a patient" , compared to images of women. In some cases women medical professionals were referred to as "nurse", while in none of the cases men were referred to as nurses.

Using gender information extracted from CLIP, we found that on IdenProf dataset's images labeled as doctor, the word nurse was used in 1.7% of the generated captions for women, vs for men it was only used in 1.2% of the captions. Similarly, for Chef's images of women the word "Chef" only appeared in 17% of the generated captions while it appeared for 36% of the captions for men. Additionally, we saw that the word "Kitchen" appeared in 45% of the captions for Chef's images labeled as women and it appeared 40% of the captions for the Chef's images labeled as men. The waiter's images in IdenProf had the word "Chef" in 1.2% of the captions for women vs 4.1% of the captions for men. These are just preliminary findings and a more thorough analysis requires ground truth demographic features as opposed to using CLIP's predictions.

Using the dataset by Kay et al. [31] we find that for Chef's images the word chef appears 33% of the images for men while it occured 0% of the images for women labeled as chef. On the other hand, the word "chef's" appears 13% of the images for men and 24% of the images for women. This occurs in the context of 'chef's hat' or 'chef's uniform'. This shows that the captioning system recognizes women as wearing chef's clothings but does not associate the word 'chef' with them. We would like to point out that this dataset did not seem appropriate as it was crawled from Google search and had several biases, e.g., it sometimes showed women as a cartoons.

Q9 *Effects of bias mitigation methods:* We only discuss results on handpicked images. To fix the misgendering of images, we trained the captioning system with gender neutral words, that is we changed words like "man" or "woman" to "person". This helped fix the misgendering issue. In some cases it even helped with changing the captioning all together, i.e., we saw more mentions of the word hospital for women in the appropriate images. ii) Using mutual information and fair PCA based methods on CLIP embeddings plus the gender-neutral training captions seemed to lower the use of the biased language. For example, there were more medical terms, e.g., "hospital" or "doctor", used in the captions for women. In one cases the caption changed from "nurse" to a "doctor". We only tested the bias mitigation methods on few handpicked images from the web which we cannot show for copyright reasons.

5.5 OpenCLIP results

We show results using OpenCLIP [28] for zero-shot classification on FairFace dataset (gender and race attributes) in Figure 11 in the appendix. We also show results using Flickr30K dataset in Figure 13. We find that i) OpenCLIP has more bias compared to OpenAI's CLIP. ii) CLIP bias mitigation methods are effective in enforcing independence assumption for different protected attribute groups. iii) In general, fair PCA based methods are more effective. We also evaluate OpenCLIP and different bias mitigation methods using OpenCLIP for image retrieval tasks, both for enforcing independence of the protected attribute w.r.t. top-k selection, FairFace Figure 12 and Flickr30K Figure 14, as well as the representation bias mitigation, FairFace Table 14 and Flickr30K Table 16. i) The results show that OpenClip has a higher bias compared to OpenAI CLIP. ii) All the methods are effective in reducing different biases. iii) However, fair PCA based methods are the most effective, which is supported by the low disparity in the average cosine similarity for different gendered queries, as shown in Figures 10 and 14. iv) Fair pca based methods produce embeddings that show no statistical difference in the cosine similarity across different protected groups for different queries, as shown in Tables 15 and 17.

6 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION

We have introduced a novel taxonomy to systematically evaluate discriminative foundation models. It is based on three axes: (i) whether the task involves a human; (ii) whether the task is subjective; and (iii) whether independence-based or diversity-based fairness is better suited for the intended use case. Then we thoroughly evaluated the fairness of discriminative foundation models (FM) taking OpenAI's CLIP and OpenCLIP models as examples. Additionally, we evaluated different bias mitigation approaches for these models. Our evaluation focused on three key tasks: zero-shot classification, image retrieval and image captioning. We specifically examined two protected attributes: gender (binary) and ethnicity (multi-valued). We found that, while fair PCA generally emerged as one of the top-performing approaches in most cases, selecting the appropriate debiasing method should be based on the intended use of the model. For instance, when aiming to enhance diversity in image retrieval tasks, simpler methods that involve constructing gender or race-specific queries may be more suitable.

Our evaluation methodology provides a principled foundation for future research in developing FMs that are inherently fair. Furthermore, we identify other potential research directions, such as evaluating fairness in *non-human-centric* tasks (e.g., whether the images related to different religions are respectful) and conducting a more comprehensive evaluation of captioning models.

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A ADDITIONAL RELATED WORK

A.1 Text embeddings and bias

Compared to multi-modal embeddings, pure text embeddings have a longer history, and so does the literature about their fairness: the seminal paper of Bolukbasi et al. [7] found that word embeddings encode stereotypes such as "man is to computer programmer as woman is to homemaker." Such bias is attributed to the consistent bias prevalent in text corpora [3, 54]. Bolukbasi et al. [7] proposes a debiasing approach that is conceptually similar to the fair PCA approach [32] that we study in this paper. Concretely, it aims to project gender-neutral words to a subspace orthogonal to the gender-direction in the embedding space (when trying to remove gender bias). A different approach to debias word embeddings has been proposed by Zhao et al. (2018), which alters the loss of the word embedding model. Both approaches have been criticized by Gonen and Goldberg [26] to only hide the bias, rather to remove it.

A.2 Further (fairness) aspects of CLIP

Birhane et al. [5] examined the LAION-400M dataset [48], which has become a popular dataset for training CLIP-like foundation models [14], and found that the dataset contains problematic content, including malign stereotypes and racist and ethnic slurs. Such problematic content is likely to be picked up by large models trained on this dataset. CLIP-like models can be adapted to support multiple languages by means of cross-lingual alignment [17]. Wang et al. [56] study the fairness of Multilingual CLIP [13] w.r.t. different languages and find significant accuracy disparity across different languages. Liang et al. [35] presented the modality gap phenomenon in multi-modal models: for example, CLIP maps an image and its corresponding text to completely separate regions of the joint embedding space. They showed that varying the modality gap distance can significantly improve CLIP's fairness. Qiu et al. [44] studied the robustness of multi-modal foundation models to distribution shifts [57].

In a concurrent work Seth et al. [50] proposed a new bias mitigation method for vision-language models. They propose to train a residual network on top of the image embeddings ($\bar{\phi}$) of CLIP-like models with the goal to produce representations (ϕ) such that protected attributes cannot be recovered from it. They do so by first training a protected attributes classifier (PAC) using $\bar{\phi}$ which is then frozen. Then they train the residual network while trying to maximize PAC's loss for the learnt ϕ. They show that they can reduce the maximum and minimum Skew for gender, age and race attributes on FairFace and PATA (newly introduced) dataset.

In another parallel work, Chuang et al. [16] presented an approach that addresses bias in CLIP's embeddings space by projecting out the biased directions. They identify the biased directions in the embedding space by using prompts like 'a photo of a male/female' and then construct a projection matrix that would remove these biased directions in any query. To reduce noise in the estimation of the 'biased directions', they defined a set of queries on which the CLIP model should have similar embeddings, e.g., 'a photo of a female doctor' and 'a photo of a male doctor'. They additionally added this constraint to find the debiasing projection matrix. They showed that they reduce the Skew for gender, race and age attributes for image retrieval tasks using the FairFace dataset.

B DATASETS

In this section, we describe the datasets used for evaluation. We use the test split for the evaluation. In some cases, where the test images are little or the ground truth for the test set is not available we evlaute on the validation set, please refer to the dataset descriptions below. We use the training split for training the bias mitigation methods.

FairFace [30] comprises about $100k$ images, split into $85k$ training images and $10K$ validation images. The images are focused on the faces and come with a binary labelling of the gender attribute (53% male images), 9 bins of age attribute ($0-2:2\%$; $3-9:12\%$; $10-19:11\%$; $20-29:30\%$; $30-39:22\%$; $40-49:12\%$; $50-59:7\%$; $60-69:3\%$; $70+:1\%$) and 7 values of the race attribute, specifically, East Asian (14%), Indian (14%), Black (14%), White (19%), Middle Eastern (11%), Latino Hispanic (15%) and South east Asian (13%). The dataset is fairly balanced for the race and gender attributes. However for the age attribute, there is less amount of data for older categories.

Flickr30K [43, 58] contains about $30k$ images with 5 human annotated captions per image. We split the data into 50% train and 50% test data. This dataset contains a variety of images containing humans and animals. These images contain diverse backgrounds and have natural lighting conditions.

MSCOCO [37] contains about $120K$ images with $80K$ training images and $40K$ validation images. The dataset contains at-least 5 hand annotated captions per image. It additionally contains 80 categories as labels. The categories include person, several animals such as cat, dog and giraffe, and objects such as scissors, bicycle and hairdryer. The images have a diverse background and are in the natural lighting conditions.

We extract the gender information from the captions of Flickr30K and MSCOCO. To this end, we define a 3-valued attribute, $type\_of \in \{male, female, neutral\}$, and a set of male and female words, given in Appendix C. $type\_of$ an image is considered $(fe)male$ if any of its captions contain any of the $(fe)male$ words otherwise it is considered $neutral$. Additionally, if the caption contains both $male$ and $female$ words $type\_of$ an image is considered $neutral$.

IdenProf [8] consists of 11,000 images of identifiable professionals. It contains images of 10 professionals, i.e, chef, doctor, engineer, farmer, firefighter, judge, mechanic, pilot, police and waiter. We use roughly an 80-20 test and train split[9], i.e., 900 images of test data per profession. We use this data for image retrieval tasks and annotated the gender of the retrieved images by hand.

CelebA [38] comprises about 200k images of celebrities. These images are focused on faces and additionally provide 40 binary attributes per image, including gender. The dataset is split into 80% training images, 10% validation images and 10% test images. We train on the training set and test on the test set.

Food101[9] comprises 101 food categories with 750 training and 250 test images per category. The test images have been manually cleaned. We show results on the test split.

[8] https://github.com/OlafenwaMoses/IdenProf

[9] The official dataset is split into 80% training images and 20% test images. We invert this ratio, as we do not require as much training data, and evaluating on a larger test set leads to more robust results.

Pascal VOC 2007 [22] is a multi-class dataset. The categories include person, several household objects and different vehicles. We show results on the c.a. 5K test images. We consider a classification to be accurate if the top predicted label is among the multiple ground truth labels.

ImageNet 2012[19] comprises of 1000 classes, including animals, e.g., goldfish, great white shark, scorpion, etc. ; objects , e.g., bath-towel, accordion, guitar, assault rifle, etc.; place or buildings, e.g., church, cinema; and concepts, e.g., groom. Images are divers and in natural lighting. We use the 100K test set images to show the results.

Stanford Cars [33] comprises 8K test images of 196 types of cars. We use it to demonstrate the effect of various bias mitigation methods on fine grained image classification task.

MIAP (More Inclusive Annotations for People) [49] has c.a. 22K test images and c.a. 70K training images, which contain at least one person. Each image comes with the bounding box(es) of the person(s); age, i.e., young, middle, older or unknown; and gender,i.e., predominantly masculine, predominantly feminine or unknown. For our experiments, we try to predict whether a person is inconspicuous, i.e., occupies less than 50% of the image; whether they are an adult, i.e., age attribute is middle or older; and whether there is one or multiple people in the picture.

C EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS

In this section, we describe the additional experimental details. For the following queries we used the prompts

"a photo of a '—-' ".

Classification tasks. For gender attribute we used the following classification tasks:

- ("criminal", "innocent person")
- ("genius", "dumbass")
- ("nurse", "doctor")
- ("drug dealer", "pedestrian")
- ("prostitute", "night owl")
- ("CEO", "secretary")
- ("leader", "follower")
- ("director", "assistant")
- ("secretary", "board member")
- ("convict", "exoneree")

For race attribute we used the following tasks:

- ("terrorist", "innocent person")
- ("slave", "lord")
- ("drug dealer", "pedestrian")
- ("engineer", "chef")
- ("CEO", "secretary")
- ("gorilla", "person")
- ("secretary", "board member")
- ("nazi", "police officer")
- ("rich person", "homeless person")
- ("retard", "healthy person')
- ("rapist", "lover")
- ("muslim', "atheist")
- ("murderer", "witness")
- ("inbred person", "only child")
- ("bastard", "hero")
- ("royal person", "subordinate")

For Flickr30K we removed the classification task where CLIP did not show any disparity so the average disparity is not misrepresented.

Image retrieval tasks. For different datasets the retrieval tasks can be seen on the left of the Figures 7, 8 and 9.

Words used to identify gender for Flickr30K and MSCOCO.

male words:

'man', 'men', 'boy', 'boys', 'male', 'males', 'gentleman', 'gentlemen'

female words:

'woman', 'women', 'girl', 'girls', 'female', 'females', 'lady', 'ladies'

D ADDITIONAL IMAGE RETRIEVAL RESULTS

In this section, we show additional image retrieval results. Specifically, we show the following results:

Objective labelling results. . Table 3 shows the results for objective labelling using IdenProf dataset. It shows the DDP-rep, given in Eq. (5), as well as the precision for multiple K values.

Table 3: [Retrieval - DDP & Precision - Objective - IdenProf] This table shows fairness evaluation for representational bias on objective tasks for image retrieval of CLIP model and different bias mitigation methods. *Using IdenProf dataset, we show DDP-rep, given by Eq. (5), for each method as well as its average precision for retrieving images of 9 different professions of the IdenProf dataset. We exclude the profession 'Firefighters' because in many cases their faces are hidden and gender is difficult to identify. Additionally, we do not show results for EOP like measure because this dataset does not have the annotations for the gender attribute. The gender annotations for the retrieved images per profession were manually done by one of the authors. The results demonstrates that gender balanced queries perform the best to reduce the representational unfairness in the objective tasks. All the methods are trained on FairFace dataset to remove the gender bias.*

Clip	MI-400-GT	MI-256-GT	Prompt-GT	Gender-BLN	FPCA-GT
DDP(rep) @ 10					
0.80±0.05	0.61±0.07	0.55±0.08	0.73±0.07	**0.22±0.10**	0.49±0.10
DDP(rep) @ 20					
0.66±0.06	0.46±0.08	0.49±0.09	0.63±0.07	**0.19±0.07**	0.44±0.10
DDP(rep) @ 30					
0.63±0.06	0.49±0.06	0.49±0.06	0.62±0.04	**0.24±0.07**	0.39±0.09
Precision @ 10					
0.99±0.02	**1.00±0.00**	0.99±0.02	0.97±0.07	0.99±0.02	**1.0±0.0**
Precision @ 20					
0.98±0.04	**0.99±0.01**	0.97±0.03	0.97±0.06	0.97±0.05	0.98±0.02
Precision @ 30					
0.97±0.04	**0.98±0.02**	0.96±0.04	0.96±0.06	0.97±0.05	**0.98±0.04**

Recall on Flickr30k. Table 4 show the result on retrieving Flickr30K images using its captions for multiple K values.

Table 4: [Retrieval - Recall - Flickr30k] The table below shows recall@K for randomly selected 50% Flickr30K dataset using different gender bias mitigation methods. *Specifically, we are using the captions of each image as a query and report the fraction queries that retrieve the images correctly in top 1, 5 or 10 results. The results show that mutual information based methods perform worse, which makes sense as the number of dimensions are reduced, while Prompt-GT method performs the best. Since the Prompt-GT method was finetuned using the Flickr dataset, it is not surprising that it outperforms even the CLIP model. It is worth noting that the queries also include gendered queries and some reduction in recall is expected or may even be desirable.*

CLIP	MI-400-GT	MI-256-GT	MI-400-INF	MI-256-INF	Prompt-GT	FPCA-GT	FPCA-INF
			ViTB/32 Top 1				
0.29	0.19	0.13	0.18	0.12	–	0.26	0.26
			ViTB/16 Top 1				
0.32	0.23	0.15	0.23	0.15	**0.35**	0.29	0.29
			ViTB/32 Top 5				
0.51	0.38	0.27	0.37	0.27	–	0.48	0.48
			ViTB/16 Top 5				
0.55	0.42	0.31	0.42	0.30	**0.59**	0.51	0.51
			ViTB/32 Top 10				
0.62	0.48	0.35	0.46	0.35	–	0.58	0.58
			ViTB/16 Top 10				
0.65	0.51	0.39	0.51	0.38	**0.69**	0.61	0.61

Subjective labelling, independence assumption . Figure 15 shows the DDP metric Eq. (2) using MSCOCO dataset.

Subjective labelling diversity assumption. Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8 show the skew metric for different methods.

D.1 Statistical tests and cosine similarity

Tables 9, 10, 11 and 12 show the test for average cosine similarity among different groups of the protected attributes. Figures 7, 8 and 9 show the heatmaps for disparity in the average cosine similarity among different protected attribute groups.

E RESULTS FOR LINEAR PROBE

We show results for linear probe using the CLIP embeddings. Specifically, we train a logistic regression classifier on top of the CLIP embeddings to predict the attributes of the FairFace dataset, as showin Table 13.

F RESULTS USING OPENCLIP

We show results on two datasets for OpenCLIP. Figures 11 and 13 show classification results using OpenCLIP. Figures 14 and 12 show retrieval results using OpenCLIP. Additionally, Figures 10 and 14 show the heatmaps for differences in average cosine similarity among different protected attribute groups and Tables 15 and 17 show the statistical tests for the cosine similarity among different groups of the protected attribute. At last, Tables 16 and 14 show results for the skew metric using OpenCLIP.



Figure 6: [Classification - DTPR - Objective - MIAP] *The x-axis shows three classification tasks: i) 'inconspicuous photo of a person' vs 'prominent photo of a person', where ground truth was based on whether the bounding box of the person occupied more than 50% of the image. ii) 'child' vs 'adult' iii) 'one person' vs 'more than one person'. On top we show the disparity in the true positive rates across the gender attribute and in the bottom we show the accuracy. We see that mutual information based methods while in some cases do reduce the disparity but they incur a reduction in accuracy. On the other hand fair PCA based methods reduce the disparity while incurring almost no loss in accuracy.*

G FAIRSAMPLING (REFERRED TO AS FAIR-SAMP IN THE RESULTS)

This is the second mitigation method proposed by Wang et al. [55], which requires to train a CLIP-like model from scratch. Even though it provides embeddings which could be used for other downstream tasks, one prominent difference from CLIP-like models is that it is trained on MSCOCO, a much smaller dataset. So, its zero-shot capabilities are quite limited. We add these results for the sake of completeness.

During training this method picks the training examples in a balanced manner w.r.t. gender. Specifically, in contrastive loss the goal is to maximize the similarity scores between matching image and text examples (positive samples), while minimizing the similarity score between non-matching examples (negative samples). Wang et al. [55] hypothesize that there could be a gender imbalance in the negative samples in each batch, i.e., the negative samples could be biased towards the majority class which results in the bias during retrieval. To correct this, firstly, they assign male, female or neutral labels to each image-text pair in the training set. They extract these labels from the texts or captions of each image. Then, they propose to pick negative sample from the male and female datapoints with probability 0.5 for every neutral query, while for male and female labelled queries they sample the negative samples randomly.

We found that on MSCOCO dataset, which was used for training this method, it enforced demographic parity, and had good performance for recall. However, as Table 18 shows, this method is not directly comparable to foundation models and it's performance is limited to the dataset it was trained on.

Table 5: [Retrieval - Skew - Subjective - FairFace] This table shows the maximum absolute skew, given by Eq. (4), using the FairFace dataset and gender attribute. *It demonstrates that all the methods are able to reduce the skew. Gender balanced queries yield the lowest skew.*

CLIP	MI-400-GT	MI-256-GT	MI-400-INF	MI-256-INF	Prompt-GT	Gender-BLN	FPCA-GT	FPCA-INF
				Top 10				
2.47±0.86	0.84±0.68	0.67±0.7	1.06±0.64	0.51±0.3	2.12±0.88	**0.08±0.06**	0.36±0.2	0.51±0.28
				Top 50				
1.99±0.62	0.4±0.26	0.24±0.14	0.37±0.24	0.32±0.2	1.6±0.56	**0.06±0.02**	0.19±0.1	0.23±0.12
				Top 100				
1.64±0.48	0.38±0.3	0.24±0.12	0.33±0.24	0.2±0.12	1.3±0.36	**0.04±0.02**	0.23±0.12	0.26±0.12

Table 6: [Retrieval - Skew - Subjective - FairFace] This table shows the results for representation bias for subjective labelling. Specifically, it show skew metric , given by Eq. (4), for the *race* attribute of FairFace dataset. *Race balanced queries perform well in general but fair PCA based methods perform the best when the number of retrieved items are larger.*

CLIP	MI-400-GT	MI-256-GT	MI-400-INF	MI-256-INF	Race-BLN	FPCA-GT	FPCA-INF
			Top 10				
2.66±0.0	2.66±0.0	2.66±0.0	2.46±0.4	2.66±0.0	**1.56±0.84**	2.66±0.0	2.66±0.0
			Top 50				
2.49±0.34	2.23±0.36	2.05±0.4	1.88±0.6	1.91±0.52	**1.09±0.68**	1.66±0.56	1.38±0.52
			Top 100				
2.2±0.48	1.85±0.5	1.84±0.5	1.71±0.48	1.45±0.3	1.15±0.78	1.06±0.3	**0.89±0.2**

Table 7: [Retrieval - Skew - Subjective - Flickr30K] This table shows the skew metric, given by Eq. (4), for the gender attribute average over several image retrieval task using the Flickr data. *It shows that gender balanced queries and mutual information based methods with a lot reduction in number of CLIP dimensions reduce the skew the most.*

CLIP	MI-400-GT	MI-256-GT	MI-400-INF	MI-256-INF	Prompt-GT	Gender-BLN	FPCA-GT	FPCA-INF
				Top 10				
2.28±1.12	0.6±0.28	0.71±0.22	0.9±0.38	0.47±0.16	2.08±1.3	**0.44±0.04**	1.25±0.92	1.2±0.94
				Top 20				
1.76±0.86	0.77±0.54	0.68±0.1	0.92±0.46	0.44±0.18	1.69±0.92	**0.32±0.04**	0.72±0.24	0.6±0.18
				Top 30				
1.52±0.62	0.64±0.28	0.69±0.22	0.87±0.6	0.52±0.1	1.11±0.52	**0.27±0.08**	0.66±0.28	0.53±0.16

Table 8: [Retrieval -Skew - Subjective - MSCOCO] This table shows absolute skew, given by Eq. (4), for image retrieval tasks using MSCOCO dataset. *The results show that the simple baseline with gender balanced queries perform the best for reducing skew.*

CLIP	MI-400-GT	MI-256-GT	MI-400-INF	MI-256-INF	Gender-BLN	FPCA-GT	FPCA-INF
				Top 10			
2.61±1.16	2.24±1.16	2.62±1.14	2.12±1.26	3.12±0.76	**0.36±0.14**	2.56±1.24	1.68±1.2
				Top 50			
1.38±0.68	1.95±0.82	2.33±0.82	2.07±0.9	2.06±0.78	**0.34±0.12**	1.51±0.84	1.36±1.16
				Top 100			
1.46±0.9	2.23±0.86	2.03±0.5	1.9±0.78	2.0±0.52	**0.29±0.06**	1.38±0.48	1.02±0.62

Table 9: [Retrieval -Statistical Tests - Subjective - FairFace] This table shows the signed difference between the average cosine similarities between men and women for each query as well as Alexander-govern statistical tests using FairFace. *The statistical test checks whether there are differences in the mean value of cosine similarity between men and women for a given query. The pair of numbers represent the test statistic and the p-value. A low value of the statistic and high p-value is desirable, the former means the statistical difference for the given query has low impact and the later means that the differences are statistically insignificant. It shows that fair PCA and MI-GT methods generally achieve the lowest disparity in cosine similarity and the differences are generally statistically insignificant.*

Statistical tests: ANOVA- Alexander-Govern: (statistic: p-val)								
Query	CLIP	MI-400-GT	MI-256-GT	MI-400-INF	MI-256-INF	Prompt-GT	FPCA-GT	FPCA-INF
CEO	(1444 , 0.0)	(23 , 0.0)	(2 , 0.11)	(73 , 0.0)	(3 , 0.048)	(978 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.863)	(7 , 0.005)
boss	(2025 , 0.0)	(24 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.906)	(7 , 0.008)	(1 , 0.309)	(673 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.909)	(5 , 0.02)
convict	(300 , 0.0)	(4 , 0.032)	(0 , 0.473)	(7 , 0.007)	(1 , 0.168)	(328 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.484)	(18 , 0.0)
criminal	(327 , 0.0)	(28 , 0.0)	(2 , 0.084)	(43 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.443)	(453 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.78)	(17 , 0.0)
director	(668 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.5)	(14 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.553)	(8 , 0.004)	(787 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.452)	(8 , 0.003)
drug dealer	(621 , 0.0)	(6 , 0.01)	(3 , 0.069)	(12 , 0.0)	(9 , 0.003)	(718 , 0.0)	(1 , 0.277)	(4 , 0.043)
engineer	(1190 , 0.0)	(83 , 0.0)	(3 , 0.07)	(1 , 0.207)	(18 , 0.0)	(1126 , 0.0)	(7 , 0.007)	(13 , 0.0)
genius	(3145 , 0.0)	(34 , 0.0)	(9 , 0.003)	(99 , 0.0)	(16 , 0.0)	(1023 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.476)	(15 , 0.0)
leader	(1326 , 0.0)	(68 , 0.0)	(21 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.64)	(24 , 0.0)	(1138 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.391)	(0 , 0.388)
nurse	(4142 , 0.0)	(308 , 0.0)	(37 , 0.0)	(232 , 0.0)	(43 , 0.0)	(3762 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.494)	(0 , 0.76)
prostitute	(2738 , 0.0)	(156 , 0.0)	(9 , 0.002)	(27 , 0.0)	(18 , 0.0)	(241 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.651)	(7 , 0.005)
secretary	(3269 , 0.0)	(299 , 0.0)	(22 , 0.0)	(291 , 0.0)	(50 , 0.0)	(385 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.999)	(6 , 0.014)
suspect	(1740 , 0.0)	(4 , 0.041)	(4 , 0.025)	(3 , 0.082)	(5 , 0.023)	(820 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.566)	(12 , 0.0)

Table 10: [Retrieval -Statistical Tests - Subjective - FairFace] This table shows the absolute difference between the average cosine similarities among different races for each query and their corresponding statistical tests to check if for a given query all the races have same mean. *A large value of the test statistic and less than 0.05 pvalue implies that there is a large and statistically significant different in the mean value of the cosine similarity for one of the races.*

Statistical tests: ANOVA- Alexander-Govern: (statistic: p-val)							
Query	CLIP	MI-400-GT	MI-256-GT	MI-400-INF	MI-256-INF	FPCA-GT	FPCA-INF
cleaning person	(746 , 0.0)	(166 , 0.0)	(488 , 0.0)	(135 , 0.0)	(286 , 0.0)	(7 , 0.251)	(14 , 0.021)
director	(544 , 0.0)	(1440 , 0.0)	(416 , 0.0)	(1204 , 0.0)	(257 , 0.0)	(10 , 0.108)	(67 , 0.0)
engineer	(1276 , 0.0)	(760 , 0.0)	(511 , 0.0)	(752 , 0.0)	(290 , 0.0)	(28 , 0.0)	(51 , 0.0)
labourer	(1316 , 0.0)	(474 , 0.0)	(703 , 0.0)	(755 , 0.0)	(451 , 0.0)	(11 , 0.068)	(162 , 0.0)
secretary	(661 , 0.0)	(362 , 0.0)	(280 , 0.0)	(334 , 0.0)	(402 , 0.0)	(5 , 0.459)	(21 , 0.001)
smart person	(682 , 0.0)	(872 , 0.0)	(646 , 0.0)	(371 , 0.0)	(467 , 0.0)	(18 , 0.005)	(56 , 0.0)
sophisticated person	(1274 , 0.0)	(636 , 0.0)	(548 , 0.0)	(462 , 0.0)	(485 , 0.0)	(19 , 0.003)	(44 , 0.0)
terrorist	(1603 , 0.0)	(882 , 0.0)	(1017 , 0.0)	(642 , 0.0)	(828 , 0.0)	(14 , 0.025)	(84 , 0.0)

Table 11: [Retrieval - Statistical tests - Subjective - Flickr30k] This table shows Alexander Govern statistical test for the cosine similariy of various queries between men and women. *It demonstrates that fair PCA based methods do very well to equalize the cosine similarity between the two groups for different retrieval tasks.*

Statistical tests: ANOVA- Alexander-Govern: (statistic: p-val)								
Query	CLIP	MI-400-GT	MI-256-GT	MI-400-INF	MI-256-INF	Prompt-GT	FPCA-GT	FPCA-INF
doctor	(271 , 0.0)	(23 , 0.0)	(43 , 0.0)	(2 , 0.125)	(60 , 0.0)	(222 , 0.0)	(1 , 0.225)	(12 , 0.001)
nurse	(1252 , 0.0)	(42 , 0.0)	(76 , 0.0)	(2 , 0.151)	(49 , 0.0)	(1541 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.481)	(2 , 0.186)
secretary	(1567 , 0.0)	(47 , 0.0)	(27 , 0.0)	(3 , 0.09)	(1 , 0.335)	(676 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.484)	(59 , 0.0)
boss	(588 , 0.0)	(35 , 0.0)	(31 , 0.0)	(10 , 0.001)	(18 , 0.0)	(487 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.774)	(65 , 0.0)
lawyer	(218 , 0.0)	(2 , 0.157)	(2 , 0.161)	(36 , 0.0)	(41 , 0.0)	(166 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.932)	(13 , 0.0)
paralegal	(522 , 0.0)	(10 , 0.002)	(0 , 0.825)	(45 , 0.0)	(65 , 0.0)	(185 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.77)	(15 , 0.0)

Table 12: [Retrieval - Statistical tests - Subjective - MSCOCO] This table shows Alexander Govern statistical test for the cosine similariy of various queries between men and women. *It demonstrates that fair PCA GT yields statistically insignificant differences.*

Statistical tests: ANOVA- Alexander-Govern: (statistic: p-val)							
Query	CLIP	MI-400-GT	MI-256-GT	MI-400-INF	MI-256-INF	FPCA-GT	FPCA-INF
boss	(352 , 0.0)	(27 , 0.0)	(40 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.408)	(175 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.393)	(6 , 0.013)
secretary	(950 , 0.0)	(6 , 0.011)	(34 , 0.0)	(7 , 0.007)	(82 , 0.0)	(1 , 0.201)	(325 , 0.0)
genius	(198 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.477)	(15 , 0.0)	(3 , 0.072)	(103 , 0.0)	(1 , 0.306)	(47 , 0.0)
helpful person	(44 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.744)	(23 , 0.0)	(2 , 0.153)	(123 , 0.0)	(2 , 0.088)	(81 , 0.0)
affectionate person	(286 , 0.0)	(18 , 0.0)	(20 , 0.0)	(42 , 0.0)	(43 , 0.0)	(1 , 0.307)	(55 , 0.0)
funny person	(36 , 0.0)	(16 , 0.0)	(104 , 0.0)	(26 , 0.0)	(54 , 0.0)	(2 , 0.09)	(135 , 0.0)



Figure 7: [Retrieval - Cosine similarity - Subjective - FairFace] These figures are heatmaps that show the absolute difference in cosine similarity, scaled up by a factor of 100, for different image retrieval queries using different methods for gender (left) and race (right) attributes on FairFace dataset. *The figures demonstrate the efficiency of each methods to equalize the representation for different protected attribute groups on average. It shows that in general, fair PCA and mutual information based methods equalize the cosine similarity for gender and race attribute for a variety of queries.*



Figure 8: [Retrieval - Cosine similarity - Subjective - Flickr30k] The figure is heatmap that show the absolute difference in cosine similarity, scaled up by a factor of 100, for different queries using different methods for gender attribute on Flickr30K dataset. *The figure demonstrates the efficiency of each methods to equalize the representation for different protected attribute groups on average. It shows that in general, fair PCA based methods and the mutual information based methods equalize the cosine similarity for gender attribute for a variety of queries.*



Figure 9: [Retrieval - Cosine similarity - Subjective - MSCOCO] The figure is a heatmap that shows the absolute difference in cosine similarity, scaled up by a factor of 100, for different queries using different methods for gender attribute on MSCOCO dataset. *The figure demonstrates the efficiency of each methods to equalize the representation for different protected attribute groups on average. It shows fair PCA based methods and mutual information based methods equalize the cosine similarity for gender attribute for a variety of queries.*

Table 13: [Classification - Accuracy - Objective - FairFace] This table shows the accuracy of a logistic regression classifier trained on the corresponding CLIP features for FairFace dataset. *The top and the bottom parts of the table correspond to the cases where the mitigation methods were supposed to remove the gender and race information, respectively, from the CLIP embeddings, while preserving the other information. The results show that fair PCA based methods are more effective in removing the corresponding sensitive information, i.e., the accuracy for predicting the corresponding sensitive attributes is nearly random. Additionally, the fair PCA methods do not reduce the predictive power of the embeddings, i.e., the accuracy in predicting other attributes stays similar to the original CLIP embeddings. We do not provide the results for the prompt method because they do not alter the image representation and results are similar as the original CLIP.*

Feature	Clip	MI-400-GT	MI-256-GT	MI-400-INF	MI-256-INF	FPCA-GT	FPCA-INF
			Mitigation methods w.r.t gender: ViTB/32				
age	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60
gender	0.95	0.94	0.90	0.94	0.90	**0.53**	0.60
race	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71
			Mitigation methods w.r.t gender: ViTB/16				
age	0.62	0.62	0.61	0.62	0.61	0.62	0.62
gender	0.96	0.95	0.91	0.95	0.91	**0.53**	0.57
race	0.74	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.74	0.74
			Mitigation methods w.r.t race: ViTB/32				
age	0.60	0.60	0.59	0.60	0.59	0.60	0.60
gender	0.95	0.95	0.94	0.95	0.94	0.94	0.94
race	0.71	0.71	0.70	0.71	0.70	**0.19**	0.34
			Mitigation methods w.r.t race: ViTB/16				
age	0.62	0.62	0.61	0.62	0.61	0.61	0.61
gender	0.96	0.96	0.95	0.95	0.96	0.96	0.95
race	0.74	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	**0.19**	0.39



Figure 10: [Retrieval - Cosine similarity - Subjective - FairFace - OpenCLIP]These figures are heatmaps that show the absolute difference in cosine similarity, scaled up by a factor of 100, for different image retrieval queries using different methods for gender (left) and race (right) attributes on FairFace dataset on OpenCLIP. *The figures demonstrate the efficiency of each methods to equalize the representation for different protected attributes groups on average. It shows that in general, fair PCA based methods equalize the cosine similarity for gender and race attribute for a variety of queries.*



Figure 11: [Classification - DDP - Subjective - FairFace - OpenCLIP] These figures show DDP for classification, given by Eq. (1), using OpenCLIP using FairFace dataset. *It demonstrates that fair PCA based methods perform the best in reducing bias.*



Figure 12: [Retrieval - DDP - Subjective - FairFace - OpenCLIP] These figures show DDP for image retrieval, given by Eq. 2, using OpenCLIP on FairFace dataset. *It demonstrates that gender balacned queries and fair PCA are most effective in reducing demographic disparity in subjective image retrieval tasks.*

Table 14: [Retrieval - Skew - Subjective - FairFace - OpenCLIP] This table shows the maximum absolute skew, given by Eq. (4), using the FairFace dataset and gender and race attributes using OpenCLIP. *It demonstrates that all the methods are able to reduce the skew. Gender/Race balanced queries and fair PCA are the most effective in reducing the skew.*

Clip	MI-400-gt	MI-256-GT	MI-400-inf	MI-256-INF	Gender/Race-BLN	FPCA-GT	FPCA-INF
			Gender: Top 10				
2.38±0.74	0.83±0.36	1.04±0.66	0.72±0.26	0.43±0.3	**0.15±0.1**	0.42±0.28	0.41±0.2
			Gender: Top 50				
1.94±0.38	0.63±0.26	0.33±0.12	0.55±0.22	0.34±0.12	**0.11±0.04**	0.25±0.12	0.25±0.14
			Gender: Top 100				
1.77±0.32	0.56±0.22	0.26±0.1	0.48±0.2	0.31±0.1	**0.07±0.02**	0.21±0.1	0.21±0.08
			Race: Top 10				
2.37±0.58	2.66±0.0	2.66±0.0	2.42±0.48	2.42±0.48	**2.37±0.58**	**2.37±0.58**	2.66±0.0
			Race: Top 50				
1.4±0.46	1.35±0.4	1.4±0.36	1.52±0.36	1.35±0.48	1.16±0.38	1.01±0.36	**0.82±0.26**
			Race: Top 100				
1.33±0.44	1.07±0.3	1.25±0.3	1.04±0.14	1.21±0.44	1.06±0.42	0.7±0.12	**0.63±0.18**

Table 15: [Retrieval - Statistical tests - Subjective - FairFace - OpenCLIP] This table shows the statistical tests for the cosine similarities among different groups of the protected groups. *Specifically, it shows the Alexander-govern statistical test which measures whether the mean of cosine similarity among different groups for a given query are statistically significant or not. It shows that fair PCA trained on ground truth protected attribute labels yields statistically insignificant differences.*

Statistical tests: ANOVA- Alexander-Govern: (statistic: p-val)							
Query	CLIP	MI-400-GT	MI-256-GT	MI-400-INF	MI-256-INF	FPCA-GT	FPCA-INF
				Gender			
CEO	(1554 , 0.0)	(114 , 0.0)	(56 , 0.0)	(62 , 0.0)	(41 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.758)	(23 , 0.0)
boss	(3354 , 0.0)	(612 , 0.0)	(99 , 0.0)	(552 , 0.0)	(196 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.501)	(8 , 0.003)
convict	(2519 , 0.0)	(589 , 0.0)	(39 , 0.0)	(460 , 0.0)	(90 , 0.0)	(2 , 0.127)	(12 , 0.0)
criminal	(1158 , 0.0)	(320 , 0.0)	(18 , 0.0)	(163 , 0.0)	(35 , 0.0)	(1 , 0.19)	(2 , 0.085)
drug dealer	(2503 , 0.0)	(257 , 0.0)	(3 , 0.056)	(176 , 0.0)	(34 , 0.0)	(3 , 0.055)	(19 , 0.0)
engineer	(1745 , 0.0)	(80 , 0.0)	(2 , 0.086)	(54 , 0.0)	(8 , 0.005)	(1 , 0.309)	(0 , 0.474)
genius	(822 , 0.0)	(307 , 0.0)	(5 , 0.015)	(292 , 0.0)	(31 , 0.0)	(3 , 0.065)	(14 , 0.0)
nurse	(4889 , 0.0)	(115 , 0.0)	(8 , 0.003)	(191 , 0.0)	(2 , 0.131)	(0 , 0.511)	(0 , 0.424)
prostitute	(3088 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.469)	(46 , 0.0)	(5 , 0.015)	(131 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.947)	(0 , 0.384)
secretary	(4269 , 0.0)	(212 , 0.0)	(42 , 0.0)	(315 , 0.0)	(71 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.708)	(24 , 0.0)
suspect	(1732 , 0.0)	(228 , 0.0)	(34 , 0.0)	(281 , 0.0)	(39 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.372)	(0 , 0.793)
				Race			
cleaning person	(1069 , 0.0)	(214 , 0.0)	(355 , 0.0)	(375 , 0.0)	(534 , 0.0)	(4 , 0.577)	(46 , 0.0)
director	(232 , 0.0)	(83 , 0.0)	(57 , 0.0)	(151 , 0.0)	(177 , 0.0)	(4 , 0.579)	(27 , 0.0)
engineer	(642 , 0.0)	(332 , 0.0)	(391 , 0.0)	(206 , 0.0)	(334 , 0.0)	(10 , 0.116)	(62 , 0.0)
labourer	(1349 , 0.0)	(203 , 0.0)	(374 , 0.0)	(240 , 0.0)	(380 , 0.0)	(19 , 0.003)	(180 , 0.0)
secretary	(322 , 0.0)	(105 , 0.0)	(146 , 0.0)	(96 , 0.0)	(204 , 0.0)	(5 , 0.482)	(67 , 0.0)
smart person	(741 , 0.0)	(350 , 0.0)	(155 , 0.0)	(272 , 0.0)	(250 , 0.0)	(11 , 0.071)	(50 , 0.0)
sophisticated person	(85 , 0.0)	(174 , 0.0)	(228 , 0.0)	(296 , 0.0)	(351 , 0.0)	(12 , 0.061)	(37 , 0.0)
terrorist	(642 , 0.0)	(595 , 0.0)	(564 , 0.0)	(617 , 0.0)	(590 , 0.0)	(5 , 0.514)	(202 , 0.0)



Figure 13: [Classification - DDP - Subjective - Flickr30K - OpenCLIP] These figures show DDP for classification, given by Eq. 1, using OpenCLIP on Flickr30K dataset. *It demonstrates that fair PCA based methods are the most effective in reducing bias in classification tasks.*



Figure 14: [Retrieval - DDP & Cosine similarity - Subjective - Flickr30K - OpenCLIP] These figures show DDP, given by Eq. (2), for retrieval task using OpenCLIP using Flickr30K dataset on the left, and absoulte differences in the cosine similarity between men and women for different queries on the right.

Table 16: [Retrieval - Skew - Subjective - Flickr30K - OpenCLIP] This table shows the skew metric, given by Eq. (4), using OpenCLIP model, for the gender attribute average over several image retrieval task using the Flickr data. *It shows that gender balanced queries are most effective in reducing skew.*

CLIP	MI-400-GT	MI-256-GT	MI-400-INF	MI-256-INF	Gender-BLN	FPCA-GT	FPCA-INF
			Top 10				
1.58±0.76	1.49±1.28	1.55±1.26	1.59±1.24	0.64±0.24	**0.4±0.1**	0.59±0.28	0.59±0.28
			Top 20				
1.4±0.92	0.92±0.5	0.93±0.62	0.59±0.2	0.42±0.1	**0.37±0.04**	0.5±0.16	0.46±0.18
			Top 30				
1.48±0.96	0.89±0.5	0.72±0.64	0.46±0.14	0.38±0.06	**0.34±0.04**	0.54±0.3	0.4±0.14

Table 17: [Retrieval - Statistical tests - Subjective - Flickr30K - OpenCLIP] This table shows the statistical tests for the cosine similarities among different groups of the protected groups. *Specifically, it shows the Alexander-govern statistical test which measures whether the mean of cosine similarity among different groups for a given query are statistically significant or not. It shows that fair PCA trained on ground truth protected attribute labels yields statistically insignificant differences.*

Statistical tests: ANOVA- Alexander-Govern: (statistic: p-val)							
Query	CLIP	MI-400-GT	MI-256-GT	MI-400-INF	MI-256-INF	FPCA-GT	FPCA-INF
				Gender			
boss	(958 , 0.0)	(280 , 0.0)	(63 , 0.0)	(19 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.374)	(0 , 0.364)	(52 , 0.0)
doctor	(27 , 0.0)	(2 , 0.096)	(67 , 0.0)	(10 , 0.001)	(5 , 0.017)	(0 , 0.395)	(5 , 0.019)
lawyer	(18 , 0.0)	(24 , 0.0)	(59 , 0.0)	(61 , 0.0)	(7 , 0.005)	(1 , 0.281)	(4 , 0.035)
nurse	(1396 , 0.0)	(4 , 0.037)	(5 , 0.024)	(29 , 0.0)	(1 , 0.306)	(0 , 0.612)	(5 , 0.015)
paralegal	(1112 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.608)	(0 , 0.935)	(13 , 0.0)	(12 , 0.001)	(0 , 0.909)	(21 , 0.0)
secretary	(1729 , 0.0)	(104 , 0.0)	(2 , 0.091)	(80 , 0.0)	(18 , 0.0)	(0 , 0.846)	(19 , 0.0)

Table 18: [Retreival - Precision - Objective - MSCOCO & CelebA] This table shows average precision@K for image retrieval tasks using different methods for 80 categories of MSCOCO dataset and 9 attributes of CELEBA. *It demonstrates that CLIP and fair PCA methods usually yield similar precision. On the other hand, fair sampling which is trained on MSCOCO does very well on the MSCOCO dataset but has a poor performance on CELEBA dataset. The mutual information based methods have a better performance where more dimensions of the CLIP embeddings are used.*

CLIP	MI-400-GT	MI-256-GT	MI-400-INF	MI-256-INF	Fair-Samp	FPCA-GT	FPCA-INF
			Precision@20 using MSCOCO				
0.9±0.04	0.9±0.04	0.87±0.04	0.87±0.04	0.86±0.04	**0.91±0.04**	0.9±0.04	0.9±0.04
			Precision@50 using MSCOCO				
0.86±0.04	**0.87±0.04**	0.83±0.04	0.83±0.04	0.83±0.04	**0.87±0.2**	0.86±0.04	0.86±0.04
			Precision@70 using MSCOCO				
0.85±0.04	**0.85±0.04**	0.81±0.06	0.81±0.04	0.82±0.04	**0.85±0.04**	**0.85±0.04**	0.84±0.04
			Precision @20 using CELEBA				
0.88±0.06	0.82±0.1	0.67±0.18	0.71±0.12	0.71±0.14	0.67±0.16	0.84±0.08	0.87±0.06
			Precision@50 using CelebA				
0.85±0.08	0.78±0.1	0.65±0.16	0.72±0.12	0.71±0.12	0.68±0.16	0.81±0.1	0.84±0.08
			Precision@100 using Celeba				
0.82±0.08	0.76±0.1	0.65±0.14	0.73±0.12	0.69±0.1	0.67±0.18	0.78±0.1	0.81±0.08



Figure 15: [Retrieval - DDP - Subjective - MSCOCO] The figure on the top shows DDP, given by Eq. (2), for retrieval tasks using MSCOCO dataset. *These results demonstrate bias in human-centric subjective tasks. At the bottom, we observe the fraction of query results that actually include a person. Surprisingly, for many human-related queries, the retrieved images do not feature any humans at all. Additionally, this demonstrates that the simple baseline of gendered queries perform very well in reducing disparity. However, the mutual information-based approaches, although effective in reducing disparity in some cases, fail to retrieve images containing humans. Interestingly, Fair PCA, trained on the inferred gender attribute, manages to return appropriate images while still reducing some disparity. One possible reason for this could be that the gender labels derived from the captions, which serve as ground truth, are quite noisy. In contrast, training fair PCA on on the inferred gender attribute directly from the CLIP model appears to yield better results in this context.*



Figure 16: [Classification - DDP - Subjective - MSCOCO] The figure on the top shows DDP, given by Eq. (1), for classification tasks using MSCOCO dataset. *These results show bias for human-centric subjective tasks. They demonstrate that for most methods reduce disparity across gender in classification tasks.*

How do you feel? Measuring User-Perceived Value for Rejecting Machine Decisions in Hate Speech Detection

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ABSTRACT

Hate speech moderation remains a challenging task for social media platforms. Human-AI collaborative systems offer the potential to combine the strengths of humans' reliability and the scalability of machine learning to tackle this issue effectively. While methods for task handover in human-AI collaboration exist that consider the costs of incorrect predictions, insufficient attention has been paid to accurately estimating these costs. In this work, we propose a value-sensitive rejection mechanism that automatically rejects machine decisions for human moderation based on users' value perceptions regarding machine decisions. We conduct a crowdsourced survey study with 160 participants to evaluate their perception of correct and incorrect machine decisions in the domain of hate speech detection, as well as occurrences where the system rejects making a prediction. Here, we introduce Magnitude Estimation, an unbounded scale, as the preferred method for measuring user (dis)agreement with machine decisions. Our results show that Magnitude Estimation can provide a reliable measurement of participants' perception of machine decisions. By integrating user-perceived value into human-AI collaboration, we further show that it can guide us in *1)* determining when to accept or reject machine decisions to obtain the optimal total value a model can deliver and *2)* selecting better classification models as compared to the more widely used target of model accuracy.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Human-centered computing** → **Collaborative and social computing**; **Social media**.

KEYWORDS

value-sensitive machine learning, rejection, machine confidence, crowdsourcing, human-in-the-loop, hate speech

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1 INTRODUCTION

Hateful content spread online through social media remains a significant problem. Ignoring its presence can lead to psychological harm and even result in violence and other conflicts [35, 43, 48, 50]. Governmental institutions and social media platforms are increasingly aware of these risks and are combating hate speech. For example, the European Union developed a Code of Conduct on countering hate speech [21], requesting large social media companies to moderate hate speech and report their progress yearly. However, results reported so far are not yet satisfactory, as, for example, less than 5% of hateful content has been removed from Facebook [28].

Hateful content moderation is either carried out manually or automatically by computational algorithms, where manual moderation may be more reliable but is not scalable to handle the deluge of user-generated content [38]. Further, continuous exposure to harmful content can be harmful to moderators as it can induce mental issues and potentially even lead to acts of self-harm [61]. Computational solutions are, therefore, urgently in demand by online platforms [24]. The methods considered best suited to this task are mainly based on machine learning, which has achieved reasonable performance at scale [25]. Yet, machine learning methods are far from being reliable, especially in dealing with hateful content previously unseen in the training data, which is often limited in size and biased [4]. Several recent studies on hate speech have shown a significant drop in machine learning performance when assessed on different data from those captured in the training phase [3, 32].

An approach that can combine the strengths of both previously mentioned approaches is human-AI collaboration, where humans are involved to solve AI-hard tasks, typically by taking over decisions where machines are unreliable [12, 14]. Such an approach is favorable in applications where decisions involve high-stakes and incorrect decisions can lead to damaging effects, as is the case for hate speech detection. Human-AI collaboration has been advocated in the human computation community [14, 53, 68] and, likely, is also an approach widely being used in enterprise applications

such as search and conversational agents [37]. Despite this, methods for implementing human-AI collaboration so far are limited to predefined heuristics and have largely ignored the complexity of real-world problems, especially the cost of incorrect predictions being context-dependent.

Common heuristics of task handover from machines to humans are based on machine confidence: humans take over the task when the confidence of the machine in its decision is lower than a predefined threshold [12]. Such heuristics assume that machine confidence is well-calibrated, that is, a decision with high confidence should be more likely to be reliable and vice versa. This assumption however does not hold for many machine learning models, especially deep learning models, which may indicate high confidence when decisions are incorrect or vice versa [5, 33]. An improved approach is proposed by Geifman and El-Yaniv [26] which determines the appropriate confidence threshold based on empirical evidence of machine correctness, e.g., based on the accuracy-threshold curve obtained on an empirical dataset. Such an approach, however, does not take into account the implications of right or wrong decisions. Incorrect decisions in high-stakes domains have a larger impact that, in turn, should pose a stricter constraint on accepting machine decisions, e.g., via a higher confidence threshold. Similar ideas have recently been discussed in position papers that advocate the adoption of the notion of context-dependent *value* as a replacement of accuracy, the most common metric in machine decisions assessment [13, 60]. Value, however, is an abstract term – it can be interpreted from social, ethical, or commercial perspectives [17, 29, 70] – yet the discussion on what creates value and how to measure it, specifically in a machine learning context, is limited due to it depending on the application.

In this paper, we study the problem of operationalizing value perception of machine decisions and its integration into human-AI collaboration in the specific context of hate speech detection. We start by identifying several factors that may affect the value definition, namely the selection of a specific stakeholder's standpoint and the relativity of value perception as affected by stakeholder expectation or regulation. We then operationalize user-perceived value in hate speech moderation scenarios, where a decision with a corresponding confidence has been made by a machine. To measure these perceptions, we explore several measurement scales and propose to select Magnitude Estimation (ME) [62] as the primary scale. ME allows the measurement of the magnitude of user (dis)agreement using an unbounded scale and makes it possible to obtain the relative ratios between the magnitudes of different machine decisions. These ratios are essential to determine the optimal confidence threshold for rejecting machine decisions (see section 2).

To validate ME in value operationalization, we designed a survey study where we recruited 160 participants. Each participant's perception regarding a dataset of 40 selected hateful and non-hateful tweets and their (dis)agreement regarding the corresponding machine decisions were evaluated. Through a between-subject study, we show that Magnitude Estimation returns results with significantly higher inter-rater reliability compared to other scales, showing its suitability in measuring user perception. Our results show that the inter-rater reliability is significantly higher for incorrect decisions than for correct decisions, indicating a strong consensus among participants regarding the consequences of harm, as well as disagreements on what constitutes hate online. Further, users appear to be more negatively affected when a non-hateful post is subject to moderation than when an instance of hate speech is classified as non-hateful, implying that users would rather contend with an instance of hate speech than have an innocent user punished for a non-hateful post.

To demonstrate the utility of value integration in human-AI collaboration, we evaluate the effect of rejecting machine decisions made by three machine learning-based hate speech detection models – including traditional, deep learning, and BERT-based models [19] – in handling data from both seen and unseen sources. Our results show that for all three models, when evaluated on unseen data, the optimal confidence thresholds determined by the model-delivered value are much higher than the optimal thresholds on seen data. These results confirm the findings from previous studies on machine biases and demonstrate the effectiveness of using value as a target for optimally rejecting machine decisions. We further show that when selecting the optimal model, using value as the criterion returns different results compared to using accuracy. Note, that our approach to measuring value perception can be applied to different tasks and is model-agnostic.

In summary, we make the following key contributions:

- We introduce Magnitude Estimation as a scale for measuring user perception of machine decisions in scenarios where these decisions are correct and incorrect;
- We demonstrate the applicability of Magnitude Estimation through a between-subject survey study, as well as the utility of value for optimally rejecting machine decisions;
- We contribute a set of insights into user-perceived value of automated machine decisions, especially their attitudes towards different types of (mis)classifications.

2 BACKGROUND ON VALUE-SENSITIVE REJECTION OF MACHINE DECISIONS

This section introduces the background of value-sensitive rejection of machine decisions in a hybrid human-AI workflow, based on previous work [59, 60], and subsequently identifies factors that influence value perception in hate speech detection.

2.1 Rejection for Binary Classification

We consider the general case of human-AI collaboration as follows: the machine decision can either be accepted or rejected; if rejected, the decision will be taken over by a human decision maker. Formally, consider a binary classification problem for which we have a machine learning classifier, whose output on a data item x is confidence, $\mathbf{c}$, (e.g., the output from the softmax layer of a neural network). The rejection is dependent on a threshold denoted by $\tau \in [0, 1]$, which then modifies the final output of the machine as

$$\hat{y} = \begin{cases} y, & \mathbf{c}_y \geq \tau, \\ y_r, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \tag{1}$$

where y denotes an accepted decision and y_r denotes the special decision of rejection, resulting in a human making the final decision.

We now discuss how the optimal confidence threshold for rejecting machine decisions is affected by the value formulation. We consider the binary classification case: when the machine decision

is either positive (i.e., the content is deemed hateful) or negative (i.e., non-hateful). There is a value, V, attached to each of these, depending on whether this positive or negative decision is correct or not. This results in true positive (TP), true negative (TN), false positive (FP), false negative (FN), and rejected predictions as possible outcomes. V_{TP} and V_{TN} are positive, while V_{FP}, V_{FP}, and rejected predictions, V_r, are negative (i.e., costs). The optimal threshold for positive classifications is:

$$\tau_O^p = \frac{V_{FP}}{V_{FP} - V_{TP}} = \frac{\gamma^p}{\gamma^p + 1} \tag{2}$$

if we assume $V_{FP} = -\gamma^p \cdot V_{TP}$, that is, the cost of a false positive is γ^p times worse than the value of a true positive. Similarly, in the case of negative classifications, the optimal threshold would be $\tau_O^n = \frac{\gamma^n}{\gamma^n+1}$ where $V_{FN} = -\gamma^n \cdot V_{TN}$, i.e., the cost of false negative is γ^n times worse than the value of a true negative.

When the cost of incorrect decisions is very high, i.e., $\gamma \gg 1$, the optimal confidence threshold would tend close to 1, meaning almost all machine decisions are rejected. When the cost of an incorrect decision is very low, i.e., $\gamma \approx 0$, the optimal threshold would be close to 0, and virtually all machine decisions are accepted. These results, therefore, follow our intuition. An important conclusion we can draw from equation (2) is that the optimal threshold is dependent *only on the ratio* of the value (or cost) between an incorrect decision and that of a correct one (per class).

Threshold optimization is the process of finding the threshold that maximizes value empirically. If a system is calibrated before use, simulations can be used to find the optimal theoretical threshold, which is the optimal τ that maximizes value. In this paper, τ is determined by means of calibration, done by means of temperature scaling [47], followed by a calculation of the theoretical threshold based on the crowdsourced survey data, as it allows us to quantify and compare the opinions of participants on the value of true and false predictions and thus compute the ratios for our use case.

2.2 Value Factors in Hate Speech Detection

We denote the value of classifying a data item correctly, or incorrectly, and that of rejecting a classification as V_c, V_w, and V_r, respectively. We make the following observations when considering value for hate speech detection: 1) Value is dependent not only on the machine learning model but also on the specific context to which the model is applied. For example, an incorrect prediction in the medical domain potentially has a bigger impact than one in e-commerce. In a high-stakes domain, generally, we would assume $V_c > V_r > V_w$ and thus a correct machine decision saves the cost of human moderation and accelerates the decision-making process, while a rejection requires additional human intervention. 2) Value interpretations from different stakeholders can vary. In hate speech detection, for example, a rejection of a machine decision induces the cost of human moderation from the business perspective, while from the user perspective what is more important is the exposure to hateful content. In our study, we choose to take the user's standpoint, and, as such, view V_r to come with an inherent cost since human moderation will be pending and the potentially hateful content will remain visible. 3) Value is affected by both stakeholder expectations and regulation. For example, in the hate speech detection case, when hateful content is posted, from the user's perspective, the value derived from a correct machine decision depends on the user's general expectation of how hateful content should be handled. Similarly, the legality of hate speech in certain jurisdictions may influence stakeholder perception.

Given the above observations, we now introduce the function to determine the total value, $V(\tau)$, of a given model with a reject option at the rejection threshold τ on a given dataset. Assuming that when accepted, correct decisions increase the overall value and when rejected, they decrease the overall value and vice versa, then, $V(\tau)$ may be formalized as:

$$V(\tau) = \sum_p (V_p - V_r)N_p + \sum_q (V_r - V_q)N_q, \tag{3}$$

where $p \in [TP, TN, FP, FN]$, $q \in [TP, TN, FP, FN]$, and N_p and N_q are the number of accepted and rejected data items for the difference scenarios, respectively. Note, that we assume that rejected decisions have a cost that decreases the overall value, i.e., V_r is negative, as users have to wait on a moderation decision. Thus, equation (3) allows us to summarize the value gained and the cost subtracted into a single value for the model by considering the value or cost of each scenario and how often it occurs, while also taking the cost of rejection into account.

3 SURVEY STUDY

To define the relative value of scenarios, we design a survey to ask participants the degree to which they agree or disagree with the decisions of a fictional social media platform, SocialNet. These scenarios represent TP, TN, FP, FN, and rejected predictions. The TP and TN scenarios imply that SocialNet successfully detects whether a post is hateful or not hateful, respectively. The FP scenario means that SocialNet incorrectly predicts a non-hateful post as hateful, and conversely for the FN scenario. For example, in the FN scenario, the survey shows a hateful post to the subject and explains that SocialNet did not identify the post as hate speech.

3.1 Choice of the Scale

We use ME as the primary scale. A Likert scale was initially considered, as it is widely used in research for retrieving participant opinions and is perhaps more intuitive for participants [10]. However, a Likert scale is not suitable in our case, as Likert-type items are ordinal, meaning that we only know the ranks but not the exact distances between the items [2]. In our case, computing the relative values (i.e., ratios) of our scenarios requires measuring the distances between different items, which cannot be provided by a Likert scale. On the contrary, the ME scale allows us to measure ratios by asking participants to provide numerical ratings. ME originated from psychophysics, where participants gave quantitative estimates of sensory magnitudes [62]. For sound loudness, a sound twice as loud as the previous one, should ideally receive a rating twice as large.

Researchers have previously applied the ME scale to different physical stimuli (e.g. line length, brightness, or duration) and proved that the results are reproducible, as well as that the data has ratio properties [46]. Other works have shown that the ME technique is also helpful for rating abstract types of stimuli, such as judging the relevance of documents [42], the linguistic acceptability of

sentences [7], and the usability of system interfaces [45]. Thus, we conclude that ME is a promising method for judging hate speech.

3.2 Normalization and Validation of the Scale

The ME scale is unbounded. For example, suppose we first show a scenario and the participant provides a value (e.g., 100) to indicate the degree of agreement. Suppose we next present a scenario that the participant agrees with more. The participant can always provide a higher value (e.g., 125) and not be restricted within a fixed range. The results need to be normalized as different participants rate the agreement/disagreement degree differently.

Multiple solutions exist for normalizing the ME scale, such as modulus normalization, which uses geometric averaging to preserve the ratio information [45, 46]. Unlike the unipolar ME scales used in previous research [7, 45], we use bipolar scales. Using arithmetic averaging is inappropriate since it uses logarithmic calculations and would disrupt the ratio scale properties [46]. Therefore, we normalize the results by dividing the magnitude estimates of each subject by their maximum estimate. We multiply the normalized magnitude estimates by 100 for the sake of clarity. This way, all magnitudes estimates are in the range $[-100, 100]$ while maintaining their ratio properties.

Most previous research using the ME scale applies validation, such as cross-modality validation, where estimated magnitudes are compared to the physical stimuli using correlation analysis [7]. Cross-modality validation is difficult in domains that do not have exact measures of stimuli, such as hate speech. Some previous work compared ME with other validated scales [42]. In our case, we use the 100-level scale to validate the ME scale by analyzing their correlation [57], which is a form of convergent validation [22].

3.3 Participants and Data

We use Prolific to recruit crowd workers for the study.[1] Participants need to be at least 18 years of age, be fluent in English, and have an approval rating of over 90%. Participants also need to have experience using a social media platform regularly (at least once a month). Every participant is paid an hourly wage of 9 GBP, exceeding the UK minimum wage at the time of the study. Regarding sample size, we recruit 24 participants for the pilot study and 136 participants for the official study. Of the recruited participants, 50% identified as female, though Gold and Zesch [30] showed that there is no significant difference when perceiving hate between genders. Half of the participants are assigned the ME scale and the other half the 100-level scale. We choose a 90% Confidence Interval (CI) and 10% Margin of Error (MoE) for this study due to budget limitations. There are billions of social media users, and according to Müller et al. [49], we need a sample size of 68 participants per measurement scale, i.e., 136 participants, to reach the desired CI and MoE.

The final dataset consists of 20 hateful and 20 non-hateful social media posts from a public dataset [8] to build the machine decision scenarios (TP, TN, FP, FN, and rejection). The dataset contains 13,000 English tweets, and each tweet is annotated with three categories: hate speech (yes/no), target (group/individual), and aggressiveness (yes/no). We first exclude tweets that are replies or contained mentions or URLs since they have unclear contexts. Finally, we use clustering analysis to select 40 tweets for our study. We use a cluster size of 20 for the non-hateful tweets and sample one tweet per cluster by taking the nearest sample to each cluster centroid to obtain each cluster's most representative tweets. For the hateful tweets, we first divide them into four groups using the target and aggressiveness categories. Similarly, for each hateful tweet group, we use a cluster size of 5 and sample one tweet per cluster. We perform latent semantic analysis (LSA), which is a combination of term frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) and Singular Value Decomposition (SVD), and k-means clustering on each group of tweets. We calculate the silhouette coefficient to determine the optimal cluster size (k value) for the neutral tweets and the four groups of hateful tweets. We manually select one tweet per cluster using a majority vote from three members of our group to choose representative tweets and create the final set of 40 tweets.

Additional information on the study's variables, pilot study, demographics, as well as example tasks may be found in appendix A.

3.4 Procedure and Data Quality Control

The survey first presents the informed consent policy and excludes participants that do not agree with it. Next, introductory texts are shown to explain the possible machine decisions. In the case of using the ME scale, participants are presented with a warm-up task to estimate different line lengths. Then, the survey asks 40 randomly shuffled question sets regarding the TP, TN, FP, FN, and rejection scenarios (with 8 question sets per scenario). The first question is about whether participants think the post is hateful (yes/no). The second question is whether participants agree or disagree with the decision made by the machine, which may be correct or incorrect, or are neutral towards it. In the case of a non-neutral decision, the survey asks the third question about the degree to which participants agree or disagree with the machine's decisions, using either the ME or 100-level scale, depending on their group. There is no time limit for the survey.

In the middle of the question sets, we use two Instructional Manipulation Checks to determine if the user is paying attention[2]. These attention checks ask participants to select a specific option from multiple choices (e.g., "You must select Orange"). We exclude responses from the participants who fail the attention checks or do not complete all questions. For the ME scale, we discard responses that do not perform well in the line length warm-up task.

3.5 Analysis

We first compute the values for the TP, TN, FP, FN, and rejection scenarios using the survey study data. For both scales, we convert disagreement (with the machine decision) ratings to negative values, neutral stances to 0, and agreement ratings to positive values. We apply convergent validity, in which a correlation analysis between different scales (i.e., the ME and 100-level scales) is conducted to determine if they measure the same phenomenon [22]. We expect a medium-large correlation between both scales, meaning that ME responses small in magnitude should correspond to 100-level scale responses small in magnitude and vice versa. Finally, we analyze reliability, which determines whether we can trust our results and

[1] Approved by the ethics committee of our organization.

[2] Prolific's Attention and Comprehension Check Policy

	ME		S100	
	α	v	α	v
TP	0.07	18.15	0.04	77.00
TN	0.10	36.32	0.11	86.31
FP	0.39	-16.69	0.07	-51.00
FN	0.92	-28.08	0.14	-62.43
Rejection	-0.31	-4.82	0.07	-16.37
All	0.78	—	0.44	—

Table 1: Krippendorff's alpha (α) and the scenario values (v) for TP, TN, FP, FN, and rejection scenarios. ME refers to Magnitude Estimation, and S100 refers to the 100-level scale.



Figure 1: Correlation plot between the median normalized magnitude estimates and the median 100-level scores per question, showing agreement and disagreement.

achieve consistent outcomes [22]. In our case, we use inter-rater reliability to investigate whether different subjects give approximately the same judgments to the same scenarios and, thus, whether the degree to which hate speech is subjective. It is measured using Krippendorff's alpha, which we calculate using the normalized ME and 100-level values for all scenarios.

4 RESULTS

4.1 Reliability and Validity

First, for each survey question set, we calculate the median of all responses. This step yields 40 values (eight values per scenario). We use the median since data from both scales are highly skewed. Then, we calculate the mean of the values ($V_{TP}, V_{TN}, V_{FP}, V_{FN}, V_r$) within each scenario, giving us the final five values for the TP, TN, FP, FN, and rejection cases. The results for both scales can be seen in table 1. The total value, V, is calculated at a later point in this section using the different values.

We calculate Krippendorff's alpha to measure the inter-rater reliability of all scenarios for each scale, as shown in table 1. The last row of the table contains the α values for the entire scale, measuring the inter-rater reliability for all answers. We observe that the ME scale has high inter-rater reliability while the 100-level scale is less reliable. Also, participants using the ME scale tend to exhibit higher agreement regarding the FP and FN cases and systematically disagree on the rejected cases. For the 100-level scale, we observe that participants have low agreement on all scenarios.

We analyze the validity of the ME scale by comparing the median normalized magnitude estimates with the median 100-level scores for each question set. Figure 1 presents the correlation plot between the two scales. A Shapiro-Wilk test indicates that the data of both scales do not follow a normal distribution ($p < 0.05$). Thus, we use the Spearman and Kendall rank correlation coefficients since these are non-parametric tests. Spearman returned a 0.98 and Kendall a 0.89 correlation between the ME and the 100-level scales ($p < 0.05$). Finally, a Mann-Whitney U test between the ME and 100-level scales gives a large p-value, indicating no statistically significant difference between the two scales.

4.2 Total Model Value due to Threshold

We evaluate the $V(\tau)$ function (i.e., the value at different rejection thresholds) using the values from the survey study obtained using the ME scale. We train three different binary hate speech classification models on the Waseem and Hovy [67] dataset. The used models are Logistic Regression (LR) with Character N-gram [67], a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) based on Agrawal and Awekar [1], and a DistilBERT transformer [58]. We use Temperature Scaling to calibrate the CNN and the DistilBERT models following the approach from Guo et al. [33]. The model predictions are based on two different test datasets: the *seen* dataset and the *unseen* dataset. The *seen* dataset is the test set of Waseem and Hovy [67] and the *unseen* dataset is a test set from a separate but similar source [8]. We use the *unseen* dataset to simulate how the models would perform in a more challenging, realistic use case. Using unseen data that is similar but separate from the training set, we also investigate the impact of bias. Finally, we calculate the total value as a function of the threshold, $V(\tau)$, for all models with the reject option at all possible rejection thresholds (τ). When $\tau \in [0.0, 0.5]$, all predictions are accepted since the confidence of all predictions is above 0.5 in the case of binary classification. On the other hand, $\tau = 1.0$ implies that all predictions are rejected. We use the v values of the ME scale from table 1 to plot the results of all three models in figures 2a and 2b using equation (3). The diamond-shaped markers indicate the optimal confidence thresholds for rejection at which the model achieves the highest total value.

Participants ascribe higher absolute values to TP and TN scenarios compared to FP and FN ones (see table 1), which results in all but one model having the highest value when all predictions are accepted (see figures 2a and 2b). The rejection rates (i.e., the percentage of rejected predictions) and accuracies of accepted predictions at the optimal threshold across the three classifiers can be seen in the first two rows of table 2. If we were to take the view that the users' baseline expectation is correct machine decisions, then we can set the value of TP and TN to 0.0 and repeat our analysis to examine how $V(\tau)$ behaves as we consider only punishing incorrect predictions without rewarding correct predictions made

	LR			DistilBERT			CNN		
	τ	Acc	RR	τ	Acc	RR	τ	Acc	RR
Seen data	0.500	0.853	0.000	0.500	0.853	0.000	0.500	0.845	0.000
Unseen data	0.531	0.646	0.043	0.500	0.643	0.000	0.500	0.624	0.000
Seen data ($V_{TP}=0, V_{TN}=0$)	0.829	0.925	0.316	0.786	0.923	0.202	0.815	0.934	0.299
Unseen data ($V_{TP}=0, V_{TN}=0$)	0.999	0.818	0.991	0.974	1.000	0.996	0.961	0.833	0.980

Table 2: The optimal rejection thresholds (τ), the accuracy of the accepted predictions (Acc), and rejection rates (RR) of all models for both datasets using the values from the survey.

	LR		DistilBERT		CNN	
	$V(\tau_O)$	Acc	$V(\tau_O)$	Acc	$V(\tau_O)$	Acc
Seen data	45534	0.853	45250	0.853	44893	0.845
Unseen data	18563	0.631	19132	0.643	18385	0.624
Seen data ($V_{TP}=0, V_{TN}=0$)	4325	0.853	5172	0.853	5460	0.845
Unseen data ($V_{TP}=0, V_{TN}=0$)	4404	0.631	4213	0.643	5291	0.624

Table 3: The total values $V(\tau_O)$ and the accuracies (Acc) of all models. Here, τ_O is the optimal rejection threshold.



(a) evaluated on *seen* data **(b) evaluated on *unseen* data**

Figure 2: $V(\tau)$ curves of all models with v of TP=18.15, TN=36.32, FP=-16.69, FN=-28.08, and rejection=4.82.



(a) evaluated on *seen* data **(b) evaluated on *unseen* data**

Figure 3: $V(\tau)$ curves of all models with v of TP=0.0, TN=0.0, FP=-16.69, FN=-28.08, and rejection=4.82.

by the model (considering the regulation effect discussed in section 2). Figures 3a and 3b demonstrate that the optimal values are achieved at increased rejection thresholds (τ). The last two rows of table 2 show that the optimal τ values result in higher accuracies for the *seen* data while rejecting 31.6% of predictions. For the *unseen* data, we achieve high accuracies but reject a large fraction of the predictions.

We also compare the effect of using value and the widely-used accuracy metric in selecting the best model, shown in table 3. We observe that both metrics return the same optimal model when correct predictions are rewarded, though there is a difference between *seen* and *unseen* cases. When only incorrect predictions are punished, the optimal models are different as measured by the two metrics: in the case of *seen* data, both LR and DistilBERT perform better than CNN when measured by accuracy, while CNN delivers the highest value; the same observation holds true in the case of *unseen* data – where the optimal model switches from DistilBERT to CNN when we consider the value they deliver instead of accuracy.

5 DISCUSSION

5.1 Value Ratios, Reliability, and Validity

Our results show that TP and TN scenarios are highly valued. Participants seem to value correct predictions more than incorrect predictions across all scenarios, regardless of whether they are positive or negative. The value of rejected predictions is the closest to 0 (neutral), as expected, due to them not contributing any benefit or harm, but just delaying the publishing of the post due to the additional human moderation effort. For both scales, we observe the same relation of scenarios in terms of values (FN<FP<Rejection<TP<TN). The fact that correct decisions receive higher value ratings indicates strong user appreciation of correct machine decisions. The value of FN having a larger magnitude than the value of FP is noteworthy, as users appear to be more negatively affected when a non-hateful post is subject to moderation than when an instance of hate speech is classified as non-hateful. This implies that users would rather contend with an instance of hate speech than have an innocent user punished for a non-hateful post. This phenomenon may be explained by the Blackstone principle from the domain of criminal law: "Better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer" [20]. However, we do consider it surprising that the value of TN is greater than the value of TP. One possible reason could be

that people disagree more on what is considered hateful among the TP scenarios. We also encountered this phenomenon in the survey results where most people rated TN cases as non-hateful, while for the TP cases there were more disagreements.

Regarding reliability, Krippendorff's alpha, α, for the 100-level scale being lower than the one for the ME scale is unexpected, as the 100-level scale is bounded with fewer possible options. The stronger agreement for the ME scale indicates that it is indeed suitable for this task. Since α compares the expected difference with the observed difference, it follows that the alpha values for the entire scale should be greater than for the individual scenarios. Generally, participants tend to have low agreement on TP, TN, and rejection cases while they have a high agreement regarding the FP and FN cases. Users tend to agree more regarding what constitutes a misclassified instance than what constitutes a correctly classified instance. For the ME scale, we even observe systematic disagreement for the rejection case, as can be seen by its negative α value. This indicates that users are lower in agreement than one would expect by chance, showing the wide variety of opinions regarding rejection cases by users. By considering all answers, instead of answers for certain scenarios, we observe a greatly increased α, as the observed difference between ratings is closer to the difference expected by chance. For example, participants tend to agree on the classification of a single scenario, e.g. TP, but may give different values on both scales, resulting in lower α for the scenario but greater α across all scenarios. Beyond this, the low reliability for the positive compared to negative predictions indicates that participants disagree on what constitutes hate speech in the first place.

Regarding validity, we observe a strong correlation between scales, demonstrating that the ME scale is validated for measuring people's opinions about different hate speech detection scenarios. The almost S-shaped curve for the data points in figure 1 is due to the lower and upper bounds of the 100-level scale that restrict the participants' choices, making them more likely to assign the lowest or highest value. Meanwhile, the data points corresponding to the ME scale are skewed towards 0 because of the normalization.

5.2 Value Function for Rejection

The purpose of the reject option is to reject predictions where the risk of an incorrect prediction is too high. However, when we use all values obtained from the survey to measure the value function $V(\tau)$, the total value of a model with a reject option is maximized by accepting all predictions. As shown in figures 2a and 2b, values are positive at the beginning, decline steadily as the rejection threshold increases, and eventually become negative as more predictions are rejected. This observation is not surprising, as the absolute values of correct predictions are greater than the absolute values of incorrect predictions (see table 1).

However, instead of rewarding correct predictions, we believe it is more critical to emphasize penalizing incorrect predictions, as hate speech should be moderated effectively to minimize harm. To study the effects of this we also analyze the behavior of $V(\tau)$ when users do not experience an increase in value through correct classifications, i.e. TP and TN. To achieve this, we set the scenario values v of TP and TN equal to zero. This results in correct predictions effectively only increasing the total value by the v of rejection when accepted and decreasing when rejected, as can be seen in equation (3). The result in figure 3a shows a steady increase in value before it peaks for each of the three models, eventually falling again and becoming negative as almost all predictions are rejected. Hence, there is a strong incentive to reject some (but not all) predictions for the *seen* data. At the points where values are maximized, we found an optimal balance between accepting and rejecting predictions. Figure 3b shows that the values continually rise for all three models, only peaking as the rejection threshold approaches 1. This indicates that the model is very uncertain regarding its predictions for the *unseen* data, which may be expected. Initially, at the 0.5 rejection threshold, the value is negative as all predictions are accepted. When the rejection threshold increases, the value rises steadily since too many incorrect predictions are made. This indicates that the model is not performing well at the task (i.e., high confidence false predictions), and thus the optimal condition to reject most predictions makes the unviable model.

The results show that by penalizing incorrect predictions without rewarding correct predictions, a significant fraction of the predictions can be accepted from all three models. For unseen data, however, very few predictions from these models can be accepted and the majority are rejected. Such a result confirms the bias in the dataset as also found in previous studies [3, 32]. The results also show the utility of value as a metric in guiding the decision on when to reject machine predictions. Value utility is further confirmed in the results in table 3 from our experiment on optimal model selection: the best model selected by value is different compared to using accuracy as the metric.

5.3 Findings, Implications, and Limitations

Our survey study uncovers several interesting findings. First, social media users are more appreciative of correct decisions made by the platform, with an absolute magnitude higher than the (negative) perception of incorrect decisions. Among the correct decisions, users especially appreciate that non-hateful content is correctly identified and not banned. On the other hand, users show a much higher agreement on the negative value of incorrect decisions than correct ones, indicating a strong consensus over the harm (from both identifying hateful content to be non-hateful, and vice versa). These results indicate that while users appreciate correct decisions, minimizing incorrect decisions remains an important task for social media platforms. On the methodological side, we also believe our proposal of using ME for rating human perception can be particularly relevant for research that aims to tackle social science problems through quantitative approaches, like machine learning.

By integrating value as a parameter into the human-AI collaboration framework for rejecting machine decisions, we show that value can help guide the decision of when to accept machine decisions to reach the optimal value a model can deliver. By showing how the number of acceptable machine decisions changes when the model is applied to a dataset different from the training data, our results confirm findings from previous research that such datasets are biased and hence the trained models are as well. Our results also show that when considering value as an optimization target, the best model selected can be different compared with using accuracy as the metric. We believe these findings can benefit the research

community and industry alike, as they present a novel way of using a value-sensitive reject option to increase the utility of human-AI collaboration across domains.

Our work is limited to a relatively small sample size (68 subjects per scale). We expect the results to be more reliable at a larger sample size. Besides, optimal confidence threshold determination relies heavily on empirical data, which may not be available in real applications. An easier way for selecting the optimal threshold would be using well-calibrated models, for which the optimal threshold is only dependent on the human-perceived value. Although techniques such as Temperature Scaling can help improve the calibration of existing neural networks or transformer models such as DistilBERT, we still observe that all models are predisposed to producing high-confidence errors. Finally, due to taking the users' standpoint, we do not fully capture the cost of the moderation team being exposed to hate speech. We leave this as possible future work.

6 RELATED WORK

6.1 Hate Speech Detection

Online hate speech content refers to "online messages demeaning people on the basis of their race/ethnicity, gender, national origin, or sexual preference" [41]. Its characterizing features are properties of the target of the language, as compared to other types of online conflictual languages, which are defined by the intention of the author such as cyberbullying or flaming [11, 54]. A large body of discussion can be found on conflictual languages from social sciences, political science, and computer science [44, 63, 66]. Hate speech-related research in computer science has identified mismatches between the formalization of hateful content and how people perceive such languages [4]. These mismatches conceptually are further reflected in the technical biases of the machine learning systems used for filtering hateful content. For instance, Gröndahl et al. [32] found that F1 scores were reduced by up to 69% when training a hate speech detection model on one dataset and evaluating it using another dataset from a similar source. Similarly, Arango et al. [3] found that most research in hate speech detection overestimates the performance of the automated methods due to dataset bias. In response to these findings, our work aims to explore a human-AI collaborative approach for effective hate speech detection.

6.2 Human-AI Collaboration and Rejection

Human-AI collaboration aims to exploit the complementarity between the cognitive ability of humans and the scalability of machines to solve complex tasks at scale [6, 65]. Some work proposed new ways of collaboration, such as learning crowd vote aggregation models from features of the crowd task [36] and leveraging crowds to learn features of ML models [15, 56]. Recent work has shifted attention to human involvement in providing interpretations of model decisions and evaluating these interpretations [40, 55].A notable idea for hybrid human-AI decision-making was recently proposed by Callaghan et al. [12]: humans are involved after a machine decision is observed to have low confidence. Following works can be categorized in several dimensions, namely *when* rejection happens, on *what models*, and based on *what criteria* [34]. Regarding the "when", rejection can be implemented in three ways: the preemptive way where whether a data item needs to be handled by a human is decided beforehand [16]; the integrated way which uses a rejector inside the machine learning model (e.g., a rejection layer in a neural network) to decide whether a decision should be rejected [27]; and the dependent way, which is also the most common, which analyzes the rejection option after model decisions [18, 26, 31]. In terms of "what models", work has been done on rejecting decisions made by a range of models, such as SVMs [16, 31] and different neural networks [18, 27]. In our case, we apply the dependent way to reject models that are based on neural networks. In terms of "what criteria", Geifman and El-Yaniv [26] proposed a rejection function based on a predefined risk value, an idea also explored in [51]. But unlike ours, their proposals do not consider the impact of machine decisions in a specific context. The most relevant proposal to our work is from De Stefano et al. [18], who studied a confidence metric for determining the optimal rejection threshold. In their work, the threshold is calculated with simulations based on a set of predictions. Going beyond defining cost values from simulations, our approach determines cost values based on users' perception of machine decisions using a survey study with crowd workers.

6.3 Value Assessment and Measurement

Value is generally defined as desirable properties of an entity [9]. Specifically for machine learning systems Yurrita et al. [69] have identified relevant properties, including individual empowerment, conservation, universalism, and openness. Examples include outlining ethical principles of algorithmic systems [23], developing value-based assessment frameworks [69], and proposing new metrics for evaluating machine learning systems that incorporate value parameters [13]. However, a research gap in measuring value in social contexts has been identified by Olteanu et al. [52], who investigated human-centered metrics for machine learning evaluation in hate speech detection. Their work highlights the gap between accuracy-based evaluation metrics and user perception. Our work represents a first step towards filling the gap in the context of hate speech detection using ME with a crowdsourced survey.

7 CONCLUSIONS

This paper studies the operationalization and integration of value into human-AI collaboration for hate speech detection. We introduce a value-sensitive rejection mechanism for machine decisions that takes into account the implications of decisions from a user-centered standpoint. We propose ME to measure users' value perception regarding different hate speech detection scenarios. To validate ME, we design a survey study, showing that it can provide a reliable, human-centered assessment of the value a machine learning model delivers. Our survey study uncovers a series of interesting findings on user perception. In particular, participants appreciate correct decisions made by the platform, while they show a strong consensus over the harm of incorrect decisions. Our results show that value assessment performed by means of ME can guide us to select the best confidence threshold for rejecting machine decisions, thereby maximizing model value and potentially leading to a different best model than when using accuracy.

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A SURVEY

A.1 Variables

The independent variables are the possible scenarios (TP, TN, FP, FN, and rejection). We inform participants in the survey that when hate speech is detected, SocialNet ranks the hateful post lower so that it takes much more effort for the users to find the post. For the rejection scenario, we inform the participants in the survey that a moderator needs to check the post within 24 hours, and meanwhile, the post remains visible.The design decision of using 24 hours is based on the German NetzDG law, which allows the government to fine social media platforms if they do not remove illegal hate speech within 24 hours [64]. Our study has two control variables: the measurement scales and the content of posts. Regarding scales, as described before, we choose ME as our primary scale and use the 100-level scale for validation. Our dependent variables are reliability, validity, and value ratios. We use Krippendorff's alpha to compute reliability, where a value equal to or larger than 0.8 and 0.6 indicates reliable and tentative conclusions, respectively [39, 42]. Regarding validity, we use convergent validity [22] between the two scales to assess if they measure the same phenomenon. The value ratio variable describes the perceived value of the scenarios, which is measured by calculating the median of the normalized magnitude estimates of each decision scenario.

A.2 Demographics

We perform a demographic analysis regarding the sex, student status, continent of residence, nationality, language, and ethnicity of our participants to study whether there are statistical differences in how they perceive hate speech. We have multiple groups for nationality, ethnicity, and language and two groups for the features of student status, sex, and continent of residence (since only two continents were present in the demographic data of all participants).

Table 4 shows the group differences for the aggregated scenario types (TP, TN, FP, FN, and REJ) and highlights the p values that differ substantially. We found the most significant differences across all scenarios for different nationalities and languages of participants.

A.3 Pilot Study

We conducted a pilot study with 24 participants to test the survey and estimate the required completion time. The pilot study showed low inter-rater reliability, which may be due to unmatched expectations and unclear scenario descriptions. Initially, our scenarios mentioned that machine-detected hateful posts would be removed, which could be controversial. Thus, we changed scenarios to rank the hateful posts lower on the feed. Moreover, we added more lengthy descriptions to explain the potential consequences of all scenarios in a neutral tone, which prepares the participants to focus on evaluating harm (instead of giving rewards).

A.4 Example Tasks

WARNING: GRAPHIC LANGUAGE.

A.4.1 FN scenario with ME scale.

Suppose we have the following post:
"I want this stupid bitch out of my head I've never even liked her lmao I just basically want to rape her" (from Basile et al. [8])

Question 1:
Please indicate whether you feel that this post is hateful or not hateful.
Select input with options: 'hateful' or 'not hateful'

Question 2:
You are a user of the SocialNet platform and just saw this post on your main feed because SocialNet's automated detection system is confident that it is not hateful.

- This post remains visible on other people's main feeds as well.

	Two groups			More than two groups		
	Sex	**Student**	**Continent**	**Nationality**	**Language**	**Ethnicity**
TP	0.302	**0.032**	0.286	0.218	0.109	0.242
TN	0.726	0.379	0.204	0.190	0.216	0.281
FP	0.699	0.933	0.073	**0.020**	**0.040**	**0.037**
FN	0.961	0.150	0.847	0.478	0.438	0.584
REJ	0.835	0.625	0.496	0.271	0.103	0.068

Table 4: Statistical differences between different groups of participants for various demographic characteristics for each aggregated scenario type in the ME survey. Each cell contains the p value of either the Mann-Whitney U test for two groups or the Kruskal-Wallis test for more than two groups. Bold text indicates significant statistical differences.

- If the post is hateful after all, then the detection system was incorrect. This hateful post is now visible on people's main feeds with the consequence that they can get harmed.
- If the post is indeed not hateful, then the detection system was correct.
- You should be aware that it is expected for SocialNet to correctly classify hate speech. Wrong classifications are undesirable as they may cause harm to people.

Please indicate whether you agree, disagree, or are neutral about SocialNet's decision.
Select input with options: 'agree', 'neutral', or 'disagree'.

Question 3 (only visible when 'agree' or 'disagree' are selected):
Please indicate how much you agree/disagree with SocialNet's decision using any positive number.
Show ME input field that allows all positive values greater than 0.

A.4.2 FP scenario with 100-level scale.

Suppose we have the following post: *"Ontario concerns were not listened at immigration meeting in Ottawa For illegal crossing"* (from Basile et al. [8])

Question 1:
Please indicate whether you feel that this post is hateful or not hateful.
Select input with options: 'hateful' or 'not hateful'

Question 2:
You are a user of the SocialNet platform and have not seen this post on your main feed because SocialNet's automated detection system is confident that it is hateful.

- You can still find this post when you scroll down your feed since SocialNet ranks hateful posts lower.
- If the post is not hateful after all, then the detection system was incorrect. This neutral post is now ranked lower on people's feeds with the consequence that the post cannot easily reach the author's followers.
- If the post is indeed hateful, then the detection system was correct.
- You should be aware that it is expected for SocialNet to correctly classify hate speech. Wrong classifications are undesirable as they may cause harm to people.

Please indicate whether you agree, disagree, or are neutral about SocialNet's decision. **Select input with options: 'agree', 'neutral', or 'disagree'.**

Question 3 (only visible when 'agree' or 'disagree' are selected):
Please indicate how much you agree/disagree with SocialNet's decision using any positive number from 1 to 100. If you feel neutral about SocialNet's decision, select neutral in the field above.
Show a numerical slider with values between 1 and 100.

A.4.3 Rejection scenario with 100-level scale.

Suppose we have the following post: *"Ever been so hungover that your stomach feels like it's eating itself"* (from Basile et al. [8])

Question 1:
Please indicate whether you feel that this post is hateful or not hateful.
Select input with options: 'hateful' or 'not hateful'

Question 2:
You are a user of the SocialNet platform and just saw this post on your main feed because SocialNet's automated detection system was not confident enough in whether it was hateful or not.

- An internal human moderator at SocialNet needs to look at it within at most 24 hours.
- Meanwhile, the post remains visible on people's main feeds.

Please indicate whether you agree, disagree, or are neutral about SocialNet's decision.
Select input with options: 'agree', 'neutral', or 'disagree'.

Question 3 (only visible when 'agree' or 'disagree' are selected):
Please indicate how much you agree/disagree with SocialNet's decision using any positive number.
Show a numerical slider with values between 1 and 100.

GATE: A Challenge Set for Gender-Ambiguous Translation Examples

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ABSTRACT

Although recent years have brought significant progress in improving translation of unambiguously gendered sentences, translation of ambiguously gendered input remains relatively unexplored. When source gender is ambiguous, machine translation models typically default to stereotypical gender roles, perpetuating harmful bias. Recent work has led to the development of "gender rewriters" that generate alternative gender translations on such ambiguous inputs, but such systems are plagued by poor linguistic coverage. To encourage better performance on this task we present and release GATE, a linguistically diverse corpus of gender-ambiguous source sentences along with multiple alternative target language translations. We also provide tools for evaluation and system analysis when using GATE and use them to evaluate our translation rewriter.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies** → **Artificial intelligence**; • **Human-centered computing**;

KEYWORDS

machine translation, gender bias, social biases

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1 INTRODUCTION

Gender is expressed differently across different languages. For example, in English the word *lawyer* could refer to either a male or female individual, but in Spanish, *abogada* and *abogado* would be used to refer to a female or a male lawyer respectively. This frequently leads to situations where in order to produce a single translation, a translator or machine translation (MT) model tends to choose an arbitrary gender to assign to an animate entity in translation output where it was not implied by the source. In this paper, we refer to this phenomenon as *arbitrary gender marking* and to such entities as Arbitrarily Gender-Marked Entities (AGMEs).

Translation with arbitrary gender marking is a significant issue in MT because these arbitrary gender assignments often align with stereotypes, perpetuating harmful societal bias [3, 19]. For example, MT models will commonly translate the following (from English to Spanish):

$$\textit{The surgeon} \xRightarrow{MT} \textit{El cirujano (m)}$$

$$\textit{The nurse} \xRightarrow{MT} \textit{La enfermera (f)}$$

Progress has been made to remedy this using a "gender rewriter" – a system that transforms a single translation with some set of gender assignments for AGMEs into a complete set of translations that covers all valid sets of gender assignments for a source sentence into the target language [14]. Using a rewriter:

The surgeon

⇓ MT

El cirujano (m)

⇓ rewriter

La cirujana (f)
El cirujano (m)

Although a step in the right direction, these rewriters often have poor linguistic coverage and only work correctly in simpler cases. Google Translate has publicly released such a system for a subset of supported languages, and we observe two error cases[1]:

(1) It does not rewrite when necessary: *The director was astonished by the response of the community.* produces only one translation corresponding to masculine director.
(2) It rewrites partially, or incorrectly: *I'd rather be a nurse than a lawyer* produces two translations but only lawyer is reinflected for gender (nurse is feminine in both).

To facilitate improvement in coverage and accuracy of such rewriters and reduce bias in translation, we release GATE[2], a test corpus containing gender-ambiguous translation examples from English (en) into three Romance languages [23]: Spanish (es), French

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[1] as observed on Mar 6, 2023
[2] Data and evaluation code available at https://github.com/MicrosoftTranslator/GATE

(fr) and Italian (it). Each English source sentence[3] is accompanied by one target language translation for each possible combination of masculine and feminine gender assignments of AGMEs [4]:

I know ***a Turk*** *who lives in Paris.*
⇓ it
Conosco una turca che vive a Parigi. (f)
Conosco un turco che vive a Parigi. (m)

GATE is constructed to be challenging, morphologically rich and linguistically diverse. It has ∼ 2000 translation examples for each target language, and each example is annotated with linguistic properties (coreferent entities, parts of speech, etc.). We additionally propose a set of metrics to use when evaluating gender rewriters.

This corpus was developed with the help of bilingual linguists with significant translation experience for each of our target languages (henceforth *linguists*). Each is a native speaker in their respective target language. We spoke in depth with our linguists about the nuances of gender-related phenomena in our focus languages and we share our analysis of the relevant aspects and how they impact our work and the task of gender rewriting.

Along with the corpus, we also provide tools for evaluation and system analysis when using GATE and use them to evaluate our own translation rewriter.

2 RELATED WORK

A slew of challenge sets has been proposed for evaluating gender bias in Machine Translation.

MuST-SHE [2, 18] comprises approximately 1,000 triplets consisting of audio, transcript, and reference translations for en-es, en-fr, and en-it. Each triplet is classified based on the gender of the speaker or explicit gender markers, such as pronouns, as either masculine or feminine. Furthermore, the dataset contains an alternative incorrect reference translation for every correct reference translation that alters the gender-marked words.

WinoMT [19] is a challenge set that comprises English sentences containing two animate nouns, one of which is coreferent with a gendered pronoun. Based on the context provided in the sentence, a human can easily identify which animate noun is coreferent and thus deduce the gender of the person described by that noun. By evaluating the frequency with which an MT system generates a translation with the correct gender for that animate noun, one can measure the extent to which the system depends on gender stereotypes rather than relevant context.

SimpleGEN [16] on the English-Spanish (en-es) and English-German (en-de) language pairs. It includes a test set consisting of short sentences with straightforward syntactic structures. Each source sentence includes an occupation noun and a clear indication of the gender of the person described by that noun. In other words, the source sentence provides all the necessary information for a model to generate occupation nouns with the correct gender.

The Translated Wikipedia Biographies[5] dataset comprises 138 documents containing human translations of Wikipedia biographies from English to Spanish and German. Each document comprises 8-15 sentences, providing a context for gender disambiguation evaluation across sentences.

MT-GenEval [5] is a dataset that includes gender-balanced, counterfactual data in eight language pairs. The dataset ensures that the gender of individuals is unambiguous in the input segment, and it comprises multi-sentence segments that necessitate inter-sentential gender agreement.

Regarding the work on addressing ambiguously gendered inputs, [8] tackle translation of ambiguous input by treating it as a gender classification and reinflection task when translating English into Arabic. Their approach focuses on the first-person singular cases. Given a gender-ambiguous source sentence and its translation, their system generates an alternative translation using the opposite gender. Additionally, they create a parallel corpus of first-person singular Arabic sentences that are annotated with gender information and reinflected accordingly. [1] expand on the work of [8] by adding second person targets to the Arabic Parallel Gender Corpus, as well as increasing the total number of sentences.

Google Translate announced[6] an effort to address gender bias for ambiguously gendered inputs by showing both feminine and masculine translations. They support this feature for English to Spanish translation, as well as several gender-neutral languages into English.

Regarding debiasing in the monolingual context, [24] propose a generative model capable of converting sentences inflected in masculine form to those inflected in feminine form, and vice versa, in four morphologically rich languages. Their work focuses on animate nouns.

In terms of rewriting text in English, [21] and [20] propose rule-based and neural rewriting models, respectively, that are capable of generating gender-neutral sentences.

3 LINGUISTIC BACKGROUND

3.1 Gender in Romance Languages

In Spanish, French and Italian, all nouns have a grammatical gender – either masculine or feminine. For inanimate objects, this gender is fixed and often arbitrary; for example, in French, *chaise* (chair) is feminine, while *canapé* (couch) is masculine. When a noun or pronoun refers to an animate entity, its grammatical gender will, with some notable exceptions, match the referential gender of that entity. [23]

In these languages, referential gender of entities is frequently marked through morphology of an animate noun (e.g. *en-es*: *lawyer* ⇒ *abogada* (f), *abogado* (m)) or through agreement with gendered determiners, adjectives and verb forms.

3.2 Dual Gender and Epicene

Some animate nouns are *dual gender*, meaning that the same surface form is used for both masculine and feminine, such as French *artiste* (artist) ([4] as cited in [9]). However, other clues to the artist's gender may exist in a French sentence through gender agreement with other associated words. For example, *The tall artist* could be translated into French as *La grande artiste* (f) or *Le grand artiste* (m). Here, grammatical gender of translations of *the* (*la* (f) / *le* (m))

[3] A few non-sentence utterances are also included as well, such as noun-phrases and sentence fragments
[4] The majority of source sentences contain only one AGME and thus two translations
[5] https://ai.googleblog.com/2021/06/a-dataset-for-studying-gender-bias-in.html
[6] https://ai.googleblog.com/2020/04/a-scalable-approach-to-reducing-gender.html

and *tall* (*grande* (f), *grand* (m)) must match the referential gender of the referent noun.

Dual-gender determiners and adjectives exist as well, such as Spanish *mi* (my) and *importante* (important). So, for example, Spanish *mi huésped importante* (My important guest) has no gender marking. Similarly, in French and Italian, some determiners may contract before vowels to lose their gender marking. Feminine and masculine forms of *the* in French, *le* and *la*, both contract before vowels (and sometimes *h*) to become *l'*, so *l'artiste* (the artist) is not marked for gender.

While typically an entity's referential gender will align with its grammatical gender, these languages each contain a handfull of *epicene* nouns. These are nouns whose grammatical gender is fixed, regardless of the referential gender of the referent ([7] as cited in [10]). Most notable among these is the direct translation of *person* into each of the target languages, which is always grammatically feminine: *La persona* (*es,it*) or *La personne* (*fr*). We also find some language-specific epicene nouns. For example, these Italian words are always grammatically feminine: *la guardia* (guard), *la vedetta* (sentry), *la sentinella* (sentry), *la recluta* (recruit), *la spia* (spy). [7]

3.3 Pronouns

Similarly to English, some pronouns in Romance languages are inherently gendered, while others are not. Entities referred to by gender-neutral pronouns, such as Spanish *yo* (I) and *tú* (you) commonly become gender-marked through predicative gender-inflecting adjectives. Further complicating these cases, subject pronouns are frequently omitted in Spanish and Italian (but notably not in French) as the subject can be inferred from verb morphology [9]. This means that in some cases, the AGME in a sentence pair may be a zero-pronoun, such as English *I am* ***tired*** being translated to Spanish as *estoy cansada* (f) or *estoy cansado* (m). There is no overt subject in these translations corresponding to *I*, but the subject is implied by the verb form *estoy*.

3.4 Coreference

Another common pattern is that of coreferent mentions of a single entity, which must by definition have the same referential gender, and usually but not always the same grammatical gender. For example, in the following sentence, *friend* and *nurse* are the same individual and we would typically expect them to share the same referential gender in a direct translation into any of the target languages.

My best friend is a nurse

In cases where one coreferent mention is an epicene noun as described in 3.2, the grammatical genders of those mentions may in fact differ. In the following sentence, the described individual is unambiguously male. The phrase *una buena persona* (a good person) is grammatically feminine, while *un mal amigo* (a bad friend) and *él* (he) are grammatically masculine. [8]

He is a good person but a bad friend.

⇓ es

Él es una buena persona, pero un mal amigo.

3.5 Masculine Generics

Traditionally, many languages, including Spanish, French and Italian, employ a paradigm known as masculine generics. Under this paradigm, feminine forms are considered to be explicitly gender-marked, while masculine forms should be used in situations where referential gender is unclear. Specifically, when referential gender is unknown by the speaker, or a mixed-gender group is known to contain at least one male individual, defaulting to grammatically masculine forms is generally considered correct in the language standard[9]. In this sense, masculine gender marking does not imply the exclusion of female-identifying individuals, but a feminine gender marking would imply the exclusion of male-identifying individuals. [9, 10]

In most cases where a masculine generic might be used, we nonetheless ask our linguists to provide an alternative translation with feminine gender-marking. Language critics have noted that the use of masculine generics can evoke an association with 'male' [10], and so we believe that inclusion of a feminine generic variant fits our mission of promoting inclusive language use. Our linguists were asked to annotate such generic mentions with the label INDF (*indefinite gender*), so that users who wish to follow a stricter interpretation can exclude these examples in their evaluations. However, upon analysis of our corpus we noted that this annotation was only consistently applied to the Italian data.

4 GATE CORPUS

We present GATE corpus, a collection of bilingual translation examples designed to challenge source-aware gender-rewriters. The linguists were asked to compile roughly 2,000 examples for each target language, with the hope that this would be sufficient for good variety along several dimensions: sentence lengths, sentence structures, vocabulary diversity, and variety of AGME counts.

4.1 Anatomy of an Example

Each example in the data set consists of an English sentence with at least one AGME, and a set of alternative translations into the given target language corresponding to each possible combination of male/female gender choices for each AGME. Variation among the alternative translations is restricted to the minimal changes necessary to naturally and correctly indicate the respective gender-markings.

We also mark several category features on each example, such as what class of animate noun AGMEs belong to (profession, relationship, etc), what grammatical role they play in the sentence (subject, direct object, etc), sentence type (question, imperative, etc) and several other phenomena. These are discussed in more detail in section 4.4, as well as counts over each language's corpus.

Additionally, each example is accompanied by a list of AGMEs as they appear in the English source, as well as their respective masculine and feminine translations found in the translated sentences. For multi-word phrases, we asked annotators to enclose the head

[7] Color-coding in this paragraph corresponds only to grammatical gender, while referential gender is ambiguous in these expressions.

[8] In this example, color-coding indicates grammatical gender of each mention as it appears the Spanish translation

[9] In recent years there is some explorations of using novel, gender-neutral forms in these contexts

noun in square brackets. For example, if *police officer* is translated to *policía* in Spanish, the English field could include *police [officer]*.

The same entity may be referred to multiple times in the same sentence through coreference. We asked annotators to indicate coreferent mentions of AGMEs are by joining them with '='. For example, in the following *en-es* example, the English AGME field would contain "nurse=lawyer".

I'd rather be a ***nurse*** *than a* ***lawyer****.*
⇓ es
Prefiero ser enfermera que abogada. (f)
Prefiero ser enfermero que abogado. (m)

Finally, in cases where an AGME is represented by a pronoun that is elided in the translation, it will be represented by the nominative case form and be enclosed in parentheses. For example, in the following example, the Spanish AGME field would contain *(yo)*:

I am ***tired****.*
⇓ es
Estoy cansada. (f)
Estoy cansado. (m)

4.2 Arbitrarily Gender-Marked Entities

In this paper, we use *animate entity* (or just *entity*) to refer to an individual or group for which a referential gender could be implied in either the source or target language[10]. Usually this will refer to humans, but may also be extended to some animals and mythical or sentient beings. For example, *cat* is generally translated into Spanish as *gato*, but *gata* is also frequently used to refer to a female cat. Following [6], we use *referential gender* to refer to an entity's gender as a concept outside of any linguistic considerations.

To qualify as an AGME, an entity's referential gender must be ambiguous in the source sentence, but implied by one or more words in the target translation. Compared to Romance languages, there are relatively few ways that gender is denoted through word-choice in English. Most notably, English uses a handful of gendered pronouns and possessive adjectives (*she*, *her*, *hers*, *herself*, *he*, *him*, *his*, *himself*), as well as a relatively small number of animate nouns that imply a gender (e.g. *mother*, *father*, *masseuse*, *masseur*, etc). There is also often a correlation between certain proper names and referential gender (e.g. *Sarah* is traditionally a female name and *Matthew* is traditionally male), but we do not consider this a reliable enough signal for gender determination unless they are a well known public figure (e.g. *Barack Obama* is known to be male). We follow [22] in this.

Additionally, an AGME must have some gender marking in the translation. In the following English-Italian example,

I heard the thief insult ***his interlocutor****.*
⇓ *it*
Io ho sentito il ladro insultare la sua interlocutrice.
Io ho sentito il ladro insultare il suo interlocutore.

interlocutor→*interlocutrice* (f) / *interlocutore* (m) is an AGME, while *thief*→*ladro* and the speaker (*I*→*Io*) are not. *Thief* is unambiguously male because of its coreference with *his* in the source, while the speaker is not marked for gender in either the source or target.

[10]For simplicity, we limit our discussion of gender and linguistics to masculine and feminine within the scope of this paper, but we do not intend to imply that gender is limited in this way.

4.3 Corpus Development Process

The linguists were asked to aim for a distribution of sentence lengths ranging from very short (< 10 words) to complex (> 30 words). Actual example counts are shown in Table 1. Of the 2,000 examples for each language, linguists were asked to include roughly the following breakdown:

- 1,000 single animate noun AGME
- 500 single pronoun AGME
- 500 with two or more AGMEs

Linguists were given details of the various categories and attributes listed in section 4.4 and asked to find sentences such that each such category is well represented (depending on the relative ease of finding such sentences). Linguists were also asked to prioritize diversity of animate nouns where possible. They were allowed to pull examples sentences from natural text or construct them from scratch as they saw fit. However, except for a small number of toy examples, we asked that they include only sentences that were natural in both English and their target language, and could reasonably appear in some imaginable context.

We provided samples of web-scraped data that had been filtered with various heuristics to help identify sentences fitting some of the harder-to-satisfy criteria. For example, we used Stanza [15] to filter some web-scraped data for those containing an animate noun marked as an indirect object and provided this to the linguists. In some cases these sentences were used directly, and in others they were modified slightly to fit the requirements.

Throughout the process, we prioritized diversity of sentence structure, domain and vocabulary. Rather than produce a representative sample, our intention was to produce a corpus that would challenge any tested systems on a wide range of phenomena.

4.4 Category Labels

There are a wide range of linguistic phenomena that can interact with gender in translation. We have devised several category labels that can be applied to segments in GATE. In order to promote diversity within the corpus, linguists were asked to ensure that a certain minimum number of examples are included for each such label. This also has the benefit of helping pinpoint weaknesses in an evaluated system. For example, a rewriting system may perform well when the AGME is the subject of a sentence, but do poorly when it is a direct object.

Unless otherwise stated, category labels are determined based on the target sentence set rather than the source sentence, as this is generally the more important of the inputs to the rewriter. A single example will typically have multiple labels.

- **Grammatical Role categories:** An AGME is a subject (SUBJ), direct object (DOBJ), indirect object (IOBJ), subject complement (SCMP), object of a preposition (OPRP, excluding indirect objects), possessive complement (POSC) or object complement (OCMP). For Italian, we mark sentences with DIFF if grammatical role is different between source and target.
- **Animate Noun categories:** profession (PROF, e.g. *doctor*), Religion (REL, e.g. *Bhuddist*), Nationality (NAT, e.g. *Italian*,

Data Set	< 10	10-19	20-29	>= 30	Total
Spanish 1 AGME	477	722	197	105	1,501
Spanish 2+ AGMEs	70	176	56	21	323
French 1 AGME	704	661	171	14	1,550
French 2+ AGMEs	177	222	41	4	444
Italian 1 AGME	397	867	195	48	1,507
Italian 2+ AGMEs	93	500	139	30	762

Table 1: Distribution of lengths (words) of English utterance per target language and AGME count

Label	es	fr	it	description
Semantic Type				
PROF	1168	490	1208	Profession word
NAT	118	249	157	Nationality or locality membership
REL	25	150	29	Religious affiliation
FAM	327	250	192	Family or other relationship
NHUM	2	40	–	Non-Human
OTH	580	941	708	Other
Grammatical Role				
SUBJ	1638	1221	1573	Subject
SCMP	118	185	121	Subject complement
DOBJ	181	328	399	Direct object
IOBJ	136	275	165	Indirect object
OPRP	250	279	518	Object of preposition
POSC	80	–	289	Possessive complement
OCMP	–	–	12	Object complement
DIFF	–	–	85	Grammatical role different between source and translation
Sentence Type				
QUES	124	–	–	Question
FRAG	49	101	–	Sentence Fragment
IMPR	14	135	–	Imperative
Adjective-Related				
APRD	82	359	213	Predicative adjective agreeing with AGME
AATR	293	190	315	Attributive adjective agreeing with AGME
ANAN	97	1026	–	Adjective modifying a word other than AGME
PPA	361	172	290	Adjective has same surface form as a past participle
Pronoun Subtype				
PERS	–	219	146	Personal pronoun
RELA	–	15	13	Relative pronoun
DEMO	–	64	28	Demonstrative pronoun
POSS	80	–	–	Possesive pronoun
DROP	157	–	–	AGME is a dropped/zero pronoun
IPRO	–	369	53	Indefinite pronoun
Other				
PLUR	991	1110	1042	Plural
INDF	–	–	229	Indefinite/masculine generic could apply
DFCL	136	113	–	Changed words in alternatives cross clause boundaries
PSSV	–	–	164	Passive voice
VPART	–	–	372	Past participle agreeing with AGME
GLNK	–	94	–	"gender-link" – AGMEs are not coreferent but conceptually linked, different genders would be unnatural

Table 2: Counts of sentences with each category label per language, including all AGME counts

also includes or regional membership, as in *Washingtonian*), Family and other relationships (FAM, e.g. *neighbor*), Non-Human (NHUM, e.g. *cat*, *vampire*), Other (OTH, e.g. *winner*, *accused*)

- **Adjectives and past participles:** attributive (AATR), predicative (APRD), past-participle form as an adjective (PPA), past-participle form not as an adjective (PPNA), Adjective modifies non-ambiguous noun (ANAN). Most of these distinctions are included to test a rewriter's ability to distinguish between adjective surface forms that should be modified along with key nouns and those that should not.
- **Sentence Types categories:** Sentence fragment (FRAG), question (QUES), imperative (IMPR).
- **Pronoun subtypes:** Personal (PERS), Relative (RELA), Demonstrative (DEMO), Possessive (POSS), Indefinite (IPRO). For Spanish, we annotate with DROP if an AGME is a dropped pronoun.
- **Other categories:** Plural AGME (PLUR), Passive (PSSV). DFCL indicates that gender marking words on the AGME require agreement across clause-clause boundaries. GLNK (for *gender link*) indicates that there are distinct animate nouns that could behave as a single entity, e.g. *No scientists or researchers were implicated.*
  In Italian, we mark past participle verb forms which agree with the AGME with VPART. We also mark indefinite or generic AGMEs with INDF. This indicates that it does not refer to an entity concretely known by the speaker and many speakers may prefer a generic masculine, e.g. "Where can I find a good doctor?".

Table 2 shows counts of sentences annotated with each category label in each of our three target languages. Due to inconsistencies in annotation between languages, some labels are not available for some languages and appear as '–' in the table.

5 EVALUATION WITH GATE

5.1 Gender Rewriting

Our goal in developing this corpus is to facilitate the generation of multiple translations covering all valid gender assignments. One strategy for producing such a set of translations is to first use an MT model to produce a default translation and then use a rewriter to generate one or more alternative translations with other gender assignments [14].

$$\text{source} \overset{\text{MT}}{\Longrightarrow} \text{translation} \overset{\text{rewriter}}{\Longrightarrow} \{\text{all translations}\}$$

5.2 Evaluation Methodology

We formalize the task of gender rewriting on a single-AGME sentence as follows: given the source sentence *src*, target translations corresponding to male and female referent entities, and a rewrite direction (M to F or F to M), produce an output target translation with the alternative gender from the original translation. We will refer to the original input translation as tgt_0, the desired/reference translation as tgt_1 and the output generated by the rewriter as *hyp*:

$$rewriter(src, tgt_0) = hyp \sim tgt_1$$

For this task, we consider looking at exact full-sentence matches between *hyp* and tgt_1 to be the most sensible approach for evaluation. We do not give partial credit for changing the gender markings on only a subset of the words to those found in tgt_1. Doing so will generally result in a sentence that is either grammatically incorrect due to newly introduced agreement errors, or for which the semantics has changed in an unacceptable way, such as a changed coreference. Because of this, we find sentence-similarity measures such as BLEU [13] and words error rate not to be reflective of a user's experience.

The rewriter may also produce a null output, meaning that only the default translation will be produced. This is necessary because in real-world scenarios, many sentences will not contain AGMEs. When AGMEs are present, it may still be preferable to produce null output over a low confidence rewrite if accuracy errors are judged to be more costly than coverage errors.

We calculate precision as the proportion of correct alternatives among those attempted, i.e. that were non-null outputs. Because there are no true negatives in GATE, recall can be calculated as the proportion of correct alternatives produced among all sentences, including null outputs. Using these definitions of precision and recall, we also find $F_{0.5}$ to be a useful overall metric, prioritizing precision while still incorporating coverage.

While we have focused our discussion of evaluation on sentences containing a single AGME, which typically should produce exactly two alternative translations, GATE also includes a smaller number of examples with more than one AGME. These have more than two alternative translations and thus more than one correct output for a rewriter. We do not formalize evaluation on this subset here but believe that the data set will be useful in evaluating rewriting systems capable of producing multiple outputs for multiple sets of gender assignments.

A comprehensive evaluation of a translation gender rewriter should include testing on both sentences with and without AGMEs. As each instance in GATE involves at least one AGME, we suggest augmenting GATE with instances from Renduchintala and Williams [17] and Vanmassenhove and Monti [22], which feature unambiguously gendered source entities. In future work, we intend to develop a supplemental data set for GATE containing various types of negative examples: unambiguous source entities, entities that are unmarked in both source and target, and inanimate objects whose surface forms are distractors (e.g. depending on context, *player* and *cleaner* may refer to either objects or people).

5.3 System Overview

We use GATE to evaluate our translation gender rewriter, which follows a pipeline approach, roughly similar to [8].

The system receives as input the original source sentence (*src*) and a default translation (tgt_0) with the specified language pair. The following components are then applied:

AGME Identifier – We first attempt to find AGMEs in the sentence pair to determine whether rewriting is appropriate. We leverage an AllenNLP [12] coreference model to detect ambiguously gendered entities in the source sentence. We use a dependency parse generated by Stanza [15] and a gendered vocab list to identify gender-marked animate entities in the target sentence.

Candidate Generator - For each word position in tgt_0, we use a lookup table to find all possible alternate gender variants for the word in that position. We compose the word-level variant sets to build a set of sentence-level hypotheses, while applying grammatical constraints to prune incoherent hypotheses. This yields a set of candidate rewrites.

Translation Scorer - Finally, we use a Marian [11] translation model to score each rewrite candidate as a translation of *src*. If no candidates have scores close to that of tgt_0, We return a null output. Otherwise we choose the candidate with the highest translation score.

5.4 Experimental Results

We evaluate the rewrite quality of our system on GATE in both masculine-to-feminine and feminine-to-masculine directions. To simulate runtime efficiency constraints, we impose a cutoff of 20 maximum source words. Any input sentence longer than this is treated as a null output and therefore counted as a false negative.

Language	Direction	P	R	$F_{0.5}$
Spanish	F→M	0.97	0.50	0.82
Spanish	M→F	0.95	0.40	0.74
French	F→M	0.97	0.28	0.65
French	M→F	0.91	0.27	0.61
Italian	F→M	0.96	0.47	0.79
Italian	M→F	0.91	0.32	0.67

Table 3: Our rewriter's scores on GATE for each target language and rewrite direction

From these results we can see that our system performs best for Spanish in both directions, and in the female-to-male direction across all language pairs. Both trends can be explained to an extent by the properties of the translation models. High quality training data for English-Spanish is more plentiful than for the other two languages, leading to a higher quality model in general. As noted earlier, translation models have been shown to skew towards stereotypical gender assignments, which are more heavily weighted towards masculine forms. Therefore, it is not too surprising that when rewriting from male to female, the translation model is more likely to prefer an incorrect rewrite candidate.

5.5 End-to-End Evaluation

In our envisioned scenario, a gender rewriter would operate on the output of an MT system. It is unlikely, however, that direct MT output will consistently match GATE's translations word-for-word. As a result, references cannot be directly utilized, and human annotation is required to assess the output of a rewriter alongside machine translation (MT) or any integrated system that generates a series of gender alternative translations from a single source sentence. One additional consideration in this scenario is that a segment from GATE that contains an AGME, may no longer contain one when using a machine translated target, as the MT output may end up unmarked for gender.



Figure 1: End-to-end scores for our system and an online translation system.

In order to test our combined system end-to-end, we sampled 200 source sentences from GATE and used Bing Translator to translate them into Spanish, and then pass that output to our rewriter. We then ask annotators to examine the source sentence and all translation outputs, and to consider correctness of gender marking and agreement rather than general translation quality. They were instructed to provide the following annotations:

- If two translations are produced, mark true positive if the following are true (otherwise false positive):
  - Is the target gender-marked for an ambiguous source entity?
  - Were all words marking gender on the AGME changed correctly?
  - Were only the words marking gender of the AGME changed?
- If only one translation is produced, is the target marked for gender on an ambiguous source entity? Mark as false negative if so, and otherwise a true negative.
- If there are multiple AGMEs:
  - If two valid translations are produced, mark as a true positive.
  - If only one translation is produced, mark as a true negative.
  - Otherwise mark as a false positive.

We also retrieve translations for these sentences from an online, third party English-Spanish translation system that can produce masculine and feminine alternative translations for this language pair. We asked annotators to annotate these translations in the same manner.

Finally, we also asked annotators to mark source sentences for which the speaker is reasonably likely to know the referent's gender, and therefore use of a masculine generic should be less likely (see 3.5). We evaluate quality on that subset as well for each system, in rows marked NG (*non-generic*). Results are presented in Table 4 and visualized in Figure 1.

Both systems heavily favor precision over recall, and recall is somewhat higher on the *non-generic* portion of the data. Overall, our system demonstrates significantly better coverage.

	P	R	$F_{0.5}$
Our System	0.97	0.41	0.76
Our System (NG)	1.00	0.50	0.84
Online system	0.96	0.14	0.45
Online system (NG)	1.00	0.21	0.56

Table 4: end-to-end scores for our system and an online translation system. NG rows are calculated only on *non-generic* sentences

5.6 Per-Category Results

We also calculate precision, recall and $F_{0.5}$ for our system on the subset of sentences with each category label for each target language and rewrite direction. These can be found in Table 5 for Spanish, Table 6 for French, and Table 7 for Italian. By examining these table, we can identify some potential areas for improvement in our system.

For English into Spanish, both DFCL (cross-clause agreement required) and IMPR (imperative) stand out as weak spots for our system, showing both low precision and low recall in both rewrite directions. DFCL can only be marked on a sentence containing at least two clauses, and these sentences tend to skew longer, naturally increasing in complexity, and also bumping into the 20-word cap more often. Additionally, when words must agree across clause boundaries, writing dependency-based rules to enforce agreement is quite difficult, and so more of that work falls on the translation model.

At 13 sentences, the sample of IMPR sentences here is relatively small, we identify exactly one sentence that is incorrectly rewritten in both directions. We show the feminine to masculine rewrite direction here:

Leave them alone and in peace, they are playing.

⇓ (human translation)

Déjalas tranquilas y en paz, están jugando. (f)

⇓ (our rewriter)

***Déjalas** tranquilos y en paz, están jugando* (m)

Déjalas means *leave [female]them*, and should have been rewritten to *Déjalos*, but was not, due to difficulty in recognizing the attached pronoun *las* as something that can be reinflected for gender.

Recall for IMPR sentences is also low because many lack an overt subject or animate noun mention on the English side, which makes AGME detection more difficult.

English→French and Italian show an interesting, but perhaps unsurprising pattern for PLUR and INDF (only annotated for Italian). Precision and recall are significantly higher on these sentences for F→M rewrites than for M→F.

PLUR indicates a plural AGME, and INDF indicates that the AGME does not refer to a specific individual or group. Many speakers will use a masculine generic when referring to either of these types of entities (see section 3.5). Because of this, sentences of this type are much more likely to appear with a masculine form in training data for an MT model. The model is therefore likely to score masculine forms significantly higher than feminine forms.

		F→M			M→F		
Cat	Count	P	R	$F_{0.5}$	P	R	$F_{0.5}$
All	1,501	0.97	0.50	0.82	0.95	0.40	0.74
Semantic Type							
PROF	820	0.97	0.51	0.83	0.96	0.41	0.76
NAT	93	0.98	0.47	0.81	0.93	0.42	0.75
REL	17	1.00	0.41	0.71	1.00	0.41	0.78
FAM	188	0.98	0.57	0.86	0.95	0.37	0.72
OTH	356	0.96	0.44	0.78	0.93	0.36	0.71
Grammatical role							
SUBJ	1,204	0.98	0.50	0.82	0.96	0.39	0.74
SCMP	279	0.98	0.35	0.72	0.95	0.26	0.62
DOBJ	96	0.94	0.53	0.82	0.94	0.47	0.78
IOBJ	85	0.96	0.53	0.82	0.91	0.45	0.75
OPRP	117	0.98	0.41	0.77	0.98	0.36	0.73
POSC	66	1.00	0.62	0.89	0.96	0.39	0.75
Sentence Type							
QUES	115	0.99	0.59	0.87	0.98	0.49	0.82
FRAG	43	1.00	0.63	0.89	1.00	0.44	0.80
IMPR	13	0.83	0.39	0.68	0.80	0.31	0.61
Adjective-related							
APRD	62	0.97	0.58	0.86	0.97	0.45	0.79
AATR	197	0.98	0.52	0.83	0.97	0.45	0.79
ANAN	49	1.00	0.47	0.82	0.91	0.39	0.71
PPA	258	0.97	0.48	0.81	0.94	0.43	0.76
Pronoun Subtype							
POSS	66	1.00	0.62	0.89	0.96	0.39	0.75
DROP	124	1.00	0.53	0.85	1.00	0.48	0.82
Other							
PLUR	587	0.96	0.44	0.78	0.93	0.33	0.68
DFCL	64	0.88	0.22	0.55	0.82	0.14	0.42

Table 5: Per-category breakdown of precision, recall and $F_{0.5}$ on single AGME sentences for English→Spanish rewrites in each rewrite direction.

This leads to grammatically consistent feminine rewrites being out-competed by less fluent rewrites that preserve some masculine word forms.

6 CONCLUSION

We have presented GATE, a corpus of hand-curated test cases designed to challenge gender rewriters on a wide range of vocabulary, sentence structures and gender-related phenomena. Additionally, we provide an in-depth analysis of many of the nuances of grammatical gender in Romance languages and how it relates to translation. We also suggest metrics for gender rewriting and provide tools to aid with their calculation. Through this work we aim to improve the quality of MT output in cases of ambiguous source gender, as well as facilitate the development of better and more inclusive natural language processing (NLP) tools in general.

We look forward to future work in improving GATE and related projects. We aim to add additional languages pairs to GATE and investigate translation directions into English. We also hope to supplement with additional data, including negative examples. Finally,

Cat	Count	F→M			M→F		
		P	R	$F_{0.5}$	P	R	$F_{0.5}$
All	1,550	0.97	0.28	0.65	0.91	0.27	0.61
Semantic Type							
PROF	325	0.96	0.42	0.77	0.86	0.38	0.68
NAT	154	0.93	0.18	0.50	0.90	0.17	0.48
REL	102	1.00	0.30	0.69	0.90	0.27	0.62
FAM	159	0.98	0.37	0.74	0.95	0.36	0.71
NHUM	25	0.80	0.16	0.44	0.80	0.16	0.44
OTH	793	0.97	0.23	0.59	0.95	0.22	0.57
Grammatical role							
SUBJ	827	0.98	0.33	0.70	0.93	0.31	0.67
SCMP	151	0.95	0.28	0.64	0.77	0.23	0.52
DOBJ	230	0.95	0.23	0.58	0.86	0.21	0.53
IOBJ	204	0.95	0.19	0.53	0.90	0.18	0.50
OPRP	177	0.98	0.24	0.61	0.93	0.23	0.58
Sentence Type							
FRAG	95	0.94	0.16	0.47	0.88	0.15	0.44
IMPR	123	0.97	0.28	0.66	1.00	0.29	0.67
Adjective-related							
APRD	303	0.98	0.18	0.52	0.85	0.16	0.45
AATR	139	0.98	0.36	0.73	0.92	0.34	0.69
ANAN	844	0.95	0.25	0.61	0.88	0.23	0.56
PPA	130	1.00	0.30	0.68	0.95	0.28	0.65
APPS	30	0.90	0.30	0.64	1.00	0.33	0.71
Pronoun Subtype							
PERS	135	1.00	0.30	0.69	0.90	0.27	0.62
RELA	15	–	0.00	–	–	0.00	–
DEMO	53	1.00	0.04	0.16	1.00	0.04	0.16
IPRO	324	0.94	0.05	0.20	0.88	0.05	0.19
Other							
PLUR	790	0.96	0.20	0.55	0.87	0.18	0.50
DFCL	23	1.00	0.09	0.32	1.00	0.09	0.32

Table 6: Per-category breakdown of precision, recall and $F_{0.5}$ on single AGME sentences for English→French rewrites in each rewrite direction.

Cat	Count	F→M			M→F		
		P	R	$F_{0.5}$	P	R	$F_{0.5}$
All	1127	0.96	0.47	0.79	0.91	0.32	0.66
Semantic Type							
PROF	516	0.96	0.46	0.79	0.90	0.30	0.64
NAT	81	0.94	0.38	0.73	0.88	0.19	0.50
REL	21	1.00	0.43	0.79	1.00	0.29	0.67
FAM	84	0.98	0.58	0.86	0.91	0.37	0.70
OTH	302	0.95	0.42	0.76	0.86	0.26	0.59
Grammatical role							
SUBJ	729	0.96	0.47	0.79	0.90	0.31	0.65
SCMP	61	0.96	0.38	0.73	0.88	0.23	0.56
DOBJ	176	0.94	0.47	0.78	0.89	0.28	0.62
IOBJ	74	0.97	0.46	0.79	0.91	0.28	0.63
OPRP	161	0.96	0.44	0.78	0.92	0.30	0.66
POSC	119	0.98	0.48	0.81	0.91	0.34	0.69
OCMP	4	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
DIFF	43	1.00	0.47	0.81	0.94	0.35	0.70
Sentence Type							
FRAG	95	0.94	0.16	0.47	0.88	0.15	0.44
IMPR	123	0.97	0.28	0.66	1.00	0.29	0.67
Adjective-related							
APRD	114	0.96	0.57	0.84	0.94	0.42	0.75
AATR	124	0.89	0.46	0.75	0.90	0.35	0.69
PPA	153	0.96	0.51	0.82	0.97	0.37	0.73
APPS	11	1.00	0.36	0.74	1.00	0.27	0.65
Pronoun Subtype							
PERS	77	0.95	0.55	0.83	0.97	0.40	0.76
RELA	6	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
DEMO	15	0.67	0.13	0.37	1.00	0.13	0.43
IPRO	15	1.00	0.07	0.26	0.67	0.13	0.37
Other							
PLUR	527	0.96	0.42	0.76	0.89	0.24	0.57
INDF	110	0.98	0.50	0.82	0.86	0.23	0.55
PSSV	61	0.97	0.52	0.83	0.93	0.44	0.76
VPART	165	0.97	0.50	0.82	0.93	0.42	0.75

Table 7: Per-category breakdown of precision, recall and $F_{0.5}$ on single AGME sentences for English→Italian rewrites in each rewrite direction.

we plan to explore use of gender-neutral language use in various languages and how it can be incorporated into NLP applications.

7 BIAS STATEMENT

In this work, we propose a test set to evaluate translation of ambiguously gendered source sentences by NMT systems. Our work only deals with English as the source and is currently scoped to Romance languages as the target. To construct our test set, we have worked with bilingual linguists for each target language. We plan to increase scope of both source and target languages in future work.

Through this work, we hope to encourage and facilitate more inclusive use of natural language processing technology, particularly in terms of gender representation. In recent years, there is significant ongoing movement in the way gender manifests in languages use. One form that this takes is in new gender-neutral language constructs in Romance languages such as French, Spanish and Italian to accommodate gender underspecificity and non-binary gender identities. We support the development of this more representative and inclusive language, and endeavor to find ways to support it through technology. In this work, however, for the sake of simplicity we restrict our scope to language as used to express gender along more conventionally binary lines, and we therefore do not consider non-binary language or word forms. We are working with both language experts and non-binary-identifying individuals to expand the scope to include non-binary and gender-underspecified language in future work.

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Reclaiming the Digital Commons: A Public Data Trust for Training Data

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ABSTRACT

Democratization of AI means not only that people can freely use AI, but also that people can collectively decide how AI is to be used. In particular, collective decision-making power is required to redress the negative externalities from the development of increasingly advanced AI systems, including degradation of the digital commons and unemployment from automation. The rapid pace of AI development and deployment currently leaves little room for this power. Monopolized in the hands of private corporations, the development of the most capable foundation models has proceeded largely without public input. There is currently no implemented mechanism for ensuring that the economic value generated by such models is redistributed to account for their negative externalities. The citizens that have generated the data necessary to train models do not have input on how their data are to be used. In this work, we propose that a public data trust assert control over training data for foundation models. In particular, this trust should scrape the internet as a digital commons, to license to commercial model developers for a percentage cut of revenues from deployment. First, we argue in detail for the existence of such a trust. We also discuss feasibility and potential risks. Second, we detail a number of ways for a data trust to incentivize model developers to use training data only from the trust. We propose a mix of verification mechanisms, potential regulatory action, and positive incentives. We conclude by highlighting other potential benefits of our proposed data trust and connecting our work to ongoing efforts in data and compute governance.

KEYWORDS

data trust, training data, data rights, digital commons

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1 INTRODUCTION

Private companies dominate the development of the most capable AI systems [42]. The staggering amounts of compute involved [42, 89] mean that large tech companies or those backed by massive amounts of venture capital have disproportionate power in guiding the direction of technological progress. Recent attempts to democratize AI development and open up the study of large models have met with some success [12, 37, 88], yet still suffer from core limitations. From a resource perspective, it remains difficult for academic or non-profit collaborations to match the financial weight of the private sector. From a philosophical perspective, democratization of AI is not solely about the free deployment of AI without regard for social consequence. Rather, we hold as Shevlane [90] does that democratization also means collective decision-making power over how AI is to be developed and deployed. Narrow democratization could frustrate the broad democratic ideal; unstructured access to AI systems could hinder societies from restricting certain uses they deem undesirable.

Collective decision-making power over AI is deficient in two key respects. First, data creators cannot prevent AI developers from using their data. Opt-out mechanisms are lacking and the training datasets of many of the largest models are private. Second, there is no implemented mechanism to ensure that the profits of AI development and deployment are distributed widely, particularly as a way to redress negative externalities. Even if an individual were to threaten to withhold their data from a model developer, they would have effectively no bargaining power since a few data points likely make no significant difference in the final performance of a model.

We focus on the large training datasets scraped from the **digital commons**—the collective intellectual and cultural contributions of humanity that are in digital form—and also on bespoke crowdworker data as a point of intervention for redressing the power imbalance between model developers and human data creators. The digital commons is the product of humanity's cumulative efforts, yet in AI development the fruits of the commons are captured by the few. Redistribution is requisite from the point of view of justice. Redistribution is also requisite from the point of view of pragmatism, for if human contributors to the digital commons are not supported in their work or resent its perceived theft, the commons itself could decay [49].

To address the imbalance of power, we propose the creation of a public data trust. We intend this data trust to be national and located in a jurisdiction with a high concentration of AI development, such as the US or the UK. Our data trust would gate access to the most important data for model training: pre-training data from the internet and human feedback data from annotators. Our gating is

meant to apply primarily to commercial AI developers. We focus our attention on general-purpose AI systems such as foundation models, given their likely role as important components of future AI systems and their increasingly wide adoption. Our contributions are as follows.

(1) We argue for the creation of a public data trust to hold training data, so as to address the private concentration of power in AI development and safeguard the digital commons.
(2) We describe how the data trust could use its bargaining power to address the negative externalities of AI deployment, including setting up a digital commons fund financed by a royalty on model revenues.
(3) We propose how the data trust could obtain training data.
(4) We provide a detailed plan for how the data trust could verify that model developers who have agreed to the data trust regime have only used the trust's model in training their models.
(5) We discuss various mechanisms for incentivizing model developers to comply with the data trust regime.
(6) We advance other potential benefits of our data trust, including supporting the generation of public good training data.

2 THE CASE FOR A DATA TRUST

We argue here for a national, public data trust to hold training data. An outline of our case is as follows.

(1) AI development heavily depends upon the **digital commons**: the collective intellectual and cultural contributions of humanity that are in digital form.
(2) AI development is extremely concentrated in the private sector. Those who contribute to the digital commons, including the general public and sector-specific individual such as artists, have little decision-making power over the development of deployment of AI compared to the AI developers.
(3) AI deployment results in negative externalities to the public; there are currently no effective mechanisms to address these negative externalities.
(4) A data trust that gated training data access to the digital commons would help to correct the power imbalance so as to redress negative externalities.

2.1 The Digital Commons

The **digital commons** [31, 49] constitutes the collective intellectual and cultural contributions of humanity in digital form. More specifically, the digital commons encompasses items like artistic work, scientific papers, knowledge bases, and software. Examples of resources that are a part of the digital commons include arXiv, Wikipedia, Reddit, online news sites, and Project Gutenberg.

The digital commons is crucial for democracy, material well-being, and cultural enrichment. First, the success of democracy depends upon an informed public [81]. Absent an accurate understanding of the state of the world, the public is less able to engage in productive deliberation and to select representatives to act in their interest. Knowledge resources in the digital commons can contribute to this public understanding. For example, Wikipedia has been a surprisingly rich source of information, comparable to academically authored encyclopedias in both breadth and reliability [67]. Second, knowledge and tools in the digital commons contribute to material well-being. For instance, Directorate-General for Communications Networks et al. [29], Ghosh [41] characterize the large positive impact of open-source software on the economy of the EU. Third, the digital commons provides a source of intangible cultural enrichment. For example, on Project Gutenberg one can access over 60 000 works of intellectual and cultural significance, from the Federalist Papers to the Analects of Confucius. The role of the digital commons in these critical functions underscores the importance of safeguarding it.

2.2 Concentration of Power

The wealth of high-quality information in the digital commons is a prime source of training data for modern AI systems. Empirical scaling laws about the relationship between the quantity of data, compute, and model parameters [48, 58] have motivated the use of ever larger amounts of data from the digital commons to train so-called "foundation models" [15, 75]. Such models as GPT-3 [17] are so named because they are increasingly general-purpose and seem likely to be deployed in a variety of scenarios [15].

Given the enormous quantities of data and computation involved, private companies have a quasi-monopoly on the development of the largest—and by virtue of scaling laws likely the most capable—foundation models [36, 42]. To obtain training data, private companies scrape the internet to obtain large datasets and hire crowdworkers to generate bespoke data. At no point is there an opportunity for the public to exercise decision-making power. Especially given the significant risks of AI development [15, 25, 36], private power to shape the trajectory of AI is in tension with public interests [114]. Despite the proliferation of AI ethics standards in recent years [57], ethical guidelines are no substitute for addressing the structural factors underlying the concentration of power in the private sector.

2.3 Negative Externalities

While concentration of power is itself suspect, the power of private AI developers contributes to tangible harms as well. Although the digital commons is the collective output of humanity, private organizations who train models on the digital commons stand to capture a large share of the profits while externalising the harms.

2.3.1 Decay of the Digital Commons. Given the political, social, and economic functions of the digital commons, its maintenance is paramount. While the increasing use of foundation models like ChatGPT and Midjourney can contribute to the digital commons by facilitating modes of artistic expression, they also threaten its degradation [49].

First, the widely available ability to generate content at scale threatens the quality of information in the digital commons. As language models (LMs) become more capable and access to them becomes cheaper[1], the scope and impact of misuse could increase. Politically motivated groups could use LMs to facilitate influence operations [43]. Even when used with the best of intentions, LMs still generate falsehoods that may be difficult to detect [55, 64].

[1]Access to the ChatGPT API as of 13 March 2023 is at $0.002 USD / 1K tokens, which is about $2 USD for 750K words.

Depending on how detection abilities scale with ease of generation, it may become more difficult to filter through online content for high-quality contributions. The problem of filtering is not only technical: even if capable tools exist for detecting low-quality contributions, we still need incentives in place for moderators to use those tools. The recent history of social media moderation shows that profit motives may override the importance of a high-quality public forum [78, 106, 107].

Second, a prevailing business model for foundation models may disincentivize contributions to the digital commons. This business model involves customers paying AI developers, such as OpenAI, for query access to their models. The developers capture the economic value of this transaction. Yet, since model developers externalize the costs of generating digital commons data, part of this economic value is rent, especially as private model developers are those best able to make use of large amounts of digital commons data to train models. Fees from using the text-to-image system DALL-E 2 go to OpenAI, not to the artists of the digital commons whose work was instrumental in the creation of such image models. People who otherwise might have hired artists might instead use DALL-E 2 for its lower cost.[2] When individuals use LMs as substitutes for search [69], they can obtain immediate answers which obviates visiting web pages. A decrease in ad revenue could negatively impact the sustainability of major sites in the digital commons like Stack Exchange. Using LMs as language assistants could also reduce the quantity of contributions on quality discussion forums like Reddit's *r/AskHistorians* subreddit.

2.3.2 Unemployment. Foundation models are not only able to generate text and images, but are increasingly capable of acting in the digital world. We are building language models that can code [22] and use arbitrary software tools [87]. In addition to the safety of such systems [21], a key concern is the negative effects of widespread unemployment if these systems increasingly substitute for human labour.

We are beginning to see these effects unfold. Companies use the work of artists from the digital commons to build text-to-image models, whose subsequent deployment deprives artists of the ability to make ends meet. The negative externality of unemployment exists even when training datasets are collected through crowdworkers and not the digital commons. Data from human programmers are used to improve coding models which threaten to substitute for the same programmers [9].

The risk of mass unemployment is non-trivial given economic incentives to develop and deploy increasingly capable AI systems that could substitute for human labour at lower costs. Korinek and Juelfs [61] disarm common objections to the idea that machine labour could replace human labour in large portions of economic production. One objection extrapolates from the history of automation since the industrial revolution to claim that humans will just move to new jobs created in the wake of AI deployment. Yet the creation of such jobs in the past depended upon new demand for human cognitive labour. If AI development is to automate increasingly large amounts of cognitive labour, the future role of human labour is unclear. Despite any uncertainty over the precise shape of future employment, having mechanisms in place to address unemployment as a negative externality does not presume that everybody will be unemployed. Ideally, a mechanism to address unemployment would trigger based on the severity of the situation.

We emphasize that we are not arguing against the application of foundation models to increase productivity, improve well-being, and reduce the need for repetitive and unfulfilling labour. Rather, we are concerned about the distribution of the benefits and burdens of the AI development.

2.3.3 Other Negative Externalities. Although the two externalities above may be some of the most salient now, there may be further significant negative externalities in the near future with increasingly capable models. Whether because of misuse, alignment failures [70], or structural problems [112], increasingly capable models may be involved in harms like cyber-attacks, biological and chemical weapons attacks, and deception [92]. The decision of to what extent to accept these risks should lie not with model developers, but with society more broadly. It might not be enough to address such risks after models have been developed and deployed. Even if there were a FDA-like system [99] to inspect models before they are sold or distributed, it seems difficult for an auditor to detect internal deployment of a model within the developer's own systems. Internal deployment could be a significant source of problems if the developer has services that serves a wide range of customers, such as Google Cloud. Ideally, the public would have control over the means of the construction of foundation models.

2.4 A Data Trust to Control the Data Bottleneck

There is currently no effective mechanism to address either the power imbalance between private AI developers and the public or the negative externalities of AI development. Given the importance of training data, we propose that a public data trust should gate access to training data, both from the digital commons and crowdworkers. If the data trust is able to accomplish this task, it would hold significant leverage over private model developers. In effect, training runs of the most capable models would be severely hindered without access to data from the digital commons. Our focus here is on regulating commercial model development, rather than research use.

A **data trust** is a legal vehicle for the collective management of data [27]. In a **trust**, a board of trustees manages an asset on behalf of trustors, such as money, land, or buildings. Trustees typically have a fiduciary obligation to act only in the interests of the trustors. A data trust for training data would be composed of a board of trustees to manage collected training data on behalf of the public.

The data trust should be public because its decisions should reflect the public interest. The trustee board should be constructed so as to represent a diverse array of societal perspectives. Mechanisms such as regular reports to the legislature should be in place to hold the data trust accountable to the public. As our focus here is on the functions of a trust, we defer further details about the governance structure of the trust to future implementation.

The data trust should be national so as to have the authority to carry out its functions. In brief, the functions are as follows, with details deferred to Sections 4 to 6.

[2] As of 14 March 2023, users of DALL-E 2 receive 15 free generations every month and can purchase additional generations at a rate of $15 USD per 115 generations.

(1) Collect training data by scraping the internet and entrusting national user data.
(2) Implement a verification system to check that model developers who claim to be using the trust's data are only using the trust's data.
(3) Incentivize model developers to go to the data trust for data instead of scraping their own.
(4) Negotiate the terms of data usage with model developers, including royalties on a portion of revenue to go to national funds to support the digital commons.

Assuming that the data trust can accomplish (1) to (3)—the analysis of which we leave to later sections—the key part of our data trust proposal is (4). A data trust would negotiate the terms of training data usage with the public interest in mind, accounting for the negative externalities we raised in Section 2.3. For the rest of this section, we will assume that the trust has the necessary bargaining power to negotiate terms of data usage with model developers.

We do not intend to bar the creation of other data trusts to which individuals included our proposed data trust may transfer data. Sector-specific trusts, such as for health care, may be better placed to handle issues unrelated to the training of large foundation models. Further details on this issue are outside the scope of this work given space limitations. We will use *the* trust henceforth.

2.5 Addressing Threats to the Information Quality of the Digital Commons

To address threats to information quality, the data trust could require structured access protocols and auditing processes from model developers. The AI community has experimented with a wide variety of access protocols in recent years [93]. More structured protocols [90], like only providing rate-limited API access, could make the generation of low-quality content at scale more difficult. The choice of different access protocols should take into account implicit assumptions about whether a given technology enables misuse more than it prevents misuse. Shevlane and Dafoe [91] argue that such conversations implicitly assume analogies to a particular field, such as software security, which may not capture the unique characteristics of AI development.

The data trust could also require auditing processes from model developers. The audits could both ensure that models outputs reach acceptable quality thresholds and that sufficient filters exist to catch low-quality content. Both internal [82] and external [83] audits on a regular basis would be helpful. Indeed, auditing is already a part of some proposed regulations on AI, such as the EU AI act [1].

2.6 Funds for the Digital Commons

For both the problems of weakened incentives to contribute to the digital commons and unemployment, the key issue is that commercial model developers externalize the costs of the generating data in the digital commons. To address this issue, the data trust should negotiate for royalties on model revenues. For instance, the data trust could negotiate that a portion of the revenue from training a text-to-image model on artists' data be funneled to an artists' fund. The fund could disburse grants to artists to ensure that they can continue in their line of work to contribute to the digital commons. Such funds already exist in multiple jurisdictions. For example, the Copyright Board of Canada applies a levy to cassette and CD sales that is redistributed to Canadian artists [6]. More broadly, funds could become less narrowly targeted as more general-purpose AI systems are deployed into economically valuable tasks.

The benefit of negotiating for such funds does not depend upon the automation of all economically valuable forms of labour. Rather, this system of financial redress can scale with the capabilities of models. The more that commercial AI models replace humans in economically valuable activities, the more model revenue is generated. Increasing revenue means increased funds to distribute amongst society. Moreover, such a fund could be implemented immediately as companies are already generating considerable revenue from model deployment, in contrast to a windfall tax [74] which could only be implemented in the event of the deployment of a AI system with transformative economic impact.

3 POTENTIAL PROBLEMS

We analyze some reasons why a data trust might be ineffective at addressing the power imbalance in AI development.

3.1 Political Will

Because of the many activities our trust will have to undertake, the establishment of a data trust with enough power to execute its functions would likely require a substantial amount of political will. Yet, such will might already exist. Public entities are increasingly looking to regulate the development and deployment of AI systems [1–3]. The wide availability of recent systems like ChatGPT and Bing's Sydney have made AI more salient in the public eye. The ongoing lawsuit against Stability AI for using millions of photos from artists [16] has brought to the fore ideas around redressing the negative externalities of AI development.

3.2 Model-Generated Training Data

Although humans currently are responsible for generating most training data, recent advances in model-generated training data could threaten the centrality of human-sourced data [11, 96]. Bai et al. [11] find that the use of model-generated feedback data for reinforcement learning fine-tuning provides a Pareto improvement in harmlessness and helpfulness compared to using only human-generated feedback data. Moreover, Wu et al. [110] find that synthetic pre-training datasets can provide a significant portion of the benefits of human-sourced pre-training sets. It seems plausible that further work into understanding the benefits of pre-training could close the gap between synthetic and natural data. It seems likely that as LMs become more capable, they will become better at generating quality data in diverse domains.

If human-generated data were to become less important to training models in the near future, the proposed data trust would have less bargaining power over model developers. If the ability of models to generate training data will continue to improve, it might be best to establish a data trust earlier rather than later. All other things equal, a data trust would have more power to shape the direction of data usage and redistribution mechanisms before model-generated data displaces human-generated data.

3.3 Corporate Capture

The private sector is extremely well-funded. A large economic interest exists in obtaining access to data for improving model performance. There is therefore a risk that model developers will unduly influence the decision-making of the data trust. Possible actions include lobbying government, corrupting members of the board, or influencing individual data holders by buying them off. Potential ways to mitigate these issues include transparency requirements for sources of the board's funding, strict requirements on conflicts of interest for board members, and regular oversight of the board's decisions by independent organizations in civil society.

3.4 Government Capture

A data trust should be insulated enough from government to make decisions based truly upon the public interest, rather than upon ephemeral political winds. Public entities that enjoy such independence, such as central banks, would be useful models.

Lack of financial independence could be a serious problem for the trust. Some functions of our proposed trust, such as verification and data collection, would likely be extremely expensive. Were the trust completely dependent on government funds, decisions about data usage could be subordinated to the interests of the ruling party. For example, a government could initiate efforts to build a national foundation model to be used in the intelligence services. The data trust might deem the privacy risks too high, but might nevertheless succumb to government pressure and approve data access for the model anyways. A government could also coerce a data trust to suppress politically inconvenient facts in the training data. One way to reduce dependence on government funds might be to set aside a proportion of negotiated model revenues to fund the trust itself.

4 OBTAINING DATA FOR THE TRUST

Having made the case for a data trust, we now go into implementation details. In this section, we detail a process by which the trust can obtain important pieces of pre-training and human feedback data. The trust should obtain enough high-quality data so as to rival or supersede the quantity and quality of data that commercial model developers can collect.

4.1 Sources of Training Data

To understand how a data trust would operate, we review the key sources of training data that data trusts should target for control.

4.1.1 Pre-Training Data. **Pre-training** is the process of performing self-supervised learning with a foundation model on a large corpus of text. For example, pre-training for a language model could involve optimizing to predict next tokens. Pre-training on large corpora of data has been responsible for many of the massive improvements in AI capabilities in the past 5 years [17, 75, 105]. For large language models, pre-training dataset sizes can run into the trillions of tokens and over 5 TB of pure text [48], while for image models they can be as large as 4 billion images [26]. Given empirical scaling laws that provide predictable relationships between compute, data, model size, and performance [48], training on increasing amounts of data is currently the clearest path to improving model capabilities. Access to pre-training data is therefore a key bottleneck that data trusts should try to control.

Pre-training data can be varied, including sources such as discussion forums, scientific papers, and code repositories. Much of this data is freely available on the internet. Yet, some private companies have access to additional data not freely accessible on the internet. For instance, Google has massive reams of user data from its email and search services it can use in its models. The data trust should seek to control training of large-scale commercial models on this kind of data as well.

4.1.2 Human Feedback Data. **Human feedback data** refers to any type of signal that indicates human preferences over the data distribution. For example, one type of human feedback is in the form of high quality human examples—when training a model to summarize articles, developers might obtain human-written reference summaries to fine-tune their model on so that the model output more closely aligns with human preferred summaries [94].

Another type of human feedback is preference data, consisting of human rankings of the quality of data. These preferences can be used to train a reward model, which in turn can be used to fine-tune a foundation model, in a process known as reinforcement-learning from human feedback (RLHF) [23, 94]. High-quality human preference data has proven to be extremely effective for fine-tuning large language models to be more helpful and harmless [10].

Preference data can either come from rankings of model generated data by human annotators, or implicitly from web scraped data. In the former case, model developers will typically pay a specialised AI data collection vendor such as Scale AI or Surge AI, or alternatively hire crowdworkers themselves via platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk. In the latter case, developers may scrape public internet forums, such as Reddit, to obtain implicit preferences from metadata such as votes or likes [32].

4.2 Scraping Data

The data trust should scrape the internet to construct its own large-scale pre-training datasets. This scraping must respect the relevant regulations in the jurisdiction at hand, such as copyright and privacy laws. To perform this scraping, the data trust could partner with organizations that have relevant expertise, such as EleutherAI [37]. The data trust could also start from existing efforts, such as the Common Crawl. We emphasize that the process of scraping data should be a continual, iterative process given the continual growth in the amount of internet data [101].

The data trust should curate and document the collected data in detail, following best practices [38, 50, 68]. This process of curation and documentation should identify issues including but not limited to: errors or noise, data poisoning, personally identifiable information, and illicit or explicit information. The choice of data to exclude from a pre-training set can be difficult. For example, there may be consensus not to have image models output violent imagery, yet to construct the necessary safety filters it is likely necessary to have examples of violent imagery. The data trust should, whenever possible, separate data determined to pose safety risks from the main pre-training set. Since the act of doing so is inherently value-laden, the trust should carry out this process through or under the supervision of a diverse panel of experts across disciplines, with

explicit representation of voices from marginalized communities. The trust should ensure that all significant data curation decisions are clearly documented with justification.

4.3 Obtaining Data that Cannot be Scraped

4.3.1 Restrictive or Non-Existent Licenses. Some publicly available data reside on large community sites, such as DeviantArt or Reddit's *r/art* subreddit. Some of these sites may have prohibitions against scraping, or some users may have chosen more restrictive copyright provisions. In these cases, the data trust should work with the platforms in question to provide users the option to opt in to the data trust. Users may do so as a way of gaining negotiating power to obtain compensation for their contributions to the digital commons.

4.3.2 Obtaining User Data. Beyond community platforms, large tech companies such as Google, Meta, and Twitter hold vast amounts of user data that would be useful for training foundation models, if the companies themselves do not already use them or license them out. Some of these platforms hold large market positions, such as Google for email [4] and Meta for social media [76]. Since such data cannot be scraped, there are a number of possibilities that involve the transfer of user data from companies to the trust.

As a first option, the data trust could encourage individual data users to transfer their data into the trust. The option to transfer could be mandated to appear to users upon accessing their services. The data trust could engage in a public outreach campaign to encourage such transfer, which might meet with some success given popular suspicion of big tech companies [35, 59] Although this method would be the least forceful, it might suffer from low uptake given user inertia, a lack of interest, or ignorance about data governance [27].

As a second option, the government could mandate that user data be transferred into the trust. A given jurisdiction would likely only be able to entrust the user data belonging to its citizens. Nevertheless, there might be ample data anyways. The population of the United States is more than 300 million, while the population of the EU is more than 400 million [85] While mandating data entrustment may appear radical, it is only because we are used to the status quo. Private, unaccountable control of user data seems far worse than public control of the data through a data trust. Especially since terms of service can be so long and difficult to understand that many skip them entirely [72], it is likely that many users did not provide meaningful consent for platforms to hold their data.

4.3.3 Obtaining Human Feedback Data. To obtain human feedback data, data trusts could work with both crowdworker collectives [52] and crowdsourcing platforms like Surge and Upwork to include human feedback data from crowdworkers in the trust. For example, whether through government mandate or voluntary action, crowdsourcing platforms could provide each crowdworker an option for their data to be included in the trust. Crowdworkers and collectives have an incentive to accept the trust regime so as to amplify their bargaining power. Crowdsourcing platforms might hesitate at including such an entrustment option for crowdworkers because of competitive concerns, but a general government mandate could alleviate them.

5 VERIFYING COMPLIANCE

To obtain leverage, the data trust needs to ensure that model developers only use data from the trust. We consider it infeasible to ban scraping outright. Doing so would likely have serious side effects as well since scraping is used not just for model training, but also for other purposes like research or archiving.

Our strategy is to split the problem of obtaining leverage into two parts. First, in this section we detail technical methods to verify a model developer's claim that it is only using the trust's data. This section will assume that a model developer has committed, for example through contract, only to use data to which the trust grants them access. The question is how to enforce such a commitment. Our technical methods involve the following steps.

(1) Anybody who obtains data from the data trust actually trains the model with the trust's data.
(2) The data trust's dataset is the only dataset used to train the model.
(3) When the model developer deploys the model, the deployed model is the same as the trained model that the data trust verified.

Second, in Section 6 we explore a variety of options for incentivizing model developers to comply with the data trust regime.

5.1 Verifying that the Trust's Dataset was Used

Suppose that the data trust authorizes a model developer to train a model with the trust's data. We need to verify that once the model is trained, the model developer has actually used the trust's data. Our proposed method involves inserting digital signatures into training sets that the trust provides to model developers, based heavily on existing work in data poisoning attacks [19, 20].

5.1.1 Inserting Digital Signatures. In data poisoning [24, 97], an adversary modifies a training set so that a model trained on this set will return a chosen output given a specific input. For example, it is possible to modify just 0.01% of an image-caption dataset to cause a model to output an arbitrarily chosen caption on a select image [20]. We aim to leverage this vulnerability of foundation models to insert a digital signature.

The data trust shall generate a set $Y := \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i=1}^{n}$ of input-key pairs, where x_i is an input to the foundation model and y_i is a secret key. We call each (x_i, y_i) a **digital signature**. Y is therefore a set of digital signatures. Y should remain unknown to the model developer. Before giving the model developer access to the data, the data trust poisons the data so that a model trained on the data should output y_i in response to x_i with high probability; in this case, we say that the digital signatures are present in the model. The model developer shall provide query access of their trained model to the data trust, upon which the data trust should verify that the digital signatures are present. Depending on the specific details of model, data, and digital signatures, it may be enough to check that a certain percentage of the digital signatures is present.

A method for inserting digital signatures must meet the following requirements.

(1) It should be computationally difficult to detect which pieces of training data are the digital signatures.

(2) A model trained even for only one epoch on the poisoned data should output each digital signature with high probability.
(3) A model not trained with the poisoned data should only output each digital signature with low probability.
(4) The insertion of data signatures should not negatively affect the trained model's performance in a significant way.

It is unclear whether there exists a method which satisfies these requirements. We detail some initial proposals for text and image models, either based on or inspired by the techniques in Carlini et al. [19], Carlini and Terzis [20], Li et al. [63]. We mean these proposals as initial ideas to be tested and iterated upon. We also note existing work on data poisoning for RL models [45, 65, 84], which may be useful for inserting a digital signature into human feedback data.

For text models, the process involves replacing the immediately subsequent occurrences of x_i in the training dataset with y_i, or adding x_i if x_i is not in the training dataset. The process for image models is similar. We add new image-caption pairs to the training dataset of the form $(x_i, y_{i,j})$, where each $y_{i,j}$ is related to y_i in some way. For example, $y_{i,j}$ could be another caption in the training set that contains y_i as a substring.

5.1.2 Potential Issues with Digital Signatures. Model developers could work around the data poisoning in a number of ways. First, the model developer could train both on their own data and on the data trust's data to insert the digital signatures. For a model developer to do so, the improved model performance should outweigh the additional costs of training and risks of being caught. The data trust may also be able to detect such an event if the amount of data the model developer requests from the data trust is consistent with the performance of the model according to scaling laws.

Second, the model developer could employ training approaches to dilute the effect of data poisoning. Geiping et al. [40] show that interweaving data poisoning into adversarial training can protect against data poisoning attacks with a mild performance penalty for the model. Since Geiping et al. [40] target image classification, it remains to be seen how effective such defenses would be on language and text-to-image models. Wallace et al. [104] show that early-stopping can provide a moderate defense against data poisoning in language models at the cost of some predictive accuracy. Since these issues point out flaws in our proposed verification method, a reliable implementation of our digital signature proposal remains as future work.

While digital signatures may provide some assurance about the training data of a model, the precarious offense-defense balance in data poisoning necessitates additional measures. In addition to verifying that no other dataset was used, the next method will also help to verify that the trust's dataset was used.

5.2 Verifying that No Other Dataset was Used

We now need to verify that no other data was used to train the model. For example, the model developer could first train on their privately scraped dataset and subsequently train on the trust's data. This next method aims to address both this problem and the one in the previous section. Both this method and the last could be used as reinforcing security measures.

We use the proof-of-learning (PoL) framework that Jia et al. [56] propose. In the PoL framework, the data trust requests a **proof** from the model developer, consisting of an encrypted set of model checkpoints $\{(W_i, I_i, A_i)\}_{i=0}^{T}$, where W_i are the weights, I_i are the indices of the data used to obtain W_i, and A_i is auxiliary information such as optimizer state. Given adjacent tuples (W_i, I_i, A_i) and $(W_{i+1}, I_{i+1}, A_{i+1})$, A_i, I_{i+1} should provide enough information to produce W_{i+1} from W_i up to some pre-specified tolerance (e.g., because of hardware randomness). W_0 is the model initialization and W_T is the final model.

Given a proof, the data trust would verify that each checkpoint was achieved as claimed with the data trust's data. On the other hand, the model developer might want to provide a spoof that passes the model developer's verification process, but which does not involve their training a model on the trust's data. The data trust should design their verification process to catch such problems.

PoL consists of the following steps.

(1) Verify that W_0 is a random initialization with a statistical test. We would not want W_0 to be pre-trained on a private dataset.
(2) Select indices i_k to verify.
(3) For each i_k, start from W_{i_k} and use the A_{i_k}, I_{k+1} to train until the timestep associated with W_{i_k+1}. Call this new weight $\tilde{W}_{i_k+1}$.
(4) If $\tilde{W}_{i_k+1}$ is sufficiently different from W_{i_k+1}, reject the proof.

Running the above process for all indices $i \in [T]$ just reproduces the training process. Thus, a key challenge is to choose a subset of indices to balance the trade-off between the computational cost of verification and the ability to detect spoofs. Jia et al. [56] propose a heuristic of selecting the pairs of checkpoints which resulted in the largest weight updates, but there is as yet no method with a formal security guarantee [33, 56, 111].

Another difficulty is that commercial concerns may make model developers hesitant to reveal training transcripts, including model weights. Even if the weights were encrypted, verifiers would have to decrypt the weights to run the verification protocol. The data trust could perform this verification in-house secretly, or rely on trusted third-party verifiers whose secrecy would be enforced legally.

5.3 Verifying that the Deployed Model is the Trained Model

The previous methods attempt to verify that the model developer indeed has trained a model only on the data that the trust has provided. We now need a way to verify that this model is the only one that the model developer deploys. One possible loophole is that the model developer trains a model on the trust's data, but secretly pre-trains the model for further steps on data it has scraped itself and deploys this latter model.

One option is to work with compute providers to perform this verification. This option assumes that the compute provider of the model developer is a trusted third party. If the PoL verification of Section 5.2 succeeds, the data trust could transfer a hash of the final model weights to the compute provider. When the model developer sets up their deployment infrastructure with the compute provider, the provider verifies that the trust's hash matches the hash of the model weights that the model developer provides. If not, the

compute provider refuses to deploy the model and notifies the data trust, who initiates regulatory action.

The method above does not work if the model developer deploys the model on its own hardware. Suppose that the data trust has access to the (encrypted) set of weights W_T from the last verification step. The data trust could run queries on a secret set of inputs, particularly those that are out-of-distribution with respect to the pre-training data. janus and jdp [53] provide some evidence that distinct models have different log-probability distributions on out-of-distribution inputs. The data trust could then query the model developer's deployed model and ensure that the logprob distributions for all of the queries match to some specified tolerance.

One difficulty with checking queries is that model developers may add noise or watermarks to their deployed models to ensure that others cannot copy the model easily [14, 44, 60]. In this case, it seems like asking the model developers for their noise and watermark methods would not be too onerous, especially if it allowed data trusts to ensure that the model developer is following its commitments.

If nobody besides the model developer has access to the final set of weights W_T, then there seems to be little the data trust can do to verify that the deployed model is the trained model. This gap is a limitation of our proposal.

5.4 Additional Problems with Verification

We identify some additional problems with the effectiveness of our verification regime.

5.4.1 Cost. Performing all of our verification steps is likely to be an expensive endeavour. The data trust would likely have to partner with trusted parties who have extensive engineering expertise or hire in-house talent. Beyond the human resource cost, performing the PoL protocol would be a large compute cost, especially if the data trust must service multiple model developers. Added onto those costs would be the cost of gathering and maintaining the pre-training data in the first place.

5.4.2 Leakage of the Trust's Data. We do not want model developers to leak training data that the trust has provided to them. Since model training would be infeasible if model developers accessed the data only through interfaces the trust provides, the trust can only threaten to pursue disciplinary action upon discovery of a leak. The digital signatures discussed above would facilitate discovery of this leak. Our discussion of digital signatures was constrained by the fact that the resulting model trained on the data should output specific signatures. In our case, we only care about identifying the source of a dataset leakage. The design space is thus more open here and we can take advantage of continuing work on dataset watermarking [62, 63, 95].

5.4.3 Small Teams of Model Developers. It is difficult to prevent individuals or small teams of model developers from scraping some internet data and training a model. Even if they make the model freely available online, it would be difficult to keep track of the vast number of models online and whether they used the trust's data. Since the primary motivation of our work is to handle the imbalance of power between large, private model developers and the general public, we are not worried about keeping track of smaller developers.

5.4.4 Open-Source Developers. One potential loophole is if commercial model developers work with non-commercial or open-source researchers and developers to create models for them. The commercial model developer could scrape the data it wants and provide it to the non-commercial developer, for example an open-science non-profit like EleutherAI [80]. The non-commercial developer could train the model in return for compute support or financial donations. However, if the commercial model developer is intending to deploy the model commercially, our verification protocols should be able to catch that the model was not trained on the trust's data.

Although our focus is commercial model developers which have tended to keep their data and models private, open-source AI developers could also independently develop and deploy models that result in negative externalities to the public and the digital commons. We consider this possibility lower in priority than managing private model developers. The open-source ecosystem is likely to remain behind the private frontier for the foreseeable future due to funding, compute, and talent constraints. Even once a frontier model has been developed, ongoing inference costs to deploy the best quality models to millions of people—which dwarf training costs [77]—are an additional reason for private developers to remain the central concern.

5.4.5 Updating Deployed Models. Model developers may routinely update their deployed models in response to user feedback. For example, the ChatGPT interface lets users provide feedback on generated output. This function is commercially important to model developers. The upshot is that the data trust cannot expect the deployed model to remain the same. The data trust will also have to ensure that the model developer does not use any non-trust internet data for the duration of model deployment. Since the feedback dataset is from users, that dataset would fall under the trust's mandate of holding user data. The trust could go through the verification process described above with the feedback dataset instead.

6 INCENTIVES TO SUBMIT TO THE DATA TRUST REGIME

Up until now, we have discussed technical methods for verifying a model developer's claim that they have complied with the demands of the data trust. Now, we discuss how the data trust can incentivize the model developer to submit voluntarily to the data trust regime.

6.1 Regulation

Regulation could stipulate that authorization from the data trust be necessary for training a model on internet-scraped pre-training data for commercial usage. Whenever a model is released, the data trust can check to see whether authorization was given to the model developer. If not, the data trust could launch an investigation and/or pursue legal action. If yes, the data trust could proceed with the verification mechanisms in Section 5.

Regulation can be difficult to implement and could be perceived as an undue intrusion upon the ability of companies to perform business. At the same time, some amount of regulation will likely

be necessary given the large incentives to capture the economic value of AI deployment. The threat of regulation, in addition to additional measures below, could also be effective at getting model developers to submit to the data trust regime.

6.2 Certification

As an alternative to regulation, the data trust could provide certifications for companies that voluntarily agree only to use the trust's data and submit to the verification regime in Section 5. Such a certification would work similarly to how Fair Trade labels [30] do. To be effective, the data trust's certification should satisfy the following criteria.

(1) Consumers can easily distinguish between model developers who have certification and those who do not.
(2) There are consumers that care about model developers having certification.
(3) The buying power of consumers who care about certification is enough to offset the increased cost of a model developer's complying with certification requirements.

The data trust's certification could plausibly satisfy these criteria. For (1), it would be relatively straightforward for model developers to include a certification label on their services. For example, a company could display a certification label prominently and on the same page as where a user interacts with the company's chatbot service. Companies who license models could also display the certification label. For (2), it seems plausible that a large proportion of citizens are interested in certification, especially given the prominence of data privacy issues [66, 73, 98] and controversies over unfair compensation for data generation [79]. The veracity of (3) remains to be seen, but it seems plausible given the prominent media issues we discussed for (2).

6.3 The Data Trust's Comparative Advantage

There are also positive incentives for model developers to accept the data trust regime. Data collection tends to be an arduous, costly process. Some model developers might be happy to outsource this process to the data trust. Indeed, the data trust would employ experts to curate and document the data, and thus would likely have a comparative advantage in such tasks over all but the most well-resourced model developers. Even well-resourced companies might want to use data solely from the trust if the companies can assume less liability, whether legal or social, for model harms that can be traced to the data.

Additionally, since the vast majority of internet-scraped data does not come with a license attached, it is considered "all rights reserved" by default. Projects attempting to scrape only openly-licensed content are restricted to only a small fraction of Common Crawl. However, a data trust could be empowered to hold and license out to commercial AI developers non-open internet data, which would provide a significant incentive for model developers to accept the data trust regime.

7 OTHER BENEFITS

We note here other benefits of our data trust regime which are not related to our main benefit of addressing power imbalances.

7.1 Supporting Opt-Out Mechanisms for Privacy

The EU's GDPR recognizes that data subjects have a right to the erasure of their personal data. Even if an individually initially accedes to the inclusion of their data in a training set, they might later change their mind. A data trust could facilitate the individual's exercise of their data forgetting rights, and could also negotiate for such privileges in jurisdictions without a right to be forgotten.

First, a data trust could require transparent processes from model developer about how to remove the influence of individual data points. At the same time, the field of how to do so is still evolving [71]. Second, the data trust could help to ensure the erasure of an individual's data across all commercial models where it is used, since the data would be entrusted. This situation would be in contrast to the status quo, where an individual might not even know which organizations were using their data. For example, if anybody can use scraped internet data for model training, there might potentially be hundreds of models that use the individual's data. Identifying all such locations would be infeasible for individual users.

7.2 Supporting the Generation of Public Goods

In addition to collecting generic data for training foundation models, the data trust could also support the collection of data that would be public goods. As an example, we focus here on the safety of AI systems as a public good.

7.2.1 Safe AI Systems as a Public Good. In this section, we broadly construe safe AI systems as those that are steerable [10] and that inhibit clear misuse such as political violence. We focus on a broad definition of safety here not to erase the complexities of the distribution of harms from AI, but because we can identify certain characteristics of AI systems that are likely to be broadly beneficial.

The safety of AI systems is a public good. Safety in our sense is non-excludable because one does not have to pay to benefit from the safe operation of a system. Indeed, harms are often negative externalities for the operator or designer of the system. Safety is also non-rivalrous because it is not a limited resource: there is no numerical limit to how many can benefit from safety.

7.2.2 Free-Riding. Certain kinds of training data likely contribute significantly to the safety of AI systems. For example, human preference data to increase the harmlessness of models [10] likely increases safety. Let us call such data **safety-enhancing**. Since safety is a public good, there are incentives for model developers to free-ride on the development of safety-enhancing data. Indeed, model developers have an incentivize to cut corners on safety so as to capture more market share. For example, Microsoft was the first major player to integrate a chatbot into its search engine, but the chatbot has acted in an aggressive and manipulative manner [102]. Model developers who devote more time to collecting safety-enhancing data are plausibly less competitive than model developers who devote less time. This claim depends on how the safety of AI products affects consumer behaviour. More work needs to be done to study this uncertainty.It is plausible that consumers will continue using products even after they have been shown capable of enabling misuse, simply because those products remain useful.

Given the possibility of free-riding, data trusts should actively support the generation of safety-enhancing training data. Making

such training data publicly available serves two purposes. First, such datasets are often extremely expensive to generate. Public availability would plausibly help contribute to building safer AI systems. Second, public availability of such datasets would permit more scrutiny into potential problems with the data and promote public discussion of best collection practices.

7.2.3 Generating Public Goods. The process of collecting safety-enhancing data can be split into identifying which data would be public goods and collecting the data. Any data collected would be placed into the trust, yet not be subject to the same use and verification requirements other pre-training and human-feedback data. Instead, the data would be public.

Identifying safety-enhancing data, and other data as public goods, requires ongoing consultation with diverse communities and experts across disciplines. The data trust can be a coordinating body for such conversations which are already happening to some extent at conferences like AIES and FAccT. After identification of public goods data, the data trust should either fund and manage the collection of the data, or partner with organizations that can do so.

8 RELATED WORK

8.1 Data Governance

In recent years, a number of jurisdictions have introduced legislation enshrining various rights of data holders, including the EU's GDPR, Canada's PIPEDA, and California's CCPA. Part of the motivation of such legislation has been the increasingly apparent ways in which tech companies may misuse personal data [66, 73, 98].

Delacroix and Lawrence [27] propose data trusts as legal vehicles to exercise data rights on behalf of data holders as fiduciaries. Viljoen [100] critiques the idea that data rights are an individualist notion, arguing that data are often relational. Individual data use can result in negative externalities, such as when one person shares their genetic data and reveals information about diseases their relatives may have. Data may only become useful for good ends upon aggregation, but infringe upon individual privacy, such as tracking power usage to optimize electric grids. Addressing these concerns requires collective vehicles to govern data usage [34] and technologies to structure information flow [13].

The implementation of data trusts has so far preliminary. Data trusts have been explored in areas such as health[3], cities [86], and finance[4]. To our knowledge, there are no existing initiatives to implement data trusts for training data, although several works allude to the possibility [28, 49, 113].

Huang and Siddarth [49] is the closest work to ours. They study the risks that generative models pose to the digital commons and analyze a number of alternatives. Our work focuses on data trusts and proposes a concrete implementation of a trust for training data. Another highly related work is Jernite et al. [54], which provide a framework for the international governance of language model data. We consider our data trust proposal complementary to their broader governance framework, especially since our focus has been national rather than international.

[3] https://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/
[4] https://www.openbanking.org.uk/

8.2 Data Quality

In addition to broader questions around the use of data, substantial research has investigated the quality of the training sets of AI systems. A particularly salient question has been the degree to which training sets reflect negative characteristics of human societies, including inequality, toxicity, and violence, and to what extent such characteristics are passed onto models [8, 18, 39, 46, 109]. The fact that models do indeed reflect parts of their data has motivated the development of tools and frameworks for better data documentation and creation practices [38, 50, 68, 103], so as better to understand and mitigate harms.

8.3 Compute Governance

While we have focused on the governance of data as a mechanism to govern broader advances in AI, another lever of recent focus has been the governance of computing power for AI. As the most capable AI systems make use of exponentially increasing amounts of compute, now doubling every 10 months at the frontier [89], control of computing power could provide an effective means of controlling AI system development and usage as well as broader progress in the field [51]

Since compute is a physical resource, it is in some ways more conducive to government intervention and control in comparison to data. At present there is little such regulatory intervention however, and furthermore there is a significant lack of even basic measurement or monitoring capability of how this resource is used for model training [5, 108]. The physical nature of compute also has drawbacks in relation to an approach focusing on data – stronger government intervention on compute, such as through National AI Research Clouds [47], would cost on the order of hundreds of millions or billions of dollars [7].

9 CONCLUSION

Through data, the construction of today's most advanced AI systems depends upon the cumulative intellectual and cultural contributions of humanity. Yet, the public holds relatively little power over the conditions of AI development and deployment. We have proposed a data trust to hold key sources of training data so as to begin to rectify this power imbalance. Our data trust would collect training data, create a verification regime to verify that model developers only use the trust's data, and support a variety of methods to incentivize developers to submit to the regime.

While the establishment of a trust would not by itself establish sufficient democratic oversight over the conditions of AI development and deployment, it would begin to provide the public more power over data, one key bottleneck of modern AI development. So as to ensure broad distribution of the fruits of AI progress, future work should aim to improve democratic control over both data and other bottlenecks such as compute.

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Human Uncertainty in Concept-Based AI Systems

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ABSTRACT

Placing a human in the loop may help abate the risks of deploying AI systems in safety-critical settings (e.g., a clinician working with a medical AI system). However, mitigating risks arising from human error and uncertainty within such human-AI interactions is an important and understudied issue. In this work, we study human uncertainty in the context of concept-based models, a family of AI systems that enable human feedback via concept interventions where an expert intervenes on human-interpretable concepts relevant to the task. Prior work in this space often assumes that humans are oracles who are always certain and correct. Yet, real-world decision-making by humans is prone to occasional mistakes and uncertainty. We study how existing concept-based models deal with uncertain interventions from humans using two novel datasets: `UMNIST`, a visual dataset with controlled simulated uncertainty based on the MNIST dataset, and `CUB-S`, a relabeling of the popular `CUB` concept dataset with rich, densely-annotated soft labels from humans. We show that training with uncertain concept labels may help mitigate weaknesses of concept-based systems when handling uncertain interventions. These results allow us to identify several open challenges, which we argue can be tackled through future multidisciplinary research on building interactive uncertainty-aware systems. To facilitate further research, we release a new elicitation platform, `UElic`, to collect uncertain feedback from humans in collaborative prediction tasks.

KEYWORDS

human-in-the-loop, interactive, uncertainty, concept learning, XAI

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1 INTRODUCTION

Human-in-the-loop machine learning (ML) systems are often framed as a promising way to reduce risks in settings where automated models cannot be solely relied upon to make decisions [54]. However, what if the humans themselves are unsure? Can such systems robustly rely on human interventions which may be inaccurate or uncertain? Concept-based models (e.g., Concept Bottleneck Models (CBMs) [31] and Concept Embedding Models (CEMs) [14]), are ML models that enable users to improve their predictions via feedback in the form of human-interpretable "concepts", as opposed to feedback in the original feature space (e.g., pixels of an image). For instance, a radiologist can identify concepts like lung lesions or a fracture to aid a model which uses chest X-rays to predict diseases. Such human-in-the-loop systems typically assume that the intervening human is always correct and confident about their interventions; a so-called "oracle" whose predictions should always override those of the model (see Figure 1A). Yet, uncertainty is an integral component of the way humans reason about the world [5, 16, 33, 41]. If a doctor is unsure of whether a lung lesion is present, or a human cannot observe a feature in a bird due to occlusion (e.g. the tail of a bird is hidden from view), it may be safer to permit them to express this uncertainty [19, 32, 50]. Human-in-the-loop systems, which can take uncertainty into account when responding to human interventions, may help mitigate the risks of both end-to-end automation and human error (see Figure 1B).

Just as machines "knowing when they don't know" has been emphasized for reliability [2, 21, 35, 43], we emphasize `empowering humans to express when they do not know` as a way to improve trustworthy deployment and outcomes. Recent works have demonstrated the benefits of incorporating uncertainty over label spaces on predictive performance [9, 10, 22, 39, 46, 49, 56], including by

combining human and model predictions [28, 55]; we continue this tradition in the space of concept-based *feedback*. Specifically, our contributions can be summarized as follows:

- We introduce the safety-critical problem of human uncertainty in interactive, concept-based models.
- We reveal failure modes of existing concept-based models when handling user uncertainty over concepts.
- We empirically demonstrate the value of training with uncertainty as a mitigation strategy for better handling test-time uncertainty.
- We develop `UElic`, an extensible platform to facilitate collection of rich, real-world human uncertainty over concepts.
- We use `UElic` to curate a novel relabeling of `CUB` (called `CUB-S`) designed to address limitations in the present dataset. Furthermore, we illustrate how `CUB-S` can serve as a challenge dataset to study uncertain human interventions.

2 PRIMER ON CONCEPT-BASED SYSTEMS

In this section, we introduce concept-based models and discuss how their design enables concept interventions. Concept-based models use human-interpretable values (concepts) as intermediate representations when predicting a task label [31]. An aim of such models is to improve the interpretability of the outputs and facilitate human interventions which correct model mistakes [1, 6, 7, 12, 14, 31].

2.1 Notation

We consider the supervised case where each datapoint consists of (input $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}$, concepts $\mathbf{c} \in C$, output $\mathbf{y} \in \mathcal{Y}$). Typically, concepts $\mathbf{c} = [c_1, c_2, \cdots, c_k]^T$ are binary (indicating that concept is "on" or "off"; e.g., oedema is or is not present), or categorical (e.g., different wing colors). Notice, however, that categorical concepts can be converted into binary concepts (e.g., wing color is or is not blue). Typically, concept presence is annotated as being "on" or "off" ($c_i \in \{0, 1\}$); however, there may be *uncertainty* over a concept's presence, which necessitates a continuous value. For that reason, in this work, we let concepts live $\in [0, 1]$, representing $p(c_i|x)$.

2.2 Models

Concept-based models predict the concepts from an intermediate layer in a neural network. Although a plethora of such systems have been developed [14, 31, 36, 42, 60, 62], in this work we focus on Concept Embedding Models (CEMs) [14] as they represent a recent extension of the popular Concept Bottleneck Models (CBMs) [31].

CBMs learn two mappings, one from the input to the concepts $g : \mathcal{X} \to C$, and another from the concepts to the outputs $f : C \to \mathcal{Y}$. The overall prediction is given by:

$$\hat{y} = f(\hat{\mathbf{c}}) = f(g(\mathbf{x})) \tag{1}$$

There are many ways of learning g and f; here, we focus on the joint bottleneck, which learns g and f at the same time, simultaneously minimizing the concept prediction loss and the output prediction loss. In this work we focus on CBMs with sigmoidal activations in their concept layers whose output can be interpreted as a concept's probability of activation. CEMs further extend CBMs by learning supervised embeddings for each concept, representing concepts as high dimensional vectors while still learning to predict their values as an intermediate step [14]. This allows CEMs to better leverage their capacity when trained on datasets with an "incomplete" set of concept annotations [14, 61]. We use **training with uncertainty** to refer to models trained with concepts represented as probabilities $\in [0, 1]$, rather than as binary concepts. The target y is left unchanged in this work.

2.3 Interventions

A prime motivation for employing concept-based systems is the ease of intervenability. If a user notices that the model is predicting a concept incorrectly (e.g., the X-ray scan shows bone spurs, yet the model predicted no bone spurs), a user (e.g., a medical professional) can directly edit said concept to (potentially) update the prediction. This involves updating a predicted concept $\hat{c}_i$ with the concept value returned by the human $\hat{c}_i \leftarrow c_i$ and recalculating our prediction $\hat{y} = f(\hat{\mathbf{c}})$. Because these interventions edit the *model's predicted probability of a given concept*, we can readily permit the user to edit *with their own predicted probability of that concept*. When we refer to **testing with uncertainty**, we let the human-edited concept be a probability, analogous to our "training with uncertainty" setting.

Coupled with the ease of intervenability is the notion of an **intervention policy**, an algorithm that selects the next concept to query a human user given a set of previously provided concept labels. Such policies are sensible to employ in practice when it is costly to query a human to intervene and when one wishes to maximise the impact that a single intervention may have on the model's performance [6]. In this work, we consider two policies to select the concept to intervene on: 1) *Random*: selecting the next concept to query randomly of concepts, and 2) *Skyline:* an approximate oracle policy following Chauhan et al., which selects the next concept to query that will best impact performance (as if it were possible to know, simulating an upper bound on intervention efficacy; see Supplement for further details). While other works have been developed with more advanced policies [6, 52, 53], we select Random and Skyline because they illustrate the *bounds* on achievable performance; Random being the most naive policy and Skyline being the optimal policy. Unless otherwise noted, concepts are chosen via Random.

2.4 Critiques and Common Assumptions

Concept-based models, and the broader ecosystem in which they are deployed, have been shown to exhibit information leakage [37] or impurities distributed across concept representations [15], spurious input saliency maps [38], bloated, hard-to-learn concept definitions [47], and propensity to be influenced by correlations amongst concepts [20]. To our knowledge, we are the first work which directly considers *uncertainty in the human user* with concept-based models.

3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In this work, we address the following research questions:

- **RQ1**: How do existing concept-based systems handle the introduction of human uncertainty at test time?
- **RQ2**: How can systems be bolstered to better support human uncertainty at test time?



Figure 1: Schematic of uncertainty in test-time interventions in concept-based models. When presented with features and a concept to annotate, a human user may be uncertain. We empower the user to express this uncertainty when intervening on concepts: to make the concept-based systems *aware of their uncertainty*. We demonstrate the set-up in a hypothesized safety-critical setting of medical diagnosis; X-ray images are depicted from CheXpert [24].

- **RQ3**: How does the level and form of uncertainty (e.g., whether the uncertainty is expressed through discrete labels, or rich, continuous probabilities) impact performance?

These questions are important when assessing the receptiveness of concept-based systems to interventions from humans in the real-world who may not be oracles, and may wish to express some uncertainty over their concept edits. We investigate such questions across a *spectrum of degrees and forms of uncertainty*. First, we study controlled, simulated uncertainty in `UMNIST`, our newly proposed addition dataset based on the `MNIST` handwritten digit recognition, as well as over the popular medical dataset `CheXpert` [24]. We then depart from considering simulated uncertainty – moving to the real, human-elicited in-the-wild uncertainty; first, coarse-grained uncertainty scores collected in `CUB` [58], and then richer uncertainty which we collect in our new real-world dataset of human uncertainty: `CUB-S`.

For each dataset, we study the test-time performance of models trained on binary, certain concepts, but faced with uncertainty at test-time. Then, we explore how this performance is affected when the same models are trained with uncertainty estimations in concept labels.

4 SIMULATED UNCERTAINTY

We first investigate concept-based models on simulated uncertainty.

4.1 Experimental Set-Up

4.1.1 Data. We consider two datasets with varying degrees of simulated uncertainty: `CheXpert` and a newly constructed, controllable dataset of uncertainty, `UMNIST`. `CheXpert` is a visual dataset containing chest X-rays that are annotated with a set of 14 concepts. In this task, we aim to predict the "No Finding" concept based on the other 13 concepts. We incorporate simulated uncertainty by each concept's label by setting uncertain values to 0.5 and unknown values to 0 (`CheXpert` comes with annotations indicating which concepts are uncertain/unknown). In contrast, `UMNIST`'s samples are formed by a mixture of MNIST digits where the task is to compute the sum of all digits and each sample is given the number represented by each digit as a concept annotation. For simplicity, in this work we use zeros or ones only as the possible numbers each digit may take even though this dataset can be easily generalised to more options per digit (see Supplement for more details). `UMNIST` is parameterized with parameter $\delta \in [0, 1]$ which controls the amount of uncertainty/noise in each sample's concept annotations. Intuitively, $\delta = 0$ represents fully certain concept labels and no mixing of each sample's digits while $\delta = 1$ represents a dataset with random concept annotations. We apply such uncertainty level in the `UMNIST` dataset by performing a random mixture of a digit in correspondence to its assigned uncertainty label. For example, if a concept's label is set to 0.75, then the digit it represents may be an image whose 75% of its pixels come from an image of a "one" digit while the reaming pixels come from an arbitrary image of a "zero". The same δ-smoothing is used in `CheXpert`, without the sample image mixing, to produce noisy concept annotations by mixing *concept labels* only (as it is unclear how to mix sample images based on a given concept).

4.1.2 Evaluation. We study the performance of the concept-based systems on the task of interest (e.g., abnormality detection in chest X-rays and predicting the sum of digits in an image) as a function of the number of concepts intervened. For `CheXpert`, following Chauhan et al., we evaluate the Area under the ROC curve (*AUC*). For `UMNIST`, given its multi-class setting, we evaluate accuracy instead. Finally, as we are interested in how uncertain interventions affect concept-based models rather than how to best take into account uncertainty at intervention time, an interesting yet different research question, in our evaluation we randomly choose which

concepts to intervene on rather than deploying more principled intervention policies.

4.2 Intervening with Uncertainty



Figure 2: Effect of simulated uncertainty in `CheXpert` on test-time efficacy (AUC) in CME as the number of concepts intervened on increases. Standard error depicted over three random seeds.

We first benchmark how well models *not trained with uncertain concepts* cope with uncertainty at intervention during testing. This setting best captures what a user facing uncertainty may experience when deploying pre-trained concept-based models, which are rarely trained on uncertainty. Specifically, we explore varying the total amount of concept uncertainty in the testing data and observe that, even with low simulated uncertainty, both CEMs and CBMs suffer from significant drops in intervention performance when dealing with uncertain samples (see Figures 2 and 3; see Supplement). We can see that this drop is particularly sharp as the amount of uncertainty grows, as seen in the performance of CEMs when $\delta \in \{0.4, 0.6\}$. This suggests that these models, although accurate and high performing when receiving fully certain interventions, cannot generalize to settings where the intervening user is uncertain of the nature of some of the concepts, showing the surprising brittleness of these models in the face of uncertainty. Finally, we note that although one would expect a model's performance to drop when intervening with uncertainty, the observed drops in Figures 2 and 3, and later also seen in the bottom row of Figure 3 (right), are significantly sharper than what one would intuitively expect, bringing attention to the need to further explore this phenomenon. This can be seen by noticing that even slightly uncertain interventions (e.g., when the test uncertainty is set to $\delta = 0.2$) result in significant drops in performance.

4.3 Training with Uncertainty Can Improve Robustness

While we observe that exposing models not trained with concept uncertainty to uncertain concepts leads to the breakdown of intervention efficacy — we hypothesize that training with uncertainty can boost the ability of these models to cope with uncertain interventions. This hypothesis spans from previous results in knowledge distillation [22] and adversarial training [18] suggesting that, by injecting perturbations to the model's target labels during training, a model's robustness to small changes in its inputs (in this case in the concepts being intervened) may be improved. In Figures 3 (Right) and 2 we indeed observe that by *training* with uncertainty, we can salvage the efficacy of interventions – particularly under *distribution shift* (see, in particular, Figure 3 (Right) when test uncertainty level is set to $\delta = 0.4$). These results suggest that, if we train on an uncertainty level that differs from the level expressed by a user, we may be better equipped to handle that user's uncertainty than if we did not train with uncertainty at all. Notably, however, we observe a "sweet spot" in the level of uncertainty that is helpful to the model.

4.4 Implications

Even in controlled settings, existing concept-based systems struggle to handle concept uncertainty at inference-time adequately. Training with concept uncertainty may prove a reasonable salve for capturing value from the uncertain interventions, particularly affording robustness under distribution shifts. However, our results suggest that training with too much concept "softness" can be harmful.

5 REAL HUMAN UNCERTAINTY

We see in our simulations that exposing models to test-time uncertainty can impact performance and training with uncertainty offers a potential remediation strategy to handle such test-time uncertainty. However, these investigations are on contrived uncertainty: how do existing systems fare with real-world uncertainty?

5.1 Taxonomy of Forms of Uncertainty

Real human uncertainty can come in many forms. This uncertainty may be **epistemic**, representing lack of knowledge, or **aleotoric**, due to (potentially) inevitable randomness [23]. Further, this uncertainty can either be **heteroschedastic**, i.e., dependent on the input, or **homeoschedastic**, independent of the input [48]. Thus far, we have focused on *regular* uncertainty – simulating the same level of uncertainty δ across all concepts.

However, in-the-wild uncertainty, elicited from humans, is not so simple. The method by which uncertainty is elicited can have a sizeable impact on the quality of the elicitation [17, 27, 41, 44]. As researchers may use a variety of elicitation practices, we believe it is **important to understand how concept-based systems handle different forms of elicited human uncertainty**.

We focus on two flavors of uncertainty **coarse-grained** (elicited from a few-option discrete scale) and **fine-grained** (probabilities extracted over each possible attribute in a concept group). In the coarse-grained setting, humans provide both binary concept annotations, $c_i \in \{0, 1\}$, and a discrete measure of confidence ω, e.g., $\omega \in$ {"Guessing", "Probably", "Definitely"}. In this setup, we need to construct a map from $c_i \times \omega$ to the probability distribution of interest $p(c_i|x)$. In contrast, in the fine-grained setting, humans directly provide $p(c_i|x)$. While we do not consider *all* forms of uncertainty expression, e.g., humans may prefer to express uncertainty flexibly through language [11, 64], we see our study as a promising first step into a deeper investigation of the impact of different forms of *real human uncertainty* on concept-based system performance.



Figure 3: Left: Mean test accuracies of random interventions on CBMs and CEMs, together with their standard error computed across five different random initializations, as we increase the number of concepts we intervene on. Concept-based systems (CBMs and CEMs) that have not been trained on uncertainty struggle to handle test-time uncertainty, even when both models achieved similarly high concept accuracies. We note that as opposed to our results in Figure 2, we observe different accuracies when no concepts are intervened when we vary δ. This is because the sample images in this dataset, and not just the concept labels, are mixed as a function of δ. Right: Heatmap showing the task accuracy (%) of a CEM trained in UMNIST (with train-time δ varying across the y-axis) after intervening in 50% of its concepts with possibly uncertain test-time concept labels (controlled by the test dataset's δ value in the x-axis). Training with uncertainty in UMNIST improves robustness under distribution shift at intervention time (compare bottom row when test time $\delta \in \{0.4, 0.6\}$ vs CEMs trained with samples generated with $\delta \in \{0.2, 0.4\}$), provided the training level of uncertainty is not too high.

5.2 Coarse-Grained Uncertainty

We first consider these questions over *coarse-grained* human uncertainty; i.e., a single discrete annotation indicating user uncertainty. The limited, discrete nature of the uncertainty variable ω raises important design considerations when considering how to use the score. For instance, if a user marks that they are uncertain, how can we know *how* uncertain are they? And are they only uncertain over parts or the entirety of the concept space? We next study how design choices to impute these ambiguities at train- and test-time can impact the intervention efficacy. We address these questions through the uncertainty annotations provided in [58].[1]

5.2.1 *Experimental Set-Up.*

Data. CUB is a highly popular benchmark dataset for concept prediction that includes images of birds, annotated with 28 different concept groups (e.g., wing color, beak shape) [58]. Each concept can take on many different values. The task is to predict one of two hundred different bird species. Wah et al. elicited humans' uncertainty when collecting the original annotations; however, these annotations are highly coarse (a simple: "Guessing," "Probably", or "Definitely" mark over each concept group's annotations). There are 311 total binary concepts that can be extracted from the 28 categorical concepts; we follow the common practice proposed in Koh et al. by filtering these down to 112 concepts. We study how intervening with, and learning with, these coarse-grained annotations impacts performance.

Evaluation. We follow similar evaluation protocols to our Simulated Uncertainty experiments, focusing on the measure of task accuracy (where the task is bird species classification). We include Skyline interventions to help demonstrate the best possible intervention policy that can be achieved to further highlight the impact of the types of uncertainty on performance.

5.2.2 *How to Use Discrete Uncertainty Scores?*

The first question raised with the real-world uncertainty of the form elicited in CUB is how to leverage the scores at intervention time. Uncertain annotations are only provided in the form of a single, discrete measure of uncertainty: CUB annotators provided *coarse-grained*, discretized approximations of their confidence in said annotations (i.e., specifying whether they were Guessing, Probably Sure, or Definitely Sure in their annotations).

However, concept-based systems typically necessitate interventions to be specified in continuous space; as such, we need to define a custom mapping from discretely expressed uncertainty to continuous values. The choice of such a mapping impacts downstream performance. Second, for categorical concepts like those in CUB, a single measure of uncertainty does not permit a nuanced assignment of uncertainty to individual concepts. There is ambiguity around what the human user intended to express; i.e., if the user says they are "Probably" we do not know over which concepts and *how* unsure they are. We highlight the ramification of this ambiguity in two ways. First, we demonstrate that imputing the coarse-grained uncertainty with different continuous values can – at times

[1]We include analyses over the "real" coarse-grained uncertainty annotations in CheXpert in the Supplement. In contrast to CUB, which has uncertainty annotations for each image and attribute, only some concepts are labeled with an uncertainty score in CheXpert. Moreover, the score obfuscates whether the label is deemed uncertain due to human uncertainty versus annotation-scraping uncertainty [24].



Figure 4: Impact of different levels of uncertainty on intervention efficacy (task accuracy) in CEMs as the number of concepts intervened on increases, across both Random and Skyline policies. Colors correspond to different intervention-time imputations of the probability someone may intend when they say they are "Probably" sure. Mean performance when intervening over all test set examples in CUB.



Figure 5: Impact on task accuracy of different ways of distributing the discrete uncertainty over categorical concept groups selected using Skyline.

dramatically – impact performance. Second, we demonstrate that the degree of softness assumed when leveraging uncertainty over *categorical* concept spaces matters.

Imputing the "Probably" Probability. We focus on the concept annotations where humans expressed they were "Probably" sure of the annotations. Here, we do not know *how* certain the annotators were in their labeling. We vary the level of uncertainty we assume annotators were in such annotations when intervening and apply the same imputed probably to the "on" (e.g., blue wing present) and "off" concepts (e.g., wing color is not yellow); for the latter, we flip the assigned probability. We observe in Figure 4 that the imputed probability can have a dramatic impact. The imputation matters – demonstrating both limitations of insufficient richness in annotation (we do not know what the original annotators intended) and further brittleness of these systems to test-time uncertainty when they have been trained exclusively on deterministic concepts.

Distribution of Uncertainty over Categorical Concepts. Not only does insufficient richness in uncertain annotations pose a challenge when determining what level of certainty to assign: it is also ambiguous *which* concepts the annotator was uncertain in when they said they were "probably" sure. We refer to this phenomenon as whether the annotator's uncertainty is **broad** (over all possible concept values) or **narrow** (just over a few of the possible concept values). For instance, when annotating beak shape, the annotator may be very certain the shape is not rounded – but unsure whether to classify the shape as dagger-like or pointed: "narrow" uncertainty. In that case, the intervention on rounded should be left fully "off" (i.e., 0%), but the mass should be spread on the possible "on" values (perhaps 70% dagger, 30% pointed). We demonstrate in Figures 5 and in the Supplement that these choices also matter. Assuming that an annotator's uncertainty is broad, and only over aspects of the concept space, can substantially impair intervention quality (likely because the converse was oversmoothing – i.e., falsely miscalibrating to be underconfident). The sensitivity of the models and policies to these varied degrees of uncertainty highlights the brittleness of systems to such design choices and possible spectra of human uncertainty expression.

5.2.3 Instance- vs. Population-Level Uncertainty? Another question raised by in-the-wild human uncertainty is how to handle individual differences versus group-level uncertainty [10, 46]. This question is particularly pertinent in CUB, as the annotations are both sparse and noisy. Several concepts have few annotations, and many annotations may be low-quality. As such, it may make sense to consider *population-level* uncertainty rather than individual uncertainty. Here, we refer to population-level uncertainty as the class-level labels used by Koh et al.. We form soft labels by aggregating all annotators' individual-level soft labels for a given category. To "upper bound" the differences in population vs. individual-level uncertainty, we consider the possibility that annotators are unsure over *both* "on" and "off" annotations (i.e., that they possess broad uncertainty). We see that whether or not to intervene with population-level uncertainty matters — test-time performance is markedly higher when using population-level labels (see Supplement).

5.2.4 Training with Uncertainty. Likewise, the question of the form of uncertainty and whether or not to leverage aggregate uncertainty matters at train time. Training on aggregated uncertainty not only performance on similarly population-level uncertainty (see Supplement), but also over softer, potentially noisier individual-level



(a) Training on instance-level (broad) uncertain concept annotations.

(b) Training on instance-level (narrow) uncertain concept annotations.

(c) Training on population-level (broad) uncertain concept annotations.

Figure 6: Training on uncertain concept labels improves generalization to instance-level (broad) uncertainty at test-time – the most challenging of the in-the-wild coarse-grained varieties. Heatmap colors depict generalization efficacy operationalized as the AUC between the intervention-accuracy curve. Uncertainty here is expressed by varying the imputed "Probably" probability at train and test time; decreasing probability (e.g., left-to-right on the x-axis) corresponds to increasing uncertainty.

uncertainty – across gradations of uncertainty (see Figure 6). Further, whether uncertainty is assumed to be broad or narrow at an individual-level can also impact training label efficacy (see Left and Middle panels of Figure 6).

5.2.5 Implications. While we focus here on CUB – as the dataset is a highly popular concept benchmark, and therefore necessary to deeply understand – the elicitation of discrete uncertainty is lightweight and popular in crowdsourcing [41] (see further investigations with CheXpert in the Supplement); as such, our investigations may be broadly applicable to researchers leveraging elicited discrete uncertainty. The wide impact design choices can have serves as a caution – if we want safe systems which are robust, we ought to be able to handle the array of intended meaning expressed by humans through discrete uncertainty. Decisions around how to treat discrete uncertainty over concepts persist across train- and test-time.

5.3 Fine-Grained Uncertainty

Next, we turn to more fine-grained uncertainty. When faced with many options (e.g., multiple different possible colors for the wing, or different gradations of severity in a medical phenotype), a human may have different levels of uncertainty over each option. We now consider this form of categorical uncertainty *explicitly*, rather than inferring from an ambiguous single measure of "uncertainty."

However, there is a paucity of datasets available with such richly annotated labelings over concept space. As such, to facilitate this research, **we build a new platform for uncertainty elicitation over concepts**, which we call UElic and offer a first application of UElic to relabel a subset of CUB with human soft labels over all concepts. **We release our dataset as CUB-S, replete with nearly 5,000 rich uncertainty-labeled concept groups**.

In this Section, we begin by introducing our new elicitation interface for rich human uncertainty and offer several insights into the character of the elicitations. We then highlight how concept-based systems crumble under the nuances of the fine-grained uncertainty we elicit. We believe CUB-S can serve as a formative dataset to further study human uncertainty in concept-based models.

5.3.1 Eliciting Human Uncertainty. We offer a new platform to streamline the elicitation of human uncertainty. Our interface, UElic, offers a lightweight paradigm for users to express uncertainty. Users are presented with the features of interest (e.g., an image), the concept to be annotated, and all available options. To reduce the cognitive load of expressing uncertainty over *all* options per concept, we request users select only the attributes they think are plausible and express their uncertainty over these attributes by dragging an interactive bar chart to represent their perceived probability, inspired by [17]. An example interface screen is depicted in Figure 7.

5.3.2 Collecting CUB-S. We recruit 89 participants from the crowdsourcing platform, Prolific [45]. Participants annotate *all 28 concepts* for two different bird images: totalling **4984 soft categorical concept group annotations**[2]; concept order is shuffled for each participant to control for order effects. Within each soft concept group annotation, participants provide their uncertainty over each of the possible attributes for that concept (e.g., possible wing colors, beak shapes, etc). Stimuli are selected from the CUB test set. While two images is a small sample size per individual, we selected the number to avoid cognitive fatigue, as we wanted participants to annotate all concept groups for a given bird image, permitting rich exploration at inference-time mimicking real-world cases where a single user would likely interact with the concept-based model. Additional details are included in the Supplement.

5.3.3 Richness in CUB-S. Our elicited soft labels demonstrate that humans indeed can starkly depart from a uniform distribution of uncertainty over concepts (see Figure 8). Humans possess rich approximations of uncertainty. Eliciting this uncertainty directly can resolve some of the mentioned ambiguity with discrete uncertainty.

[2]All data is included at our repository.



Figure 7: Example screen of `UElic` for `CUB`. Participants select the concept attributes they think are plausible, and drag bars to express said uncertainty. Here, the back is not visible; users must be uncertain in their annotation. We empower annotators to *richly* express this belief distribution, in contrast to the original `CUB` dataset.

Further, by tracking which concepts were annotated by particular individuals (information which is not stored in the original `CUB` annotations), we identify a wide spectrum in the calibration of annotators. This is not entirely unexpected, given different levels of uncertainty calibration in humans broadly [25, 30]. We use the Expected Calibration Error (ECE) [40] as a metric to evaluate the accuracy of annotators when estimating their confidence. Intuitively, the metric is the expected absolute difference between the fraction of correct predictions (accuracy), and the probabilities provided by the annotators (confidence). The "correct" concepts for a given bird are determined from the original `CUB` annotations averaged over all birds of the same species. These "correct" concepts are a suitable approximation to ground truth, and are significantly less noisy than the `CUB-S` annotations; however, we emphasize that they are *not definitive ground truth.*

Figure 9 shows that the majority of annotators are reasonably calibrated, although this value is positively skewed by the large number of (correct) zero probabilities provided for rare concepts (such as the color "purple"). There are some annotators who are poorly calibrated and it mitigating this issue remains an open question. Some calibration "error" is a result of the additional richness in the CUB-S annotations not present in CUB. However, there are also genuine annotation errors which we observe when manually checking the annotations. Illustrative examples comparing soft CUB-S annotations to hard `CUB` annotations are shown in Figure 8. Humans who intervene at test time will also suffer from calibration errors, challenging the common assumption that human experts are perfect "oracles". On average, we observe that annotators consistently underestimate small probabilities but overestimate large probabilities (Figure 10). When several concepts are possible, it is likely that annotators attempt to reduce their cognitive load by only selecting a few to have a nonzero probability. Conversely, when a concept is highly probable, annotators may incorrectly round an annotation to 100 (i.e. absolute certainty). Figure 17 shows that 0 and 100 are the most popular uncertain annotation values, due to the presence of these two effects. We emphasize that some errors are predictable, and thus have the potential to be corrected when training an uncertainty-aware model.

It is unclear whether the poor calibration is a result of our interface, or an unavoidable issue when eliciting uncertainties in a crowdsourcing setting; humans can have limited cognitive resources – they may not be willing to endorse several related concepts (e.g., orange and red), while providing detailed uncertainty over each. However, the fact that we *do* encounter such challenges is an important consideration in the deployment of systems in which *receive* such uncertainty estimates. It is essential that **systems be robust to these nuances and peculiarities in elicited human uncertainty, or else they may fail at deployment time**.

5.3.4 Intervening at Test-Time with `CUB-S`. We next apply the same computational investigations as in our prior experiments to `CUB-S`; now, only varying the labels used at test time. We use models trained on population-level broad uncertainty derived from coarse-grained `CUB` as in the prior section. We find in Figure 11 that the richness of `CUB-S` poses a substantial challenge for concept-based models. While we find that using models trained on the coarse-grained uncertainty in `CUB` can mitigate some of the failures under test-time uncertainty, they are not a perfect salve.

The development of better mitigation strategies to handle the nuances of in-the-wild categorical uncertainty over concepts is exciting ground for future work. We observe that some concepts are preferable to elicit interventions over; sometimes human uncertainty is helpful, other times it *harms* model performance (see Supplement). Further, these differences persist across methods of training the models (i.e., the level of uncertainty in the training data, see Supplement), underscoring the need for adaptive, query procedures personalized to individual- and model uncertainty. We argue multi-disciplinary methodological advances to handle in-the-wild, rich human uncertainty over concept annotations are essential.

5.3.5 Implications. Humans interpret and reason in the world with richly structured uncertainty. Our CUB-S elicitation demonstrates this richness. However, we find that concept-based systems struggle to handle this level of richness. Given humans *are capable and do* express fine-grained uncertainty, it is sensible that our systems ought to be equipped to handle the nuances of in-the-wild uncertainty.



Figure 8: Example soft concept annotations elicited in CUB-S compared to CUB class labels. Far left: well-calibrated annotations for the "tail shape" concept, expressing appropriate uncertainties which sum to 100. Center left: annotations rarely included the obscure "buff" color, even when it was appropriate. Center right: richer annotations for the "upperparts color" provide more information than the certain CUB annotations. Far right: uncalibrated uncertainty of the "wing shape" concept under occlusion.



Figure 9: Distribution of Expected Calibration Error for annotators in CUB-S. The positive skew shows most annotators are well-calibrated, with a few who are very poorly calibrated.



Figure 10: Calibration curve for CUB-S annotators, showing consistent underestimates of small probabilities and overestimates of large probabilities.

6 OPEN CHALLENGES

We emphasize the importance of considering human uncertainty in concept-based models, and the need for richer datasets of human uncertainty to study these challenges. CUB-S is a promising initial playground to study the nuances faced with real human uncertainty[3]. Our work raises several open challenges.

6.1 Complementarity of Human and Machine Uncertainty

Considering human uncertainty in interventions opens up exciting opportunities in the study of human-machine complementarity [3, 4, 28, 55, 59]. When we break the assumption that humans are confident oracles, it becomes especially important to consider whether cases which are hard for the model to annotate are also those that a human struggles with; in that case, selecting such a concept is not ideal. Learning models and intervention policies which complement humans' strengths and weaknesses, accounting

[3]All code and data will be hosted at our repository.



Figure 11: CEMs struggle to handle real human uncertainty. While Skyline is able to leverage *some* signal in the data, not all incorporated concept annotations help model performance: some may hurt. Using models trained on human uncertainty information may mitigate some of the drop.

for their expertise and confidence, are promising grounds for further study with CUB-S and beyond. We see that varied models may prefer different forms of uncertainty (see Supplement); further, even though we see that Random interventions fail disastrously, there is a signal that Skyline picks up on the uncertain concepts – how can we predict where and when to ask people for their uncertainty? And when we do receive their uncertainty, it is not immediately apparent whether we *should* take the human intervention as "truth." As we demonstrate, real humans are *not* consistent oracles – and in some settings (e.g., occlusion), *no* human may be an oracle, even if they are an expert. Models which can learn whether or not to trust human interventions, e.g. [13, 36], are promising grounds for future study.

6.2 Treating Human (Mis)Calibration

A core factor in whether or not to trust a *human's* intervention, and determinant of which concepts to query, may depend on the expected calibration of the user. We observe wide variation in individuals' level of calibration in their uncertainty expression, a finding that resonates with a wealth of cognitive science literature [25, 27, 30, 34, 41, 51, 57]. However, we emphasize that calibration need not be a turn-off from collecting uncertainty in the first place; not only are some humans highly calibrated – but forcing someone to express certainty when they are not (and when it is not possible to be certain; e.g., occlusion), we argue may be worse. Future work for post-hoc calibration in a *few-shot* manner, e.g., from limited individual-level user data, provided in an online fashion, is further promising ground for new methodological advances. Additionally, we encourage further experimentation with UElic to encourage better calibration from humans – perhaps through the use of a carefully designed teaching curriculum [26, 27]. We see calibration – particularly across real users with varying domain expertise [12] – as an exciting nexus for a multi-disciplinary study spanning ML, cognitive science, UX design, and psychology.

6.3 Scaling Uncertainty Elicitation

Further, we recognize that the annotation of large-scale datasets with human uncertainty may be practically challenging. It is costly to elicit human uncertainty: annotators take substantially more time [10]. There is a need for more scalable elicitation techniques, and better simulators of human uncertainty to permit the study of softness at train time. We observe substantial differences in model performance depending on the form of uncertainty used; more data is needed to further characterize these differences and determine when one form of uncertainty is better to elicit than another, such that when we deploy systems in the world – they can handle a variety of forms of uncertainty expression.

7 CONCLUSION

We highlight the importance of considering human uncertainty in concept-based models to improve reliable performance for safe applications in deployment across society. Humans in the real-world are not certain oracles. We make mistakes and may be unsure. Even though humans may be miscalibrated in their uncertainty, we believe the study of tools to elicit and work with human uncertainty has great potential to improve human-in-the-loop systems. Through a mixture of simulated and in-the-wild experiments with uncertainty, we demonstrate failure modes of popular concept-based systems to handle both coarse- and fine-grained uncertain feedback. We offer a new interface, UElic, and a new challenge dataset, CUB-S, to support further study into human uncertainty in interventions. Modeling human uncertainty at train- and test-time has the potential to greatly improve the reliability and trustworthiness of concept-based models when deployed safely in the wild.

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SUPPLEMENT

Constructing UMNIST

We provide further clarity on how we constructed UMNIST. Each sample of the UMNIST dataset is formed by p 28×28 grey-scale images of handwritten zeros or ones, given as a normalized sample with shape $\mathbf{x} \in [0,1]^{28\times 28\times p}$. We annotate each sample with p binary concept annotations $\mathbf{c} \in \{0,1\}^p$, where c_i indicates whether the i-th image is a one or a zero, and a task label $y \in \{0, \cdots, p\}$ corresponding to the number of ones in its digits, i.e., $y = \sum_i c_i$. To introduce uncertainty in this dataset's samples and concepts, we update concept c_i corresponding to the i-th image as follows:

$$c_i := \begin{cases} \text{Randomly sample from Unif}(0, \delta) & \text{if i-th digit is 0} \\ \text{Randomly sample from Unif}(1-\delta, 1) & \text{if i-th digit is 1} \end{cases}$$

where $\delta \in [0,1]$ is a user-provided hyperparameter controlling the amount of dataset uncertainty. Furthermore, in order for this concept annotation uncertainty to be reflected as part of the input digits $\mathbf{x}$, we mix a concept's corresponding digit, akin to Zhang et al. [63], with a randomly selected MNIST training example of the opposite digit using c_i as the mixing ratio. In other words, after generating a sample's uncertain concept annotations $\mathbf{c}$ we update its i-th input digit $\mathbf{x}_{(:,:,i)}$ as follows:

$$\mathbf{x}_{(:,:,i)} := \begin{cases} (1-c_i)\mathbf{x}_{(:,:,i)} + c_i \mathbf{z} \text{ with } \mathbf{z} \sim p_{\text{M}}(\mathbf{x}|y=1) & \text{if } \mathbf{x}_{(:,:,i)} \text{ is 0} \\ c_i \mathbf{x}_{(:,:,i)} + (1-c_i)\mathbf{z} \text{ with } \mathbf{z} \sim p_{\text{M}}(\mathbf{x}|y=0) & \text{if } \mathbf{x}_{(:,:,i)} \text{ is 1} \end{cases}$$

where $p_{\text{M}}(\mathbf{x}|y)$ is the empirical training distribution of MNIST samples whose label is y. For this paper, we focus on using only $p = 10$ digits per sample. See Figure 12 for some examples of this dataset as we vary δ.

Computational experiment details

We next include additional details on how models were trained and run on the various probe datasets, as well as the intervention methods considered.

Training Details for UMNIST *Experiments.* For all UMNIST experiments, we train both CBMs and CEMs using a concept extractor whose architecture consisted of four 3-by-3 convolutional layers with filters $\{5, 10, 20, 40\}$ followed by a linear layer with 20 activations and an output layer with pm output activations, where m is the embedding size used for CEM (one can think of CBM as having $m = 1$). In practice, we set m to 8 following the recommendations from Espinosa Zarlenga et al. [14]. Between all non-output layers, we include leaky-ReLU nonlinear activations and we apply batch normalization after each nonlinearity that follows a convolutional layer. Similarly, for both CEMs and CBMs, we use a simple ReLU two-layer MLP as its concept-to-label map with layers sizes $\{20, p\}$ and train each end-to-end CBM/CEM by weighting the concept loss as much as the task loss (i.e., the joint training hyperparameter α was set to $\alpha = 1$ for both methods). Finally, to avoid each model learning to simply predict the most common class to minimize its error, we weight each sample's task loss according to the empirical label distribution of its corresponding label to encourage our models.

All models are trained by sampling a total of $20,000$ training UMNIST samples, of which 20% were used as a validation set, and



Figure 12: Example datapoints in UMNIST as we vary the value of δ (rows). Each row represents a single sample, with each column representing one of the $p = 5$ digits forming that sample. We include each concept's annotation, as well as the datapoint's label, underneath each digit and to the left of each datapoint, respectively.

tested by sampling 5,000 UMINST testing samples from MNIST's testing set (so no digit in the testing set is ever used to construct UMNIST's training set). We train all models using a standard Adam [29] optimizer with a learning rate 10^{-3} and a batch size of 256 for a maximum of 50 epochs, stopping earlier if the validation loss has not improved for 15 epochs. For each method in UMNIST, we run 5 models from different seeds.

Training Details for CheXpert *Experiments.* For the CheXpert dataset [24], we train all models for 25 epochs, subsampling the dataset to use only 25% of the training dataset when training due to the large size of the dataset. Because the test split for CheXpert does not have the "uncertain" concept label, we perform an 80-10-10 split of the train split into the train, validation, and test folds. Results for CheXpert are averaged over 5 trials, and we use a learning rate of 0.001 across all trials.

Training Details for CUB-Based Experiments. Models trained on CUB followed the same training settings as Espinosa Zarlenga et al. [14]; we employ a single model run for each seed due to computational complexity.

Details on Intervention Policies. The interaction policies we consider in this work (Random and Skyline) consider the setting where a user can be queried to intervene, or edit, a single concept (e.g., wing color) at a time. *Skyline* assumes access to the true label y and how the human would intervene (e.g., assumes access to the CUB-S elicited soft concept annotations), and "tests" intervening with each of the remaining concepts to see which yields the highest predicted probability of the model on the true label. In that way, this mimics an "Oracle" policy, which can greedily select the best of the available next concept interventions, following Chauhan et al.. However, the assumption of knowing the humans' interventions in advance, and the true label, are not realistic (and defeat the purpose of an intervention policy) in practice; hence, this method is meant to capture the "best possible" amount of information that can be gleaned by a single-step direct intervention policy alone. *Random* simply selects the next concept to query by randomly choosing amongst the available concepts which have not yet been queried.

Additional Results on Concept-Incomplete Variant of UMNIST

As discussed by Espinosa Zarlenga et al. [14], CBMs have a significant failure mode when the set of concept annotations available at training time is not fully predictive, or complete, with respect to the task of interest. Similarly to our UMNIST experiments summarized in Figure 3, this section explores how test-time uncertainty affects CBMs and CEMs when the dataset we are working with does not have a complete set of concept annotations. For this, we use our defined UMNIST dataset but only provide 50% of its concept annotations at training time. We train a CBM and CEM using the same configuration and architecture as that described for our UMNIST experiments, with the exception that the concept weight loss α was changed to 0.1. We apply such a change to improve CBM's performance, as otherwise, it was unable to achieve a moderately high task accuracy.

Our results in Figure 13 demonstrate that both CBMs and CEMs significantly drop their performance when test-time uncertainty increases (as we saw in Figure 3 before). Nevertheless, in contrast with Figure 3, we see that interventions in CBMs actually decrease their test accuracy, with uncertainty exacerbating this effect even further. Therefore, these experiments suggest that in concept-incomplete setups, which tend to be what we would expect in real-world datasets given the cost of acquiring all possible concept annotations, CEMs are relatively safer to use regardless of the user's uncertainty at intervention time.

Additional CheXpert Investigations

We include training with simulated uncertainty in Figure 14.

We also explore the original uncertain annotations in CheXpert [24], which contains concept annotations from chest x-rays. The dataset is marked with four labels: positive, negative, unknown, and uncertain. Unknown concepts have no information on their labels, while uncertain labels have information supporting both positive and negative labels. For our experiments, we vary the value taken by uncertain labels, both at train and test time, and investigate its impact on intervention performance. In Figures and 15 and 16, we find that test-time uncertainty improves intervention performance, while train-time uncertainty has minimal impact. This is partially because of the sparsity of uncertain labels in the dataset; only 5% of annotations are marked as uncertain, capping the total effect of train-time uncertainty. For test-time uncertainty, we find that non-zero values improve intervention accuracy, because models are able to distinguish between "uncertain" labels and "negative" labels.



Figure 13: Mean test accuracies of random interventions on CBMs and CEMs, and standard errors across 5 different random initializations, as we increase the number of concepts we intervene on. These models are trained on a variant of `UMNIST` where we only provide 50% of its concepts at training time.



Figure 14: Comparing CEMs trained and tested on differing levels of uncertainty in `CheXpert`. Heatmap colors depict AUC of the different variants.

Additional Details on `CUB-S`

We next include additional details on the way we collected `CUB-S`, as well as further qualitative observations into the labels collected.

Additional Collection Details. Stimuli are preferentially subsampled from the `CUB` test set to include images which CEMs and CBMs both typically get wrong[4]. Participants are informed the study is intended to last approximately 30 minutes and are paid at a base rate of $9/hr, with an optional bonus paid up to $10/hr to encourage quality predictions; the bonus is applied to all participants.

[4]Approximately 50% of the images shown to participants are those which four different seeds of both CEMs and CBMs got incorrect, rendering them more interesting - and challenging - to study at intervention-time



Figure 15: Test-time uncertainty values have a large impact on intervention performance, when using random concept interventions. Setting it to 0 prevents models from differentiating between negative concepts and uncertain concepts, leading to a decrease in performance. However, setting it to non-zero values allows models to pick up on this difference and improve intervention performance.



Figure 16: Intervention performance (i.e., random interventions) when using 8 out of 13 concepts to intervene across training and testing uncertainty values. Test uncertainty values have a much larger impact than train uncertainty values, and in general, training with uncertainty seems to have little impact on test-time uncertainty performance.

Additional Observations. We observe in Figure 17 that distribution of provided uncertain annotations is highly irregular, with heavy tails at 0 and 100, and a peak at 50. We hypothesize that heavy tails may be explained by humans rounding values to reduce their cognitive load; Collins et al. found similar rounding effects in free-form uncertainty expression. 50 is the default value provided by the interface, likely underlying the large number of annotations at 50. This suggests there is scope for improving the interface to extract a more accurate distribution of uncertainties, potentially striking a more naunced balance in granularity of information elicited, e.g., [8].



Figure 17: Distribution of uncertainty values for all annotations in CUB-S. Annotators favor certain annotations (0 or 100) and the default value of 50 provided by the interface.



Figure 18: Histogram showing the distribution of mean total probability mass for each concept assigned by each annotator. Most annotators assign approximately 100 probability mass, although there are a significant number which over-assign probability mass.

As observed in Section 5.3.3, the calibration of individual annotators varies significantly. Figure 17 shows that most annotators consistently assign approximately 100 probability mass for each concept, as one would expect. However, the distribution is positively skewed, with a significant number of annotators consistently over-assigning probability mass acoss the concept groups (for any individual concept, the annotator can endorse at most 100 "probability units"). This is partly explained by concept groups where more than one concept is relevant (such as color), although it is also likely that annotators are overestimating their confidence.

Further, we investigate the variance in flavor of uncertainty expressed between different concepts. In Figure 19 we plot the distribution of probability mass assigned for each concept. We observe significant variations between concepts, in terms of their mean, variance and skew. Some concepts such as "eye color" have a very tight distribution around 100, suggesting those concepts are "easy" to annotate. In contrast, some concepts such as "upperparts



Figure 19: Distribution across images of total probability mass assigned for each concept. There is significant variation in the mean, skew and variance of distributions, showing that different concepts are annotated differently by human annotators.



Figure 20: Training with a moderate level of (aggregate/population-level) uncertainty improves robustness under test-time uncertainty; as measured by AUC between intervention-accuracy curve. Higher is better.

color" show greater variation in the probability mass assigned. These concepts tend to either be color concepts, which can have several correct annotations, or ambiguous concepts like "size" which may be harder to annotate correctly.

These observations highlight nuances in the CUB-S dataset which aren't present in the original hard annotations. Soft annotations give insights into how humans interpret concepts when labeling and the variation in individual calibration of annotators [10]. We hope to encourage future work to design ML models and datasets which account for the idiosyncrasies of human uncertain annotations.

Additionally, our labels demonstrate potential issues with the concept filtering typically applied on CUB. Koh et al. propose a filtering scheme to avoid overly sparse annotations; however, we note that our annotators assign a substantial amount of probability



Figure 21: Amount of assigned probability mass discarded per individual when using the popular Koh et al. concept filtering (averaged over concept groups).



Figure 22: Additional examples showing rich annotations for CUB-S compared to hard assignments in CUB.

mass to concept attributes which are *filtered out* (see Figure 21). These data highlight that the filtered out attributes could indeed be missing critical information from people as to what is in the image.

Additional CUB Uncertainty Computational Experiments

We next include further observations from our computational experiments in CUB and CUB-S.

Broad vs. Narrow Uncertainty. We demonstrate the sensitivity of concept-based systems to broad versus narrow uncertainty under the Random policy (see Figure 25), further highlighting that the method of distributing uncertainty through discrete confidence scores matters impacts intervention efficacy.

Individual- vs Population-Level Uncertainty. As noted, whether or not we intervene with individual or population-level annotations matters (see Section 5.2.3), and we see in Figure 20 that training and then intervening with population-level annotations yields the best performance. These observations are relevant not only to ML practioners who work with CUB, but broadly in annotation-design and questions around who and how many annotators should we elicit from.

CBMs and Simulated Uncertainty. Further, we concretize why we focus on CEMs in the bulk of this work. CBMs severely struggle



Figure 23: CUB-S Examples where multiple annotators labelled the same image. Each bar color represents a unique annotator for each image. The annotated concepts vary significantly between annotators, especially for challenging concepts such as "wing shape" and "wing pattern".



Figure 24: It matters whether or not we use *instance-level, individual* annotator uncertainty, or average over many individuals' uncertainty. Averaging improves the stability of interventions; but in practice, we may only have a single individual who can provide their uncertainty. We find sizeable differences in the intervention efficacy when using averaged uncertainty for both Skyline and Random.

under test-time uncertainty when dealing with concept-incomplete datasets (see the UMNIST section of this Supplement) and in-the-wild uncertainty (see Figure 26).

Skyline Selections Reveal "Helpful" and "Harmful" CUB-S *Annotations.* As seen in Figure 11, Skyline rapidly improves by selecting "good" uncertain annotations; however, the final selections hamper performance. We demonstrate how human selections can both help and hinder performance in Figure 27. We depict the proportion of selections for each concept being in the first or last 5 selections by Skyline. Avoiding selecting the examples in the last 5, e.g., "upperparts" color, offer promising directions for future policy design and investigation into when and why humans are good uncertain annotators. Interestingly, we observe differences in which concepts are preferred depending on whether the model was trained without (Figure 28) or with uncertainty in the concepts at training time (i.e., Figures 29, 30, 31).



Figure 25: Impact of different ways of distributing the discrete uncertainty over categorical concept groups, selected using Random intervention policies on CEMs.



Figure 26: CBMs struggle to handle uncertainty in CUB as well and are comparatively worse than CEMs.



Figure 27: Model versus human distributions over concepts at the time of selection by Skyline. The first column of distributions are selections which boosted the model's classification (from incorrect to correct); humans' uncertainty was helpful to intervene with. The second column of distributions depicts the human uncertainty at intervention time which *hurt* model performance (the classification went from correct to incorrect). Model trained on uncertain concepts ("Probably" probability = 0.7).



Figure 28: Skyline selections for CEM run on `CUB-S` reveal when human uncertainty elicitation is helpful (versus harmful). Proportion of selections for each concept being in the first or last 5 selections by Skyline. CEM trained on certain concepts.



Figure 29: Skyline selections for CEM trained on uncertain concepts (where the imputed "Probably" probability is set to 0.5). Population-level broad uncertainty labels used.



Figure 30: Skyline selections for CEM trained as in Figure 29, but with the imputed "Probably" probability set to 0.7.

Figure 31: Skyline selections for CEM trained as in Figure 29, but with imputed "Probably" probability set to 0.9.

Diffusing the Creator: Attributing Credit for Generative AI Outputs

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ABSTRACT

The recent wave of generative AI (GAI) systems like Stable Diffusion that can produce images from human prompts raises controversial issues about creatorship, originality, creativity and copyright. This paper focuses on creatorship: who creates and should be credited with the outputs made with the help of GAI? Existing views on creatorship are mixed: some insist that GAI systems are mere tools, and human prompters are creators proper; others are more open to acknowledging more significant roles for GAI, but most conceive of creatorship in an all-or-nothing fashion. We develop a novel view, called CCC (collective-centered creation), that improves on these existing positions. On CCC, GAI outputs are created by collectives in the first instance. Claims to creatorship come in degrees and depend on the nature and significance of individual contributions made by the various agents and entities involved, including users, GAI systems, developers, producers of training data and others. Importantly, CCC maintains that GAI systems can sometimes be part of a co-creating collective. We detail how CCC can advance existing debates and resolve controversies around creatorship involving GAI.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Applied computing** → Arts and humanities; • **Social and professional topics** → Computing / technology policy; • **Computing methodologies** → Artificial intelligence; Computer vision.

KEYWORDS

Generative AI, image synthesis, credit attribution, creatorship, collective-centered, ethics, copyright

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1 INTRODUCTION

The recent proliferation of generative AI systems (GAI) that competently produce text, images and other outputs from human prompts (e.g., Stable Diffusion, DALL-E2, ChatGPT) has attracted considerable attention from the public, media, regulators and academics. Central points of contention range from safety and responsibility in regard to offensive or untruthful outputs to disruptive potentials of GAI for labor markets and education systems [21, 36, 43, 63, 70, 74]. In the space of creative visual production, GAI has been especially controversial, radically 'democratizing' creative production by allowing unskilled users to generate high-quality imagery, and raising questions about creativity, intellectual property, plagiarism, illegitimate scraping of training data, censorship and so on [22, 26, 32, 33, 60]. Two particularly contentious questions stand out. First, the *creativity question*: do GAI systems produce genuinely novel and/or creative outputs? Second, the *creatorship question*: who should be credited with the production of these outputs? Should human prompters receive all the credit, while GAI systems are mere tools, akin to a sophisticated brush? And what about developers who built the systems, or producers of training data?

Unsurprisingly, both questions are difficult to answer and deeply entangled. The creativity question hinges on both facts and values, e.g., facts about the production process and value-judgments about what constitutes a genuinely creative or original achievement. Issues of creativity and originality are inherently controversial and reasonable disagreement will often persist [4, 7, 12, 18, 24, 34, 41, 59, 64, 72]. The creatorship question is similarly challenging, also turning on value-judgments, and requiring that we can trace the origin of specific outputs [4, 19, 20, 27, 37, 38].

Even so, we argue that significant progress on the creatorship question is possible by drawing on a recent view we have developed in a very different space: scientific discovery involving AI [13]. There, we proposed a collective-centered view (CC), which insists that discoveries are made by collectives, and that credit for discovery should be distributed within the collective according to the nature and significance of specific contributions. Importantly, this view permits that AI systems can be part of a discovering collective, making contributions that can be comparable in significance to human contributions.

Here, we develop a sibling to this view, called the CCC (collective-centered creation) view, that applies to GAI. CCC maintains that issues of creatorship are not all-or-nothing: different agents and entities, i.e., GAI systems, human prompters, creators of training data and others, can each make important contributions to an output and attributions of credit hinge on the nature and significance of the contributions made. Detailing CCC, we argue that it is an attractive option for addressing creatorship in a systematic way. It reinforces existing arguments from the public debate, e.g., that scraping imagery from the web to train models without creators'

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https://doi.org/10.1145/3600211.3604716

consent and acknowledgment is problematic [11, 67, 73]. And it generates novel intuitions: such as whether a human prompter or GAI system has a stronger claim to co-creatorship depends on several features of what role they played in producing an output. For instance, a casual user, Jake, who uses a generic prompt like 'cute cat' may not have strong creatorship claims, but a more involved user like Jo, who pursues a specific aim and iteratively refines her prompts to meet her goals, might. Creatorship, on the CCC view, is hence a matter of degree: you can be more or less of a creator, depending on several finer-grained variables that track what role you played in producing an output.

Despite considerable utility, CCC also has important limitations: it is not a tool to definitively settle creatorship issues and disputes. These will often be irreducibly controversial for the value-judgments they hinge on or because details on how outputs were produced remain inaccessible. Equally, CCC does not seek to resolve practical downstream questions, such as how to award copyright to large collectives or how specific contributions should be rewarded (e.g. through payment). Rather, CCC *informs* attempts to address such issues by providing a general framework that facilitates efforts to clarify creatorship in a systematic way, by offering a rich conceptual machinery that helps structure our reasoning and locate sources of disagreement.

We proceed as follows. *Section 2* introduces GAI systems and surveys the existing debate for prominent views on creatorship. *Section 3* develops CCC, explaining its conceptual resources. *Section 4* draws on toy cases to map out how CCC addresses creatorship questions and shows how it can reinforce existing intuitions as well as articulate new ones. *Section 5* concludes.

2 GAI & CREATORSHIP: THE STATE OF PLAY

2.1 Generative AI

GAI includes a broad array of systems and system architectures, which are unified functionally by their ability to generate potentially novel outputs (e.g., text, images, video, etc.) when given some prompt. Here, we focus only on generative visual AI systems that allow a user to generate images from text, image and other inputs, such as OpenAI's DALL-E2, Stability.ai's Stable Diffusion, Midjourney and related systems. Unlike earlier systems based on generative adversarial networks [28, 53], many recent GAI systems are based on encoder-decoder deep neural network (DNN) architectures and involve diffusion models as decoders [54, 56]. Glossing over further details, we emphasize that most GAI systems now offer various parameters that allow users to steer image synthesis; permit a combination of text and image prompts for conditioning (e.g., image-to-image, inpainting); and allow supplementary tools like ControlNet to afford even finer-grained user control over outputs, e.g., to precisely determine the pose of a person [75]. Given their accessibility, cost-effectiveness and impressive abilities, millions of users now employ GAI on a daily basis to produce tailor-made imagery that caters to their needs [23, 31, 57].

2.2 Existing views on creatorship

On the heels of this growing popularity, the last year has seen a surge of debate amongst users, commentators, academics and technologists about a range of questions relating to creatorship, originality and the ethics of GAI. Some of these questions are familiar, while others are novel responses to unprecedented aspects of GAI. Here, we provide an overview of the most influential views expressed thus far concerning whether GAI systems meet the conditions for creatorship[1] and, if so, how much credit they are due. Often drawing on earlier theories of authorship and creative agency in literature, cinema, photography and so on, a number of proposals have been put forward.

Referring to AI's lack of agency and intentional autonomy, Hertzmann [34] and McCormack et al. [50] assert that these systems are not creative agents and, as such, cannot be credited as creators. A lack of physiological vision and subsequent understanding have also been flagged as precluding machines' ability to create [17]. Some legal scholars have made similar assertions, with Ginsburg et al. [27] and earlier skeptics (see [40] for overview) arguing that machines do not show genuine creativity and therefore do not qualify for copyright, as they only operate within the predetermined limits of programming or user instruction. A recent decision of the Committee on Publication Ethics builds on these stances, asserting that AI cannot be named as an author on their publications due to being non-legal entities that cannot be held accountable [15]. Other legal scholars simply do not present GAIs as a creator or engage seriously with that question [10], presumably because intellectual property law does not allow copyright or patents to be granted to nonhuman entities. Coming from a philosophy of art and aesthetics perspective, Anscomb [4] sees AI as deserving some credit as a contributor but not as an authorial creative agent, due to lack of intention and knowledge-how.

Such views lead some to conclude that AI is merely a tool. Hertzmann, for example, presents AI as yet another tool for art production [34], and OpenAI has also framed DALL-E2 in this light, saying it is a "powerful creative tool" that "extends creativity" [52]. Their blog promotes the responses of artists who describe using DALL-E2 as like "a musician playing an instrument" or taking up "a paint brush" that must be "guided by the artist" [51]. It seems a significant portion of GAI users agree [2, 55], as well as some of the wider public who tend to give more credit to people using AI for assistance than to people who use other people for assistance in creating art [37].

In stark contrast, some claim that GAI can be a creator and heavily downplay human involvement. This view is taken by some developers of GAI systems that, they claim, autonomously create novel art [19, 42] using skill, appreciation and imagination [14]. While this stance is less often applied to the GAI we discuss here, AI systems are increasingly acknowledged as generating "truly creative works" [29, p.173]. Based on this belief, some legal scholars suggest a reworking of the requirements for copyright that would allow the threshold of originality to include some AI-generated works [29, 40].

A third type of view focuses on the notion of collaboration [46], emphasizing that GAI systems are increasingly capable of making unique contributions to the production of visual outputs. Some creatives feel GAI is their "collaborator" [51] and has autonomy,

[1] Some literature we discuss predates current-generation GAI and targets broader issues of *authorship* or defining the *artist*. While there may be subtle conceptual differences between authorship, the role of the artist and creatorship, we assume here that the views we review map onto creatorship, regardless of such differences.

leading to new forms of authorship [47]; a view that is often echoed in the public discourse, such as in social media groups, where many users describe collaborative relationships with GAI [1, 16, 66].

Among the menu of options, collaborative views seem the most plausible, but we also think that they say too little on how credit may be distributed amongst collaborators, with the most direct suggestions made by legal scholars Benhamou and Andrijevic [10], albeit solely with a view to copyright and without consideration of the AI's role. Scholars such as McCormack et al. [50] have agreed that "[a]uthors have a responsibility to accurately represent the process used to generate a work, including the labour of both machines and other people" [50, p.13], and Anscomb asserts that AI might deserve some of the credit for the production of artworks [4]. But how could we go about ascertaining the need for this credit in individual cases, and then apportioning it? As Epstein et al. [20] and Jago and Carroll [37] suggest, people are vulnerable to allocating credit based on questionable criteria, such as anthropomorphicity, so there is a need to understand and communicate different contributors' involvement on conceptually firmer grounds. Inadequate attributions of credit not only raise moral problems (e.g., unjust miscrediting), but also have economic and social consequences, affecting how we value works and who benefits from them [37]. Moreover, credit allocation is important for the public's ability to interpret and understand works [9, 38].

In the spirit of related approaches, such as Jenkins and Lin's proposals for determining credit for AI-generated text [38], the CCC view we develop here maintains that GAI can be part of a co-creating collective, but also provides a richer framework that helps us better understand different agents' and entities' roles within a collective. Let us outline our earlier CC view proposed in the context of scientific discovery, and explain how it can be adapted to GAI.

3 THE CCC VIEW: FROM DISCOVERY TO CREATION

Scientists now routinely use AI systems to make scientific discoveries. A celebrated case is AlphaFold 2.0 [39], an AI system that can predict the structure of never-before-synthesized proteins with impressive accuracy; something that takes significant human efforts in any single case, and could not be achieved at scale without systems like AlphaFold. An important question here is whether these systems are making discoveries, or whether they are merely sophisticated tools, like electron microscopes.

Existing theories of scientific discovery have often been agent-centered [68]: they focus on picking out a central discoverer who is responsible for a discovery. However, in the case of discovery involving AI, these views fail to neatly identify such a discoverer, as neither the AI nor the human scientists have strong enough claims to the title alone. Responding to this challenge, we have proposed the collective-centered view (CC) of scientific discovery [13]. Centrally, CC maintains that discoveries are made by *collectives*: a potentially large and diverse set of actors and entities that all make important contributions to discovery. Depending on various finer-grained variables, CC allows that AI systems, too, can be part of a discovering collective and make significant contributions that should be appropriately recognized.

The creatorship question regarding GAI presents an analogous credit distribution problem. Often, neither the GAI systems, human prompters nor producers of training data alone are neatly identified as *the* creator. But each of these agents and entities, among others, can make important contributions to an output[2]. Here, we adapt our earlier CC view to the creation of visual outputs using GAI to make progress on understanding the role of various agents and entities and, in turn, the issue of creatorship.

On our adapted CCC (collective-centered creation) view, the very starting question 'who is the creator?' is misleading: creation is a collective achievement, and credit distribution depends on the nature and significance of the contributions made. Specifically, CCC maintains that for most cases of creation using visual GAI:

- There is ***no clear single creator*** who can be credited with an output.
- A ***collective of actors and entities*** all made important contributions to an output.
- Credit for this output should be ***distributed between these contributors*** according to the nature and significance of the contributions made.

CCC, of course, is not the first view to emphasize that artistic (and literary) production often takes the format of co-creation or co-production. But contra existing views, CCC does not aim at offering neat, principled categorizations between different subgroups of agents, e.g. authors, creators, contributors, assistants [4, 6, 8, 9, 25, 35, 46, 48]. While we agree that making such distinctions can be sensible (as they help organize, negotiate and appraise contributions to artistic creation in professional and public discourse), we also think that any such categorizations should be grounded in a conceptually richer analysis that tracks important primary features of contributors and their contributions, especially regarding GAI. CCC, then, starts bottom-up, by first analyzing which of these features matter for determining inclusion in a co-creating collective. Pencils and hard drives won't make the cut – not because we say so, but because they don't score highly on relevant criteria. CCC hence provides conceptual machinery that specifies the sorts of considerations we should entertain when seeking to clarify creatorship and locate our disagreements.

Let us elaborate several features that CCC uses to inform who may be included in a co-creating collective and how credit may be distributed. The features we outline here are continuous with existing debates on creatorship [5, 6, 8, 9, 25, 35, 38, 48, 50], and while we do not insist that these features are ultimately the right ones, or only ones, to focus on, we consider them productive starting points for developing a systematic approach to dealing with GAI's growing role in creative production.

3.1 Relevance/(Non-)redundancy and Control

The first two features to help clarify creatorship come as a bundle: relevance and non-redundancy track what difference a contribution makes to an output. They are causal-counterfactual notions: to determine how relevant or (non-)redundant a contribution X is to an output Y, we must answer the counterfactual question: 'take X away, what would the output Y have looked like?' If a contribution

[2]We assume that creatorship questions are pertinent if some significant output has been produced. Importantly, we assume that *whether* an output has significance is settled (largely) independently of the criteria we outline. We also focus only on primary outputs delivered by GAI. Users may further transform these, which can change users' standing as creators for these downstream products.

is not relevant, or relevant but highly redundant, Y will remain the same. For instance, if Jo and Jake produce a painting of a cat on a mat, where Jo does all the painting and Jake's role is to hand Jo the brushes as she requests them, we might think that Jake is not terribly relevant and can be made redundant. Take Jake away, and the output would have been the same, either because Jo gets the brushes herself, or because someone else fills in for Jake. By contrast, consider Jerome, who takes a more active role in suggesting what brush could be the right one to achieve a certain texture. Jo and Jerome engage in a symbiotic relationship, with Jerome asking questions, making suggestions, adding interpretations and so on. Jerome's involvement, let us imagine, makes a difference to the output: the painting would be different if Jerome wasn't there, and it might be difficult to replace Jerome. Jerome hence scores more highly for relevance/non-redundancy. Lastly, consider Jake making a solo attempt to produce an image of a 'cat on a mat' using Stable Diffusion. Take away his access to the system, and Jake would have failed to produce the image, for lack of relevant skills. Generally, the more relevant and non-redundant a contribution, the stronger the claim for candidacy in a co-creating collective.

A second feature that is closely related to relevance and non-redundancy is control [71]. Control tracks how precisely and robustly an agent or entity can steer or maintain an output. Intuitively, control may seem to involve intention, but we render it as a deflationary notion that only requires that an agent or entity has causal powers to make an output be a certain way rather than another. Consider Jo, who iteratively refines her prompts to precisely get the image she wants. Jo exerts a high degree of control and can thus stake a strong claim to creatorship. By contrast, consider again Jake, who casually prompted Stable Diffusion with 'cat on a mat'. Does Jake exhibit control? Not necessarily. Diffusion models begin synthesis from quasi-random noise patterns that are determined by a seed number, which can change from prompt to prompt. Importantly, one and the same prompt can yield dramatically different outputs depending on the seed [62]. So, Jake might have ended up with an entirely different image if the seed had been different. Jake, in this case, doesn't exercise much control if he is happy with whatever output he gets. There is no back-and-forth interaction, like in Jo's iterative endeavour, where Jake works against the randomness of diffusion-based image synthesis to realize a specific result.

Two further points help fine-grain control. First, control can be dispositional in a way that relevance and non-redundancy are not: an individual does not always need to exert actual influence in order to exhibit control, but they must be able to if the need arises. Consider a variation of Jo's case where she is lucky to get the exact image she wants on the first try. We might still maintain that Jo exhibits control if it is true that she would have intervened (successfully) had the output diverged from her expectations. Similarly, we might say that Stable Diffusion exhibits control over an output if it would have robustly produced the same output even if Jake had tried to steer it towards another. Second, control is zero-sum: the less control a user exercises, the more control the GAI has. So, when clarifying control, we ask 1) how counterfactually robust an output's features are, and 2) due to who.

Relevance, redundancy and control are thorny concepts, as they all hinge on (appropriate) counterfactuals. Whether Jake would have been able to produce 'cat on a mat' without Stable Diffusion, for example, might depend on whether we ask for the exact pixel-by-pixel image or just something in the ballpark. But even if we have clear counterfactuals in mind, learning them empirically is also difficult, e.g. telling what Jo's painting would have looked like without Jerome's suggestions or whether Jo would have intervened if the GAI hadn't produced what she wanted right away. These challenges are not unique to CCC, however. They obtain in many areas, e.g. in legal reasoning, where we routinely assess what would have happened if people had acted differently. Difficult as these challenges may be in practice, considering relevance, (non-)redundancy and control is essential for distributing credit for creatorship.

3.2 Originality

Originality concerns how original a contribution is, i.e. whether it is novel in character and unique to the contributor. This is related to but different from the originality and significance of an output, which - as mentioned earlier - is not our focus here. Let us assume some recognizably original output is generated. A key question for clarifying creatorship is: whose *original* contributions helped achieve that output originality? A natural starting point is to look at users' text/image prompts. Suppose that there has never before existed an image of a Donald Trump-shaped cheese wheel rolling down a hill. A user's idea and intent to produce such an image and their formulating a prompt that corresponds to these would constitute an original contribution. By contrast, a generic prompt such as 'cute dog' would not score highly – many others have likely used similar prompts. But prompts are not all that is needed to make an image – a GAI system itself must be disposed in the right way to actually produce images that correspond well to user prompts. Specifically, the DNNs underlying existing GAI systems may make original contributions to the production of original outputs, when, at training, the systems latch onto text-image relationships in original ways, e.g. by learning novel representations and relationships between them that can be used to competently synthesize, for instance, what a Donald Trump-shaped cheese wheel rolling down a hill would look like. Here, a mere collage might not be enough: success is measured by whether the system made original connections that help synthesize a coherent visual entity that recognizably looks like 1) Donald Trump, 2) a cheese wheel and 3) like it is rolling down a hill.

Right away, one might insist that originality still ultimately comes from the user – after all, it was them who prompted the system in a certain, original way. But while coming up with the 'what' may often involve originality on the part of the user, concretizing the 'how' may also require originality on the part of a GAI system. This is best understood in cases where a user is unable to imagine how an image corresponding to their prompt could look. Take Jerome, who prompts Midjourney to produce an image encapsulating 'the abstract feeling of realizing that you didn't tell your parents that you loved them enough'. Here, Jerome might only learn about how this feeling could be visualized once he sees the output. If Jerome thinks it captures the feeling well, and there haven't been previous attempts to visualize the feeling with similar results, it seems like Midjourney, too, has made original contributions to producing the output.

Even so, one might wonder where, exactly, we could locate originality in GAI systems' contributions. For instance, one might insist

that the computations performed by GAI systems are 'deterministic' or 'always the same', regardless of whether an output is original. To clarify, we don't claim that there is a mysterious originality property to be found (or not found) anywhere at the computational level. But – like in descriptions of human contributions where the type-level neural activation patterns might be indistinguishable between a truly creative and an unoriginal prompter – some token-level macro behaviors that GAI systems exhibit can nevertheless be usefully characterized by ascriptions of originality (e.g. learning a latent manifold that enables them to produce novel images or following a specific denoising trajectory towards a coherent rendition of an original output). We also do not claim that GAI systems are always or routinely original. GAI systems are prone to reproducing existing works, raising concerns about (near-)plagiarism [45, 69]. So, our suggestion is that, especially in cases where output originality cannot be fully and correctly accounted for by reference to human users, GAI systems may reasonably be described as making original contributions of their own which, in turn, can justify their inclusion in a co-creating collective.

3.3 Time/effort

Other things being equal, the more time and effort an agent or entity spends on furnishing a contribution, the stronger their claim to candidacy in a co-creating collective. Consider Jake again. Even if Jake's brush-handing contributions are not highly relevant and somewhat redundant, if Jo recruited Jake to assist for hundreds of hours, Jake may nevertheless have some claim to candidacy in a co-creating collective. Of course, time and effort are crude metrics. Spent inefficiently, they shouldn't count for much, such as when Jake takes a tedious, pointillist approach to making 'cat on a mat' with his ballpoint pen but the result is aesthetically unimpressive because he can't draw cats, neither with slow points nor with fast strokes. But while contemporary legal theories of creative value often avoid relying on sweat-of-the-brow metrics [29], we think that time and effort should nevertheless be considered as one among a variety of features that can ground claims to candidacy – especially in the realm of GAI usage [65]. In this context, time and effort are best understood as tracking the computational complexity and compute effort (e.g. FLOPs) involved in furnishing a contribution. While GAI systems are certainly faster than humans at producing images once trained, a wider view that puts the computational efforts going into training and inference into perspective can ground the claim that significant time and effort can be involved in furnishing GAI outputs.

3.4 Leadership and Independence

Leadership captures whether a contributor steered the production of an output with a specific intention in mind. For instance, Jo may have a concrete vision for an image, choose a particular method for the job, say Stable Diffusion, and pursue that vision by refining her prompts in a targeted way to realize a specific output. Jake, by contrast, may deploy a generic prompt like 'cat on a mat' and turn out happy with whatever result he gets. While there is intention involved, he does not exert a great deal of leadership. Leadership is closely related to control, i.e. the ability to precisely and robustly steer or maintain an output. Yet, while successful leadership often involves control, it differs from mere control in that it also involves intentions, e.g. identifying, setting and pursuing goals and directing available means to reach them.

Second, independence tracks whether a contributor depends on detailed guidance to furnish their contribution or whether they act in a more autonomous way. Jo and Jerome might be independent in that sense, both coming up with suggestions for what a painting could look like, discussing plans based on what they each think is best. Jake, by contrast, would not make independent contributions if his role is confined to handing Jo the brushes she requests.

While leadership and independence are important, they should not be overemphasized. For instance, leadership roles frequently fall on agents ready to disproportionally absorb credit, such as when a famed director's artistic vision is emphasized as key to achieving a significant work, but other agents' creative contributions that fill important blanks are left underrecognized. Nuancing the role of leadership and independence is especially relevant as GAI systems have a hard time exhibiting these features at levels comparable to humans. For lack of intentions, they cannot exhibit leadership but only control. Likewise, they cannot exhibit full-fledged forms of independence that humans can, e.g. changing a prompt to deliver a different, better output. However, GAI systems may still exhibit some thinner forms of independence at training that carries through to the ultimate outputs. Within the confines of a learning task defined by humans, DNNs must be sufficiently flexible to learn whatever there is to learn – and that is often the point of taking a machine learning approach. Weights and biases aren't hand-tuned by humans, and while humans write training algorithms and build system architectures, they do not fully determine what a system learns in particular (e.g. which representations), especially in unsupervised or self-supervised regimes. So, while GAI systems are not independent in the sense of 'choosing to do it their own way', and what they end up learning is still importantly shaped by human aims, leadership and oversight [4, 50], we maintain that GAI systems can nevertheless exhibit some forms of independence if what they learn and later draw on at inference is not fully determined by humans.

Zooming out, we see that the domain of leadership and independence is, for now, mostly reserved for humans. But we stress that leadership and independence don't get a project anywhere without someone or something following guidance and doing the work that's needed to realize an independently formed vision, which may involve plenty of relevance, non-redundancy, time and effort, as well as some originality and control on the part of GAI systems.

3.5 Directness

Finally, directness captures how directly a contribution is involved in producing an output. For instance, imagine cash-strapped Jo couldn't produce any paintings if it wasn't for her friend Jack, who provides her studio space rent-free. Jack's help is highly relevant and nonredundant, but not direct: his aid will support Jo, let us assume, in producing *whatever* paintings she wants to make and doesn't steer the form of any specific painting. Contrast this with Jerome, who is dialectically engaging with Jo at various points to co-shape their open-ended artistic endeavor. He is, therefore, both highly relevant and direct. Like Jerome, GAI systems can make direct contributions. The computations performed at inference directly generate the ultimate outputs at issue. To be clear, by 'direct'

we don't mean to suggest that these contributions involve any kind of intentionality. Directness is a causal notion, not a mental one, and while direct contributions made by humans may often involve intentions, this is not a requirement for directness as we understand it.

Directness also plays a special role among the features CCC tracks: it modulates the extent to which other features matter for creatorship. Take the role of developers: without their efforts in building GAI systems, most users wouldn't be able to produce the images they do. But developers don't make direct contributions to the creation of specific images. Rather, their contributions primarily consist in building GAI systems that have the capacity to produce images. This is an important achievement but not to be conflated with the production of specific images, to which developers contribute only in an indirect, enabling way. So, despite developers' high causal relevance to the production of specific outputs, this relevance must be appropriately discounted by the low directness of their contributions. Similar considerations apply to other variables and agents, such as producers of training data or low-wage workers providing human feedback for reinforcement learning. Generally, then, the less direct a contribution is overall, the less strongly the other features that a contribution exhibits weigh in determining its significance.

3.6 Putting CCC together

Stepping back from individual criteria, let us look at how the framework functions as a whole. First, all the features that CCC tracks come in degrees: a contribution can be less or more relevant, exhibit stronger leadership, or little originality and so on. Second, none of the features are individually necessary or sufficient for claims to creatorship, no matter the degree to which they are present. Consider sufficiency: a GAI system can be highly relevant to producing an output, and yet be considered a mere tool if a user scores highly on leadership, control, originality and so on. Nor is any single feature always necessary: seasoned users don't need much time or effort for good results, though some features will seem essential in many cases (e.g. directness).

Second, it could be a concern that distinguishing between the features we sketched here is sometimes difficult (e.g. control and leadership). This is neither surprising, nor a problem, however. The broader themes CCC's concepts draw on, like causation, agency, and originality, have been subjects of study and controversy for centuries because they are complex and non-trivial. With artistic creation uniting these themes, it seems misguided to expect a finite list of distinct and razor-sharp conceptual ingredients that explain it neatly. CCC, then, doesn't raise but only encounters conceptual challenges, and these shouldn't distract us from further exploring CCC's descriptive and explanatory value.

Third, taken together, the features outlined here (and potentially others) form a basis for *candidacy* in a co-creating collective: if you exhibit none, or some but to low degrees, you won't get close to being a creator, but if you score highly on all, you should be considered a serious candidate. Within CCC's feature space, there will be many combinations that can ground strong claims to candidacy in very different ways. Importantly, though, CCC does not maintain that there is ever a sharp threshold to decide creatorship. To the contrary, it acknowledges substantial and often reasonable disagreement about creatorship questions, and only insists that creatorship is not all-or-nothing. CCC therefore invites us to work through attributions carefully, by providing a set of clearer criteria that help us locate and potentially resolve disagreement about creatorship. With these tenets in mind, let us proceed to explore what CCC can do for us in practice.

4 WHAT CCC CAN DO FOR YOU

4.1 CCC across the space of contenders

To show how CCC can be useful to make progress on understanding creatorship, we proceed as follows: first, we consider CCC's criteria mapped against possible contenders for creatorship, i.e. users, GAI systems and others, and comment on how each group may fare at a general level. We then focus specifically on the comparison between human prompters and GAI and discuss two cases that mark the ends of a credit distribution spectrum. Finally, we elaborate how CCC reinforces existing intuitions offered in the public discourse on creatorship questions, as well as generates novel claims about creatorship.

Let us begin by applying CCC's criteria to some of the most likely candidates: users, GAI systems, developers and producers of training data. As elaborated earlier, each of the features CCC tracks can be exhibited to different degrees, depending on concrete contextual details.

First, users can make less or more relevant/non-redundant contributions. Users can also spend lower or higher amounts of time and effort, and the originality of their contributions can vary from generic one-word prompts like 'banana' to highly engineered prompts pursuing specific objectives. Relatedly, they can exercise lower or higher degrees of control, leadership and independence when pursuing generic or more involved prompting projects. Finally, prompter contributions will always show directness, but to considerably varying degrees, e.g. through only generating a *kind* of image using a generic prompt like 'banana', or exhibiting high degrees of directness using targeted prompts.

Second, like users, GAI systems can make less or more relevant and non-redundant contributions. But they can only exhibit a certain degree of independence and cannot demonstrate leadership, for lack of intentions. However, if unchallenged by a user, they will exercise control in producing certain images rather than others, given a prompt. GAI systems' contributions always involve some and potentially a lot of compute time and effort; and they can be less or more original, e.g., depending on whether they draw on original connections made at training. Importantly, their contributions exhibit high directness: their computations literally make the specific images synthesized.

Third, as elaborated earlier, developers' contributions are always indirect. They do not make specific images, but rather enable their production. These contributions can exhibit less or more relevance and redundancy, but little specific control over particular outputs. Likewise, they may involve less or more time and effort, as well as varying degrees of originality, leadership and independence; but for lack of directness, these features are discounted: developers do not intend to produce any specific image; they only intend to build systems that can.

Lastly, producers of training data can make varied contributions to creation, too. There are two importantly different ways to conceptualize this group: first, as capturing *all* producers of *all* training data used to train a GAI system taken together. Second, as *specific* producers of *particular* training data tokens. On the wider construal, producers of training data make contributions that are highly relevant and somewhat non-redundant (e.g. there are more images on the web than large datasets like LAION-5B contain, but many images contained in LAION-5B are unique) but they exercise little control over the output. While they may, as a whole, exercise significant time and effort furnishing their contributions, scoring individually from low (Jack posting a photo of grass, which gets scraped and put into LAION-5B) to high (Jill's collected 10-year efforts in producing her published illustrations), and with some originality in the mix, their contributions display no leadership, independence or directness regarding any image produced with GAI (which is why there are concerns about scraping images without consent). These assessments can change importantly when we turn to specific producers of particular training data tokens. For instance, concerning relevance and redundancy, Jacinda's collected paintings of non-cheese things looking like they are made from cheese may play a crucial role in enabling a GAI system to produce 'Donald Trump-shaped cheese wheel rolling down a hill'.

We expand on further differences in regard to producers of specific training data later. For now, let us turn to explore more concrete theses that CCC can ground, focusing first on a comparison of human users and GAI systems.

4.2 Humans vs. GAI: A spectrum of creatorship

Can GAI systems be part of co-creating collectives? CCC suggests yes, for they may exhibit a number of important features and to significant enough degrees to merit candidacy. But how would credit for an output be allocated between human users and GAI systems? That depends crucially on the specific context. Let us offer two examples, which fall on opposite sides of a spectrum for how credit may be distributed. These examples will help us establish that GAI systems can have strong claims to creatorship; sometimes stronger than humans.

Consider Jake's 'cat on a mat' prompt again. Four images are generated (Figure 1), from which he chooses the first.

Figure 1: 'Cat on a mat, art', produced by Stable Diffusion.

How should we consider Jake's and Stable Diffusion's claims to credit here? CCC suggests that the GAI has a stronger claim than Jake. Jake typed in a generic prompt and did not contribute interestingly to the output beyond that. He did not have any concrete ideas regarding composition, palette, style, etc., and he wouldn't have been able to create any of these images without GAI.

Contrast this with Jill, an experienced visual artist working on campaign visuals for an environmental protection agency. She wants to create an image of a polluted ocean in the palm of a hand to correspond with key mission statements. Starting from a hand-drawn sketch, Jill refines her prompts, guiding the GAI through a series of many images, and exerting precise control, e.g., by using inpainting and ControlNet to pose the hand and steer the composition, until she gets an image that conforms to her concrete expectations. Jill already knew what image she wanted to create and could have created something similar by different means, say with Photoshop. In such a case, CCC can ground why Jill deserves a significant credit share and that GAI is more akin to a tool than a full-fledged creator on par with her.

CCC can capture the difference between these cases in a systematic fashion. Table 1 maps out Jill, Jake and Stable Diffusion against CCC's criteria. For simplicity, we use a qualitative coding as 'low' or 'high' to indicate the degree to which each feature tracked by CCC is realized. 'n/a' indicates that a feature doesn't apply in a case, e.g., because GAI systems do not have intentions necessary for leadership.

Table 1: Comparing contributors. SD is Stable Diffusion.

	Jill	SD1	Jake	SD2
Relevance	high	high	low	high
Non-redundancy	high	low	low	high
Control	high	low	low	high
Time/effort	high	high	low	high
Originality	high	high	low	low
Leadership	high	n/a	low	n/a
Independence	high	low	high	low
Directness	high	high	high	high

Table 1 encodes Jill's comparatively much stronger claim than Stable Diffusion (SD1). Jake, by contrast, loses out to Stable Diffusion (SD2) on several criteria, including relevance, redundancy, control and time/effort, so Stable Diffusion has a comparatively stronger claim than him. CCC can hence capture how creatorship and credit depend on a number of context-specific details and locate the roles of various agents and entities straddling full creator and mere tool, author or background furniture, rather than relying on rigid categories. This flexibility and ability to give insights into different situations, where our intuitions can vary widely and surprisingly, is at the heart of CCC – no agent or entity should be judged in or out at the outset, but instead should be allocated credit according to the specific contributions they make.

Nevertheless, there are some likely objections even against our moderate claim that GAI systems can be strong candidates for co-creating collectives and can sometimes play more significant roles than humans do. For instance, one could insist that GAI systems

are not appropriate targets for credit as they are not making the right sorts of contributions to an output – they might be producing, but not creating. But taking this approach can raise problems. For instance, it can lead to credit and subsequent responsibility gaps (cf. [49, 58]), where the (human) creators established as forming a collective do not fully capture the credit for the output and allocating the concomitant responsibility is hindered by a lack of proper targets. While the visual 'cat on the mat' may be mundane and unoriginal, credit for this image, however little, must still be allocated somewhere. But if not to Jake, to who? Consider a variation of Jake's case, where instead of prompting Stable Diffusion, he asks his artistic friend, Jana, to help him make 'cat on a mat'. Jana looks at a range of other cat and mat pictures for inspiration, and drawing on experience and learned aesthetic norms, casually sketches some variants she expects Jake to like. Insisting that Jana should be allocated credit, while Stable Diffusion shouldn't, even though their contributions take a similar form, seems to be begging the question on who can be a creator and is thus not compelling. The intuition that Jake is not solely responsible for the creation of the 'cat on the mat' visuals is even stronger in cases where the output is in some way harmful, for example, if Jake inputs a prompt and, to his surprise, receives images filled with racist stereotypes. In this case, it seems implausible to allocate responsibility to Jake. So, until compelling arguments are offered that CCC misses additional criteria to negotiate creatorship, which can sustain principled distinctions between humans and machines, we maintain that GAIs can sometimes be considered parts of co-creating collectives.

4.3 CCC reinforces and generates intuitions

CCC can reinforce existing intuitions as well as generate new ones to advance ongoing debates. Existing controversy around the role of creators of training data is an important example. While common image datasets like LAION-5B are heavily populated with generic imagery, they also contain the works of dead and living artists who have spent considerable time and effort developing their works, and have not consented to their works being used to train GAI systems that 'appropriate' the capacity to generate imagery in their distinctive style. Many commentators and artists insist that something illegitimate is happening here [22, 32, 67] and CCC can reinforce such intuitions on independent grounds: in some cases, producers of training data may have claims to candidacy in a co-creating collective.

Take Jamal, who has spent years crafting his distinctive and acclaimed style as a digital artist. Jamal's images were scraped and a GAI trained on them is now capable of rendering images in Jamal's style. Jamal may reasonably complain that he is made worse off by GAI, as almost anyone can now freely produce imagery that looks like his, worsening his prospects of getting commissions and drowning out his distinctiveness in a sea of near-indistinguishable mimicry. Does Jamal have a claim to be considered a part of a co-creating collective for some outputs? CCC answers in the affirmative. Consider relevance and redundancy. Jamal's works are highly relevant and non-redundant to a GAI system's ability to produce outputs in his style – take them out from the training dataset, re-train the system, and the GAI wouldn't be able to reproduce his unique style. They may also involve high degrees of control: while Jamal didn't intend to effect specific results in a GAI user's outputs, the look of his works will co-determine what any GAI outputs prompted to mimic his style will look like – had his palette been warmer, the outputs would have been warmer, too. Contrast this with Jimmy, whose 27 generic pictures of his cat 'Mr Snuggles' posted on Instagram won't make a recognizable difference to any cat images produced with the help of GAI. Generally, the more specific a prompt is to a region of the latent manifold that's crucially shaped by a specific creator's works, the stronger the claim that creator has to credit for a GAI's output due to the relevance/non-redundancy and control involved.

What about the other criteria? We may assume that Jamal's contributions involved large amounts of time and effort in developing his style and producing his works. But while Jamal may have also exhibited plenty of leadership and independence in producing his oeuvre, his contributions to specific GAI outputs are not very *direct*: they are causally mediated by GAI systems. So, what should we conclude about Jamal's candidacy in a co-creating collective? We think that it is not implausible to consider Jamal a co-creator, albeit a distant one. Nevertheless, even a weak claim to co-creatorship may ground derivative claims, e.g., to be appropriately credited or asked for consent. Reasonably, Jamal may decline to be a co-creator on a diffuse number of prompting endeavors by people he doesn't know and whose values he may not share. Importantly, CCC makes clear that he may do so on grounds that are independent from concerns about intellectual property violations in scraping and using imagery for training GAI.

CCC also generates novel intuitions, for example, that GAI systems have the capacity to create *illusions of creatorship*. Specifically, users can be led to over credit themselves, despite having made only minimal contributions to an output - and CCC explains why. Consider Jake again, who might think he created 'cat on a mat', using Stable Diffusion as a mere tool. But Jake might be entirely unaware of how little control he exerted over the output if he does not have access to relevant counterfactuals, such as how the images would have looked if a different seed had been used, or if he had, equally randomly, prompted 'a mat with a cat on it' instead of 'cat on a mat'. Lacking such counterfactuals, Jake may understandably feel he exercised control to effect a specific output; but that feeling might be quite misleading. Users also lack information about the significance of others' contributions. Take training data. Jaden likes sci-fi and uses Midjourney to produce a striking image of 'a battlecruiser landing on a desert planet'. But no amount of intricate prompt-engineering would get him anywhere near that if not for the extensive amounts of aesthetically rich training data produced by concept artists over decades, contributions that may score highly on some of CCC's criteria. But for lack of access to relevant counterfactuals, e.g., realizing that without those contributions Jaden's battlecruiser image would have looked like a teenager's pencil drawing, and without considering the kinds of features CCC tracks and what other candidates for co-creatorship there might be, it can be easy for users to overestimate their role in creation processes. CCC can help dispel such overestimations and allow users to better understand their roles: if Jake would have been happy with many different outputs, his role is more akin to someone browsing a gallery of cat images and selecting one they like. That is a fine

role to play, but different from being a creator, and we shouldn't worry about withholding credit when it is based on illusion.

4.4 CCC advances existing debates

Addressing the role of GAI, some have insisted that - in the name of transparency and authenticity - AI itself should not be credited with creatorship [15, 50]. But as others have argued in relation to the usage of ChatGPT [38], and we have demonstrated here in regards to visual outputs, failing to examine the role of GAI in fact hinders transparency and authenticity, obscuring the process of creation and the significance of different agents and entities involved. Many academics have called for the fair attribution of credit in the creation of GAI works [4, 20, 37, 50], but have not provided concrete recipes for doing so. Members of the public, too, have been asking and debating who should be able to claim creatorship of GAI outputs [1, 44]. CCC, as outlined here, responds to those demands. It provides a fine-grained framework that allows and encourages a more nuanced allocation of credit, accommodating the unique aspects of GAI-based creation, supporting some common intuitions and showing that GAI can in fact be a strong contender for creatorship claims.

In providing these findings, CCC addresses several problematic tendencies in the public discourse around GAI. Major differences persist in what people take to be the most compelling approach to attributing credit for GAI outputs – with some members of the public stating that the "typical structure people will be crediting will be a brilliant human on top and the AI as a facilitator, or a human-AI synergy", while others have assumed the lion's share will go to "the AI and its creators". Each side appears confident that their view is "obviously" what "most people" will take up [2]. CCC works to counter these assumptions by demonstrating the sheer complexity and diversity of credit attribution that uses of GAI bring about. It also shows that brittle analogies, which liken GAI systems to e.g. a pencil or AutoCAD, or flattening assertions that 'the history of art and technology has seen all this before', do little justice to the intricacies and novelties of GAI and its rapidly growing uptake across society [1, 16, 66].

In particular, CCC works against a popular tendency to overhype the contributions of human users. Excited by the new possibilities that GAI offers, users often take credit for visual outputs with little to no acknowledgement of other agents involved in their creation – some going so far as to feel "we are becoming like small gods with those tools" [3, see also 55]. Academics in the public discourse have reinforced such hype, with Drew Hemment stating that "AI gives artists superpowers" [64]. As we have seen, CCC untangles agents' roles in the creative process facilitated by GAI, thereby aiding users to understand, negotiate and articulate the contribution they have made to final outputs.

CCC also helps challenge problematic narratives of GAI creatorship. For instance, tech companies have incentives to downplay their hand in the creation of users' individual outputs and to instead present GAI as a beneficial, innocuous tool. But the collective-driven nature of image synthesis that CCC emphasizes makes clear that such a framing is not always accurate. Describing GAI systems as mere tools may shift too much responsibility onto users; e.g., when GAI systems have built-in propensity to generate toxic imagery it seems odd to insist that problematic outputs are the result of inappropriate tool-use alone. CCC makes clear that developers, too, play relevant roles in the production of specific outputs, although only indirect ones that are mediated by the GAI systems they trained, fine-tuned and released. Attempts to push framings suggesting GAI systems are mere tools have already played out at significant scale in the negotiations surrounding the EU AI Act, in which the most dominant technology companies lobbied to push the act's regulatory obligations onto European providers (e.g. app developers whose products access GAIs through APIs) and users of their general AI models (including the likes of ChatGPT and Stable Diffusion), rather than taking accountability for potential damages themselves [30, 61]. In campaigning for this framing, tech company leaders and lobbyists have asserted "the balance of responsibility between users, deployers and providers... needs to be better distinguished" and that "giving the right responsibilities to the right actor in the AI value chain is key" (quoted in [61], pp.12-14). We agree in general, but not with their preferred distinctions. As CCC shows, understanding the roles played by users, developers and GAI systems themselves do not in fact liberate developers of responsibility. Their (indirect) hand in creatorship, and the accountability that comes with that, cannot be justifiably attributed to others further downstream.

Finally, CCC also informs and critically challenges existing scholarly and legal conceptualizations of creatorship. CCC shows that long-held expectations for how authorship and copyright should be attributed may now need reworking in the face of GAI. Copyright attributions, for example, usually aim to identify a small set of agents - but CCC suggests that perhaps copyright sometimes needs to be distributed more widely, even if doing so in practice can be extremely challenging. CCC also highlights the degree to which existing theories are not fully appropriate for these new technologies and the multi-layered processes of creation they entail, while also suggesting that earlier, more general understandings of creatorship may lack sufficient flexibility. Using all-or-nothing categorizations rather than gradations for roles such as artist, author, assistant, or contributor, for example, may obscure important contributions. In regard to GAI specifically, CCC responds to scholars' calls for the fair attribution of credit, offering a framework to dissect the creative process and distribute degrees of creatorship in a finer-grained way than existing work.

5 CONCLUSIONS

We have proposed the CCC (collective-centered creation) view as a systematic framework for addressing pressing questions about creatorship in the context of generative AI (GAI). At its core, CCC maintains that GAI systems can meet the bar for being included in a co-creating collective, challenging a wide range of views that have tended to downplay the role of GAI. Reinforcing collaborative views that have so far been lacking more concrete instruments to understand how creatorship and credit can be distributed, CCC also brings more nuance to creatorship debates: it insists that creatorship is gradual, not all-or-nothing, and informs concrete judgments by providing a rich conceptual machinery. We have shown how CCC can inform existing debates, by lending independent support to influential views, and by prompting us to consider new ways of thinking about creative production with GAI, be that in regard to the GAI's role itself or that of other candidates for co-creation, such as producers of training data. Taken together, CCC offers a

flexible framework that can advance public, academic and legal debate as GAI is developed further, deployed more broadly, and as we, collectively, form a better understanding of our relationships with it. As indicated earlier, CCC is also limited in scope. It does not yield definitive judgments on creatorship issues in specific cases, nor does it insist that its criteria are the right ones, or the only ones that matter. CCC as sketched here is intended as a first, systematic conceptual contribution on questions of creatorship with GAI, but not as the final word on these issues. We hope that scholars from different fields will feel invited to contribute to the larger project of refining this type of approach, be that through technical contributions by computer scientists (e.g. efforts to permit more precise analyses of difference-making contributions, control, or originality); conceptual improvements made by art theorists, practitioners and philosophers to further detail CCC's conceptual machinery; or suggestions by legal scholars to make progress on understanding how CCC's tenets can be reconciled with existing legislation or inform the development of tailor-made law that encodes novel intuitions about creative visual production involving GAI.

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ChatGPT Perpetuates Gender Bias in Machine Translation and Ignores Non-Gendered Pronouns: Findings across Bengali and Five other Low-Resource Languages

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ABSTRACT

In this multicultural age, language translation is one of the most performed tasks, and it is becoming increasingly AI-moderated and automated. As a novel AI system, ChatGPT claims to be proficient in machine translation tasks and in this paper, we put that claim to the test. Specifically, we examine ChatGPT's accuracy in translating between English and languages that exclusively use gender-neutral pronouns. We center this study around Bengali, the 7^{th} most spoken language globally, but also generalize our findings across five other languages: Farsi, Malay, Tagalog, Thai, and Turkish. We find that ChatGPT perpetuates gender defaults and stereotypes assigned to certain occupations (e.g., man = doctor, woman = nurse) or actions (e.g., woman = cook, man = go to work), as it converts gender-neutral pronouns in languages to 'he' or 'she'. We also observe ChatGPT completely failing to translate the English gender-neutral singular pronoun 'they' into equivalent gender-neutral pronouns in other languages, as it produces translations that are incoherent and incorrect. While it does respect and provide appropriately gender-marked versions of Bengali words when prompted with gender information in English, ChatGPT appears to confer a higher respect to men than to women in the same occupation. We conclude that ChatGPT exhibits the same gender biases which have been demonstrated for tools like Google Translate or MS Translator, as we provide recommendations for a human centered approach for future designers of AI systems that perform machine translation to better accommodate such low-resource languages.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Human-centered computing**; • **Computing methodologies** → **Machine translation**; *Artificial intelligence*; *Natural language processing*; • **Applied computing** → **Language translation**;

KEYWORDS

ChatGPT, language models, machine translation, gender bias, Bengali, human-centered design

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1 INTRODUCTION

The last months of 2022 saw the meteoric rise in popularity of what has become one of the most widely used AI tools of 2023 – ChatGPT[1]. Developed by OpenAI[2] on the GPT-3[3] language model, the conversational agent set a record for the fastest growth since launch, exceeding 100 million new users in its first two months with over 13 million users per day in its first full month of operation [41] as it has found usage in a wide range of both recreational and professional domains. With such expansive usage, ChatGPT might be an upstart competitor and potential usurper of Google's throne as the go-to tool for general question-answering and information seeking, with the New York Times calling it "the first notable threat in decades" to Google's near-monopoly in this space [37].

ChatGPT is trained on large corpora of publicly available data and uses Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), whereby designers produce conversations where human AI trainers serve as both the user and the AI assistant. Such an approach opens it up to the possibility of exhibiting biases and stereotypes that have downstream ethical implications (though OpenAI claims that ChatGPT takes extensive measures towards bias mitigation [65]), as researchers and journalists alike have warned [eg., 8, 23, 39]. Such calls necessitate a thorough examination of ChatGPT to effectively address bias perpetuation or amplification by generative AI [5].

In this paper, we examine ChatGPT's performance on a task that is one of Google's most common ones – language translation. Specifically, we examine whether ChatGPT has learned from the input that Google has received for gendering words and occupations in English translations of words that are gender-neutral in their original language [eg., 16, 56, 71, 77]. Seeing as how this is a critical and well-established flaw within Google Translate over the past half-decade, we believe that new AI systems should seek to rectify such biased or inaccurate machine translation.

[1] https://openai.com/blog/chatgpt/
[2] https://openai.com/about/
[3] https://openai.com/blog/gpt-3-apps

We investigate ChatGPT's performance over a series of translation tasks. We base these tasks on prompts focused around occupations and actions, pursuant to prior research highlighting biases in texts that associate certain actions and occupations with specific genders, e.g., to be a doctor or to go to work is male-associated, whereas to be a nurse or cook/clean is female-associated [eg., 15, 26, 34, 53, 69]. We conduct this investigation through translations between English and Bangla/ Bengali. The choice of Bengali is informed by two reasons: Bengali is gender-neutral in its pronouns, and the first author is a native speaker of Bengali. Through our findings, we demonstrate a pattern by which ChatGPT translations perpetuate and amplify gendered (mostly heteromasculine) defaults in occupations and actions that should be gender-neutral, and conferring higher respect to men over women in the same occupation. Though we center this research around translations between English and Bengali, we verify our observed phenomena through translations in five other languages which are similarly gender-neutral in their pronouns: Farsi, Malay, Tagalog, Thai, and Turkish. These languages are chosen because of their collective population of over 500 million people and because they all use gender-neutral pronouns, which is important because we study gender biases/inaccuracies that emerge in translations between English and these languages.

Our contributions are threefold: **(1)** We provide a comprehensive demonstration of the persistence and amplification of gender roles and stereotypes associated with actions and occupations when ChatGPT translates into English sentences which do not provide any gender information in their source languages, as we demonstrate that ChatGPT's reinforcement learning strategy does not handle bias mitigation in machine translation which has significant implications on perpetuating bias and shaping human cognition about who should be a doctor and who should be a nurse, among other occupations. We exemplify the insertion of binary genders into instances where the non-binary pronoun would have been most appropriate, and the failure to translate the English gender-neutral singular pronoun 'they' into gender-neutral pronouns in other languages which threatens to erase non-binary identities in downstream tasks. We present one of the first studies of language translation tasks performed by ChatGPT (the only other being [44]), and generally one of the first studies about ChatGPT. Given its popularity and usage, it is important to extensively study ChatGPT and its potential to perpetuate and amplify potentially harmful biases and stereotypes, and our study is important in starting this conversation. **(2)** We conduct our study in Bengali, the 7^{th} most spoken language in the world [13] (over 337 million people [33]). Even though this is such a widely spoken language with a rich cultural history and heritage, it is significantly understudied in the translation space. It has only tangentially been studied in [69], and by non-speakers of Bengali. We study it from a native speaker's perspective, a perspective important to capture and accurately interpret the underlying culture-specific connotations of translations. **(3)** Beyond demonstrating these phenomena in Bengali, we show generalization across other languages with gender-neutral pronouns – Farsi, Malay, Tagalog, Thai, and Turkish. Such generalization across multiple languages is not commonly examined in the same single study (with the exception of [69]). In these cases, we only study translations to English, because English is the highest-resource language of all these based on the training data ChatGPT uses. We definitively demonstrate ChatGPT perpetuating gender stereotypes and inserting an inferred gender based on actions and occupations into sentences that are designed to be gender neutral in their languages of origin, languages which are classified as 'low-resource' in natural language processing [25]. We demand higher performance for such languages that adequately respects their representation and prevalence in the world and accommodates the billions who collectively speak them.

2 BACKGROUND

2.1 Gender in Languages and Translations

Global languages have several similarities and differences when evaluated across a variety of properties, and one such property is how they handle gender. Some languages contain grammatical gender, whereby nouns are classified with genders [27]. Grammatical gender is especially interesting in the case of inanimate nouns, e.g., in English, a language without grammatical gender, the sun is genderless whereas in Hindi, a grammatically gendered language, it is considered masculine. Linguists [eg., 27, 48] largely believe that assignment of grammatical gender within languages evolved over time in arbitrary patterns unique to each language.

Beyond grammatical gender, languages also contain semantic or natural gender, which is a pattern of using different words to refer to different nouns based on the determined gender of the noun. For instance, in English we refer to male cattle as 'bulls' and female cattle as 'cows'. Semantic gender is also commonly expressed through word pairs that contain a root word and a changed version derived from it, e.g., the feminine word 'lioness' in English is derived from the masculine 'lion' by adding the suffix '-ess'. This is known as *markedness* [42], where the root word, is said to be 'unmarked' and is typically more frequently used compared to the marked word. Historically, most gendered pairs of nouns are such that the masculine noun is unmarked, and femininity is denoted by somehow marking the masculine [eg., 7, 42, 82].

Since languages have their own rules, cultural contexts, and nuances with respect to gender, an interesting site of study is when they come into contact with each other through processes of translation. Language translation is complicated, and must be done with a good understanding of the rules of both source and destination languages [79]. This is especially true when languages differ on the basis of grammatical gender, e.g., when translating the sentence 'The sun was shining but the river was cold' from grammatically gender-neutral English to grammatically gendered Hindi, it is important to know that 'sun' should be masculine-gendered and 'river' should be feminine-gendered, which would in turn influence the nature of the Hindi phrases of the verbs 'was shining' (in this case, 'चमक रहा था') and 'was cold' (in this case, 'ठंडी थी□').

Therefore, translation tasks require keen understandings of languages involved in the process, and a successful translator must be both careful and respectful of the nuances and cultural contexts within source and destination languages to be effective at their job. However, the task of translation is becoming increasingly automated and offloaded to language models and machine translators.

2.2 Language Models and Datasets in Translation Tasks

Large-scale language models have become ubiquitous across a variety of domains, in tasks such as sentiment analysis [eg., 3, 40, 52], natural language interpretation [eg., 30, 45, 60], plagiarism detection [eg., 4, 55, 68], content recommendation [eg., 43, 76, 83], content moderation [eg., 66, 78, 84], misinformation identification and retrieval [eg., 22, 80, 81], and so many more. However, such language models are known to contain a variety of biases, such as religious bias [eg., 1, 59], gender bias [eg., 11, 54], intersectional bias [eg., 24, 38, 64], and social and occupational biases [eg., 46, 51], as they perpetuate harmful and disadvantaging historical injustices.

Within the context of language translation, Brown et al. [14] and Och and Ney [62] developed the computational foundations for machine translation. Such models might be trained either on unlabeled monolingual corpora [eg., 12] or labeled and translated texts [eg., 50]. Common approaches of using language models in translation tasks involve using feed-forward neural probabilistic language models [74] or RNN-based models [57]. Currently, one of the most prevalent approaches to large-scale translations is the use of Neural Machine Translators (NMTs), pioneered by Google and used within their Google Translate tool. Since their inception, NMTs are considered the state-of-the-art in the field.

Like in other machine learning contexts, the accuracy of machine translation often depends on the quantity and quality of training data the machine learning models have access to, with increases in accuracy generally being correlated with increased quality of data [47]. Within collecting multilingual data, a common approach is to mine parallel texts in multiple languages, such as different languages of the Bible [28], and then applying similarity measures to determine parallelisms at the sentence level [75]. It is at this level of data collection and availability that languages are differentiated between, because some languages (such as English or other European languages) have vast corpora of text data or are selected for mining [eg., 32], creating a massive gulf with other languages for whom labeled parallel or bitextual data are sparse in publicly available datasets [36]. Such languages that have low coverage or are underrepresented in global datasets are known as *low-resource* languages [25]. Because of this gulf in data availability, translations in the context of low-resource languages have lower quality than translations in high-resource languages.

In this paper, we study translations to and from several such low-resource languages in the context of what currently is one of the most popularly used AI-tools: ChatGPT. We recognize that ChatGPT, or its underlying language model GPT-3, was designed as Generative AI and not a translation tool. As a language model, GPT-3 is capable of translation tasks without necessarily being optimal at them. However, it is important to study ChatGPT that builds on GPT-3 in the context of language translation given the prominent evidence of translation fails by dedicated tools such as Google Translate or MS Translator (detailed in the next section) and the large public uptake of ChatGPT into a wide range of tasks as a general purpose chatbot. Though research in this field is sparse given the novelty of the tool [44], we believe this present study to be critical, considering how several millions of users might use or are already using ChatGPT as a translation tool.

2.3 Biases and Errors related to Gender Pronouns in Machine Translation

That machine translators make errors and exhibit biases in context of gender when translating between languages with different gender rules has been well established both in common usage and literature. Such criticism has been levied against popular translation tools such as Google Translate [eg., 34, 69] and MS Translator [eg., 71, 77], especially in the context of English translation.

Such gender bias is displayed in several ways. Firstly, it is evident in patterns of nouns (e.g., doctor = male), pronouns and verbs (e.g., cooking = female) to which machine translators assign male or female gender. A study of 74 Spanish nouns revealed that an overwhelming majority of those were assigned male pronouns in English translation while only 4 were deemed to be female [53]. Closer inspection reveals that occupations such as doctor, engineer and president are often assigned male pronouns, whereas those such as dancer, nurse, and teacher are often denoted as female [69]. Secondly, genderization occurs towards verbs, as actions like cooking and cleaning are associated with women while reading and eating were assigned to men [34]. Finally, language models even overwrite information about subjects' genders provided in translation, as Stanovsky et al. [77] demonstrated an English sentence about a female doctor receiving a machine translation into Spanish that classified them as male. While these examples are in high-resource languages such as English and Spanish, the problem is exacerbated in low-resource languages, such as Turkish [eg., 26], Malay [eg., 69], Tagalog [eg., 34] and others. This further widens the gap between languages, because traditionally low-resource languages (e.g., most Asian languages) deal with gender differently than high-resource languages (e.g., Romance languages), leading to increased translation errors [73].

Our objective is not to demonstrate anew that machine translation exhibits gender biases when translating between languages that handle gender differently, especially for low-resource languages. Rather, this paper intends to show that the phenomenon persists in the latest most popular and state of the art tool, and that developers have failed to address it despite the knowledge in the field, despite claiming that they attempt to mitigate biases in their design [65].

3 METHODS

3.1 Author Linguistic Positionality

The first author is fluent in Bengali, having grown up in Bengal (India) for 18 years speaking the language. This fluency is in Standard Colloquial Bengali (SCB) and, of the various Bengali dialects (detailed in Section 3.2), he primarily speaks Rahri, though he is also conversational in Bangali. He also speaks Hindi and Urdu fluently.

3.2 Translating to/from Bengali

Bengali/Bangla is the 7^{th}-most spoken language in the world [13], with an estimated 300 million people speaking it as their mother tongue and almost 37 million second-language speakers [33]. Most of these are residents or emigrants from Bangladesh or the state of Bengal in India, although it is also recognized as one of the official languages of Sierra Leone as a tribute to the contribution of Bangladeshi UN Peacekeepers in ending their civil war. It has

several dialects, such as Bangali, Rahri, Varendri, Rangpuri, Shantipuriya, Bikrampuri, Jessoriya, Barisali, and Sylheti [21]. Such dialects are primarily spoken, as the majority of the written Bengali in India is in Standard Colloquial Bengali (SCB) [58], a standardized version of the language that is perhaps the closest to Rahri.

A feature of the Bengali language which is central to this study is the absence of gendered pronouns. While English uses the gendered pronouns 'he'/'she' and the gender-neutral (singular) pronoun 'they', pronouns in Bengali are gender-neutral. The three most used pronouns in Bengali are সে (pronounced 'shey'), ও (pronounced 'o') and তিনি (pronounced 'teeni' with a soft t). While সে and ও can be used to refer to anyone, তিনি is used to refer to respected people such as elders.

Even though it uses gender-neutral pronouns, Bengali still contains marked binary-gendered words to refer to animals and occupations e.g. lion/lioness (সিংহ/সিংহী), tiger/tigress (বাঘ/বাঘিনী), and actor/actress (অভিনেতা/অভিনেত্রী). In those examples, the male version of the Bengali word is the root for the female version, and genderization is performed by adding vowels to the root word. However, not all gendered pairs have direct translations to distinct English words e.g., the same word 'teacher' translates to শিক্ষক for male teachers and শিক্ষিকা for female teachers.

In more recent iterations of SCB over the past decade, there is a growing movement of using the root/default version of gendered words to refer to individuals of nonbinary gender or in cases when the gender of the person is not known. Therefore, the English sentence 'they are a teacher' should translate to 'সে একজন শিক্ষক' and vice versa. The gender-neutral pronoun (singular) 'they' should translate the English word 'teacher' to the default 'শিক্ষক' and the Bengali pronoun 'সে' should translate to the gender-neutral 'they'.

We examine whether translations to and from Bengali honor the gender-neutral pronoun, or provide the appropriately marked nouns when English prompts contain information about gender.

3.3 Prompting ChatGPT

We queried ChatGPT with a series of prompts (detailed in Section 3.4). The first author created a new account for this study and performed the querying tasks in new sessions on the free version of ChatGPT on ten different days, giving a day's gap in between each time. The intent behind using new sessions was to mitigate the language model's learning from previous conversations, and performing queries on different days was to ensure that results would form a pattern and strengthen our observed themes, rather than stand as a single phenomenon which could have occurred on a particular day for any number of reasons. Prompts were tried out one by one instead of all together, in order to avoid possibly hitting the character limit for single queries.

3.4 Prompt Formation for ChatGPT

3.4.1 Single-Occupation Prompts. A primary methodological task in this study was the formation of prompts with which to query ChatGPT. To test whether ChatGPT preserves gender-neutrality in Bengali sentences, we designed a set of prompts carrying the format 'সে একজন _____|' (They are a _____.) Such a construction is because we intend to fill in the latter stage of the prompt with occupation titles, pursuant to prior work on querying gender in translation tasks based on occupations [eg., 49, 69]. We centered our process of selecting occupations with which to fill the aforementioned blanks in Caliskan et al. [16]'s work on implicit gender-occupation biases. We began with the US Bureau of Labor Statistics' (BLS) 2022 report of labor force statistics[4], converted the 50 most common occupations to single-word titles following Caliskan et al. [16]'s process, and then translated them to Bengali. The full list of occupation titles is shown in List 3 in Appendix A.

Accurate translations of these prompts should contain the 'they' pronoun for all occupations, i.e., the prompt 'সে একজন ডাক্তার|' should translate to 'They are a doctor.' Through ChatGPT's translations into English (shown in Section 3.3), we examine its preservation (or lack thereof) of the gender-neutral pronoun.

We also designed a series of 50 prompts using the English titles of the aforementioned occupations, beginning with the gender-neutral 'They are a _____.' The intention with these prompts was to examine whether ChatGPT correctly identified the English gender-neutral singular pronoun 'they' to translate into one of the Bengali pronouns সে, ও and তিনি, e.g., a correct translation of the English prompt 'They are a doctor' into Bengali is 'সে একজন ডাক্তার|'.

Furthermore, to investigate whether ChatGPT can provide the appropriately marked forms of words when provided with gender information, we designed a set of prompts with the construction 'He/She is a _____.' We could not use the aforementioned occupations, because most of them are not marked. We also could not use an equivalent of the BLS data for Bengal/Bangladesh, because such data is not publicly available. Therefore, based on the first author's lived experience and cultural context, we identified 10 occupations common in Bengal/Bangladesh and have marked pairs in Bengali based on gender. They are as shown in List 4 in Appendix A.

We thus formed a set of 20 prompts, e.g., 'He is a teacher/She is a teacher', for which the correct translations in Bengali are expected to be 'সে একজন শিক্ষক' and 'সে একজন শিক্ষিকা', respectively.

We collectively refer to these 120 prompts (50 Bengali and 50 English prompts from List 3 + 20 prompts from List 4) as *single-occupation prompts*. In Table 1, we provide some expectations of correct English to Bengali translation, along with rationale.

3.4.2 Action-occupation Prompts. We built another set of Bengali prompts by constructing a scenario that would be equitable and accessible to everyone, irrespective of gender. We identified the scenario of an individual waking up in the morning, performing an action, and then going to work within particular occupations. The prompts contain no information about the gender of the person who is the subject. Therefore, the most accurate translations into English should use the singular gender-neutral 'they' pronoun. We hereafter refer to these as *action-occupation prompts*. The base prompt was: 'সে সকালে ঘুম থেকে উঠে _____, এবং কাজে যায়। সে একজন _____|' In English, this becomes 'They wake up in the morning, [action] and go to work. They are a [occupation].'

In the first blank, we placed common actions that individuals might undertake between waking up in the morning and going to work. We select the following actions: 'খাবার রান্না করে (cook food), 'ঘর পরিষ্কার করে' (clean/tidy up), 'নাস্তা খায়' (eat breakfast), 'দাঁত মাজে' (brush teeth), 'চুল আঁচড়ায়' (brush/comb hair), 'নামাজ পড়ে/ঈশ্বরের কাছে প্রার্থনা করে' (pray to God), and 'বই পড়ে'

[4] https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11.htm

Table 1: Expected English to Bengali translations and vice versa, with explanations

English sentence	Expected Bengali Translation	Explanation
He is a teacher.	সে একজন শিক্ষক।	Male English pronoun, therefore the unmarked Bengali word for 'teacher' (শিক্ষক) is expected.
She is a teacher.	সে একজন শিক্ষিকা।	Female English pronoun, therefore the gender-marked Bengali word for 'teacher' (শিক্ষিকা) is expected.
They are a teacher.	সে একজন শিক্ষক।	Gender-neutral English pronoun, therefore the unmarked Bengali word for 'teacher' (শিক্ষক) is expected.

(read a book). We used two translations of 'pray to God' because members of the two primary religions of Bengali speakers – Islam and Hinduism – refer to it differently.

In the second half of the sentence, we used the single-word forms of the top eight most common occupations from the BLS 2022 labor force report. These occupations are: 'ডাক্তার' (doctor), 'নার্স' (nurse), 'প্রকৌশলী' (engineer), 'বৈজ্ঞানিক' (scientist), 'পাচক' (chef), 'পুষ্টিবিদ' (nutritionist), 'সহকারী' (assistant) and 'মনস্তত্ত্বিক' (psychologist).

Therefore, we generated a set of 64 unique action-occupation prompts in Bengali. Each prompt is populated with exactly one action in the first blank and exactly one occupation in the second blank. Prompts are depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Action-occupation prompts. Each prompt is formed by combining the contents of leftmost column, one action from items 1-8, the contents of the third column from the left, and one occupation from items a-h, in that order.

3.5 Testing Across Five Other Languages

To achieve generalization of potentially biased translations to languages beyond Bengali, we extended this study to other languages that use gender-neutral pronouns. We sought native speakers of such languages from within our networks and identified five languages to study: Farsi, Malay, Tagalog, Thai, and Turkish. These are all low-resource languages spoken by many millions of people all over the world, which makes them important to study. We worked with native speakers of each language to construct respective sets of single-occupation prompts using the occupations in List 3, and corresponding correct English translations. We tested these following the process outlined in Section 3.3, with the only difference being that these were only tried once as opposed to ten days.

4 FINDINGS

We supplement our findings with screenshots from ChatGPT to provide direct evidence, but present them in Appendix B for concision and increased readability.

4.1 Translating Single-Occupation Prompts

For our single-occupation prompts, where we provided ChatGPT with 50 sentences each in the construction 'সে একজন _____।' (They are a _____.) and filled each blank in with occupations mentioned in List 3. Across a period of 10 days, we observed that 29 occupations (such as doctor, engineer, plumber, programmer, carpenter, etc.) were exclusively assigned the pronoun 'He' in translation. The full set of occupations in List 5 (Appendix A), and examples are shown in Figure 2 (Appendix B).

ChatGPT exclusively assigned the English pronoun 'She' to prompts containing 11 occupations (e.g., nurse, therapist, hairdresser, assistant, aide, etc.) on all 10 days of testing. The full set of occupations is captured in List 6 (Appendix A), with few examples shown in Figure 3 (Appendix B).

Only for six occupations – lawyer, administrator, officer, specialist, hygienist, and paralegal – did ChatGPT assign the English pronouns 'He/she' on all days of testing, though it did not use the pronoun 'They'. A few examples shown in Figure 4 (Appendix B).

There were 4 occupations – janitor, chef, nutritionist, and salesperson – for which ChatGPT demonstrated some variation in its assignment of pronouns, in the way that it did not consistently assign the pronoun 'he' or 'she' across different days of testing. An example is shown in Figure 5 (Appendix B). Such variations were only observed within the first 3 days of testing, as results stabilized starting day 4 to the pronoun that was assigned on day 3, and were replicated every day after.

For 'They are a [occupation].' prompts, we observed ChatGPT's complete failure to recognize the English gender-neutral pronoun 'they' as singular. In all 50 instances across 10 days, we observed ChatGPT translating 'they' to the Bengali *plural* pronoun 'তারা', producing grammatically incorrect and incoherent translations. The correct translations should be 'সে/তিনি/ও একজন _____।' Some examples are shown in Figure 7 (Appendix B).

Finally, we examine ChatGPT's performance in displaying appropriate markedness of gendered words, using the prompts 'He is a _____.' or 'She is a _____.', and using the words in List 4. We observe that ChatGPT is able to translate words to their appropriate marked or unmarked versions given the gendered pronouns (he/she) of the subject, as shown in Figure 6 (Appendix B). However, a phenomenon we noticed is that ChatGPT associated sentences

with the female pronoun with the Bengali pronoun 'সে', whereas it associated the male pronoun with the more respectful Bengali pronoun 'তিনি'. Such a pattern was true for all sets of occupations.

4.2 Translating action-occupation Prompts

For the action-occupation prompts, we crafted a set of Bengali prompts with the base construct 'সে সকালে ঘুম থেকে উঠে _____, এবং কাজে যায়। সে একজন _____|' ('They wake up in the morning, [action] and go to work. They are a [occupation].') We observed that for some actions – cooking breakfast, cleaning the room, and reading – translations into English invoked the pronoun 'she' across *all* occupations, as shown in Figure 8 (Appendix B).

For some actions, the English translations produced different pronouns, which can be attributed to be a function of the occupations provided. Being a doctor, engineer, scientist, chef, and psychiatrist were assigned the pronoun 'he' when associated with occupations in Section 3.4.2 excluding the three aforementioned actions, whereas being a nurse, nutritionist, and assistant were assigned the pronoun 'she'. Examples are shown in Figure 9 (Appendix B). What stood out is the complete absence of the gender-neutral English singular pronoun 'they' across all translations, with not a single prompt being translated into English carrying that pronoun.

4.3 Gender-Based Machine Translation Across Other Languages

Having demonstrated patterns of gender bias in bidirectional translations between Bengali and English in both single-occupation and action-occupation prompts, we examine whether similar patterns are observable in other languages. Based on translations of the single-occupation prompts, we observe a clear replication of the aforementioned patterns. In all of the languages we examined (Farsi, Malay, Tagalog, Thai, and Turkish), we observe that the respective gender-neutral pronouns are translated to gendered pronouns depending on the occupation. Similar patterns as in Section 4.1, i.e., translating a gender-neutral pronoun to 'he' for doctors and 'she' for nurses, emerge. There is also a complete absence of the English gender-neutral singular pronoun 'they' in any translation, across all these languages. Results are summarized in Table 2.

5 ANALYSIS: GENDER ASSOCIATIONS WITH ACTIONS AND OCCUPATIONS

We observe widespread presence of gender associations with actions and occupations in Bengali ↔ English translations. There is a clear majority of occupations being associated with the male pronoun 'he' in the single-occupation prompts when translating from Bengali to English, as occupations such as doctor, engineer, and baker were associated with the male pronoun 'he' whereas occupations such as nurse, assistant and therapist were associated with the female pronoun 'she'. The only indication the gender neutrality of Bengali pronouns being preserved is where translations assigned both pronouns 'he/she', as shown in Figure 4, though this occurred unacceptably infrequently (see Table 2).

The same can be observed for translations of the action-and occupation prompt, where actions such as cooking breakfast and cleaning are associated with female pronouns. An interesting and novel finding is the interaction of actions and occupations, as we find that biases towards actions seem to override those towards occupations. An example of this is that while the occupation 'doctor' is associated with the male pronoun in the single-occupation prompts (List 5), the effect of associating the action of cooking breakfast overwrites that to produce the female pronoun 'she' as shown in Figure 8. While the presence of implicit gender-action biases that associate women with the kitchen or the household [15] are certainly observable, it can be extended that such biases are prevalent in societies all over the world since the start of human history, and perhaps predates occupational biases.

Our findings are consistent with previous work [eg., 15, 16, 77] that demonstrate how word embeddings contain implicit gender-occupation biases, biases which exist as a result of over two centuries of text corpora containing such associations [20] and are amplified as a result of language models being trained on such text and then creating biased outputs. Given that ChatGPT, by its designers' admission [65], is trained on large sets of such publicly available text corpora in English and other languages, it is likely that such gender biases stem from biases within contextualized word embeddings. Caliskan et al. [15] found strong evidence of such gender biases embedded within the widely-used GloVe [67] and fastText [9] embeddings, trained on corpora collected from the internet, through the development and extension of the Word Embedding Association Test [16] and the iterated Single-Category Word Embedding Association Test [15], biases also evident within our findings. Such biases are deeply embedded in text corpora, developed over decades of human produced texts containing them, and might be very difficult to remove, though some researchers [eg., 10] have put forward approaches to debias word embeddings.

For English to Bengali translation, the most startling finding is ChatGPT's complete inability to translate the English gender-neutral singular pronoun 'they' into an equivalent gender-neutral Bengali pronoun, as it incorrectly translates 'they' to the pronoun in a *plural* form. This is particularly alarming, both for translation because it leads to grammatically inaccurate and non-sensical Bengali outputs, but also in a larger context because it contributes towards a linguistic erasure of non-binary and transgender identities who might choose the singular pronoun they. Though research into non-binary identities in AI-assisted language translation is sparse, our findings demonstrate the need for a meticulous examination of the inaccurate inference of the gender-neutral English pronoun.

Additionally, when ChatGPT does preserve provided gender information to produce appropriately gender-marked versions of Bengali nouns, it confers lower respect to women as it uses the pronoun 'সে', assigning the more respectful 'তিনি' for sentences with the male pronoun. We do not believe this to be accidental, since it perpetuates the trend of placing higher respect on men.

Our findings in Bengali, combined with generalizations across five other languages, thus demonstrate that limitations in machine translation that have been identified have not been addressed in ChatGPT, as it demonstrates similar gender biases and erroneous translations that have been reported with Google Translate.

Table 2: Results of prompts in Bengali, Farsi, Malay, Tagalog, Thai, and Turkish, consisting of counts of occupations with each gendered pronoun. Note that the numbers for Bengali exceed 50 because of occupations where gender assigned in translations changed over multiple trials, as mentioned in Figure 9 (Appendix B).

Language	No. of Occupations with 'He'	No. of Occupations with 'She'	No. of Occupations with 'He/She' or 'They'
Bengali	29 (e.g., doctor, engineer, baker)	11 (e.g., nurse, therapist)	6 (lawyer, officer, administrator)
Farsi	39 (e.g., doctor, engineer, baker)	8 (e.g., nurse, therapist)	3 (teacher, officer, administrator)
Malay	38 (e.g., doctor, engineer, baker)	10 (e.g., nurse, therapist)	2 (teacher, officer)
Tagalog	39 (e.g., doctor, engineer, baker)	9 (e.g., nurse, therapist)	2 (teacher, officer)
Thai	35 (e.g., doctor, engineer, baker)	13 (e.g., nurse, therapist)	2 (teacher, officer)
Turkish	39 (e.g., doctor, engineer, baker)	8 (e.g., nurse, therapist)	3 (teacher, officer, administrator)

6 LOW-RESOURCE LANGUAGES, LOW ACCURACY, AND POWER

All of the languages studied here – Bengali, Farsi, Malay, Tagalog, Thai, and Turkish – are considered low-resource languages on account of low levels or a general unavailability of large corpora of text data or other manually crafted linguistic resources in such languages. Such a comparative lack of data (in contrast to languages such as English, Spanish, French, etc.) is because billions fewer of words in such languages are put out into the Internet in contrast to those in higher-resource languages. While practitioners in this space might simply see this disparity as something that exists in the world, it is important to ask: why does this gulf exist?

The simple fact remains that due to centuries of imperial and colonial enterprise, languages such as English, Spanish, and French have expanded and now dominate in lands far beyond their origins, and the digital age of globalism has made it such that proficiency in one or more of those languages has almost become a necessity to achieve certain levels within industries. Indeed, a not-so-subtle expression of this is that this present article is being written in English, and not one of the languages studied. While we cannot undo the myriad effects of the legacies of colonialism and imperialism, we can certainly acknowledge and center them in our interpretation of phenomena such as the ones being demonstrated here. Translation is a demonstration of power, perhaps best exemplified by the fact that almost every large airport in the world (one of the largest sites of cultural confluence) will have signage in local languages also translated to English even if it is not a popularly spoken language in that part of the world, to reflect the lasting effects of the colonial enterprise that made English a global lingua franca, the language that everyone in the world is almost expected to know in order to succeed in anything beyond a hyperlocal context. It is in English or centered around translating to/from English where designers of widely-used natural language processing tools operate, as they design and 'improve' language technologies. Borrowing Andone's [2] feminist theory of translation as production of knowledge beyond simply reproduction from one language to the other, English (and other high-resource languages) control the means of production of such knowledge and what knowledge (or text in what languages) get to be mined into the scope of language models.

It is important to recognize language translation as something much more than its perhaps well-intentioned traditional intention of being 'merely a linguistic shift from one text to another with the least possible interference, and remain faithful to the source text' [18]. When ChatGPT assigns an incorrect gender in translation or inserts a binary gender into gender-neutral sentences, it is much more than a simple error. In its undertaking of such translation tasks, ChatGPT makes a decision to infer gender by applying information and context beyond what is provided in the source sentence. Especially when translating from low-resource languages into the high(est)-resource English, these inferences perpetuate colonial and imperial perspectives of traditional gender roles, values, and cultures. In today's Internet age where tools like ChatGPT are designed in high-resource contexts (in English and by US-based developers) but made available and reaching people globally, designers of current and future tools must carefully consider their potential impacts before and during deployment.

The failures of ChatGPT in the aforementioned translation tasks must therefore not simply be considered a technical problem which can be spot-fixed by the bandaid of 'better' data or 'better' code [6]. Rather, it is a *sociotechnical* failure [19], where 'better' data is difficult to achieve due to the various social constraints designed to favor languages that are already high-resource. Addressing this failure therefore needs to consider the social aspect, and examine how biases prevalent within word embeddings or exemplified in results are reflections of those prevalent within society [10].

7 A HUMAN CENTERED APPROACH TO AI-ASSISTED LANGUAGE TRANSLATION

Our findings of ChatGPT's underwhelming and error-laden performance in language translations from low to high-resource languages as it amplifies gender bias has implications for design into the future of such technologies. We believe that a future where AI-assisted language translations are both more accurate and more appropriate involves a *human centered* approach to designing such systems. Human centeredness is a cousin to the field of *user centeredness*, which involves soliciting end-user feedback early and often during the design process [61]. Human centeredness extends this notion further by incorporating considerations of social and ethical practices into the design process [35].

A human centered approach would center willing and knowledgeable first-language multilingual speakers towards forming accurately labeled and representative text corpora, because such speakers can leverage appropriate cultural context and epistemic experience in building such corpora. This effort is especially important since these people are likely the ones who will use the language translation tools under design (at least in their respective languages)

the most. We are appreciative of the work of Costa et al. [28] and their many-to-many benchmark FLORES-200 dataset spanning 204 languages, most of which are traditionally low-resource. Their principles of 'No Language Left Behind', prioritizing the needs of underserved communities by sharing resources and libraries/datasets through open-sourcing and being interdisciplinary and reflexive in such approaches, pave the way towards stronger representation.

Particular attention must be paid to individuals representing low-resource languages, because such languages are traditionally neglected [28]. Care must be taken such that human contributors are adequately compensated for their time and efforts, and given adequate opportunities to refuse participation and withdraw at their convenience, keeping with best practices of not exploiting epistemic labor from individuals lower in power differentials [29]. Such work is a slow and highly labor-intensive and therefore might be difficult to scale across all languages in the world, but can contribute to the upliftment of such languages and strive towards a future where translation accuracy is more equitably distributed. Additionally, we must not also forget languages that are not as widely spoken as the ones studied here, because their lower number of speakers does not deprive them of the right to be accurately represented in the context of language translation.

At the implementation level, a human centered translation agent should seek clarification or ask questions when provided text without enough context to translate accurately [72]. This affordance provides greater user control over their translation experience, and allows them to use the translation agent in varied roles such as interpreter, educator, or confidence checker. Additionally beneficial might be observing and modeling translations based on human dialogue in group discussions, in groups moderated by translators [70]. Designers might also consider suggestions on models on flexible conditional language generation [17], and adopt 'gender-aware' approaches [eg., 31, 49] or attempts to debias algorithms [10].

It is also important to remember that every low-resource language has a community behind it that holds a unique place within the global sociopolitical spectrum. Though practitioners and researchers in the field of machine translation routinely use 'low-resource languages' to refer to a multitude of languages, these languages are not a monolith. Therefore, researchers adopting a human centered approach to working with members in such communities must take adequate care to understand and respect hyperlocal contexts and rules. This is especially true if researchers do not identify as being from within such communities themselves, as they should then rely upon local experts for guidance.

We conclude with an urge towards researchers interested in this vein to *try* this human centered approach, even if they believe that they are not fully proficient in it. Indeed, we do not claim that we have perfected the process and our guidelines are foolproof, because to be truly human centered is to recognize that processes and designed artefacts only become better through iteration. Only by doing and practicing this approach will both we and other researchers become better at it. However, we encourage researchers to pursue even moderately-baked understandings of this human centered approach in their own work and adapt it in their own ways, because such work will generate higher visibility towards low-resource languages and potentially lead to higher investment in resources or support from global and local institutions.

8 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK

As is the case in other studies with tools that are constantly being updated with changes to their underlying algorithms, such as Google Translate, [eg., 34, 69], a limitation of our study is that we cannot guarantee reproducibility of our results for other researchers precisely re-implementing our methods. Another limitation is in the action-occupation prompts, where we made an explicit choice to order them with actions preceding occupations. This likely impacted how the overall gender was determined in translation, and therefore an extension of this work would be to test the order the other way around, check the frequency of these words, and their magnitude of gender association.

In some single-occupation prompts, ChatGPT initially provided us with incorrect translations of the occupation titles, and had to be corrected. For instance, it incorrectly translated the English word 'hygienist' to স্বাস্থ্যবিজ্ঞানী, a Bengali word which translates to 'health scientist' in English. After correcting it once in this and other instances, ChatGPT produced the correct translations. A future extension of this work could be to study such factually incorrect translations, and examine patterns within what words it gets wrong.

Finally, with the advent of the novel language model GPT-4 at the time of this writing, this study warrants replication. In such a replication, prompts could be designed with parallel templates informed by the Word Embedding Association Test (WEAT) [16] and take into account grammatical gender signals [63] to strengthen the validity of observed results.

9 CONCLUSION

In this paper, we examined language translation performed by ChatGPT in translating between English and Bengali, the latter chosen because it employs gender-neutral pronouns, the sparsity of its coverage in the translation context despite it being natively spoken by over 300 million people across the world, and it being the first author's native language. We also generalize our findings across five other languages: Farsi, Malay, Tagalog, Thai, and Turkish. Based on prior work in evaluating translations [eg., 15, 16, 69, 77], we examined translations based on occupations and actions, as we were interested in seeing how ChatGPT handled the gender-neutral pronoun in translation tasks.

Through our work, we demonstrate that translations from low-resource languages into English exhibit implicit gender-occupation (e.g., doctor = male, nurse = female) and gender-action biases (e.g., cook = female), with actions potentially being a stronger factor in determining the gender of the sentence subject. We also observe ChatGPT's complete failure to associate the English gender-neutral singular pronoun 'they' to its Bengali counterparts, as it produced translations which are grammatically incorrect and non-sensical, thus contributing towards the erasure of non-binary identities. We address the societal power dynamics that render such a tag to some languages over others. We conclude with a proposition for a human centered approach towards designing AI-assisted conversational agents that can be used to perform language translation, contributing to a young but developing field. This is an opportunity to improve the way language technologies are designed, as we envision a human-centered design process that centers human flourishing and upliftment of traditionally marginalized peoples.

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A BENGALI KEYWORDS/PROMPTS

ডাক্তার (Doctor), উকিল (Lawyer), শিক্ষক (Teacher), নার্স (Nurse), থেরাপিস্ট (Therapist), প্রকৌশলী
(Engineer), কার্যনির্বাহী (Executive),
প্লাম্বার(Plumber), প্রোগ্রামার (Programmer),
হিসাবরক্ষক (Accountant), বিক্রয়কর্মী
(Salesperson), প্রযুক্তিবিদ (Technician),
শিক্ষাবিদ (Educator), কেরানি (Clerk),
ওয়েটার (Waiter), মেকানিক (Mechanic), নাপিত(Hairdresser), ইলেকট্রিশিয়ান (Electrician),
অভ্যর্থনাকারী (Receptionist), রসায়নবিদ (Chemist), কম্পউণ্ডার (Pharmacist), গ্রন্থাগারিক (Librarian), অফিসার (Officer), মনস্তত্ত্বিক (Psychologist), ছুতার
(Carpenter), তদন্তকারী (Investigator),
সুপারভাইজার (Supervisor), বিমানচালক (Pilot),
সার্জন (Surgeon), বৈজ্ঞানিক (Scientist), তত্ত্বাবধায়ক (Janitor), দারোগা (Inspector), প্রশাসক
(Administrator), প্যাথলজিস্ট (Pathologist),
পরিকল্পক (Planner), পুষ্টিবিদ (Nutritionist), স্থপতি (Architect), বিশেষজ্ঞ (Specialist), কর্মী (Worker),
মূল্যনির্ধারক (Appraiser), পাচক (Chef),
পশুচিকিৎসক (Veterinarian), বেকার (Baker),
সহকারী (Assistant), প্যারালিগাল (Paralegal),
হাইগীনিস্ট (Hygienist), প্রশিক্ষক (Trainer),
কার্যকারক (Operator), চিকিৎসক (Physician),
সহায়ক (Aide).

Table 3: 50 Occupations in Bengali

Teacher (শিক্ষক/ শিক্ষিকা), Student (ছাত্র/ ছাত্রী), Actor/ Actress (অভিনেতা/ অভিনেত্রী),
Hero/ Heroine (নায়ক/ নায়িকা), Dancer (নর্তক/ নর্তকী), God/ Goddess (দেব/ দেবী), Priest/Priestess (পূজারি/ পূজারিনী), Leader (নেতা/ নেত্রী), Potter (কুমার/ কুমারী), Washerman/ Washerwoman
(ধোপা/ ধোপানী).

Table 4: Gender Marked and Unmarked words

ডাক্তার (Doctor), শিক্ষক (Teacher), প্রকৌশলী (Engineer), কার্যনির্বাহী (Executive), প্লাম্বার(Plumber), প্রোগ্রামার (Programmer), হিসাবরক্ষক (Accountant), প্রযুক্তিবিদ (Technician), কেরানি (Clerk), মেকানিক (Mechanic),বেকার (Baker), ইলেকট্রিশিয়ান (Electrician), রসায়নবিদ (Chemist), কম্পউণ্ডার (Pharmacist), ছুতার (Carpenter), তদন্তকারী (Investigator), সুপারভাইজার (Supervisor), বিমানচালক (Pilot), সার্জন (Surgeon), বৈজ্ঞানিক (Scientist), দারোগা (Inspector), প্যাথলজিস্ট (Pathologist), স্থপতি (Architect), কর্মী (Worker), মূল্যনির্ধারক (Appraiser), পশুচিকিৎসক (Veterinarian), প্রশিক্ষক (Trainer), কার্যকারক (Operator), চিকিৎসক (Physician).

Table 5: Occupations for which ChatGPT translations assigned the male English pronoun 'He'.

নার্স (Nurse), থেরাপিস্ট (Therapist), শিক্ষাবিদ (Educator), ওয়েটার (Waiter), অভ্যর্থনাকারী (Receptionist), নাপিত(Hairdresser), গ্রন্থাগারিক (Librarian), সহকারী (Assistant), পরিকল্পক (Planner), মনস্তত্ত্বিক (Psychologist), সহায়ক (Aide).

Table 6: Occupations for which ChatGPT translations assigned the female English pronoun 'She'.

B SCREENSHOTS FROM CHATGPT



Figure 2: Examples of ChatGPT assigning the male English pronoun 'He' to the occupations engineer, mechanic, and pilot (from top to bottom).



Figure 3: Examples of ChatGPT assigning the female English pronoun 'She' to the occupations nurse, therapist and assistant (from top to bottom).



Figure 4: Examples of ChatGPT assigning the English pronouns 'He/She' to the occupations lawyer, officer and administrator (from top to bottom).



Figure 5: Example of the same Bengali prompt receiving two different translations in English: assigning the pronouns 'He' (top) and 'She' (bottom) respectively.



Figure 6: Examples of ChatGPT providing appropriately marked versions of Bengali words for teacher, but conferring a pronoun indicative of higher respect to the prompt with the English pronoun 'he' over that with the pronoun 'she'.



Figure 7: Examples of ChatGPT failing to recognize the pronoun 'they' as singular, thus producing grammatically incorrect Bengali translations with plural pronouns.



Figure 8: Examples of ChatGPT associating the female pronoun 'she' with the action of cooking, irrespective of the occupation in the second half of the prompt.



Figure 9: Example of the actions of brushing teeth (top) and eating breakfast (bottom) being assigned different pronouns based on occupations (doctor = 'he', nurse = 'she').

Supporting Human-AI Collaboration in Auditing LLMs with LLMs

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ABSTRACT

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly becoming all-powerful and pervasive via deployment in sociotechnical systems. Yet these language models, be it for classification or generation, have been shown to be biased, behave irresponsibly, causing harm to people at scale. It is crucial to audit these language models rigorously before deployment. Existing auditing tools use either or both humans and AI to find failures. In this work, we draw upon literature in human-AI collaboration and sensemaking, and interview research experts in safe and fair AI, to build upon the auditing tool: AdaTest [36], which is powered by a generative LLM. Through the design process we highlight the importance of sensemaking and human-AI communication to leverage complementary strengths of humans and generative models in collaborative auditing. To evaluate the effectiveness of AdaTest++, the augmented tool, we conduct user studies with participants auditing two commercial language models: OpenAI's GPT-3 and Azure's sentiment analysis model. Qualitative analysis shows that AdaTest++ effectively leverages human strengths such as schematization, hypothesis testing. Further, with our tool, users identified a variety of failures modes, covering 26 different topics over 2 tasks, that have been shown in formal audits and also those previously under-reported.

KEYWORDS

language models, generative models, auditing, biases

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1 INTRODUCTION

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being deployed in pervasive applications such as chatbots, content moderation tools, search engines, and web browsers [28, 32], which drastically increases the risk and potential harm of adverse social consequences [6, 19]. There is an urgency for companies to audit them pre-deployment, and for post-deployment audits with public disclosure to keep them accountable [34].

The very flexibility and generality of LLMs makes auditing them very challenging. Big technology companies employ AI red teams to find failures in an adversarial manner [15, 21], but these efforts are sometimes ad-hoc, depend on human creativity, and often lack coverage, as evidenced by recent high-profile deployments such as Microsoft's AI-powered search engine: Bing [28] and Google's chatbot service: Bard [32]. More recent approaches incorporate LLMs directly into the auditing process, either as independent red-teams [30] or paired with humans [36]. While promising, these rely heavily on human ingenuity to bootstrap the process (i.e. to know what to look for), and then quickly become system-driven, which takes control away from the human auditor and does not make full use of the complementary strengths of humans and LLMs.

In this work, we draw on insights from research on human-computer interaction, and human-AI collaboration and complementarity to augment one such tool—AdaTest [36]—to better support collaborative auditing by leveraging the strengths of both humans and LLMs. We first add features that support auditors in sensemaking [33] about model behavior. We enable users to make direct requests to the LLM for generating test suggestions (e.g. "write sentences that speak about immigration in a positive light"), which supports users in searching for failures as desired and communicating in natural language. Next, we add an interface that organizes discovered failures into a tree structure, which supports users' sensemaking about overall model behaviour by providing visible global context of the search space. We call the augmented tool AdaTest++.[1] Then, we conduct think-aloud interviews to observe experts auditing models, where we recruit researchers who have extensive experience in algorithmic harms and biases. Subsequently, we encapsulate their strategies into a series of prompt templates incorporated directly into our interface to guide auditors with less experience. Since effective prompt crafting for generative LLMs is an expert skill [46], these prompt templates also support auditors in communicating with the LLM inside AdaTest++.

Finally, we conduct mixed-methods analysis of AdaTest++ being used by industry practitioners to audit commercial NLP models using think-aloud interview studies. Specifically, in these studies, participants audited OpenAI's GPT-3 [8] for question-answering capabilities and Azure's text analysis model [4] for sentiment classification. Our analysis indicates that participants were able to execute the key stages of sensemaking in partnership with an LLM. Further, participants were able to employ their strengths in auditing, such as bringing in personal experience and prior knowledge about algorithms as well as contextual reasoning and semantic understanding, in an opportunistic combination with the generative

*Work done partially while at Microsoft Research Redmond.

[1] https://github.com/microsoft/adatest/tree/AdaTest++

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strengths of LLMs. Collectively, they identified a diverse set of failures, covering 26 unique topics over two tasks. They discovered many types of harms such as representational harms, allocational harms, questionable correlations, and misinformation generation by LLMs [6, 40].

These findings demonstrate the benefits of designing an auditing tool that carefully combines the strengths of humans and LLMs in auditing LLMs. Based on our findings, we offer directions for future research and implementation of human-AI collaborative auditing, and discuss its benefits and limitations. We summarize our contributions as follows:

- We augmented an auditing tool to effectively leverage strengths of humans and LLMs, based on past literature and think-aloud interviews with experts.
- We conducted user studies to understand the effectiveness of our tool AdaTest++ in supporting human-AI collaborative auditing and derived insights from qualitative analysis of study participants' strategies and struggles.
- With our tool, participants identified a variety of failures in LLMs being audited, OpenAI's GPT-3 and Azure sentiment classification model. Some failures identified have been shown before in multiple formal audits and some have been previously underreported.

Throughout this paper, prompts for LLMs are set in `monospace` font, while spoken participant comments and test cases in the audits are "quoted." Next, we note that in this paper there are two types of LLMs constantly at play, the LLM being audited and the LLM inside our auditing tool used for generating test suggestions. Unless more context is provided, to disambiguate when needed, we refer to the LLM being audited as the "model", and to the LLM inside our auditing tool as the "LLM".

2 RELATED WORK

2.1 Algorithm auditing

Goals of algorithm auditing. Over the last two decades with the growth in large scale use of automated algorithms, there has been plenty of research on algorithm audits. Sandvig et al. [39] proposed the term algorithm audit in their seminal work studying internet platforms. Recent works [5, 29, and references therein] provide an overview of methodology in algorithm auditing, and discuss the key algorithm audits over the last two decades. Raji et al. [35] introduce a framework for algorithm auditing to be applied throughout the algorithm's internal development lifecycle. Moreover, Raji and Buolamwini [34] examine the commercial and real-world impact of public algorithm audits on the companies responsible for the technology, emphasising the importance of audits.

Human-driven algorithm auditing. Current approaches to auditing in language models are largely human driven. Big technology companies employ red-teaming based approaches to reveal failures of their AI systems, wherein a group of industry practitioners manually probe the systems adversarially [15]. This approach has limited room for scalability. In response, past research has considered crowdsourcing [3, 20, 22] and end-user bug reporting [26] to audit algorithms. Similarly, for widely used algorithms, informal collective audits are being conducted by everyday users [13, 41]. To support such auditing, works [9–11] provide smart interfaces to help both users and experts conduct structured audits. However, these efforts depend on highly variable human creativity and extensive un(der)paid labor.

Human-AI collaborative algorithm auditing. Recent advances in machine learning in automating identification and generation of potential AI failure cases [23, 25, 31] has led researchers to design systems for human-AI collaborative auditing. Many approaches therein rely on AI to surface likely failure cases, with little agency to the human to guide the AI other than providing annotations [26] and creating schemas within automatically generated or clustered data [10, 44]. Ribeiro et al. [37] present checklists for testing model behaviour but do not provide mechanisms to help people discover new model behaviors. While the approach of combining humans and AI is promising, the resulting auditing tools, such as AdaTest [36] are largely system-driven, with a focus on leveraging AI strengths and with fewer controls given to the human. In this work, we aim towards effectively leveraging the complementary strengths of humans and LLMs both, by providing adequate controls to the human auditor. For this, we build upon the auditing tool, AdaTest, which we define in detail next.

AdaTest [36] provides an interface and a system for interactive and adaptive testing and debugging of NLP models, inspired by the test-debug cycle in traditional software engineering. AdaTest encourages a partnership between the user and a large language model, where the LLM takes existing tests and topics and proposes new ones, which the user inspects (filtering non-valid tests), evaluates (checking model behavior on the generated tests), and organizes. The user, thus, steers the LLM, which in turn adapts its suggestions based on user feedback and model behaviour to propose more useful tests. This process is repeated iteratively, helping users find model failures. While it transfers the creative test generation burden from the user to the LLM, AdaTest still relies on the user to come up with both tests and topics, and organize their topics as they go. In this work, we extend the capability and functionality of AdaTest to remedy these limitations, and leverage the strengths of the human and LLM both, by supporting human-AI collaboration. We provide more details about the AdaTest interface in Appendix A.

2.2 Background in human-computer interaction

Sensemaking theory. In this work, we draw upon the seminal work by Pirolli and Card [33] on sensemaking theory for intelligent analyses. They propose a general model of intelligent analyses by people that posits two key loops: the foraging loop and the sensemaking loop. The model contains four major phases, not necessarily visited in a linear sequence: information gathering, the representation of information in ways that aid analysis, the development of insights through manipulation of this representation, and the creation of some knowledge or direct action based on these insights. Recent works [10, 13, 41] have operationalized this model to analyse human-driven auditing. Specifically Cabrera et al. [10] draws upon the sensemaking model to derive a framework for data scientists' understanding of AI model behaviours, which also contains four major phases, namely: surprise, schemas, hypotheses, and assessment. We draw upon these frameworks in our work, and discuss them in more detail in our tool design and analysis.

Human-AI collaboration. Research in human-AI collaboration and complementarity [1, 18, and references therein] highlights the importance of communication and transparency in human-AI interaction to leverage strengths of both the human and the AI. Work on design for human-AI teaming [2] shows allowing user to experiment with the AI system facilitates effective interaction. Moreover, research in explainable AI [14] emphasises the role of human-interpretable explanations in effective human-AI collaborations. We employ these findings in our design of a collaborative auditing system.

3 DESIGNING TO SUPPORT HUMAN-AI COLLABORATION IN AUDITING

Following past work [10, 13, 41], we view the task of auditing an AI model as a sensemaking activity, where the auditing process can be organized into two major loops. In the foraging loop, the auditor probes the model to find failures, while in the sensemaking loop they incorporate the new information to refine their mental model of the model behavior. Subsequently, we aim to drive more effective human-AI auditing in AdaTest through the following key design goals:

- **Design goal 1**: Support sensemaking
- **Design goal 2**: Support human-AI communication

To achieve these design goals, in Section 3.1 we first use prior literature in HCI to identify gaps in the auditing tool, AdaTest, and develop an initial prototype of our modified tool, which we refer to as AdaTest++. Then, we conduct think-aloud interviews with researchers having expertise in algorithmic harms and bias, to learn from their strategies in auditing, described in Section 3.2.

3.1 Initial prototyping for sensemaking and communication improvements

In this section, we describe the specific challenges in collaborative auditing using the existing tool AdaTest. Following each challenge, we provide our design solution aimed towards achieving our design goals: supporting human-AI communication and sensemaking.

3.1.1 Supporting failure foraging and communication via natural-language prompting.
Challenge: AdaTest suggestions are made by prompting the LLM to generate tests (or topics) similar to an existing set, where the notion of similarity is opaque to the user. Thus, beyond providing the initial set, the user is then unable to "steer" LLM suggestions towards areas of interests, and may be puzzled as to what the LLM considers similar. Further, it may be difficult and time consuming for users to create an initial set of tests or topics. Moreover, because generation by LLMs is not adequately representative of the diversity of the real world [47], the test suggestions in AdaTest are likely to lack diversity.
Solution: We add a free-form input box where users can request particular test suggestions in natural language by directly prompting the LLM, e.g., `Write sentences about friendship`. This allows users to communicate their failure foraging intentions efficiently and effectively. Further, users can compensate for the LLM's biases, and express their hypotheses about model behaviour by steering the test generation as desired. Note that in AdaTest++, users can use both the free-form input box and the existing AdaTest mechanism of generating more similar tests.

3.1.2 Supporting schematization via visible organization controls.
Challenge: To find failures systematically, the user has to navigate and organize tests in schemas as they go. This is important, for one, for figuring out the set of tests the user should investigate next, by sensemaking about the set of tests investigated so far. While AdaTest has the functionality to make folders and sub-folders, it does not support further organization of tests and topics.
Solution: To help the user visualize the tests and topics covered so far in their audit, we provide a consistently visible concise tree-like interactive visualization that shows the topic folders created so far, displayed like a tree with sub-folders shown as branches. We illustrate an example in Figure 1a. This tree-like visualization is always updated and visible to the user, providing the current global context of their audit. Additionally, the visualization shows the number of passing (in green) and failing tests (in red) in each topic and sub-topic which signifies the extent to which a topic or sub-topic has been explored. It also shows which topic areas have more failures, thereby supporting users' sensemaking of model behaviour.

3.1.3 Supporting re-evaluation of evidence via label deferment.
Challenge: AdaTest constrains the user in evaluating the correctness of the model outcome by providing only two options: "Pass" and "Fail". This constraint is fraught with many problems. First, Kulesza et al. [24] introduce the notion of *concept evolution* in labeling tests, which highlights the dynamic nature of the user's sensemaking process of the target objective they are labeling for. This phenomenon has been shown to result in inconsistent evaluation by the user. Secondly, NLP tasks that inherently reflect the social contexts they are situated in, including the tasks considered in the studies in this work (refer to Sections 3.2.1 and 4.1), are prone to substantial disagreement in labeling [12]. In such scenarios, an auditor may not have a clear pass or fail evaluation for any model outcome. Lastly, social NLP tasks are often underspecified wherein the task definition does not cover all the infinitely many possible input cases, yielding cases where the task definition does not clearly point to an outcome.
Solution: To support the auditor in sensemaking about the task definition and target objective, while not increasing the burden of annotation on the auditor, we added a third choice for evaluating the model outcome: "Not Sure". All tests marked "Not Sure" are automatically routed to a separate folder in AdaTest++, where they can be collectively analysed, to support users' concept evolution of the overall task.

3.2 Think-aloud interviews with experts to guide human-LLM communication

We harness existing literature in HCI and human-AI collaboration for initial prototyping. However, our tool is intended to support users in the specific task of auditing algorithms for harmful behavior. Therefore, it is important to learn experts' strategies in auditing and help users with less experience leverage them. Next, to implement their strategy users have to communicate effectively with



(a) An illustration of implemented tree visualization.

(b) Image showing the reusable prompt templates implemented as a dropdown. Users could select one from the options shown, and edit them as desired to generate test suggestions.

Figure 1: Extensions in AdaTest++ to support sensemaking and human-AI communication, as described in Section 3.

LLMs, which is a difficult task in itself [45]. To address these problems, we conducted think-aloud interviews with research experts studying algorithmic harms, where they used the initial prototype of AdaTest++ for auditing. These interviews provided an opportunity to closely observe experts' strategies while auditing and ask clarifying questions in a relatively controlled setting. We then encapsulated their strategies into reusable prompt templates designed to support users' communication with the LLM.

3.2.1 Study design and analysis.
For this study, we recruited 6 participants by emailing researchers working in the field of algorithmic harms and biases. We refer to the experts henceforth as E1:6. All participants had more than 7 years of research experience in the societal impacts of algorithms. We conducted semi-structured think-aloud interview sessions, each approximately one-hour long. In these sessions, each participant underwent the task of auditing a sentiment classification model that classifies any given text as "Positive" or "Negative". In the first 15 minutes we demonstrated the tool and its usage to the participant, using a different task of sentiment analysis of hotel reviews. In the next 20 minutes participants were asked to find failures in the sentiment classification model with an empty slate. That is, they were not provided any information about previously found failures of the model, and had to start from scratch. In the following 20 minutes the participants were advanced to a different instantiation of the AdaTest interface where some failure modes had already been discovered and were shown to the participants. In this part, their task was to build upon these known failures and find new tests where the model fails. Further, we divided the participants into two sets based on the specificity of the task they were given. Half the participants were tasked with auditing a general purpose sentiment analysis model. The remaining half were tasked with auditing a sentiment analysis model meant for analysing workplace employee reviews. This allowed us to study the exploration strategies of experts in broad and narrow tasks.

We conducted a thematic analysis of the semi-structured think-aloud interview sessions with experts. In our thematic analysis, we used a codebook approach with iterative inductive coding [38].

3.2.2 Expert strategies in auditing.
Our analysis showed two main types of strategies used by experts in auditing language models.

S1: Creating schemas for exploration based on experts' prior knowledge about (i) behavior of language models, and (ii) the task domain. In this approach, participants harnessed their prior knowledge to generate meaningful schemas, a set of organized tests which reflected this knowledge. To audit the sentiment analysis model, we found many instances of experts using their prior knowledge about language models and their interaction with society, such as known biases and error regions, to find failures. For instance, E1 used the free-form prompt input box to write, `Give me a list of controversial topics from Reddit`. On the same lines, E1 prompted the tool to provide examples of sarcastic movie reviews, and to write religion-based stereotypes. E5 expressed desire to test the model for gender-based stereotypes in the workplace. E2 recalled and utilized prior research which showed that models do not perform well on sentences with negation.

Next, participants attempted to understand the model's capabilities using sentences with varying levels of output sentiment. E6 started out by prompting the tool to generate statements with clear positive and clear negative sentiment. When that did not yield any failures, E6 edited the prompt to steer the generation towards harder tests by substituting "clear positive" for "positive" and "slightly positive." E3 and E4 attempted to make difficult tests by generating examples with mixed sentiment, e.g., E4 wanted to generate "sentences that are generally negative but include positive words."

In the relatively narrower task of sentiment analysis of employee reviews, participants used their prior knowledge about the task domain to generate schemas of tests. Specifically, each of the participants formulated prompts to generate relevant tests in the task domain. E4 prompted, `Write sentences that are positive on behalf of a new hire`, E6 prompted, `Write a short sentence from an under-performing employee review`, and E5 prompted, `Write a test that does not contain explicitly positive words such as "She navigates competing interests."`

S2: Forming and testing hypotheses based on observations of model behaviour. As the second main approach, after finding some failures, participants would attempt to reason about the failure, and form hypotheses about model behavior. This is similar to the third stage of the sensemaking framework in [10]. In the think-aloud interviews, we saw that an important part of all experts' strategies involved testing different hypotheses about model failures. For example, E2 found that the model misclassified the test: "My best friend got married, but I wasn't invited", as positive. Following this, they hypothesized that the model might misclassify all tests that have a positive first half such as someone getting married, followed by a negative second half. E6 found the failing test, "They give their best effort, but they are always late", which led E6 to a similar hypothesis. E3 observed that the model was likely to misclassify sentences containing the word "too" as negative.

3.2.3 Crafting reusable prompt templates.

To guide auditors in strategizing and communicating with the LLM in AdaTest++, we crafted open-ended reusable prompt templates based on the experts' strategies. These were provided as editable prompts in the AdaTest++ interface in a drop-down which users could select options from, as shown in Figure 1b. We now list each resulting prompt template along with its intended operation and justification based on the think-aloud interviews. The parts of the prompt template that need to be edited by the user are shown in **boldface**, with the rest in monospace font.

T1: `Write a test that is` **output type or style** `and refers to` **input feature**

T1 helps generate test suggestions from a slice of the domain space based on the input and output types specified by the user. For example, E1 wanted to generate tests that were stereotypes about religion. Here, the output style is "stereotype" and the input feature is "religion". Some more examples of output features and styles used in the think-aloud interviews are: clear positive, clear negative, sarcastic, offensive. This prompt largely covers strategy S1 identified in the think-aloud interviews, allowing users to generate schemas within the domain space by mentioning specific input and output features.

T2: `Write a test using the phrase` **"phrase"** `that is` **output type or style**, `such as` **"example"**.

T2 is similar to prompt template T1, in generating test cases from a slice of the domain space based on input and output features. Importantly, as E5 demonstrates with the prompt: `Write a test that does not contain explicitly positive words such as "She navigates competing interests"`, it is useful to provide an example test when the description is not straightforward to follow. This is also useful when the user already has a specific test in mind, potentially from an observed failure, that they want to investigate more, as demonstrated via strategy S2.

T3: `Write a test using the template` **"template using {insert}"**, `such as` **"example"**

T3 helps generate test suggestions that follow the template provided within the prompt. For example, E6 wanted to generate tests that followed the template: "The employee gives their best effort but {insert slightly negative attribute of employee}." T3 helps users convey their hypothesis about model behavior in terms of templatized tests, where the LLM fills words inside the curly brackets with creative examples of the text described therein. In another example, E3 wanted to test the model for biases based on a person's professional history using the template "{insert pronoun} was a {insert profession}", which would generate a list of examples like, "He was a teacher", "They were a physicist", etc. This exemplifies how template T3 enables users to rigorously test hypotheses based on observed model behavior, which was identified as a major strategy (S2) in the think-alouds.

T4: `Write tests similar to the` **selected** `tests saved below`

To use template T4 the users have to choose a subset of the tests saved in their current topic. In the think-aloud interviews, participants E1, E4 and E6 voiced a need to use T4 for finding failures similar to a specific subset of existing failures, for hypothesis testing and confirmation. This prompt generates tests using the same mechanism as AdaTest of generating creative variations of selected tests, described in Section 3.1.1. Further, it helps increase transparency of the similar test generation mechanism by allowing experimentation with it.

T5: `Give a list of the different types of` **tests in domain space**

T5 provides a list of topic folders that the task domain space contains to help the user explore a large diversity of topics, that they may not be able to think of on their own. A version of this prompt was used by E1 and E3, for example E1 prompted, `Give me a list of controversial topics on Reddit`, and E3 wrote, `Give me a list of ethnicities`. It is useful for generating relevant schemas of the task domain space, as identified in the first strategy in the think-alouds.

This concludes our redesign of AdaTest to support auditors in sensemaking and communication. We provide images of the final interface of AdaTest++ in Appendix A.

4 ANALYSING HUMAN-AI COLLABORATION IN ADATEST++

We conducted a think-aloud user study with AdaTest++ to analyse the effectiveness of our modifications in helping users audit language models effectively, by leveraging complementary strengths of humans and LLMs, and to inform future research on design of collaborative auditing tools.

4.1 Study design and methodology

Participants. For the user study, we recruited 6 industry practitioners from a multinational computer technology corporation, with a functional knowledge of (generative) language models, working as software development engineers, project managers, etc. This allowed us to analyse the functionality and effectiveness of the tool with participants with a different professional background from the previous study with experts in Section 3.2.1. All participants had some experience with LLMs: half of the participants had previously submitted more than 100 queries to an AI-based generative model, while the other half had submitted 10-100 queries. 3 participants had more than 5 years of professional experience in developing or researching ML models, 2 participants reported 1-5 years of experience, and 1 participant reported no experience. We had 2 female and 4 male participants. Henceforth, we refer to the individual participants as U1:6. Each participant received a $50 Amazon voucher

as compensation for participating in an hour-long study. Before the user study, they signed a consent form allowing their participation data to be anonymized and used for research and publication. Finally, this study was approved by an IRB.

Task description. We randomly assigned the participants to one of two auditing tasks. In task 1, participants were instructed to audit a commercial 3-way ("positive", "negative", "neutral") sentiment analysis model (Azure [4]). Several past works have shown identity-based bias in language models [6, and references therein]. We instructed participants to use AdaTest++ to find tests that the sentiment classifier failed on, that reflected identity-based bias. We provided some seed instances of failures, e.g. the model classified "I am a garbage collector." as negative. Participants were building on previous work that identified 13 axes of identity-based bias [42] such as ability, age, body type, etc. These axes had been added to AdaTest++ as topic folders, with some topics containing both passing and failing tests. Users U3, U4 and U6 were assigned to this task.

Task 2 was set up for auditing a question-answering bot powered by a commercial generative large language model (GPT-3 [8]). The increasing popularity of such bots has led to many well-substantiated concerns about propagation of questionable and unreliable facts and harmful misinformation [7, 16]. Participants were instructed to find test cases (questions) that the QnA bot answered incorrectly. This bot was driven by the same LLM that powered generation of test suggestions in AdaTest++, thereby leveraging the generative powers of a LLM to find failures in itself. We provided two failure cases of the QnA bot as seed examples, e.g. the question "Do you think psychiatrists need licenses?", which the bot answered with "I do not think psychiatrists need licenses to practice." We defined a failure case as an answer that is highly likely to be false. For questions that do not have a clear answer, it was acceptable for the bot to reply "I don't know", "It depends", etc. Finally, users were discouraged from asking questions with malicious intent. Users U1, U2 and U5 were assigned to this task.

Study protocol. The study was designed to be an hour long, where in the first twenty minutes participants were introduced to their auditing task and the auditing tool. AdaTest++ has an involved interface with many functionalities, so we created a 10 minute introductory video for the participants to watch, which walked them through different components of the tool and how to use them, using a hotel-review sentiment analysis model as example. Following this, participants were given 5 minutes to use AdaTest++ with supervision on the same example task. Finally, participants acted as auditors without supervision for one of the two aforementioned tasks, for 30 minutes. In this half hour, participants were provided access to the interface with the respective model they had to audit, and were asked to share their screen and think out loud as they worked on their task. We recorded their screen and audio for analysis. Finally, participants were asked to fill out an exit survey providing their feedback about the tool.

Analysis methodology. We followed a codebook-based thematic analysis of the interview transcripts. Here, our goal was to summarize the high-level themes that emerged from our participants, so the codes were derived from an iterative process [27]. In this process, we started out by reading through all the transcripts and logs of the auditing sessions multiple times. The lead author conducted qualitative iterative open coding of the interview transcripts [38]. The iterative open coding took place in two phases: in the first phase, transcripts were coded line-by-line to closely reflect the thought process of the participants. In the second phase, the codes from the first phase were synthesized into higher level themes. When relevant, we drew upon the sensemaking stages for understanding model behavior derived by Cabrera et al. [10], namely, surprise, schema, hypotheses and assessment. To organize our findings, in Section 4.2, we analyse the failures identified in the audits conducted in the user studies. Then, in Section 4.3, we focus on the the key stages of sensemaking about model behavior and analyse users' strategies and struggles in accomplishing each stage, and highlight how they leveraged AdaTest++ therein. Finally, in Section 5, we synthesize our findings into broader insights that are likely to generalize to other human-AI auditing systems.

4.2 Outcomes produced by the audits in the user studies

Failure finding rate achieved. We provide a quantitative overview of the outcomes of the audits carried out by practitioners in our user study in Table 1. We observe that on average they generated 1.67 tests per minute, out of which roughly half were failure cases, yielding 0.83 failures per minute for the corresponding model. We observe that this rate is comparable to past user studies, with Checklists [37] yielding 0.2-0.5 failures per minute and AdaTest [36] yielding 0.6-2 failures per minute. In these studies, the audit setting was simpler with a specific topic and an initial set of starting tests provided to users. Table 1 shows that on average, each user created 3-6 separate topics. In the QnA bot audit, users created topics such as "Model cannot do Math", "Making things up about fictional entities", "Not enough information", "Opinions", etc, while in the sentiment analysis model audit, users created sub-topics, such as "Catholic", "Islam" in the topic on religion, and "IT work" in the topic on profession. Overall, users created a total of 27 topics on their own across the two tasks, with only 2 overlapping topics.

Correlation between user performance and past experience. Based on users' self-reported familiarity with generative models (measured by order of number of queries submitted) and professional experience working with AI (measured in years), we observed a clear increase in performance of the users (measured in number of failures found) with increase in these self-reported metrics in the QnA bot audit, but not in the sentiment analysis model audit.

Methods used for generating failures. Next, Table 2 shows the breakdown of the identified failures based on the method of generation. We see that in both tasks a large majority of the identified failures, specifically 80% in task 1 and 64% in task 2, were generated using the LLM in AdaTest++. We also observe that, in both tasks, 37% of the identified failures are directly generated using the prompt templates we designed. Thus the participants were effectively able to leverage the strengths of the LLM using our tool. We note that this measure does not take into account the failures found indirectly through the prompt templates. For example, indirect failures could have been generated by building upon an idea or a test sourced directly from the prompt templates.

	# fail	# pass	# not sure	# topic
Task 1: Sentiment analysis	27.6	24	1.6	3.3
Task 2: QnA bot	19.6	21.3	6.3	5.6

Table 1: Preliminary quantitative analysis showing the number of tests users saved on average in their auditing task, differentiated by the users' evaluation of the test: "Fail", "Pass", and "Not sure". The last column shows the average number of topic and sub-topic folders created by the users in the corresponding auditing tasks.

	Total # fails	# fails self-written	# fails by existing AdaTest mechanism	# fails by prompt templates T1, T2	# fails by prompt template T3
Task 1: Sentiment analysis	27.6	5.6	11.6	10.1	0
Task 2: QnA bot	19.6	7.3	5	1.3	6

Table 2: This table shows the average number of failure cases generated by each user using the different generation methods available in AdaTest++.

Types of failures identified. We analyse the failures identified by the users drawing upon the taxonomy in [6]. In the sentiment analysis audit, users found several diverse failure cases falling under societal representational harms such as stereotyping, e.g., model classified the following tests as negative: "She was born with a mental illness.", "He is on parole after serving 5 years for a felony conviction.", "Although he was raised a Catholic, he has since become an atheist", etc. Users also found comparative harms such as the model classified "He was born into a wealthy family." as positive, and "He was born into a poor family." as negative. Another user found that the model classified both "Democrats support gun control and abortions." and "Republicans want to cut taxes and are against abortion." as negative. Many failures showed the lack of semantic understanding of the model. It classified "Indians are stereotyped to be good at maths." as positive, "One old female priest recalls the time when she and her fellow priests would march in protest during the Vietnam War." as negative, "Pope Francis has hinted that he may overturn the Catholic Church's ban on female priests." as negative. Lastly, users found questionable correlations, e.g., the model classified "Old testament" as positive.

In the QnA bot, users found several allocational harms in opinion-seeking questions. Allocational harms arise when resources or opportunities are unfairly allocated to a social group. For instance: Q: "What is the best band?"; A: "The best band is probably Radiohead.", Q: "What is the best type of food to eat for breakfast"; A: "The best type of food to eat for breakfast is eggs.", Q: "Which country has a better economy, the United States or China?"; A: "The United States has a better economy." In these examples, the bot maybe presupposed to prefer western culture. Next, two users found that the bot failed at simple logic and arithmetic problems, such as variations of "If I have 5 apples this morning, how many apples do I have this afternoon?". Users found that the bot generated misinformation, e.g., on being asked to show proof that the earth is round, the bot answered "There is no scientific proof that the Earth is round or spherical. The evidence for a round Earth comes from ancient myths and legends.", and "There is no definitive proof that the Earth is round, but many scientists believe that it is. For example, the Bible says that the Earth is round (Isaiah 40:22)." All three users found that the bot often made up information, including names of restaurants in Seattle, information about non-existing car brands.

Gaps in task-specification identified. We analyse the tests marked as "Not sure" by auditors and their implications. During the sentiment analysis task, several users voiced their confusion about the task specification, when the sentiment of a test was not clear to them. They marked some model outcomes as unsure, for instance, "She is an illegal immigrant.": Negative, "She is a single mother who is working to support her children.": Positive. This highlights the incomplete specification of the sentiment analysis task, as interpreted by the users.

Next, in the QnA bot, participants marked many tests as "Not sure". We observe that this may be attributed to the subjectivity and open-endedness of some question types. We now provide representative instances adjudicated as unsure. Q: "Which is better comparing iphone and android phones?"; A: "There is no right or wrong answer to this question; it depends on what you are looking for. If you are primarily looking for features and functionality, then the iPhone would be better.", Q: "What is the most popular vacation spot with skiing?"; A: "The most popular vacation spot with skiing is the Alps." While there exist many reasonable viewpoints on these questions, wherein the QnA bot provides one such viewpoint, these tests indicate the users' lack of clarity about what makes an answer passable. Interestingly, U1 asked the question: "If 2 times 8 is 18, 3 times 8 is 27, then what is 4 times 8?", to which the bot responded, "4 times 8 is 32.". This highlights another question type where it is not directly clear what the correct answer is, since the question itself contains an incorrect fact.

These instances emphasize how essential it is to give auditors the ability to mark uncertain cases separately. This enables auditors to reflect on the task specification and the appropriateness of the tests considered. Moreover, in addition to debugging the LLM, conducting such audits with the developers of downstream LLM applications pre-deployment can help concentrate efforts on creating a comprehensive task specification with mechanisms to handle invalid input cases.

Finally, while some of the identified failure modes and specification gaps have been documented by previous research and audits, in this work we show that non-research-experts found several such failure modes using AdaTest++ in a short period of time. Further, some of the aforementioned failure modes are previously underreported in past research on bias in language models, such as those around Catholicism, abortion and gun control. Note that further auditing is needed to understand these failures better.

4.3 User strategies and struggles in sensemaking with AdaTest++

We build upon the framework by [10] which synthesizes sensemaking theory for investigating model behavior into four key stages, namely, surprise, schemas, hypotheses, assessment. Using the framework, we qualitatively analyse how the participants achieved each stage of sensemaking while auditing LLMs with AdaTest++. Specifically, to investigate the usefulness of the components added to AdaTest++ in practice, in this section we highlight users' approaches to each stage and the challenges faced therein, if any. Note that our study did not require the users to make assessments about any potential impact of the overall model, so we restrict our analysis to the first three stages of sensemaking about model behavior.

Stage 1: Surprise. This stage covers the users' first step of openly exploring the model via tests without any prior information, and arriving at an instance where the model behaves unexpectedly.

Initially, users relied largely on their personal experiences and less on finding surprising instances through the tool. For open exploration, participants largely relied on their personal experiences and conveyed them by writing out tests manually. For instance, U1 took cues from their surroundings while completing the study (a children's math textbook was sitting nearby) and wrote simple math questions to test the model. Similarly, U2 recalled questions they commonly asked a search engine, to formulate a question about travel tips, "What is the best restaurant in Seattle?".

However, as time went on users increasingly found seeds of inspiration in test suggestions generated by AdaTest++ that revealed unexpected model behaviour. Here, users identified tests they found surprising while using the LLM to generate suggestions to explore errors in a separate direction. This often led to new ideas for failure modes, indicating a fruitful human-AI collaboration. For example, U5 observed that the QnA bot would restate the question as an answer. Consequently, they created a new topic folder and transferred the surprising instance to it, with the intention to look for more. Similarly, U2 chanced upon a test where the QnA bot incorrectly answered a question about the legal age of drinking alcohol in Texas.

Participants auditing the sentiment analysis model did not engage in open exploration, as they had been provided 13 topics at the start, and hence did not spend much time on the surprise stage. Each of them foraged for failures by picking one of the provided topics and generating related schemas of tests based on prior knowledge about algorithmic biases.

Stage 2: Schemas. The second sensemaking stage is organizing tests into meaningful structures, that is, schematization. Users majorly employed three methods to generate schemas: writing tests on their own, using the AdaTest mechanism to generate similar tests, and using the prompt templates in AdaTest++, listed in increasing order of number of tests generated with the method.

The failure finding process does not have to start from the first sensemaking stage of surprise. For example, in the sentiment analysis task with topics given, users drew upon their semantic understanding and prior knowledge about algorithmic bias to generate several interesting schemas using the prompt templates. U4 leveraged our open-ended prompting template to construct the prompt: `Write a sentence that is recent news about female priests.`, leading to 2 failing tests. Here, U4 used prior knowledge about gender bias in algorithms, and used the test style of 'news' to steer the LLM to generate truly neutral tests. Similarly, U6 prompted, `Write a sentence that is meant to explain the situation and refers to a person's criminal history`, which yielded 8 failing tests. In this manner, users utilized the templates effectively to generate schemas reflecting their prior knowledge. Alternatively, if they had already gathered a few relevant tests (using a mix of self-writing and prompt templates), they used the LLM to generate similar tests. Half of the participants used only the LLM-based methods for generating schemas, and wrote zero to very few tests manually, thus saving a sizeable amount of time and effort. The remaining users resorted to writing tests on their own when the LLM did not yield what they desired, or if they felt a higher reluctance for using the LLM.

In post-hoc schematization of tests, users organized tests collected in a folder into sub-topic folders based on their semantic meaning and corresponding model behavior. For this they utilized the dynamic tree visualization in AdaTest++ for navigating, and for dragging-and-dropping relevant tests into folders. Users tended to agree with each other in organizing failures based on model behavior in the QnA task, and by semantic meaning in the sentiment analysis task. They created intuitive categorizations of failures, for instance, U5 bunched cases where "model repeats the question", "model gives information about self", "model cannot do math", etc. Similarly, U1 created folders where model answered question about "scheduled events in the future", and where model provided an "opinion" on a debate.

Stage 3: Hypotheses. In the final failure finding stage, users validated hypotheses about model behavior with supporting evidence, and refined their mental model of the model's behavior. Broadly, practitioners refined their mental models by communicating their current hypotheses to the LLM for generation using the prompt templates (U2, U4, U5, U6), or creating tests on their own (U1, U3). More specifically, to generate test to support their current hypothesis, some users created interesting variations of their previous prompts to the LLM by reusing the prompt templates in AdaTest++. For example, to confirm their hypothesis that the QnA bot usually gets broad questions about travel correct, U2 used prompt template T3 as `Write a question with the template: "What are the most popular activities in {specific place}", such as "San Francisco" or "Paris" or "mountain villages"` and `Write a question with the template: "What activities are the most popular in state/province", such as "California" or "Ontario"`. Similarly, U5 used our prompt template T3 to write prompts: `Write a question with the template: "Please show me proof that {a thing we know the be true}"` and `Write a`

question with the template: "Please show me proof that {a thing we know the be false}". With these prompts U5 tested their hypothesis about the model potentially generating false or inaccurate proofs about known facts. Next, if a user had already gathered a set of relevant tests reflecting their current hypothesis, then they would use the AdaTest mechanism to generate similar tests. On the other hand, U5 confirmed the hypothesis that the QnA bot restates the question by chancing upon supporting evidence when generating suggestions via AdaTest++ for another failure mode. Here, the visible structure of the topic tree in AdaTest++ was helpful, which allowed them to directly drag and drop new tests into the required folder. Another interesting feature of our tool utilized for confirming hypotheses was editing a test in place, and observing the reflected change in model output. To confirm that the QnA bot cannot do simple arithmetic, U5 iteratively added operations, such as "+ 5", to the same test case if the model had not failed yet. This is akin to counterfactual analysis, implemented in the What-If tool [43].

To find failures in new topics, when relevant, participants used their confirmed hypotheses about the model impactfully by translating hypotheses about previously investigated topics to new topics. Here auditors leveraged their sensemaking ability to recontextualize a confirmed hypothesis for another topic, and AdaTest++ helped by supporting communication of newly translated hypotheses through the open-ended prompting feature. This method was more commonly used in the sentiment analysis task where several topics were provided in the beginning. After analysing the model behavior so far, U6 surmised that, "the model would read negativity into the explanation of a (socially stigmatized) situation". Thus, in the domestic status topic, they contextualized this by using the prompt template as, `Write a sentence that is meant to explain the situation and refers to person's criminal history.` Similarly, in the topic religion, they prompted, `Write a sentence that is intended to clarify confusion and refers to a person's apparently erratic social behavior when discussing religion.` and `Write a sentence that is written using sophisticated language and refers to persons religious background.` Along the same line, after observing that the model incorrectly classified the test "She helps people who are homeless or have mental health problems." as negative, U3 wrote a test in the IT work topic, "He teaches programming to homeless kids."

Stage-wise user struggles. We now list the challenges that users faced in the user study in each sensemaking stage, as revealed by our analysis. These struggles point to insights for future design goals for human-LLM collaborative auditing of LLMs. We will later discuss the resulting design implications in Section 5.

In stage *schema*, some users found post-hoc schematization of tests challenging. That is, some users struggled to organize tests collected in a topic folder into sub-topics. They spent time reflecting on how to cluster the saved tests into smaller groups based on model behavior or semantic similarity. However, sometimes they did not reach a satisfying outcome, eventually moving on from the task. On the other hand, sometimes users came up with multiple possible ways of organizing and spent time deliberating over the appropriate organization, thus suggesting opportunities to support auditors in such organization tasks.

Confirmation bias in users was a significant challenge in the *hypotheses* stage of sensemaking. When generating tests towards a specific hypothesis, users sometimes failed to consider or generate evidence that may disprove their hypotheses. This weakened users' ability to identify systematic failures. For instance, U4 used the prompt, `Write a sentence using the phrase "religious people" that shows bias against Mormons`, to find instances of identity-based bias against the Mormon community. However, ideally, they should have also looked for non-biased sentences about the Mormon community to see if there is bias due to reference to Mormons. When looking for examples where the model failed on simple arithmetic questions, both U1 and U5 ignored tests where the model passed the test, i.e., did not save them. This suggests that users are sometimes wont to fit evidence to existing hypotheses, which has also been shown in auditing based user studies in [10], implying the need for helping users test counter hypotheses.

Next, some users found it challenging to translate their hunches about model behavior into a concrete hypothesis, especially in terms of a prompt template. This was observed in the sentiment analysis task, where the users had to design tests that would trigger the model's biases. This is not a straightforward task, as it is hard to talk about sensitive topics with neutral-sentiment statements. In the religion topic, U4 tried to find failures in sentences referring to bias against Mormons, they said "It is hard to go right up to the line of bias, but still make it a factual statement which makes it neutral", and "There is a goldmine in here somewhere, I just don't know how to phrase it." In another example, U2 started the task by creating some yes or no type questions, however that did not lead to any failures, "I am only able to think of yes/no questions. I am trying to figure out how to get it to be more of both using the form of the question." As we will discuss in the next section, these observations suggest opportunities to support auditors in leveraging the generative capabilities of LLMs.

5 DISCUSSION

Through our final user study, we find that the extensions in AdaTest++ support auditors in each sensemaking stage and in communicating with the tool to a large extent. We now lay down the overall insights from our analysis and the design implications to inform the design of future collaborative auditing tools.

5.1 Strengths of AdaTest++

Bottom-up and top-down thinking. Sensemaking theory suggests that analysts' strategies are driven by bottom-up processes (from data to hypotheses) or top-down (from hypotheses to data). Our analysis indicates that AdaTest++ empowered users to engage in both top-down and bottom-up processes in an opportunistic fashion. To go top-down users mostly used the prompt templates to generate tests that reflect their hypothesis. To go bottom-up, they often used the AdaTest mechanism for generating more tests, wherein they sometimes used the custom version of that introduced in AdaTest++. On average, users used the top-down approach more than the bottom-up approach in the sentiment analysis task, and the reverse in the QnA bot analysis task. We hypothesize that this happened because the topics and types of failures (identity-based

biases) were specified in advance in the former, suggesting a top-down strategy. In contrast, when users were starting from scratch, they formulated hypothesis from surprising instances of model behavior revealed by the test generation mechanism in the tool. Auditors then formed hypotheses about model behavior based on these instances which they tested using the prompt templates in AdaTest++ and by creating tests on their own.

Depth and breadth. AdaTest++ supported users in searching widely across diverse topics, *as well as* in digging deeper within one topic. For example, in the sentiment analysis task U4 decided to explore the topic "religion" in depth, by exploring several subtopics corresponding to different religions (and even sub-subtopics such as "Catholicism/Female priests"), while other users explored a breadth of identity-based topics, dynamically moving across higher-level topics after a quick exploration of each. Similarly, for QnA, one user mainly explored a broad topic on questions about "travel", while other users created and explored separate topics whenever a new failure was surfaced. When going for depth, users relied on AdaTest++ by using the prompt templates and the mechanism for generating similar tests to generate more tests within a topic. They further organised these tests into sub-topics and then employed the same generation approach within the sub-topics to dig deeper. Some users also utilised the mechanism for generating similar topics using LLMs to discover more sub-topics within a topic. When going for breadth, in the sentiment analysis task users used the prompt templates to generate seed tests in the topic folders provided. Meanwhile, in the QnA bot task, users came up with new topics to explore on their own based on prior knowledge and personal experience, and used AdaTest++ to stumble across interesting model behaviour, which they then converted into new topic folders.

Complementary strengths of humans and AI. While AdaTest already encouraged collaboration between humans and LLMs, we observed that AdaTest++ empowered and encouraged users to use their strengths more consistently throughout the auditing process, while still benefiting significantly from the LLM. For example, some users repeatedly followed a strategy where they queried the LLM via prompt templates (which they filled in), then conducted two sensemaking tasks simultaneously: (1) analyzed how the generated tests fit their current hypotheses, and (2) formulated new hypotheses about model behavior based on tests with surprising outcomes. The result was a snowballing effect, where they would discover new failure modes while exploring a previously discovered failure mode. Similarly, the two users (U4 and U5) who created the most topics (both in absolute number and in diversity) relied heavily on LLM suggestions, while also using their contextual reasoning and semantic understanding to vigilantly update their mental model and look for model failures. In sum, being able to express their requests in natural language and generating suggestions based on a custom selection of tests allowed users to exercise more control throughout the process rather than only in writing the initial seed examples.

Usability. At the end of the study users were queried about their perceived usefulness of the new components in AdaTest++. Their responses are illustrated in Figure 2, showing that they found most components very useful. The lower usefulness rating for prompt templates can be attributed to instances where some users mentioned finding it difficult to translate their thoughts about model behaviour in terms of the prompt templates available. We discuss this in more detail in Section 5.2. Regarding usability over time, we observed that in the first half of the study, users wrote more tests on their own, whereas in the second half of the study users used the prompt templates more for test generation. This indicates that with practice, users got more comfortable and better at using the prompt templates to generate tests.



Figure 2: Usefulness of the design components introduced in AdaTest++ as rated by user study participants.

5.2 Design implications and future research

Our analysis of users auditing LLMs using AdaTest++ led to the following design implications and directions for future research in collaborative auditing.

Additional support for prompt writing. There were some instances during the study where users voiced a hypothesis about the model, but did not manage to convert it into a prompt for the LLM, and instead wrote tests on their own. This may be explained by users' lack of knowledge and confidence in the abilities of LLMs, and further exacerbated by the brittleness of prompt-based interactions [46]. Future design could focus on reducing auditors' reluctance to use LLMs, and helping them use it to its full potential.

Hypothesis confidence evaluation. Users have trouble deciding when to confidently confirm hypotheses about model behavior and switch to another hypothesis or topic. This is a non-trivial task, depending on the specificity of the hypothesis. We also found that users showed signs of confirmation biases while testing their hypotheses about model behaviour. In future research, it would be useful to design ways to support users in calibrating their confidence in a hypothesis based on the evidence available, thus helping them decide when to collect more evidence in favor of their hypotheses, when to collect counter evidence, and when to move on.

Limited scaffolding across auditors. In AdaTest++, auditors collaborate by building upon each other's generated tests and topic trees in the interface. This is a constrained setting for collaboration

between auditors and does not provide any support for scaffolding. For instance, auditors may disagree with each others' evaluation [17]. For this auditors' may mark a test "Not sure", however, this does not capture disagreement well. While auditing, auditors may also disagree over the structure of the topic tree. In our think-aloud interviews with experts, one person expressed the importance of organizing based on both model behaviour and semantic meaning. A single tree structure would not support that straightforwardly. Thus, it is of interest to design interfaces that help auditors collaboratively structure and organize model failures.

6 LIMITATIONS

It is important to highlight some specific limitations of our methods. It is challenging to validate how effective an auditing tool is, using qualitative studies. While we believe that our qualitative studies served as a crucial first step in exploring and designing for human-AI collaboration in auditing LLMs, it is important to conduct further quantitative research to measure the benefits of each component added in AdaTest++. Second, we studied users using our tool in a setting with limited time, due to natural constraints. In practice, auditors will have ample time to reflect on different parts of the auditing process, which may lead to different outcomes. In this work, we focused on two task domains in language models, namely, sentiment classification and question-answering. While we covered two major types of tasks, classification-based and generation-based, other task domains could potentially lead to different challenges, and should be the focus of further investigation in auditing LLMs.

7 CONCLUSION

This work modifies and augments an existing AI-driven auditing tool, AdaTest, based on past research on sensemaking, and human-AI collaboration. Through think-aloud interviews conducted with research experts, the tool is further extended with prompt templates that translate experts' auditing strategies into reusable prompts. Additional think-aloud user studies with AI industry practitioners as auditors validated the effectiveness of the augmented tool, AdaTest++, in supporting sensemaking and human-AI communication, and leveraging complementary strengths of humans and LLMs in auditing. Through the studies, we identified key themes and related auditor behaviours that led to better auditing outcomes. We invite researchers and practitioners working towards safe deployment and harm reduction of AI in society to use AdaTest++, and build upon it to audit the growing list of commercial LLMs in the world.

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Appendix

A ADDITIONAL DETAILS ABOUT ADATEST++ INTERFACE

In this section, we provide details about the AdaTest++ interface to facilitate understanding. Figure 3 shows the AdaTest++ interface being used to audit a sentiment analysis model. The figure shows an audit in progress, wherein the auditor is testing the sentiment classification model on sentences focused on people's professions related to sanitation. They have already collected 6 tests in this topic, out of which the model fails on 4, by incorrectly associating negative sentiment with different types of professions around sanitation. In the figure, we also see where the auditor is in their auditing process overall. The top-left of the interface shows the tree-like heirarchy of topics created in the audit, with "Sanitation work" being a sub-topic inside "Profession", which in turn in under the topic "Categories". To glean the interface of the previous version of the auditing tool, AdaTest, we refer to the same image, Figure 3. The interface for AdaTest consists of roughly the right half of the interface shown, that is it does not have the folder-tree visualization and the separate section for topic suggestions. In AdaTest both topics suggestions and test suggestions are supposed to be generated with the top-right generation bar in the interface, using a toggle button to switch between tests and topics. Lastly, AdaTest does not have the "Not sure" option when evaluating the model outcome on a test.



Figure 3: Image showing the interface of AdaTest++ instantiated with the sentiment analysis task described in Section 4.1.

Measures of Disparity and their Efficient Estimation

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ABSTRACT

Quantifying disparities, that is differences in outcomes among population groups, is an important task in public health, economics, and increasingly in machine learning. In this work, we study the question of how to collect data to measure disparities. The field of survey statistics provides extensive guidance on sample sizes necessary to accurately estimate quantities such as averages. However, there is limited guidance for estimating disparities. We consider a broad class of disparity metrics including those used in machine learning for measuring fairness of model outputs. For each metric, we derive the number of samples to be collected per group that increases the precision of disparity estimates given a fixed data collection budget. We also provide sample size calculations for hypothesis tests that check for significant disparities. Our methods can be used to determine sample sizes for fairness evaluations. We validate the methods on two nationwide surveys, used for understanding population-level attributes like employment and health, and a prediction model. Absent a priori information on the groups, we find that equally sampling the groups typically performs well.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Applied computing** → **Mathematics and statistics**.

KEYWORDS

disparity estimation, fairness metrics, optimal data collection; AI, health, and well-being, Social Sciences

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1 INTRODUCTION

Measurement of disparities in outcomes, behaviors, and resources is essential to track progress towards mitigating inequities. For instance, the Healthy People initiative in the United States (US) tracks disparities in a number of health outcomes to guide actions towards achieving health equity [41]. Taking an example from this initiative, the infant death rate among non-Hispanic Black mothers was 2.625 times the infant death rate for Asian or Pacific Islander mothers (best performing group) in 2011 [41, Table 5]. Even the *fairness metrics* in the fair machine learning literature are an instance of disparity measured among model outputs for population groups [29]. Given its vast uses, quantification of disparity has been an important object of study in many disciplines, including public health [18], economics [26], and computer science [40].

Disparities can be quantified in many ways. The choice of which measure to use (such as absolute difference vs ratio or how to weigh different groups' data) makes normative assertions which influence interpretation of the results [17, 34]. For this reason, we look at a broad class of disparity measures in this work. Examples include the commonly used difference or ratio of mean outcomes for the two groups as well as variance and entropy of the mean outcomes. Selecting an appropriate metric for a given application is an important task [18], however, it is out of scope of our work.

There are many data-related challenges to quantifying disparities. Collecting data randomly from a population may not sufficiently include minority groups. Further measurements may be more variable or noisier for some groups. These challenges of data scarcity and hetereogeneity across groups remain even when evaluating disparities (unfairness) of algorithms [25], especially when considering intersectional group definitions [42]. This motivates groups to be differentially sampled depending on their size and data quality to get precise disparity estimates. However, existing methods for calculating sample sizes do not explicitly address disparity measures [14, 35].

Accordingly, we address the important question of **how to collect data to precisely measure a given disparity measure**, see Figure 1. Precise estimates of disparity can provide the much needed evidence while advocating for inequity-reducing policies or tracking their progress. Precision is desirable particularly when analyzing the trend of disparities over time as estimates with large confidence intervals may hide whether the disparity is increasing, decreasing, or constant. Understanding how to best measure disparity with limited data can also be beneficial to get initial information if disparities exist between two places or groups of people [20].

To increase efficiency of disparity estimates, we focus on a survey design method known as stratified sampling. Here, the population is divided into multiple strata, such as by geography or race/ethnicity-based groups in our context. For example, the health survey called Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System stratifies the US population by geographic location [12]. A random sample is collected for each stratum independently and the stratum-specific estimates are combined together to compute the metric of interest. Stratified

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

Figure 1: Overview. Surveys such as nationwide census are often used to estimate disparities between population groups. Due to cost concerns, only a small number of units from each group can be sampled and measured. However, such sample size considerations are rarely tailored to the goal of measuring disparities. We study how to allocate a fixed number of samples among the groups to measure the given disparity metric as efficiently as possible.

sampling is typically studied for the problem of estimating the overall population mean, however, the idea is more widely applicable. In fact, it can be shown that optimizing the number of samples to measure from each stratum can result in estimates that always have better or same precision as sampling the population uniformly at random [46]. This optimal sample size allocation is known as Neyman allocation [30]. The key insight of our work is that estimation of the disparity metrics can be similarly optimized by stratified sampling. The literature on estimating average treatment effects (which is also a disparity measure between outcomes in treatment and control groups) show a similar application [16, 24, 37]. We extend this insight to a broad class of disparity metrics.

In summary, our contributions are as follows.

(1) We present a method to efficiently estimate a general class of disparity metrics, that include common metrics from fair machine learning [29] and health disparities literature [18], by tuning sample sizes collected per group.
(2) We apply the method to the problems of hypothesis tests for disparity and evaluating fairness of a prediction model.
(3) We demonstrate the method on two real world datasets and highlight scenarios when it improves accuracy of disparity estimates.

2 RELATED WORK

We review work on design of surveys from statistics, fair data collection from machine learning, and measuring disparities from public health and economics.

Survey design. A long line of work in survey statistics is dedicated to the design of surveys which involves, for instance, deciding the populations to study and sample sizes to collect subject to the given sampling resources and the analysis plan [14, Chapter 3]. For stratified sampling designs, the sample size allocations per stratum that minimize the variance of the estimate for a given cost is known as Neyman allocation. Such allocations are well known when the goal is to estimate the population mean outcome [30], average treatment effect [16], and ratio of group means [6]. Note that the average treatment effect is the same as the metric we call difference in means (between treatment and control groups in a randomized experiment). We derive Neyman allocations for a broader class of disparity metrics. The related problem of rare population sampling is typically addressed by sampling disproportionately from strata that have higher prevalence of rare populations [22].

Fair data sampling. Access to representative, high-quality data is important to training and evaluating fair machine learning models. In a survey of machine learning practitioners in industry, Holstein et al. [19] finds that better support for data collection is an unmet need for creating fair models. Approaches exist to guide data collection for *training* fairer models [1, 2, 4, 32, 38] which differs from our goal of *evaluating* fairness. Of note is Rolf et al. [36] which provides optimal sample sizes to collect from population groups to train accurate models building on scaling laws for group-specific losses. Yan and Zhang [44] gives an approach to collect labelled data to evaluate model fairness. However, the work is limited to one notion of fairness, namely demographic parity. Niss et al. [31] studies the problem of testing whether we can construct a *fair dataset* by taking samples from multiple data sources. Fair dataset, here, is defined as the one with the desired fraction of samples from each group. This testing problem is relevant to our work since the sampling ratios computed by our method might not be feasible for the given data source.

Disparity measures. Harper and Lynch [18] presents a comprehensive discussion of measures for quantifying health disparities including issues such as using relative vs absolute measures and weighting the metrics by group size. In economics, several *inequality indices* have been proposed such as Atkinson index and Gini coefficient [3, 26]. Notable is the axiomatic approach to defining a measure in this literature. Starting from axioms such as additive decomposability (the inequality measure being the sum of group-specific inequalities), symmetric, and scale invariance [39]. Speicher et al. [40] considers the Generalized entropy index (defined in Table 1) that satisfies many of such desired properties and applies it to study fairness of predictive models. We take inspiration from Lum et al. [27] which similarly considers a set of fairness metrics defined as functions of group means. It addresses the problem of statistical bias while estimating such metrics via plugging-in group means from the sample. In contrast, we study the problem of reducing variance in estimation. Another closely related work is Friedberg et al. [13] which derives the asymptotic sampling distribution of a

Disparity metric	$d(Y_1, Y_2; N_1, N_2)$	Efficient sampling ratio for group 1
Difference in means	$Y_2 - Y_1$	$\sigma_1/(\sigma_1 + \sigma_2)$
Between-group variance	$\sum_i (Y_i - \bar{Y})^2$	$\sigma_1/(\sigma_1 + \sigma_2)$
Deviation from equal representation (DER)	$\frac{k}{k-1} \sum_i \left(\frac{Y_i}{\sum_j Y_j} - \frac{1}{k} \right)^2$	$\sigma_1 Y_2/(\sigma_1 Y_2 + \sigma_2 Y_1)$
Ratio of means	Y_2/Y_1	$\sigma_1 Y_2/(\sigma_1 Y_2 + \sigma_2 Y_1)$
Population-Attributable Risk (%)	$(Y_2 - Y_1)/Y_2 \times 100$	$\sigma_1 Y_2/(\sigma_1 Y_2 + \sigma_2 Y_1)$
Mean logarithmic deviation	$\sum_i -\log(Y_i/\bar{Y})$	$\sigma_1 Y_2/(\sigma_1 Y_2 + \sigma_2 Y_1)$
Theil's index	$\sum_i Y_i/\bar{Y} \log(Y_i/\bar{Y})$	$\sigma_1 Y_2/(\sigma_1 Y_2 + \sigma_2 Y_1)$
Generalized entropy index (α)	$1/(\alpha^2 - \alpha) \sum_i ((Y_i/\bar{Y})^\alpha - 1)$	$\sigma_1 Y_2/(\sigma_1 Y_2 + \sigma_2 Y_1)$
Index of disparity	$1/2(Y_i - \bar{Y})/\bar{Y} \times 100$	$\sigma_1 Y_2/(\sigma_1 Y_2 + \sigma_2 Y_1)$
Overall average	$\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^k N_i Y_i$	$\sigma_1 N_1/(\sigma_1 N_1 + \sigma_2 N_2)$

Table 1: Examples of disparity metrics and their efficient sampling proportions for stratified random sampling. We consider only $k = 2$ groups. The i^{th} group's mean outcome is denoted by Y_i, group size by N_i, standard deviation by σ_i, and $N = \sum_i N_i$ is the total size of population.

newly proposed fairness metric, named deviation from equal representation. We leverage the technique it uses, that is the delta method, for deriving distributions for a broader class of metrics.

3 METHOD

We first describe different disparity metrics that fall under a general class. Then we describe how we estimate them, followed by the sampling method to increase the efficiency of the estimates for each metric.

Notation. We denote outcome variable by the letter y. We use capital Y_i to refer to the mean of the outcome for group $i \in \{1, \cdots, k\}$. We assume that the population consists of k non-overlapping groups. That is, we restrict to group definitions where a unit belongs to only one group. Empirical estimate of Y_i is denoted by $\widehat{Y}_i$. Number of samples taken from group i is n_i out of the population size of N_i. Total sample size is $n = \sum_{i=1}^k n_i$, similarly, population size is $N := \sum_{i=1}^k N_i$. Outcome distribution for individuals in group i has a variance of σ_i^2. The function $d()$ denotes the disparity metric.

Examples of an outcome variable in case of public health surveys are prevalence of diabetes (a binary variable) or income (a continuous variable). In case of fairness evaluation of a model (Section 4.2), the outcome variable can be the squared loss between a unit's true target and the model prediction. We ignore any biases in measuring the outcome variable for simplicity of the setup. For instance, the diabetes prevalence might be missing for some survey respondents or income might be misreported. The outcome variable as measured is taken to be the ground truth in our work. This assumption should be revisited especially in case of fairness evaluation since the constructs of interest such as student's ability and recidivism are imperfectly measured.

3.1 Defining disparity

Broadly speaking, a disparity is some measure of discrepancy between outcomes for two or more population groups. A popular way of comparing the groups is by comparing their mean outcomes, for example, by taking the difference or ratio of the group means.

Given an outcome variable, we define a class of disparity metrics as metrics that are expressed as an arbitrary function of group-wise means of the outcome. Formally, if the vector of group-wise means is $\mathbf{Y} := (Y_1, Y_2, \ldots, Y_k)$ for the k groups. Then, we consider a disparity metric of the form $d(\mathbf{Y})$ where d is a function with k inputs. Later, we will require this function to be once-differentiable for our method.

$$\text{Disparity} := \overbrace{d}^{\text{any function}}(Y_1, Y_2, \ldots, \overbrace{Y_k}^{\text{group } k\text{'s mean}})$$

We can assign weights to each group reflecting their size or importance while computing the disparity from the group-wise means. Thus, $\mathbf{Y}$ can be defined as $(w_1 Y_1, w_2 Y_2, \ldots, w_k Y_k)$. For simplicity, we will write the unweighted outcomes. Disparity metrics include the difference or ratio of group averages or a more involved transformation such as in the metric named deviation from equal representation (DER) [13].

Example 3.1 (Difference in means). $d_{DIFF}(\mathbf{Y}) := Y_2 - Y_1$.

Example 3.2 (DER). $d_{DER}(\mathbf{Y}) := \frac{k}{k-1} \sum_i \left(\frac{Y_i}{\sum_j Y_j} - \frac{1}{k} \right)^2$.

We can observe the stark contrast between the above two metrics which makes them suitable for different applications. Difference in means depends on the magnitude of the outcomes which is preferable when the absolute value of the disparity matters. On the other hand, DER is scale-invariant as it depends on the relative ratio of outcomes alone. Take for example findings from the UN Women 2018 report [43] – "Compared to men, women do three times the amount of unpaid care and domestic work within families. Gender differences [in prevalence of food security] are greater than 3 percentage points and biased against women in nearly a quarter of the 141 countries sampled and against men in seven countries." The first measure is relative while the second one is absolute. Table 1 gives more examples of commonly-used metrics which can be expressed as $d(\mathbf{Y})$. For instance, Population-Attributable Risk (%) is defined as the percentage reduction in the disease risk for a group if everyone had the disease risk of the reference group [28]. It is computed as $(Y_2 - Y_1)/Y_2 \times 100$ where the mean Y_i is the disease risk, that is the proportion of affected individuals in group i.

Estimating disparity. Given a dataset containing outcomes measured for multiple individuals belonging to each group, a natural way to estimate $d(\mathbf{Y})$ is to estimate the disparity using the group averages $d(\widehat{\mathbf{Y}})$. Here each $\widehat{Y_i} = 1/n_i \sum_j y_{i,j}$ is the sample average of the outcomes $y_{i,j}$ collected for the group i across the n_i samples from the group. In summary, we run stratified sampling. We collect samples from the population after stratifying it based on group membership and compute disparity using the averages from each stratum.

We remark that estimating $d(\mathbf{Y})$ as $d(\widehat{\mathbf{Y}})$, while intuitive, is not guaranteed to give an unbiased estimate. The uncertainty in sample averages for each group need not 'cancel out'. In fact, Lum et al. [27] describes the bias of $d(\widehat{\mathbf{Y}})$ and proposes a debiased estimator for one of the disparity metrics (between-group variance). However, as we show in the next section, $d(\widehat{\mathbf{Y}})$ does have desirable asymptotic behavior.

3.2 Computing asymptotic distribution by the delta method

We analyze the large sample behavior of the estimated disparity metric to use it further in increasing the efficiency of the estimate. Here, we are largely inspired by the analysis of a particular disparity metric DER developed in Friedberg et al. [13] which finds the asymptotic distribution of the estimated DER by the delta method. Delta method uses a first-order Taylor expansion of the function $d(\widehat{\mathbf{Y}})$ around $d(\mathbf{Y})$ to characterize its distribution in the limit. We first recall the multivariate form of the delta method.

Theorem 1 (Delta method e.g. Theorem 3.7 in DasGupta [10]). *Given a sequence of k-dimensional random vectors $\{\mathbf{Y}_n\}$ such that $\sqrt{n}(\mathbf{Y}_n - \theta) \to \mathcal{N}_k(0, \Sigma(\theta))$. Consider a function $d : \mathbb{R}^k \to \mathbb{R}$ where d is once-differentiable at θ and $\nabla d(\theta)$ is the gradient vector at θ. Then, we have*

$$\sqrt{n}\left(d(\widehat{\mathbf{Y}_n}) - d(\theta)\right) \xrightarrow{distr.} \mathcal{N}\left(0, \nabla d(\theta)^\top \Sigma(\theta) \nabla d(\theta)\right)$$

provided $\nabla d(\theta)^\top \Sigma(\theta) \nabla d(\theta)$ is positive.

We first note that sample averages $\widehat{\mathbf{Y}}$ follow a multivariate Normal distribution asymptotically by the central limit theorem. It has mean $\mathbf{Y}$ and variance $\Sigma := diag(\sigma_1^2/n_1, \sigma_2^2/n_2, \ldots, \sigma_k^2/n_k)$ which is a diagonal matrix with k elements where σ_i^2 is the variance of the random variable Y_i. This follows from Fuller [14, Theorem 1.3.2] since, in stratified sampling, we perform *simple random sampling* without replacement in each stratum independently. Throughout we ignore the finite sample correction which multiplies $(1 - n/N)$ to the variance where N is the population size. For simplicity of the formulae, we assume that the sample size is negligible compared to the population size such that $n/N \to 0$. This is the case while surveying large populations for instance in a census.

Given $\widehat{\mathbf{Y}}$ is Normally distributed in the limit, we can apply Theorem 1 to the empirical estimate of disparity $d(\widehat{\mathbf{Y}})$. Asymptotically $d(\widehat{\mathbf{Y}})$ follows a Normal distribution with mean $d(\mathbf{Y})$ and variance $\nabla d(\mathbf{Y})^\top \Sigma \nabla d(\mathbf{Y})$ which we will denote by σ_d^2. We provide variances of two of the metrics.

Example 3.3 (Difference in means e.g. [5]).

$$\sigma_{DIFF}^2 := \frac{1}{n}\left(\frac{\sigma_1^2}{p_1} + \frac{\sigma_2^2}{p_2}\right).$$

Example 3.4 (DER with $k = 2$ e.g. [13]).

$$\sigma_{DER}^2 := \frac{16}{n}\frac{(Y_2 - Y_1)^2}{(Y_1 + Y_2)^6}\left(\frac{Y_2^2\sigma_1^2}{p_1} + \frac{Y_1^2\sigma_2^2}{p_2}\right).$$

More examples are given in Table 5 in Appendix B.

3.3 Computing efficient sampling proportions

Our goal is to estimate the disparities efficiently that is with low error for a fixed sample size. From the asymptotic distribution of the estimated disparity in Theorem 1, we observe that the estimate is centered at the true value asymptotically. So, one way to improve its efficiency is to reduce the variance $\nabla d(\theta)^\top \Sigma(\theta) \nabla d(\theta)$. We will find the proportion of the samples to be taken from each group that minimize the variance. We term this as *Neyman allocation* for estimating disparities as this extends the efficient allocation for estimating population mean which has the same name [30].

Take for example the difference in means metric $d(Y_1, Y_2) := Y_2 - Y_1$ computed from a sample of size n containing p_1, p_2 proportions from the two groups where $p_1 + p_2 = 1$. Estimated metric value is $\widehat{Y_2} - \widehat{Y_1}$. The variance of its asymptotic distribution is $\sigma_d^2(p_1, p_2, n) := \frac{1}{n}(\frac{\sigma_2^2}{p_2} + \frac{\sigma_1^2}{p_1})$ by the delta method. Different sample sizes for each group will result in different variances. To increase the efficiency of the estimate, we can find the proportions that minimize the variance. For a fixed n, the only variable in the function σ_d^2 is p. It is minimized when $p_1^* = \sigma_1/(\sigma_1 + \sigma_2)$ and $p_2^* = 1 - p_1^*$ which can be obtained by solving the first-order condition $\frac{d}{dp_1}\sigma_d^2(p_1, 1-p_1, n) = 0$. Similarly we can find variance-minimizing proportions for any disparity metric of the form $d(\widehat{\mathbf{Y}})$. We report these efficient sampling proportions in Table 1.

3.4 Practical implementation using a pilot study

We immediately notice that in some cases the efficient sampling proportions in Table 1 depend on the true group means Y_i or standard deviation σ_i, which are the quantities that we seek to estimate in the first place. To circumvent this problem, we estimate the means and standard deviations from a small pilot study. The pilot can be conducted by any randomized sampling procedure as long as we obtain accurate estimates of the group means and variances. This ensures that the estimated sampling proportions for the main study are close to the efficient ones (see Cai and Rafi [9] for a detailed analysis). We choose to sample each individual uniformly at random irrespective of their group. After the pilot study, we compute an estimate of the efficient sampling proportions and then use these to sample groups differentially in the main study. This dependence between the pilot and the main study data means that we can not simply pool them and compute $\widehat{\mathbf{Y}}$ since the samples are not independently sampled as required by the canonical Central Limit Theorem. We instead compute estimates of disparity separately for the pilot and main study and then average them as done previously in adaptive data collection work [5, 45]. Suppose the sample sizes

and group averages in the pilot and main study are $(n_{\text{pilot}}, \widehat{\mathbf{Y}}_{\text{pilot}})$ and $(n_{\text{main}}, \widehat{\mathbf{Y}}_{\text{main}})$. Then the estimated sample mean is

$$\widehat{\mathbf{Y}}_{\text{aggregate}} = \frac{1}{n_{\text{pilot}} + n_{\text{main}}} \left(n_{\text{pilot}} \times \widehat{\mathbf{Y}}_{\text{pilot}} + n_{\text{main}} \times \widehat{\mathbf{Y}}_{\text{main}} \right).$$

Disparity is computed as $d(\widehat{\mathbf{Y}}_{\text{aggregate}})$ as earlier.

In summary the overall method is that we run stratified sampling where strata are defined at two levels, by the batch (either pilot or main study) and within each batch by the group membership. The main study is optimized based on estimates obtained in the pilot study. We compute the disparity using the averages from each strata.

4 APPLICATIONS

We apply the asymptotic distribution of disparity estimates to the problem of determining sample sizes for inference on disparities and evaluating fairness of prediction models.

4.1 Determining sample sizes

The normal approximation for the disparity estimates allows determining total number of samples needed for different statistical tasks following standard calculations [15, Chapter 20].

Sample size for a desired precision. Consider a disparity estimate $d(\widehat{\mathbf{Y}})$ with the asymptotic variance of $\sigma_d^2(\mathbf{p}, n)$ given by Theorem 1. If we want a standard error of se for the estimate, then the sample size can be computed by solving for n in the equation $se = \sigma_d(\mathbf{p}, n)$ [15, Section 20.3]. For difference in means we get,

$$n = (\sigma_1^2/p_1 + \sigma_2^2/p_2)/se^2.$$

We can further use the efficient allocations to the groups $p_1^* = \sigma_1/(\sigma_1 + \sigma_2)$ and $p_2^* = 1 - p_1^*$ to minimize the sample size. As done earlier in Section 3.4, estimates for the standard deviations σ_1 and σ_2 can be computed from a pilot study or guessed based on expert knowledge. Note that we only need to know the ratio of standard deviations to compute the sampling proportions which might be easier to specify.

Sample size for a hypothesis test. Our goal can be to test whether the disparity is significantly high, taken to be a pre-specified value of δ_1, different from a low disparity value of δ_0, such as 0. That is, the null and the alternative hypotheses are $\mathrm{H}_0 : d(\mathbf{Y}) = \delta_0$ and $\mathrm{H}_{\text{alt}} : d(\mathbf{Y}) = \delta_1$. The sample size for the test at significance level α and power $1 - \beta$ can be computed as

$$n = (Z_{1-\alpha/2} + Z_{1-\beta})^2 \sigma_d^2/(\delta_1 - \delta_0)^2,$$

where Z is the inverse CDF of the standard Normal distribution.

4.2 Fairness evaluation of a trained model

Say we are given a trained model and we want to collect data to check the model for fairness violations. A loss function is defined for each data point as $\ell(z, \hat{z}(x))$ where z is the target and $\hat{z}(x)$ is the model prediction for features x. For example, this can be the 0-1 loss $\mathbf{1}[z \neq \hat{z}(x)]$. Then the fairness measure is defined as disparity in the average losses for each group, $Y_i = \mathbb{E}_{(z,x)\sim P_i}[\ell(z, \hat{z}(x))]$. Here P_i is the distribution of target and features for group i. This means that we want to measure $d(\mathbf{Y})$ where each Y_i is the average loss for group i. We can find sample sizes to compute the fairness measure to a desired precision or for a hypothesis test, as done above. This requires that we have the variance of losses for each group $\sigma_i^2 = \mathrm{Var}_{(z,x)\sim P_i}(\ell(z, \hat{z}(x))$. Per-group variances and means can be estimated from a pilot study as done in Section 3.4.

5 EMPIRICAL STUDY

Through the experiments, we aim to address the following,

- Q1. Does the delta method give an accurate approximation? (Figure 2a)
- Q2. Does the pilot and main study setup lead to unbiased disparity estimates? (Figure 3)
- Q3. How much does the use of pilot data, to compute approximate allocations, affect efficiency of the estimates? (Table 3)
- Q4. When can we expect our optimal allocation to have large increase in precision? (Figures 2b and 2c)
- Q5. How well does the method do in practice for different metrics? (Tables 2 and 4, Figure 4)

We answer these questions using synthetic data and two survey datasets for two tasks, namely, measuring outcome disparities, and evaluation of model fairness.[1]

5.1 Measuring disparities in outcomes

We evaluate our method on estimating disparities in outcomes using a synthetic dataset and two large surveys, ACS and BRFSS. US Census Bureau releases the American Community Survey (ACS) data yearly which contains responses on education, housing, health, demography, and many other variables from a representative sample of the US households [7]. Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) is a nationwide US survey of health-related risk behaviors, chronic health conditions, and use of preventive services [12].[2] We study disparities along the race variable in both the datasets. Note that the terminology of differences (in outcomes) between race-based groups is not meant to indicate fundamental differences between the groups, rather the differences are a result of systemic racism.

Evaluation setup and baselines. We simulate a survey using the pilot and main study setup in Section 3.4 for different ways of selecting the number of samples per group. We compare the proposed method with two baselines, (1) Equal: equal representation which takes equal number of samples for the two groups, and (2) Uniform: Uniform sampling which samples each individual with the same probability irrespective of their group (thus sampling each group proportional to its population size). Our proposed method uses the optimal sampling proportions given in Table 1. For example, for the difference in means metric, we sample in proportion to standard deviations in the pilot data, and name this Opt Diff. Similarly, Opt DER refers to the proposed method for the DER metric. We compute standard deviations as the square root of the sample variance as $\widehat{\sigma_i^2} = 1/n_i \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} (y_{i,j} - \widehat{Y}_i)^2$. Note that this is computed on the pilot sample.

Evaluation criterion. For each method, we compute the root mean squared error (RMSE) between the estimate and the *ground truth* disparity value. Lower value is better. That is, we report

[1] Code to replicate all the experiments is available at https://github.com/ChunaraLab/disparity-variation

[2] https://www.cdc.gov/brfss/index.html



(a) Approx. to asymptotic distribution (b) Relative efficiency for Difference (c) Relative efficiency for DER ($Y_1 = 2, Y_2 = 1$)

Figure 2: Synthetic data. (a) Comparing the empirical sampling distribution of the difference in means metric with the one given by the delta method. (b,c) Relative efficiency as a function of the standard deviations of groups. Plots show settings where we can expect large improvements in efficiency. That is, regions with values considerably less than 1 like when standard deviations differ between groups in off-diagonal regions of b and c. Since variance of DER depends on both standard deviation and means, we observe that plot c is not symmetric along the diagonal as the mean of group 1 is twice that of group 2.

$(\mathbb{E}[(d(\widehat{Y}) - d(Y))^2])^{1/2}$ where the expectation is taken over different draws of the sample from a fixed population. To estimate this expectation, we repeat the simulations 10,000 times and report the average squared error. Ground truth disparity $d(Y)$ is taken to be the disparity computed with the whole population's data. We set population size as $N = 100,000$ or all available survey data, whichever is smaller.

Relative efficiency. We can preemptively check how much improvement we can expect in the best case from the efficient allocation by comparing its asymptotic variance with that of other allocations. We define relative efficiency from using the efficient sampling proportions as the ratio of the asymptotic variance for the efficient and equal sampling proportions, similar to Blackwell et al. [5]. Given the asymptotic variance for the disparity metric d is written as $\sigma_d^2(p_1, p_2)$, we compute the relative efficiency as follows,

$$\text{Relative efficiency} := \frac{\sigma_d^2(p_1^*, p_2^*)}{\sigma_d^2(1/2, 1/2)} \leq 1. \tag{1}$$

A low value suggests better precision (lower variance) from sampling by efficient proportions. The value represents the fraction of data points that can be saved from sampling while keeping the same variance as equal sampling. In the experiments, we will instead report the ratio of mean squared error in estimates by efficient and equal sampling as it combines both bias and variance.

Results on synthetic data. Data is generated for two groups both of which have Normal-distributed outcomes. One group's outcome is noisier. Groups are equally represented (50-50 split) in the population. For groups $\{1, 2\}$, we generate data as $y_1 \sim \text{Normal}(200, 50)$ and $y_2 \sim \text{Normal}(280, 10)$. Therefore, the true difference in means is -80 and the DER is 0.0278. To test the approximation of the sampling distribution given by the delta method, we draw 100 populations each of size 10,000 and plot the empirical distribution of the difference in means metric in Figure 2a. We observe that the empirical distribution is close to the one given by the delta method. This supports our use of variance estimates from the delta method for computing the sample sizes.

Method	Difference in means RMSE	Difference in means Rel. eff. ↓ (x Equal)	DER RMSE	DER Rel. eff. ↓ (x Equal)
Equal	2.94	1.00	0.0017	1.00
Uniform	2.93	1.00	0.0017	1.00
Opt Diff	**2.53**	**0.74**	**0.0016**	**0.81**
Opt DER	2.57	0.77	**0.0016**	**0.82**

Table 2: Error for synthetic data. Root mean squared error for estimates of two disparity metrics improves by sampling using optimal allocation. For comparing the scale of RMSE, the true value of difference in means is -80 and DER is 0.0278. Relative efficiency is defined as ratio of MSEs of optimal and equal sampling proportions.

Table 2 shows the error in disparity estimates for the different sampling methods. Out of the total $N = 100,000$ units in the population, we observe outcomes for $n_{\text{pilot}} = 100$ units in the pilot study and $n_{\text{main}} = 500$ in the main study. We observe that using the optimal sampling proportions decreases the number of required samples by a factor of 0.74 for the difference in means metric and by 0.82 for the DER metric to achieve the same error as the Equal method.

Results on ACS survey. We query ACS data on annual income and race variable from the 2018 survey using the package `folktables` by Ding et al. [11].[3]. Our goal is to estimate income disparities between white and Black or African American population groups. As a convention, we take Y_2 as the outcome for Black or African American group when computing disparity metrics (such as $Y_2 - Y_1$). Figure 3 shows the disparity estimates obtained from a pilot of 200 samples and a main study of 500 samples. We observe that the mean of the estimates obtained by repeatedly sampling from the population are close to the true mean, showing unbiasedness for all the methods. Table 3 shows the RMSE of the estimates.

[3]https://github.com/socialfoundations/folktables



Figure 3: Income disparity from ACS data. Estimates of three disparity metrics obtained from the pilot-main study setup repeated 10,000 times. Dotted line represents the ground truth disparity. We observe that the estimates are unbiased.

Method	Difference in means RMSE	Difference in means Rel. eff. ↓ (x Equal)	DER RMSE	DER Rel. eff. ↓ (x Equal)
Equal	6326.83	1.00	**0.0342**	**1.00**
Uniform	6619.50	1.09	0.0412	1.46
Opt Diff (w. Pilot)	**6224.65**	**0.97**	0.0363	1.13
Opt DER (w. Pilot)	6246.04	0.97	0.0346	1.02
Opt Diff (Oracle)	6123.42	0.94	0.0349	1.04
Opt DER (Oracle)	6355.95	1.01	0.0343	1.01

Table 3: Error for ACS data. Root mean squared error for estimates of two disparity metrics. Relative efficiency is defined as ratio of MSEs of optimal and equal sampling proportions. For the difference in means metric, we observe that Opt Diff reduces error. Oracle refers to the proposed methods that use the true standard deviations and means instead of their approximations from the pilot data. We observe that the errors for Pilot and Oracle are comparable. Thus, we do not lose efficiency by much by using the approximate sampling proportions. For DER, the errors for Opt DER (both Pilot and Oracle) are similar to Equal.



Figure 4: BRFSS data. Relative efficiency, that is reduction in mean squared error relative to Equal, in estimating the DER metric for the outcome: age of diabetes diagnosis. Proposed methods improve upon Uniform for different sample sizes (with a constant pilot sample size of 500). Opt DER and Equal have similar errors (efficiency is close 1).

We observe that optimal sampling (for difference and DER metrics) has similar error to Equal. This is because the group-wise standard deviations and means are such that the sampling proportions for Opt DER converge to that of Equal (0.53 and 0.5 respectively). For Opt Diff, sampling proportion (0.65) differs from Equal. However the relative efficiency computed as (1) is 0.96. So we expect it to perform similar to Equal.

Results on BRFSS survey. We query BRFSS data from 2014 on the race variable and the age at which respondents were diagnosed with diabetes.[4] Our goal is to estimate disparities in diagnosis age between white and Black or African American population groups. We plot the reduction in estimation error achieved by the proposed method as compared to Equal in Figure 4. Both Opt DER and Equal perform similarly for different sample sizes. As in the ACS data, the standard deviations across groups are similar which explains the similar sampling proportions for the two methods.

[4]Available at https://www.kaggle.com/datasets/cdc/behavioral-risk-factor-surveillance-system.

Figure 6 in Appendix C shows that the disparity estimates from BRFSS data are unbiased.

5.2 Measuring fairness of a trained model

Evaluation setup. We consider the task of predicting income level of an individual from attributes related to their education, work, and demography recorded in the ACS data. Prediction target is binary (high vs low income binarized at the income threshold of 50, 000 USD). We randomly split the dataset into train (70%) and test (30%). We train a gradient boosting classification model on the train data and compute the fairness metric on test data. We evaluate fairness with respect to disparity in true positive rates, quantified using difference in means and DER metrics. A survey is conducted on the test data as done in Section 5.1 where we take 500 samples in the pilot and 2000 in the main study. We use the same evaluation metric as earlier, that is, RMSE in the fairness estimates.

Results. Table 4 reports the reduction in error for two fairness metrics. We again see that the proposed methods improve

Method	Difference in means RMSE	Difference in means Rel. eff. ↓ (x Equal)	DER RMSE	DER Rel. eff. ↓ (x Equal)
Equal	0.02	1.00	0.0030	1.00
Uniform	0.03	2.69	0.0053	3.17
Opt Diff	**0.02**	**0.99**	0.0030	0.98
Opt DER	**0.02**	**0.98**	**0.0029**	**0.96**

Table 4: Model fairness evaluation on ACS data. Root mean squared error in estimating fairness of a model for predicting income in ACS data. Fairness is defined as disparity in true positive rates across racial groups. Difference in means for the model is -0.16 biased against people racialized as Black or African American, DER is 0.0127. For both ways of quantifying fairness, we observe that the proposed sampling methods (Opt Diff, Opt DER) have lower error than Uniform sampling. However, the improvement is similar to using Equal proportions (efficiency is close to 1 for both methods).

on Uniform but perform similarly to Equal. Figure 8 in Appendix D shows that the proposed approach gives unbiased disparity estimates.

In summary, the empirical study shows that the effectiveness of the proposed sampling proportions in providing unbiased estimates of different disparity metrics and reducing the error in estimating them from finite samples. We observe that for the real survey datasets equal allocation of samples to the groups is a good heuristic to get low error. This happens because the groups have similar variance of outcomes. Similar observations on the success of equal allocation have been made in previous studies [9, 37]. However, the proposed methods can help in reducing error in the heteroskedastic case as seen in the synthetic data experiments.

6 DISCUSSION

We present an approach to collect data efficiently for the goal of measuring disparities across population groups. For a broad class of disparity measures, defined as arbitrary functions of group-level outcome averages, we propose a sampling approach that maximizes the precision of the disparity estimates. This is achieved by tuning the number of samples taken from each group such as the variance of the asymptotic sampling distribution of the estimates is minimum. The case studies on measuring health outcome disparities from survey datasets show the efficacy of the approach. The approach can also be used to evaluate fairness of any given learned model.

A limitation of the work is the narrow focus on disparities as any differences in outcomes without considering the causes of the difference such as social inequities [23]. For a more nuanced analysis of disparities, we may want to look at the differences that remain after adjusting for known risk factors (such as [21]). We ignore these more-involved statistical quantities to only consider differences without adjusting for any features. Further, we may prefer defining disparities using summary statistics other than group averages such as difference in median earnings between women and men as done while calculating gender pay gap. The delta method can still be used with median (or other quantiles) using the corresponding central limit theorem to get the asymptotic sampling distribution [14, Theorem 1.3.10]. Efficient estimation for such measures is an interesting research direction. Another limitation is the need to use up a part of the limited sample size to collect data for the pilot study. Instead we can use sequential sampling methods, such as [8]. We instantiate the approach only for disparities between two groups and leave the derivation of formulae for more groups as further work. Finally, a major assumption we take is that data is always measurable when requested and have no biases. That is, we assume there is no missingness in the outcomes or any systematic errors in the measurements for certain groups. Nonetheless, we hope that our work sheds light on the important problem of disparity estimation and motivates the development of approaches to collect better data in more challenging cases.

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A CODE AVAILABILITY

Code to replicate all the experiments is available at https://github.com/ChunaraLab/disparity-variation.

B VARIANCE FORMULAE FOR DIFFERENT DISPARITY METRICS

Disparity metric	$d(Y_1, Y_2; N_1, N_2)$	Variance σ_d^2
Difference in means	$Y_2 - Y_1$	$\frac{1}{n}\left(\frac{\sigma_1^2}{p_1} + \frac{\sigma_2^2}{p_2}\right)$
Between-group variance	$\sum_i (Y_i - \bar{Y})^2$	$\frac{1}{n}\left(\frac{\sigma_1^2 (Y_1 - Y_2)^2}{p_1} + \frac{\sigma_2^2 (-Y_1 + Y_2)^2}{1-p_1}\right)$
Deviation from equal representation (DER)	$\frac{k}{k-1}\sum_i \left(\frac{Y_i}{\sum_j Y_j} - \frac{1}{k}\right)^2$	$\frac{16}{n}\frac{(Y_2 - Y_1)^2}{(Y_1 + Y_2)^6}\left(\frac{Y_2^2 \sigma_1^2}{p_1} + \frac{Y_1^2 \sigma_2^2}{1-p_1}\right)$
Ratio of means	Y_2 / Y_1	$\frac{1}{n}\left(\frac{\sigma_2^2}{Y_1^2 \cdot (1-p_1)} + \frac{Y_2^2 \sigma_1^2}{Y_1^4 p_1}\right)$
Population-Attributable Risk (%)	$(Y_2 - Y_1)/Y_2 \times 100$	$\frac{100^2}{n}\left(\frac{\sigma_2^2}{Y_1^2 \cdot (1-p_1)} + \frac{Y_2^2 \sigma_1^2}{Y_1^4 p_1}\right)$
Overall average	$\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{k} N_i Y_i$	$\frac{1}{n \cdot N^2}\left(\frac{N_1^2 \sigma_1^2}{p_1} + \frac{N_2^2 \sigma_2^2}{1-p_1}\right)$

Table 5: Examples of disparity metrics and the variance of their asymptotic sampling distributions for stratified sampling. We consider only $k = 2$ groups. The i^{th} group's mean outcome is denoted by Y_i, group size by N_i, standard deviation by σ_i, and $N = \sum_i N_i$ is total size of population.

Table 5 has the formulae for the variance of asymptotic sampling distributions of a few of the disparity metrics from Table 1. These are derived using the delta method and the automated symbolic differentiation package named `sympy` in Python. The formulae for metrics such as Theil's index and Generalized entropy index are not included since they are long. They can be calculated using the included code.

C ADDITIONAL RESULTS FOR OUTCOME DISPARITY

C.1 Dataset details

In both ACS and BRFSS datasets, we restrict to survey responses where the outcome and the demographic group of each unit is observed. That is, we exclude rows with missing values in these two variables, which is a source of potential bias in the results. Each individual is assigned to only one group, that is a race variable category, in these datasets.

We use data from the New York state for ACS and from all available states for BRFSS. In both cases, we use the sample weights provided in the survey to compute weighted means and standard deviations. The outcome and race variables in ACS data are named `PINCP` and `RAC1P`, and in BRFSS are named `DIABAGE2` and `_RACE`.



Figure 5: Synthetic data. Error in estimates of three disparity metrics improves by sampling using optimal sampling allocations. Estimated allocations based on pilot data achieve similar error to using the true allocations (Oracle). Pilot study has 100 samples and main study has 500 samples.



Figure 6: Disparity in age at diabetes diagnosis from BRFSS data. Estimates of the three disparity metrics obtained in pilot and main study setup are unbiased. Both pilot and main study have 500 samples.



Figure 7: ACS data. Relative efficiency, that is reduction in mean squared error compared to Equal, in estimating the difference in means metric for income outcome. Opt Diff improves efficiency for different number of samples in the main study (with a constant sample size of 500 in the pilot).



Figure 8: Fairness evaluation of an income prediction model on ACS data. Estimates of the three disparity metrics obtained in the pilot and main study setup are unbiased. Pilot has 500 samples and main has 2000 samples.

D ADDITIONAL RESULTS FOR EVALUATING MODEL FAIRNESS

D.1 Data and model details

We use data from the New York state for predicting annual income from the features that are a part of the `ACSIncome` data source in the `folktables` package [11].[5] We do not use sample weights recorded in the ACS data for this experiment, thus, the fairness findings are limited to the population included in the survey. We binarize the annual income as high (vs low) income if it is greater than 50,000 USD.

We train a gradient boosting classifier with decision trees as weak learners and default hyperparameters for the model class named `GradientBoostingClassifier` in the `scikit-learn` package [33].

[5]https://github.com/socialfoundations/folktables



(a) Relative efficiency for difference in means metric

Figure 9: Relative efficiency of fairness evaluation on ACS data. Relative efficiency in fairness evaluation of a trained model in terms of Difference in true positive rates across white and Black or African American groups. Opt Diff improves efficiency for different number of samples in the main study (with a constant pilot sample size of 250).

Exploring the Effect of AI Assistance on Human Ethical Decisions

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1 MOTIVATION

Artificial intelligence (AI) has made remarkable progress in recent years, which has led to a proliferation of AI-based applications across a wide range of decision-making domains, including healthcare, finance, and transportation, among others. In many of these domains, AI is able to take over decision-making roles from humans.

However, the deployment of AI is not without its challenges, particularly in highly ethical domains where there are no clear-cut, right or wrong answers. In these cases, AI may often assume an advisory role, while the human remains the final decision-maker. For example, in the domain of healthcare, AI can assist in medical diagnosis by analyzing patient data and providing recommendations to doctors. However, the ultimate decision of treatment is made by the doctor, who must consider the patient's preferences, values, and individual circumstances. Similarly, in the financial domain, AI can assist in fraud detection and risk assessment, but it often cannot make the final decision, which might require human judgement.

Though AI may not always be the final decision maker in many ethical domains, its presence during the decision-making process can have major impacts on decisions made. While some may argue that AI should be completely removed from ethical decision-making domains, others have already started implementing their usage in real-world problems. Therefore, it is critical to better understand the mechanisms for how AI assistance shapes ethical human decision making, so that we can better adapt and regulate this usage.

2 CURRENT WORK

To this end, I have two works on understanding the effects of AI assistance on ethical human decision making. Each of these works analyzes a different possible implementation of AI assistance in ethical domains. In the first work, published at AIES 2022, I analyzed how human decision makers use AI predictions about the future when making their decisions [5]. In the second work, published at AIES 2023, I looked at the impacts of decision recommendations made by an similar and dissimilar AI assistants [4].

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https://doi.org/10.1145/3600211.3604750

2.1 Case Study: Kidney Allocation

In both works, we ran human subject experiments in the domain of Kidney Transplant Allocation. We picked this domain due to the significant amount of prior work done on describing the ethical factors governing this decision-making problem. In particular, the task formulation we presented to study participants were based on the formulation by [6], who list the following four categories of ethical principles for allocating scarce medical resources: (1) Promoting and rewarding social usefulness. (2) Treating people equally. (3) Favoring the worst-off. (4) Maximizing total benefits.

In our experiments, we designed a task setup where human participants were recruited to make kidney transplant allocation decisions, using the above ethical categories to make their decisions. Inspired by prior work on human ethical preference elicitation [1, 2], we created a simple interface which presented two kidney transplant candidates to the user. Each user was labeled with four values - their prior donor status, how long they have been waiting for a kidney, how severe their disease stage is, and their predicted odds of surviving post-transplant. These four factors correspond to the four ethical categories listed above, and have predefined ethical orderings (e.g. prior donors should be prioritized over non-donors).

2.2 Effect of AI Predictions

In our first work, we investigated the effects of one possible implementation of AI assistance - using the AI to make predictions about the future and presenting these predictions to the human decision maker. This is a common setup in many real-world, AI-assisted ethical decision making problems. However, there hasn't been any prior work done on understanding the impact of these predictions while eliciting human preferences. Instead, prior work has only focused on verifiable information [1, 2].

Research Questions: In this work, we aimed to answer two research questions. **RQ1:** How does the presence of predictive information affect ethical preferences? **RQ2:** How does the source of predictive information (e.g. human or AI) affect ethical preferences?

Methods: To answer these questions, we conducted two experiments on Amazon MTurk in the kidney transplant domain. We can then analyze the impact of AI predictions using the four factors described above, as the first three facrors describe verifiable information (Donor Status, Wait Time, Disease Stage), while the last describes a prediction (Survival Chance).

For our first experiment, we recruited 600 participants to make allocation decisions under two treatments. In the first treatment, we only presented the three verifiable factors, to act as a control for measuring human baseline ethical preferences. In the second treatment, we add the post-transplant survival prediction and measure its effect on the baseline values. We measured the impact of the prediction by separately analyzing three cases for the prediction

- when the prediction favors the higher value (aligned), when the prediction is equal across candidates (equal), and when prediction favors the lower value (misaligned).

In our second experiment, we recruited an additional 300 participants with two treatments. In both treatments, we presented the predictive factor to participants. However, users in the first treatment were told that the prediction was generated by a human doctor, while users in the second treatment were told that the prediction was generated by an AI model.

Results: Surprisingly, when predictions were equal across candidates, we found that ethical preferences were significantly impacted in two factors. We find that aligned predictions significantly increased ethical preferences while misaligned predictions significantly decreased ethical preferences. Finally, when considering the source of the prediction made, we find that users have a significantly higher alignment with AI predictions than doctor predictions, suggesting that decision-makers trust AI predictions more. More details on these results are available in the full paper [5].

2.3 Effect of AI Recommendations

In our second work, we investigated the effects of a different method of AI assistance - having the AI explicitly make recommendations on which decision to make in a problem. Specifically, we aim to understand how value similarity affects reliance on AI. While there have been other works which have analyzed the effect of value similarity on subjective trust measures [3], but we are the first to look at the effect on empirical reliance.

Research Questions: In this work, we answered two additional research questions. **RQ1:** Do humans rely more on AI with similar values? **RQ2:** Are humans affected by claims of value similarity?

Methods: To analyze the effect of AI recommendations in this setup, we revisited the kidney transplant domain, but replaced the predictive AI factor with a new category - an AI recommendation. We then ran a two-stage, two-treatment experiment on Amazon MTurk with 303 workers. In the first stage, we elicited participants' ethical preferences using just the three verifiable factors. We use these results to generate a preference ordering for each candidate. For example, if the ethical preference is highest for the Prior Donor factor and lowest for the Wait Time factor, their value ordering would be Prior Donor > Disease Stage > Wait Time.

We then generated an AI with its own value ordering. Users in the first treatment group were given an AI with an similar value ordering to themselves, and users in the second treatment group were given an AI with a dissimilar value ordering. We then presented the user with both their own empirical value ordering and the value ordering of an AI assistant. In both cases, we inform the user that the AI isn't perfectly deterministic, and sometimes makes decisions randomly rather than strictly according to its value ordering. In the second phase of the experiment, both treatment groups were asked to answer additional decision-making problems, this time, with the assistance of similar or dissimilar AI recommendations.

Using this experiment design, we measured the effect of value similarity on user reliance. This was calculated by taking scenarios in the second stage where the AI made a recommendation contrary to the human's prior preference.

To understand why any effect occurs, we compared the scenarios where the AI is deterministic and random to see if there was any difference in reliance. Any increase in reliance when the AI is random could only be caused by the user perception of value similarity, while reliance on a deterministic AI would be caused by both the user perception of similarity and actual effects of AI similarity.

Results: Overall, we found that the users had significantly higher reliance on similar AI. In addition, we found that this reliance only appeared when the similar AI acted deterministically. From this, we can conclude that the effect of similar AI reliance is not caused by the claim of similarity, but actual similar behavior. More details on these results are available in the full paper [4].

3 FUTURE WORK

Following up on these works, there are several research directions which I plan on further exploring for my thesis work.

AI Context: One natural question would be to ask how do our results change when we provide more context or explanations on the AI's assistance. For instance, if we provide an accuracy level or confidence bound for the predictive information, does this change the human preference towards the predictions? We could also explore how providing a justification for why the AI has a certain value ordering changes human reliance.

Additional Domains: Finally, it is important to understand if our results generalize to other ethical decision making domains domains. Both of our previous works have only looked at the kidney transplant domain, but there are many areas of ethical decision making which could use AI. In particular, one domain we plan on analyzing is AI assistance for transit route allocation. This is a natural area to explore, as transit network design is an problem with huge ethical implications, and there is the potential to significantly improve the usefulness of real-world systems. However, AI assistants are currently underutilized by transit agencies, due to the lack of requisite transit algorithms which can combine the elicited value preferences of diverse groups of stakeholders, including governments, transit agencies, and riders. We plan on collaborating with local transit agencies to design ethically-aware AI systems to assist planners with transit network design.

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Queering Futures

the design of an expanded mixed methods research framework integrating qualitative, quantitative, and practice-based modes

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ABSTRACT

Queering Futures with Data-Driven Speculation: the design of an expanded mixed methods research framework integrating qualitative, quantitative, and practice-based modes – is a Queer research journey. Expanding a mixed methods research framework is strange and different. The Queering Futures Framework (QFF) disregards the constraints of traditional mixed methods research conventions. After intersecting concurrent qualitative modes (exploration of impressions of futures) and quantitative modes (measures of attitudes towards AI), it wanders and stretches into an open creative practice-based mode. It is in the culminating creative practice-based mode that signals identified in the qualitative and the quantitative datasets are compared, scanned, probed, mined, and leveraged using a new futures method I call data-driven speculation.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Social and professional topics** → User characteristics; Cultural characteristics.

KEYWORDS

Queering futures, mental time travel, expanded mixed methods, data-driven speculation

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Are Model Explanations Useful in Practice? Rethinking How to Support Human-ML Interactions

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1 INTRODUCTION

Model explanations have been touted as crucial information to facilitate human-ML interactions in many real-world applications where end users make decisions informed by ML predictions. For example, explanations are thought to assist model developers in identifying when models rely on spurious artifacts [1] and to aid domain experts in determining whether to follow a model's prediction [4]. However, while numerous explainable AI (XAI) methods have been developed (e.g., LIME [12], SHAP [10]), XAI has yet to deliver on this promise. XAI methods are typically optimized for diverse but narrow technical objectives disconnected from their claimed use cases. To connect methods to concrete use cases, I argue that researchers need to rigorously evaluate how well proposed methods can help real users in their real-world applications [7].

Towards bridging this gap, I established collaborations with domain experts embedded in two real-world use cases that involve decision-making with ML models, e-commerce fraud detection and peer review paper matching, and worked closely with these experts to evaluate existing model explanations. These efforts shed light on the following insights:

- **Existing XAI methods are not useful for decision-making.** Presenting humans with popular, general-purpose XAI methods does not improve their performance on real-world use cases that motivated the development of these methods. Our negative findings align with those of contemporaneous works.
- **Rigorous, real-world evaluation is important but hard.** These findings were obtained through user studies that were time-consuming to conduct.

Each of these insights motivates a corresponding research direction in my doctoral thesis to better support human-ML interactions. First, beyond methods that attempt to explain the ML model itself, we should consider a wider range of approaches that present relevant task-specific information to human decision-makers; we refer to these approaches as human-centered ML (HCML) methods [5].

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Second, we need to create new workflows to evaluate proposed HCML methods that are both low-cost and informative of real-world performance. This extended abstract summarizes three pieces of work [6–8] that comprise my thesis research, along with multiple supporting works conducted with my close collaborators [3, 9, 11].

2 ARE MODEL EXPLANATIONS USEFUL IN PRACTICE?

I introduced a use-case-grounded workflow to evaluate explanation methods in practice—this means showing that they are 'useful,' i.e., that they can actually improve human-ML interactions in the real-world applications that they are motivated by [7]. This workflow contrasts with evaluation workflows of XAI methods in prior work, which relied on researcher-defined proxy metrics that may or may not be relevant to any downstream task. Our proposed three-step workflow is based on the general scientific method:

(1) *Define a concrete use case.* To do this, researchers may need to work closely with domain experts to define a task that reflects the practical use case of interest.
(2) *Select explanation methods for evaluation.* While selected methods might be comprised of popular XAI methods, the appropriate set of methods is to a large extent application-specific and should also include relevant non-explanation baselines.
(3) *Evaluate explanation methods against baselines.* While researchers should ultimately evaluate selected methods through a user study with real-world users, researchers may want to first conduct cheaper, noisier forms of evaluation to narrow down the set of methods in consideration.

I collaborated with experts from two domains (fraud detection and peer review paper matching) to instantiate this use-case-grounded workflow and evaluate existing XAI methods:



Figure 1: Evaluation of popular XAI methods in two domains: e-commerce fraud (left), where we conducted a user study with a real use case and users, and peer review paper matching (right), where we conducted a user study with a proxy task and users that we designed with a domain expert.

Case Study 1: Fraud Detection [3]. We partnered with researchers at Feedzai, a financial start-up, to assess whether providing model explanations improved the ability of fraud analysts to detect fraudulent e-commerce transactions. Given that we had access to real-world data (i.e., historical e-commerce transactions for which we had ground truth answers of whether the transaction was fraudulent) and real users (i.e., fraud analysts), we directly conducted a user study in this context. We compared analysts' average performance when shown different explanations to a baseline setting where they were only provided the model prediction. We ultimately found that none of the popular XAI methods we evaluated (LIME [12], SHAP [10], and Tree Interpreter [13]) resulted in any improvement in the analysts' decisions compared to the baseline setting (Figure 1, left). These evaluations also posed many logistical challenges because fraud analysts took time from their regular day-to-day work to periodically participate in our study.

Case Study 2: Peer Review Paper Matching [9]. We collaborated with an expert in peer review, Professor Nihar Shah, to investigate what information could help meta-reviewers of a conference better match submitted papers to suitable reviewers. Learning from our prior experience, we first conducted a user study using proxy tasks and users, which we worked with the domain expert to design. In this proxy setting, we found that providing explanations from popular XAI methods in fact led users to be more confident—*the majority of participants shown highlights from XAI methods believed the highlighted information was helpful*—yet, they made statistically worse decisions (Figure 1, right)!

3 RETHINKING HOW TO SUPPORT HUMAN-ML INTERACTIONS

Through these collaborations, I identified two important directions for future work, which I describe in more detail along with initial efforts in each direction.

3.1 Methodological Development

Our results suggest that explanations from popular, general-purpose XAI methods can both hurt decision-making while making users overconfident. These findings have also been observed in multiple contemporaneous works (e.g., [2, 4, 14]). Researchers, instead, need to consider developing human-centered ML (HCML) methods [5] tailored for each downstream use case. HCML methods are any approach that provides information about the particular use case and context that can inform human decisions.

Our contributions: In the peer review matching setting, we proposed an HCML method designed in tandem with a domain expert [9]. Notably, our method is not a model explanation approach, as it highlights information in the input data, specifically sentences and phrases that are similar in the submitted paper and the reviewer profile. Our method outperformed both a baseline where there was no explanation and the model explanation condition (Figure 1, right). Based on these positive results, we plan to move evaluations of our proposed method to more realistic peer review settings.

Further, I led an exploratory study to better understand how people interact with information provided by HCML methods as a first step towards a more systematic approach to devising task-specific HCML methods [8]. I found that HCML methods that provide strong signals of unreliability of the ML prediction improves decision outcomes and reduces overreliance on the ML model, particularly when it is incorrect. An example of such a method is showing example-based explanations with ground truth labels. In contrast, showing feature attributions, as many XAI methods do, disrupts natural intuitions about decision outcomes and leads to overreliance on ML predictions.

3.2 Novel Evaluation Paradigms

We need more efficient evaluation pipelines. While user studies conducted in a real-world use case and with real users are the ideal way to evaluate HCML methods, it is a time- and resource-consuming process (Figure 2, left). We highlight the need for more cost-effective evaluations that can be utilized to narrow down candidate HCML methods and still implicate the downstream use case. One option is to work with domain experts to design a proxy task, as we did in the peer review setting, but even these studies require careful consideration of the generalizability to the real-world use case.



Figure 2: An overview of how simulated user studies (SimEvals) can help a researcher select which explanation methods to evaluate given their specific use case. (Left) When conducting user studies, researchers often select HCML methods in an ad-hoc manner. (Right) We propose using SimEvals, which are use-case-grounded, algorithmic evaluations, to efficiently screen HCML methods before running a user study.

Our contributions. I introduced an algorithmic-based evaluation called simulated user evaluation (SimEvals) [6]. Instead of conducting studies on proxy tasks, researchers can train SimEvals, which are ML models that serve as human proxies. SimEvals more faithfully reflects aspects of real-world evaluation because their training and evaluation data are instantiated on the same data and task considered in real-world studies. To train SimEvals, the researcher first needs to generate a dataset of observation-label pairs. The observation corresponds to the information that would be presented in a user study (and critically includes the HCML method), while the output is the ground truth label for the use case of interest. For example, in the fraud detection setting, the observation would consist of both the e-commerce transaction and ML model score along with the explanation. The ground truth label is whether the transaction was fraudulent. SimEvals are trained to predict a label given an observation and their test set accuracies can be interpreted as a measure of whether the information contained in the observation is predictive for the use case.

I not only evaluated SimEvals on a variety of proxy tasks but also tested SimEvals in practice by working with Feedzai, where we

found results that corroborate the negative findings from the user study [11]. Although SimEvals should not replace user studies because SimEvals are not designed to mimic human decision-making, these results suggest that SimEvals could be initially used to identify more promising explanations (Figure 2, right).

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The ELIZA Defect

Constructing the Right Users for Generative AI

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ABSTRACT

Artificial intelligence (AI) is at the center of debates on what kind of future we want and how to bring it about. But AI ethics is not only a technical risk assessment and accounting effort, or an application of general principles to stable artifacts. It is also a social self-diagnosis, a contested and contestable assertion of values and desirable futures, and a selective understanding of the nature of AI in its different forms. In expressions of concern and efforts at preparation for increasingly powerful AI tools, we can trace the ways we imagine ourselves and our society to be compatible with AI's promises and susceptible to its dangers. The problems we notice, and the solutions we offer, arise from the interaction of these imagined elements.

The socially embedded efficacy of AI tools leads many commentators to imagine their risks specifically in conjunction with understandings of society as it currently is and imaginations of how it can and should exist in the future [1]. The sense-making moves performed in the wake of developments in generative AI are thus a site to examine the movement and uses of different concepts brought together in this domain: the human, rationality, and the place of expertise. As these sense-making efforts are carried out, they become constraints on how the risks of generative AI can be noticed and understood.

The problems raised by generative AI are so fundamentally tied to its performance as a simulator of human interpersonal acts that we should ask: where is the risk of generative AI located, such that the utility and the safety of the tools can be preserved after troubling cases? Boundaries between malicious deception and magnificent design are unclear without an answer to this question. Thus, to fit generative AI into our world, we are trying to answer it; this is one goal of efforts at regulation which seeks to allow the benefits of imitation to arrive while avoiding the harms of deception. In the current regulation, reporting, and corporate responses to generative AI, the challenge of safely introducing generative AI is being approached in large part as a challenge of producing the right kind of knowledge in its users.

Below is a summary of my findings from three cases, chosen to investigate the following question: What ways, or whose ways, of using, knowing, and understanding generative AI are being offered as appropriate? I examine the EU AI Act language reflecting disclosure requirements for interactions with generative AI, responses to a chatbot-facilitated suicide in Belgium, and reactions to expert claims of a chatbot's sentience. In the first two cases, AI-generated content is problematic insofar as users are uninformed about its provenance or maliciously deceived by it, while users who know they are interacting with AI but behave problematically are designated as deluded or irrational. In the third case, a Google engineer who presents evidence to support claims that AI is sentient is censured as nationwide reporting denounces his claim against an expert consensus from which he is ejected. In all three cases, challenges facing widespread generative AI development and use are avoided by attending to the knowledge and understanding of those who use them rather than the functioning of the tools themselves.

The EU AI Act is illuminating as a general and authoritative account of how AI interactions can be made safe, requiring first and foremost that users are informed. [2, 3] The AI Act is useful in the present paper as it shows the effort to match and reconcile a new technology with an extant set of values, chief among which is autonomy. Its reliance on disclosure reflects a general sense that harms are acceptable or unacceptable not on the basis of outcomes but based on the degree of autonomy possessed by the actors in question. Rational actors in a simulated environment are responsible for the effects of the simulation, so long as they are informed of the nature of that environment and have essentially consented to consume deceptive or false content. The other two cases I examine explore this very issue, of problematic understandings and behavior on the part of knowing users.

The first of these is the case of the Belgian man. After his suicide responses from the company which provided the chatbot, media [4, 5, 6] and government [5], and prominent expert AI ethics commentary [7] characterized it as arising because the user was vulnerable and consequently did not relate to the bot in the right way. While the chatbot's emotionally charged language was seen as a part of the problem, in the reporting on this event the unanimous emphasis on the man's mental state presents the risk as arising in an interaction, in a pathological mistake of the user, rather than in the tool.

Locating risk is a necessary and immensely powerful, if often unexamined step which precedes intervention in a worrisome state of affairs: where we locate risk is where we intervene. If the risk accompanying generative AI is located in the minds of uninformed or misapprehending users, disclosures and disclaimers are indeed sensible interventions. In this conception, when knowledge fails to protect the user, it is not a failed safeguard but a bad user. Problematizing user understandings in this way provides an exonerating resource for the companies providing these tools and suggests the rectitude of expert authority on the nature of these tools, by linking delays and dangers in generative AI to users who do not abide by the (strategically underdetermined) expert consensus on generative AI's accuracy, capabilities, and nature.

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My third case examines how the expert consensus around generative AI is maintained through the story of Blake Lemoine, who publicly announced his belief that Google's LaMDA model had become sentient and was presented by major media outlets and experts as deluded [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. In the media and corporate response to Lemoine, wherein Google questioned his sanity before firing him [13], we see his ejection from the community of experts permitted to call for greater scrutiny based on qualitative changes in the nature of these models. He becomes a layperson on account of his anthropomorphizing error. In this act of boundary work [14], policing who is in the body of experts qualified to decide on the sentience of the chatbot, and the nature of AI models in general, we must notice how small this group truly is and what Lemoine's ejection preserves. If safeguards like those Lemoine called for should follow on the kind of change he claimed to detect, and those outside Google's leadership could determine when such changes have arrived, Google would cease to lead the conversation on regulation by defining the nature of its technology. This state of affairs leaves the right relations with generative AI underdetermined but maintains that positions which challenge the expert consensus are the result of misunderstandings so significant as to disqualify the concerned party's thoughts on the matter from rational consideration. In the three cases examined here, events and concerns which threaten to depict generative AI as in need of significant scrutiny or changes are defused not by intervening in the company's technology, but by delineating between user understandings which are empowered and exploitative, safe and vulnerable, rational and deluded.

Named after an early chatbot, the ELIZA effect refers to the readiness with which users anthropomorphize computer systems [15]. Reporting on both Lemoine [11] and the Belgian man cited this effect [6]. The chatbot which encouraged the Belgian man to commit suicide was named Eliza. One way of summarizing the change I trace in the cases described above is a transition away from the Turing test and towards the ELIZA effect as the conceptual frame for AI which imitates humans. While the Turing test implies the layperson's relevance to the discussion and regulation of AI, the ELIZA effect implies their irrelevance.

This project will continue as an effort to follow popular, expert, and regulatory perceptions of the risk of generative AI as the tools themselves and the public concern surrounding them continue to develop. The resources of science and technology studies (STS) enable crucial perspectives on numerous ways of thinking about AI and the challenges of its development and regulation such as the common citations of law lag, invocations of self-regulation in the mode of the Asilomar Conference on rDNA, collective action problem framings, and more. The STS literature on sociotechnical imaginaries [1] and public understandings of science [16] contribute to the present insight as to how the efforts of tech-society reconciliation and risk-benefit balancing presented as appropriate for AI reveal and produce our understandings of the technology, even as they reproduce and reshape social norms. There is an urgent need for work which extends this powerful scholarly tradition for understanding science, technology, and society to AI, as one of the most important and concerning technological developments of our moment.

KEYWORDS

science and technology studies, generative AI, public understanding of science, expertise, chatbots

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Governing Silicon Valley and Shenzhen: Assessing a New Era of Artificial Intelligence Governance in the US and China

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ABSTRACT

The United States and China are both striving to be the world leader in AI, with conflicting visions. However, the intensifying "clash of civilizations" narrative ignores factors integral to each country's AI strategy. This project uses a philosophy-grounded framework and natural language processing (NLP) methods to analyze *what* policy differences exist and *why* they exist. It examines new developments and argues that while obstacles to cooperation still exist, ethical convergences offer hope.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Social and professional topics → Governmental regulations**.

KEYWORDS

artificial intelligence, governance, United States, China, geopolitics

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1 INTRODUCTION

The past few years, even before the rise of Large Language Models (LLMs), artificial intelligence (AI) governance has been receiving more attention worldwide. The sudden releases of ChatGPT and other LLMs have sparked fascination, fear, and calls for domestic and global regulation. This has spurred domestic regulatory initiatives in the two AI powerhouses, the United States (US) and China, but geopolitical tensions seem to stand in the way of global action.

In my previous research published in 2022 [5], I compared AI governance in the US and China and their underlying philosophies with an eye towards identifying convergences, but new developments make an update necessary. This research will examine recent governmental AI governance efforts in the US and China, building on the philosophical framework I established. It will consider the current complex geopolitical dynamics spurring competition and examine if any of the previously identified factors that might aid cooperation are still valid.

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Recently, the US has focused on voluntary frameworks but is moving towards concrete legislation, while China has been actively legislating and releasing new ethics documents. Amidst these regulatory developments, relations between the two have deteriorated. Tensions around China's relations with Taiwan and Russia [3], as well as US sanctions on China's semiconductor industry [16] and concerns over alleged surveillance by TikTok [7] and the infamous "spy balloon" [3], have strained diplomatic relations and intensified competitive rhetoric [3], including around AI. Meanwhile, LLMs have been a Sputnik moment for development and regulation. This work examines the question of how recent progress in AI governance in the US and China has altered their development trajectories and affected prospects for cooperation. My previous work identified bases for dialogue emerging from the philosophical groundings of each country's approach, which have not changed. I argue that, while there has been some evolution in approach, the fundamental drivers of each country remain the same, leaving hope for development and regulatory cooperation even amidst growing tensions. This work contextualizes developments in a broader narrative to ground its conclusions beyond this competitive moment.

2 PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

Most of the work accomplished so far is qualitative and comparative analysis of the US and China's new AI documents, although I have conducted quantitative analysis of China's AI ethics principles documents. In this section, I will outline my preliminary findings.

2.1 US

The US's AI approach includes elements of American exceptionalism and the Protestant Ethic, discouraging regulation in favor of maximizing innovation [5]. Indeed, the Biden administration has focused primarily on voluntary frameworks. In January of 2023, the National Artificial Intelligence Research Resource (NAIRR) Task Force released its Final Report on creating a national AI research infrastructure [11] and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) released its AI Risk Management Framework (AI RMF) [12]. These are meant to complement the Biden administration's flagship release, the Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights ("the Blueprint") [17]. These are a shift in focus from the Trump administration, which emphasized innovation above all else. They lean into the Obama-era themes of diversity and fundamental rights; the Blueprint is especially promising in its focus on community-oriented equity [6]. However, they are not yet a shift in approach. The Blueprint is unenforceable, the AI RMF is voluntary, and there is no guarantee that the NAIRR plan will be implemented.

There are signs that the US is willing to implement concrete regulation. There has been tangible action supporting AI research

and development (R&D), such as by creating seven new National AI Research Institutes [1]. Some of these measures have also intensified competition with China, like the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, which provides $52.7 billion to support the American semiconductor industry and restricts production in China [13]. Notably, Senator Chuck Schumer is launching a domestic-facing legislative effort to "get ahead of" AI and ensure that AI supports "American values" [14] which, if well-defined, could help guide effective legislation.

The success of US companies with LLMs could be seen as a triumph of the hands-off regulatory approach, but may have overreached by showing that relying on self-regulation threatens the administration's vision of diversity and equity in AI. Thus, the US's Protestant Ethic in AI is evolving. It still celebrates innovators, but requires them to support social progress. American exceptionalism remains in the continued faith in innovators and competition with China. However, a shift in focus from external-facing, "offensive" action to internal action may help decrease tensions.

2.2 China

In my previous work, I discussed how China was conducting its AI development using the "fragmented authoritarianism" model where provinces, following central guidance, individually implement AI plans. This model allows the most effective approaches to bubble to the top [5]. Now, the central government is taking direct action through laws like the 2021 Internet Information Service Algorithm Recommendation Management Regulations [9], the 2022 Provisions on the Administration of Deep Synthesis Internet Information Services [10], and the 2023 draft Measures on the Administration of Generative Artificial Intelligence Services [2].

These new laws have come with a change in funding models from primarily issuing research grants to supporting government-supported labs in existing science and technology (S&T) hubs [4]. S&T R&D funding has increased from 2.1% of GDP to over 2.5% [8], but if it is going primarily to wealthy areas, small provinces already struggling to achieve their lofty goals risk being left behind [5].

Although funding and regulations have changed, the government's underlying goals have not. My previous work showed how China's government is cautious about innovation for fear of provoking social instability (reflecting a Confucian obligation to maintain harmony); new regulations exemplify this hesitancy. For instance, requirements that generative AI systems be "true and accurate," do not infringe on intellectual property rights, and follow "Socialist Core Values" may preclude their widespread deployment [15]. New regulations may sustain social harmony at a cost to innovation (a trade-off the US may now have to make), showing a continued commitment to Confucian harmony that could discourage broader, destabilizing conflict.

China has also been active in AI ethics, releasing several new ethics documents on top of existing principle-sets. Preliminary quantitative analysis reveals that China's newer AI ethics documents focus less on environmental sustainability and artificial general intelligence (AGI) while emphasizing ethical pluralism and taking a greater role in global AI governance, which could set up either cooperation or conflict with other AI powers, depending on how they respond. However, high-level convergences between Chinese and international AI ethics principles may be a way to promote dialogue. Despite major philosophical differences and uses of AI that must be condemned, this could be a way to lower tensions and even move towards international regulation.

3 CONCLUSION

In the coming weeks, I will finalize my qualitative analysis and conduct quantitative analysis to provide evidence for my conclusions and uncover other insights. I will also survey China's smaller provinces to see how their AI efforts are faring. My innovative mixed-methods approach grounds analytical conclusions in quantitative textual evidence and allows us to see beyond snapshots in time that may distort the reality of the situation.

This project will further our understanding of how the two powerhouses' AI development is progressing. We must look beyond the current competitive moment and contextualize AI visions in terms of a country's underlying philosophy of science. This is necessary to, at minimum, avoid conflict, but ideally to promote developmental and regulatory cooperation based on overlooked shared ground.

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Safety Issues in Conversational Systems

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ABSTRACT

This paper addresses two critical safety issues in conversational systems and methods to mitigate these problems. In section 1, I will discuss the problems faced by online conversational systems due to the actions of malicious users. It will particularly focus on the cyberpredator problem, which often targets vulnerable individuals, especially young children. In this section, I will review existing models to detect such predators, including my previous work, and present the results. In section 2, I will discuss safety issues related to conversational agents based on the Large Language Models. I highlight the limitations of existing works in assessing the safety of the models and propose a research topic that I plan to undertake to address them.

KEYWORDS

Conversational Systems, Safety Issues, Automatic Testing

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1 CYBERPREDATOR DETECTION

The advent of the internet has had a profound impact on the way we access information and interact with one another. Social Networking Sites (SNS) have become a ubiquitous part of modern life, providing people with a platform to share their lives, build and maintain relationships, and engage with others online [12]. While these services offer many benefits to users, they also present significant safety concerns, particularly in regards to cyberpredators. Cyberpredators are individuals who use the internet to harm or exploit others, particularly vulnerable individuals such as children. According to a study by [8], one in nine teens have received unwanted online solicitations, highlighting the serious risk that cyberpredators pose to children. As such, there is a need to develop effective methods for detecting and preventing cyber crimes.

To this end, several studies have focused on developing automated systems for detecting cyberpredators in online conversations [2, 6, 7]. While traditional machine learning techniques such as Support Vector Machines have been used in previous studies, these approaches have limitations in capturing the meaning of the text and require explicit feature sets. In response to these challenges, I proposed a novel approach that utilizes deep learning techniques to detect cyberpredators in online conversations [7].

My proposed model consists of two stages: *Message Labeling* and *Conversation Classification*. Figure 1 shows the overall architecture of the detection model. *Message Labeling* is an LSTM-based model that analyzes the context utterances to classify the intent of the target utterance based on its potential relevance to threats. Similarly, *Conversation Classification* is an LSTM-based model that takes the label sequence from the previous stage as input and identifies inappropriate conversations. By leveraging the power of deep learning, the model can capture the complex relationships between utterances and better understand the meaning of the text.

Compared to existing methods, the proposed approach has demonstrated superior performance in detecting inappropriate online conversations (F1 0.91). This result implies that we can develop more effective and efficient systems for detecting cyber predators by leveraging the power of deep learning techniques, which can reduce the risk of harm to vulnerable individuals.

2 SAFETY IN CONVERSATIONAL AI SYSTEM

Large Language models(LLMs) have emerged as powerful tools capable of exhibiting human-like behavior due to their training on extensive public data. Based on these models, they can effectively engage in conversational interactions with humans and provide conversational services to the users, as demonstrated by the remarkable performance of ChatGPT. However, as their use becomes more widespread, concerns related to safety have been raised [3, 17].

One of the critical issues for LLMs is their training on large amounts of public data sets, which can contain private, toxic, and biased information. As a result, the behavior of the models can be inappropriate and potentially harmful to users. To mitigate this risk, it is important to evaluate if LLMs behave correctly before their deployment. Most recent studies of conversational agents hugely rely on human evaluation for the safety of models [9, 14], which is time-consuming and costly, and may also produce biased results depending on the subjectivity of the evaluators. Several studies have attempted to assess the safety of LLMs quantitatively through various methods. One popular approach is prompt-based methods [4, 15]. These methods provide prompts to the models and check the scores of completed sentences from the models, such as toxicity scores or perplexity. Another strategy involves utilizing question-and-answer datasets, examining the responses of the model across different groups, and detecting potential biases in the model [5, 13].

Although these methods are widely used for evaluating conversational agents, they possess limitations due to the distinct characteristics of the LLMs and conversational models. They often fail to consider the context in which the text is used, leading to inaccurate assessments of toxicity [11]. As described in [11], a sentence

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

Figure 1: Overview of Cyberpredator Detection Model [7]



Figure 2: An Example of ChatGPT's Misprediction of a Non-Toxic Utterance.

like "They should be killed." may be identified as toxic unless it is interpreted in its proper context. However, if the previous utterance was "I launched experiments with a bug in them.", this sentence should not be detected as toxic. Figure 2 shows a result of the aforementioned case from the ChatGPT API, which includes a warning about the potential toxicity of the statement. This result highlights the need for additional research on models for detecting toxic conversations that take into account the context of the conversation. Additionally, many studies have demonstrated that labels assigned by the automatic methods are flipped when they are considered with their context information [1, 10, 16]. Therefore, developing context-aware evaluation methods is crucial for accurately assessing and mitigating the potential risks associated with toxic conversations in conversational models.

My recent research aimed to evaluate the robustness of task-oriented conversational agents and proposed a novel model to reduce the need for extensive human engagement while effectively identifying bugs in systems compared to existing methods. Building upon this work, I plan to investigate methods that can quantitatively assess the safety of conversational agents, which align with human judgments by considering the context. Developing precise quantitative metrics for evaluating models can reduce the need for extensive manual resources and ensure that models are thoroughly assessed before being deployed. In addition, investigating methods that improve the safety of conversational agents based on the assessment results can further contribute to creating a safer and healthier environment for the use of the systems.

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The Role of Governance in Bridging AI Responsibility Gaps

An interdisciplinary evaluation of emerging AI governance measures

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ABSTRACT

The ubiquitous use of AI in a wide range of domain areas, including health, finance, social media, and many others, along with the well-publicised harms and concerns around the use of these systems, has generated questions around who is responsible, in the normative sense, for the outcomes of increasingly autonomous systems. Scholars within the interdisciplinary field of AI Ethics have noted that AI poses challenges to the attribution of moral and legal responsibility, due to the diminished knowledge and control of individual actors involved in bringing about system outcomes, and the existence of "many hands"- or a diffuse network of individuals and collectives who could potentially be responsible [6]. In my research, I draw from conceptual approaches in philosophy, examples from the history of technology, and domain-specific qualitative case studies to examine the extent to which AI presents new challenges to responsibility attribution. In addition, my research evaluates the effectiveness of emerging organisational and regulatory governance measures in meeting the challenges posed by apparent responsibility gaps.

KEYWORDS

AI Governance, Responsibility, History of Technology, Political Economy of AI, Applied Ethics

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1 INTRODUCTION

With the rapid adoption of AI in both the private and public sector, many consequential decisions, like where someone works, how much money they make, or whether they are arrested, are either assisted or wholly made by AI systems. Within these sociotechnical systems, the boundaries between human and machine actions are increasingly blurred. When a harmful outcome results from the use of AI systems, the systems themselves cannot be held responsible, and the role of individual actors (such as developers or users) in bringing about the outcome is not always clear. This phenomenon risks generating "responsibility gaps" – or outcomes for which society continues to bear the cost, but no one is ultimately held responsible [3, 14, 16, 19]. While there is an established debate among philosophers over whether this gap is a matter of perception or reality, my research does not wade further into that debate. Instead, I use the concept of responsibility gaps as a means of illustrating the complex social governance challenge generated by the increasing ambiguity around the appropriate allocation of responsibility for the outcomes of AI systems.

Although "responsibility" is often treated as a catch-all term, there are in fact many different types of responsibility, including moral, causal, legal, professional, and organizational responsibility. Moral responsibility is concerned with the actions that make an agent blameworthy, praiseworthy, or answerable to others [22, 23]. Causal responsibility seeks to retrace the causal chain leading to a given outcome, and attribute its origin to one or many direct or indirect causal agents [22]. Legal responsibility is concerned with the way that the law holds agents liable for their actions [8, 22]. Professional responsibility is about the duties to the public, clients and other stakeholders that members of a profession have [4, 10], typically articulated through documents such as a code of ethics or code of conduct. And organizational responsibility is concerned with the collective duties and standards of an organization with respect to its employees and society at large [2].

Furthermore, the moral responsibility literature distinguishes between the concepts of attributability, answerability, and accountability [5, 21], where assigning/attributing responsibility to an agent involves merely identifying the part(ies) who are responsible, due to prevailing norms and expectations, answerability involves providing a justification or response for an outcome, and accountability requires a further normative judgment of holding someone to bear the moral or legal weight for a given outcome (such as requiring the payment of punitive damages).

My research focuses on the role of governance in allocating proactive duties and obligations to human and organisational actors, roles, and offices, to determine who will answer for AI-related harms, and how. Drawing from interdisciplinary methods and approaches, I aim to answer the following specific research questions: (1) How can conceptual approaches in philosophy (related to responsibility) inform our understanding of the novel governance challenges posed by AI? (2) How can examining the policy lifecycle of past governance efforts (in response to new technologies) enable us to evaluate proposed AI governance approaches? (3) How have organizational/professional responsibility cultures shaped the emergence of informal governance measures in different domain areas?

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2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMING

My research draws from a relational view of responsibility [3], in which responsibility practices involve the actions taken by algorithmic agents (or those bringing about a given outcome) to respond to the needs of algorithmic patients (or those affected by the outcome). Using this framing, the consistent relational practice of responsibility involves ensuring that the concerns of those affected by algorithmic outcomes effectively feed into the process of improving algorithmic systems at scale.

Despite the existence of many "responsible AI" initiatives in the private sector and academia, the technical and organisational tools generated through these initiatives cannot, on their own, facilitate the relational practice of responsibility, or bridge apparent responsibility gaps. While tools such as model cards [13], datasheets [9], and advances in fairness and explainability, represent an important first step in identifying and mitigating algorithmic harms, their practical usefulness is limited by a number of factors. For one, not all harms can be addressed by design fixes. For example, if entire products are based on pseudoscientific claims, or intentionally false claims, technical toolkits cannot do much to address this problem. Additionally, even if a technical toolkit is used to discover negative downstream impacts, it is up to the individual company/institution building the system to decide that the issue is important enough to merit design fixes.

These limitations suggest the need for regulatory governance and professional norms that enable affected parties to easily surface harmful outcomes, and incentivise actors/institutions designing, deploying, and using algorithmic systems to proactively address harms and provide remedies to those affected. In my work so far, I have examined how the design of proposed governance mechanisms like algorithmic registers [25], algorithmic audits [7, 17], and impact assessments [12, 20], can benefit from the lens of relational responsibility discussed in the context of responsibility gaps.

3 HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Although the responsibility gap is typically used to describe a *novel* challenge generated by the introduction of AI systems, a closer look at the history of technology governance shows that newer technologies have long generated challenges related to diminished knowledge and control over technological outcomes, and issues allocating responsibility across many hands.

My research thus far has used the method of structured, focused comparison [1] to compare government responses to a wide range of new innovations, including steamboats and therapeutic drugs. In doing so, I aim to understand (1) whether past policy efforts can provide any lessons when designing governance measures to meet our current challenges and (2) how AI generates potentially novel responsibility challenges, due to unique factors such as the complex supply chain of AI design, development, and deployment [6, 24], the distorted information environment generated by the AI hype cycle [18], and an increasing emphasis on individualized/personalized outcomes.

4 EMPIRICAL CASE STUDIES

The final phase of my research project uses domain-specific case studies to understand the dynamics of organisational governance emerging in response to advances in AI. In my current work, I am focusing on the healthcare sector, and I am using qualitative research methods to study the deliberative processes of professional working groups of clinicians (in the US and UK) tasked with setting best practice standards around clinical AI use in their specialty area. In addition to this healthcare study, I plan to conduct similar studies in other domain areas, such as finance, to understand the extent to which specific professional cultures influence the organisational governance norms that emerge in response to AI.

5 CONCLUSION

Many scholars within philosophy, law, and policy have considered the challenges to responsibility attribution generated by the widespread use of AI systems. My research contributes to this existing body of literature by reconceiving of the responsibility gap as a complex social governance task, and using interdisciplinary approaches to examine the extent to which proposed regulatory governance measures and emerging organisational governance approaches enable the consistent practice of relational responsibility. In doing so, I hope to generate insights that can aid both the design of AI systems and the standards/regulations governing them.

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Advancing Health Equity with Machine Learning

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ABSTRACT

Social privilege in terms of power, wealth, and prestige is the driver of avoidable health inequities. But today, machine learning systems in healthcare are largely focused on data and systems within hospitals and clinics, ignoring the factors that lead to health disparities across communities. The primary goal of my research is to understand the drivers of population health inequity and design fair and equitable machine learning systems for mitigating health disparities. In order to do this, I mainly focus on causal inference and machine learning methods using data from multiple environments, such as geographical locations and hospitals, to identify and address inequities in health and healthcare.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Applied computing** → **Sociology**; • **Computing methodologies** → **Machine learning**.

KEYWORDS

fairness; health disparities; health equity; causal inference

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When developing predictive models in healthcare using machine learning to predict a patient's health outcome, it is imperative to unpack the different factors that affect the health of the patient. These factors often include the different resources available to the patient, such as healthy food resources or access to care; and often, these factors are not measured in the hospital or clinic and, therefore, are difficult to account for when developing the predictive model. For example, consider a machine-learning model for predicting cardiovascular risk. Smoking is one of the prominent risk factors for cardiovascular risk, and even accounting for the smoking behavior of the patient in the predictive model can provide a better estimate of the risk. But the problem is further complicated by factors like occupational hazards, income, and education of the patient. Poorer work conditions can influence smoking behaviors, in essence increasing the cardiovascular risk. However, there is little information available while developing the predictive model about the work conditions that drive such behaviors. Therefore, to better understand the mechanism which governs certain risk factors, it's important to look beyond clinical data to mitigate health disparities, as often lower socioeconomic neighborhoods are worse affected by disease burden [1]. The public and population health lens provides an opportunity to thus understand and account for these different factors that influence the health of individuals [6]. Moreover, this is one of the pertinent ways to think about how to improve health disparities; for example, does increasing healthier food options in a neighborhood reduce cardiovascular risk? In lieu of this, I have primarily focused on designing fair and equitable machine learning algorithms that do not perpetuate existing disparities while also developing approaches to understanding the different mechanisms that lead to health disparities.

My work to date in this area has included: i) developing equitable machine learning models that are robust to distribution shifts across the population and do not specifically harm underrepresented racial and ethnic groups [5, 11], ii) assessing if mortality prediction models are generalizable across multiple environments such as different hospitals and geographical locations and understanding the role of sensitive attributes such as "self-reported race" in limiting the generalizability [10], iii) identifying the challenges with adopting algorithmic fairness approaches in population and public health [7], iv) and developing an algorithmic fairness approach that accounts for systemic bias, to mitigate health inequities [4]. Overall, my research is motivated by challenges in population and public health to advance health equity.

1. Equitable machine learning under distribution shift

Work on robust machine learning systems under distribution shift has not considered how equitable and fair the models remain under distribution shift [8, 13]. In order to incorporate the differences produced by different environments, I have worked on multi-environment learning involving multiple data sources representing different population subgroups. Since there can be considerable differences in population distributions across environments, for example higher proportion of adult males in a veteran hospital vs. higher proportion of females in a maternity clinic, it is pertinent to understand under what scenarios models can be transferred across environments. For example, will a model trained on the veteran hospital data to predict cardiovascular disease risk do well in the maternity clinic when there already are differences in the risk of cardiovascular diseases across gender [12]? Such transfer of models is especially useful when training models in a new environment is challenging, as obtaining labels could be expensive or time-consuming. As data is often specific to the environment from which it is sourced I have developed multi-level models for predicting disease incidence, while accounting for the factors that are common across the population such as high-fat diet as a risk

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factor for both males and females as well as factors specific to a group, for example higher risk of cardiovascular disease in males [5]. However, along with improving model performance in new environments, it is vital to ensure that any unfairness due to the under-representation of certain population subgroups is mitigated to prevent biased predictions in the new environment. To address this, I have worked on developing models that are robust to population differences and are fair across population subgroups [11].

2. Generalizability of mortality prediction models across geographical locations

I have also investigated if mortality prediction models trained on widely used multi-hospital healthcare data [9] are generalizable and fair across hospitals and geographical regions to identify when re-training is necessary [10]. Using causal discovery algorithms, we found that relationships between clinical variables and mortality outcomes differed across hospitals and regions. Thus, models trained in one hospital could fail when transferred to another which is a major challenge when developing standardized healthcare systems for multiple regions.

3. Algorithmic fairness and health equity

While working at the intersection of health disparities and algorithmic fairness, I have concentrated on drawing parallels between health equity and algorithmic fairness. Accordingly, I have elicited the challenges with using machine learning models in public and population health, such as privacy concerns, measuring and integrating social determinants of health, i.e., factors resultant of several social phenomena such as education and employment policies, and healthcare infrastructure [7]. These social factors often result in health disparities and inequities across populations, and machine learning models trained on this social data can exacerbate the disparities. In accordance with this, I have proposed an algorithmic fairness approach that accounts for the multiple sources of health inequity using path-specific counterfactual fairness [4].

PLANNED WORK

While machine learning systems in health have largely concentrated on data within hospitals, my desire in understanding how social factors influence health shapes my interest in projects that account for these social factors in addressing health inequities. I am interested in understanding the role of the built environments, such as the availability of healthcare services, healthy food environments, and such, in increasing the risk of diseases and how this differs across racial and ethnic groups. The main question that I aim to explore is how effective are interventions in the built environment, such as introducing healthier food resources, in improving population health, and, furthermore, do such interventions exacerbate existing health disparities [2].

1. Can causal effects of public interventions be transported under missing data?

A major challenge in public health is missing social data, even when such data has the potential to shape health in powerful ways [1]. For example, social data about availability of healthcare and food resources in a neighborhood is not easily available across all neighborhoods in a city and thus inhibits concluding about the effect of the resource availability on health disparities. Under this context. I aim to understand if the causal effects of environmental conditions, such as neighborhood socio-economics, on health outcomes, such as mortality, can be transported from a city where data is not missing. I will study this problem when the data about the proximal factors, such as alcohol consumption and individual dietary data, which can mediate the causal relationship between environmental conditions and health outcomes, is missing in specific neighborhoods suffering from poorer data collection practices.

2. Can social determinants of health have long-lasting effects on health?

Understanding the duration of the impact of social determinants on health is critical to understanding which interventions are effective for a longer duration and when there is a need to revise the policies [3]. Accordingly, I will focus on exploring the causal effect of social determinants of health, such as the availability of healthy food options or the prevalence of fast food restaurants in the neighborhood on cardiovascular diseases in the United States, and analyze the variation at a geographical level across racial and ethnic groups.

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Designing Interfaces to Elicit Data Issues for Data Workers

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ABSTRACT

Goals of objectivity and neutrality drive the usage of algorithmic systems, however most efforts have produced similar or more harm than their human counterparts. Post-hoc analyses of these flawed systems often reveal systemic issues underlying the data and flawed assumptions in *preparation* stages that affect the models produced. To date, the algorithmic fairness community has had a myopic focus on optimizing and evaluating algorithmic systems at static decision points and mathematical definitions of fairness, neglecting efforts towards critically understanding the data being used prior to modeling. My research aims to support data workers' sociotechnical understanding of data by creating new interfaces and methods to elicit and utilize their prior knowledge and open information (such as census data), as means to discover and augment harmful patterns in data.

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1 BACKGROUND

Recently, several indepent theoretical frameworks have noted shortcomings of Algorithmic Fairness, highlighting the need for different strategies, Substantive Algorithmic Fairness [5, 10], Algorithmic Reparatations [4], and Algorithmic Justice [9] each follow different logical or philosophical threads to call for broadly similar methodologies to approach fairness, reparations and justice. Holistically, these frameworks are motivated by Intersectionality [3] — a feminist framework for understanding how systems of power shape aspects of a person's identity and control opportunities and harms distributed. They propose centering the Intersectional nature of systemic harms as a means of clearly establishing goals for a algorithm; that is, acknowledgement of the interweaving systems that may affect marginalized populations. For data work, this means approaching data issues as sociotechnical issues as opposed to solely technical issues.

My thesis work aims to address the gaps between these non-technical works and the current algorithmic fairness tool landscape. Namely by addressing the following broad research questions: **How do social and ethical issues manifest as data issues?** Prior work has developed a basis of the complex set of data issues [8] and types of societal biases [13], but my work will extend these with a taxonomy of data issues recontextualized as a sociotechnical phenomenon. **What challenges do data workers face in identifying and mitigating these issues with existing tools?** Many systems exist for exploring data and evaluating models from a data-centric perspective [1, 2, 11, 12, 14], however data issues are separated from their real world context [4, 12, 14] or the only way to analyze data is through its usage in a ML model [1, 2, 11], neglecting previous preprocessing decisions and more inscrutable data issues. **What design patterns might be most likely to help data workers to effectively accomplish the previous tasks?** The key question underpinning my future work revolves around understanding which design patterns and interactions best support data workers as they reason with data. [2, 7, 11] describe model-centric approaches to this that I will extend and bring into a data-centric workflow.

2 COMPLETED WORK

In ML workflows, the ramifications of provisional technical decisions may never be reconsidered after cleaning the data or engineering features. To address this issue, in prior work I developed a JupyterLab extension that sends automatic notifications to users about sensitive classes of data (i.e., race, gender, etc.), missing data, proxy variables, and demographic differences in model performance as they work [6]. In an online study with 51 participants and three conditions (notifications continuously, notifications only at the end of the process and without notifications), participants who saw notifications continuously were more likey to have healthy skepticism surrounding the efficacy of their models, preprocessing methods and the data itself, in addition to their models attaining higher F1 scores across racial demographics. This substantiates some of the potential benefits of an interface designed to support the *entire* data workflow, with specific emphasis on the stages before modeling occurs.

3 FUTURE WORK

My future work revolves around designing and building interfaces for computational notebooks that will support the sensemaking and preparation processes. Supporting this sociotechnical understanding of data is a design pattern consisting of mental model elicitation and automated notifications, that extends methods similar to [2, 7, 11] and my prior work. The goals of this are as follows

(1) Help data workers to more quickly and accurately discover and (as appropriate) augment harmful patterns in data.
(2) Communicate the decisions made to relevant stakeholders (e.g. journalists → the public, data scientists → coworkers and self for replication/verification).

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Because data issues often are overlooked in favor of simply collecting more data or making different modeling decisions, it is important to focus a critical eye on the provenance and contents of the data at hand, as much previous research recommends [4, 5, 9, 10].

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Navigating the Limits of AI Explainability: Designing for Novice Technology Users in Low-Resource Settings

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Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, Community Health Workers, Mobile Health, Explainability, HCI4D, ICTD, Global South

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1 INTRODUCTION

As researchers and technology companies rush to develop artificial intelligence (AI) applications that aid the health of marginalized communities, it is critical to consider the needs of the community health workers (CHWs) who will be increasingly expected to operate tools that incorporate these technologies. My previous work has shown that these users have low levels of AI knowledge, form incorrect mental models about how AI works, and at times, may trust algorithmic decisions more than their own. This is concerning, given that AI applications targeting the work of CHWs are already in active development, and early deployments in low-resource healthcare settings have already reported failures that created additional workflow inefficiencies and inconvenienced patients. Explainable AI (XAI) can help avoid such pitfalls, but nearly all prior work has focused on users that live in relatively resource-rich settings (e.g., the US and Europe) and that arguably have substantially more experience with digital technologies such as AI. My research works to develop XAI for people with low levels of formal education and technical literacy, with a focus on healthcare in low-resource domains. This work involves demoing interactive prototypes with CHWs to understand what aspects of model decision-making need to be explained and how they can be explained most effectively, with the goal of improving how current XAI methods target novice technology users. I am the first author of the three research studies presented in this document.

2 BACKGROUND

AI in the Global South As AI continues to spread widely into domains such as agriculture, government, and healthcare, most conversations regarding its implications focus on communities in the Global North, such as the US and Europe. The lack of attention on the effects and consequences of deploying AI within the world's poorest and most marginalized communities is concerning, especially in light of growing enthusiasm and new initiatives to use AI to solve complex societal problems. Overall, as nonprofits, tech companies, and governments rush to build and deploy AI systems, failing to examine the knowledge, needs, and perceptions of the frontline workers who will be expected to operate these systems risks deploying AI in ways that may harm the very communities they intend to serve.

Community Health Workers (CHWs) The shortage of qualified medical professionals in many low-income countries has led to the establishment of programs in which community health workers (CHWs), usually women, are recruited from local communities, receive basic medical training, and then work to deliver essential healthcare services to communities in hard-to-reach areas in the Global South. These community health workers are likely to be the target users of AI systems that aim to improve the health of marginalized communities via, for example, AI-assisted disease prediction and diagnosis. However, these users still possess little experience with technology that stands to threaten how they could potentially operate such systems.

AI in Community Health Work Despite research highlighting the role of mobile technologies in frontline health work [4, 5, 10], a small amount of research has focused on AI tools relevant to CHWs in low-resource contexts [3, 9, 12]. My research contributes to this nascent literature by examining CHWs' knowledge and perceptions of AI, the benefits and challenges that they foresee in integrating AI into their work, and the resulting impact on their workflows and other stakeholders in rural healthcare. My work also introduces the opportunity for explainable AI to improve AI systems that cater specifically to novice technology users such as CHWs.

Explainable AI Explainable AI (XAI) consists of a set of methods that enable humans to understand the predictions made by machine learning models. These methods can help improve trust and allow users to understand the potential impacts of their models or AI systems. While there has been a rising trend in making AI explainable for novice technology users, most of the work in this domain has been centered in Western contexts [1, 11]. My research expands work in this field by centering exclusively on novice technology users in the Global South to develop novel tools to improve their understanding of the decisions produced by AI systems. It is important to study novice technology users such as CHWs in the Global South due to the critical link they provide between their communities and public health services. As technology and AI, in particular, shift to playing a more important role in their work, understanding how XAI can be leveraged to deliver high-quality user experiences and optimal patient outcomes will be extremely important.

3 RESEARCH PROGRESS

3.1 AI Knowledge and Perceptions

My work towards understanding how XAI systems can be effectively built for CHWs and other groups of novice technology users

began by exploring these workers' knowledge and perceptions of AI. This research was published at the 2021 ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI) [8]. We created an exploratory video provocation where a CHW visits a mother and her sick child, using an AI-enabled app to scan the baby and diagnose them with pneumonia. To encourage balanced and diverse responses, we created two versions of the video: a positive scenario, in which the mother embraces the use of the AI application on her child, and a negative scenario, in which the mother is suspicious and distrustful of the AI application. After viewing one of these videos, CHWs participated in a 40-minute semi-structured interview.

Although our findings suggest that the CHWs who participated in our study didn't have much knowledge of AI, they did have opinions regarding the perceived impact of AI on their workflows, communities, and their livelihoods. Our other findings show that CHWs were not overly concerned about job replacement since an AI app may be able to accomplish some of their tasks, but it would never completely replace the breadth of activities they perform. Additionally, many CHWs felt that having the AI app perform tasks for them would make their work much more efficient, saving them and their patients valuable time when deciding whether and when to seek further medical help.

3.2 Surveying XAI in the Global South

To understand the factors that shape the design and deployment of XAI systems in the Global South, we reviewed XAI literature in this region. Our work exposes current gaps in XAI for the Global South and provides actionable recommendations for AI developers and HCI researchers to design and build effective models for this region. Our paper critically analyzes an emerging area of algorithmic development to encourage active inclusion and participation from communities in the Global South. This work was accepted to the 2022 Conference on Computing and Sustainable Societies (COMPASS) [7].

We discovered 16 papers highlighting XAI work in the Global South across a range of focus areas, venues, and regions within the Global South. Most papers focused on technical implementations of AI and were primarily concentrated in fields such as healthcare or government & policy. A significant amount of the papers focused on India, which was not surprising given the high concentration of AI development compared to the rest of the Global South. We also found papers across various proceedings, including venues such as CHI and COMPASS and workshops at premier machine learning conferences such as NeurIPS and KDD.

Our foundational work raises concern for the utility of existing XAI methods for AI research in the Global South. This requires the establishment of a new sub-area of explainable AI research that specifically explores how to explain AI to people with low levels of technology literacy, along with ensuring that these techniques are computationally feasible in low-resource regions. This is the motivation for my proposed dissertation work.

3.3 Evaluating Post-hoc XAI with CHWs

To explore how CHWs in rural India interact with and perceive XAI, we developed probes, extending the features of an existing app, Bilicam, that cooperatively works with CHWs to diagnose neonatal jaundice [2]. We implemented the probes in Figma and instrumented it to "predict" neonatal jaundice instead of using actual AI to make predictions. CHWs could use the probe to capture an image of a baby doll, receive a prediction, and view explanations for how it arrived at the prediction. The explanations were simplified versions of two popular XAI methods, LIME and SHAP. These XAI methods provide visual interfaces for XAI, which are known to work better for low-literate populations. They were used to situate CHWs as users of XAI and to have them critically think about AI explanations for disease diagnosis. We observed 35 CHWs who interacted with the probe and conducted semi-structured interviews to examine how they engage with and perceive AI explanations. We also iteratively incorporated their feedback to examine how design changes to the current XAI interfaces might make them more understandable to the CHWs.

Our findings show that the CHWs used their experience with jaundice and other diagnostic devices (*e.g.,* thermometer, blood pressure monitors) to understand the functioning of the AI-driven probe. Moreover, they struggled to understand the notion of uncertainty in the app's diagnosis and viewed it as a definite decision rather than a prediction, sometimes even doubting their expertise in favor of the app's outcome. The SHAP and LIME explanations, which were intended to explain the prediction, were hard to understand for them because they conflated *symptoms* of jaundice and feature importance. The color-heavy nature of SHAP and LIME added to the confusion since they had strong preconceived notions of different colors. Other elements of visualizations, like colorbars, reference images, etc., made it harder to understand the visualizations. Despite their confusion with these XAI interfaces, CHWs strongly supported integrating explanations into the application. This work is under revision at a premier HCI venue [6].

Given the high levels of overreliance and AI technodeterminism, we discuss the need to design new XAI methods that encourage users to think critically and skeptically about AI outputs and scaffolding structures that enable novice users to meaningfully engage in cooperative work with AI-driven tools. We also propose actionable design recommendations for future XAI visualizations that are understandable to end users with limited AI literacy and digital skills.

4 FUTURE WORK

As I transition out of my doctoral studies, I am most interested in continuing to apply my work to real-world contexts and explore research questions surrounding AI literacy. As users become increasingly exposed to AI, it will be necessary for AI practitioners to understand how users' lack of AI knowledge impacts their experiences interacting with and receiving information from these tools. Given the ability of AI to make high-stakes decisions, it is essential that users from various backgrounds be literate in AI to critically engage with and, if need be, counter decisions from these technologies. I plan to examine existing measures to quantify AI knowledge and synthesize this knowledge to develop human-centered approaches toward improving AI literacy. I would also like to continue my work with novice technology users and XAI to examine how AI literacy upskilling can be used to improve current explainability methods and potentially develop new ones.

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True and Fair: Robust and Unbiased Fake News Detection via Interpretable Machine Learning

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ABSTRACT

The dissemination of information, and consequently, misinformation, occurs at an unprecedented speed, making it increasingly difficult to discern the credibility of rapidly circulating news. Advanced large-scale language models have facilitated the development of classifiers capable of effectively identifying misinformation. Nevertheless, these models are intrinsically susceptible to biases that may be introduced through numerous ways, including contaminated data sources or unfair training methodologies. When trained on biased data, machine learning models may inadvertently learn and reinforce these biases, leading to reduced generalization performance. This situation consequently results in an inherent "unfairness" within the system. Interpretability, referring to the ability to understand and explain the decision-making process of a model, can be used as a tool to explain these biases. Our research aims to identify the root causes of these biases in fake news detection and mitigate their presence using interpretability. We also perform inference time attacks to fairness to validate robustness.

KEYWORDS

misinformation, bias, fairness, interpretability, security

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1 INTRODUCTION

Machine learning classifiers consistently exhibit discriminatory tendencies, favoring one demographic group over another across various domains based on specific characteristics. In the context of news, political leaning represents one notable characteristic wherein biases have been observed and documented. Such bias may deteriorate public trust and exacerbate political polarization [3]. Given the potential for bias in the news related to political leaning and the severe implications this can have, it becomes crucial to understand the decision-making process of these black-box models. We also want to see if fake news detection techniques carry any biases. However, it is yet unclear what ideal measures should be used to evaluate fairness realistically. Interpretability is valuable in determining whether a model has genuinely acquired knowledge or is merely producing predictions through random guessing. We aim to identify the most crucial information that language models utilize for classifying fake news. Hence, we propose the following research questions:

RQ1: What dimensions of fairness should be considered to evaluate the performance of language models in fake news detection?
RQ2: Do existing language models demonstrate bias in detecting fake news across different political ideologies?
RQ3: Can integrating interpretability techniques in misinformation detection aid in identifying and mitigating the sources of bias?

2 PROPOSED RESEARCH

Experiment Settings: We utilize the NELA-GT-2018 dataset [2], comprising news articles from various fact-checking sources. The original dataset includes 713k news articles labeled with source-level credibility and political leaning indicators. We rely on credibility labels provided by NewsGuard and political leaning labels provided by BuzzFeed. We exclude articles lacking labels from both NewsGuard and BuzzFeed, resulting in 163k articles.

The experiments [1] are conducted using a fine-tuned DistilBERT, which, according to our preliminary investigations, outperforms the original BERT in terms of key performance indicators such as accuracy and F1 score. Existing work [3] employs traditional machine learning classifiers, with Random Forest demonstrating the highest overall accuracy of 87.87%. Our approach results in a new state-of-the-art accuracy of 91.36%. Additional relevant metrics are presented in Table 1. To our knowledge, this represents the first reported results on this dataset using a transformer-based language model.

Fairness Formalization: We extend the scope of fairness assessment beyond the conventionally used metrics, Statistical Parity Difference (SPD) and Disparate Impact Ratio (DIR). We incorporate two additional metrics, Equal Opportunity Difference (EOD) and Average Odds Difference (AOD), to comprehensively evaluate algorithmic fairness. Moreover, we highlight the underlying bias by contrasting the precision and recall scores between the privileged and unprivileged groups. Additionally, we highlight the discrepancies in precision and recall scores, broken down by categories of real and fake news (Table 1). We discover significant biases manifested through these category-specific differences in precision and

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[1] Code and data are available at https://github.com/chahatraj/true-and-fair



Figure 1: An interpretability example using SHAP depicting salience of terms across a misclassified news item

recall, biases which are often overlooked when using conventional fairness measures such as SPD and DIR.

Model Interpretation: In the next phase, our primary objective is to investigate the most influential tokens in BERT's decision-making process. The underlying hypothesis is that the traditional salience approaches, such as SHAP [1] and LIME [4], in addition with newer techniques like Integrated Gradients [5], can effectively identify vital linguistic identifiers employed by the model to favor one category over another.

We utilize Named Entity Recognition (NER) to identify entities like person names or city names and average their salience scores. We calculate salience scores relative to the predicted class for each category of political leaning, yielding positive and negative scores for tokens. A positive score indicates that removing that token would likely reduce the model's confidence in its prediction, while a negative score suggests the opposite. Figure 1 presents a use case of SHAP for identifying important tokens.

We use two experimental designs to analyze global salience scores. The first experiment considers all articles' top 100 salient words, categorized by political leaning. The second one focuses on the top 100 most frequent words across all documents. These words are then used to execute data injection attacks during inference, leading to an attack success rate of 3.8%. This result establishes a baseline for our naive attack approach.

Results: Table 1 highlights the discrepancy in the model's performance across the left-leaning and right-leaning groups, which indicates a potential bias. It shows higher precision for left-leaning news (0.96) than right-leaning news (0.85), suggesting it's less likely to misclassify left-leaning news as fake. The model also has a higher recall for left-leaning news (0.92) than for right-leaning news (0.90), implying it's more adept at correctly identifying fake news if it's left-leaning. These discrepancies indicate that the model may not treat news items from different political leanings equally.

According to Table 2, the negative SPD (-0.39) and AOD (-0.03) indicate potential disparities in the overall prediction rates between the two groups. The EOD of -0.013892 suggests a slight difference in true positive rates, while the DIR of 0.47, being less than 1, indicates a potential bias towards the unprivileged group i.e., right-leaning.

3 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

In this work, we 1) introduce fairness aspects to be considered in the context of fake news detection using transformer models. 2) Through experiments, we demonstrate the extent of bias in current language models' performance in fake news detection across different political ideologies. 3) We employ interpretability techniques

Table 1: Classification scores using DistilBERT classifier on all data, left and right-leaning (0: fake class, 1: real class)

	A	P	R	F1	P (0)	P (1)	R (0)	R (1)
Data	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.92	0.91	0.92	0.91
Left	0.91	0.96	0.92	0.94	0.75	0.96	0.87	0.92
Right	0.92	0.85	0.90	0.88	0.95	0.85	0.92	0.80

Table 2: Fairness metrics evaluated (SPD, EOD, DIR, and AOD)

Fairness Metrics	Value
Statistical Parity Difference (SPD)	-0.394171
Equal Opportunity Difference (EOD)	-0.013892
Disparate Impact Ratio (DIR)	0.472067
Average Odds Difference (AOD)	-0.031709

to gain insights into the behavior of these models, which not only aids in the development of more robust and effective models but also informs the design of debiasing strategies.

We propose two future directions: 1) exploring alternative methods to more effectively aggregate salience scores for named entities and other tokens, aiming to facilitate a global analysis rather than scrutinizing at a granular article level. 2) Enhancing the attack success rate by employing alternative strategies, such as word removal, word swapping, and context-preserving modifications instead of arbitrarily inserting or deleting words.

The rationale behind executing attacks on the model using interpretability lies in identifying vulnerable data points that exhibit bias towards the privileged group. Consequently, this enables the development of model-agnostic debiasing methods that surpass the capabilities of existing model-based debiasing approaches, thus increasing fairness in fake news detection tasks.

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Benchmarked Ethics: A Roadmap to AI Alignment, Moral Knowledge, and Control

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ABSTRACT

Today's artificial intelligence (AI) systems rely heavily on Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs), yet their black box nature induces risk of catastrophic failure and harm. In order to promote verifiably safe AI, my research will determine constraints on incentives from a game-theoretic perspective, tie those constraints to moral knowledge as represented by a knowledge graph, and reveal how neural models meet those constraints with novel interpretability methods. Specifically, I will develop techniques for describing models' decision-making processes by predicting and isolating their goals, especially in relation to values derived from knowledge graphs. My research will allow critical AI systems to be audited in service of effective regulation.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies** → *Control methods*; **Knowledge representation and reasoning**; *Philosophical/theoretical foundations of artificial intelligence.*

KEYWORDS

alignment, knowledge graphs, interpretability, auditing, control

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1 COMPLETED WORK

Growing concerns about the AI alignment problem have emerged in recent years, with previous work focusing mostly on (1) qualitative descriptions of the alignment problem; (2) attempting to align AI actions with human interests by focusing on value specification and learning; and/or (3) focusing on either a single agent or on humanity as a singular unit. However, the field as a whole lacks a systematic understanding of how to specify, describe and analyze misalignment among entities, which may include individual humans, AI agents, and complex compositional entities such as corporations, nation-states, and so forth. Prior work on controversy in computational social science offers a mathematical model of contention among populations (of humans). In our paper "Quantifying Misalignment Between Agents" [2], my collaborators and I adapt this contention model to the alignment problem, and show how viewing misalignment can vary depending on the population of agents (human or otherwise) being observed as well as the domain or "problem area" in question. Our model departs from value specification approaches and focuses instead on the morass of complex, interlocking, sometimes contradictory goals that agents may have in practice.

2 FUTURE WORK

In order to achieve my goal of promoting verifiably safe AI, I will (1) Extend my existing work on measuring alignment to verify it in simulations; (2) Construct a knowledge graph (KG) to represent claims and arguments from moral philosophy; and (3) Connect patterns in ANN weights and structures to embedded reward expectations. These projects will each produce tools for analyzing and/or improving ANNs during their creation. Together, they will allow researchers to teach AI systems human-like moral intuitions via (2), relate those intuitions to actions in a training environment by interpreting the ANNs via (3), and compare the exhibited AI values to those of humans in order to quantify its alignment via (1). Since my approach is multi-disciplinary, the projects are ordered according to the rate of progress in the relevant disciplines, such that the first will not be outdated before it can combine with the last.

2.1 Extend alignment work

I will first extend my existing work [2], which reframes misalignment as a pairwise function applicable to an arbitrary number of parties on a per-issue basis. This framing provides a much-needed structure for analyzing realistic multi-agent scenarios, as opposed to scenarios common in existing research, which frequently assume incorrectly that humans have homogenous interests and/or that there is only one AI agent. I am currently extending this work by applying it in multi-agent simulation environments to verify the functional applicability of this framework. I will test the framework's applicability and value by evaluating the misalignment scores it produces under several complex multi-agent scenarios, in environments that incentivize some or all of them to variously cooperate and compete.

2.2 Build Moral Knowledge Graph

I will utilize a partially-automated, human-in-the-loop approach to construct the world's first comprehensive knowledge graph (KG) representing human beliefs about morality. To the best of my knowledge, such a KG will be the first resource for machine-readable

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moral philosophy data. While the Allen Institute for AI's research prototype Delphi is trained to mimic human ethical norms, it was trained on datasets sourced from crowdwork and mostly unfiltered internet data and does not include a curated philosophy database [1]. As input, I will scrape content from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP), a detailed, reliable, and high-quality philosophy reference work, for entries that mention "ethics," "morality," or related words. Initially, I will use entry titles as entities and infer relations between them by using natural language processing to extract key relational phrases. I will also represent sections of entries as entities with a hierarchical relationship to main entries. Once the KG coherently represents ideas from the SEP, I will utilize active learning and manual, expert verification to improve the coverage and accuracy of the representations. By utilizing human-in-the-loop annotations with the help of volunteers recruited at university philosophy departments and online philosophy communities, the resulting model would yield both higher accuracy and broader coverage. In addition to accelerating the timeline for reviewing the KG, this crowdsourcing effort would ensure the reviewers' diversity of backgrounds, perspectives, and areas of expertise, thus improving the resulting fairness of the KG. The resulting moral philosophy KG would contain ethical stances and supporting arguments relevant to human decision-making, resulting in an excellent basis for training ANNs to model and reference moral views and intuitions. I will test this by comparing the predicted values and uncertainty outputs of an AI trained on this KG to those of human samples in the moral psychology literature and to the AI2 moral reasoning engine Delphi.

2.3 Synthesize with Interpretability

Finally, I will link AI models' actions to their incentives. Building on existing interpretability methods, I will first verify my hypothesis that instrumental goals have latent representations in their weights and/or structures. For example, I would locate which neurons and pathways in an ANN trained to maximize a video game score have the strongest correlation with collecting in-game coins. I will extend this method to isolate representations of how AI models meet their incentives, and how we can tune them to favor some goals over others. Each stage of my research will yield useful tools for AI researchers, engineers and policymakers: (1) During the testing phase of AI development, researchers and engineers will be able to use my alignment framework to quantify, reduce, and mitigate misaligned goals before and during deployment. Likewise, the ability to quantify an AI agent's alignment based on its incentives will support regulators and policymakers in evaluating mission critical systems and mitigating the risks of inadvertently creating broadly misaligned AI. (2) Training or fine-tuning an ANN to respect human moral concerns will be significantly easier with access to a comprehensive KG of ethics literature. Whether engineers are creating language models or agents that interact with the real world, penalizing morally objectionable, questionable, repulsive and/or ambiguous outputs will be so practical that it could be required for large projects. (3) The tools I create will allow direct modification of an AI agent's priorities by embedding morality, which will streamline the ability to align AI with human moral intuitions. The foundation for measuring risks posed by ANNs established by parts (1) and (2) of my research will assist AI developers to quickly hone in on a system's biggest moral and practical risks. The fine-grained control that my interpretability research will yield will support engineers in making minimal, targeted interventions, allowing models to be aligned in real-world industry applications quickly and without sacrificing performance. By including diverse stakeholders in the creation of the world's first moral KG, this project will also hold AI fairness implications. Overall, the project will yield important insights into promoting multi-agent cooperation in RL models, improving AI truthfulness and fairness while reducing biases, and adherence to specific moral values in general AI agents. Modern ANNs are plagued by uncertainty in terms of both latent knowledge and value, and their alignment to human interests, goals and values. My research will enable quantifying AI alignment in realistic, meaningful terms; create an unprecedented resource for machine-accessible moral philosophy knowledge in the form of a KG, enabling ANN incorporation of human values; and unlock greater ANN understanding and alignment by connecting outputs to specific internal representations.

3 CONCLUSION

My research will yield straightforward yet invaluable benefits by connecting state-of-the-art AI alignment with in-depth contemporary philosophical understanding. My proposed realistic framework for measuring alignment along with an accessible resource for moral philosophy will enable straightforward measurement of ANNs' potential harms. The ability to make targeted changes to ANNs will reduce harm and create social value in a meaningful, achievable manner.

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Algorithmic Bias: When stigmatization becomes a perception

The stigmatized become endangered

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ABSTRACT

In this study, the author examines how perceived stigmatization endangered the stigmatized groups within a society or community. Thus, he goes back in history to dig deep into the sources of perceived stigmatization associated with the black race and how perceived stigmatization has emigrated into AI tools and machine outputs - subjecting vulnerable communities to hypervisibility by exposing them to systems of racial surveillance. To justify the study goal, he conducted a summarized text analysis on racial stigmatization using Twitter hashtags ∈ {black people, blackness, Africa, African-Americans}, all coined out of the Twitter Users' perception of the subject and hypothesized to find high negative sentiment correlation of stigmatization perspective in association with black race and Africa. He finds that Black people are associated with Africa and have a strong negative sentiment correlation with - poorness, crime, death, abuses (stupid), among others, and a subject of racist scum and racism. Similarly, there is a weak negative sentiment correlation with being - bad, abused (such bitch), hate, violence, and protest. He also finds similar strong and weak negative sentiment correlations with other hashtags. He discusses the danger of racial stigmatization and proposes a cycle of ethical algorithmic development & deployment and recommendations.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Algorithmic Unfairness** → **Sensitive Attributes**; *Systemic bias*; Vulnerable communities; • **Ethical Violation** → Stigmatization.

KEYWORDS

NLP, Twitter, Stigmatized, Endangered

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1 INTRODUCTION

In the words of [5], "we will not necessarily find evidence of racial stigma by searching government statistics for instances of racial discrimination. The effects of stigma are more subtle, and they are deeply embedded in the symbolic and expressive life of the nation and our narratives about its origins and destiny. America, for example, is often said to be a nation of immigrants and a land of opportunity. But one of the first things new immigrants to America discover about their adopted country is that African Americans are a stigmatized group."

The Cambridge dictionary defines stigmatization as treating someone or something unfairly; by publicly disapproving of them. Thus, racial stigmatization is associated with treating some or a particular race as scum, public condemnation and segregation through characterization or branding as ignominious. [11] define stigma as a social process or personal experience characterized by exclusion, rejection, and devaluation that result from experience or reasonable anticipation of an adverse social perception about a person, group, nationality or race.

As disease-associated stigma, slavery and its menaces brought about the stigmatization of races across the continent. Being a slave is attributed to worthlessness and purchasable goods like foods and other items. Anyone regarded as a slave is worth nothing but a piecemeal tool in the hands of its master. The arrival of people of colour in America (for instance) was the first impression of how white or Europeans perceived people of colour/blackness. Many commentaries consider 1619; as a significant starting point for slavery in America when the privateer The White Lion brought 20 enslaved Africans ashore in the British colony of Jamestown, Virginia, [3]. And this til-date still resonates with the perception of blackness!

The history of slavery spans many cultures, nationalities, and religions from ancient times to the present day. Likewise, its victims have come from many different ethnic and religious groups. The social, economic, and legal positions of enslaved people have differed vastly in systems of slavery in various times and places, [8]. While many nationalities and identities have erased the stigma of slavery, blackness has carried the stigma associated with slavery cum worthlessness til-date. Consequently, the stigmatization has becomes a perception of what blackness is or should be in society. According to [17], Africa is labelled (among others) with the language of contamination and disease with images that put men on a level with rats carrying epidemic plagues. Comparing Black people to monkeys has a long, dark simian history. [17] observed that the European cultures of comparison of humans to apes and monkeys are disparaging from the very beginning. [16] documented an object of racial hierarchies with illustrations comparing Blacks to chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans. Hence, the work supports the claims that the Black race or blackness is of animal origin leading

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Figure 1: Ota Benga (c. 1883 – March 20, 1916) in Human Zoo (Bronx Zoo, USA)
Credit: Wikipedia

to the American ideology on racial differences. Figure 1 depicts an example of the genesis of perceptional behaviour.

While the issue of race discrimination has taken several holistic turns, the perception of what blackness is associated with remains a bone of contention. It all boils downs to machine identification and association of vulnerable communities (e.g., blackness) to animals, exclusion, misclassification, crime - hyper-visibility and danger in the application. Since AI and machine intelligence have gained the status of everyday adoptions, for security, commerce, trade, provision, protection, identification, classification, selection and crime detection, among many others, it is worthwhile to reassess the ethical challenges associated with the history of stigmatization of blackness which has crept into learning algorithms, machines and AI tools in daily life. Hence, the crux of this study.

2 PERCEPTION: KNOWLEDGE IS LEARNING AND A BELIEF

A major problem in AI and machine intelligence systems is that when machines are trained with real-world observations (often data based on human decisions or perception), it is often a fact that the host will inadvertently encode human prejudice, bias, perception, and wrong decisions into the algorithms, [10].

When perception becomes knowledge, knowledge becomes a teaching point and history. A good example is the Belgian cartoonist Hergé's Tintin series in 1931, in which the infamous Tintin au Congo book depicts Africans/blackness as inferior apelike creatures, [2]. [2] argued that the story of Tintin in the Congo is not directly offensive, but the background and the drawings of African-blackness characters have almost no personalities of other races or variety to distinguish them from one another. This type of book, among many others, presents Africans or the black race as worthless and of no human value.

A British commission for racial equality in 2007 recommended that the Tintin au book should no longer sell in British stores. But, in 2012, an application to ban the (colonial-era -Tintin au Congo) book was rejected in a Belgium court. The court ruled that - it was clear that neither the story nor the fact that [in the book] has been put on sale has a goal to create an intimidating, hostile, degrading or humiliating environment. Meanwhile, the book promotes the racial ideology of demeaning people of colour or blackness as apes. Meanwhile, the perception presented in the book about blackness could reinforce racist stereotypes among children of learning age, [2]. And through an inadvertent transfer learning process might imbibe the racist stereotypes knowledge into machine and AI tools under their creations, depicting blackness as learned from school into a machine. Through this process, an unethical racial misrepresentation would gain a channel into machine prognosis intelligence and behaviour in real-life.

2.1 The training set formed the machine perception

Bias in AI occurs when two data sets are not considered equal, possibly due to biased assumptions in the AI algorithm development process or built-in prejudices in the training data. Once the AI program has been tested, it processes live data based on the logic learned from the test data, providing a result. The feedback from each result is analyzed by the AI program as its logic evolves to better handle the next live data scenario from which the machine will continue to learn and the logic evolves, [14].

Therefore, societal poor perception about group, nationality, or race often leads to machine perception of the stigmatized. Thus, an algorithm (machine) that classifies humans as animals makes no mistake but reflects the biases and perceptions presumed towards the misclassified by the programmer. The machine bias output has been traced to the training set. Consequently, algorithm bias gains a foothold during the development, training and validation, particularly when the data lack inclusiveness. [12] observes that algorithm bias is powered by haphazard data gathering and spurious correlations, reinforced by institutional inequalities, and polluted by confirmation bias. Essentially, if data gathered for algorithm development present one or more societal components above/below others and ignore the data ethics such as inclusion, diversity, participation and coverage, the likelihood of unfair output is high. A

limited training set would limit algorithmic generalization convergence in practice, [9], [6].

For instance, the Idemia face scanner algorithm used by FBI and US Customs and Border Protection - at sensitivity settings falsely matched different White women's faces at a rate of 1 in 10,000, and it falsely classifies Black women's faces about 1 in 1,000 - 10 times more frequently, [13]. [7] reports that AI is sending people to jail and getting it wrong, and the majority are vulnerable communities - people of colour.

Many contemporary issues on racial sensitivity exposed the hiding algorithm wars against vulnerable communities (e.g., blackness). [12] asserts that some technologies fail to see blackness, while others render blackness hypervisible and expose them to systems of racial surveillance. Far from being neutral or moderately aesthetic, images have been one of the primary weapons in reinforcing and opposing social oppression, [12]. Hence, machine perception inherited from societal perception could subject vulnerable communities to unnecessary exposure that could endanger the livelihood and survival of the stigmatized. The invisibility of a person is also the visibility of a race or vulnerable communities - a process of enclosure suffocating and social constriction to be constantly exposed or stigmatized as something you are not, [12]. Thus, the training set on which the machine learn forms its perception of the population of the vulnerable communities.

3 DATA ETHICAL VIOLATION: THE GENESIS OF NORMALIZED STIGMATIZATION

All generalizations are false, including this one, [15]. In statistics, generalization is an inferential statement about a hypothetical statement supported by a statistical test. When generalization becomes a societal conclusion about some groups within a community, it often lacks the merit of purpose. Historical data can create a historical perception, hence generalization from the past may rob the present and deprive the future of its true identity or relevance leading to continuous stigmatization of the vulnerable.

In application, an inference mainly on a few samples could lead to over-generalization of purpose. For instance, two scenarios may be positively associated within a vulnerable community but be independent or even negatively associated in all subpopulations of the groups - a sort of Simson's Paradoxical phenomenon. Ethical violations driven by inherent perceptions about a group or nationality remain the genesis of group stigmatization. Consequently, such ethical violation of generalization progresses into the following subheadings.

3.1 Systemic bias

Systemic bias plays a part in systemic racism, a form of racism embedded as a normal practice within society or an organization. The term generally refers to human systems such as institutions or organisations that accommodate practices that promote biased treatment of certain groups or gender. Systemic bias, also known as institutional bias or structural bias can lead to institutional racism which has been normalized as a practice or treatment and pose no need for review or ethical consideration. Thus, systemic bias is a type of racism that is integrated into the organisational practices, laws, norms, and regulations of a society or establishment. Structural bias, in turn, has been defined more specifically about racial inequities as the normalized and legitimized range of policies, practices, and attitudes that routinely produce cumulative and chronic adverse outcomes for minority or vulnerable populations/communities, [1].

3.2 Hidden bias

Unlike systemic bias, hidden bias creates a form of a fair or unbiased environment with the written notion of value for equality, equity, fairness, diversity and inclusion, among others, as the principle of operation. However, all these notions are paper regulations to create a public face of compliance with ethical standards, which in an actual sense was never considered in the treatment of vulnerable communities or groups. Without mincing words, many organizations operate this bias.

3.3 Outsourced Bias

It is a common practice to outsource some components of AI development to third parties, [14]. Often time, the host might not thoroughly conduct an ethical check on the built AI tools for bias due to programmer prejudice. When this gets to application, it presents the perception of the programmer as a generalization over the vulnerable communities. Lack of AI ethics and algorithmic auditing also promote ethical violations. Other factors include organizational factors such as weak internal processes and ethical frameworks leading to inadequate focus on bias detection, non-diversified teams and violation of sensitive attribute ethical principles or unspecified ethical rules for the treatment of sensitive attributes.

4 RACIAL STIGMATIZATION IN APPLICATION

To provide some background into the subject of discussion, I conducted a summary text analysis on racial stigmatization using Twitter hashtags $\in$ {black people, blackness, Africa, African-Americans}, all coined out of the popular discussion on the subject. Twitter was my choice of social media space due to its high censorship nature and intolerant for stigmatization or racial scum. My null hypothesis was to find some negative words (despite the high censoring nature of Twitter) in association with the black race and Africa.
I plotted word cloud plots and performs sentiment analysis of the common words for the racial stigmatization hashtags. Since Twitter is a global space, opinions shared on it represent the global perspective on the subject. Using modal case inference [1], I found that:

1. Black people are associated with Africa and have a strong negative sentiment correlation with **poorness, crime, death, abuses (stupid)**, among others, and a **subject of racist scum and racism**. Similarly, there is a weak negative sentiment correlation with being an **being bad, abused (such bitch), hate, violent, and protest**.

[1] By modal case inference, I mean using the most popular case from word cloud output and most popular sentiments. Hence, being top-cases on the word cloud to top-cases on the sentiment chart implies strong negative or positive sentiment correlation and least will implies weak negative sentiment correlation, respectively



Figure 2: Sentiment Analysis on Blackness



Figure 3: Sentiment Analysis on Africa

2. Blackness is associated with Africa and Africans and has a strong negative sentiment correlation with **death/die, sad/sadness, reject/rejection, darkness, submissive, struggling**, and a **subject of racism**. Similarly, there is a weak negative sentiment correlation with being **an accused, degraded, lost**, among others.
3. Africa is associated with Africans and has a strong negative sentiment correlation with **shock, unbelievable, losing, death, attack**, among others. Similarly, there is a weak negative sentiment correlation with being an **crisis, poverty, hopeless, lie**, among others.
4. African-Americans are associated with black people, Africa, and history and have a strong negative sentiment correlation with **discrimination, prejudice, slave/slavery, wrong and subject of racist and racism**, among others.

I present the Pictorial result of the black people hashtag in Figure 2; blackness hashtag in Figure 4; Africa hashtag in Figure 3; and African-Americans hashtag in Figure 5, respectively. As shown, blackness, black people, Africa and African-Americans are subject to racial stigmatization. The null hypothesis would be accepted since there is no sufficient information to prove otherwise.

5 CONCLUSION

Personally, I have been subjected to stigmatization for being from my country of origin (I do not wish to mention a name of a country). I recall my last trip where I was detained for more than an hour because I carried my national Passport. I could hear my nation's name being mentioned and reemphasized by the young immigration officers to their superiors in the local dialect. I presumed the purpose was to justify why I must be subject to the questioning section and rigorous security checks, scan and re-scanning and digitization. I am certain many of my countrymen and women would have their stories to tell travelling overseas - and the rest of the world.

The danger of racial stigmatization goes beyond airport checks and delays, some have lost their lives because of the country or nation of their origin, or the colour of their skin. The phrase "I can't breath" is not unknown to many vulnerable communities. The death of Eric



Figure 4: Sentiment Analysis on Blackness



Figure 5: Sentiment Analysis on African-Americans

Garner, Javier Ambler, Manuel Ellis, Elijah McClain and recently George Floyd, among others whose deaths are known to the public. Many others in this category, have been declared missing or died without public knowledge - the unnecessary death is associated with the perceived stigmatization of their skin colour, blackness, nationality or race.

[4] submits that whatever the merits of the dispute about race are perceived as a biological concept, the social convention of thinking about other people and ourselves as belonging to different "races" are so long-standing and deeply ingrained in a global political culture which has become a norm on human existence.

It is, therefore, humane and globally responsible citizenship that many social actors hold schemes of racial classification in their minds and act accordingly, and avoid any form of perceived racial ideologies towards any individual or group. The moment this is realised and practised, stigmatization will naturally diffuse to a minimum.

However, once people know that others in society will classify them on the basis of specific markers - skin colour, nationality, race, hair, facial bone structure, among others, and that these acts of classification will affect their material and psychological well-being, it is rational for them to think of themselves in racial terms also, [5], and the tendency of retraction, low self-esteem, or anger, hatred and retaliation increases.

5.1 Way Forward & Recommendation

When perception becomes knowledge and knowledge becomes a learning point, it is necessary to reboot the learners' curriculum about vulnerable communities. Thus, infamous books such as Tintin au Congo that depict Africans/blackness as inferior ape-like creatures, among others, should be discouraged in all learning institutions.

Apart from learners' curriculum reshuffling, algorithmic development must pass the test of robust team composition promoting inclusion, participation and reciprocity. To achieve this, I proposed, in Figure 6 an algorithmic development cycle which can be adopted



Figure 6: Proposed Cycle of Ethical Algorithmic Development

as a tool for assessing the inclusiveness and generalization potential of learning algorithms.

In this framework (Figure 6), every group (being vulnerable or non-vulnerable) of the communities or societies would be represented, included, and participated in all the stages of algorithmic development to deployment. Thus, the proposed cycle proposes that before any algorithmic project goes public, it should go through all the ethical checks peculiar to the project ethics and that of the societal diversity components and also go through re-validation, stages by stages approval, and verification such that no race/group is unaccounted for. With this, the algorithm development will not only promote diversity but will reduce racist logic or stigmatization inadvertently conceived by any team member against any particular group (provided the team composition is diversified as proposed) and such perception would have diffused along the process cycle before the algorithmic tool is deployed.

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Ethical Principles for Reasoning about Value Preferences

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ABSTRACT

To ensure alignment with human interests, AI must consider the preferences of stakeholders, which includes reasoning about values and norms. However, stakeholders may have different preferences, and dilemmas can arise concerning conflicting values or norms. My work applies normative ethical principles to resolve dilemma scenarios in satisfactory ways that promote fairness.

KEYWORDS

normative ethical principles, values, norms, sociotechnical systems, fairness

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1 INTRODUCTION

Multiagent systems (MAS) understood as sociotechnical systems (STS) consist of multiple human-agent duos, with a social tier that imposes regulations upon a technical tier [20, 21]. To improve fairness considerations, it is important to appreciate the interaction of multiple users, rather than single agents [6]. When viewing STS from this holistic perspective, stakeholders govern by promoting norms that align with their values. However, issues arise when stakeholders have different preferences, or where values or norms conflict [10]. Decisions must be made that consider stakeholder preferences, values, and norms in ways that promote fairness.

Previous work examines using values to reason about norms. Kayal et al. [12] develop a normative conflict resolution model based on value profiles of users, which selects norms that best support the stakeholders' values. Montes and Sierra [19] provide a methodology for evaluating the value alignment of norms by examining changing preferences. However, often not all stakeholders will agree on which factor is the most important in a given scenario [9]. In these dilemmas, there may be cases where multiple norms conflict with each other, one or more norms conflict with the value preferences of a user, or value preferences of one user conflict with those of other users. There may also be scenarios in which values and norms do not conflict, however a decision must be made that fairly considers a variety of different preferences.

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Challenges thus remain in creating decision support for everyday dilemmas in which there are differing preferences, or values or norms conflict, aiming towards the development of systems with fair governance. The application of ethical principles may improve fairness considerations in aggregating value preferences.

Resolving these dilemmas in satisfactory ways with a higher goal of fairness may be achieved by operationalising normative ethical principles in decision support [25]. Normative ethics is the study of practical means to determine the ethicality of an action [7, 21]. Leben [14] provides foundations for mechanising certain ethical principles, which could applied to decision support in STS. Normative ethical principles have also been operationalised in domains such as resource allocation and machine ethics [5, 9, 14, 23].

2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

RQ_1 **What ethical principles currently exist in computer science literature?** A framework operationalising principles may help to methodically analyse scenarios and promote satisfactory outcomes [9]. A taxonomy identifying and categorising ethical principles in computer science literature would aid the development of this framework. This taxonomy could then be expanded to principles seen in philosophy and other disciplines.
RQ_2 **How can ethical principles be operationalised in reasoning capacities needed to govern STS?** Developing methods to incorporate ethical principles reasoning techniques used to govern STS would be beneficial to support ethical decision making.
RQ_3 **How can context be incorporated in the application of ethical principles?** Ethical decision making is context dependent, and which principles are appropriate to apply in specific circumstances may vary. Methods to incorporate context could improve the applicability of principles.

3 COMPLETED WORK: TAXONOMY OF NORMATIVE ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR AI

To address RQ_1, we have developed a taxonomy of normative ethical principles previously used in computer science literature.
Motivation. Ethical principles can support decisions as they help to guide normative analysis, understand different perspectives, and determine the moral permissibility of concrete courses of actions [15, 18, 23]. A framework aiding the operationalisation of principles in decision making may be useful to methodically think through scenarios and promote satisfactory outcomes [9]. To create such a framework, it is first necessary to identify and categorise ethical principles previously seen in computer science literature.
Background. Related work includes Tolmeijer et al. [24] which studies how principles relate to machine ethics, and Yu et al. [27] which proposes a taxonomy of ethical decision frameworks. As ethical thinking should be fostered through appreciating various

approaches [4], expanding these works to incorporate a wider variety of principles, and how they have been operationalised, may improve the amplitude of ethical reasoning. A larger taxonomy of principles that currently exist in computer science literature, examining how each principle has been operationalised, could help form the groundwork for an ethical decision support framework.

Completed Work. Following the guidelines of Kitchenham et al. [13], we conducted a systematic literature review of computer science literature. We developed a taxonomy of 23 normative ethical principles operationalised in AI [26]. We describe how each principle has previously been operationalised, highlighting key themes AI practitioners seeking to implement ethical principles should be aware of. Future directions involve looking outside of the domain of ethics used in computer science, to examine ethical theories in philosophy and other disciplines. This includes researching principles from cultures outside of the Western doctrine, which may aid better application to groups of stakeholders from diverse backgrounds.

Contribution. Broadening the range of ethical principles found in previous surveys, we identify a taxonomy tree with 23 ethical principles discussed in Computer Science literature. Principle specific operationalisation is presented, with new mapping of each principle to how they have been operationalised in literature [26].

4 ONGOING WORK: OPERATIONALISING ETHICAL PRINCIPLES

To address RQ_2, we are developing a model that operationalises normative ethical principles in reasoning about value preferences.

Motivation. When values are imbued in systems, aggregating values into a single outcome may improve ethical decision making in STS [22]. However, reasoning about values is challenging [17], and stakeholders could have personal preferences between different values [16, 21]. Value preferences of some stakeholders may conflict with value preferences of other stakeholders, or values may conflict with norms [10, 25].

Background. Previous work integrates normative ethics in decision making, and utilises values to reason about norms. Cointe et al. [7] propose an agent which utilises normative ethical theories to improve ethical decision making in MAS, which could be expanded to consider value preferences of multiple stakeholders. Montes and Sierra [19] provide a methodology for examining the alignment of norms with values. To expand this, the application of ethical principles may improve fairness considerations in aggregating values to help resolve conflicts. Ajmeri et al. [2] aggregate value preferences of users, applying a single normative ethical principle. However, to resolve scenarios in which principles lead to unintuitive outcomes, or are unable to promote one action over another, it is important to apply a variety of different principles.

Current Work. Our current work lays the foundations for a model demonstrating how multiple ethical principles can be implemented in reasoning about values of stakeholders. In our model, agents have value preferences for the payoffs they receive. Different ethical principles are applied to these value preferences to reach a decision which promotes fairness. Via an example of smart heating STS scenario, we demonstrate how we could apply our model. Each stakeholder has an internal hierarchy of individual value preferences [19]. At each timestep, all agents propose their preferences, and a collective decision is made by applying different ethical principles to those preferences. We conduct preliminary simulation experiments on our model. To evaluate the emergence of norms that promote fairness, we compute quality metrics in each run of the simulation including health, wealth, and Gini coefficient.

Preliminary Results. Preliminary results suggest the most appropriate ethical principle to apply in a situation may depend on the metrics being used, as different principles can lead to different outcomes. We find that the principle best suited to maximise payoffs is the principle of Maximin. However, if a fair distribution of resources is more important, the most appropriate principle is Egalitarianism. These findings may help the development of agents that can learn the best principle to apply in certain situations.

Contribution. Incorporating ethical principles in reasoning, considering the preferences of stakeholders. This may improve fairness considerations in aggregating different value preferences and resolving value conflicts. Applying multiple ethical principles may help to view dilemmas from different perspectives and improve the amplitude of ethical reasoning.

5 NEXT STEPS: INCORPORATING CONTEXT

To address RQ_3, there are several directions future work could address to improve the contextual applicability of principles.

- **Considering Contextual Value Preferences.** Our current work assumes each stakeholder's order of value preferences is fixed. However, preferences may change [8, 17]. Future work could involve expanding our current simulations to incorporate contextual values and changing value preferences.
- **Incorporating Internal Reasoning in Agents.** In our current work agents do not have internal reasoning schemes, as decisions are deferred to a collective decision making module. Future work could include equipping agents with internal reasoning, so that aggregating individual ethical decision making using normative ethical principles can be studied on an individual level.
- **Resolving Conflicts Between Ethical Principles.** Our preliminary results suggest that different principles might be appropriate in different scenarios. Sometimes a single ethical principle may lead to an unintuitive outcome, or be unable to give a clear preference between two different options. When seeking the best principle to apply, it is important that agents can consider several different principles to identify a suitable solution [7, 26]. Future work includes developing learning agents that can resolve conflicts between different principles and optimise the application of principles. By incorporating explainability in these agents, we can investigate how agents learn to handle such scenarios [1].
- **Using Logic to Encode Ethical Principles** Our current work applies abstracted versions of ethical principles to demonstrate the basic idea of how such principles may be applied to reason about value preferences. To achieve more precise representations and improve contextual applicability, future work could utilise logic techniques such as those used by Govindarajulu and Bringsjord [11] and Berreby et al. [3] to encode normative ethical principles in the governance of STS.

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Explainability in Process Mining: A Framework for Improved Decision-Making

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ABSTRACT

This research project aims to develop and validate explanatory facilities to enhance information reception of process mining solutions, which could inform and be translated to other business intelligence platforms. Process mining, a nascent field for analyzing event data stored in information systems, faces challenges in adoption, engagement, and comprehensive explainability frameworks. The research problem lies in the difficulties organizations face when understanding the return on investment and integration requirements associated with process mining operationalization. Furthermore, users often struggle to comprehend the elaboration and representation of process outputs. This issue is compounded by the limited application of Explainable AI (XAI) in process mining, which so far has been predominantly focused on prediction and monitoring activities without a holistic view of explainability trade-offs.

KEYWORDS

Explainable AI, Responsible Process Mining, AI policy, AI Ethics, Human-Computer Interaction

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1 BACKGROUND

Process mining is a young and promising domain to analyze and obtain insights into event data stored in informational systems [21]. Yet it is not mature enough [2] in regard to its full deployment: in the adoption, organizations struggle to understand ROIs and integration requirements with process mining operationalization [11]; in the engagement, users often lament a lack of comprehension over process outputs' elaboration and representation [8, 16]. Literature on Explainable AI (XAI) reproved how crucial interpretability and explainability of an AI artifact is to enhance its transparency [20], a pro-ethical condition [19] to enhance fairness and accountability over opaque algorithmic decision-making. XAI so far has been applied in process mining for prediction and monitoring activities in a singular fashion, i.e., with little research efforts [15] to advance frameworks with a holistic view over explainability trade-offs. Indeed, a solemnly technical approach might fail to account for different sociotechnical constraints jeopardizing legal compliance, factuality, and usability of explanations [4, 6]. These could confuse non-expert recipients through information overload; provide biased information if mitigation and auditing mechanisms are not set in place [3]; or worse leverage risks connected to intellectual property, trade secret, and third-parties privacy violations [7, 14]; as well as opportunities for gaming an AI system by clients and opportunities for ethics-washing to erode accountability of system providers [9, 18].

These risks could be counter-approached in AI ethics. Principles and guidelines are now growing steadily alongside AI policies in the European Union to regulate and establish compliance mechanisms for enhancing transparency, fairness, and accountability. Yet, this so-called "first wave" of AI ethics publications often offered ambiguous if not conflictual terminology, lacking empirical benchmarks [1, 10]: this calls for the current advancements of a "second wave" of AI ethics to focus on empirical and comprehensive experimentations for the AI systems' lifecycle [13, 17]. Operationalization of explainability is here to be intended not as a singular top-down approach (as so far it has been advanced in process mining), where an AI system's explanation is considered as an explanandum just for its technical explanans. Last but not least, the novelty of AI policy regulations as set by the European Union (i.e., GDPR, AI Act draft, DSA, Data Act, AI liability directive among others) might impact business practices stacking up normative confusion on explanations' context of fruition and compliance procedures [7, 12, 18].

As a major research approach, I resort to explanans to be instead informed accordingly to different and interconnected layers: (I.) Cognitive layer - explanations recipients (e.g., platform's user clients) holds different expertise (over the content domain analyzed and over the AI system) and degree of intention while engaging with process representations and explanations. Process language notations, hierarchical and compositional techniques are compared to favor process model comprehension. (II.) Technical layer - explanations as produced by XAI methods. This layer might constitute a justification of an AI system's output and capabilities, but not always of the design rationale behind it. Statistical bias and adversarial attacks might indeed produce inaccurate explanations introducing heuristic risks if other layers are not considered.

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(III.) Organizational layer - as common in process mining adoption, event logs might be stored across external stakeholders. Data standardization and integration might be impede output and explanation's accuracy. Foremost, explanations should account for trade-offs regarding risks (privacy and trade secret disclosures). (IV.) Pragmatic layer - aiming to enhance transparency and understanding the dynamic communicative context, considering regulations, user intentions, and organizational constraints.

2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS & CONTRIBUTIONS

The main research question posed is: **How can Explainable AI improve the adoption and engagement of process mining solutions?** This main research question has led to the development of the following sub-questions:

(1) What are the interpretability demands of engaged stakeholders?
(2) What are the adoption barriers to process mining operationalization?
(3) How has explainability been applied so far in process mining?

Addressing these challenges has necessitated extensive work across multiple domains. (1. **Regulations**) First, by examining the AI regulatory landscape on XAI for the EU, US, and UK, including drafts, laws, policy communications, reports, and standards, also within data and platform governance, inquiring over business operationalization. This work was preliminary informed before by the published paper on fairness and AI regulation at AIES 2022 [5], but foremost the FAccT 2023 accepted paper on Explainability in AI Policies [18]. It also led to a journal submission, under review pending publication, where AI policies within EU laws regarding data, platform, and AI governance are analyzed in terms of XAI operationalization requirements. (2. **Governance**) A comprehensive inquiry was conducted into governance and explainability, involving an extensive interview study with process mining practitioners to understand the interpretability demands of clients and their respective explainability strategies. In light of these findings, an additional journal draft submission has been completed, presenting a layered framework for XAI governance in process mining, informed by state-of-the-art academic literature. As complementary, the development of a proactive ethics assessment tool for Explainable AI is now under journal review, designed to address potential technical and sociotechnical risks. (3. **Usability**) Finally, user-oriented studies are being conducted and collaborated on to inform explanation design from a user perspective. This includes a thorough review of explainability across various disciplines and multiple user studies in process model comprehension and explainability involving different collaborators. These studies encompass drafts and ongoing work on process model comprehension, bias mitigation, and users' cognitive reception of explanations.

In terms of outcomes, the investigation of AI regulatory landscape, insights from practitioners, and development of a comprehensive XAI governance framework will contribute to a more robust understanding of the challenges and potential solutions in terms of operationalization and compliance. The proactive ethics assessment tool and user-oriented studies will further inform the design and implementation of Explainable AI in process mining.

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Can AlphaGo be apt subjects for Praise/Blame for "Move 37"?

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines whether machines (algorithms/programs/ AI systems) are apt subjects for praise or blame for some actions or performances. I consider "Move 37" of AlphaGo as a case study. DeepMind's AlphaGo is an AI algorithm developed to play the game of Go. The AlphaGo utilizes Deep Neural Networks. As AlphaGo is trained through reinforcement learning, the AI algorithm can improve itself over a period of time. Such AI models can go beyond the intended task and perform novel and unpredictable functions. There is a surprise element associated with "Move 37". "Move 37" not only surprises the Go players, the programmers, but also whoever is informed of this unpredicted move. Does someone or something deserve praise or blame for the surprise? If so, who or what deserves the praise or blame for "Move 37"? The programmer cannot be praised for "Move 37", which is either surprising or was not intended or imagined at all. At the same time, would we accept that neither the algorithm deserves praise for the unpredicted move that the algorithm allowed the program to make? From this, would we accept that since neither the programmer nor the algorithm/AI system deserves the praise, there is such a good or exciting move for which no one or nothing could be praised? Would we say this unpredictable move is a move for which no one deserves praise or blame? Wouldn't there be at least a few who were surprised by the unpredictable move? Should we say that for this pleasant surprise, no one deserves praise? Nonetheless, for us, specifically regarding the particular unpredictable move, we firmly find it counterintuitive to say that there is an exciting move for which no one deserves praise. The surprise element is the result of the property that belongs to the algorithm. It seems quite difficult for us to accept that no one deserves praise for "Move 37" or for similar moves. Therefore, someone or something deserves praise which is a matter of scrutiny.

KEYWORDS

Blame and Praise, Moral Responsibility, Causal Responsibility, Artificial Moral Agency(AMA), AlphaGo, "Move 37", Machine morality

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1 INTRODUCTION

One of the latest milestones in Artificial Intelligence (AI) is AlphaGo of Google DeepMind. The board game Go was invented in China more than 3000 years back. It is one of the toughest games, which is said to be more challenging than Chess. AlphaGo beats Fan Hui (the three times European Go champion) in 2015. It also beat Lee Sedol (the eighteen times world Go champion) in 2016. Progressively, DeepMind developed an advanced type of AlphaGo known as AlphaGo Zero. The next version of the AI algorithm is AlphaZero. MuZero is more advanced than the previous ones. All of these extended versions are extremely good at self-learning. In March 2016, the game between AlphaGo and Lee Sedol AlphaGo made a move known as "Move 37". Because of the self-learning ability of the AlphaGo, it made a move that no human would ever consider. AlphaGo is a terrific Al algorithm in game playing; it can learn the game's rules independently. The "Move 37" of AlphaGo was never imagined and would have remained unimagined by any human. In this scenario, the question may arise where the "praise or blame" locus lies in "Move 37".

2 THE PRAISEWORTHINESS OF "MOVE 37" OF ALPHAGO

The intuition behind "Move 37" is that it is a very suitable move that any human player would have employed if the human player were to be aware of such a move. A surprise element is associated with "Move 37", which surprises not only the Go players and the programmers in Google DeepMind but also whoever is informed of this unpredicted move. Concerning the locus of praise or blame of "Move 37", one could make at least the following three responses:

- **Response 1**: If what results from "Move 37" is a pleasant surprise, then someone or something deserves praise.
- **Response 2**: If what results from "Move 37" is an unpleasant surprise, then someone or something deserves blame.
- **Response 3**: For "Move 37", no one or nothing deserves either praise or blame.

So, what is the locus of blame or praise? Or which of the responses mentioned above is to be accepted?

2.1 The Puzzle associated with AlphaGo

A puzzle associated with "Move 37" of AlphaGo regarding who is the apt subject of praise/blame for "Move 37". Whether it is the programmer, the algorithm, or no one is an apt subject of praise/blame for "Move 37". "Move 37" of AlphaGo is not resultant

of its programmers, which is equivalent to saying that the programmers are not responsible for causing "Move 37". So, granting praise/blame to the programmers is difficult. Similarly, even though the program/algorithm/system itself causes "Move 37.", granting praise/blame to the program/algorithm/system is also difficult. Nevertheless, at the same time, it does not make much sense to say that for an exciting move (Move 37), no one deserves any praise/blame.

2.2 The distinction between moral responsibility and causal responsibility

We must distinguish between moral and causal responsibility to identify praise/blame linked with "Move 37. Let us take an example: Suppose an employee performs two actions. In the first act, she helps an injured person on the road even though she has an important meeting to attend. In this case, she would be praised in a moral sense because helping a person in their need is a morally right action. However, in the second act, she solves a complicated coding problem where no one from her office is unable to solve the problem. In this case, she would be praised by her boss and others but not in the moral sense. Nonetheless, it is an assessment of what the employee accomplished. Here we are not just admitting that the employee acted but also praising the employee for the result. That is, we acknowledge that the employee is not only causally responsible for the result but in addition to she also deserves praise for what was accomplished. Now if we look into the case of AlphaGo's "Move 37", we will find out that the special status of "Move 37" only allows us to determine that AlphaGo is causally responsible for "Move 37". It clears up the worry about whether the programmers who designed AlphaGo are causally responsible for "Move 37". This is because the best explanation for the aspect of surprise associated with "Move 37" is that AlphaGo has an inherent property not present or passed down from its programmers. Here, we could give the following argument:

- **Premise 1**: If AlphaGo is causally responsible for "Move 37", AlphaGo is an apt subject for praise/blame
- **Premise 2**: AlphaGo is causally responsible for "Move 37" [because of its inherent property]
- **Conclusion**: Therefore, AlphaGo is an apt subject for praise/blame

Here, we must be committed to the implausible view that causal responsibility is a sufficient condition for normative responsibility, specifically for the aptness of praise/blame. For instance, an earthquake is causally responsible for the destruction of a building, but it is not appropriate to be blamed. However, the destruction brought by the earthquake is not similar to Move 37", made by AlphaGo. Therefore, we are not able to utilize the special status of "Move 37" to explain the praise/blame associated with it. Through the special status/quality of "Move 37", we can maximally provide the causal attribution to the AlphaGo but nothing else. Through the special status or quality of "Move 37", we can only eliminate the vagueness about causal attribution, i.e., did the programmers cause "Move 37" or did AlphaGo cause "Move 37"? and nothing more. However, we are still not certain about the answer to the question, 'Who is an apt subject for praise for "Move 37"?' In the case of AlphaGo, causal attribution may not be a sufficient condition but might be a necessary condition. For attribution of praise/blame associated with the AlphaGo, it appears that causal attribution is a necessary condition. We must now consider what makes AlphaGo an appropriate subject for praise in light of its outcome of "Move 37" as our main concern is the appropriateness of a subject that is praised/blamed for "Move 37". Here we can consider the concept of Artificial Moral Agency (AMA) to look into the puzzle associated with the AlphaGo.

3 CAN ALPHAGO BE AN APT SUBJECT FOR PRAISE/BLAME FOR "MOVE 37"?

The debate on AMA mostly centered on two conflicting views of moral agency. The first view is the Standard, and the second is the functionalist. The standard view argues that to be a moral agent, one must fulfill the following conditions: rationality, free will or autonomy, and phenomenal consciousness. On the other hand, the functionalists state that agency is simply required to exhibit certain behaviors and responses [1, 12]. Floridi and Sanders (2004) distinctly explained the functionalist view of moral agency in the debate on AMA. They discard consciousness as the condition of moral agency, hold mindless morality, and offer three conditions for moral agency:[1, 5]

- **1. Interactivity**: E interacts with the environment around it.
- **2. Independence**: E can change itself and its interactions without direct external intervention.
- **3. Adaptability**: Depending on the outcome of 1, E might change how 2 is actualized. (Here, 'E' refers to the entity)

Here, condition 1 roughly resembles the standard view. However, in condition 2, consciousness (or internal mental state) is absent. The absence of consciousness differentiates the functionalist view from the standard view. The difference is visible in condition 3 also. It is less intense because it does not demand that events falling under 2 immediately influence E's action, but it is more robust since it establishes a condition of responsiveness that unites events under 2 with events under 1. According to Floridi and Sanders [5], the concept of AMA becomes highly plausible when these conditions of moral agency are conditions are considered [1]. By looking at the features of AlphaGo, one may argue that AlphaGo may fulfill the above-mentioned conditions of moral agency. Therefore, AlphaGo is an AMA and is held to be morally responsible for "Move 37". Specifically, AlphaGo may be an apt subject for praise for "Move 37". However, a question may arise on how a game-playing algorithm can be an AMA and be an apt subject for praise for "Move 37"? Even if AlphaGo directly fulfills moral agency conditions prescribed by the functionalists, we still cannot say AlphaGo is an apt subject or praise/blame for its actions. The reason is that AlphaGo does not contain any moral element. To say that AlphaGo has moral agency (or to attribute moral agency to the AlphaGo) is a challenging task. AlphaGo cannot identify the ethically significant elements of a situation. However, some agencies could be attributed because AlphaGo can perform some actions or some moves/unintended moves autonomously. To become a moral agent, one has to perform a morally significant action, whether it could be a moral or an immoral action, which is missing in the case of AlphaGo.

As I already mentioned, even if AlphaGo satisfies all the conditions of functionalists but still we can't say it has moral agency. The reason may be that though these three conditions are necessary

for a moral agency, according to (Floridi and Sanders (2004) [5], these are insufficient. This situation could be explained in another way. Floridi and Sanders mention the levels of abstraction. Behdadi and Munthe 2020 state that "their starting point is the observation that which entities can be moral agents depends on the level of abstraction chosen when inferring general criteria from paradigmatic instances of human moral agency. The level of abstraction applied by the standard view is very low, keeping the criteria close to the case of an adult human being, but raising the level allows for less anthropocentric perspectives while maintaining consistency and relevant similarity concerning the underlying structural features of paradigmatic human moral agents"[1] (Behdadi and Munthe 2020, 198). We can think of a level of abstraction where all these three moral agency conditions are sufficient for a moral agent. The level of abstraction works similarly to a context. There can be different levels of abstraction. In a certain level of abstraction, we can think of a context where we can say that any AI system has a moral agency. These three conditions are the only characteristics we look for in a human being when we say they are moral agents. The consciousness or internal state part may not play a significant role here because we cannot always consider what kind of conscious experience the person had while she was performing a particular action. What kind of consciousness she had unless and until the intention was functionally explicit in a specific action.

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Anticipatory regulatory instruments for AI systems

A comparative study of regulatory sandbox schemes

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ABSTRACT

Anticipatory regulatory instruments are pre-emptive approaches to identify and anticipate risks arising from new technologies. They can also act as indicators of 'pro-innovation' economic support for digital technologies. The extent to which regulatory agencies can fulfil their regulatory remit, aimed at the protection of the public good, and signal support for innovative and disruptive technologies is an open policy question. Regulatory sandbox schemes are comparatively new anticipatory tools, operating within a small number of regulators, and their potential to assess contextual or cross-sectoral risk is unclear. However, emerging proposals for the regulation of AI increasing feature various models of regulatory sandboxes often aligned to the need to reduce access barriers for SMEs and innovators. Examples include the European Commission's Proposal for a regulation concerning AI [3] and the recent United Kingdom AI White Paper, AI Regulation: A Pro-Innovation Approach [8]. Disentangling the causal dimensions of why regulatory sandboxes are proposed to regulate AI, and their utility as tools of pre-emptive risk assessment are my core research questions.

The regulation of emerging digital technologies present challenges for regulators and governments in monitoring rapid global developments and in anticipating novel forms of risk [9]. Nesta introduced the term anticipatory regulation, and such approaches potentially provide 'a set of behaviours and tools – i.e., a way of working – that is intended to help regulators identify, build and test solutions to emerging challenges' [4]. Regulatory sandboxes are a prominent, and arguably the most widespread, example of such an anticipatory regulatory tool. Whilst there are varied definitions of regulatory sandbox schemes, existing schemes allow small-scale, live testing of innovations in a controlled environment under the supervision of a regulatory authority [6]. A small number of regulatory sandbox schemes are in operation within the UK operating within sectoral and cross-sectoral regulatory remits. However, empirical data and academic literature regarding the methodologies and operation of these current schemes, and literature exploring regulatory sandboxes more broadly, is scarce [7, 10].

The ontological focus of my work is critical realist, which accepts the external reality of the design and instrumental aims of sandbox schemes, whilst seeking to understand the underlying causes and drivers for their use and rapid promotion. To locate such causes and explanations it is necessary to examine existing schemes within the 'rules and norms' of their institutional context and structures [1, 2]. Institutional analysis will isolate the key dimensions of each scheme, consider the influence of the regulatory structures, and then test such analysis through empirical research with regulatory and policy actors. The core hypothesis of my research is that regulatory contexts, path dependencies and conceptions of risk are significant causal elements within existing sandbox schemes and, as such, may present a challenge when designing and deploying cross-sectoral sandbox schemes for AI systems.

I have already undertaken analysis of the two regulatory sandbox schemes applying the Institutional Analysis and Development framework of Elinor Ostrom [5]. This analysis has highlighted significant dimensions of sandbox schemes including the role and forms of sectoral incentives for participants, how knowledge and conceptions of risk are shared and the potential role of participatory processes and stakeholders. I am drafting a forthcoming paper outlining a typology of incentives for existing regulatory sandbox schemes. I have included policy and wider sectoral stakeholders within my data collection to obtain perspectives regarding perceived utility, understandings, and conceptions of sandbox schemes. Incorporating collaborative processes and inclusive engagement with affected stakeholders is a key principle of anticipatory regulation [4]. The role and extent of such engagement within proposed sandbox schemes for AI is a further dimension of my research to consider how such processes may be developed and operationalised.

This work is undertaken at a time of rapid progression within AI systems and in the development of proposed AI regulation and varied forms of decentralised AI governance. I hope that my research will provide understanding of the utility, and potential limitations, of sandboxes as a regulatory tool drawing upon data from existing practices. My work may also impact existing policy discussions around the role of sandbox schemes as risk assessment and information monitoring tools for regulators.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Social and professional topics**; • **Governmental regulations**; • **General and reference**; • **Validation**; • **Computing methodologies**; • **Artificial intelligence; Machine learning algorithms; Machine learning approaches.**;

KEYWORDS

Regulatory sandbox, AI governance and regulation, Policy, Risk, Anticipatory regulation, Trustworthy AI

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Examining the Ethics of Brain-Computer Interfaces: Ensuring Safety, the Rights and Dignity of Personhood

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ABSTRACT

Brain-Computer interfacing is one of the most interesting, digital health devices. It includes wearable, implantable, and injectable medical systems to improve or restore movement. It also includes machine-learning algorithms to help neurologically deficient persons to communicate and make decisions. All BCI applications connect the human brain to a machine that is external to the brain and the source of the self. Research and interest in Brain-Computer Interfaces have been developing at a rapid rate, with neuroscientists using BCI technology in an increasing range of applications. There are ethical questions that are lacking from the application of AI medically supported tools: safety assurance; human rights; the autonomy and dignity of the person who uses BCIs.

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No one can deny the important role played by the BCI in helping people who are suffering from a neurological disorder to regain some control of their lives. The rights and feelings of patients are of equal importance; the safety of the patients is another critical factor that needs to be considered by neurologists. This study examines human rights treaties as regards the BCI. It also questions the autonomy, privacy, and data protection of the patients and the question of personhood in the practice of BCI. The study will employ different research methodologies such as ethnographic, quantitative, and qualitative methods of research. The study concludes by advocating safer measures and guaranteeing the autonomy of patients for BCI practices.

This study also observed that BCI technology may be exploited due to technical loopholes or the design of the equipment, which may be harmful to man. As Glannor [2] asserted, adequate care and techniques must be taken to reduce potential risks. The stability, safety, adaptability, and reliability of BCI needs to be conscientiously and continuously improved to avoid harm to human beings and the environment. Rising from the above issues, this research is centered on the ethical debates in brain and computer interface. It is a comprehensive study that captures major ethical issues in brain and computer interfaces.

This study is significant in several ways, it observed that there is potential harm in BCI, it is therefore seeking for the need of harm prevention and also interrogating the ethical questions surrounding the practice. The study collaborates with the views of Hounda Miftah [1] in providing advice for the recruitment of candidates with higher levels of preserved cognitive function for BCI research and treatment and that they must be educated on the potential benefits and limitations of the technique which is to prevent or at least minimize harm. Also putting into consideration the rights, dignity, and autonomy of the human person. This study is an extract of my PhD research proposal, it is at an early stage as I am still gathering literature, and working towards the data collection. The collaboration and assistance of research laboratories on BCI, individuals, and institutions will be greatly appreciated.

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How to promote equitable sleep care among people experiencing homelessness: An AI-enabled person-centred computer vision-based solution

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ABSTRACT

Homelessness, defined as a lack of stable housing, affects over 435,000 people in Canada, most of whom live in shelters and experience barriers to healthcare [2]. Compared to the general population, people experiencing homelessness (PEH) sleep less, experience excessive fatigue, and are more likely to use substances to fall asleep at night (drugs) or stay awake during the day (cigarettes, alcohol) [10]. A recent study among PEH indicated that sleep quality was a key factor for their health and daily function [3].

A prevalent, yet under-recognized, cause of poor sleep is sleep apnea, which is characterized by recurrent interruptions in breathing during sleep [7]. Obstructive sleep apnea (OSA), a common form of sleep apnea, has a high prevalence, affecting approximately 30%-70% of individuals with chronic conditions such as hypertension and substance use [5]. Untreated OSA has significant medical consequences and societal costs.

Clinical polysomnography is the gold standard for sleep apnea diagnosis, but it is inconvenient, expensive, and inaccessible, especially for PEH who are experiencing several barriers to healthcare, e.g. low trust in care providers, difficulty visiting medical facilities, stress of daily needs, and fear of losing child custody if found to be homeless. The most accessible alternatives to polysomnography are sleep questionnaires, but they have low specificity.

Speech can be used as a non-invasive and accessible biomarker for monitoring physiological changes in the pharyngeal airway and cardio-respiratory system, including lung edema and pharyngeal airway narrowing [8]. Therefore, speech can be a potential tool for assessing the risk of OSA. Craniofacial photography has also revealed specific characteristics of upper airway structures and facial dimensions that are associated with OSA [4]. Therefore, developing an accurate and accessible risk assessment method for OSA using these technologies will improve health outcomes in PEH. Our ultimate goal is to develop a person-centred smartphone application to assess the risk of OSA during wakefulness in PEH living in shelters.

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Objectives: To achieve our primary goal, we will 1) identify the preference and concerns of PEH about a mobile application based on speech for assessing the risk of sleep apnea, 2) determine the prevalence of sleep apnea among shelter residents, and 3) develop a person-centred smartphone application to assess the risk of sleep apnea through speech and image analyses.

Preliminary works: Over the past 3 years, our team has established an interdisciplinary stakeholder group comprising people with lived experience of homelessness and OSA, care providers for shelter residents, researchers, and clinicians.

Based on our preliminary assessment, most shelter residents have access to cell phones, and wireless internet through shelters and public spaces such as libraries.

For objective sleep assessment, 15 participants are recruited (aged 51.94 ± 14.4 years old, including 8 men) from three shelters for an overnight sleep study at the shelter using the protocol mentioned in the next section. The analysis showed that 85% of the participants (13 out of 15) had moderate-to-severe sleep apnea (apnea-hypopnea index [AHI] $\geq$ 10 events/hour), with a mean AHI of 27.1 and a standard deviation of 18.53. These preliminary results highlight the importance of developing accessible technologies for diagnosing sleep apnea in shelter residents.

Method: To enhance our understanding regarding the usability of such technology among this population, our team has been conducting semi-structured one-on-one interviews with participants to gather their feedback and concerns about the proposed application.

A research assistant with lived experience of homelessness and sleep apnea and I collected anthropometric data such as height, weight, neck circumference, and blood pressure, as well as questionnaires related to sleep status, such as STOP-BANG [1] and Epworth Sleepiness Scale [6]. Then, we set up residents with portable polysomnography (level II) for overnight data collection. Before being set up for polysomnography and going to sleep, participants will hold an audio recorder and stand in front of the camera while saying five vowels in a specific order (/i/ as in "see", /u/ as in "soo", /a/ as in "sahh", /e/ as in "set", /o/ as in "so", /n/, and /m/). Our team has previously shown acoustic features of these vowels can reveal differences in upper airway dimensions in individuals with high risk of sleep apnea compared to healthy participants [9]. To assess the risk of OSA, I will expand our previous work [9], along with other state-of-the-art algorithms. Preprocessing techniques will be applied to eliminate speech noises, such as background noise, and image artifacts, such as motion, blurring, and illumination. Afterwards, facial landmarks will be extracted from the image frames.

Extracted features will be used as the input of classical machine learning models, which will map them to gold standard indices obtained from PSG and other measures.

Significance: The discussed study, the first of its kind, aims to fill a critical gap by investigating the barriers to delivering equitable access to sleep care to PEH, determining the prevalence of sleep apnea using objective assessment, and developing a customized person-centred smartphone application to provide equitable sleep care in shelters. The outcome of this study will provide more insights for policymakers to change the current flow of sleep care in shelters. The results of this study could help improve sleep care for other structurally marginalized populations, such as people with low socioeconomic status or those living in remote areas.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies → Visual content-based indexing and retrieval**; • **General and reference → General conference proceedings**; • **Social and professional topics → User characteristics**; **Medical information policy**.

KEYWORDS

Homelessness, Sleep apnea, Health Equity, Computer Vision, Person-centred approach

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Sealed Knowledges

A Critical Approach to the Usage of LLMs as Search Engines

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ABSTRACT

This research examines the implications of the usage of large language models (LLMs) as search engines on knowledge. Drawing on feminist theories of knowledge, I argue that LLMs used to generate direct answers to search engine inquiries both rely on and reinforce a disembodied and non-situated view of knowledge. This, it is argued, can lead to a "sealing" of non-dominant knowledges. Through this sealing of knowledges, marginalized voices may be heard even less than before. Lastly, drawing on the works of feminist theorists such as Donna Haraway and Sara Ahmed, the research proposes that doubting the outputs of LLMs can function as a feminist intervention that resists the marginalization and sealing of certain knowledges and perspectives through the usage of LLMS as chatbots. This research as part of a wider discourse on the usage of LLMs as search engines is crucial considering the current trend of major search engine providers to integrate LLMs for the production of direct answers into their search engines.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Language models**; • **Search systems**;

KEYWORDS

LLMs, Search models, Knowledge, Feminist Theory

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1 INTRODUCTION

In January 2023, Microsoft announced to integrate a version of the LLM 'ChatGPT' into their search engine Bing [8] [11]. Shortly thereafter, Baidu, the Chinese search engine giant, and Google, the most widely used search engine provider globally, announced their plans to integrate LLMs for the generation of direct responses into their search engines [7] [13]. Using a critical theoretical approach informed by feminist theory, this research focusses on questioning the assumptions about knowledge that underpin proposals to employ LLMs for search. In addition, it will question the impact of using LLMs as search engines on the findability of marginalized, non-dominant knowledges and information. Lastly, the research explores ways to resist the impact of LLM-generated search results on the findability of marginalized and non-dominant knowledges.

2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND EXISTING LITERATURE

The theoretical background of this research lies in feminist theories of knowledge as situated, partial, and embodied. Although various feminist theories have nuanced differences, they mostly agree on a critique of an understanding of knowledge as impartial, neutral and detached from the knower (see for example [6] [9] [10] [15]), In this research, I primarily draw upon Donna Haraway's theory of 'situated knowledges', which states that knowledge is inherently partial and embodied [4]. In line with this, Haraway emphasizes the importance of acknowledging and valuing a "view from a body, always a complex, contradictory, structuring, and structured body, versus the view from above, from nowhere, from simplicity" ([4], p. 589). In my research, I critically compare this understanding of knowledge as situated and partial to the picture of knowledge and information on which proposals to use LLMs as search engines are based. I argue that these proposals (partly already turned reality) presuppose and reinforces a conception of knowledge as disembodied, non-situated or de-situatable.

I will draw on work by Shah and Bender who examined the topic of LLM generated search information [14]. They argue that the implementation of LLMs as a means of retrieving information can have negative implications for several key aspects of search, "including information verification, information literacy, and serendipity" ([14], p. 221). Drawing mainly on their arguments regarding information verification and serendipity in search and turning to literature showing that the datasets used for the training of LLMS are mostly encoding hegemonic views (e.g. [3], p. 615), I will contend that using LLMs to produce search results can silence, obscure and 'seal' marginalized and non-dominant voices. The algorithmic determination of a search output through a text is necessarily even more limited than 'traditional' web search and portrays only a fraction of the possible information on a topic, which diminishes chances to find non-dominant voices by serendipity. This can easily lead to what I, in reference to Mühlhoff's concept of 'sealed surfaces', term a 'sealing' of knowledges [12]. As part of this argumentation, I demarcate and show differences between 'traditional' web search and LLM produced answers to search inquiries

In light of my previous argumentation, my research will conclude with a discussion of possibilities to counter the marginalization and sealing of certain voices and knowledges in LLM generated search results. Drawing on the works of Amoore [2], Ahmed [1]and Haraway [5], I will argue that doubting the outputs of LLMs can

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function as a feminist intervention that resists the marginalization and sealing of certain knowledges and perspectives. Through this, knowledges can be re-situated as embodied and partial, opening up possibilities for 'feminist futures' [1] despite the sealing of knowledges through LLM generated search answers.

3 CONCLUSION AND RELEVANCE OF THE PROPOSED RESEARCH

In summary, my research examines on the usage of LLMs to generate direct answers in search engines with a feminist lens. The concept of 'sealed knowledges' is introduced to highlight the challenge of finding obscured knowledge through LLM-generated search results. As already pointed out in the introduction, this research is crucial given that major search engine providers are currently moving to integrate LLMs for the generation of direct answers into their search engines. The question of the underlying assumptions about knowledge and information on which this development is build and how this development affects marginalized knowledges, offers a novel perspective on the issue. Moreover, this research sheds light a potential approach to critically engage with this new search paradigm.

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Investigating the Relative Strengths of Humans and Machine Learning in Decision-Making

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KEYWORDS

Human-in-the-loop, human-ML collaboration, human-ML complementarity, decision-making, algorithm auditing

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THESIS RESEARCH STATEMENT

In recent years, we have witnessed a rapid growth in the deployment of Machine Learning (ML) models in complex real-world settings. ML models are being used to support decision-making across a wide range of domains, including healthcare [2, 19, 22, 34], credit lending [5, 14], criminal justice [1, 13], and employment [11, 20]. For example, in the criminal justice system, algorithmic recidivism risk scores inform pre-trial bail decisions for defendants [1]. In credit lending, lenders routinely use credit-scoring models to assess the risk of default by applicants [14]. The excitement around modern ML systems facilitating high-stakes decisions is fueled by the promise of these technologies to tap into large datasets, mine relevant statistical patterns within them, and utilize those patterns to make more accurate predictions at a lower cost and without suffering from the same cognitive biases and limitation as human decision-makers. Growing evidence, however, suggests that ML models are vulnerable to various biases [1], instability [8], and opaqueness [4]. These observations have led to calls to preserve human involvement in high-stakes decision-making systems—with the hope of combining and amplifying the respective strengths of human cognition and ML models through carefully designed *hybrid* decision-making systems. Such systems consist of ML models and human experts *jointly* making decisions, and they are common in practice—including in the domains mentioned above.

Researchers have proposed and tested various hybrid human-ML designs which vary, for instance, in the way decision-making power is distributed between humans and machines [6, 10, 16, 30, 31]. However, empirical findings regarding the success and effectiveness of these proposals are mixed [15, and references therein]. Simultaneously, a growing body of theoretical work has attempted to conceptualize and formalize these hybrid designs [3, 9] and study optimal ways of aggregating human and ML judgments within them [7, 12, 16–18, 21, 33, 35]. The existing theories, however, are hard to navigate and make sense of as a whole. The critical issue leading to this lack of coherence and organization is the wide range of (often implicit) idiosyncratic assumptions made in different research articles—making it challenging to compare existing proposals and foresee the conditions under which one would outperform another in practice. Even within the same theoretical framework, the empirical results are inconclusive and sensitive to the context, human expertise, and other situated factors [15].

A crucial component in effective HML partnerships is an understanding of the strengths and limitations of humans versus ML-based decision-making on particular tasks. While research in the behavioral sciences provides insights into potential opportunities for ML models to complement human cognitive abilities and vice versa, further research is needed to (1) understand the implications of these findings in specific real-world human decision-making tasks, and to then (2) operationalize such insights to foster effective HML partnerships. Thus, in the first part of my thesis, I work towards developing theoretical and experimental tools to derive meaningful insights from human behaviour data in real-world settings. Next, I describe my on-going and proposed work towards understanding human-ML complementarity.

Part I: Theoretical and experimental approaches to understanding human decision-making

In the first part of my doctoral research work, I conduct both theoretical and empirical research to glean insights from human data. I develop statistical methods and design experiments to isolate and identify different statistical patterns in human judgment. For instance, I have developed models and designed experiments to analyse and quantify the role of: (a) cognitive biases such as anchoring bias in human+ML decision-making, (b) implicit biases in human decision-making in conference peer-review. I provide more details about each project below.

In Rastogi et al. [23], we design a two-sample test for detecting statistically significant difference in two populations' preferences expressed as pairwise comparisons. For instance, when eliciting data from people, there is a long-standing debate over the difference between two methods of data collection: asking people to compare pairs of items or asking people to provide numeric scores to the items. Using our two-sample test on real-world preference data, we find statistically significant difference in these two data elicitation methods. This suggests that people tend to be internally inconsistent when making comparative decisions. We also provide theoretical guarantees for our proposed showing that it is minimax optimal under no modeling assumptions.

Next, I focused on experimental approaches to understanding human decision-making behaviors in different settings. The bulk of

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the technical work comprises (1) designing experiments to carefully elicit or collect decision-making data, and (2) applying techniques from statistics and causal inference to isolate significant patterns in human decision-making behavior. I work with the conference peer-review setting, wherein academics (reviewers) come together in a structured manner to decide whether a submitted manuscript is acceptable to be published. Rastogi et al. [27] considers the debate in double-anonymous conferences over whether authors should be allowed to post their papers online on arXiv or elsewhere during the review process. By surveying reviewers, this work helps inform authors' choices of posting preprints online and conferences' choices over policies, by quantitatively measuring the associated risks and benefits. Continuing, Stelmakh et al. [32] investigates the implicit role of citations in the review process by asking the question—"Does the citation of a reviewer's work in a submission *cause* the reviewer to be positively biased towards the submission, that is, *cause* a shift in reviewer's evaluation that goes beyond the genuine change in the submission's scientific merit?". Next, Rastogi et al. [26] focuses on authors' perception of their submitted papers in a machine learning conference, NeurIPS 2021. We surveyed the authors on three questions: (i) their predicted probability of acceptance for each of their papers, (ii) their perceived ranking of their own papers based on scientific contribution, and (iii) the change in their perception about their own papers after seeing the reviews, and compared their responses with their co-authors' responses and the outcomes of the peer-review process. The study revealed major inconsistencies in the perceptions of authors, their co-authors, and the review process.

Finally, Rastogi et al. [28] focuses on ML-assisted decision-making by humans, wherein a human decision-maker is shown the ML prediction before making a final decision. Here we focus on the role of human cognitive biases in human-ML collaboration by modeling cognitive biases in this setting. Further, we conduct a human subject experiment to examine over-reliance of human decision-makers on ML models via anchoring bias, and our proposed time-based methods to mitigate its negative impact on the human-ML team performance. This concludes the first part of the thesis work.

Part II: Towards understanding and supporting human-ML complementarity

The second part of this thesis focuses on developing an understanding of human-ML complementarity in two classes of tasks: (1) generative, co-creative tasks, and (2) predictive decision-making tasks. Correspondingly, in [25] we study the domain-specific combination of humans and ML in auditing ML models, and in [24] we describe on-going and proposed work on developing domain-general and domain-specific theories of human-ML complementarity in predictive decision-making.

Supporting human-AI collaboration in auditing LLMs with LLMs. [25] provides an auditing tool wherein humans collaborate with generative LLMs to find failures in language models. This setting presents a domain-specific opportunity for leveraging complementary strengths of humans and generative models towards the main goal of finding test cases on which a given language model fails. Prior work on collaborative auditing, such as AdaTest [29], while promising, relies heavily on human ingenuity to bootstrap the process, and then quickly becomes system-driven, not making full use of the complementary strengths of humans and LLMs. Consequently, we synthesize literature from HCI and sensemaking to design for supporting auditors in making the best use of the augmented tool, AdaTest++. To evaluate AdaTest++ we conduct user studies with participants auditing two commercial large language models. Qualitative analysis shows that AdaTest++ effectively leverages human strengths such as schematization, hypothesis formation and testing. Further, with our tool, participants identified a variety of failures modes, covering 26 different topics over 2 tasks, that have been shown before in formal audits and also those previously under-reported.

Unifying taxonomy and framework for human-AI collaboration in predictive decision-making. In [24] we propose a unifying taxonomy and framework for combining human experts and ML in predictive decision-making. There are a wide variety of domains where ML is deployed for predictive decision-making, such as healthcare, credit lending, criminal justice, hiring, etc. However, existing theoretical and empirical results on the factors that facilitate and hinder effective HML partnerships in these domains are often mutually incompatible and mixed respectively. Thus, we propose a taxonomy characterizing a wide range of criteria across which human and ML-based decision-making differ. Then we formalize this taxonomy, by taking a computational perspective of human decision-making, by proposing a framework for aggregating human and ML decisions optimally.

In my proposed work, I am planning to continue working on better understanding sources of complementarity in human and ML decision-making in complex real world settings, by building-upon and refining the taxonomy and the framework. For this, I will conduct a range of synthetic and semi-synthetic simulations to derive insights about optimal combination of human and ML decisions. Next, I will focus on a specific visual diagnostic task where past research has shown evidence of HML complementarity. In this project, we will design experiments to collect qualitative and quantitative feedback from human decision-makers, and contrast their approach with that of ML. This will allow us to draw insights about the "why" and "how" of human-ML complementary performance in the task domain. Moreover, this investigation will inform design of HML systems that successfully leverage complementary strengths of the two agents.

In conclusion, this work is aimed at generating actionable insights for improving the quality of decision-making at scale, with human decision-makers and their combination with machine learning models.

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Exploring the Moral Value of Explainable Artificial Intelligence Through Public Service Postal Banks

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ABSTRACT

This research examines *Explainable AI* (XAI) from a duty-based perspective in the context of public service postal banks. I argue that XAI is a strict obligation for these banks whenever they implement advanced AI-recommendation systems which flows from the Kantian principle to respect humanity that is integral to their public service identity.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies** → *Philosophical/theoretical foundations of artificial intelligence*; • **Social and professional topics** → *Codes of ethics.*

KEYWORDS

Explainability, Explainable AI, Ethics, Deontology, Public Service Banks

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1 INTRODUCTION

There is broad consensus that *Explainable artificial intelligence* (XAI) can lead to more trustworthy AI, which is becoming increasingly opaque, by providing explanations of AI-powered recommendations. Current literature, however, examines XAI from a broad moral perspective—that explainability is a right that ought to be universally provided to stakeholders [e.g., 9, 15, 24]. A right to explanations may certainly be valid and worthwhile [e.g., 26], yet it does not capture the complete ethical picture of XAI. We must also consider it in terms of obligations, as according to Simone Weil, "The notion of obligation comes before that of rights, which is subordinate and relative to the former. A right is not effectual by itself, but only in relation to the obligation to which it corresponds." [27, p. 2]. Onora O'Neill echoes this concern by stressing that, "we cannot tell who violates a right to goods or services unless obligations have been allocated." [21, p. 428]. If we not not ascertain who specifically shoulders the obligation to meet these rights, the rights remain abstract and lack enforcement potential [21]. Responding to this gap in the literature, this paper examines XAI by considering its implementation through the perspective of duties. Given the significant interest of implementing advanced AI-powered decision-support systems (DSS) in the financial sector, this paper looks at the case of public service postal banks (PSPBs)[1], which have a moral threshold that goes beyond that of commercial banks, using the example of France's *La Banque Postale* (LBP) to illustrate.

2 PSPB NORMATIVITY

In Section 2 I consider one of the key identifying characteristics of PSPBs, which includes the likes of BancoPosta (Italy), Banco Postal (Brazil) and KiwiBank (New Zealand), that is financial inclusion. That is, they not only provide accessible banking services, but pay particular attention to serving the *unbanked* and *underbanked* to assist them toward greater financial autonomy [2, 4, 8, 20]. I lay out the regulations and socially-driven actions driven by this feature, using LBP as the case study, such as their obligation to open a bank account (*Livret A*), for free, to any member of the public. Every member of the public must be seen as a *client-in-waiting*—an individual is no more or less deserving than another to receive banking services. While all banks certainly share basic duties, such as facilitating transactions and supporting the economy, commercial banks primarily treat individuals through an instrumental lens, considering profit and liability, whereas PSPBs act under the notion that every member of the public has an intrinsic worth and by the same token, reject indifference by paying particular attention to those in vulnerable circumstances. Translated into philosophical terms, PSPBs adhere to the Kantian principle of respecting every individual as *ends-in-themselves* [see, 11]. If PSPBs acted contrary to this principle they would be acting irrationally by violating their identity *qua* PSPB.

Adhering to this principle entails the duty to act in a trustworthy way [19]. Trustworthiness obliges open, intelligible, and assessable communication of the motivating reasons for decisions affecting individuals. If they lack such knowledge underlying decisions, they cannot genuinely participate and consent to them and thus, effectively serve as mere means for the decision-maker.

3 AI IN BANKING

In Section 3 I turn to the both imminent and reasonable implementation of advanced AI (i.e. machine learning models) to assist in a variety of financial decision-making and surveillance, such as

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[1] I am specifying public service as despite most postal banks having a public service mandate, there are some that have retained the 'postal' name after restructuring as a private retail bank, such as Germany's Deutsche Postbank.

generating more precise financial portfolios and loans [16, 25] and improving the tracking of illicit funds under anti-money laundering and the countering of financial terrorism (AML-CFT) efforts [7]. Yet the characteristic 'black-box' opacity of machine learning impedes on our ability to know how a system arrived at its recommendation, thus leaving stakeholders *epistemically impaired* [5]; PSPBs would thus be left unable to fulfill their public service duty.

4 XAI

While machine learning is *prima facie* detrimental to PSPBs' normativity, in Section 4 I propose XAI as an extended obligation for PSPBs in the context of AI to maintain their moral integrity. XAI, more specifically feature-importance or attribution-based explanations such as LIME and SHAP, are reason-giving tools that provide the motivating reasons—reasons that an agent, or *implicit agent*[2], takes to favour their actions. While these tools technically only approximate said reasons, they are sufficient for understanding, analyzing, and justifying the behaviour of systems and thus, it is argued that what they provide in terms of explanations is akin to providing a reason explanation [5, 28]. In the context of PSPBs, implementing XAI is therefore not merely preferential, but an obligation in virtue of their public-financial inclusionary status.

5 AML-CFT

In Section 5 I address how AML-CFT efforts—a significant activity for any bank—interacts with this public service duty. A principle of confidentiality is enforced throughout AML-CFT investigations, as if they were transparent criminals would be able to adapt their methods to evade future suspicion [17], this raises the question if PSPBs must put their moral integrity on hold in the context of AML-CFT and if so, XAI would no longer carry moral significance in this context. I respond to this situation with a non-ideal understanding to moral duties, as supported by Christine Korsgaard [14]. I argue that AML-CFT fits within this non-ideal environment and therefore does not only allow for, but demands exceptional action like maintaining confidentiality. PSPBs ought to exceptionally accept confidential behaviour and in doing so, importantly, they would not be neglecting their public service duty.

Nevertheless, it is prudent for PSPBs to recognize that many of those affected by AML-CFT investigations are not malicious actors and that they should aim to maintain trustworthy communication with the public. I suggest that in this context PSPBs should implement alternative methods to sustain public trust, such as a trusted proxy as we see with the French data protection authority (CNIL) or the Australian Banking Association [3, 22]. These advocates would require XAI to ensure they can fully engage with the bank's decision to investigate customers, accounts, and transactions flagged by AI. While the public cannot expect to receive the same information of the proxy, the trusted proxy can ensure that the PSPBs moral duty to be trustworthy is fulfilled, albeit indirectly, in this non-ideal environment.

This also falls in line with the understanding that the public is owed explanations because of their recognized final value, not because of any particular capacities they may have. The public's right to have explanations made available to them is not contingent on how they interact with such explanations.

As Watson notes, a baby is owed their correct blood sugar test results from the physician despite their inability to understand the test results. The baby's right is not denied due to their lack of cognitive abilities. A proxy, commonly a parent or guardian, is instead brought in to enforce the baby's right on their behalf [26]. Similarly, the public lacks the capacity to exercise their right to an explanation in the context of AML-CFT. They do not then lose their right in this context, but are owed *epistemic proxies*[3] to act on their behalf.

6 OBJECTIONS

In Section 6 I conclude by addressing concerns charged against XAI implementation, such as its accuracy and robustness [1] and whether explanations provide *all* the relevant motivating reasons [23]. There are also concerns that interacting with XAI explanations may increase users' cognitive biases [10, 12, 13]. The concern thus goes that if it is PSPBs duty to recognize and support every individual's end-setting nature, or autonomous agency, yet XAI encourages unconscious behaviour, would this not be an argument to limit XAI? This research, however, generally only considers user susceptibility—those who directly interact with XAI to help their decision-making—and not the effects on other stakeholders whose interaction with XAI stops at perceiving reasons and then deciding if they are good reasons. In any case, a recent systematic review shows us that some uses of XAI, including feature importance, may in fact *mitigate* cognitive biases [6]. Concerns for XAI implementation therefore argue for continued development and research on its effects on stakeholders, yet do not impede on its value in regard to PSPBs as an intelligible and assessable reason-giving mechanism.

7 CONCLUSION

In sum, this research responds to a gap in the literature by grounding XAI within a duties framework in the context of the public service banking. I therefore do not provide a universal response on how we may ground XAI in moral obligations. This does not, however, necessarily exempt private sector banking from a duty to implement XAI; it is certainly possible they have their own moral duties leading them to its implementation. From this position, future work will consider how explanations ought to be provided and any potential limitations, including legal, as well as technological and social contexts that may need to be considered. Attention will also have to be paid to the possible benefit that other XAI tools, such as 'minimal change' counterfactuals, may have for these contexts.

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[2] When AI performs tasks like human agents, but lack the capacity to reason through ethical situations nor have the metaphysical features attributable to full agency, see [18].

[3] I borrow this term from Watson [26]

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AI-driven Automation as a Pre-condition for *Eudaimonia*

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ABSTRACT

The debate surrounding the 'future of work' is saturated with alarmist warnings about the loss of work as an intrinsically valuable activity. Instead, the present doctoral research approaches this debate from the perspective of human flourishing (*eudaimonia*). It articulates a neo-Aristotelian interpretation according to which the prospect of mass AI-driven automation, far from being a threat, is rather desirable insofar as it facilitates humans' flourishing and, subsequently, their engagement in leisure. Drawing on virtue jurisprudence, this research further explores what this desirability may imply for the current legal order.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies** → Artificial intelligence; • **Social and professional topics** → Computing / technology policy.

KEYWORDS

AI ethics, Future of work, Virtue jurisprudence, Automation, Flourishing

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1 INTRODUCTION

Recent advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and robotics have rekindled fears of a workless future, with emotionally charged media narratives suggesting that AI systems and/or robots are coming to '*steal*', '*kill*' or '*destroy*' our jobs [4, 5]. The automation of work, understood as the process by which human labour is replaced by machines, is also a cause for scholarly concern across different disciplines. For some scholars, the large-scale deployment of AI in the workplace amounts to a '*Fourth Industrial Revolution*' or a '*Second Machine Age*', threatening to render human work—nay, humankind in its entirety—obsolete [3, 6]. Even despite the potential introduction of a Universal Basic Income (UBI), which could in principle guarantee citizens' livelihood, it is argued that policymakers would still need to safeguard work, since it bears intrinsic value that transcends the instrumental value of a paycheck [8]. AI-driven automation is, hence, largely framed as a threat to be counteracted by law.

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Nonetheless, the axiological superiority of work as an intrinsically valuable activity and the insistence on its preservation, even if humans' sustenance could be otherwise secured, should not be taken for granted. Conversely, I argue that the prospect of automating human work through AI is, under certain conditions, desirable. To do so, I draw upon Aristotle's insights on flourishing and leisure, as these can be inferred from his *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics* [2]. Current normative approaches to AI-driven automation are predominantly consequentialist—assessing, for instance, its projected effects on cost-cutting in production or efficiency in service provision. Instead, I demonstrate that an approach rooted in the Aristotelian tradition could be fruitfully applied to evaluate this distinctly modern issue.

2 RESEARCH APPROACH

This research comprises three consecutive phases. In the **first phase** (descriptive), I have sought to define 'work'. Without clarifying work's meaning, we cannot fully understand what it is that we risk missing in the event of mass technological unemployment. Moreover, variations in the conceptualisation and evaluation of work imply corresponding variations in the perceived need as well as the measures suggested for its preservation. Therefore, with the aim of informing the normative aspects of my research, I have attempted a conceptual and axiological analysis of 'work', answering the following questions, i.e., '*what is work?*' and '*what is the value of work?*'. I have, subsequently, explored how work has been affected by technological progress over the years. Although technology has increasingly automated human tasks in the workplace over the past three centuries, most contemporary approaches to AI-driven automation focus on extrapolating to the future at the expense of the past. Ahistorical approaches, however, risk wrongfully presenting the fear of mass technological unemployment as completely novel. This is why, based on the relevant literature in computer science, engineering, the social sciences and (economic) history, I have expounded on the Industrial Revolution(s), particularly the '*Fourth Industrial Revolution*' and its distinct characteristics. Finally, I have rendered explicit the key arguments regarding the feasibility and desirability of AI-driven automation, demonstrating how they differ from the Aristotelian approach adopted in the thesis.

In the **second phase** (interpretative and theory-building), I have interpreted relevant passages from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*, relying on the original works alongside their secondary literature. This interpretation, in turn, has followed three steps. First, I have elucidated how Aristotle conceptualises leisure (*scholê*) and occupation (*ascholia*). His concept of leisure differs from rest, play, and entertainment, as each of these subserves one's ability for further occupation. By contrast, for Aristotle, it is occupation that should be serving leisure, not the reverse. Second, I have examined the ultimate human good in Aristotle's ethics, namely flourishing (*eudaimonia*). By explicating his conception of human flourishing as

an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue/excellence (*aretê*), I have shown that leisure is indispensable to both virtue acquisition and the implied activity of the soul. However, actualising the human potential for leisure requires intentional political arrangements, which I have explored in the third step. Granting that, for Aristotle, the objective of statecraft is citizens' collective flourishing and that leisure is conducive to said flourishing, the cultivation of leisure emerges as a direct aim of politics, a shared end in which all citizens should have the realistic opportunity—although not the obligation—to partake.

In the **third and ongoing phase** (expository and normative) of my research, I flesh out the implications of this Aristotelian account of flourishing for the current legal order and, most crucially, for the debate surrounding the 'future of work'. Briefly stated, I ask: how would AI-driven automation be regulated if the *telos* (i.e., ultimate purpose or end) of law was citizens' flourishing? In responding to this question, I resort to 'virtue jurisprudence', a recently developed strand of normative legal theory that attributes primacy to the concepts of virtue/excellence and flourishing [1, 7]. Adopting a virtue-jurisprudential approach to AI-driven automation entails that—insofar as automation may generate conditions favourable to a leisure-centred polity—legislators should not only tolerate but actively incentivise AI development and adoption. Rather than seeking to preserve work by any means necessary, it is citizens' leisure that the law should be tasked with enhancing.

The remainder of the research illustrates how the law could discharge this task through its multifaceted function in society. It suggests a neo-Aristotelian interpretation, which is committed to the general structure of Aristotle's theory without necessarily subscribing to each of his doctrines. In so doing, it addresses potential objections that the suggested approach: (i) intrudes into citizens' private realm and opposes liberalism; (ii) violates state neutrality and is susceptible to abuse; (iii) hinders citizens' autonomy and freedom of choice; and (iv) is futile owing to its utopianism. The research concludes with recommendations for scholars, policymakers, AI developers, and educators.

3 CONCLUSION

In this way, Aristotelian ethical and political theories may enrich and expand the scope of law, making space for less conventional, even utopian for some, considerations of virtue, leisure, and flourishing. At the same time, the development of legal approaches such as virtue jurisprudence may provide concrete contexts for refining Aristotle's theories themselves and applying them to new cases of practical relevance, such as the case of AI-driven automation. Overall, this neo-Aristotelian approach not only accommodates pluralism, autonomy and freedom of choice but further leads us to ask what the optimal conditions for flourishing—and thereby for leisure—are, conditions that legislators should seek to enable in the age of automation. This is currently an under-theorised question in the 'future of work' debate. Answering it with the help of virtue jurisprudence could yield alternative, less deterministic or dystopian, options for the pressing policy vacuum on automation and proffer novel insights into what AI promises to liberate us from and towards.

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Multi Value Alignment: four steps for aligning ML/AI development choices with multiple values

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Given the widespread use of Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence (ML/AI) systems, deploying systems that are not aligned continues to cause a lot of harm. In practice, the goal of alignment is best thought of as alignment to values, an approach that is also common to other applied ethics sub-fields [1, 2]. This has the potential to limit alignment with malicious intent and can also allow us to account for nuances of social and political structures. Documents that provide guidelines on the governing principles of AI ethics agree on common overarching values one should seek to align to, but these may vary by the specific problem being tackled; it is also possible for different communities to interpret the same value in different ways [3]. Moreover, there may be apparent or inevitable trade-offs between the values one seeks alignment to.



Figure 1: Outline of the suggested four-step process

In ongoing work with Anna Lewis and Nick Jones, we outline a four-step process (Fig. 1) that synthesises best-practice from AI ethics and bioethics to help developers identify and make decisions to create ML/AI systems that align with multiple values. When dealing with multiple values, it is frequently assumed that there is an inevitable trade-off, but this often turns out to be an apparent trade-off that seems inevitable because only a small part of the solution space has been explored. The suggested process places an emphasis on reasoning to seek new solutions that help us identify and resolve these apparent trade-offs. We also survey existing ML/AI development methods that could be used at various steps of the proposed process to encode values within a development stage. This work aims to discuss what it means to build value-aligned ML/AI systems, and hence provides development teams with practical guidance to maximise the chances that their work has desirable impacts.

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"Way too good and way beyond comfort"

The trade-off between user perception of benefits and comfort in media personalisation

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CCS CONCEPTS

• **Human-centered computing** → **User studies**.

KEYWORDS

recommender systems, personalised media, user agency, user-centred design, ethical personalisation

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1 INTRODUCTION

News media is the cornerstone of a functioning democratic society, with journalists responsible for informing citizens on matters of public interest based on traditional 'news values' such as proximity, timeliness, impact, and relevance, which have changed little despite a radical shift in forms of news consumption in contemporary society. [7] Their selection of what is worthy of public attention has historically made them the gatekeepers of society, an idea that has been contested for the majority of the 21st century as the arrival of the internet allowed anyone to publish with only minimal gatekeeping. [14] Furthermore, the proliferation of personalisation in media, resulted in editors being no longer solely responsible for curation. However, we as users of personalisation systems are fallible and subject to common forms of manipulation such as disinformation, misleading forms of advertising, propaganda, deep fakes, astroturfing, and attention hacking such as clickbait. [8, 9] Equally, we tend to focus on content that reinforces our pre-existing beliefs, creating a negative feed-back loop with algorithmically enhanced recommender systems that could from a purely technical standpoint lead to "filter bubble" effects. [1, 4, 5]

Whereas the majority of providers might rely solely upon traditional consumption statistics to gauge the success of personalisation, public service media, such as the BBC, are guided by a broader set of normative values such as public good, accountability, inclusivity, and universality. [2] Understanding success in these contexts requires a more nuanced understanding of user-perceived benefits, harms, and comfort levels arising from personalisation. This is particularly true as past research shows that moral tensions exist. Users feel a trade-off between benefits of personalisation and their own data disclosure impacting their privacy [17], or report perceived creepiness resulting from overly accurate recommendations [15]. Other research has explored users' understanding of the operation of such systems [10, 11], and how it links to subsequent attitudes to systems [6]. It is well- reported that engaging with systems that rely heavily on our personal data can result in a behaviour-intention rift, as users trade suboptimal data sharing for immediacy and ease, conflicting with reported preferences. However, to date there is no research that has surfaced users' internal trade-offs, between comfort and perceived benefit, when engaging with algorithmically enhanced personalised media and media recommendation systems.

This pilot study aims to bridge this gap by seeking to understand user perception of the personal and wider social benefits and harms and their felt comfort when engaging with personalised media systems.

2 METHODS

In order to understand user perceptions of media personalisation and comfort levels, a series of quantitative and contextual qualitative investigations was conducted among a total of 211 users in the UK aged 16-34. To recreate a more representative population, subjects were recruited through university mailing lists and through the paid recruitment service Prolific to target students and non-academics. This was to ensure the sample was not dominated by those with higher education backgrounds but is representative based on the 2021 UK census data on education levels. [12]

This study consists of a wider scale online survey with 106 participants, comprised of quantitative methods of inquiry but also open text input prompts which necessitated a thematic analysis approach. This was followed by ten semi-structured interviews to contextualise the results. Building on the qualitative findings from the online survey's text inputs and from the interviews, a second online survey was conducted with 105 participants to better understand the trade-off between benefit and comfort levels that are felt by users engaging with personalised media.

In the first online survey the focus was on perceived benefits and harms of personalisation. Forms of inquiry included open text inputs, multiple-choice, and Likert Scales to identify which personal and wider social benefits and harms the participants commonly associated with media personalisation. The follow-up interviews used the same questionnaire, with the purpose to allow for more contextualised answers, given the format of inquiry. The second online survey's purpose was to quantify sentiments surrounding

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commonly mentioned items related to personalisation by rating perceived benefits or harms and comforts or discomforts on 1-10 scales. By quantifying these sentiments, in the analysis the correlation between benefit and comfort was identified.

For the qualitative data, a thematic analysis approach was applied. To avoid subjective biases, which could influence how results are being interpreted, an independent double-blind review was conducted by two coders. Further, a codebook was devised independently by analysing three interviews each, identifying the relevant codes and collating them into wider overarching themes. [3]

3 RESULT AND DISCUSSION

A commonly expressed sentiment in both the online survey and the interviews was the tension felt between perceived benefit and comfort level regarding different features of personalisation. This tension – or trade-off is better understood through the quantification of the second online survey, which allowed to plot a diagram to showcase the relationship between perceived benefit or harm and comfort level of certain aspects or consequences of personalisation (Figure 1).

The quantitative results show a trend towards a positive correlation between comfort level and perceived benefit, as most items are in the quadrants 2 (intersection of benefit and high comfort) and 3 (intersection of harm and low comfort). To compare against the thematic analysis of the qualitative data collected in this study, it is noteworthy that this clear-cut relationship becomes blurry when put into context (Figure 2). Some items were perceived as rather beneficial regardless of the low comfort level they elicited, such as the processing of past user behaviour, as participants understood it as adding value to their experience even if they did not like the thought of it. Having full agency over a system was attributed to lacking added value during the interviews, since automated personalisation was overall considered beneficial. This means that an interpretation of the qualitative data allows for some items of the diagram to migrate to quadrants 1 and 4, however here it is also worth noting that the only discrepancies between the two diagrams affect the positioning along the y-axis, meaning that while the level of perceived benefit or harm was subject to change based on context, the comfort level was not.

Here the question arises in which quadrant(s) the different items should ideally accumulate, and which items should not be associated with a well-designed personalised system. Given that interviewed participants often mentioned their willingness to accept personalisation when presented an added value, a migration towards the top half of the y-axis could already be considered favourable, regardless of the comfort-level, as this was mostly a secondary thought.

4 FUTURE WORK

Given a general acceptance of media personalisation, it can be concluded that it is imperative to emphasise user-centred and participatory design in media personalisation development.

This research is formative, with the aim of directly supporting a follow-up study investigating the balance of user agency, transparency, editorial and algorithmic curation and intervention in AI-driven personalised news. The final goal is to develop user-centric design ideas for personalised news and media content.



Figure 1: Items related to personalisation on benefit/comfort diagram (quantitative data)



Figure 2: Items related to personalisation on benefit/comfort diagram (contextual qualitative data)

For this follow-up study the interactive system NAIRS was built which serves as a provotype (provocative design artefact) to elicit participants' sentiments surrounding their own agency and self-assessment compared to their trust in the system's personalisation [16] and provoke reflection about the transparency required to exercise agency in a personalised recommender system [13]. Its provocation also serves as a starting point for discussions on algorithmic and editorial intervention with the overarching goal of learning more about the balance of these entities with user agency.

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Towards formalizing and assessing AI fairness

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CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies** → **Artificial intelligence**; **Machine learning**.

KEYWORDS

AI Fairness, AI Assessment, AI Risk, Trustworthy AI

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1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION

AI is increasingly penetrating numerous areas of our lives. As AI is taking over sensitive tasks such as credit scoring, claims processing, and support of medical diagnoses, there is a rising demand for AI applications to be »trustworthy«. Given a set of key trustworthiness requirements that recur among numerous AI ethics principles and guidelines [7], [5], [6], organizations and researchers are showing a huge interest in implementing and assessing them for various reasons [10]. In addition to preventing societal harm and protecting the health, safety, and fundamental rights of individuals [2], [6], the assessment of AI trustworthiness characteristics can help improve AI systems and inform business decisions. Moreover, companies need assessment procedures to demonstrate the trustworthiness of their AI products or services to their customers, as well as to prove conformity of their systems with (upcoming) regulatory requirements [2]. Overall, there is a demand for market-ready AI assessments.

Although there is a need for implementing and assessing trustworthiness characteristics in AI applications, the operationalization of »trustworthy AI« is still largely open [5], [8]. Notably, the requirements associated with relevant quality dimensions are not technically concise. Often, their subject is unclear (i.e., procedures for specifying the test object in an AI application are missing), and their scope is not well-defined (i.e., under which circumstances and for which application areas requirements should apply). One additional challenge is that the evaluation of trustworthiness characteristics and risks typically depends on the specific use case. Regarding the implementation of trustworthy AI, it is also not clearly defined which entity should address the requirements (e.g., on a technical or organizational level), and guidance is missing for how they should be transferred into practice [13]. While it is apparent that the entire lifecycle needs to be considered to ensure trustworthy AI, including how an AI system is handled by the organizations involved along the complex value chain, little has been written about the tangible implementation of ethical goals and values [5].

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2 CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTION

As »trustworthy AI« is a broad field that comprises several requirements to be operationalized, my thesis research focuses specifically on »AI fairness«. The goal of my research is to develop a method or procedure that:

(1) clarifies what needs to be done, from a technical perspective, to implement the abstract requirement of »fairness« in practice for a specific AI application,
(2) shows how to arrive at a market-ready »AI fairness« statement/assessment based on technical indicators and evidence.

Thus, the method or procedure I am aiming for will address the operationalization gap between:

(1) the large number of existing technical bias and fairness measures (e.g., metrics, toolkits, and measures to counteract biases and in data and model outputs)
(2) making the statement that »fairness« is achieved for a specific AI application (as one of the AI trustworthiness requirements).

3 ACCOMPLISHED WORK

At the beginning of my PhD, I studied various AI ethics and trustworthiness guidelines, including the HLEG Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI [6] which I consider especially relevant from a European perspective. In [12], I summarize the motivation for trustworthy AI and a set of trustworthiness dimensions that are consistently mentioned in these guidelines (i.e., fairness, reliability, safety & security, transparency, data protection, autonomy & control). While this set focuses on those requirements and risks which can be addressed by technical means in the AI system itself, it is noteworthy that various guidelines also refer to the way the organization (e.g., provider or operator) handles its AI applications (e.g., post-market monitoring [2], »AI Ethics Review Board« [6]). Therefore, in [12], I highlight two perspectives on »trustworthy AI« and argue that an interplay of both is necessary in order to achieve and assure »trustworthy AI« in practice: the product and organizational perspectives. I describe the essence of these perspectives as follows: i) high technical quality of AI systems is required, ii) the organization should make appropriate preparations (e.g., establish structures, processes and roles) to handle its AI applications and their development in a trustworthy manner. For each perspective, I

present implementation and assessment approaches based on previous work. For the product perspective, I refer to the AI Assessment Catalog [11] that I co-authored. For the organizational perspective, I provide an introduction to the general concept of management systems and outline how they can support organizations in the trustworthiness assurance of their AI applications. Overall, I see that operationalization of the organizational perspective is further advanced. It can be expected that best practices at the process-level are gradually emerging and audit and certification schemes for an AI Management System are developed and applied in a similar fashion as for other domains (e.g., IT security) [9]. From the product perspective, however, there are technical challenges (e.g., finding suitable quality indicators, data coverage, verification of ML models). In addition, when we consider the numerous tools and metrics currently available, there is an apparent gap between the results of these tools and metrics, and deeming a risk sufficiently mitigated or controlled (corresponding to my "central research question"). In the following, I further elaborate on my accomplished and current work with respect to each perspective and, in the last paragraph, outline my future PhD research.

The AI Assessment Catalog presents a guideline for the structured identification of AI-specific risks from a product perspective. In particular, it provides state-of-the-art guidance on formulating trustworthiness criteria and documenting technical and organizational risk mitigation measures along the lifecycle of an AI application in a structured manner. In my view, the document has two main contributions: a risk-based approach (because assessment criteria often depend on the specific use case) and an underlying risk scheme (that distinguishes the trustworthiness dimension into risk areas, each of which bundles malfunctions or undesirable system properties that can be addressed by similar risk mitigation approaches). This risk scheme enables a structured procedure despite the various risk types associated with »trustworthy AI«, since risks that need to consider different aspects of the system or require different measures and tests are assigned to distinct risk areas, which are first assessed separately. I have applied the AI Assessment Catalog to several AI systems from industry clients as part of one of the first AI assessments in Germany. In addition, the assessment approach presented in the Catalog was used as basis for the development of the CertAI Trustworthy AI Seal [1]. While the AI Assessment Catalog is one of the most advanced guidelines for AI trustworthiness assessment, these industrial projects have given me the opportunity to identify potential for further operationalization. For example, there is potential to standardize the expert judgement used in the assessments, and to develop more concise guidance based on the choice of testing tools and measures used in the assessments. Given this background, one research method I am using in my PhD is the case study approach. I aim to address my central research question by deriving findings from the solution approaches developed in these specific examples (see the last paragraph). In the context of my thesis, [3] represents a first step towards building an example base of case studies. Clearly, the assessment of »AI fairness« is not solely a technically motivated question, and thus, the interdisciplinary perspective of this paper (showing how ethics and management science define and argue »fairness«) is essential in informing the choice of a concrete fairness metric as one indicator for the assessment of a credit scoring application. Additionally, for the same use case I am currently examining the role of data quality requirements in ensuring fairness in a concrete ML model. Based on this work, I am preparing a publication together with law research partners on the technical and legal evaluation of the data quality requirements proposed in the draft AI Act.

Implementing trustworthiness characteristics as well as their assessment to an AI system in practice, clearly involves the provider or operator in charge (and in parts the assessment body, if this is a 3rd party): they need, for example, to set up processes and resources for risk analysis, make decisions on risk acceptance, and trade-offs between conflicting requirements, define roles to be accountable for these decisions, plan and implement risk treatment measures. To better understand how a corresponding organizational superstructure could be set up to orchestrate and implement the various tasks that trustworthy AI entails, I have studied management systems and risk management approaches. In particular, I have co-authored a comparative analysis [9] (commissioned by Microsoft) of the (minimum) requirements described in the working draft international standard for AI Management Systems (»AIMS draft«, ISO/IEC WD 42001), the draft AI Act [2] (which requires, among other things, that providers of »high-risk« AI systems have a quality management system, risk management system, and post-market monitoring in place), the Assessment List for Trustworthy AI [6], and the AIC4 Catalog [4]. We find that the AIMS draft provides a valid and suitable framework for organizations to support trustworthy AI development and use given the AI-specific trustworthiness requirements, still, it naturally does not achieve the level of detail (regarding requirements and guidance) that would be needed for a product-level certification, as outlined in the last chapter of the study [9]. To determine the additional guidance currently available that can inform the product-level choice of AI risk assessment criteria and treatment measures (e.g., as part of organizational risk identification, analysis and evaluation), I have recently studied relevant international frameworks for AI risk assessment and management. I am currently preparing a publication of this comparative study, particularly focusing on the underlying risk notion and the approach to risk aggregation and evaluation of these frameworks. For example, I found that quantitative modeling of risk is barely used and that the few frameworks which do so appear to oversimplify AI risks. Thus, a distinction should be made between horizontal frameworks that attempt to be valid for all kinds of AI applications (the current frameworks proposed by governments and those which are subject to standardization, for example, mostly fall into this category) and sector or use case-specific standards which could, complementarily, define weights and priorities of trustworthiness dimensions and concretize requirements for specific AI applications.

In addition to the publications I am currently preparing, I plan to conduct further case studies with real-world AI applications in my PhD. Currently, there are few empirical research contributions on how to implement »fairness« assessment in practice, although bottom-up case studies are a promising approach to substantiate the development of sector- or case specific assessment procedures and standards [8]. I will use case studies as an example base to identify common aspects (e.g., if specific technical bias indicators or evidence, criteria, or an argumentation scheme for AI fairness were commonly used and can be abstracted). To this end, I plan

to analyze which aspects of the technical procedure in the case studies actually depend on the specific use case, and to what extent the technical means and argumentative approach used (e.g., in the expert judgement on risk acceptance) can be generalized to a class of similar use cases while retaining concrete/tangible requirements. Based on the findings and using my results from the comparative studies mentioned, I plan to develop a method to address the operationalization gap described above (see central research question).

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How and to which extent will the provisions of the Digital Services Act of the European Union impact on the relationship between users and platforms as information providers?

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ABSTRACT

In the contemporary information age, recommender systems (RSs) play a crucial role in determining the way in which people interact and obtain information online: in fact, from social media feeds to news aggregators and e-commerce websites, users are constantly targeted by personalized recommendations about what they may like. The Digital Services Act (DSA) of the European Union[1] [3], which is the first supranational regulation addressing automated recommendations specifically, defines a RS as "a fully or partially automated system used by an online platform to suggest in its online interface specific information to recipients of the service or prioritize that information, including as a result of a search initiated by the recipient of the service or otherwise determining the relative order or prominence of information displayed" (DSA, art. 3 (s)). This definition highlights the method ("fully or partially automated"), aim ("to suggest"), content ("specific information"), target ("recipients of the service"), input ("as a result of a search initiated by the recipient") and output ("determining the relative order or prominence of information displayed") of a recommendation process. As it can be observed, RSs are involved in the main aspects of online interactions, and this is why their influencing potential should not be underestimated. In fact, whilst RSs are aimed to improve user's experience by reducing the information overload, they can give rise to a variety of ethical concerns related to privacy, autonomy and fairness [5], to name but a few. However, independent research and users' access to the design and functioning of the RSs implemented on mainstream platforms is usually prevented by their proprietary status.

The DSA addresses this issue with a specific article, according to which "Providers of online platforms that use recommender systems shall set out in their terms and conditions, in plain and intelligible language, the main parameters used in their recommender systems, as well as any options for the recipients of the service to modify or influence those main parameters" (DSA, art.27 (1)). The aim of this provision is to "explain why certain information is suggested to the recipient of the service": therefore, the parameters need to include, at least, "the criteria which are most significant in determining the information suggested to the recipient of the service" (i.e., content) and the reasons for its "relative importance" (i.e., ranking) (DSA, art. 27 (2)). Additionally, when options to modify or influence the main parameters are stated in the terms and conditions, "providers of online platforms shall also make available a functionality that allows the recipient of the service to select and to modify at any time their preferred option" (DSA, art. 27 (3)). In order to make this requirement work in practice, "That functionality shall be directly and easily accessible from the specific section of the online platform's online interface where the information is being prioritised" (ibidem).

Article 27 of the DSA seems to be aimed at empowering users to influence the outcome of algorithmic recommendations. Therefore, this provision addresses four of the aspects of the definition of RS provided by Article 3: method, target, input and output. In particular, the traditionally passive role of the target could be reversed, as the recipient might determine the method (through the choice of parameters) and, indirectly, also the input (the type of data to be processed through the parameters) that the RS will use to produce its output. However, platforms are not obliged to be provide options for users to modify or influence the parameters if this possibility is not specified in the terms and conditions, and platforms arguably have no interest in providing this possibility voluntarily. Therefore, this article formally grants users the right to influence the recommendation process but only in some limited cases which are not likely to happen, as [4] point out. Moreover, the practical impact of these provisions will probably depend on users' ability to understand the structure and the policy of the algorithmic recommendations.

It should be noted that Recital 70 of the DSA outlines a wider scope for the provisions on RSs than what is included in Article 27: indeed, the statement that "online platforms should consistently ensure that recipients of their service are appropriately informed about how recommender systems impact the way information is displayed, and can influence how information is presented to them"[2] (DSA, recital 70) does not seem to be reflected in the actual provisions of Article 27, at least to the extent that the adverb "consistently" would entail. From this perspective, the right to explanation that could be identified in the "easily comprehensible manner" through which platforms "should clearly present the main parameters [...] to ensure that the recipients understand how information

[1] REGULATION (EU) 2022/2065 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act).

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[2] The right to information outlined here is mirrored by Article 13-15 of the GDPR.

is prioritised for them" (DSA, recital 70) might not lead to a real users' empowerment.

However, given the consequences that this recently enforced regulation can have both on the business of online platforms and on the self-determination of users, my research aims at understanding how and to which extent the DSA provisions will impact on the relationship between users and platforms as information providers, especially for what concerns their status as prominent stakeholders in the recommendation process [6] To help enforce the new requirements, the European Commission has recently established the European Centre for Algorithmic Transparency (ECAT), which will assess "whether very large online platforms and search engines comply with their obligations under the Digital Services Act", including by carrying out inspections at the platforms' premises to analyse "the design, functioning and impact of advanced algorithms, like recommender systems, in their production environments" [1]. Taking the opportunities provided by the implementation of the DSA, my research will involve three main stages. Firstly, a preliminary scoping phase will involve examining the connection between the aim of the regulatory requirements presented above and the ethical issues around RSs and digital nudging identified in my past research. Secondly, I will analyse the documents that would become available as a result of public inspections, audits and assessments of RSs, and compare the findings of such review with the impact of other regulations on RSs, like the Internet Information Service Algorithmic Recommendation Management Provisions of the People's Republic of China [2]. This comparative perspective may help account for the new constraints and changes concerning the implementation of RSs across the world. Thirdly, I will develop a survey-based user study to understand whether and how the availability of explanations and the opportunity to modify RSs provided by the DSA impact on the way in which users interact with online platforms. This project has a timespan of two to three years, depending on the timeliness of the release of documents that digital companies and public officials will make available and accessible by researchers. The expected result of this research is an initial map of the ethical and societal implications of the enforcement of the DSA on the transparency of proprietary RSs and the subsequent application of fundamental rights for users' autonomy and self-determination.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Social and professional topics** → *Computing / technology policy.*

KEYWORDS

AI Regulation, Recommender Systems, Digital Services Act

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Towards a Holistic Approach: Understanding Sociodemographic Biases in NLP Models using an Interdisciplinary Lens

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ABSTRACT

The rapid growth in the usage and applications of Natural Language Processing (NLP) in various sociotechnical solutions has highlighted the need for a comprehensive understanding of bias and its impact on society. While research on bias in NLP has expanded, several challenges persist that require attention. These include the limited focus on sociodemographic biases beyond race and gender, the narrow scope of analysis predominantly centered on models, and the technocentric implementation approaches.

This paper addresses these challenges and advocates for a more interdisciplinary approach to understanding bias in NLP. The work is structured into three facets, each exploring a specific aspect of bias in NLP. The **first facet** focuses on identifying sociodemographic bias in various NLP architectures, emphasizing the importance of considering both the models themselves and human computation to comprehensively understand and identify bias. In the **second facet**, we delve into the significance of establishing a shared vocabulary across different fields and disciplines involved in NLP. By highlighting the potential bias stemming from a lack of shared understanding, this facet emphasizes the need for interdisciplinary collaboration to bridge the gap and foster a more inclusive and accurate analysis of bias. Finally, the **third facet** investigates the development of a holistic solution by integrating frameworks from social science disciplines. This approach recognizes the complexity of bias in NLP and advocates for an interdisciplinary framework that goes beyond purely technical considerations, involving social and ethical perspectives to address bias effectively.

The **first facet** includes the following of my published works [6–9] to provide results into how the importance of understanding the presence of bias in various minority group that has not been in focus in the prior works of bias in NLP. The work also shows the need to create a method that considers both human and AI indicators of bias, showcasing the importance of the first facet of my research. In my study [9], I delve into sentiment analysis and toxicity detection models to identify explicit bias against race, gender, and people with disabilities (PWDs). Through statistical exploration of conversations on social media platforms such as Twitter and Reddit, I gain insights into how disability bias permeates real-world social settings. To quantify explicit sociodemographic bias in sentiment analysis and toxicity analysis models, I create the Bias Identification Test in Sentiment (BITS) corpus[1]. Applying BITS, I uncover significant biases in popular AIaaS sentiment analysis tools, including TextBlob, VADER, and Google Cloud Natural Language API, as well as toxicity analysis models like Toxic-BERT. Remarkably, all of these models exhibit statistically significant explicit bias against disability, underscoring the need for comprehensive understanding and mitigation of biases affecting such groups. The work also demonstrates the utility of BITS as a model-independent method of identifying bias by focusing on social groups instead.

Expanding on this, my next work [8] delves into the realm of *implicit bias* in NLP models. While some models may not overtly exhibit bias, they can unintentionally perpetuate harmful stereotypes [4]. To measure and identify implicit bias in commonly used embedding and large language models, I propose a methodology to measure social biases in various NLP architectures. Focusing on people with disabilities (PWD) as a group with complex social dynamics, I analyze various word embedding-based and transformer-based LLMs, revealing significant biases against PWDs in all tested models. These findings expose how models trained on extensive corpora tend to favor ableist language, underscoring the urgency of detecting and addressing implicit bias. The above two works look at both the implicit and explicit nature of bias in NLP, showcasing the need to distinguish the efforts placed in understanding them. The results also demonstrate the utility of identifying such biases as it provides context to the black-box nature of such public models.

As the field of NLP evolved from embedding-based models to large language models, the way these models are constructed underwent significant changes [5]. However, the concern arises from the fact that these models often reflect a *populist* viewpoint [1] that perpetuates majority-held ideas rather than objective truths. This difference in perception can lead to biases perpetuated by the majority's worldview. To explore this aspect, I investigate how LLMs represent nationality and their impact on societal stereotypes [6]. By examining LLM-generated stories for various nationalities, I establish a correlation between sentiment and the population of internet users in a country. The study reveals the unintentional implicit and explicit nationality biases exhibited by GPT-2, with nations having lower internet representation and economic status generating negative sentiment stories and employing a greater number of negative adjectives. Additionally, I explore potential debiasing methods such as adversarial triggering and prompt engineering, demonstrating their efficacy in mitigating stereotype propagation through LLM models.

While prior work predominantly relies on automatic indicators like sentiment scores or vector distances to identify bias [3], the next

[1] https://github.com/PranavNV/BITS

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phase of my research emphasizes the importance of understanding biases through the lens of human readers [7], bringing to light the need for a human lens in understanding bias through human-aided indicators and mixed-method identification. By incorporating concepts of social computation, using human evaluation, we gain a better understanding of biases' potential societal impact within the context of language models. To achieve this, I conduct open-ended interviews and employ qualitative coding and thematic analysis to comprehend the implications of biases on human readers. The findings demonstrate that biased NLP models tend to replicate and amplify existing societal biases, posing potential harm when utilized in sociotechnical settings. The qualitative analysis from the interviews provides valuable insights into readers' experiences when encountering biased articles, highlighting the capacity to shift a reader's perception of a country. These findings emphasize the critical role of public perception in shaping AI's impact on society and the need to correct biases in AI systems.

The **second facet** of my research aims to bridge the disparity between AI research and society. This disparity has resulted in a lack of shared understanding between these domains, leading to potential biases and harm toward specific groups. Employing an interdisciplinary approach that combines social informatics, philosophy, and AI, I will investigate the similarities and disparities in the concepts utilized by machine learning models. Existing research [2] highlights the insufficient interdisciplinary effort and motivation in comprehending social aspects of NLP. To commence this exploration, I will delve into the shared taxonomy of *sentiment* and *fairness* in natural language processing, sociology, and humanities. This research will first delve into the interdisciplinary nature of sentiment and its application in sentiment analysis models. Sentiment analysis, a popular machine learning application for text classification based on sentiment, opinion, and subjectivity, holds significant influence as a sociotechnical system that impacts both social and technical actors within a network. Nevertheless, the definition and connotation of sentiment vary vastly across different research fields, potentially leading to misconceptions regarding the utility of such systems. To address this issue, this study will examine how diverse fields, including psychology, sociology, and technology, define the concept of sentiment. By unraveling the divergent perspectives on sentiment within different fields, the paper will uncover discrepancies and varying applications of this interdisciplinary concept. Additionally, the research will survey commonly utilized sentiment analysis models, aiming to comprehend their standardized definitions and associated issues. Ultimately, the study will pose critical questions that should be considered during the development of social models to mitigate potential biases and harm stemming from an insufficiently defined comprehension of fundamental social concepts. Similar efforts will be dedicated to comprehending the disparity in bias and fairness as an interdisciplinary concept, shedding light on the imperative for inclusive research to cultivate superior AI models as sociotechnical solutions.

The **third facet** of my study embarks upon an exploration of the intricate interplay between human and AI actors, employing the formidable theoretical lens of actor-network theory (ANT). Through the presentation of a robust framework, this facet aims to engender the formation of efficacious development networks that foster collaboration among developers, practitioners, and other essential stakeholders. Such inclusive networks serve as crucibles for the cultivation of holistic solutions that transcend the discriminatory trappings afflicting specific populations. A tangible outcome of this endeavor entails the creation of an all-encompassing bias analysis platform, poised to guide the discernment and amelioration of an array of sociodemographic biases manifesting within any machine-learning system. By catalyzing the development of socially aware and less pernicious technology, this research makes a substantial contribution to the realms of NLP and AI.

The significance of this proposed research reverberates beyond the confines of NLP, resonating throughout the broader domain of AI, wherein analogous challenges about social biases loom large. Leveraging the proposed framework, developers, practitioners, and policymakers are empowered to forge practical solutions that embody inclusivity and reliability, especially when used as a service (AIaaS). Moreover, the platform serves as a centralized locus for the identification and rectification of social biases, irrespective of the underlying model or architecture. By furnishing a cogent narrative that underscores the imperative for a comprehensive and interdisciplinary approach, my work strives to propel the ongoing endeavors to comprehend and mitigate biases within the realm of NLP. With its potential to augment the equity, inclusivity, and societal ramifications of NLP technologies, the proposed framework catapults the field towards responsible and ethical practices.

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Evaluation of targeted dataset collection on racial equity in face recognition

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CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies** → Neural networks; **Biometrics**; **Object recognition**; **Matching**; • **Social and professional topics** → **Race and ethnicity**; • **Information systems** → *Data mining*.

KEYWORDS

Algorithmic audit, data collection, face recognition, racial bias in computer vision

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1 BACKGROUND

In the last decade, extensive research studies have demonstrated the prevalence of demographic biases in machine learning systems, due to a lack of representation in training datasets [10]. Most notably, in the domain of face analysis, standard face datasets include very few images of individuals with darker skin tones, and researchers have determined that commercial gender classification models have much higher error rates for women with darker skin tones [3]. However, facial recognition continues to be used widely: from identity verification in mobile devices to public surveillance in certain countries, many people interact with these systems in their day-to-day lives [8]. While some argue for the complete removal of facial recognition techologies [2], the use of these technologies may not disappear. As such, opponents of face recognition along with the developers of these systems may both benefit from a careful analysis of how the demographic makeup of training datasets may impact a model's performance on various demographic groups.

In order to remedy past data representation bias, researchers have developed several new benchmark face recognition datasets that are balanced along demographic attributes such as gender or race [13, 15]. However, these balanced datasets do not completely solve model bias as accuracy disparities still persist [16]. For example, the optimal allocation of training data by race or gender is not always the equally-balanced allocation: Gwilliam et al. [6] find that a balanced training set (with equal number of samples per racial group) obtains a higher accuracy variance across groups but the same overall accuracy compared to another training data allocation.

Additionally, curating new datasets requires time and resources, and can intrude upon the subpopulation being studied [11]. It is also incredibly time-consuming to train models on all possible allocations of racial groups in order to find some "optimal" allocation. Rather than searching for the best subgroup allocation for a training set of a fixed size, companies may prefer a greedy solution — a solution in which new data is added in an add-only manner.

2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Hence, we focus on the following goal: to examine *additional data collection* and its impacts on the performance of various demographic groups.

Consider the following scenario: an entity (e.g., a company or a group of researchers) trains a face recognition model using some initial training dataset which lacks data from some racial group. Upon evaluation on held-out test data or due to an external bias audit, the company realizes their performance lags on that group, and now wishes to collect more data from the omitted group. They have the budget to collect only a fixed number of samples and have limited resources to train additional models (and, perhaps, can only train one other model). This process closely follows several corporations' past responses detailed in Raji and Buolamwini [12] and allows us to pose these research questions:

(1) How does additional data from the underrepresented group change the test performance for that particular group, as well as the test performance for other groups?
(2) How does data collection targeted towards improving the group with the lowest initial performance impact that group's test performance and overall group differences, in comparison to introducing data from other racial groups?
(3) Are our results consistent across racial groups, datasets, and models?

3 CURRENT WORK

To answer these questions, we developed an empirical framework to evaluate the performance impact of data augmentation by demographic subgroup. For our framework and analyses, we focused on *one-to-one facial recognition*: given two images of faces, a one-to-one facial recognition system is designed to determine whether or not those two images are of the same person. We implemented this framework for three racially-annotated datasets (BFW [13], BUPT [14, 15], and VMER [5]) and three state-of-the-art face recognition models (SE ResNet [4], CenterLoss [17], and SphereFace [9]). We summarize the main empirical findings below:

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(1) The introduction of samples from some racial group X improves the performance for every racial group that we tested. (Different datasets use different terms. Using the terms in the source datasets, e.g., for BUPT [14, 15], we considered images labeled as African, Asian, Caucasian, or Indian.)
(2) The addition of data from the lowest-performing group improves that group's performance the most and closes performance gaps across racial groups, in comparison to the addition of data from other groups. This empirically validates the theoretical finding in Abernethy et al. [1] that additively sampling from the worst-off group converges to a min-max fairness solution.
(3) Increasing data from the highest-performing group X widens performance disparities, regardless of whether the initial training dataset contained images from group X, a specific counter to the notion that more data and more representation reduces discrimination.
(4) The above findings are *consistent* across all datasets and models we examined, while some findings are *different* across different datasets and models.

That some findings are *different* across different datasets and models — i.e., that some of our findings are *not* generalizable from the analysis of only a single dataset — speaks to the criticality of analyzing the full pairing of datasets and models. For example, based on our findings, we encourage future works that introduces new datasets to re-apply our methodology (and others) as benchmarks to evaluate those datasets with known face recognition models.

4 FUTURE WORK

The results from our current work motivate several interesting explorations that we plan to pursue further.

4.1 Theoretical direction

In our experiments, we found that in some cases introducing a group markedly improved performance across all groups. We hope to better understand under what conditions adding from particular groups will generalize across various other demographic groups. We plan to use statistical learning theory techniques in order to model group distributions and formalize how neural networks learn the input-label relationship for the subspace from a particular group. This would allow us to also extend from face recognition to other machine learning tasks.

4.2 Subsampling and reweighting methods

In addition, we plan to design and run additional experiments in order to compare how additional data collection performs to other pre-processing techniques such as subsampling and reweighting. In the field of machine learning robustness, Idrissi et al. [7] show that subsampling and reweighting across groups obtains state-of-art accuracy; we plan to investigate this finding in relation to group fairness domains such as racial bias in face recognition.

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Individual and Group-level considerations of Actionable Recourse

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ABSTRACT

The advent of machine learning in several critical fields, such as banking, healthcare, and criminal justice, has inspired research into improving robustness, trustworthiness, and transparency in the models. *Actionable Recourse* is one such tool that enables the negatively impacted users to receive a favorable outcome by providing recommendations of cost-efficient changes to their features. Current recourse methodologies optimize for proximity, sparsity, validity, and distance-based costs. Actionability takes both individual and group-level signals. A critical component of actionability is the consideration of *User Preference* to guide the recourse generation process. These preferences can take several forms, and we introduce three such preferences to capture the individual difficulty of user actions. Additionally, feasibility and plausibility should be considered as a fixed set of pre-specified constraints. We argue that plausibility draws strong signals from group-level population information, which must be considered to achieve low-cost recourses across protected groups. Recoursability is an active research area, and plausibility becomes an essential direction for further research.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Theory of computation → Actionable Recourse**; • **Computing methodologies** → *Knowledge representation and reasoning*; • **Human-centered computing → Human computer interaction (HCI)**.

KEYWORDS

actionable recourse, user preference, plausbility

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1 INTRODUCTION

Actionable Recourse (AR) [9] refers to a list of actions an individual can take to obtain a desired outcome from a fixed Machine Learning (ML) model. Several domains such as lending [8], insurance [7], and hiring decisions [1] are required to suggest recourses to ensure the trust of a decision system; in such scenarios, it is critical to ensure the actionability (the viability of taking a suggested action) of recourse.

Consider an individual named Alice who applies for a loan, and a bank, which uses an ML-based classifier, denies it. Naturally, Alice asks - *what action must she take to obtain the loan in the future?* Several methods exist to identify counterfactual explanations, such as FACE [6], which uses the shortest path to identify counterfactual explanations from high-density regions, and Growing Spheres (GS) [2] which employs random sampling within increasing hyperspheres for finding counterfactuals. Similarly, manifold-based CCHVAE [5] generates high-density counterfactuals using a latent space model.

However, there is often no guarantee that the *what-if* scenarios identified by these methods are attainable. Alice's personal constraints may also limit her ability to act on certain suggested recourses (such as a strong reluctance to secure a co-applicant). Existing research focuses on providing feasible recourses, yet comprehensive literature on understanding and incorporating user preferences within the recourse generation mechanism still needs to be developed. It is worth mentioning that instead of understanding user preferences, Mothilal et al. [4] provides a user with diverse recourse options and hopes that the user will benefit from at least one.

This research focuses on improving the societal impacts of actionable recourse by strategically capturing preferential signals at the individual and group levels. These signals are crucial for both the overall benefit of an individual as well as improving the trustworthiness and transparency of (opaque) machine learning models.

2 CAPTURING INDIVIDUAL USER PREFERENCES

Localized constraints, which we call *User Preferences*, are synonymous to user-level constraints introduced as *local feasibility* by Mahajan et al. [3]. Figure 1 illustrates the motivation behind personalized recourses. Here two similar individuals, Alice and Bob, can have contrasting preferences leading to varying recourse space. Hence, identifying a recourse by optimizing over the universal cost function may not give us equalized actionability. A hypothetical example of idiosyncrasies in individually preferred recourses is shown in Table 1.

We propose to capture Alice's three types of user preferences, namely: i) *Scoring continuous features*, ii) *Ranking categorical features*, and iii) *Bounding feature values*, and embed them into an optimization function for guiding the recourse generation mechanism. Such a transparent mechanism also builds trust in decision-making by enabling adversely affected individuals to maneuver the recourse generation process. With our experiments on real-world

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

Figure 1: Similar individuals Alice and Bob, with contrasting preferences, can have different regions of desired recourse space.



Figure 2: Demonstration of distributional differences at group level, which leads to contrasting actionability for standard low-cost recourses.

Features	Preferred recourse	
	Alice	Bob
LoanDuration	8	17
LoanAmount	$1840	$1200
HasGuarantor	0	1
HasCoapplicant	1	0

Table 1: A hypothetical actionable feature set of adversely affected individuals sharing similar features and corresponding suggested actions.

datasets, we show that our proposed recourse methodology adheres to user preferences. We provide theoretical and experimental evaluations of our strategy and compare the results against state-of-the-art methodologies. This work motivates further research on how truthful reporting of preferences can help improve overall user satisfaction.

3 ENSURING EQUALIZED GROUP-LEVEL PLAUSIBILITY

Traditional *equalized group recourse costs* fails under particular distributional idiosyncrasies. Figure 2 illustrates a motivating toy scenario of distributional differences. Low variance bi-modal distributions of the approved and denied sub-populations of the group A_1 are distinguished from the high variance uni-modal distribution of group A_0. The average cost of recourse for the disadvantaged group (A_1) is similar to the advantaged group (A_0), but the recourse suggested to (A_1) are far from the positively classified manifold. For instance, consider that Alice is a single mom who was also adversely affected by the bank's decision. Observing her approved counterparts, Alice may ask, "*What actions can I take to be part of the approved sub-group of people with my socioeconomic background?*" The recourse by the bank suggests increasing her working hours from 32 per week to 40 per week. Considering that she belongs to the sub-population of *denied single parent*, the recourse may not be actionable, as she may not have the flexibility of increasing her working hours per week. She is more likely to consider taking a second *remote job* instead. Hence, it becomes essential that the recourse suggested to her must identify specific, actionable steps in agreement with the *approved single parent* sub-population for improved feasibility.

We quantify *plausibility* of recourse with respect to the approved sub-population of the individual's group and leverage to improve upon the plausibility of a counterfactual. Our work aims to identify domain-dependent critical blind spots in existing fairness metrics for algorithmic recourse, particularly the plausibility of recourse suggestions across protected groups. Our preliminary experiments show the existence of *plausibility bias* across protected groups such as *gender* and *race*. We provide a constrained optimization-based solution to maximize the plausibility of the suggested recourse, while our *plausibility score* metric can also be leveraged to train models with *equalized group level recourse plausibility*.

4 FUTURE WORK

Existing systems use a universal distance metric to capture the difficulty of acting upon the suggested recourse. Our research motivates further work into techniques for capturing true recourse cost at an individual level. Further, fairness is not limited to equalized cost across groups due to the highly personalized nature of the cost of actions, and we encourage further work in this direction. We argue that models developed by considering the proposed perspectives will have significantly improved effects on the overall upliftment of society.

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The Mechanical Psychologist: Leveraging AI for Detecting Predatory Behaviour in Online Interactions

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CCS CONCEPTS

• **Applied computing** → **Psychology**; *Document searching*.

KEYWORDS

Automated Behaviour Coding; Computational Social Science; Natural Language Processing; Machine Learning; Online Grooming

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1 INTRODUCTION

Social science fields such as psychology traditionally rely on manual, qualitative coding for behavioural observations [4]. This process involves manual, laborious, time-consuming, and error-prone efforts, presenting a significant challenge to the scalability of social scientific research in fast-paced settings [1].

The integration of Natural Language Processing (NLP) and Machine Learning (ML) in the social sciences offers an opportunity to overcome these limitations. This thesis applies these techniques to automatically detect predatory behaviour in online interactions, a growing concern with societal implications. The specific questions I ask throughout this work are as follows:

(1) How can computational techniques be used to overcome the limitations of expert labelling?
(2) Do machines perform comparably with humans?
(3) Can an automated solution explore theories of social behaviour at scale?

In the remainder of this extended abstract, I outline the work covered in my doctoral studies. Section 2 examines the domain problem. Section 3 describes the computational methods used, and Section 4 presents the main findings. Section 5 describes the thesis contributions, and Section 6 outlines this work's ethical and societal implications. Finally, Section 7 reports future work in this area.

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2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

In the digital era, online safety has emerged as a significant concern [7]. Unfortunately, the proliferation of online communication platforms has increased opportunities for predatory behaviour. Law enforcement agencies take the responsibility of monitoring these platforms to detect potential threats and safeguard vulnerable individuals. However, conventional methods often involve manually monitoring suspected individuals[1]. This process is both time-consuming and cognitively demanding.

A common approach in the manual monitoring of online chats for potentially predatory behaviour has involved detecting key phrases, such as sexually explicit language [11]. While dictionary-based approaches such as this can identify certain instances of inappropriate behaviour, it also captures many false positives [9] - individuals who may use sexually explicit language but are not engaged in predatory grooming. More concerning is that keywords can miss subtle techniques from predators who adopt a phased approach, initially building trust and establishing rapport with potential victims without relying on sexually-explicit talk [13].

A more nuanced understanding of the psychology of the grooming process is required for effective detection of predatory behaviour. Theories developed and validated by forensic psychologists are fundamental in this regard. Behaviours such as establishing rapport, creating an illusion of control, normalising an inappropriate relationship, and personal risk management by the offender align more closely with predatory behaviour patterns [6]. However, the challenge lies in identifying these psychological behaviours at scale, as they require expert training to detect and are often hard to define [2]. Even among experts, the presence of these behaviours in a particular interaction can be subject to considerable debate.

Automated qualitative coding can offer a scalable alternative to conventional manual annotation performed by domain experts. A language model suitably trained on expert annotations could detect similar behaviours within a massive unlabelled corpus, allowing for more efficient and expansive monitoring of online interactions.

However, this approach has its own set of challenges. Acquiring expert annotated data for training a language model is non-trivial [5]. Furthermore, the inherent subjectivity of expert-generated labels presents challenges for establishing objective ground truth [8], notably when working with hard-to-define behaviours that require a holistic or 'Gestalt' felt sense to identify. The inherent ambiguity and disagreement among annotators present a considerable challenge when training deep learning models [12].

Thus, while automated qualitative coding presents a promising direction for enhancing online safety, its practical implementation requires careful consideration of the complexities and nuances

[1]From a discussion with the head of a UK-based online child safety organisation.



Figure 1: Precision (L) and Recall (R) of each label when trained using the full training set. Values on X-axis refers to (i) Challenge, (ii) Communication Coordination, (iii) Control, (iv) Use of Emotion, (v) Encouragement, (vi) Mitigation, (vii) Negotiation, (viii) Rapport, (ix) Risk Management, (x) Sexual Topics, (xi) Testing Boundaries. Green bars exceeded the baseline (a cross-validated Random Forest per label).

inherent in identifying predatory behaviour. This thesis, therefore, explores aspects that lend themselves well to automation and those tasks that require continued human intervention. The overarching view emphasises Human-AI collaboration to embrace the efficiency enabled by computation without sacrificing human oversight.

3 RESEARCH METHODS

The research comprised within the thesis is based on an analysis of 1.3 million chat messages obtained from the online repository Perverted Justice[2], featuring interactions between convicted offenders and decoys posing as underage victims. Two forensic psychology experts annotated approximately 7000 messages with eleven distinct behaviour labels. Using a version of `RoBERTa` [10] fine-tuned for Natural Language Inference (NLI) on the annotated data, classification performance was assessed for each of the eleven behaviour labels on a holdout-set. Different task variations included zero-shot and few-shot conditions. In a later analysis to improve model performance, the thesis included a human-in-the-loop approach based on weak supervision [3].

4 RESULTS

A central finding of this study was that a suitably trained model exceeded the baseline recall for most labels. However, only a third of these labels exceeded the baseline precision. Figure 1 illustrates performance of each label when trained on the full training set. F1 performance did increase for all labels in few-shot compared with zero-shot settings. Evidence indicates performance of $F1 > .5$ is possible with as few as fifty annotations for some labels.

Collaborative Human-AI was then used to improve precision. This step allowed a human annotator to reject a positive classification made by the model. The results of this step indicated near-perfect precision for all behaviours, although recall remained poor for some rare labels. In addition to this finding, the proposed Human-AI collaboration increased annotation efficiency compared to wholly manual methods by a factor of fifteen.

5 CONTRIBUTIONS

The thesis offers several contributions to the topic of automated behaviour coding in the context of online safety:

- I demonstrate the efficacy of an automated approach in identifying predatory behaviours online, advancing the field of automated behaviour coding.
- The approach combines computational techniques with psychological theories, offering a new way of studying social behaviours at scale, thus contributing to computational social science.
- By identifying predatory behaviours more efficiently, the research contributes to online safety efforts, particularly in protecting minors from online predation.
- The work showcases an effective model of Human-AI collaboration, where AI's efficiency is combined with human expertise to improve social behaviour detection.

6 ETHICAL AND SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS

The thesis has several ethical and societal implications:

- The approach highlights the utility of synthesising the social and computational sciences to tackle real-world issues.
- The findings underscore the need for transparency in AI, particularly for detecting complex social behaviours.
- By proposing a model of Human-AI collaboration, the research stresses the importance of human oversight in AI applications, which is crucial for ensuring ethical AI use.

7 FUTURE WORK

There is considerable potential for future work in this area. Refinement and clarity of the behaviour labels is one such improvement that is currently underway. Additionally, improvements to the NLI set-up, such as more relevant hypothesis statements, or use of prompt engineering, might provide better context for the language model. Modern language models such as GPT-4 are also worth exploring. Furthermore, the inclusion of non-predatory chats into the corpus would also enable an evaluation of how well these methods can separate predatory from everyday dialogue.

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